PALE Written Report Compilation

P A L E W r i t t e n R e p o r t s |1
Problem Areas
in Legal Ethics
Written Report
Compilation
Atty. Emman Rey Dapaing
Code of Professional Responsibility

Group 1: Canons 3 8
Cagatin
Cepe
Gako
Sumiog
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED
AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
It is not unethical for a lawyer to make known his legal services. However, he must do so only by using true,
honest, fair dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
He must not resort to false and misleading information; and even if such information is true, the manner of
making it known must not be undignified and demeaning to the legal profession.
The practice of law is not a trade like the sale of commodities to the general public where the usual
exaggerations in trade, when the other party had the opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves
fraudulent (Art. 1340, NCC).
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Self-praises or false claims on qualifications or quality of legal services are unethical. Thus, a lawyer should not
pretend to a prospective client just to get the latters trust and confidence that he is a seasoned trial lawyer
when in truth he is not or had not even prosecuted or defended a case yet in his lifetime.
Any false pretense by a lawyer intended to defraud, mislead and deceive or to tout on his qualifications or
quality of hiss legal service is unethicalwhether done by him personally or trough another with his permission.
As what the Supreme Court has decided in the case of In Re: Tagorda (53 Phil. 37), the use off a card by a lawyer
containing self-laudatory statements about his ability is condemned.
In Re: LUIS B. TAGORDA (G.R. No. L-32329 March 23, 1929)
FACTS: In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he campaigned that
he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of
sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; that he is willing to
serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that even though
he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the
same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits
etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is

unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement
for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all other like self-laudation,
defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagordas liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he was
unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of
law for a month.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use
of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that
said partner is deceased.
A group of lawyers who desires to establish a partnership may adopt a firm name. However no false name or
misleading or assumed name shall be used in such name. No name not belonging to any of the partners or
associates may be used in the firm name for any purpose.
If a partner died, the name of the deceased may still be used, provided that there is an indication that that said
partner is already dead.
The use of a cross after the name of the deceased partner is sufficient indication. It is advisable though that the
year of the death be also indicated.
This rule, in effect is an abandonment of the Ruling in Sycip case.
Name of a partner in law firm should be dropped if appointed as judge; other positions.
Main law office and branch office do not constitute two law firms (Ouano Arrastre Services, Inc. Vs Aleonar 202
SCRA 619)
o Said firm has a main office in Makati and a branch office in Cebu City. Both operates under one and the
same name. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm, said firm should not be
allowed to pretend that its main branch and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms,
with separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.
Death of a partner does not extinguish the client-lawyer relationship with the law firm. (B.R. Sebastian
Enterprises Inc vs. CA 206 SCRA 28)
o The responsibility of the other member/s of the firm to the petitioner as counsel remained until
withdrawn in the manner provided by the Rules of Court.
Negligence of a member in the law firm is negligence of the firm (Antonio vs. CA 153 SCRA 592).
o The Petitioners herein believed that they were deprived of their day in court when the respondent
Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration. Such motion was filed beyond the
reglementary period; alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated to the United
States without at least informing them that a decision was rendered against them.
In this case, Mr. Obligar, representing himself as the messenger of Atty Funelas (former counsel),
received a copy of the decision on January 6, 1987. This decision became final and executory on January
22, 1987. Thus, the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not
be acted upon on the merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was
properly denied.
The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable. Clear
and as it can be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record is the law office of
Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the documents in his
capacity as the representative of the said law firm.
It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and represented itself as such, with at least two
named partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was earlier
dissolved, concrete evidence must be presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be dropped
from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Reason for the rule is:

1. To prevent the law firm or partners from making use of the name of the public official to attract legal
business; and
2. To avoid suspicion of undue influence (report of IBP Committee, p. 16)
Officers not allowed to practice law are, among others:
1. Judge;
2. President of PH;
3. Members of Constitutional Convention;
4. Members of congress;
5. Members of cabinet;
6. Members of Judicial and Bar Council;
7. Governors;
8. Mayors;
9. Prosecutors;
10. Solicitors; and
11. Others specially disqualified by law or regulations.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation
of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
A lawyer who seeks publicity to attract legal business is debasing the legal profession, especially so, if he pays
something of value for it.
Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments or
procuring his photograph in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged and all other
self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of the profession.
BEST ADVERTISEMENT FOR A LAWYER the establishment of well-maintained reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust (Director of Religious Affairs VS. Bayot, 74 Phil. 579).
o FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage
licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that
legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked
for the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because
of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the
ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR
SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Through collective efforts, lawyers can contribute to the enhancement of the system by:
1. Presenting position papers or resolutions for the introduction of pertinent bills in Congress;
2. Petitions with the Supreme Court for the amendment of the Rules of Court or introduction of New Rules;
and
3. Petitions with the IBP and other forums which have any relevant influence to the system.
Experienced legal practitioners and professors of law may write legal publications or books as an avenue of
improving the legal system.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE
PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives:
1. Elevate the standards of the legal profession;
2. Improve the administration of justice; and
3. To enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
In order to keep themselves abreast of legal developments, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements
of the law and jurisprudence.
He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals.
The lawyers life is one continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and related
disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness.
Judges by the nature of their functions, must keep abreast with the laws, rulings, and decisions of the Supreme
Court
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports
of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals. (De Roy vs. CA, 157 SCRA 757)
o FACTS: De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house
of Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually,
De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a
copy of the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for
reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the
Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.
HELD: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
In decreeing the integration of the Philippine Bar, the Supreme Court has given renewed significance to the
obligation to:
1. Encourage and foster legal education;
2. Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education; and
3. Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal service, and on the true functions of the Filipino lawyer.
To keep the lawyers, specially practicing lawyers, abreast with the law and jurisprudence, continuing legal
education should be made mandatory by the Supreme Court.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
TASKS.
The Canons and Rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on June 21, 1988 are not intended
for the private practitioners alone.
They shall govern the acts off all lawyers including those in the service of thee Government like the Solicitors of
the OSG.
A lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon is assuming public office. However, lawyers who are
incumbent judges and magistrates shall be governed in the performance of their official functions by the Code
of Judicial Conduct which became effective on October 20, 1989.
All public officials and employeesjudges, prosecutors, solicitors and other lawyers in the government service
are equally governed by the Coded of Conduct and Ethical Standards Under R.A. 6713.
Lawyers in the government service are also prohibited to engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official functions.
The prohibition will continue for one year after their separation from the public office.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
A prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer and as such, he should seek equal and impartial justice.
The interest of a prosecutor in a criminal prosecution is not to win a case but to see that justice is done. Such as
by seeing to it that the accused is given a fair and impartial trial and not deprived of any of his statutory or
constitutional rights.
It is reprehensible for a prosecutorwhether private or publicto suppress facts capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused or to conceal witnesses who can equally establish the accuseds innocence of the
crime charged.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Government lawyers do not shed their professional obligations in assuming public positions.
Under Section 4, RA 6713, public officials are required to uphold the public interest over and above personal
interest; must discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill.
If a lawyer in concurrently allowed to engage in the practice of law, he should not use his public position to
enhance his private practice of law or a private business of his.
In Vitriolo, et al. v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, 448 Phil 199 [2003], the SC said that: Promotion of private interests
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
It is unethical for a government lawyer to remain silently connected with a Law firm and solicit cases for the said
firm with referral fees or monthly retainers for the purpose.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
Exception: if the misconduct is of such character that affects his qualification as a lawyer.
Gonzales-Austria, et al. vs. Abaya (176 SCRA 634):
o Complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct and for disbarment was filed against Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC Palawan for having allegedly forged the
signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case.
Here, the SC stated that, generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such ground.
Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar,
for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of.
Atty. Austria was suspended as a member of the Bar for a period of one year.
Collantes vs. Renomeron (A.C. No. 3056. August 16, 1991 A.C. No. 3056. August 16, 1991)
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Renomeron, Registeer of Deeds of Tacloban.
Atty. Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain
"special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip
ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's
Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements.
Issue: whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his
malfeasances as a public official.
Ruling: Yes. According to the SC the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously
(Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
Atty. Renomeron was disbarrerd from the practice of law.

A government lawyer, who under the law, is required to represent the Government, any of its agencies or
officers, should not refuse to appear for them.
In the case of Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960], the court stated that Bias or prejudice
and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and
the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification.3 And unlike a
practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his
functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others,
"that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which
he is about to enter. . . ."
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
A government lawyer may leave the government service in various ways: retirement, resignation, expiration of
the term of office, dismissal or abandonment.
Whichever way he leaves his service, he is prohibited by the Rule from engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened in said service.
Violation of restriction is tantamount to representing conflictive interest.
In PNB vs. Cedo (A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995): By accepting engagement or employment against his former
employer (PNB) in transactions which he formerly handled while still an officer of said bank, Atty. Cedo violated
the Rule and was suspended for 3 years.
In PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. (455 SCRA 568), the SC ruled that the applicable meaning of the term
intervention is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as drafting, enforcing, or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Requirements for applicants for admission as a member of the bar: (rule 138, RRC)
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show
that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a
law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of
the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence
of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Consequences for violation of the Rule:
If the false statement or suppression of material fact is discovered before the candidate could take the bar
examinations, he will be denied permission to take the examinations.
If it was discovered after the candidate passed the examinations, but before having taken his oath, he will not
be allowed to take his oath as a lawyer.
It must be stressed, the oath may only be taken before the Supreme Court by a person authorized by the court
to engage in the practice of law (People vs. de luna et al GR 10236-48)
People vs. de Luna: Several persons took an oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law before a Notary Public.
The SC held that: appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought
admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they
were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer
is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized
by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein,
implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking
thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this
Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the court of the Philippines."
If the discovery was made after the candidate has taken his oath as a lawyer, his name will be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
In Re: Ramon Galang (66 SCRA 282)
In 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court
for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged
with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his
criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in
1967, 1969 and 1971.
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966,
1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case
in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his
oath.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the
Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, the SC have no other alternative
but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
P A L E W r i t t e n R e p o r t s | 10
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ (A.C.
No. 244): The Diaos name was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys for false pretenses on his educational
attainment. He misrepresented that he finished Associate in Arts Degree when in truth he had no such degree.
Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been
obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations
is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
If the crime concealed is a crime not involving moral turpitude: When the applicant concealed a charged of a
crime against him but which crime does not involved moral turpitude, this concealment nevertheless will be
taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him
morally unfit to become a lawyer. When he made a concealment, he perpetrated perjury (In re: Galang, 66 SCRA
282; Heron S. Meling Case, 431 SCRA 1460).
Prohibition against candidates: Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence
any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other
nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision
of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
A lawyer shall make no recommendation or endorsement of any applicant for admission to the bar, if he knows
that the applicant is not qualified to become a member of the bar for lack of good moral character, lack of
educational requirements or other relevant attribute.
It is his duty to society to do something to prevent such applicant from taking the bar examinations.
Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to the bar shall possess such degree of learning and
proficiency in law as is necessary for due performance of the duties of the attorney.
His support to an applicant must be solely based on FITNESS, both INTELLECTUAL and MORAL.
The act of supporting the application to the Bar any person known to him to be unqualified constitutes gross
misconduct in office (Rule 138, Sec. 27, RRC).
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself properly as not to put into question his fitness to practice law.
If good moral character is a qualification for the privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege (Quingwa vs Armando Puno, 19 SCRA 439).
Petitioner Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. Respondent took petitioner to a hotel and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her. She submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage. When she got pregnant, respondent refused to fulfill his promise of marriage; and refused to
recognize the child as his own.
A lawyer should maintain the standard of moral fitness required of him when he applied for admission to the
Bar.
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional
or nonprofessional activities.
A lawyer who commits an unlawful act though not related to the discharge of his professional duties as a
member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice
of law (Melendrez vs Decena).
Avoidance of Scandalous Conduct: In Toloso vs Cargo (171 SCRA 21), the court held that a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief the he is flouting those
moral standards.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Lawyers are officers of the court whether they are incumbent judges, prosecutors or legal practitioners.
To maintain the dignity of the legal profession, lawyers must conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly
toward each other.
They shall avoid resulting to harassing tactics against their opposing counsels.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations or intemperate
words tending to obstruct, embarrass or influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute
have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct
contempt or contempt in facie curiae (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Cloribel 31 SCRA 1; Lim Se vs Argel
70 S 378)
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Cloribel (31 SCRA 1)
In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not
favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latters lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a motion
for reconsideration.
Said lawyer made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many of
our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating
favoritism and partisanship of the members of the Court, notable Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro
due to alleged interest in the case.
The language employed by Santiago degrades the administration of justice which transgresses Section 3 (d) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the RoC which states that "a lawyer's language
should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". He is also expected to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the contrary and
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. The inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as
a shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.
A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession (In re: Climaco, 55 SCRA 107).
The lawyers arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and
be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another (Torres vs. Javier, 470 SCRA 408).
Examples of disrespectful language:

o Labelling a judge as corrupt in a motion for inhibition;
o Calling an adverse counsel as bobo; or
o A lawyer stating that justice is blind and also deaf and dumb.
Lack or want of intention is no excuse for the disrespectful language employed. Counsel cannot escape
responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning
(Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441).
However, when the use of strong language has been impelled by the same language used by the Judge, the
lawyer cannot be blamed (Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello).
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
It is highly unethical for a lawyer to exert efforts directly or indirectly, in any way, encroach upon the professional
employment of another.
As soon as a client retains a counsel, and had not dismissed the latter, efforts on the part of another lawyer to
take him as a client constitutes an act of encroaching upon the employment of another lawyer.
Competition among attorneys is contrary to the long established etiquette of the legal profession. No self-
respecting practitioner, will ever voluntarily tender his services in pending matters then being conducted by
other counsel, and will not obtrude criticism on acts of a partys attorney.
If, however, the first lawyer was already dismissed or dispensed with by the client, the entry of the appearance
of another lawyer in the case is not encroachment upon the business of another lawyer (Laput vs. Ramontique,
6 SCRA 45).
A lawyer should not negotiate with the other who is represented by a counsel (Likong vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 414).
However, a lawyer may interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side. But he should avoid
any suggestion calculated to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth.
Any person who seeks relief against an unfaithful or neglectful lawyer may approach another lawyer for proper
advice and assistance. Any advice or assistance extended after proper verification is not encroaching upon the
business of another lawyer for such act is justified under the circumstances. A lawyer shall not abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at defiance of the law or at the lessening confidence in the legal system.
Group 2: Canons 9 - 13
Elumbaring, Czaryna G.
Nueza, Maricris L.
Opalla, Nisa S.
Chapter 2. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANONRudith
Quiachon, 9. A lawyer
Ann W. shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Reason for the rule: The ethical consideration for this Canon is aptly stated in the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility:
The prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded on the need of the public for INTEGRITY
and COMPETENCE of those who undertake to render legal services.
Because of the fiduciary and personal character of the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex
nature of our legal system, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence
if the practice of law is confined to those who are subjects to the requirements and regulations imposed
upon the members of the legal profession.
Comments: Only those licensed by the SC may practice law in this country and the assistance to unauthorized
practice of law is prohibited.
A lawyer must not take as partner or associate one who is:
1. Not a lawyer;
2. Disbarred;
3. Suspended from the practice of law; and
4. A foreign lawyer, unless licensed by the SC.
Fiduciary Duty: The principle that an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to the prejudice or
cause an occasion for loss of a client.
The relationship between the lawyer and the client is one of Mutual Trust and Confidence of the highest degree.
The client can terminate the relation at any time with or without cause. But the lawyer is entitled to terminate so
long as it is with the clients consent and the courts if the case is pending.
Rule 71, Section 3 (e) Revised Rules of Court: The act of pretending or assuming to be an attorney or an officer of
the court and acting as such without authority is punishable with contempt of court.
Case: People vs De Luna, 102 Phil. 968
Held: Notarizing the oaths of office as lawyers of persons who failed in the Bar Examinations and
announcing that they will practice law in all parts of the Philippines is a gross misconduct and is contemptuous.
Comments: The practice of law is limited only to individuals duly qualified in MORAL CHARACTER and EDUCATION
and who PASSED THE BAR examinations.
Rule 9.01. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The practice of law is just a PRIVILEGE and may be WITHDRAWN if the lawyer fails to maintain the standards of moral
and professional conduct.
Case: PAFLU vs Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302
Held: Public policy demands that legal work in the representation of parties litigant should be entrusted
only to those possessing tested qualification and who are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the profession,
as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
Case: Guballa vs Caguioa, 78 SCRA 207
Held: A lawyer is prohibited from taking a partner or associate any person who is not authorized to practice
law, to appear in court or to sign pleadings.
Case: US vs Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil 146
Held: The repeated irregular signature of pleadings by an attorney in the name of a firm improperly
constituted, with one partner, who by an order of this court, had been denied the right of practice, and the
participation by him in an act of contempt committed by such partner, is misbehavior which renders him
guilty of contempt.
Case: Beltran, Jr. vs Abad, 132 SCRA 453
Held: Finally, Atty. Jacobe is required to explain within 10 days from notice why he should not be disciplined
for collaborating and associating in the practice of law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
Rule: A lawyer cannot delegate his authority without clients consent even to a qualified person.
The rule is absolute that the authority of a lawyer to represent a client in a case cannot be delegated to an
UNQUALIFIED person because of PUBLIC POLICY.
It does not follow however that the retained lawyer is automatically authorized to make such delegation to a
QUALIFIED person because a client-lawyer relationship is a PERSONAL one.
Case: Lamport vs Aetna Life Insurance, 199 SW 1029, 1933
Held: The retained counsel cannot just get another lawyer to represent the client without the latters
consent. The reason is that the attorneys are selected on account of their special fitness through their
learnings or probity for the work in hand.
An associate or assistant in a law firm may appear for the client, unless the client has contracted otherwise.
Rule 9.02. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate, that upon the latters
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing agreement.
Rule: Division of attorneys fees with non-lawyers is prohibited.

Case: PAFLU vs Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, supra
Held: An agreement providing for the division of attorneys fees whereby a non-lawyer (union president) is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is immoral and cannot be justified. There should be an attorney-
client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorneys fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless
the clients representative in court is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an
attorney-client relationship; therefore he cannot recover attorneys fees.
Case: Harriman vs Straham, 33 p. 2d. 1067, 47 Wyo. 208, cited in PAFLU case
Held: The rationale of the prohibition is that if attorneys fees were allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also to leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
Case: Five J Taxi vs NLRC, 235 SCRA 556
Held: Article 222 of the Labor Code as amended by Section 3 of PD 1691 states that, non-lawyers may
appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only if:
1) They represent themselves; or
2) They represent their organization or the members thereof.
While it may be true that Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who
did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, he is not entitled to attorneys fees.
EXCEPTIONS to RULE 9.02: Only subsection A and C because in B the person who undertakes to complete the
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer is a lawyer himself who is licensed to practice law.
CHAPTER 3. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

Canon 10. A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Reason for the rule: The reason for requiring candor and fairness on the part of a lawyer in his relation with the
courts had been clearly explained by the SC in the case of Muoz vs People.
Case: Muoz vs People, 53 SCRA 190

Held: The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted
by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could be
easily imagined. Even with due recognition then that the counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth.
Case: Director of Lands vs Adorable, 77 Phil 468
Held: In this case, the attorney for the claimants and the appellees, acting under the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play, and nobility as becoming of a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking
advantage of the claimants and the appellants ignorance of what really happened in the Court of Appeals,
informed this court that the case had been decided in favor said claimant and appellant, filing to said effect
the copy of the said decision sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the
reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble deciding again a case already decided.
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Comments: A lawyer must be truthful and be a minister of truth.

Article 19 of the New Civil Code: In all his dealings, he is expected to act in good faith just as anybody especially in
his dealings with the court.
The Lawyers Oath mandates that the lawyer among other duties:
a) To do no falsehood;
b) Nor consent to the doing of the same in court; and
c) To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
to the court.
The violation of the oath is a ground for disbarment or suspension under Rule 138 Section 27 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Case: Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Cloribel, 31 SCRA 3
Held: It is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote
Case: Muoz vs People, 53 SCRA 190
Held: The mere version of the lawyers client of what transpired in the case, shows lack of candor.
Case: Limpin, Jr. vs IAC, 161 SCRA 83
Held: A lawyer was held in contempt of court for trying to mislead the SC by raising issues long laid rest by
final and executory judgment.
Case: Sevilla vs Zoleta, 96 Phil 979
Held: Lawyer falsely stating in a deed of sale that the property is free from all liens and encumbrances when
it is not so.
Case: Monterey vs Arayata, 61 Phil 820
Held: Lawyer making it appear that a person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor.
Case: Calo vs Degamo, 20 SCRA 447 and Diao vs Martinez, 7 SCRA 475
Held: Lawyer concealing the fact that he was charged with or convicted of a crime, in an information sheet
required by law in connection with his employment and where he concealed his lack of the required pre-
legal education.
Case: In re: Samaniego, 90 Phil 382
Held: Lawyer encashing a check payable to a deceased cousin by signing the latters name on the check.
Case: In re: Rusiana, 105 Phil 1328
Held: Lawyer falsifying a power of attorney and used it in collecting the money due to the principal and
appropriating the money for his own benefit.
Case: Chavez vs Viola, GR 2152 and Occena vs Marquez, 60 SCRA 38
Held: Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved, and
alleged in a latter pleading that the same clients were the owners of the same property and where there
are false allegations in the pleadings.
Case: Martin vs Moreno, 129 SCRA 315
Held: Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to Dismiss
Case: Ragacejo vs IAC,153 SCRA 462
Held: Lawyer denying having received the notice to file brief which denial is belied by the return card
Case: Bautista vs Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151 and In re: De Lara, 27 Phil 176
Held: Lawyer presenting falsified documents in court which he knows to be false and introducing false
evidence.
Case: Retuya vs Gorduiz, 96 SCRA 526
Held: Lawyer filing false charges or groundless suits
Case: Libit vs Oliva, 237 SCRA 375
Held: Lawyer falsifying Sheriffs Return and seeking the default of the defendant
Case: Bongolota vs Castillo, CBD No. 176, 1995
Held: Using in pleadings the IBP number of another lawyer
Case: Roces vs Aportadera, AC No. 2936, 1995
Held: Use of fictitious residence certificate by a notary public.
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
RULE in the Quotation of a Decision: He should quote the same VERBATIM to avoid misleading the court.
A lawyer is prohibited from:
1) Knowingly misquoting or misrepresenting
a) Contents of a paper;
b) Language or argument of opposing counsel; and
c) Text of a decision or authority.
2) Knowingly citing as law, a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment; or,
3) Asserting as a fact that which has not been proved.
Case: Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Association vs Insular Life Assurance Co., 37 SCRA 244
Held: We must articulate our firm view that in citing the Courts decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of the courts, judges, lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-
for-punctuation mark.
However a mere typographical error in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous.
Case: Banogon vs Zerna, 154 SCRA 593
Held: Lawyers must not intentionally misread or interpret the law to the point of distortion in cunning effort
to achieve their purposes.
Case: Erectors Inc vs NLRC, 158 SCRA 421
Held: Foisting a non existent rule to mislead the court is a violation of Legal Ethics.
Case: Adez Realty Inc. vs CA, G.R. No. 100643, October 30, 1992
Held: The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave
offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent, but rather,
because it is a clear and serious violation of ones oath as a Member of the Bar.
Rule 10.03. A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
Lawyer Not To Misuse Rules of Procedure: A lawyer should always bear in mind that our rules of procedure, like the
Rules of Court, are intended to facilitate the delivery of justice to those to whom it is due without unnecessary
expense and waste of time for truly justice delayed is justice denied.
Case: Aguinaldo vs Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137
Held: The aim of a lawsuit is to render JUSTICE and the rules of procedure are precisely designed to attain
such objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation.
Case: Economic Insurance Co, Inc. vs Uy Realty Co., 34 SCRA 749 and Urbayan vs Caltex Phil Inc., 5 SCRA 1016
Held: It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable
legal defense the law allows. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party
like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to
justice, not as a means of frustration.
Case: Que vs Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009
Held: The successive filing of petitions all containing a prayer for injunctive relief, reveal the respondents
persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the lower courts against his client.
RESPECT DUE THE COURTS
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Lawyer's First Duty is to the Courts.

-A lawyer is an officer of the court (Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724).
-The public duties of the attorney takes precedence over his private duties. His first duty is to the courts. Where
duties to the courts conflict with his duties to his clients, the latter must yield to the former (Langen v. Borkowski,
43 ALR 622).
Respect Due to the Courts and Judicial Officers must be Maintained.
In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595

HELD: As a member of the bar and an officer of the court, an attorney is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath
he has taken, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
-Respect of courts helps build the high esteem and regard toward them, which is essential to the proper
An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
administration of justice.
and communication to the courts.
-It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due tot the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Rule 138, Section 20 (b), RRC). The respect is not only towards the Justices and Judges but also to
the officers of the Courts like Clerks of Court, Sheriffs and other judicial officers who take part in the judicial work.
-Lawyers must be respectful not only in their actions but also in their language whether in oral arguments or in
pleadings. (Canon 8, Rule 8.01)
Obeying court orders and processes - the highest sign of respect to the courts.
- Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. They should stand foremost in complying
with the courts directives and instructions.
- A lawyers unexplained failure to appear at the scheduled hearing constitutes disrespect to the court and is guilty
of contumacious behavior (Corleto v. Arro, 99 SCRA 121).
- Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the government to which they belong as well as to
the State which has instituted the judicial system.
Defending judges from unjust criticism
-It is the attorneys duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal
attack.
- This requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but also to
discourage other people from so doing.
- By the very nature of his position as judge, he lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against
unfounded criticism and it is the attorney who can better more appropriately support the judiciary.
Rule 11.01. A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
- The traditional attires for male lawyers in the Philippines are the long-sleeve Barong Tagalog, and coat and tie.
-Female lawyers appear in semi-formal attires.
-Judges also appear in the same attire in addition to black robes.
-To maintain the dignity and respectability of the legal profession.
- Respect to the court must begin with the lawyers outward physical appearance in court. Sloppy or informal attire
adversely reflects on the lawyer and demeans the dignity and solemnity of the court proceedings. (Agpalo)
- If he dresses improperly, he may be cited for contempt.
Rule 11.02. A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

- It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also to the courts and to the public to be punctual in attendance
and to be concise and direct in the trial and disposition of cases (Canon 21, CPE). He shall delay no man for money
or malice (Lawyers Oath).
-Failure to appear in time in a pre-trial conference may result in the non-suit or the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to prosecute or in the declaration of the defendant as in default (Rule 20, Section 1, RRC).
-Counsel may even be held in contempt of court for coming late in the hearing or trial of a case (Rule 71, Section 3
(a), RRC).
-Lack of punctuality interferes in the speedy administration of justice. Consequently, both the judge and the lawyer
are in duty bound to perform their duties with punctuality (Canon 7, CPE).
-A judge who is unpunctual in his habits sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice (Ibid).
- Inexcusable absence from, or repeated tardiness in attending a pre-trial or hearing may subject the lawyer to
disciplinary action and may prejudice his client who may be declared in default.
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
- A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.
- His arguments should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another.
- The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time, a disrespect to
the dignity of the court.
- While he should so abstain from using such language, he may use strong language to drive home a point. He has
the right to be assiduous and zealous in the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
- This rule has similar objectives as Rule 8.01 which reads. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
- Rule 8.01 is general. But Rule 11.03 specifies the courts before whom the lawyer is directed to abstain from using
the proscribed language.
-Lawyers must maintain the rule of law and not the rule of the jungle.
-A lawyer owes the court the duty to observe and maintain a respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintainance of its supreme importance (Canon 1, CPE).
Sangalang v. IAC, 177 SCRA 87
HELD: The Court finds Atty. Sangcos remarks in his motion for reconsideration, disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft
and corrupt in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes as an open assault
upon the Courts honor and integrity.
Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation,
one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party.
A Mere Disclaimer of any Intentional Disrespect, Not a Ground for Exoneration
Paragas v. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809

HELD: A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is no ground for exoneration. His intent
must be determined by a fair interpretation of the languages by him employed.
Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.
- Disrespectful, abusive, and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations, or intemperate
words tending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the court have no place in a pleading.
- Neither does the mistake of a judge in some of his rulings warrant the use of offensive language.
- In championing the cause of his client, a lawyer should not resort to insulting or disparaging language amounting
to disrespect toward the court.
A judge should be courteous to the lawyer to merit respect
- The duty to observe and maintain respect is not a one-way duty from a lawyer to a judge. A judge should also be
courteous to counsel, especially those who are young and inexperienced.
Upholding courts authority and dignity
- As an officer of the court, a lawyer should uphold the dignity and authority of the court and not promote distrust
in the administration of justice (Canon 10).
- He should seek to preserve faith in the courts and help build and not destroy the high esteem and regard toward
them.
- He should prevent anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent.
A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge improper motives
- A judge may commit errors, he may abuse his discretion in the resolution of issues before him.
- He should not make hasty accusation against the judge without any cogent and valid ground existing in the record.
- The rule allows criticism so long as it is supported by the record or is material to the case.
- His right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through legitimate channels
is well recognized.
Lawyer Can Demand That The Misbehavior Of A Judge Be Placed On Record: Act Not Contemptuous.
-There are times when it is the judge who misbehaved during a court proceeding. The affected lawyer may demand
that the incident be made of record. This act of the lawyer is not contemptuous.
In re: Aguas, 1 Phil 1

HELD: The SC held that the action of the judge in seizing the witness by the shoulder and
turning him about was unwarranted and an interference to which every witness is entitled
while giving testimony in a court of justice.
- Against suchare
While lawyers conduct, the
prohibited said attorney
to attribute motives had the right
to a judge to protest
not supported and
by the to demand
record, that
lawyers must the
however
be courageous enough to expose arbitrariness and injustices of courts and judges.
incident be made a matter of record, and that what he did was not contemptuous.
Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
- The duty to support the judge does not, however, preclude a lawyer from filing administrative complaints against
erring judges.
-And complaints against said judges must be coursed to the proper authorities only.
- They must be filed with the Supreme Court which has administrative supervision over all courts and the power to
discipline judges of lower courts.
- Constitution Article VIII Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
- Constitution Article VIII Section 11. x x x The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Grievances against Justices of the Supreme Court
- If the complaints are based on impeachable offenses, the complaints must be coursed through the House of
Representatives and the Senate in accordance with the rules on impeachment (Art. XI, Sections 2-8, 1987
Constitution).
Criminal complaints against judges in connection with their duties as such must be file with the Supreme Court
and not with the Ombudsman.
Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. no. 102781
HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
and criminally liable to the State under the RPC for his felonious act.
The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. (provided in the Constitution)
CANON 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A COMMON AIM OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR. Pineda
Examples of Obstruction of Justice:
Instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the
case against the clients, the accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducosin)
Asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit. (Bueno vs Santos)
Advising a client who is detained to escape from prison. (Medina vs. Yan)
Filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false expectation
of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals)
Rule 12.01. A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself with the
law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preference. He should
also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.
Newly hired counsel: must acquaint himself with all the antecedent proceedings and processes that have
transpired in the record prior to his takeover.
If presenting documentary exhibits, he must be ready with the originals for the purpose of comparison with
copies thereof.
Rule 12.01 is reiterated briefly in Rule 18.02: A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.

Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
There is FORUM SHOPPING when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion in another or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause,
on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping exists when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum:
1. a party seeks favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or
2. when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that
one or the other would make a favorable disposition (Benguet Electric Corp. vs. Flores, 287 SCRA 449, March
12, 1998).
The most important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the VEXATION caused the
courts and party-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same related causes, asking
the same relief.
Forum shopping constitutes DIRECT CONTEMPT of court and may subject the offending lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Effect of Forum Shopping: Dismissal of all actions pending in the different courts without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate actions against the counsel or party concerned.
MASINSIN VS. THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO

232 SCRA 192
FACTS: In an ejectment suit against the spouses Masinsin, the lower court ruled against them. No appeal having been
taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. Later, the Masinsins through different counsels tried to
nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. They file pleadings, one after another. The
Court took notice of the filing of series of unsubstantiated petitions by the Masinsins through their counsels which
is a delaying tactic. The Court finds the counsels guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer; hence they are censured
and warned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels of the Masinsins are guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer?
HELD: YES. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of the
Masinsins to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory. In
no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary
action and warranting application of the contempt power. Petition is dismissed. Petitioner's counsel of record is
strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most
severely.
Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
A lawyer who asked for extension of time must act in good faith.
A lawyer shall file their pleadings on time or they suffer the consequences.
MARIVELES V. MALLARI
(A.C. No. 3294, February 17, 1993) (219 SCRA 44)
FACTS: Mario S. Mariveles filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against his former counsel, Attorney
Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged to handle his defense in Criminal Case where he was charged
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision was rendered, Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal
the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did. However, in the Court of Appeals, despite
numerous extensions of time, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellants brief,
resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mallari be disbarred?
HELD: YES. What was committed by Atty. Mallari is a blatant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 12.03 a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 18.03 a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of that practice, he will
eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law profession.
Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the respect and confidence
of all and sundry to the noble profession.
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
FACTS: A writ of execution is issued in favor of Victoria Aguinaldo and Simeona Aguinaldo for the reconveyance of a
part of the property in litigation. An appeal was made by Segundo Aguinaldo but the same was denied. Cecilio
Aguinaldo contested the writ alleging that his father Segundo Aguinaldo died during the pendency of such appeal.
Thereafter, the petitioners, in order not to render nugatory a decision, final and executory in character, ask the court
to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo substituted as defendants. The lower court granted them favor
and substituted respondents in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo citing the provision of Sec. 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that whenever a party to a pending case dies, xxx it shall be the duty of his attorney
to inform the court promptly of such death, xxx and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative. Respondents contested saying it's too late to apply said provision of the
Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting favor to petitioners?
HELD: NO. Defendant's reliance that it is too late to apply the provision of Sec 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is
untenable. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. The
judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. The Court said litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere artifice, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Rule 12.05. A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the
trial, while the witness is still under examination.
A witness is placed under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
A lawyer is sworn to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Rule 12.06. A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.
The lawyer who presented a witness knowing him to be a false witness is criminally liable for Offering False
Testimony in Evidence Art. 184, RPC
Rule 12.07. A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Improper conduct of a lawyer toward a witness:
- Misbehavior in Court or treating the witness beyond what is fair and necessary or maligning or abusing
them with such other similar acts where DISRESPECT instead of RESPECT is the tone of the action.
Ex. Frightening or shouting at the witness
Terrorizing or tearing them down arrogantly
Cross examine with incessant questions
Rights of Witnesses Which Must Be Respected During Trial (Revised Rules of Evidence)
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matter pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by
law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense (Rule 132, Section, RRC)
Lawyers Should Treat Witnesses With Fairness
a. A Lawyers language should always be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession
Always treat the adverse witness and suitors with FAIRNESS and DUE CONSIDERATION.
He should never minister malevolence or prejudice of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause.
b. The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyers conscience in his professional matters.
The client has no right to demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in
offensive personality.
(Canon 8, CPE) Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that is what the client would say if
speaking in his own behalf.
c. Rule 138, Section 20 (f), RCC To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial
to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged.
d. If it is the judge who subjects the witness to harsh treatments, the lawyer has the right to protest in a
respectful and dignified manner the action of the judge and to make the incident of record without being
held liable administratively or for contempt of court.
Judges are Equally Mandated To Be Courteous To Litigants and Witnesses
Judges must, before his court, be:
- To be patient
- Attentive
- courteous
Rule 12.08. A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a.) On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
b.) On substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
Rationale:
The impropriety lies in the DIFFERENCE between the respective functions of a witness and an advocate. The function
of a WITNESS is to tell the facts as he recalls them in answer to questions. The function of an ADVOCATE is that of a
partisan (supporter).
It is difficult to distinguish between the ZEAL of an advocate and the FAIRNESS and IMPARTIALITY of a disinterested
witness.
It will be hard for the lawyer to DISASSOCIATE his relation to his client as an attorney and his relation to the party as
a witness.
And even if he can do so, a CRITICAL public is only apt to place such construction upon it.
National Bank vs. Uy Teng Piao: Althought the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time
an attorney in a cause, the courts PREFER that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary and that
they should withdraw from the active management of the case.
INHIBITION, A Question of Propriety
Inhibition the name of a writ which forbids a judge from further proceedings in a cause depending before
him; it is the nature of a prohibition.
The DUAL role of being a witness at the same time a lawyer for a client, especially when the procedure
followed is one of self-examination (lawyer asking the questions to himself and answering them), invite CRITICISM
and CONFUSION in the proceedings
It becomes CONFUSING when there are objections raised to the questions propounded. It may be
OPPOSING as counsel or ARGUING as witness and the stenographer will find it DIFFICULT TO RECORD the
proceedings accurately.
Instances When a Lawyer Is Allowed to Testify In Behalf of His Client:
1. On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
2. On substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
o To avoid self-examination:
Engage another lawyer WITH the consent of the client FOR THAT PURPOSE.
Secure assistance of an associate or partner in the law office.
CANON 13. A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH
TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING TO THE COURT.
Rule 13.01. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.
Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03. A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in the
normal course of judicial proceedings.
A Lawyer Is A Minister of Justice
Principle of Justice may be summed up into RENDERING OR GIVING ONE WHAT IS DUE HIM. This is the proper
administration of our laws.
Art. 19. New Civil Code Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honestly and good faith.
The lawyer must be guided by the PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE in defending or prosecuting a case.
He must RELY in the MERITS of his case and should AVOID using INFLUENCE and connections to win his cases. He
must win his cases because they are MERITORIOUS and not because of CLOUT, CONNECTIONS, DOMINANCE or
INFLUENCE.
A Lawyer must not display or boast of being INFLUENTIAL to the court for this would ERODE the confidence of the
public in the FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Judges has the duty not CONVEY or PERMIT others to convey the impression that they are in a SPECIAL POSITION
to influence the judge as provided under RULE 2.03 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The INDEPENDENCE of
the court must at all times be maintained in order to strengthen our system in dispensing justice.
Rule 13.01. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with judges.
Extending Extraordinary Attention

Reason: To protect the good name and reputation of the judge and the lawyer.
Examples:
- Opening the door of the judges office or car
- Carrying his things in going to his chambers
- Lighting his cigarettes
- Serving him food in social gathering
- Spending for his birthday parties
The public may jump into conclusions that these are being done by the lawyer in anticipation for some FAVORABLE
RECIRPOCATION on the part of the judge which will then affect the confidence of the people in the judicial system
Cultivating Familiarity with the Judges
For the purpose of infiltrating the circle of the judges in hoping that they may influence them in relation to legal
matters.
Ex.
- Joining clubs or associations where judges are members
- Making judges and prosecutors godfather of their children
Such is HIGHLY UNETHICAL which must be avoided to protect at all times the independence of the judges to
prevent destructive suspicions by the litigants and public as a whole.
Discussing cases privately with the judge
Ex.
- Seeing the judge in his chambers and talk to him about a matter related to a case pending in the court of
said judge.
Canon 3, CPE : the lawyer must be rebuked and denounced for any DEVICE or ATTEMPT TO GAIN from a judge
special personal consideration or favor.
This must be avoided since the court should administer justice free from BIAS and PREJUDICE otherwise litigants
might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its NOBLENESS and DECORUM.
Lantoria v. Bunyi: Atty. Bunyi is guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case by preparing the draft decision. These acts of respondent amounted to conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.
Ex.
- Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
This may INTERFERE with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise PREJUDICE the due administration of justice.
GENERALLY, they are to be condemned. EXCEPT in EXTREME circumstances of a particular case justify a statement
to the public, it is unprofessional to make it ANONYMOUSLY.
EX PARTE REFERENCE should not go beyond QUOTATION from the records and papers ON FILE in the court.
Test When Public Statement is Contemptuous: The CHARACTER of the act done and its DIRECT TENDENCY to
prevent and obstruct the discharge of official duty.
Trial by Publicity; Prejudicial there must be an ALLEGATION and PROOF that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
Martelino v. Alejandro: Where the publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a massacre of Muslim trainees, there is no
trial by publicity which would prejudice the right of the accused to a fair and impartial hearing. If there was
a trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the government.
Censuring by the SC of the fiscal for unduly allowing wide publicity and sensationalism on a case under
investigation:
Cruz v. salva: in the case at bar, while the provincial fiscal has established a justification for his reinvestigation
of the case although the same is on appeal and pending consideration by this Tribunal, however, said Fiscal
committed a grievous error and poor judgment when he allowed, even encouraged, the reinvestigation to be
conducted with much fanfare, publicity and sensationalism. Such actuations of the Fiscal constitute contempt
of court punishable by public censure.
If the counsel instigated or induced his client to make the public statement or publicity in the media involving a
pending case to arouse public opinion and to influence the judge, both the client and the lawyer may be subjected
to CONTEMPT OF COURT.
If the case is already finished, the courts are subject to the same criticism as other people.
In re Almacen: Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. The
Court also treats with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations, provided it
is done in respectful terms and through legitimate channels; for courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. The reason is that an attorney does not surrender
his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the court in fair and respectful manner, and the independence
of the Bar, as well as the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. Criticism has been an important
part of the traditional work of a lawyer. As a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise his right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. But the cardinal condition of all
such criticism is that is shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Rule 13.03. A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in
the normal course of judicial proceedings.
This rule should be followed when a case is already within the jurisdiction of a court.
Rationale: To preserve the independence of the judges in the performance of their duties.
Bumanlag v. bumanlag: A final word is called for on respondents statement in his Explanation inferring that
he was led to file his petition with the President by the fact that his motion for reconsideration were only
denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever. As the Court has had occasion to state in
Pp. vs. Catolico and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of
the time-honored usage of the Court that Minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court, upon
being only duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of
the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by
the Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the
prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only upon
their own signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Courts decision which suspended him
for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the future
of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with. SO ORDERED.
Distinguish from RULE 11. 05: A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
The latter rules refers to complaints against Judges themselves which must be coursed to the proper authorities
only.
Group 3: Canons 14 - 18
Malinao, Kennerly Albert
Requieron, Areo June
Sumando, Fritzie Lynne
Uy, Dexter
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
Services to the Needy. The privilege to practice law is a special privilege. The endorsement of this privilege is not
however without any burden. Among them is the needed involvement of practicing lawyers in the rendition of legal
aid to the poor and indigent without expecting ordinary attorneys fees for their services. This burden is a social
obligation of every practicing lawyer.
The Canon is in consonance and obeisance to the constitutional provision that free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter's race, sex. creed or
status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Case: Legarda v. CA, GR# 94457, March 18, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria Legarda is the owner of the subject property and respondent New Cathay House Inc., is the lessee
of the said property.
Respondent New Cathay filed a case for specific performance with injunction and damages against Petitioner due to
the latter's failure and refusal to sign the lease contract agreed upon by the parties.
Petition hired the services of Coronel Law Office who filed a motion for extension to file the answer. However,
counsel for the petitioner never filed any answer within the prescribed period.
The CFI ruled in favor of respondent but the counsel of the petitioner never bothered to filed a motion for
reconsideration hence the judgment became final and executory.
Petitioner then hired new lawyers and filed the petition for certiorari before the SC seeking to annual the certificate
of sale issued by the sheriff in favor of the respondents counsel.
Reasoning among others that his previous counsel was so reckless and grossly negligent that the latter failed to
protect his interest in the case.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the petition arguing that the actions of the counsel binds its principal.
ISSUE: WON the negligence of the counsel binds the petitioner
RULING: NO
a. The SC said that the negligence of the counsel in this case is not only a case of simple negligence
but one which is so reckless and gross negligence and binding the petitioner will unjustly enriched
the respondent upon the expense of the petitioner.
b. As to the petitioners counsel, he must be reprimanded.
i. As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He
should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases.
ii. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can
afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer.
Discovering Guilt of Client. Even if after accepting the case, the lawyer discovers that his client is guilty, he must still
continue with the defense of his client ad use all fair arguments arising on the evidence. (Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p.
211) and see to it that due process is accorded to his client and that he should not be punished for more than what
the law provides. If the prosecution fails to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it is not wrong for the counsel
to invoke the acquittal of his client because under such circumstance, the client is legally entitled to an acquittal
(Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court) which the Judge ought to grant
Rule 14.01 is applicable only in Criminal Cases. A lawyer cannot decline to represent an accused just because of his
opinion that the said person is guilty of the charges filed against him.
Rule 14.01 is inapplicable to Civil Cases. It is the lawyers duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
only as they appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
Section 20, Rule 138.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de
officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.
Duty of Counsel de Oficio. An accused, no matter how financially destitute, is entitled to be heard through counsel.
He cannot be deprived of his life and liberty without due process of law (Section 1, Art. III, Constitution). The rule
provides the opportunity for poor litigants to be represented by competent counsel.
Case: LEDESMA v. CLIMACO, GR# L-23815 June 28, 1974
FACTS:
On October 13, 1964, petitioner was appointed as the Election Registrar of COMELEC for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharged his duties as such,
At the time of his appointment as Election Registrar, petitioner was a counsel de parte of a case pending before the
sala of Judge Climaco the respondent in this case. Hence the former filed a motion to withdraw as such.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Climaco appointed petitioner as counsel de officio to 2 other accused whose
cases are also pending before the Sala of the respondent.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, the petitioner filed another motion to withdraw as counsel de officio premised
on the reason that as per policy of the COMELEC, he is required to render full time work and that the volume or
pressure of his work prevents him from adequately handling the defense.
On November 6, 1964, respondent denied the said petition, hence petitioner instituted this present petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can demand to be withdrawn as counsel de officio
RULING: NO
The lawyer appointed by the judge as counsel de officio cannot decline such appointment except for sufficient and
serious cause.
He cannot be excused for any trivial and flimsy reasons.
Judges are cautioned not to frequently appoint the same lawyer as counsel de oficio
Accused can refuse a coundel de oficio
Appointment as Amicus Curiae is not to be declined
Free legal aid on request of the IBP
Lawyer to renderee legal aid to destitutes upon being assigned by the judge
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present client and
the prospective client.
Exceptions:
a. Lack of competence; and
b. Conflict of Interests
A lawyer who pretends to be disqualified under the rule is committing Grave Misconduct.
WHEN DOES A LAWYER HAVE A DUTY TO DECLINE EMPLOYMENT? (regardless of how attractive the fee offered):
A. If its acceptance involves a violation of any of the rules of legal profession.

B. If its acceptance involves nullification of a contract which he prepared.
C. If its acceptance involves an advocacy in any manner in which he had intervened while he was still in
government service.
D. If its acceptance involves employment, the nature of which might be easily be used as a means of
advertising his professional services or his skills.
E. If its acceptance involves employment with a collection agency which solicits business to collect claims.
F. If its acceptance involves any matter in which he knows that he or has the reason to believe that he or his
partner will be essential witness for the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Same standards of conduct to be employed for a client unable to pay lawyers fees. If a lawyer accepts a case for
a client and the client is unable to pay the lawyers professional fees. He must still represent the client with utmost
fidelity, competence, and diligence. The profession is not a money-making trade but a noble involvement in the
Case: SARENAS v. OCAMPOS, AC# 4401. January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against her former counsel respondent whose legal services she contracted on civil
case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land.
Petitioner alleged that when an adverse decision was rendered against her in the said civil case, the respondent
asked the CA for extension of period within which to file her brief which was granted by the said Court.
However, the respondent did not file any brief within the prescribed period. Hence the same lapsed and the adverse
decision became final.
In his comment, respondent claimed that he merely agreed to handle the case gratis et amore upon the request
of a friend.
a. Furthermore, respondent claimed that it should be the petitioners main counsel Atty. Osiris who
should file the necessary brief.
b. Finally, respondent claimed that based on the evidence presented, the reversal of the adverse
decision of the Trial Court is remote, hence there is no damaged caused by the dismissal of the
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the fact that the respondent handled the case gratis et amore excused him from the damages
caused to the petitioner
RULING: NO
That respondent accepted to represent complainant et al. gratis et amore does not justify his failure to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file appellants brief.
In every case a lawyer accepts, deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
It bears to emphasize that the client is entitled to the benefits of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized under the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Until his final release from the professional relationship with a client, a counsel of record is under obligation to
protect the clients interest. That is why if a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any other
representation on behalf thereof unless it is in collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution
of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he, it bears repeating, in fact filed a
motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional responsibility
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
Case: Mejia vs Reyes
FACTS:
Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch of the
Philippine National Bank. While still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia
and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-in-interest of
the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio
City.
[C]omplainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the respondents advice; that thereafter for the
first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine
National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank
attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and
pray this Court to disbar him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Reyes is guilty of malpractice and should be disbarred.
RULING: YES
The malpractice committed is not so serious. Respondent was just admonished and warned not to repeat it.
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case. The respondents act of appearing and
acting as counsel for the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine
National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does
not appear satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the
respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. Evidence shows that the Philippine National
Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his
appointment as bank attorney and notary public.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to
him by a prospective client.
Case: Hadjula vs. Atty. Madiana
Ponente: GARCIA, J.
FACTS:
[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and further alleged that in the
course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she disclosed personal secrets only to be
informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious,
so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential
data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a
client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in
confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal
and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a
result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion,
absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.Without meaning to condone the error of
respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing
charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became
handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by
the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was
violating the rule on confidentiality.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent
in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the
error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and
filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily
available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant
became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative
sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
Confidential Information refers to information trasmitted by a voluntary act or disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given
Two-Fold Purpose of the Privilege of Attorney-Client Privilege
To encourage a client to make full disclosure to the facts of the case to his counsel without fear
To allow the lawyer freedom to obtail full information from his client
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
Case: FALAME vs. ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Baguio jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civilcase. As defense counsel in the first civil case,
respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property,
respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common
with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Baguio is guilty of representing conflicting interests between his clients.
RULING: YES, Atty. Baguio is guilty.
A lawyer may not act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client as provided in
Rule 15.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility . The rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. Furthermore, the termination of attorney-client relation
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment or even death..
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in
settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
A lawyer should temper inclination of client to appeal notwithstanding the clear absence of success
Overstatement or understatement of the prospects of the case is to be avoided
Lawyers are admonished from making bold assurances to clients
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.
Lawyers must be reminded that the practice of law does not include influence-peddling.
Case: MERCADO V. SEC BANK Corp
FACTS:
On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with the Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R.SP No.
71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution dated October 23, 2003 denying
their motion for reconsideration. Such petition were denied twice because of petitioners failure to show a reversible
error had been committed by the Appellate Court. This prompted petitioner Jose Teofilo Mercado to write Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide assailing the latter of his partiality by alleging that he pressured the Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the ponente handling the petitioners case, to favor his adversary Security Bank Corporation. He
alleged that this information was transmitted to him by his counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, who he claims is a close
friend of the ponente. Petitioner further alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his petition for
review by insinuating that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank.
On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the
letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Likewise, the Third Division ordered Mercado
to personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Petitioner apologized and explained that he should not be punished for contempt of court because the
contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanuevas statements and that he wrote
the letter while he was "under the impulse of personal stress" as he was losing his residential house.
Atty. Villanueva, on the other hand, denied petitioners allegations. He also stressed that there was no
correlationbetween the ponentes trip to the United States and his trip to London.
Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive
evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt incident.
On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and Recommendation. He found Mercado
"guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into
disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief
Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he
was properly motivated." Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand
pesos(P5,000.00).
The Court concluded, though it was not categorically stated by Justice Dacudao, that Atty. Villanueva was in fact the
source of the unfounded accusation that Chief Justice pressured the ponente.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jose P. Villanueva is guilty of contempt of court by committing a breach of the Code
ofProfessional Responsibility due to reasons claimed by petitioner Mercado
RULING: YES
Atty. Jose P. Villanueva is guilty of indirect contempt of court. Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness." Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he was "a very
very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain
a favorable disposition of his case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation
crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the
successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But
when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this
case, Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court,
together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced.
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers. Atty.
Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this
Court as well.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
A lawyer must promote respect for the law.
A lawyer should give proper advice to his clients.
A lawyer is not gun for hire.
A lawyer should advice clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude towards courts of justice.
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEY AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION.
The money collected by an attorney for his client belongs to the client.
The money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his client are held in trust for the client.
Case: PEDRO RAMOS v Atty. Mandagan April 6, 2016 A.C. 11128
FACTS:
Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from him the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00)
According to Ramos, the P300,000.00 shall be used as bail bond in the event that his petition for bail in the said criminal
case is granted. An Acknowledgment Receipt was issued in his favor as proof of payment.
However, petition for bail was denied. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning the
amount of 300,000.00 despite the demand.
On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued an
Order5 directing Atty. Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos complaint.
In her Answer,6 Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of 300,000.00 was not intended for payment of bail, but as
mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and other documentary exhibits.
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,11 finding Atty. Mandagan liable for gross
misconduct and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and recommended that Atty. Mandagan be suspended for
a period of one (1) year. Subsequently, the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution12 dated October 11, 2014.
Hence this case.
ISSUE: WON the lawyer is liable.
RULING: YES.
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera,15 this Court held that:
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.16 (Citations omitted).
In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of 300,000.00 from Ramos for
the purpose of posting a bond to secure the latters provisional liberty. When the petition for bail of
Ramos, however, was denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to return the amount to
Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to Ramos despite demand from Ramos
counsel.
This court cannot give credence to Atty. Mandagans defense that the amount she received from Ramos
was not for bail but merely for mobilization expenses. Records show that Atty. Mandagan failed to
substantiate her claim. At any rate, as correctly observed by the IBP-CBD, "[Atty. Mandagan] should be
forthright in stating what constitutes legal mobilization expenses if only to dispel any doubt as to its
intended purpose.
RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
A lawyer under his oath pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obliged to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his
possession.
In order that he may promptly account for or deliver the same to the client or representative, he should keep and
maintain adequate records of the clients money or properties.
If funds are kept in separate account, the temptation to convert them to personal use is one step removed.
To avoid the appearance of impropriety.
RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.
Funds of client should not be commingled with funds of counsel.
Case: ESPIRITU VS CABREDU 395 SCRA 19
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous.
Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported by the latter and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance, be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
RULE 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
For the further protection of the lawyer, he shall also have a lien to the extent of his attorneys fees and legal
disbursements on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client. And is allowed to apply so much of the
funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements subject to the condition that he shall promptly
notify his client.
To enforce a charging lien, it is necessary that the lawyer shall have caused a statement of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court which rendered the favorable judgment with written notice to the client and adverse
party.
Retaining lien A right merely to retain the funds, documents and papers of his clients which have lawfully
come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fess and disbursements have been paid.
Requisites:
1. Attorney-client relationship
2. Lawful possession of papers, funds and documents
3. Unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees
Charging lien an equitable right to have the fees and lawful disbursements due a lawyer for his services,
secured to him out of a money judgment.
Requisites:
1. Attorney-client relationship
2. Rendered services
3. Money judgment favorable to the client has been secured in the action
4. Attorney has a claim for attorneys fees or advances statement of his claim
has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof served the adverse
party.
The attorneys retaining lien does not apply to public documents introduced in court as exhibits. These documents
are subject to the courts custody. To hold otherwise would be to curtail unduly the inherent power of a judicial
tribunal in the conduct of the proceedings before it.
Case: VILLANUEVA, JR. VS JUDGE QUERUBIN GR no. L-26137 Sept. 23, 1968
FACTS:
Guanzon and Matti were board members of negros occidental. They engaged the services of petitioner Atty.
Villanueva jr, for the purpose of filing an action against the provincial governor. Thereafter, several hearings took
place in which petitioner was able to acquire documents and papers which were subsequently presented and
marked as exhibits. Later, guanzon and matti manifested that they are terminating the services of petitioner. As a
result petitioner moved to oppose said manifestation, but the judge issued an order requiring petitioner to deposit
to the clerk of court the documents presented by him. This prompted the petitioner to file the present certiorari,
prohition and mandamus case praying that the documents and papers which respondent Judge requires petitioner
to surrender had lawfully come to [his] possession in the course of his employment by his clients, the respondents
Guanzon and Matti. In gathering these documents which he successfully utilized as evidence, petitioner bound by
his loyalty and relationship of trust to his clients had to spend considerable time, effort and money. When,
therefore, respondents Guanzon and Matti terminated petitioner's services without paying his lawful attorney's
fees, petitioner acquired the right and the respondents, particularly respondent Judge, are bound to recognize
this right to retain all these documents and papers until his fees are paid.
ISSUE: WON the lawyer has a lien on documents introduced as exhibits.
RULING: NO.
The disputed documents and papers were public in character. Moreover, they were introduced as exhibits. They
were properly subject to the court's custody. The intransigence of the petitioner in his persistence to continue in
possession of the same based on his erroneous belief as to the extent of the privilege of a retaining lien, to impart a
semblance of legality to his defiance, must not be, as earlier noted, accorded the imprimatur of the approval of this
Tribunal. If such were not the law, the resulting injury to a fair and efficient administration of justice might well prove
to be incalculable. Against such a deplorable consequence this Court must resolutely set its face.
Case: PEDRO RAMOS VS. ATTY MANDAGAN, supra.
The Lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His
failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it
may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
RULE 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The lawyer is allowed to borrow money for as long as the client is protected. Thus a lawyer may borrow money from
a client bank, for here the clients interest are fully protected by the banks rules and regulations which have to be
complied with.
Case: CONCEPTION VS ATTY. DELA ROSA, AC 10681, Feb. 3, 2015.
FACTS:
Respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return,
with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be
soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest
Bank checks5 in respondents name.
On the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants. Thus, complainants began
demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay soon. Blesilda sent a demand letter to
respondent, which the latter did not heed. Complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela
Serna, sent another demand letter to respondent. In his Reply, the latter denied borrowing any money from the
complainants. Instead, respondent claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was
the real debtor.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR
RULING: YES
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust
and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of
his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias) the Court categorically declared that
a lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case and by independent advice.
A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of clients confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by
the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent,
complainants relied solely on the formers word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up
to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Fidelity to the cause of client is the essence of the legal profession. Without this fidelity, the profession will not survive,
for in the long run, no one will engage any lawyer anymore.
The canon is a reminder to lawyers to keep their loyalty to their clients as well as to keep the latters secrets given in
confidence even after the termination of the lawyer-client relationship. However, undivided fidelity to clients should
not be at the expense of truth and the fair dispensation of justice.
Case: PITCHER v ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE A.C. 9532 Oct. 8, 2013.
FACTS:
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), a British national who passed away on June 18,
2004. Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the
shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.
The parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to the scheduled meeting,
complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her
that the same was legal. On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of
complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked
them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key. Subsequently, however, respondent,
without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door. this prompted
Bantegui to file before Prosecutors Office a complaint for grave coercion against complainant and respondent. in
turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the
recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge. Thus, the two entered in Memorandum
of Agreement, whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid
the acceptance fee. Thereafter, The Prosecutors Office issued a Resolution, finding probable cause to charge
complainant and respondent for grave coercion. Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into
hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave
coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant. Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts,
complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On March 18, 2009,
Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation, observing that, the actions taken by respondent,
such as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled
for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause. The Office
of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and Recommendation, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his
duties to his client and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a
lawyer.
ISSUE: WON counsel for complainant is guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the profession
RULING: YES.
Records definitively bear out that respondent completely abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave
coercion case against them; this notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the
P150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and
filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
even without prodding from the client or the court. Hence, considering respondents gross and inexcusable neglect
by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, as well
as Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified
to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
REYNALDO G.RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO A.C. No. 10537, February 03,
2015
The lawyer failed to file an appellants brief on time causing the denial of such appeal and warranted
suspension from practice.
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ v ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
The fact that the lawyer is not the original lawyer of the client from the trial to the appeal stage does not
excuse him from exerting due diligence in studying the clients case before taking appropriate legal action.
MULTI-TRANS AGENCY PHILS. INC., Petitioner, vs. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORP., Respondent G.R. No. 180817
Mistakes or negligence of a counsel that deprives the client its day in court is gross negligence the SC can
motu propio demand the lawyer to explain even without any existing complaint in the IBP
Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
While a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case he still needs to present
every available remedy within the bounds of the law to support his clients cause. Since a lawyers actions
has an implication on the livelihood, property and liberty of his clients.
RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEO, respondent. A.C. No. 3523 January 17,
2005
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to
practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and
diligence to manage [his] cases. The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family.
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, v ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
The numerous filing of dilatory motions is an evidence of lack of necessary skill and diligence in handling the
clients case.
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BALMES L. OCAMPOS, respondent. A.C. No. 4401. January
29, 2004
That respondent accepted to represent complainant et al. gratis et amore does not justify his failure to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty to file appellants brief. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.[26]
RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN T. QUIOCHO, respondent. A.M. No. 5925. March 11, 2003
The misuse of the clients funds is an offense against the fiduciary nature of the legal profession. You should
not get payment for services that you are not able to render in advancing the clients cause
EMMA V. DE JUAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III, respondent A.C. No. 5817. May 27, 2004
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his
service is entitled to not just competent service but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the
duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect
within the bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action. [15]
PABLITO SANTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE LAZARO, respondent A.C. No. 5085. February 6, 2003
It is a basic postulate in legal ethics that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise
due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of
a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed upon him by his client and makes
him answerable to him, to the courts and to society.
LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent. A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003
Every case an attorney accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. [14] To be sure, any member of the legal fraternity
worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical manner.
GROUP 4: Canons 19 - 22
Chanco, Alona
Macasarte, Summerson
Requillo, Milott
Sollano, Joanna Paula
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
In the Judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.
Rule 19.01.
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threatening to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.
Only Honorable, Fair and Honest means shall be employed in the maintenance of cases.
Lawyer shall not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless cases against adversaries of his client.
Pena vs. Aparicio
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a
lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance
of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to
collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within specified period. However, the letter in this
case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against
complainant which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed
to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A Lawyer shall not bribe or attempt to bribe a judge to win his case. Any means not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause is
condemnable and unethical.
Rule 19.02
A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetuated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he has
to terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03
A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
Lawyer, not client controls the procedure in the handling of a case.
Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. vs. CFI of Rizal , Branch VI (208 SCRA 523)
The counsels of the parties in this case had the implied authority to do all acts necessary or incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of their clients who were all present and never objected to the
disputed order of the respondent court. They have the exclusive management of the procedural aspect of the
litigation including the enforcement of the rights and remedies of their client. Thus, when the case was submitted
for decision on the evidence so far presented, the counsel for private respondents acted within the scope of his
authority as agent and lawyer in negotiating for favorable terms for his clients.
CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Rule 20.01 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required.
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer.
Kinds of Payment which may be stipulated upon:
1. a fixed or absolute fee which is payable regardless of the result of the case
2. a contingent fee that is conditioned to the securing of a favorable judgment and recovery of money or property
and the amount of which may be on a percentage basis
3. a fixed fee payable per appearance

4. a fixed fee computed by the number of hours spent
5. a fixed fee based on a piece of work
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for reinstatement and back wages.
They signed 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as attorneys fees and 20%
expenses to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the employees and fixed
Atty. Sesbrenos attorneys fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and
20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. The court later on modified the attorneys
fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA, which decided that the attorneys fees should be reduced to 20% of
the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorneys fees
amounting to 50% of all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with
prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded to Atty.
Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by the client
Held:
Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees. A lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys
fees is always subject to judicial control. In the case at bar, the parties entered into a contingent fee contract,
wherein Atty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims if they will win the case. However, the court
finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorneys fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far
so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the
client. Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may
be protected from unjust charges. The court held that a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.
How attorneys fees may be claimed by the lawyer:
1) It may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a
separate action.
2) A petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the
proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
3) The determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination of the courts will be premature.
Kinds of Retainer Agreements on Attorneys fees:
1) General Retainer or Retaining Fee it is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general
counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the ordinary business of the client and referred to
him for legal action;
2) Special Retainer that is a fee for a specific case or service rendered by the lawyer for a client
3) Quantum Meruit it means as much as he deserves, and is used as the basis for determining the lawyers
professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client.
Rule 20.02 A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in
proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward,
costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
When counsel cannot recover full amount despite written contract for attorneys fee;
1) When he withdraws before the case is finished
2) Justified dismissal of attorney (payment: in quantum meruit only)
The reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the decision; otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.
BAUTISTA V. GONZALES
Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid
Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However, the
agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a
lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the clients rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy. The execution of these
contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
Attorneys fees for legal services shared or divided to non-lawyer is prohibited. Division of fees is only for
division of service or responsibility.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement
regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved
by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner additional
legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.
Issues:
WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
WON respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the properties awarded to Vinson.
What respondents were demanding was additional payment for service rendered in the same case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning
their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees
should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of
unconscionable greed!
CANON 21.
A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Related Canon or Rules
Rule 15.02: A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him
by a prospective client.
CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF CLIENTS. CONCEPTS

Confidence refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under the Revised Rules of Court
(Report of the IBP Committee, p.117.)
Secret refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely to be detrimental to the client (Report of
IBP Committee, p.117)
Rule 130, Sec. 21 (b), RRC:
An attorney, cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorneys secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired to such capacity.
Rule 138, Sec 20 (e), RRC:
It is the duty of an attorney to maintain inviolate the confidences and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client
RATIONALE OF THE CANON
The reason of the lawyer-client privilege is to encourage and inspire the clients to tell all about the facts of
their cases.
Unless the clients are so assured that what they disclose to their lawyers will not be revealed to third
persons, they will keep and suppress matters which they consider unfavorable to them such that the edited
facts presented will be distorted and the legal advice proffered thereon will become misleading and
inaccurate.
Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society
29 Phil. 163
It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of being
communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has
faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended
and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
communication between the attorney and his client.
Rosacia v. Bulalacao, 248 SCRA 664
If the advice sought from the lawyer is not legal advice but something else like an accounting advice,
business or personal assistance, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
SCOPE OF THE CANON
Formerly, in order that a communication to an attorney shall be privileged, the relationship of attorney and client
must exist at the time communication is made. However, under the new Code of Professional Responsibility,
communication made by a prospective client to the lawyer or in his professional capacity is covered by the privilege.
MODE OF COMMUNICATION
It may be verbal, written or through any other means (State v. Dawson, 90 Mo. 149, 1 SW 827)
RULE 21.01
A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
The lawyer is only excused from the duty of preserving his clients confidences in these instances:
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law; and
(c) When necessary to collect his fees; to defend himself, his employees or associates; or by judicial action.
RATIONALE OF THE STRICT PROHIBITION
The attorney-client relationship is by nature one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
The lawyer, as he becomes familiar of his clients case, he is informed of the weak as well as the strong
points of the case.
WHEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CLIENT AFTER ACQUIAINTING HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCLOSURE
If the client had authorized his lawyer after having been fully informed of the consequences to reveal his
confidences or secrets, there is waiver of the part of the said client to invoke the attorney-client privilege.
This waiver is sufficient
However, if the witness to be examined in regard to the privileged communication is the lawyers secretary,
stenographer or clerk involving facts acquired in such capacity, the waiver of the client is not sufficient
because the consent of the attorney is also required.
WHEN REQUIRED BY LAW
When the law directs the lawyer to reveal the confidences and secrets of his client, the law prevails.
The privilege cannot be utilized as a weapon to frustrate the administration of justice or the enforcement
of the law.
The law does not make a law office a nest of vipers in which to hatch crimes or frauds (Gerhardt v. United
R. Co., 220 SW 677; 9 ALR 1076).
Both public policy and the lawyers duty forbid the lawyer from assisting in the commission of a crime or
permitting the privilege to conceal a wrongdoing.
His duty to society obliges him to make the revelation (Will v. Tornabelles & Co., Puerto Rico Fed. Rep. 125).
WHEN NECESSARY TO COLLECT FEES OR TO DEFEND HIMSELF

OR STAFF BY JUDICIAL ACTION, RULE OF SECRECY SHALL YIELD
Intended for the protection of the lawyers rights, his employees or associates whose rights cannot be
suppressed by the use of the privilege.
The lawyer may divulge the confidential communication of his client in a proper judicial proceedings, if that
is necessary to protect his rights. The same rule applies in relation to the lawyers staff and associates.
However, the lawyer is permitted only to make disclosures which are necessary for his action or defense
and not to go beyond what is relevant and material
RULE 21.02
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor
shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
A lawyer, who acquired information from a client in the course of his legal employment, is prohibited from making
use of such information, whether it is privileged or not:
(a) To the disadvantage of his client;

(b) To the lawyers own advantage; or
(c) To the advantage of a third person.
Bautista v. Barrios 9 SCRA 695
If the lawyer makes the prohibited disclosure that is, the revelation does not fall under any of the
exceptions he will be subjected to disciplinary action for breach of trust.
Except: If the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents to the use thereof.
Exception to the exception: The lawyer may be judicially compelled to make a disclosure in matters of unprivileged
information, even if the client objects.
RULE 21.03
A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to an outside agency
seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
People v. Sy Juco
64 Phil. 667
Since, it has been proven that the cabinet belongs to a lawyer and that he keeps the records of his client
therein, the lower court cannot order the opening of said cabinet. To do so is in violation of his rights as an attorney.
It would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose his clients secrets.
RULE 21.04
A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the
client.
In a law firm, partners or associates usually consult one another involving their cases and some work as a
team.
If a client engaged a law firm as counsel, and a lawyer of the firm is assigned to the case, the lawyer may
disclose the affairs of the client to the partners or associates, unless the client has prohibited the lawyer
from doing so.
It cannot be avoided that some information about the case received from the client may be disclosed to
the partners or associates.
RULE 21.05
A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
The prohibition against a lawyer from divulging the confidences and secrets of his clients will become a
futile exercise, if his secretary or staff are given the liberty to do what is prohibited of the lawyer.
The lawyer must adopt measures as will prevent those working under him from making disclosures or using
said confidences and secrets.
The lawyer is obliged to exercise care in selecting and training his employees so that the sanctity of all
confidences and secrets of his clients may be preserved. (Report of IBP Committee, p. 119; A.B.A. Code of
Professional Responsibility, p.51).
RULE 21.06
A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his family.
REASON FOR THE RULE
Not every member of the lawyers family has the proper orientation and training for keeping clients confidences
and secrets. Hence, it is the better practice for lawyers to be always careful and reserved about the secrets of their
clients which they must keep inviolate.
RULE 21.07
A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of
interest.
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569
The prohibition applies, even if the prospective client did not thereafter actually engage the lawyer. By the
consultation, the lawyer already learned of the secrets of the prospective client. It is not fair, if he will not be bound
by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
The exception is when the lawyer will be placed in a situation of representing conflicting interests if he does
not disclose the consultation to the next person consulting him on the same matter. Otherwise, if he
remains silent, he may be violating the rule against representing conflicting interests.
Canon 22. A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
Termination of Attorney-Client Relation

(1) Withdrawal of lawyer under Rule 22.01
(2) Death of the lawyer
(3) Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of law
(4) Declaration of presumptive death of lawyer
(5) Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of lawyer
(6) Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by the client
(7) Appointment or election of a lawyer to a government position which prohibits private practice of law
(8) Death of client
(9) Intervening incapacity or incompetence of the client during pendency of case
(10) Full termination of the case
General Rule: The client has the right to terminate at any time with or without just cause.
Limitations:
(1) Client cannot deprive counsel of right to be paid services if dismissal is without cause
(2) Client cannot discharge counsel as an excuse to secure repeated extensions of time
(3) Notice of discharge is required for both court and adverse party
Procedure for a lawyers withdrawal as counsel in a case:

Rule 139, Section 26 RoC.
Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the:
1. written consent of his client filed in court, or
2. without the consent of his client should the court
a. determines upon hearing that he ought to be allowed to retire; and
b. gives notice to the client and attorney
Adm. Case No. 6266 November 16, 2006

BRIONES vs. ATTY. ZAPANTA
Facts
Complainant:
Briones represented her for civil case
Briones showed respondent a copy of "Discharge and Appearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to
Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing". Briones added that Zapanta requested her not to file it and he would
submit a withdrawal of appearance instead. Briones also informed Zapanta that she could not attend the
hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other commitments. Zapanta allegedly assured her that he would
be present in the hearing.
both failed to appear in the hearing
Zapanta failed to file their formal offer of evidence within ten days from notice on January 24, 2003, he filed
a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003 instead.
Trial court dismissed her case with prejudice.
Briones filed this case of Disbarment for abandonment and neglect of duties against Zapanta.
Respondent:
Zapanta countered that he was discharged as complainants counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing
added that he prepared a withdrawal of appearance on October 30, 2002 but complainant ignored his
several requests to sign it in his office. Nevertheless, he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on
March 5, 2003 without complainants conformity.
claimed further that complainants new lawyer should be faulted for belatedly filing an entry of appearance
and a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Is the withdrawal valid?
Held:
No. Rule 139, Section 26 RoC.
Until his dismissal or withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his
client even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated.
respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that he had prepared his withdrawal of appearance as
early as October 30, 2002 but complainant refused to sign it
until a lawyers withdrawal shall have been approved, he remains counsel of record and is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date
of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of his
appearance on record.
respondent should have informed the complainant of the courts order addressed to him, especially if he
considered himself discharged in order for complainant and her new counsel to be guided accordingly.
He then is found GUILTY of negligence and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for THREE MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Rule 22.01. A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:
(1) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
(2) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(3) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
(4) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
(5) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(6) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
FELICISIMO M. MONTANO vs. IBP and Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA

Facts:
Atty. Gerona was the original lawyer hired but because of his sick daughter Montano asked for Atty. Dealca
to prepare and submit his appellants brief on time at the agreed fee, in writing, of P15,000.00, 50% down
and 50% upon its completion.
Montano paid the 50%. Upon completion he paid another P4,500 with a promise to pay the P 3, 500 the
next day.
Such next days had been extended until atty. Dealca left Motano the case folder with a note saying: For
breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, heres your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Montano filed this administrative case of disbarment
On his defense, Atty Dealca alleged there was already a breach of the agreement on complainants part. It
was not him but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet fails to pay as promised.
And further averred that complainants refusal to pay the agreed lawyers fees, measly as it was, was
deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was just, ethical and proper.
Issue: Is the ground for withdrawal valid?
Held:
No. Canon 22.01 (5). Although a lawyer may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay
the fees for the services, withdrawal is unjustified if client did not deliberately fail to pay.
The failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00 does not appear to be deliberate. Complainant paid
75% of the fee already as demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply
because of complainants failure to pay the remaining balance. Plus, the situation was aggravated by
Dealcas note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language.
Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys
fees.
Conditions for the Substitution of Counsel

(1) Written request for substitution
(2) Written consent of client
(3) Written consent of the attorney to be substituted or in the absence, proof of service of notice of said motion to
the attorney to be substituted
At the discretion of the court, a lawyer who has been dismissed by a client is allowed to intervene in a case in order
to protect the clients rights. [Obando v. Figueras (2000)]
Rule 22.02
A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Group 5
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

"..a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his
official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important
as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but also beyond
suspicion.xxx"
-Joaquin vs. Javellana [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601. November 13, 2001]
Backgrounder: The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary consists of six canons to wit:
Independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety, equality, and competence and diligence.
This is based on the 2002 Bangalore Draft, as amended, which was intended to be the Universal Declaration of
Judicial Standards applicable in all judiciaries.
This New Code of Judicial conduct supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct, but
the latter may still apply in a suppletory character in case of deficiency or absence of provisions in the New Code.
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and
in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
An independent judiciary has been described as one free of inappropriate outside influences. Judges
frequently experience pressures in the exercise of their judicial functions. Common sources of pressure
upon a judge include political patrons, family members, friends and associates, colleagues on the bench,
media, civil society, militant groups, criminals and criminal syndicates, and rebel groups. For instances, it is
not unusual for political leaders who helped a judge get appointed or promoted to ask for favors regarding
a pending case. It is also not uncommon for family members, friends or even close associates to seek
assistance in getting provisional remedies, bail grants or even favourable verdicts. Canon 1 requires that
judges reject pressure from any source by maintaining independence in the pursuit of their duties.
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

In Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, a judge acted improperly when she rendered rulings based on directives
she received from government official In her defense, the respondent judge claimed that at that time, the
country was then under a revolutionary government and to promote peace she made certain rulings acting
on the pressure of the government official. The Supreme Court ruled that:
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed
from the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on
the telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the
law and a revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has
laid on respondent their confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of
their carried contentions. For this reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render
justice, t be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral
fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has
dismally failed to exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.
PUBLIC OPINION
Canon 1 requires judges to rule fairly regardless of public opinion.
In Libarios vs. Dabalos, the Supreme Court imposed disciplinary action against a judge who issued a warrant
of arrest and fixed the bail of the accused without first conducting a hearing. The judge acted under the
pressure of a rally staged by the complainant and sympathizers. The High Court ruled that the pressure of
a rally demanding the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the
unjustified haste in respondent judges act of fixing a bail without a hearing. In admonishing the respondent
judge, the Court stated that,
In every case, a judge should endeavour diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws
unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. Respondent judge should
not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to establish principles of law.
In the Philippines, the media is one of the more prevalent forces that exert pressure on the judiciary. By
promoting public opinion for or against one party, the media attempts to improperly influence the outcome
of judicial decisions. In the performance of their judicial duties, judges must ignore public opinion,
specifically disregarding editorials, columns or TV or radio commentaries on cases pending before them.
In one sensational murder case, the media depicted the accused as guilty even though proceedings in the
case were ongoing. This media influence led to widespread public belief in the suspects guilt, despite the
fact that he had not yet been subjected to a preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court ordered the
suspension of the trial and directed the conduct of preliminary investigation. In separate concurring
opinions, two magistrates of the High Court recorded their observations on the manner by which the trial
judge dispensed with his judicial functions and the judicial response to pressure wielded by the media.
According to the Honorable justice Isagani L. Cruz,
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly
a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant
consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
Honorable Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr. concurred:

Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and persons.
However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of
the case.
The highest degree of independence is required of judges. Once a judge gives in to pressures from whatever
source, the judge is deemed to have lost his independence and is considered unworthy of the position.
More than just a breach of the rudiments laid down in the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges who succumb
to pressure and as a result, knowingly ignore proven facts or misapply the law in rendering a decision
commit corruption. Judges who commit corruption face both administrative and criminal prosecution, and
if found guilty, may be punished with imprisonment, suspension or removal from office, and even forfeiture
of license. In certain instances, Supreme Court also orders the forfeiture of benefits of the erring judge.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions
which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Just like Section 1, Section 2 is an expanded or more detailed articulation of Rule 1.03 of the 1989 Code,
focusing specifically on the influence or pressure wielded by the judges colleagues or contemporaries.
SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
The inclusion of the present Section 3 in the Canon on Independence affirms that a judges restraint from
exerting influence over the judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is required for more than just propriety. It is also
required for compliance with the duty to respect not just the individual independence of fellow judges but
also the independence of the judiciary as a whole.
Judges working in the same building or justices of collegiate courts develop what is often referred to as
compaerismo, a kind of camaraderie bound by respect and personal friendship resulting from sharing a
common profession. This camaraderie often leads judges to seek accommodations from fellow judges
ranging from the allowance of provisional remedies to the issuance of favourable decisions. The judge
requesting the accommodation may be prompted either by personal or familiar interests, or by a desire to
benefit a friend. Many such accommodations are exchanged for little more consideration than a free dinner
or similar token. While seemingly innocuous, this kind of unethical conduct frequently gives rise to a quid-
pro-quo situation, whereby the judge who requested the accommodation is later asked to return the
favour. This is especially true in the Philippines where utang-na-loob is a sacrosanct cultural value. Once
a judge engages in this kind of favoritism, the circle of mutual accommodation will continue to widen,
involving increasingly larger segments of the judiciary.
Section 2 and 3 are intended to address these unethical practices among judges.
Any attempt, whether successful or not, to influence the decision making process of another judge,
especially one who is of lower rank and over which he exercises supervisory authority, is serious
misconduct.
In Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, the respondent judge of the RTC wrote a letter to a lower court judge of MTC
seeking to influence him to hear a case and even intimating that he issued an order of acquittal. The High
Court ruled that a judge who tries to influence the outcome of a litigation pending before another court not
only subverts the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integrity and
impartiality. The interference in the decision making process of another judge is a breach of conduct so
serious as to justify dismissal from service based only on a preponderance of evidence.
Section 2 and 3 intend to curb practices or prevent situations whereby the judge influences the decision in
a case not pending before him, or whereby a judge hearing a case allows himself to be influenced by another
judge. However, if the consultation is purely on an academic or hypothetical basis, and the judge does not
surrender his or her independent decision making, there can be no breach of Section 2 and 3 of the Code.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Culturally, Filipinos hold the interests of family to be of paramount importance. Parents are protective and
supportive of their children and grandchildren. Children are expected to be respectful and obedient to their
parents. Under the New Code, the term family is extended beyond that of nuclear members to include
those related by blood or marriage up to the 6th civil degree, as well as those who belong to the judges
employ and are living in his household. These familiar ties may not influence a judge in his or her discharge
of judicial duties.
Friendships are also held in high regard and most often are raised to the level of familiar relationship. To a
degree of lesser only to that of the family, Filipinos develop close relationship with their associates in
business, fraternity brothers or sorority sisters, or fellow members of any civil religious or even political
organization. Filipinos highly value smooth interpersonal relations, commonly called pakikisama. For
example, when one makes a request to a friend or close associate, the latter usually grants it even though
he would have refused that same request if made by one who is neither a friend nor associate. Despite all
this, the maintenance of friendships and the pursuit of pakikisama does not justify using judicial power to
grant favors.
However, an individual certainly does not divest himself of these relationships just because he has joined
the judiciary. While judges may continue to value these relationships, they must be aware that relatives,
friends, and associates may try to influence then in the performance of their judicial duties. Judges must
always guard against the probability that these people can be potential influence peddlers, trying to sell to
others whatever perceived influence or closeness to a judge they may claim to have.
It should be noted that when a judge is related to one of the parties within the 6th degree of consanguinity
or affinity, his disqualification is mandatory. This provision is intended to ensure that judges are spared
from potential influence of family members by disqualifying them even before any opportunity for
impropriety presents itself.
Judges should at all times remind themselves that they are not in the judiciary to give out favors but to
dispense justice. They should also make it clear to the members of their family, friends and associates that
they will neither be influenced by anyone nor would they allow anyone to interfere in their judicial work.
Otherwise, the judge risks undermining public confidence not just in him or herself but in the entire judicial
institution.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
This Section deals specifically with the avoidance of inappropriate connections as well as any situation
that would give rise to the impression of the existence of such inappropriate connections with the executive
and legislative branches of the government.
Judges are expected to exercise judicial power. Such power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The rule set forth in Section 5 has both legal and practical value. Legally, it affirms the independence of the
judiciary from the two branches of government, as required by the Constitution. Thus, as co-equal bodies,
neither executive nor the legislative branch can dictate or exert influence upon the judiciary. Practically,
considering that the appointments, promotions and movements of judges are subject to executive
approval, and that the organization, budget and resources of the judiciary are matters that require
legislative grace, the provisions of Section 5 require judges to uphold their solemn duty to render justice
freely without any obligation to reciprocate whatever beneficence that might have been bestowed on them
by the other two branches.
In Alfonso vs. Alfonso-Legasto, a judge did not act independently of the LGU when she downsized her staff
at the MTC and asked the city to re-employ the laid-off workers without diminution of compensation or
disadvantage with regard to location of work assignment. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent
judge had acted improperly in not informing the Court of the need to streamline her court and of its
personnel needs, instead asking the LGU to employ those who were displaced due to her downsizing.
In Bagatsing vs. Herrera, the Court explained that judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusively
to the Court the authority to deal with internal personnel issues, even if the court employees in question
are funded by the local government, because a reasonable person could conclude that the LGU maintained
some influence over the MTC judge, under the New Code, respondent judges action created an improper
connection with an executive/administrative body- the LGU.
The reality in the Philippine political system is that judges can easily get an appointment or promotion with
some assistance or support from political leaders, religious groups, military stalwarts, big companies and
the affluent. The most pervasive influence comes from the leaders in the legislature and those closely allied
with the executive department. For instance, most members of the bench have received appointments
through the grace of past and present political leaders of this country. It is natural to suppose that
considerations of fealty and utang na loob would compel the judge to consider such factors when rendering
his or her decision. However, acting upon such considerations violates this code.
In the case of Suspension of Clerk of Court Jacobo, the judge in that case was on congenial terms with the
governor from whom he borrowed vehicles on several occasions to travel to his judicial station. The
Supreme Court held that this congeniality was not necessarily detrimental to judicial independent, provided
that there was no showing that such relations were for corrupt ends. However, had this case been tried
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct, the judges acts would likely have created an appearance of an
improper connection. To the common person, the accommodation may seem a reason for the judge to
ingratiate himself towards his benefactors, which may ultimately be perceived as affecting the judges
ability to rule independently. Therefore, whether or not the congenial relationship was indeed used for
corrupt ends, it would be advisable for judges to avoid becoming dependent on other parties, especially for
basic needs like transportation to the judges workstation.
SEC. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
While Section 6 is a new provision, it is inspired by the provision on Social relations in the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which reads:
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement
or seclusion, it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work
will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue
their interests in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in
pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course.
It is desirable that the judge should as far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would
normally tend to arouse the suspicious that such relations warp or bias his judgment and prevent an
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of judicial duties.
Judges are not required to live a hermits life. They should socialize and be sensitive to sical concerns and
developments. Judges may join civil, religious or professional organizations but their membership in these
organizations should not interfere with their judicial tasks. There is nothing more regrettable and probably
unbearable for a judge than to suffer an ignominious dismissal from the service due to slothfulness and
inefficiency and failure to render service that could have been fully rendered were it not for the extra-
judicial activities, which distracted the judges time and efforts from his or her official duties.
More importantly, judges should not fraternize with litigants and their counsel. In fact, they should make a
conscious effort to avoid them in order to avoid the perception that their independence has been
compromised. Under the 1989 Code, a judge must refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
SEC. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and
enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
SEC. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence
in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Sections 7 and 8 instruct judges on what to do to maintain and enhance judicial independence.
Section 7 requires judges to encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order
to maintain and enhance judicial independence.
While Section 8 focuses on inspiring public confidence. Public confidence in the judiciary can of course be
attained only if judges are perceived by the public to be fair, honest, competent, principle, dignified and
honourable. Accordingly, the first duty of judges is to conduct themselves at all times in a manner that is
beyond reproach. In whatever atmosphere or environs they may happen to be, judges must remain
conscious of their character and reputation as judges and should avoid anything which will indignify their
public positions and demean the institution to which they belong.
Judges are the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. There can be no surer
guarantee of judicial independence than the character of those appointed to the Bench. Thus, the above
Sections are intended to serve as catch-all provisions for all other acts that would guarantee the
independence of the judiciary, but which may not have been covered in the specific instances mentioned
in the earlier provisions.
As held in the case of Dimatulac vs Villon:
Judges should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
his obligations to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for
the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade.
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
The Code of Judicial Conduct not only provides that a judge should act with integrity, but also that he or
she should so behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
As held in Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc. vs. Cartagena,
judges must be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty.
While the 1989 Code grouped the values of integrity and independence together, the New Code of Judicial
Conduct has separated them, emphasizing the need for judges to maintain a life of personal and
professional integrity in order to properly carry out their judicial functions. Thus, the present Canon 2
contains three separate provisions all intended to ensure the maintenance of judicial integrity.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.
Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary underscore the importance
of public perception in the maintenance of judicial integrity. Section1 emphasizes that a judge's conduct must not only
be above reproach, but must be perceived to be so.
The Supreme Court explains, We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets
of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people's confidence in the judicial system is founded
not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on
the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When a judge
becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and daily life be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
United States courts have also emphasized the damage judges inflict on public confidence when they break
the law. One court imposed the strongest disciplinary sanction of disbarment on lawyer serving as a city
court judge upon finding the judge submitted false reimbursement claims for attending conferences and
seminars. The court held that the judge violated the publics trust.
It noted, where those whose job it is to enforce the law break it instead, the public rightfully questions
whether the system itself is worthy of respect.
Thus, "in the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.
Judges have been disciplined for lack or loss of good moral character, both in the performance of their
duties and in their private lives. With regard to professional integrity, judges have been penalized
for demanding and/or accepting bribes, fraternizing with litigants and/or lawyers, altering orders, delay in
rendering decisions, sexual harassment of employees, and ignorance of the law.
With respect to personal integrity, judges have been penalized for transgressions in their private lives such
as keeping and/or flaunting a mistress, inebriated behavior, and frequenting casinos and cock fights.
More importantly, judges have been disciplined for conduct that reflects negatively on or taints the integrity
of the judiciary as a whole. Thus, incompetence, as well as lack of impartiality and independence, are
detrimental to the integrity of the judiciary.
Judges who failed to observe the Rules of Court in such matters as issuance of warrants of arrest, temporary
restraining orders, injunctions, hold departure orders, and citations for contempt, conducting hearings in
their residence and using intemperate language, were found to have damaged the integrity of the judiciary.
A judge has been admonished even for not wearing the judicial robe in the performance of judicial
functions. In reprimanding him, the Supreme Court said: "A judge must take care not only to remain true
to the high ideals of competence and integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first
place.
Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance
thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity
In one case, the High Court held, When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's
dismissal is in order.
It appears that integrity is the underlying requirement for all other virtues required of a judge. The Supreme
Court has held that "We presume all judges to be honest and men of integrity unless proven otherwise.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
To the basic requirement of Section 1, Section 2 adds the sentence, "justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
This phrase emphasizes the importance of the public perception of the judiciary, not because the judicial
department intends to be influenced thereby, but because it is essential that public confidence is always
reposed in the judicial systems and processes. It is therefore the duty of the judge to promote public
confidence in the judiciarys integrity.
The Supreme Court has often reminded judges of this principle. The High Court has held: a judge's official
conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of
impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies an exalted position in the administration of
justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as reality
in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but also beyond
suspicion. A judge has the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's
integrity.
It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the competence and diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on their integrity and moral uprightness.
A judge must not only be honest but also appear to be so; not only be a good judge, but also a good person.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Section 3 is an exact reproduction of Rule 3.10 of the 1989 Code. This Section once again addresses the
importance of the competence of the judge as an administrator and vanguard of justice. Rule 3.08 of the
1989 Code provided for a related code of conduct, to wit: "a judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of
the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
As in the case of the judge's own conduct, the competence of court personnel must also affirm the integrity
of the judiciary. Judges should not be lenient in the administrative supervision of employees. As an
administrator, the judge must ensure that all court personnel perform efficiently and promptly in the
In Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, The Supreme Court explained:
Oftentimesleniency provides the court employees the opportunity to commit minor

transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious
delinquencies. The respondent judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his
employees. He should realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of the behavior of
his employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then,
his subordinates would check that any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked. The slightest
semblance of impropriety on the part of the employees of the court in the performance of their
official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators. The
slightest breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and
employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
The judiciary would certainly inspire public confidence if all courts headed by the judges
and justices were conducted with integrity.
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but
also to the process by which the decision is made.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct is the updated version of the previous Canon 3, which provides
that: A judge should perform official duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence. The present
version of the Canon maintained some of the provisions of the earlier Canon, specifically Rule 3.07, and the
provisions on Disqualifications and Remittal of Disqualification.However, the provisions pertaining to
diligence competence and the like have been transferred to other provisions in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. American courts have also emphasized this principle. One court summarized the reasons for long
standing insistence upon impartiality in the judiciary thus: The principles of impartiality, disinterestedness,
and fairness on the part of the judge are as old as the history of courts; in fact, the administration of justice
through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and
pervading the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgement of the inviolability of this
principle which gives credit, or even toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals.
SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded judges that they are the visible representations of the
law and of justice. A judge must, therefore, apply the law and render justice impartially, without any favor,
bias or prejudice. However, mere allegations of bias or prejudice are not sufficient to find a violation of
this section. The complainant carries the burden of proof.
Because allegations of bias are quite serious, the person bringing the allegation must prove bias sufficient
to require inhibition (also called recusal or disqualification) with clear and convincing evidence. Bare
allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice.
A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as
biased and partial.
To sustain a claim of bias or prejudice, the resulting opinion must be based upon an extra- judicial source:
that is, some influence other than the facts and law presented in the courtroom. In the United States, this
is known as the Extra-Judicial Source Rule. As long as decisions made and opinions formed in the course
of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented, the conduct observed by the magistrate, and
the application of the law, such opinions even if later found to be erroneous will not sustain a claim
of personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.
The concern is not only with the judges actual decision but the manner in which the case is decided. As the
Supreme Court has put it, a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in
a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.
It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
This provision is designed to maintain and improve public confidence in the entire judiciary as an impartial
dispenser of justice.
In the leading case of Pimentel vs. Salanga the High Court advised:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
The Supreme Court later ruled again in the same manner:
The intendment of the above provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to find. Its rationale is
predicated in the long standing precept that no judge should handle a case in which he might be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be
tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest. The rule is aimed at
preserving at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation.
A judge should behave at all times in a way that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
There is undue interference where the judge's participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or to
bolster a case of one of the parties.
In Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al. the judge ordered the presentation of specific
documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any party or without the participation of the
parties.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to ask questions from witnesses, if only to clarify what
may appear to be vague points in the narration. Questions designed to avoid obscurity in the testimony and
to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.
In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either party. It is also
improper for the judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of the complainant. A
judges unwelcome persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will
be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
The need for judges to conduct themselves in so as to minimize their disqualification has been the subject
of repeated Supreme Court warnings against judges fraternizing with litigants before their courts.
Judges may, in their exercise of sound discretion, restrict themselves voluntarily from sitting in a case, but
such a decision should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not
enough that a party casts some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative is that
it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor. Another issue is the possibility that
no judge would be available to decide a case because judges with jurisdiction over the case would opt to
recuse from the case. Hence, it is imperative that judges ensure that they would not be unnecessarily
disqualified from a case. This is sometimes referred to as the duty to sit.
In Parayno vs. Meneses the Supreme Court explained the nature of the voluntary inhibition expected of a
judge:
The majority view is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to demands of necessity.
Simply stated, the rule of necessity means that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if there is
no other judge available to hear and decide the case. For example, members of the Supreme Court
were entitled to adjudicate the validity of a statue placing a limit of 5 percent in the costs of living
increase for judges, where it was apparent that all state judges had at least an involuntarily
financial interest in the case.
Actual disqualification of a member of a court of last resort will not excuse the member from performing
his official duty if failure to do so would result in a denial of a litigant's constitutional right to have a
question, properly presented the court adjudicated. In other words, when all judges would be disqualified,
disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. The doctrine
operates on the principle that a basic judge is better than no judge at all.
Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the controversy,
however disagreeable it may be.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of
the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any
person or issue.
This Section warns judges against making any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of the proceedings before them or impair the manifest fairness of the process.
In Martinez vs. Giorenella, a judge was disqualified from trying a criminal case because he met with the
complainants in chambers and advised them to settle with the accused because their case was weak.
In contrast, in Palang vs. Zosa, a judge was commended by the Supreme Court when he voluntarily recused
himself from presiding over a civil case because he had expressed an opinion in a previous case that might
have led one of the parties to doubt his impartiality.
In Gutierrez vs. Santos, a judges act of recusing himself from presiding over a case was upheld by the
Supreme Court. While in private practice, the judge had expressed an opinion concerning an issue that
would unduly benefit one of the parties. However, the Supreme Court has recently held that judges and
justices are not disqualified from participating in a case simply because they have written legal articles on
the law involved in the case.
Judges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements or gratuitous utterances that suggest
they are prejudging a case. Judges should be aware that the media might consider them a good and credible
source of opinion or ideas, and therefore should refrain from making any comment on a pending case. Not
only is there danger of being misquoted, but also of compromising the rights of the litigants in the case. Not
all comments by judges are impermissible.
For example, the United States Supreme Court held judicial comments that are critical of the parties or
counsel generally do not alone support a motion for disqualification.
If a judge expresses open-mindedness regarding the issue at hand and the judges comments do not clearly
favor one side over the other, recusal may not be required. However, some comments are clearly
impermissible in American courts. For example, references to a lawyers age or gender are improper, and
constitute reversible error if prejudicial to a party.
Comments indicating that the judge formed an opinion as to the outcome of a case before hearing evidence
and argument are improper.
SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide
the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings;
In Umale vs. Villaluz, the Supreme Court commended a judge who voluntarily inhibited himself on the
ground that he had personal knowledge of the case.
In People vs. Gomez, the Supreme Court held that a judge may validly disqualify himself due to his bias and
prejudice. Of course, bias and prejudice cannot be presumed.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not sufficient for a judge to inhibit, especially when the charge is
without basis. It must be proven with clear and convincing evidence.
Moreover, it has been held that bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than the evidence presented.
A judge who exhibits actions which give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, has no choice but to
inhibit.
However, the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not aground for disqualification on the
ground of bias and prejudice.
The fact alone that the judge is a next-door neighbor of the complainant in a case is also not a ground for
disqualification.
Mere divergence of opinion between a judge and a party's counsel as to applicable law and jurisprudence is
likewise not a ground for disqualification.
Even reasons of strained personal relationship, animosity and hostility between a judge and party or
counsel are not grounds for disqualification.
Litigants are entitled to a judge who will decide on the merits of the facts presented. However, they are
not entitled to a judge whose mind is a clean slate. That is, each judge brings to the bench the experiences
of life, both personal and professional. A lifetime of experiences that have generated a number of general
attitudes cannot be left in chambers when a judge takes the bench.
The Supreme Court has warned judges against succumbing to first impressions, which can be perceived as
the source of bias. As the Court explained:
The manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party,
no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to
the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty
conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion
of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies
and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hears both sides with patience and
understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary
that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance
true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with
constitutional significance.
The rules also require disqualification if a judge has outside knowledge of disputed facts. To be grounds
for disqualification, the knowledge must be obtained extra-judicially.
For example, when a judge personally observed a claimant in a workers compensation claim, it is
reversible error for the judge to rule based upon the out-of-court observations. This prohibition also
disallows extra- judicial research on the internet.
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
A judge may be disqualified if he was formerly associated with one of the parties or their counsel.
In one case, a judge was disqualified for notarizing the affidavit of a person to be presented as a witness in
a case before him.
Under the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, if a judge previously represented a party, disqualification
is required.
Finally, if a judge is a material witness in a case, the judge may not hear the case.
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;
In the case of Oktubre vs. Velasco, a municipal judge who filed complaints in his own court for robbery and
malicious mischief against a party for the purpose of protecting the property interests of the judges co-
heirs, and then issued warrants of arrest against the party, was found guilty of serious misconduct and
ordered dismissed from the bench before he was able to recuse himself. The Supreme Court held that "his
subsequent inhibition from the cases which he filed in his own court does not detract from his culpability
for he should have not taken cognizance of the cases in the first place the evil that the rule on
disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process.In the United States,
this principle has occasionally been employed to disqualify judges when the law firm of a family member is
counsel of record. Counsel generally has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter if they are
partners in the firm representing the litigant. However, salaried associates or counsel are less likely to
trigger disqualification because they are not deemed to have an economic interest in the matter.
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy,
or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein;
A judge is automatically disqualified from sitting in a case in which the judge previously served as a lawyer.
This restriction extends to judges who served as lawyers in closely related cases.
Recusal is also mandated when the judges former law partner or associate served as a lawyer in the matter
while the judge was practicing with the lawyer.
Finally, a judge may not sit in a case in which the judge has been a material witness.
(e) The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
In Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals refused to inhibit himself
from reviewing the decision in a case which he had partially heard as a trial judge prior to his promotion,
on the ground that the decision was not written by him. The Supreme Court upheld his refusal, but
nevertheless commented that he "should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take
on the case owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle
a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and prejudice."
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel
within the fourth civil degree; or
The Supreme Court has, in several cases, admonished judges for participating in proceedings in which one
of the parties or counsel is a relative within the sixth or fourth civil degrees, respectively.
In Villaluz vs. Mijares, a judge was fined for presiding over a petition for correction of a birth record where
the petitioner was the judges daughter.
In Hurtado vs. Judalena, a preliminary injunction issued by a judge in favor of his sister before inhibiting
himself was found reprehensible.
Similarly, in Perez vs. Suller, a judge improperly presided over the preliminary investigation of a criminal
complaint wherein the complaining witness was his nephew. The High Court held that the judge should
have inhibited himself, because while conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as
"sitting in a case, the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137are the same.
In Garcia vs. De La Pena, a Municipal Trial Court judge was dismissed for taking cognizance of a criminal
complaint lodged by his brother, and issuing a warrant of arrest. The Supreme Court stated:
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case,
the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a
case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the
absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith
and confidence in the courts' justice.
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
While United States jurisprudence has distinguished between direct and indirect interest, there is no
equivalent Philippine jurisprudence on the matter. This rule is intended to ensure judges impartiality by
preventing situations in which a judge must consider familial interests in the conflicts before him or her. If
the public is aware of a family members financial interest, the public may question the judges impartiality.
This would be the case especially if the decision tended to work to the judges family members benefit
despite the fact that the ruling is in accordance with the established facts and law. For the judges and the
judicial departments benefit, it would be advisable to simply disqualify the judge from hearing the case.
The reasons for disqualification cited in Canon 3, Section 5 are not limited to these circumstances. Strict
compliance with the rules on disqualification is required.
The petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of the judgment, and cannot be raised on
appeal. Otherwise, the parties are deemed to have waived any objection regarding the impartiality of
the judge.
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the
records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the
judges participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the
judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
Canon 3, Section 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct is an almost verbatim reproduction of the former
Canon 3, Rule 3.13. Notably, the decision to continue hearing the case, despite the existence of reasons for
disqualification should be:
(1) coupled with a bona fide disclosure to the parties-in-litigation; and

(2) subject to express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material or
substantial. Absent such agreement, the judge may not continue to hear the case.
The judge should disclose on the record the basis for his disqualification. Perhaps prompted by a cultural
sense of delicadeza, some magistrates state only "personal reasons" as the ground for inhibiting
themselves. The parties affected often would often not question such disqualification, usually for fear of
incurring the judges ire. However, such vague reasoning is not acceptable, as it would effectively place
voluntary disqualification at the whim of the judge. This kind of latitude is not the intended effect of the
rule.
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct created a specific and strictly-followed procedure for remittal of
disqualification. To effectively remit disqualification, a judge must disclose on the record the basis of the
disqualification and ask parties and lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive
disqualification. As long as the disqualification is not based upon personal bias or prejudice, the parties and
lawyers may all agree that the judge should not be disqualified. If all parties and the judge agree that the
judge should participate, the judge may participate, and must incorporate the agreement into the record
of the proceeding.
Each step must be strictly followed. Any deviation renders the waiver invalid. For example, the judge must
affirmatively disclose facts that might be grounds for disqualification.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the judge must obtain a waiver from both lawyers and parties. Waivers by
lawyers alone will not suffice.
The judge is invested with the great responsibility of ensuring that the judiciarys impartiality will forever
be maintained and upheld. The decision of whether the judge will proceed or recuse in a case depends on
which course of action would allow the parties to be properly heard and given their day in court so that
ultimately the ends of justice are fully served.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
The requirement that judges be free from impropriety or any appearance thereof is closely related to the
maintenance of integrity and promotion of confidence in the judiciary. Judicial ethics cases decided before
the adoption of this new Code were often decided on the grounds that improper acts tended to dilute public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the courts.
The new Code of Judicial Conduct significantly expands the provisions respecting the avoidance of
impropriety. The new provisions on propriety complement and at times reiterate, principles also stated in
the other canons, especially those on independence and integrity. By prohibiting not only impropriety but
even the appearance of impropriety, the Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can
nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such.
This is so because the community holds judges to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
attorneys and other persons not invested with public trust.
For example, the United States Model Code of Judicial Conducts Commentary suggests that there is
an appearance of impropriety when the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judges ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.
The High Court held in a number of instances that acts done by a judge which are not illegal may still violate
the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Some examples include censure of a judge who heard cases on a day when he was supposed to be on official
leave, and of another judge who heard a motion while on vacation, in his room dressed in a polo jacket.
In another case, the Court stated that even if there was no clear evidence of sexual congress between a
judge and one of his subordinates, photos showing the two of them coming out of a hotel together was
enough to give rise to the appearance of impropriety that the Code strongly warns against.
Under Philippine law, even a joking remark made by a judge to a litigant suggesting that the litigant prove
he harbored no ill feelings towards the judge was improper, as was the admonition by a judge, after
conducting a marriage ceremony, that the bride and groom should sexually satisfy each other so that they
will not go astray.
In the United States, the judges own perception of motives is not relevant when considering the
appearance of impropriety.
For example, in one case, a Chief Judges racially insensitive remarks in a newspaper created an appearance
of impropriety even though the judge alleged those remarks had been misinterpreted and did not reflect
the judges personal beliefs. Because the comments significantly eroded his ability to work effectively with
all segments of the community in administering the courts, the court removed the Chief Judge from his
position.
The Philippine courts have also acknowledged the irrelevance of the judges perception of impropriety.
In Vidal v. Dojillo, the Court gave a reprimand with warning to Judge Dojillo for sitting beside the counsel
for Dojillos brother in the hearing of an election protest filed by the latter. The Court was not convinced by
Dojillos defense that he intended only to give moral support. As a judge, Dojillo should have known family
concerns are only secondary to preserving the integrity of the judiciary as a whole.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
While judges are only human, their acceptance of the judicial position means that more is expected from
them than from ordinary citizens, as their acts, both public and private, color the publics perception of the
judiciary as a whole.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to ensure not only that their conduct is above reproach,
but also that it is perceived to be so by a reasonable observer.
A judicial officer is subject to scrutiny for both public and private conduct. Such scrutiny is an unavoidable
consequence of occupying a judicial position.
Judges are thus held liable for acts that, if committed by any other person would not necessarily be deemed
improper, including the use of intemperate language and succumbing to states of inebriation during parties.
Dignified conduct is best described as conduct befitting men and women possessed of temperance and
respect for the law and for others. Thus, the Supreme Court rebuked judges who made sexually suggestive
advances to women, including inviting ladies to go with the judge and his companions to the beach, writing
letters asking a married woman to come to the judges sala after five oclock in the evening, and assigning
a female stenographer to the judges chambers.
A judge was similarly disciplined for confronting a former boyfriend and his female companion in a
restaurant, and giving false and misleading information to the police.
In the United States, judges are also discouraged from engaging in behavior that shows disregard for the
law or the judiciary.
For example, judges have been disciplined for a pattern of hostile conduct toward attorneys, court
personnel and judges, and for a pattern of making derogatory and obscene references to members of the
bar in a social setting.
This principle also applies where the judge may not have actually acted immorally, but has nevertheless
raised the suspicion of impropriety.
In Ribaya vs. Binamira-Parcia, the Court noted that there were just too many intriguing uncertainties
that surrounded the filing of a case that had become the root of an administrative complaint. The Court
ruled that although a judge had done nothing to violate the constitutional rights of the accused as alleged
by the complainant, she had nevertheless failed to erase doubts as to her manner of administering justice
within her jurisdiction.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality.
Essential to the avoidance of impropriety and its appearance is the maintenance of cold neutrality and
impartiality. This section is squarely directed at bolstering this principle as it requires judges to scrupulously
guard against any act that may be construed as an expression of bias in favor of a litigant.
In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Paderanga, the Court explained that a judge is commanded at all
times to be mindful of the high calling of a dispassionate and impartial arbiter expected at all times to be a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he
shares with his fellow mortals. Judges should refrain from inviting counsel for one side into their chambers
after or prior to sessions in court without disclosing to the other counsel the reason for such meetings,
being aggressive in demeanor towards a lawyer appearing before them, and making public comments, or
allowing court staff to make comments, on pending cases.
The high tribunal observed that constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie
to the point that favors in the future may be asked from the judge which he may find it hard to resist. If a
judge is seen eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in his or her sala,
public suspicion may be aroused, thus tending to erode the trust of litigants in the impartiality of the judge.
Such action constitutes fraternizing with lawyers and litigants which is conduct unbecoming a judge and
in violation of this canon.
Judges must be especially careful about violating this canon when distributing jobs at the court. A judge
created the appearance that the courts business was based upon the exchange of favors where the judge
hired a corporation run by a close friend of the court administrator to provide services for a court program,
the corporation then hired a relative of the court administrator to run the program, and the judge then
became engaged to a corporation accountant.
In Omana v. Yulde, a judge was found guilty of impropriety and failure to behave in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of judiciary. Respect for the office required him
to avoid fraternizing and drinking excessively with lawyers who have pending cases in his court.
On the other hand, a judge should not be too thin-skinned in his relationship with lawyers. A judge should
not hold a lawyer in contempt for an expression of concern about the impartiality of the judge, even if the
judge may have been insulted.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family represents
a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
This rule rests on the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which the judge is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to fairness and integrity. The purpose is to
preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
In Garcia v. de la Pena, a judge violated the rule on compulsory disqualification when he handled a case in
which a relative within the second degree of consanguinity was a party.
In another case, a judge violated the same rule when she did not recuse herself in a criminal case where
the accused was her brother in law, regardless of the fact that it was only after the case had been submitted
for decision that the accused became her brother-in-law.
A judge's failure to recuse himself when his son-in-law appeared as additional counsel in a case he was
trying or his failure to recuse in the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife was the
complaining witness is a patent violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court. The Code
of Judicial Ethics is violated where the judge in a preliminary investigation did not recuse himself despite
the fact that the counsel for the accused was the counsel for the judges family in a pending civil case
Even when judges do not intend to use their position to influence the outcome of cases involving family
members, it cannot be denied that a judges mere presence in the courtroom, or even writing letters to an
administrative body conducting an investigation pursuant to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions tend to
give rise to the suspicion that influence is being used.
In one United States state court, a judge was publicly reprimanded for ordering his own sons release from
custody after the son was arrested for possession of drugs. Although the court could not think of a situation
more fraught with the threat of partiality as where a judges child faces criminal charges, the fact that the
judge harbored no malicious intention or purely selfish motive by his actions mitigates in his favor. The
court settled on public reprimand as punishment.
Another judge was removed from office when she presided over an arraignment hearing pertaining to a
dishonored check given to the judges husband, particularly when the judge clearly displayed favoritism to
her husband.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients of
the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
The rationale for this section is the same as that of Section 3. The high tribunal held that it was inappropriate
for a judge to have entertained a litigant in his house particularly when the case is still pending before his
sala.
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
While judges are not expected to live a hermit-like existence or cease functioning as citizens of the Republic,
they should remember that they do not disrobe themselves of their judicial office upon leaving their salas.
In the exercise of their civil liberties, they should be circumspect and ever mindful that their continuing
commitment to upholding the judiciary and its values places upon them certain implied restraints to their
freedom.
A judge was admonished for the appearance of engaging in partisan politics when he participated in a
political rally sponsored by one party, even though he only explained the mechanics of block voting to
the audience.
The use of expletives is frowned upon by the Supreme Court. The court reprimanded a judge who used
expletives like putris and putang ina, even thought they were not directed to any particular individual.
In another case, the court found that the judge displayed unbecoming behaviour by sarcastically
commenting upon a complainants ability to read English and using phrases such as moronic attitude,
stupid, and putang inamo to describe the complainant.
SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests and shall make
reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.
This section of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should be read in conjunction with Section7 of the
Republic Act 6713, which prohibits certain personal fiduciary and financial conflicts. A judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with
the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court.
When a judge, along with two other people, acted as real estate agents for the sale of a parcel of land for
which he agreed to give a commission of P100,000 to each of his companions, and after the transaction was
completed only gave the complainants P25,000 each, the high Court held that the judge violated the section
of the prior Code of Judicial Conduct.
One way to avoid financial conflicts spawned by equity stock investments is to invest in mutual funds
because a holder of such funds is not considered to have a financial interest in the underlying stocks in the
fund.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of
a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
This rule has two parts. The first is that a judge may not use judicial office to advance private interests. The
second is that a judge may not give the impression that he or she can be influenced to use the judicial office
to advance the private interests of others.
Javier vs. de Guzman explains the rationale behind the first part. In that case, the respondent judge took
advantage of his position as a Makati Regional Trial Court judge by filing in the Makati court a collection
case in which he and his wife were the complainants. The Court ruled that although a stipulation in the
contract gave the judge, as creditor, choice of venue, the judge had nonetheless fallen short of what is
expected of him as a judicial officer. As this case was decided before the effective date of the new Code,
the Court explained that the reason for the ruling of impropriety was that peculiar Philippine psyche,
personality and culture would lead the public, and in particular the judges adversary in the collection case,
to suspect that the judge would use the choice of venue as a means to exert influence in favor of himself.
This is precisely the reason behind this particular section of the new Code.
Similarly, a judge who filed a case for estafa in his own sala and who assisted in the issuance of the warrant
of arrest against the accused was held guilty of serious misconduct.
In another case, a judge was found liable for gross misconduct when he made phone calls to the station
commander on behalf of a family friend who had been detained, and asked her bailiff to look into the status
of the car that had been left in the parking lot when the friend had been arrested.
Posting advertisements for restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address to
receive applications for such position, and of screening applicants in his court, constitute involvement in
private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of family business.
As is further shown by the Courts decision in Umale vs. Villaluz, et al., the trend since the 1960s has been
to progressively provide clearer guidelines for a judges recusal.
In the United States, a recurring issue is ticket-fixing, in which judges impermissibly take advantage of
their position to avoid punishment for traffic violations. The Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court was
sanctioned because he was stopped for a traffic violation, produced his judicial identification credential
instead of his drivers license and asked, Dont you know who I am?
Another common violation of this rule is using judicial power to exact personal vengeance. For example, it
was improper when, after a confrontation between a judges son and the sons teacher, the judge had the
teacher arrested and arraigned before him.
A judge was disciplined when, upon being served with process, he issued a bench warrant directing that the
process server be arrested for contempt of court.
SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any
other purpose related to their judicial duties.
When a judge released a draft of her decision to a party, that conduct was found to be not just a simple
breach of confidentiality but a scheme to make the party negotiate for increases in the monetary awards
to be given by the judge.
Similarly, a judge's act of personally furnishing a party copies of orders issued, without passing them
through the court docket, was considered to be highly irregular, giving rise to the suspicion that the judge
was partial to one of the parties in the case.
Overlapping somewhat with Section 8, it is improper for a judge to allow his wife to have access to court
records which are necessarily confidential, as this practice may convey the impression that she is the one
who can influence the judge's official functions.
Where respondent appellate justice announced on television that he lost a confidential draft of an order
and publicly asked the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate, he was held by the Supreme Court
to have been guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of
justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system,
the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise
interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
This section allows the judge to participate in legal academia and public discourse on legal matters with the
proviso that there shall be no interference in the performance of the judges primary functions with respect
to his or her jurisdiction. However, in dealing with the media, the Philippine Judicial Academy suggests that
a judge or court should avoid acrimonious debate with reporters and the public, for a knee jerk reaction
from the court or judge may only provoke negative follow-up reports and articles.
This sections tolerance of judicially-related activities is limited by Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which prohibits judges from being designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative
functions.
In the landmark case of In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, a judge sought the Courts
permission to accept membership in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, an administrative
body. The Court denied his request, ruling that allowing the judges membership would be a violation of the
constitutional provision on the discharge by members of the judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-
judicial or administrative agencies.
The Manzano decision did include the qualification that the constitutional prohibition should not be
construed as a directive to avoid all involvement with organizations concerned with judicial interests. As
the Court stated therein: This declaration does not mean that RTC judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to the Province/City Committee on Justice.
As incumbent RTC judges, they form part of the structure of governmentEven as non-membersRTC
judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Under Subsection (c), a judge may not engage in private business without the written permission of the
Supreme Court.
In NBI v. Villanueva, a judge was found to have taken his business consultancy with a woman too far where
it was shown that they were sleeping in the same bedroom and having breakfast together.
SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
This prohibition is based on the inherent incompatibility of the rights, duties and functions of the office of
an attorney with the powers, duties and functions of a judge.
The practice of law in the United States has not been confined to services by an attorney in a court
of justice; it also includes any service of a legal nature rendered outside of courts and unrelated to matters
pending in the courts. It is uniformly held that writing and interpreting wills, contracts, trust agreements,
and the giving of legal advice in general constitute practicing law.
Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from overtly representing clients as counsel of record, but also
from acting more subtly in a way more befitting an advocate than a judge. For example, a judge may not meet
with a complainant to give him advice.
The due process requirement of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge is denied the accused when the
court assumes the dual role of magistrate and advocate by asking many questions of an accused.
While municipal judges can administer oaths or execute certificates on matters related to their official
functions, they cannot notarize private documents.
However, it should be noted that judges assigned to municipalities and circuits may act as notaries public
provided that:
(1) all notarial fees charged be to the governments account, and
(2) certification be made in the notarial documents attesting to the lack of lawyers or notary in the
municipality or circuit.
Otherwise, the act of a judge in notarizing a pleading in a case which is not pending in that judges sala, or
in notarizing private documents, constitutes unlawful practice of law in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, as implemented by SC Circular 1-90.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the
interests of judges.
This rule also recognizes the difference between membership in associations of judges and membership in
associations of other legal professionals. While attendance at lavish events hosted by lawyers might create
an appearance of impropriety, participation in judges-only organizations does not. In the United States,
judges are encouraged to take part in activities of bar associations and other organizations dedicated to the
improvement of the legal system.
However, a judge may generally not use the resources of the federal government to do so.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance
of judicial duties.
This section should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 which prohibits public officials
from soliciting or accepting gifts. According to this provision: Public officials and employees shall not solicit
or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of money value
from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated
by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office. Thus, aside from constituting
serious misconduct, the act of demanding and receiving money or property from a litigant violates this
provision of the Act.
For example, a judge who accepts the free use of a car for a year or utilizes free battery charging services
from the shop of the litigant or who allows a litigant to pay for the freight of for personal acquisitions also
violates the Anti-Graft Law.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority,
to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be
done in connection with their duties or functions.
This section complements the previous section and assures that what the judge cannot do directly, may not
be done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members. The high Court held that a judge allowing
his bailiffs son to store attached property at his house constitutes misconduct.
While sections 13 and 14 cover instances where the judge is clearly the recipient of money or property from
litigants before his court, the sections are likewise relevant to cases where the transaction between the
judge and interested parties is less obvious. In a case involving the financial and judicial audit of the
municipal trial court in Koronadal, a judge was found guilty of gross misconduct for having violated these
provisions. In that case, the judge had periodically borrowed from court funds to pay for a variety of
personal expenses including his childrens tuition and medical expenses incurred for his parents illness. He
had also used evidence submitted to the Court such as guns and ammunition for his own protection.
In Dulay vs. Lelina, the Court suspended the respondent judge for six months for allowing his daughters to
accept a business partnership offered by persons with pending cases before his court.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award
or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that such gift, award or benefit might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give
rise to an appearance of partiality.
This section qualifies the last two sections by allowing judges to accept token gifts, awards, or benefits when
given as a consequence of a special occasion. As to gifts and grants from foreign countries, Section 7(d) of
R.A. 6713 allows the following:
1. The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
2. The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant
or medical treatment; or
3. The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely
outside the Philippines (such as allowances, transportation, food and lodging) of more than nominal value
if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and permitted by the
head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs.
CANON 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
This is a new Canon not found in the previous two Philippine Codes of Judicial Conduct. It expands the
measures to promote equality required by international human rights agreements. Those agreements
advocate a universal application of law and non-discrimination between the sexes. The United Nations
Charter and the International Bill of Rights, both of which the Philippines has ratified, affirm the equality of
all human beings and establish a norm of full respect of human rights and for fundamental freedom for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Moreover, the Philippines ratified the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) on August 5, 1981, which requires party states to recognize the important
economic and social contributions of women to the family and to society. It stresses the need for a change
in attitude, through education of both men and women, to accept equality of rights and responsibilities and
to overcome prejudices and practices based on stereotyped roles. In line with this Convention, Section 14,
Article II of the Constitution provides that the State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The drafters of the New Code of Judicial Conduct were well aware of the basic principles found in many
U.N. documents and thus included principles of equality and non-discrimination as are affirmation of
equality in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Acknowledgment of the unequal and unfair treatment of women and minorities within the judicial system
is a crucial first step towards achieving full equality. In order to remove biases, judges need better to
understand the impact of variables such as gender, poverty, race, illiteracy, disability, discrimination,
alcohol and drug abuse, and sexual and physical abuse on social behavior, and on their own decisions. As
the guardians of justice, courts must adhere to the principle of equality. People expect the courts to
be unaffected by differences in social status, degree of education, and even physical abilities.
Thus, Canon 5 begins with the preamble ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential
to the due performance of the judicial office.
SEC. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources,
including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual
orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.
To render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the judicial system, judges are expected to
be aware of the diversity in society that results from an increased worldwide exchange of people and
ideas. Judges must be able to avoid the infiltration of preconceptions into their decisions. They should be
mindful of the various international instruments and treaties ratified by the Philippines, which affirm the
equality of all human beings and establish a norm of non-discrimination without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
The first two articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 provide for equality of rights and
the prevention of discrimination. Since 1948, The U.N. General Assembly passed various international
conventions and declarations. These conventions are aimed at the elimination of discrimination against
specific groups. For example, the U.N. General Assembly passed the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women and its optional protocol, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and its two optional protocols, and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.
The Philippines implemented these conventions in Article II, Section 11 of the 1987Constitution, which
states, the State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Likewise, the State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
Accordingly, it is the duty of the State to ensure that there is equality before the law in all aspects of national
life by rectifying or ending all practices and systems that discriminate against women on the basis of sex.
Cognizant that a judicial system must be sensitive and responsive to gender equality, the Supreme Court
created a Committee on Gender Responsiveness in the Judiciary on March 27, 2003and approved the
Gender and Development (GAD) Mainstreaming Plan for the Philippine Judicial System on December 9,
2003.Conducting judicial proceedings in a manner and with an attitude that affirms the dignity of such
proceedings is crucial to maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.
Judges should not yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters.
They have a duty to ensure that the minority status of the accused plays no part in their decisions.
Neither should judges insult witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court.
Likewise, judges may not use derogatory or condescending language in their judgment when dealing with
a rape complaint.
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants that the judicial system is fair and just.
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, judges should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
When a judge accepts and occupies a high office in the administration of justice, he is responsible for
ensuring that his conduct, even in private arenas, reflects the dignity of the judicial office.
Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or distasteful jokes that may give even erroneous
impressions of prejudice and lead the public to believe that cases before them are being prejudged.
When a judge advised an accused of the best course of action at arraignment, it appeared that the judge
was taking sides with the accused. This behavior may create the impression that the sentence meted out
to the accused is in colorful vernacular lutong macao.
Judges should also avoid using racially derogatory language to refer to someone that is not in the
courtroom.
A judge should avoid being seen in public with litigants because it may give adverse parties the impression
that the judge is partial.
The Supreme Court reprimanded a judge who rode in the defendants car to make an inspection. The judge
aggravated the impropriety and demonstrated bias by taking an active part in the inspection, making
unwarranted observations, and directly contradicting the witness to the point of maliciously distorting
facts.
Likewise, a judge who advises a claimant to settle her claim and overtly pressures her to accept the proposal
of the employer creates the suspicion that the judge is biased in favor of the employer.
Consequently, in pending or prospective litigation, a judge should scrupulously avoid actions that may lead
to suspicion that social or business relations or friendships are influencing judicial decisions. Magistrates of
law must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise, can
withstand the highest level of public scrutiny.
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
This provision is taken from Canons 1, 9 and 10 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule3.04, Canon 3 of
the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1 states, the assumption of the office of judge casts upon the
incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct which concern his relation to, among others, the
practitioners of law in his court. Canons 9 and 10 more specifically provide that the judge should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court and that judges should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all others concerned in the
administration of justice in their courts. This is reiterated in Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the 1989 Code of
Judicial Conduct when it states, a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially
the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others before the court.
In addition, a judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made
for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
As arbiters of the law, judges should be conscientious, studious, courteous, patient and punctual in the
discharge of their judicial duties, recognizing that time of litigants, witnesses and counsel is of value. In
addressing litigants, witnesses and counsel, judges should avoid a controversial tone. Judges should be
aware that undue interference, impatience or participation in the examination of witnesses, especially
those who are excited or nervous about the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the
presentation of a case or the determination of the truth.
Judges should act with decorum toward jurors, parties, court staff, and spectators alike. They should not be
quick to interrupt a presentation by counsel, and instead show restraint.
While judges may properly intervene in a trial to promote expeditious proceedings, prevent unnecessary
waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or to clear up obscurities, the propriety of these queries is
determined by whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning.
A judge should not examine or cross-examine a witness if the questioning reveals information that destroys
the theory of one party.
Also, there is undue interference where the judges participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build
or bolster a case for one of the parties.
Judges also should not interrupt proceedings before another judge.
Unequal and disparate treatment in the courthouse, whether intentional or perceived, is unacceptable and
can negatively impact the professional lives of attorneys and employees, the assessment of claims of
litigants, and the respect and credibility of the justice system. A judge can influence the outcome of a case
in many ways. The judge is responsible for the interpretation of laws, the weighing of the testimonies and
demeanor of witnesses, and the application of the facts to the law pertaining to the case. Judges are the
dominant figure in the judicial process and the authority that determines which conduct or evidence may
or may not be allowed.
When sitting as arbiters in court, they take their personal value systems into the courtroom. They set the
tone and environment within which members of all groups, in their roles as litigants and lawyers, will be
heard.
When judges censure the use of harsh or sexist language and the inappropriate behavior of attorneys, they
protect the dignity of litigants and the judicial system. When they create a friendly and respectful
environment in court, they make vulnerable witnesses more at ease and less intimidated by the judicial
process.
Judges must also be concerned with the publics impression of the judiciary. When judges of the same court
fight with each other, slap their personnel in public, or commit acts of sexual harassment, the image of the
judiciary is impaired.
Repeated comments about a womans physical appearance, bodily functions, or manner of dress are
inappropriate.
Judges should not make insensitive and sarcastic comments in rape cases or use vulgar language in
solemnizing marriageseven off the record. Such comments demean respect for the entire judiciary and
people begin to doubt the moral standards of judges and their capacity and fitness to dispense justice.
This is also true of judges who resort to vilification of parties through the use of arrogant, intemperate and
undignified language.
It is disconcerting when courts that are expected to be paradigms of equality display any gender or racial
insensitivity or bias. The effect is the same when the insensitive act or comment is made by a lawyer
appearing in the court and the judge does not admonish the lawyer for the insensitivity.
A humane court is essential for due process. If the court environment is intimidating or biased, the court
itself may deter and limit access to justice.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence, direction or control
to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
Judges should organize their courts to ensure the prompt and convenient dispatch of business and should
not tolerate misconduct by clerks, sheriffs and other assistants who are sometimes prone to expect favors
or special treatment due to their professional relationship with the judge.
Judges should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence
in court management and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and
court personnel.
They should ensure that clerks and other personnel faithfully perform the functions assigned to them as
well as observe at all times high standards of public service and fidelity.
Judges should ensure that court personnel under their supervision do not discriminate by dispensing special
favors or disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized person, regardless of whether such
information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
All personnel involved in the dispensation of justice should conduct themselves with a high degree of
responsibility.
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service, where personnel should act with self-restraint and
civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
Judges and clerks of court must therefore take proper action against the misdeeds of employees. While the
traditional value of pakikisama often fosters harmony and good relationships in the workplace, it cannot
be allowed to frustrate or prejudice the administration of justice.
The conduct and behavior of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and therefore they should
refrain from the use of language that it is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper.
Any misbehavior, whether true or only perceived is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of
justice.
The men and women who work in the judiciary must always act with propriety as the image of the court
is reflected in the conduct of its personnel.
SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in
proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Judges should conduct proceedings in court with dignity and in a manner that reflects the importance and
seriousness of proceedings. They should maintain order and proper decorum in the court.
Since judges set the tone and environment of the court proceedings, they should censure lawyers who use
sexist language or inappropriate behavior in court.
They should hold lawyers to the requirements of Rule 12.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Judges have the duty to prevent lawyers from abusing witnesses with unfair treatment. Witnesses have the
following rights and obligations as provided for in
Rule 132, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1)To be protected from irrelevant, improper or insulting questions and from a harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3)Not to be examined except as to matters pertinent to the issues before the court;
(4)Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or
(5)Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade the witness reputation, but a witness must answer the
fact of any previous final conviction for a criminal offense.
Women appearing as witnesses or litigants have found themselves subjected to inappropriate, overly
familiar and demeaning forms of address, comments on their personal appearance, sexist remarks, jokes
and unwelcome advances.
As courts are expected to ensure equality, any lawyer who makes an insensitive or demeaning comment in
court should be admonished.
In People v. Bores, the Supreme Court opined that the frightful experience of being questioned about rape
committed against children requires the highest degree of tact, patience and diplomacy. Thus, excessive
queries to a 6-year old child as to whether she remembered step-by-step the sexual intercourse at the
hands of the accused were unnecessary and inappropriate.
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
Judicial office demands competence and diligence. The administration of justice, the Supreme Court
affirms, is a sacred task ... and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He
becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly, of justice.Hence, the Constitution
prescribes that he must be a person of proven competence, as a requisite of his membership in the
Judiciary.
SEC. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
Though a judge has a duty to not sit where disqualified, a judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse
himself when the circumstances do not require recusal.
Amended in 1974, an American statute mandates that a judge sit in a case unless there is a reasonable
question as to the judges impartiality. Thus, a judge should not recuse himself simply to avoid sitting on
difficult or controversial cases.
SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of
judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the
judicial office or the courts operations.
Violations of this section often involve a failure to keep records or handle funds incompliance with court
rules.
An excessive caseload might provide a defense if, for example, the case load is due to the unusual absence
of another magistrate.
However, if the excuse for the failure to comply with the rules is the general insufficiency of staff, the judge
may still be subject to discipline.
SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities
necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and
other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
Judges are regarded as persons learned in the law and it is in part their masterful grasp of the law that
sustains public trust in their work and in the confidence of the people and the legal profession in the
administration of justice. The Supreme Court has said, service in the judiciary means a continuous study
and research on the law from beginning to end.
Judges are perceived as the visible representation of the law, an intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests.
Canon 4 of the 1946 Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that since the judge is to administer the law and
apply it to the facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law, diligent in endeavoring to ascertain
the facts.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to maintain professional
competence.
Under the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure constitutes a serious charge for which
disciplinary proceedings may be instituted by the Supreme Court against judges of regular and special courts
as well as against justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
If guilty, the respondent judge may be subject to dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits other than accrued leave credits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or controlled
corporations.
The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges.
As advocates of justice and visible representation of the law, the public expects judges to be conversant
with the developments of law and jurisprudence and proficient in their application or interpretation of it.
It is imperative that judges be well-informed of basic legal principles. Judges are not, however, expected to
be infallible; not every error or irregularity committed by judges in the performance of official duties is
subject to administrative sanction. In the absence of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do
injustice, incorrect rulings do not constitute misconduct and may not give rise to a charge of gross ignorance
of the law.
Thus, judges are not liable for every erroneous order or decision; otherwise the judicial office becomes
unbearable and they will be the objects of endless harassment.
Good faith and absence of malice or corruption are sufficient defenses to charges of ignorance of the law.
However, the Supreme Court admonished that good faith of fallible discretion inheres only within the
perimeter of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margin of error.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, an error or irregularity on the part of the judge in the application
or interpretation of the law must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption.
Resort to administrative sanction is an exceptional remedy. The normal course of action is to correct the
errors or irregularities in the application of law by the judge by way of motion for reconsideration, or where
appropriate under the rules of procedure, motion for new trial or special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.
The Supreme Court provided the following guideline in Maquiran v. Grageda: Now, the established
doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of
other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said
to have opened, or closed.
SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international law, including
international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
In the Philippines, this provision of the code is implicit within Section 4 as well. The Constitution
incorporates the two principal sources of international law general or customary norms and conventional
norms. Subject to conditions set forth in the fundamental law, both customary and conventional norms of
international law are part of Philippine law.
Customary norms are binding on all States. They are the norms of international law referred to in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution when it provides that the Philippines adopt the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
As to conventional or treaty law, the Constitution in Section 21, Article VII prescribes that when at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate concur in a treaty or international agreement, it may become
part of Philippine domestic law. This means that the treaty becomes binding as domestic law even though
it is also a source of international obligations.
The main legal instruments of international human rights enjoy the same status in Philippine law. In
particular, the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party. Moreover, a great number of these rights are considered general norms of
international law and thus form part of Philippine law by constitutional mandate. The International Court
of Justice considers the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person as erga
omnes obligations, that is, obligations of every State towards the international community as a whole. They
are the concern of all States; all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.
Within its own territory, the Philippines has the obligation to respect the civil and political rights recognized
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights without discrimination as to national origin,
among other factors an obligation that binds both its citizens and foreign nationals within its jurisdiction.
Norms of international law become the concern of judges because they form part of legal standards by
which their competence and diligence required by the New Code of Judicial Conduct are to be measured.
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.
The essence of the judicial function is expressed in Section 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay. This principle
permeates the whole system of judicature, and supports the legitimacy of the decrees of judicial tribunals.
Canon 18 of the 1946 Canons of Judicial Ethics defines the scope of judicial duties. In the trial and resolution
of particular controversies -- the core of judicial function -- a judges duty is the application of general law
to particular instance[s], deciding cases impartially and without undue delay.
A judges duty includes the management of the judicial office. Canon 18 directs a judge to administer his
office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Judges are required under Canon 8
to organize their courts with the view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business.The core of the
judicial function is to administer justice impartially and without delay.
More specifically, in every case, a judicial officer shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
A judge must also deal efficiently with administrative responsibilities. According to Rule 3.09 of Canon 3, he
or she should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
Outside of their core judicial duties, Rule 4.01 Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to:
(1) speak, write, lecture, teach or participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system and
the administration of justice;
(2) appear at public hearing before a legislative or executive body on matters concerning the law, the legal
system or the administration of justice and otherwise consult with them on matters concerning the
administration of justice;
(3) serve on any organization devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration
of justice.
Explicit in this Rule is the limitation that the judge may only engage in these activities to the extent that
they do not impair the performance of judicial duties or cast doubt on the judges impartiality.
Rule 5.01 of Canon 5 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct also permits the judge to:
(1) write, lecture, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

(2) participate in sports and other special recreational activities;
(3) participate in civil and charitable activities;
(4) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political educational,
religions, charitable, fraternal, or civil organization.
The judge, however, is subject to the restriction that such activities do not interfere with the performance
of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court.
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
Canon 2 of the 1946 Canons of Judicial Ethics affirms the principle that the courts are made for the litigants,
not the litigants for the courts.
Punctuality was required under Canon 7, recognizing that the time of the litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value.
Canon 8 did not allow judges to tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, sheriffs, and other assistants.
Canon 9 required consideration of witnesses and others in attendance in court. Canon 14 prohibited the
undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, as well as interruptions
of counsel in their arguments except to clarify the judges mind as to their positions.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct required the judge to:
(1) maintain order and proper decorum in the court (Rule 3.03, Canon 3);
(2) facilitate performance of administrative functions of other judges and court personnel (Rule 3.08, Canon
3); and require court personnel to observe highstandards of public service and fidelity at all times (Rule
3.09, Canon 3).
In Briones v. Ante, Jr. the respondent judge was guilty of committing acts unbecoming of a judge and abuse
of authority when he shouted invectives and threw a chair at the complainant, resulting in wrist and other
injuries to the complainant.
In Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva, the respondent judge was found guilty of serious misconduct and inefficiency
by reason of habitual tardiness. He was fined and suspended for judicial indolence.
A judge may be subject to an administrative fine for inefficiency, neglect, and unreasonable delay in
elevating the records of a civil case to the Court of Appeals. As the Supreme Court has stressed, as an
administrative officer of the court, a judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business and require at all times the observance of high standard of public
service and fidelity. A delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate court, where
a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusable.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a magistrate
must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge.
A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over
his domain. Such an image is evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
The Court goes on to stress that government service is people-oriented.
Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-
restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
Canon 3 of the 1946 Code of Judicial Ethics stated that the official conduct of the judge should be free from
the appearance of impropriety. His or her personal behavior should be beyond reproach in the
performance of judicial duties as well as in everyday life. Canon 23 did not allow a judge to accept duties
that would interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official
functions.
Canon 28 required judges to abstain from participating in any judicial acts in whichpersonal interests are
involved.
Canon 29 disallowed judges from accepting any presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing
before them.
Under the 1989 Code of Judicial Ethics, judges were required to avoid financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
While Rule 5.03 of Canon 5 permitted Judges to hold and manage investments, they were prohibited from
serving as an officer, director, manager, adviser, or employee of any business except as director of a family
business of the judge.
Rule 5.04 of this Canon prevented judges or any member of their families to accept a gift, bequest, favor
or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law.
Rule 5.07 of Canon 5 prohibited private practice of law by a judge, or any other profession in conflict with
judicial functions.
In Beso v. Daguman, a judge neglected his duty when he failed to exercise extra care in ensuring that
records of the cases and official documents in his custody were intact. The Supreme Court reiterated that
judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business.
By issuing orders indefinitely postponing the hearing of election protest, the judge in De laCruz v. Pascua
manifested inefficiency in the disposition of an election protest case and thus overtly transgressed basic
mandatory rules for expeditious resolution of cases.
DEFINITIONS
In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the
words used:
Court staff includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
Judge means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.
Judges family includes a judges spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-inlaw, and any other relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and
who lives in the judges household.
This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct heretofore applied in the Philippines to
the extent that the provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code: Provided, however, that in case of
deficiency or absence of specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial
Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character.
This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall take effect on the first day of June 2004,
following its publication not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of large circulation in the Philippines to
ensure its widest publicity.
Promulgated this 27th day of April 2004. The Code took effect on June 1, 2004.
Philippine Notarial Law

Group 6
Luna Marie Dominique S. Acosta

Lyra J. Aguilar
Rita Ann S. Caslib
Glenn Enterina
Cecilio M. Sereo
Katrina Paula R. Solis
Gil S. Taojo III
Roi D. Uayan
The practice of law is imbued with public interest. It is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts and to the nation.
Adherences to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession, and regular payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are the conditions required for remaining member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and the clients must repose in him or unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional
privilege.
One of the many functions of a lawyer is to become a Notary Public. A notary public exercises duties which call for
carefulness and faithfulness. He must inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and take no part in
any illegal or immoral enterprise. By applying for and having commissioned as notary public, a lawyer assumes these
duties in a dual capacity, in the non-performance of which duties; he may be disciplined as a member of the bar.
The 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02- 8-13-SC) give us guidelines regarding the notarial practice in the
Philippines. This was promulgated on July 6, 2004 and took effect on the First day of August, 2004.1
What is Notarization?
It refers to any act that a notary public empowered to perform such as acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations
including jurats, signature witnessing and copy certifications.
Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act for notarization which converts a private document to a public
instrument and making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution.2 What effect does notarization have on a document?
Notarization converts a private to document into a public document and renders the document admissible in court
as evidence without need for further proof of its authenticity. It is invested, with substantial public interest and a
notarized document is entitled by law, to full faith and credit upon its face. Notarization also vests upon the
document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof.3
THE PURPOSES
1. To promote, serve and protect public interest;
2. To simplify, clarify and modernize the rules governing notaries public; and
1 Sec 2 Rule XII, Rules of Notarial Practice

2 Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez A.C. no. 8384 April 11, 2013
3 Sec. 30, Rule 132, Rules of court: De Rosales vs Ramos, A.C. No. 5645, July 2, 2002
3. To foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Acknowledgment. this refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document:
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these rules
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him
for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document
as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority
to sign in that capacity.
Examples of documents or instruments that are acknowledged before a notary public are deeds, contracts, and
agreements.
Affirmation or Oath. - The term Affirmation or Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) Appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules; and
(c) Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.
Commission- It refers to the grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to the written evidence of the authority.
Copy Certification. It refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor publicly
recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
Notarial Register. - refers to a permanently bound book with numbered pages containing a chronological record of
notarial acts performed by a notary public.
Jurat - refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
Examples of documents or instruments that contain jurats are Affidavits and Certifications.
A lawyer may be disciplined for notarizing a document in the absence of the affiant4 or for not disclosing on its face
the fact that the person who signed it is an authorized agent. While the irregularities are not so serious as to warrant
suspension or disbarment, they nevertheless require the lawyers reprimand or censure for they not only show
carelessness and lack of caution and resourcefulness in the performance of his duties as notary public but also a
violation of the attorneys oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.5
If the document he notarized turned out to have been falsified, without that fact being known to him at time, he
may still be admonished for not taking pains to ascertain the identity of the person who acknowledged the
instrument before him.6 But his acting in good faith under an honest mistake of fact in the discharge of his duties as
notary public is an exempting circumstance.7
Notarial Act and Notarization refer to any act that a notary public is empowered to perform under these Rules.
Notarial Certificate refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is completed
by the notary public, bears the notarys signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a
particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.
Notary Public and Notary- refer to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules.
Principal- refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization.
Regular Place of Work or Business- refers to a stationary office in the city or province wherein the notary public
renders legal and notarial services.
Competent Evidence of Identity - The phrase competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature
of the individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither
of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary identification.
Examples of Competent Evidence of Identity:
passport, driver's license,

Professional Regulations Commission ID,
National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, Barangay Certification
postal ID, voter's ID,
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card,
Senior Citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development certification (Section 12 of Rule II, 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008);
oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
4 Ramirez v. Ner, 21 SCRA 267 (1967)

5 Lopez vs Casalang, 24 SCRA 731 (1968)
6 Cailing vs Espinosa, 103 PHIL 1165 (1958)
7 Soto vs Lacre, 77 SCRA 453 (1977)
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
The 2004 Notarial Rule requires that an affiant show or exhibit an identification issued by an government agency
which shows on its face his picture and signature and the same should be reflected in the notarial certification or a
statement therein made by the notary public that the affiant is personally known to him, whenever a document is
acknowledged is notarized before a notary public.8
Can a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) or Cedula be presented instead?
No. While CTCs have previously been valid as proof of identity, the present Rules no longer consider the same as
valid since it does not contain any photograph of the person and may be easily obtained without any supporting
documents, and therefore is not a competent evidence of identity.
Exhibition of a residence certificate or CTC is not sufficient, the picture of the affiant is not shown in the said
certificate. The requirement will enable the notary to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him and
to unmask the impostors. A notary public is guilty of misconduct in making it appear in the jurat of a document that
affiant exhibited to him a residence certificate when in fact he did not do so. Such misrepresentation is censurable
and justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer as a member of the bar and as a notary public.9
Official Seal or Seal. - Official seal or Seal refers to a device for affixing a mark, image or impression on all papers
officially signed by the notary public conforming the requisites prescribed by these Rules.
Signature Witnessing. - The term signature witnessing refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
as defined by these Rules; and
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public
Court. Refers to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioner. Refers to a person who applies for a notarial commission.
Office of the Court Administrator. Refers to the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Couty.
Executive Judge. Refers to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of a city or province who issues a notarial
commission.
Vendor. Under these Rules it refers to a seller of a notarial seal and shall include a wholesaler or retailer.
Manufacturer. Under these Rules it refers to one who produces a notarial seal and shall include an engraver and
seal maker.
WHO MAY BE A NOTARY PUBLIC?
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
8 Vda. de Guerrero v. Rodrigo, Jr. , 38 SCRA 283 (1970)

9 Supra
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular place of work or business
in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.10
FORM AND CONTENTS OF PETITION FOR NOTARIAL COMMISSION
Every petition for a notarial commission shall be in writing, verified, and shall include the following:
(a) a statement containing the petitioner's personal qualifications, including the petitioner's date of birth, residence,
telephone number, professional tax receipt, roll of attorney's number and IBP membership number;
(b) certification of good moral character of the petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers of the local chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where he is applying for commission;
(c) proof of payment for the filing of the petition as required by these Rules; and
(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs with light background taken within thirty (30) days of the application.
The photograph should not be retouched. The petitioner shall sign his name at the bottom part of the
photographs.11
10 section 1, Rule 3 AM 02-18-13-SC

11 section 2, Rule 3 Ibid.
PAYMENT OF APPLICATION FEE
Every petitioner for a notarial commission shall pay the application fee as prescribed in the Rules of Court.12
12 section 3, Rule 3 Ibid.

Summary Hearing on the Petition
The Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing on the petition and shall grant the same if:
(a) the petition is sufficient in form and substance;

(b) the petitioner proves the allegations contained in the petition; and
(c) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the Executive Judge that he has read and fully understood these
Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission and a Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal
in favor of the petitioner.
The Notice of Summary Hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where
the hearing shall be conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the
Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the petitioner. The notice may include more than one
petitioner.
Any person who has any cause or reason to object to the grant of the petition may file a verified written opposition
thereto. The opposition must be received by the Executive Judge before the date of the summary hearing.
FORM OF NOTARIAL COMMISSION

The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall be valid for a period of three (3) months from date
of issue, unless extended by the Executive Judge.
A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be purchased by the notary public pursuant to the Certificate shall
be presented to the Executive Judge for approval prior to use.
Every person commissioned as notary public shall have only one official seal of office in accordance with these Rules.
A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.
The Executive Judge shall keep and maintain a Register of Notaries Public in his jurisdiction which shall contain,
among others, the dates of issuance or revocation or suspension of notarial commissions, and the resignation or
death of notaries public. The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the Court Administrator information and
data recorded in the register of notaries public. The Office of the Court Administrator shall keep a permanent,
complete and updated database of such records.
A notary public may file a written application with the Executive Judge for the renewal of his commission within
forty-five (45) days before the expiration thereof. A mark, image or impression of the seal of the notary public shall
be attached to the application.
Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the name of the notary public in the register of
notariespublic.
The notary public thus removed from the Register of Notaries Public may only be reinstated therein after he is issued
a new commission in accordance with these Rules.
The Executive Judge shall, upon payment of the application fee mentioned in Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an
application for the renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If the application is denied,
the Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor.
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1.Powers. - (A) A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial acts:
(1) Acknowledgments;
Acknowledgment refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

Appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document;
Is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
Represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed
by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative
capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.13
(2) Oaths and affirmations;

It refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
Appears in person before the notary public;
Is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.14
Who are the officers authorized to administer oaths?

A: The following officers have general authority to administer oaths:
1. President;
2. Vice-President;
3. Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
4. Members of the Judiciary;
5. Secretaries of Departments;
6. provincial governors and lieutenant-governors;
7. City mayors;
8. Municipal mayors;
9. Bureau directors;
10. Regional directors;
11. Clerk of courts;
12. Registrars of deeds;
13. Other civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines whose appointments
are vested in the President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
14. All other constitutional officers;
13 Sec. 1, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC

14 Sec. 2,Rule II,A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
15. PAO lawyers in connection with the performance of duty; and

16. notaries public.15
(3) Jurats;
It refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
2. Is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice;
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
4. Takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.16
(4) Signature witnessings;

It refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
2. Is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public.17
(5) Copy certifications;

It refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
1. Is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor publicly
recordable;
2. Copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
3. Compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
4. Determines that the copy is accurate and complete.18
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.
(B) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument or
document presented for notarization if:
1. the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
2. both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
3. the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of
signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary
public"; and
4. (4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment,
jurat, or signature witnessing.
(C) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or make a mark on an
instrument or document if:
1. the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
2. the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses
to the instrument or document;
3. both witnesses sign their own names ;
15 Sec. 41
16 Sec. 6, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC

17 Sec. 14, Rule II, A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC
18 Sec. 4, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC
4. the notary public writes below his signature: Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names and
addresses of person and two [2] witnesses); and
5. the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular place of work or business;
provided, however, that on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may be performed at the
request of the parties in the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
1. public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be administered;
2. public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
3. hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is confined for
treatment; and
4. any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under detention.
N.B. The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from
being a violation of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.19
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
1. is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
2. is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Importance of personally at the time of the notarization: See PIKE P. ARRIETA, vs. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA20
SEC. 3.Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized; See Villarin v Sabate21
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash,
property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal within the fourth civil degree.
Citing Albano v. Mun. Judge Gapusan22, the Court ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership through the notarization of a Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.23
SEC. 4.Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public reasonable doubt as
to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will.
SEC. 5.False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not:

(a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
19 [Laquindanum v. Quintana, AC No. 7036 (2009)

20 [A.C. No. 4369. November 28, 1997]
21 AC No. 3224, Feb. 2000
22 A.M. No. 1022-MJ, (1976)
23 [Espinosa v. Omaa (2011)]
SEC. 6.Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary public shall not notarize:

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.
RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1.Imposition and Waiver of Fees. - For performing a notarial act, a notary public may charge the maximum
fee as prescribed by the Supreme Court unless he waives the fee in whole or in part.
Under RULE 141 of the Rules of Court LEGAL FEES
Sec. 12. Notaries. -- No notary public shall charge or receive for any service rendered by him any fee,
remuneration or compensation in excess of those expressly prescribed in the following schedule:
For protests of drafts, bills of exchange, or promissory notes for non-acceptance or non-payment,
and for notice thereof, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
For the registration of such protest and filing or safekeeping of the same, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00)
PESOS;
For authenticating powers of attorney, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
For sworn statement concerning correctness of any account or other document, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS;
For each oath of affirmation, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
For receiving evidence of indebtedness to be sent outside, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
For issuing a certified copy of all or part of his notarial register or notarial records, for each page,
ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
For taking depositions, for each page, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and
For acknowledging other documents not enumerated in this section, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00)
PESOS.
A notary public may charge travel fees and expenses separate and apart from the notarial fees prescribed in the
preceding section when traveling to perform a notarial act if the notary public and the person requesting the notarial
act agree prior to the travel.
No fee or compensation of any kind, except those expressly prescribed and allowed herein, shall be collected or
received for any notarial service.
A notary public shall not require payment of any fees specified herein prior to the performance of a notarial act
unless otherwise agreed upon.
Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public prior to the performance of a notarial act are not subject to
refund if the notary public had already travelled but failed to complete in whole or in part the notarial act for reasons
beyond his control and without negligence on his part.
A notary public who charges a fee for notarial services shall issue a receipt registered with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and keep a journal of notarial fees. He shall enter in the journal all fees charged for services rendered.
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in his office a complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees.
Form of Notarial Register.

A.) A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these rules, a
chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered pages.
The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the SolGen to any notary public upon request and
payment of the cost thereof.
The regiser shall be duly paged, and on the first page, the SolGen shall certify the number of pages of which
the book consists.
For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of Agreement or Understanding may be entered into by the
Office of the SolGen and the Office of the Court Administrator.
Entries in the notarial register.
A.) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the
following:
1. the entry number and page number;

2. the date and time of day of the notarial act;
3. the type of notarial act;
4. the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
5. the name and address of each principal;
6. the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known
to the notary;
7. the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
8. the fee charge for the notarial act;
9. the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work or
business; and
10. any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
B.) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the reasons and circumstances for not completing a
notarial act.
C.) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the circumstances of any request to inspect or copy an
entry in the notarial register, including the requester's name, address, signature, thumbmark or other
recognized identifier, and evidence of identity. The reasons for refusal to allow inspection or copying of a
journal entry shall also be recorded.
D.) When the instrument or document is a contract, the notary public shall keep an original copy thereof as
part of his records and enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to
each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. He shall also retain a
duplicate original copy for the Clerk of Court
E.) The notary public shall give to each instsrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document
the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
F.) If case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange or promissory note, the notary public shall make a full and
true record of all proceedings in relation thereto and shall note therein:
whether the demand for the sum of money was made, by whom, when, and where;
whether he presented such draft, bill or note;
whether notices were given, to whom and in what manner;

where the same was made, when and whom and where directed; and
of every other fact touching the same.
G.) At the end of each week, the notary public shall certify in his notarial register the number of instruments
or documents executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, ghis certificate shall
show this fact.
H.) A certified copy of each month's entries and duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged
before the notary public shall, within the first ten (10) days of the month following, be forwarded to the
Clerk of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the
month, the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein reauired.
Signatures and Thumbmarks
At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be signed or thumb or other mark affixed by each:
principal;
credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal;
witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by the notary public on behalf of a person
physically unable to sign.
Inspection, Copying and Disposal
A.) In the notary's presence, any person may inspect an entry in the notarial register, during regular business hours,
provided:
the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent evidence of
identity as defined in these Rules;
the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the notarial
register in a separate, dated entry;
the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the principal in the
notarial act or acts sought; and
the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
B. ) The notarial rigester may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an official investigation or
by virtue of a court order.
C. ) If the notary public has a rsasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or wrongful motive in
requesting information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to any entry or entries therein.
Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial Register
A.) In case the notarial register is stolen, lost destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable or illegible as a
record of notarial acts, the notary public shall, within ten (10) days after informing the appropriate law enforcement
agency in the case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgement, including registered mail and also provide a copy or number of any pertinent police report.
B.) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or death of the notary public, the notarial register and
the notarial records shall immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive Judge.
Issuance of Certified True Copies

The notary public shall supply a certified true copy of the notarial record, or any part thereof, to any person applying
for such copy upon payment of the legal fees.
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
Official Signature In notarizing a paper instrument or document, a notary public shall:

(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the name indicated and as appearing on the notary's commission;
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time the notarial act is performed.
Official Seal - (a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his own
expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be of metal, circular in shape, two
inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the city or province and the word Philippines and his own name on
the margin and the roll of attorney's number on the face thereof, with the words "notary public" across the center.
A mark, image or impression of such seal shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing
appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial act is performed and shall be clearly impressed by
the notary public on every page of the instrument or document notarized.
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the notary public
or the person duly authorized by him.
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or other otherwise rendered
unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the notary public, after informing the appropriate law enforcement agency,
shall notify the Executive Judge in writing, providing proper receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail.
In the event a crime is committed, provide a copy or entry number of the appropriate police record. Upon receipt of
such notice, if found in order by the Executive Judge, the latter shall order the notary public to cause notice of such
loss or damage to be published, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the city or province where the notary public is commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall issue to the
notary public a new Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the notary public, or the revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, the official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge and shall be destroyed or defaced in public
during office hours.
In the event that the missing, lost or damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall be delivered by the notary
public to the Executive Judge to be disposed of. Failure to effect such surrender shall constitute contempt of court.
In the event of death of the notary public, the person in possession of the official seal shall have the duty to surrender
it to the Executive Judge.
Seal Image. - The notary public shall affix a single, clear, legible, permanent, and photographically reproducible mark,
image or impression of the official seal beside his signature on the notarial certificate of a paper instrument or
document.
Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A vendor or manufacturer of

notarial seals may not sell said product without a written
authorization from the Executive Judge.
(b) Upon written application and after payment of the application

fee, the Executive Judge may issue an authorization to sell to a
vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals after verification and
investigation of the latter's qualifications. The Executive Judge shall
charge an authorization fee in the amount of PhP 4,000 for the
vendor and PhP 8,000 for the manufacturer. If a manufacturer is
also a vendor, he shall only pay the manufacturer's authorization
fee.
(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of four (4) years
from the date of its issuance and may be renewed by the Executive Judge for a similar period upon payment of the
authorization fee mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a buyer except upon submission of a certified copy of the
commission and the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal issued by the Executive Judge. A notary
public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of name shall present to the vendor or manufacturer a certified
copy of the Confirmation of the Change of Name issued by the Executive Judge.
(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or manufacturer for each Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal.
(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall affix a mark, image or impression of the seal to the Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and submit the completed Certificate to the Executive Judge. Copies of the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and the buyer's commission shall be kept in the files of the
vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after the sale.
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of name shall present to the vendor a certified copy of
the order confirming the change of name issued by the Executive Judge.
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
Form of Notarial Certificate - The notarial form used for any notarial instrument or document shall conform to all
the requisites prescribed herein, the Rules of Court and all other provisions of issuances by the Supreme Court and
in applicable laws.
Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate. The notarial certificate shall include the following:
(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city where the notary public is commissioned, the expiration
date of the commission, the office address of the notary public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax receipt number and the place and date of issuance thereof,
and the IBP membership number.
In Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla vs. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua24, the Supreme Court stated thus: By affixing his
notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into
a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate
documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal,
he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery
of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a
private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
The Court, in Mariano Agadan, et. al., vs. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan25, likewise ruled that a notary
public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
24 A.C. No. 6655, October 11, 2011

25 A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be
mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a
private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness
and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary
public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness.
Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act - A certificate of authority evidencing the authenticity of the official seal
and signature of a notary public shall be issued by the Executive Judge upon request in substantially the following
form:
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT
I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive Judge), certify that (name of notary public), the person named in the seal
and signature on the attached document, is a Notary Public in and for the (City/Municipality/Province) of the
Republic of the Philippines and authorized to act as such at the time of the document's notarization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my signature and seal of this office this (date) day of (month) (year).
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)
In Flora C. Mariano vs. Atty. Anselmo Echanez26, the Supreme Court ruled that it is undisputable that Atty.
Echanez performed notarial acts on several documents without a valid notarial commission.
The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarizations was likewise sufficiently
established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where Atty. Echanez performed the
unauthorized notarial acts.
Atty. Echanez, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for and in Cordon, Isabela,
when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further committed a form of falsehood which is
undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
26 A.C. No. 10373, May 31, 2016

Change of Name and Address of a Notary Public
Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary public by court order or by marriage, or after ceasing to
maintain the regular place of work or business, the notary public shall submit a signed and dated notice of such fact
to the Executive Judge.
The notary public shall not notarize until:
(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the new name of the notary public and/or
change of regular place of work or business; and
(b)
(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps have been completed, the notary public may
continue to use the former name or regular place of work or business in performing notarial acts for three (3) months
from the date of the change, which may be extended once for valid and just cause by the Executive Judge for another
period not exceeding three (3) months.
Resignation - A notary public may resign his commission by personally submitting a written, dated and signed formal
notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial seal, notarial register and records. Effective from the date
indicated in the notice, he shall immediately cease to perform notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to
personally appear, the submission of the notice may be performed by his duly authorized representative.
Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous
place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have resigned
their notarial commissions and the effective dates of their resignation.
Who monitors and supervises the actions of notaries public?
The Executive Judge shall at all times exercise supervision over notaries public and shall closely monitor their
activities. 27
What are the grounds for the revocation of commission or disciplinary sanctions upon a notary public?
A. Any ground on which an application for a commission may be denied.
B. The Executive Judge may also sanction any notary public who:
1. fails to keep a notarial register;

2. fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
3. fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days of the
month following;
4. fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5. fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
27 Section 2, Rule XI
6. fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
7. fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
8. fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;
9. executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10. knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; and
11. Commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes
good cause for revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction.
Failure to keep a proper notarial register
Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial
Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission.
In the case of Rosalina de Rosales vs Atty. Mario G. Ramos 28, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty.
Ramos for violations of the Notarial Law, specifically the notarization of a Deed of Sale. The document was allegedly
entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however
denied having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of her brother Manuel. Atty. Ramos admitted in his
Answer that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document
in his Notarial Registry Book.
In this case the court had the opportunity to emphasize the importance of keeping a notarial register:
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a notarial register
where he shall record all his official acts as notary, and specifies what information with regard to the notarized
document should be entered therein. Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as
notary public The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information
regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for
acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a contract Considering the evidentiary value given to
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount
to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in fact it was not.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested
with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public the courts and the administrative offices in general. 29
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the
basic requirements of their duties.
Failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act
28 A.C. No. 5645, July 2, 2002
29 Mariano Agadan, et.al. vs Atty. Richard Kilaan [A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013]
Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their
participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of
the parties is a breach of duty. Thus was the ruling in the case of Jimmy and Juanita Anudon vs Atty. Arturo Cerfa 30
wherein Atty. Cerfa was charged with falsification of a public document and disbarment for notarizing a deed of sale
without the presence of the principal. The notary publics act of relying merely on the pronouncements of the
nephew as to the authenticity of the signatures of his aunt and uncle was clearly in contravention to the rules which
require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document is in fact the person so presented in
the document and not merely an agent or worse, a stranger.
Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. It
was clearly established in this case that Juanita and Jimmy could not have signed the deed of sale brought by their
nephew before Atty Cerfa as they were abroad at the time. Furthermore, this court pronounced that:
[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are
personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents
of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined
from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to
them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds. 31
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement
between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It
is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it.
This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the
document.
Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules
Aside from those specifically enumerated in Section 1, Rule XI, a notary public may also be sanctioned for the
violation of other provisions of the Rules. The case of Judge Lydia A. Laquindanum vs Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana32 is
instructive as to the gravity of these violations.
In this case, Atty. Quintana notarized documents outside of his area of commission and with an expired commission
in violation of Sec. 11, Rule III as well as allowing his wife to notarize documents in violation of Sec. 1 of Rule II. In
this case the Supreme Court held that the act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be
taken lightly as it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Notarizing documents with an expired
commission is also a violation since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also
amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood. Atty. Quintana is also personally accountable for the documents that
he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife.
The practice of letting secretaries or assistants undertake the notarial process is not only a violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice but also violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib33 the Court
held, thus: A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot relieve himself
of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries.
30 A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015

31 Spouses Domingo v. Reed [513 Phil. 339, 350 (2005)]
32 A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009
33 A.C. No. 5377, June 15, 2006
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. They cannot take refuge by claiming that the notarization done by a secretary was done without their
authority. Precisely, the entire process of securing a notary requires the utmost attention from the notary public
himself. A notary public is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his personnel.
Is a judge prohibited to act as a Notary Public?
Circular No. 190 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 190 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries
public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties.
In the case of Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo34, the Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and Circular No. 190, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to
present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law. He contended that as a judge, not a notary
public, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.
According to the Supreme Court, the affidavits of cohabitation he notarized were documents not connected with
the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five
years without legal impediment to marry. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he
cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before performing the marriage ceremony.
What is the process for revocation or disciplinary action?
The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate administrative proceedings against an erring notary public. A verified
complaint by an interested, affected or aggrieved person, shall also be admitted by the Executive Judge. The notary
public shall be required to file a verified answer to the complaint. If the answer of the notary public is not
satisfactory, the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of the complaint are not proven,
the complaint shall be dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the Executive Judge shall impose the
appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court for review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory, unless
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.
Publication of Revocations and Administrative Sanctions
The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have been administratively sanctioned
or whose notarial commissions have been revoked. 35
What happens upon the death of a notary public?
34 A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014

If a notary public dies before fulfilling the obligations in Section 4(e), Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII, the Executive
Judge, upon being notified of such death, shall forthwith cause compliance with the provisions of these sections. 36
Punishable Acts - The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who:
(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;

(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official records of a notary
public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official misconduct.
Reports to the Supreme Court. - The Executive Judge concerned shall submit semestral reports to the Supreme Court
on discipline and prosecution of notaries public.
In Horst Franz Ellert vs. Judge Victorio Galapon, Jr37, Judge Victorio L. Galapon, Jr. of the Municipal Trial
Court at Dulag, Leyte was charged with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial authority, ignorance of the law, unlawful
notarization, perjury, and false testimony. The Court ruled thereat: Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts may perform their functions as notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents
connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of documents which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that there was no lawyer or notary public in Dulag, Leyte.1avvphi1 Therefore,
respondent judge's action as a notary public cannot qualify as an exception.
In Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum vs. Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana38, respondent lawyer was found
performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court that issued his notarial commission. Further he was alleged to have allowed his wife to do
notarial acts in his absence. The Court elucidated thus:
The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from
being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification.
Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly
commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes.
Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers
oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood.
Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his
wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
37 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1294, July 31, 2000

38 A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009

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Code of Professional Responsibility

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.

advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is

Reason for the rule is:

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.

Gonzales-Austria, et al. vs. Abaya (176 SCRA 634):

Atty. Renomeron was disbarrerd from the practice of law.

Violation of restriction is tantamount to representing conflictive interest.

Consequences for violation of the Rule:

In Re: Ramon Galang (66 SCRA 282)

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Cloribel (31 SCRA 1)

Examples of disrespectful language:

o Labelling a judge as corrupt in a motion for inhibition;

o Calling an adverse counsel as bobo; or

Chapter 2. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Rule: Division of attorneys fees with non-lawyers is prohibited.

CHAPTER 3. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

Case: Muoz vs People, 53 SCRA 190

Comments: A lawyer must be truthful and be a minister of truth.

RESPECT DUE THE COURTS

Lawyer's First Duty is to the Courts.

Respect Due to the Courts and Judicial Officers must be Maintained.

In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595

Rule 11.01. A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02. A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Paragas v. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809

In re: Aguas, 1 Phil 1

MASINSIN VS. THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO

Extending Extraordinary Attention

Malinao, Kennerly Albert

Requieron, Areo June

Sumando, Fritzie Lynne

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

Case: Legarda v. CA, GR# 94457, March 18, 1991

ISSUE: WON the negligence of the counsel binds the petitioner

Case: LEDESMA v. CLIMACO, GR# L-23815 June 28, 1974

ISSUE: WON petitioner can demand to be withdrawn as counsel de officio

He cannot be excused for any trivial and flimsy reasons.

(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

a. Lack of competence; and

A. If its acceptance involves a violation of any of the rules of legal profession.

Case: SARENAS v. OCAMPOS, AC# 4401. January 29, 2004

Case: Mejia vs Reyes

Case: Hadjula vs. Atty. Madiana

Two-Fold Purpose of the Privilege of Attorney-Client Privilege

Case: FALAME vs. ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO

Case: MERCADO V. SEC BANK Corp

A lawyer must promote respect for the law.

A lawyer should give proper advice to his clients.

A lawyer is not gun for hire.

Case: PEDRO RAMOS v Atty. Mandagan April 6, 2016 A.C. 11128

Hence this case.

ISSUE: WON the lawyer is liable.

In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera,15 this Court held that:

To avoid the appearance of impropriety.

Funds of client should not be commingled with funds of counsel.

Case: ESPIRITU VS CABREDU 395 SCRA 19

ISSUE: WON the lawyer has a lien on documents introduced as exhibits.

Case: PEDRO RAMOS VS. ATTY MANDAGAN, supra.

Case: CONCEPTION VS ATTY. DELA ROSA, AC 10681, Feb. 3, 2015.

Case: PITCHER v ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE A.C. 9532 Oct. 8, 2013.

Sollano, Joanna Paula