5/26/2017 A.M.No.

RTJ041845

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION


ATTY.FRANKLING. A.M.No.RTJ041845
GACAL, [FormerlyA.M.No.IPINo.031831RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
versus BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.
JUDGEJAIMEI.INFANTE,
REGIONALTRIALCOURT, Promulgated:
BRANCH38,INALABEL,
SARANGANI, October5,2011
Respondent.

xx

DECISION


BERSAMIN,J.:

Itisaxiomaticthatbailcannotbeallowedtoapersonchargedwithacapitaloffense,oranoffense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
Prosecution.Anyjudgewhosoallowsbailisguiltyofgrossignoranceofthelawandtherules,and
issubjecttoappropriateadministrativesanctions.

Atty.FranklinGacal,theprivateprosecutorinCriminalCaseNo.113603oftheRegional
Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a prosecution for
murderarisingfromthekillingofFelominoO.Occasion,chargesJudgeJaimeI.Infante,Presiding
Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Branch Criminal Case No. 113603 was raffled for
arraignmentandtrial,withgrossignoranceofthelaw,grossincompetence,andevidentpartiality,
for the latters failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him
immediatelyafterallowingbail.

Antecedents

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OnMarch18,2003,JudgeGregorioR.Balanag,Jr.oftheMunicipalCircuitTrialCourtof
KiambaMaitum,SaranganiissuedawarrantforthearrestofFaustinoAnchetainconnectionwith
a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into
hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through
AssistantProvincialProsecutorAlfredoBarcelona,Jr.,affirmedthefindingsandrecommendation
ofJudgeBalanagontheoffensetobecharged,andaccordinglyfiledintheRTCaninformationfor
murderonApril21,2003(CriminalCaseNo.113603),butwitharecommendationforbailinthe
amountofP400,000.00.CriminalCaseNo.113603wasraffledtoJudgeInfantesBranch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another
releasingAnchetafromcustody.

On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante,
filedasocalledVeryUrgentMotionForReconsiderationAnd/OrToCancelBailbondWithPrayer
ToEnforceWarrantOfArrestOrIssueWarrantOfArrestAnewOrInTheAlternativeVeryUrgent
Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent
motion).

InthehearingoftheveryurgentmotiononApril29,2003,onlyAtty.Gacalandhiscollaborating
counsel appeared in court. Judge Infante directed the public prosecutor to comment on the very
urgent motion within five days from notice, after which the motion would be submitted for
resolutionwithorwithoutthecomment.Ancheta,throughcounsel,opposed,statingthatthemotion
didnotbeartheconformityofthepublicprosecutor.

AtthearraignmentofAnchetasetonMay15,2003,thepartiesandtheircounselappeared,
but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., the assigned public prosecutor, did not appear
because he was then following up his regular appointment as the Provincial Prosecutor of
SaranganiProvince.Accordingly,thearraignmentwasresettoMay29,2003.

OnMay21,2003,JudgeInfantedeniedAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotiononthegroundthat
the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the
further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to
Section5,Rule110,oftheRulesofCourt.JudgeInfantedirectedthattheconsiderationofthebail
issuebeheldinabeyanceuntilafterthepublicprosecutorhadsubmittedacomment,becausehe
wantedtoknowthepositionofthepublicprosecutoronAtty. Gacals very urgent motion having
[1]
beenfiledwithouttheapprovalofthepublicprosecutor.
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beenfiledwithouttheapprovalofthepublicprosecutor.

OnMay29,2003,thepublicprosecutorappeared,butdidnotfileanycomment.Thereupon,Atty.
Gacalsoughtauthoritytoappearasaprivateprosecutor.ThepublicprosecutordidnotopposeAtty.
Gacals request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the grant of bail to
Ancheta. In response, Judge Infante required the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty.
Gacalsmotionforreconsideration,andagainresetthearraignmentoftheaccusedtoJune20,2003.
[2]

OnJune4,2003,thepublicprosecutorfiledacomment,statingthathehadrecommendedbailasa
matterofcoursethattheordersdatedApril23,2003approvingbailuponhisrecommendationand
releasingtheaccusedwereproperandthathisrecommendationofbailwasineffectawaiverof
thepublicprosecutorsrighttoabailhearing.
ByJune20,2003,whennoorderregardingthematterofbailwasissued,Atty.Gacalsought
theinhibitionofJudgeInfanteonthegroundofhisgrossincompetencemanifestedbyhisfailureto
exercisejudicialpowertoresolvetheissueofbail.

[3]
Inhismotionforinhibition, Atty.Gacalinsistedthattheissueofbailurgentlyrequireda
resolutionthatinvolvedajudicialdeterminationandwas,forthatreason,ajudicialfunctionthat
Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with
dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained
whileAnchetawasletfreeonbailevenwithouthisfilingapetitionforbailthatsucheventalso
puttheintegrityofJudgeInfantescourtinperilandthatalthoughhismotionforreconsideration
included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his
refusaltoresolvethematterinduetimeconstitutedgrossignoranceoflaw.

Atty.GacalcontendedthatJudgeInfantewasnotworthyofhispositionasajudgeeitherbecause
he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know how to
exercise his judicial power that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to
perform the functions of a judge that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for
resolution,withorwithoutthecommentofthepublicprosecutor,butatanothertime,hedirected
thatthebailissuebesubmittedforresolution,withhislaterorderdenotingthathewouldresolve
the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor that he should not be too
dependentonthepublicprosecutorscommentconsideringthattheresolutionofthematterofbail
[4]
wasentirelywithinhisdiscretionasthejudge andthatthegrantingofbailwithoutapetitionfor
bailbeingfiledbytheaccusedorahearingbeingheldforthatpurposeconstitutedgrossignorance
[5]
ofthelawandtherules .
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[5]
ofthelawandtherules.

Finally,Atty.GacalstatedthatJudgeInfanteandthepublicprosecutorwerebothguiltyofviolating
[6]
the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue advantage to Ancheta by allowing
[7]
himbailwithouthisfilingapetitionforbailandwithoutahearingbeingfirstconducted.

OnJuly9,2003,JudgeInfantedefinitivelydeniedAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotion.

OnAugust5,2003,theOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator(OCAd)receivedfromtheOfficeofthe
OmbudsmantheindorsementoftheadministrativecomplaintAtty.GacalhadfiledagainstJudge
Infante (CPLM030581 entitled Gacal v. Infante, et al.), forwarding the records of the
administrative case for appropriate action to the Supreme Court as the exclusive administrative
[8]
authorityoverallcourts,theirjudgesandtheirpersonnel.

On August 21, 2003, then Court Administrator Prebitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the
Court) required Judge Infante to comment on the administrative complaint against him, and to
showcausewithin10daysfromreceiptwhyheshouldnotbesuspended,disbarred,orotherwise
disciplinarilysanctionedasamemberoftheBarforviolationofCanon10,Rule10.03oftheCode
ofProfessionalResponsibilitypursuanttotheresolutionoftheCourtEnBancinA.M.No.029
[9]
02SCdatedSeptember17,2002.

On October 6, 2003, the OCAd received Judge Infantes comment dated September 22, 2003, by
whichhedeniedanytransgressioninthegrantingofbailtoAncheta,statingthefollowing:

2.Attheoutset,asaclarificatorynote,accusedFaustinoAnchetaisoutonbail,notbecausehe
appliedforbaildulygrantedbythecourtbutbecausehepostedtherequiredbailsinceinthefirst
place the Fiscal recommended bail, duly approved by the Undersigned, in the amount of
P400,000.00.UnderscoringismadetostressthefactthataccusedAnchetahadactuallyneverfiled
an application for bail. Perforce, the court had nothing to hear, grant or deny an
application/motion/petitionforbailsincenonewasfiledbytheaccused.

3.Thus,thetwinOrdersdatedApril23,2003areexactlymeantasanapprovalofthebailbond
(property) posted by accused Ancheta, it being found to be complete and sufficient. They are not
orders granting an application for bail, as misconstrued by private prosecutor. (Certified true
machinecopyofthetwinOrdersdatedApril23markedasAnnex2and2aareheretoattached)

4.OnApril25,2003,privatecomplainantinthecitedcriminalcase,thrucounsel(theGacal,
GacalandGacalLawOffice),filedaVeryUrgentMotionforReconsiderationorinthealternative
VeryUrgentMotionforthisCourttoMotoPropioCorrectanApparentError,prayingthatthetwin
Orders dated April 23, 2003 be reconsidered. (Certified machine copy of the said urgent motion
markedasAnnex3isheretoattached)

5.OnApril29,2003,duringthehearingonmotion,theprivatecomplainantandhiscounsel
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5.OnApril29,2003,duringthehearingonmotion,theprivatecomplainantandhiscounsel
(privateprosecutor)appeared.TheFiscalwasnotpresent.ThecourtnonethelessorderedtheFiscal
tofilehiscomment/sonthesaidmotion.Theaccusedthruprivatecounselinanopencourthearing
opposedthesubjectmotioninasmuchasthesamebearsnoconformityoftheFiscal.Inthathearing,
the court advised the private prosecutor to coordinate and secure the conformity of the Fiscal in
filinghismotion.(CertifiedmachinecopyoftheOrderdatedApril29,2003,markedasAnnex4is
heretoattached.)

6.On May 15, 2003, the scheduled date for the arraignment of accused Ancheta, the parties
andprivateprosecutorappeared.Again,the1stAsst.ProvincialFiscal,AlfredoBarcelona,Jr.,failed
to appear who, being the next highest in rank in their Office, was processing his application for
regularappointmentasProvincialFiscalofSaranganiProvince.HewasthentheActingProvincial
FiscalDesignateinviewoftheappointmentofformerProvincialFiscalLaureanoT.AlzateasRTC
JudgeinKoronadalCity.DuetotheabsenceoftheFiscalandthemotionforreconsiderationthen
pendingforresolution,thescheduledarraignmentwasresettoMay29,2003,perOrderdatedMay
15,2003,(certifiedmachinecopyofwhichmarkedasAnnex5isheretoattached).

7.OnMay21,2003,theUndersignedresolvedtodenyforbeingproformathependingmotion
forreconsideration.AsheldintheOrderofdenial,itwasfoundthattheprivateprosecutorwasnot
dulyauthorizedinwritingbytheprovincialprosecutortoprosecutethesaidcriminalcase,norwas
he judicially approved to act as such in violation of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
CriminalProcedure.Thebailissue,however,washeldinabeyanceuntilsubmissionofthecomment
thereonbytheFiscalasthisPresidingJudgewouldlikethentoknowthepositionoftheFiscalanent
to the cited motion without his approval. The arraignment was reset to June 20, 2003. Again, the
privateprosecutorwasorallyadvisedtocoordinateandsecuretheapprovaloftheFiscalinfilinghis
motions/pleadings.(Certified machine copy of the Order dated May 21, 2003 marked as Annex 6
heretoattached)

8. On June 4, 2003, the Fiscal finally filed his Comment on the Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by private complainant thru counsel (private prosecutor). Consistently, the
FiscalinhiscommentrecommendedbailasamatterofcourseandthatheclaimedthatOrdersdated
April23,2003approvingbailuponhisrecommendationareproper,waivingineffecthisrightfora
bail hearing. (Certified true machine copy of the Fiscals comment marked as Annex7 is hereto
[10]
attached).

UnderdateofFebruary16,2004,theOCAdrecommendedafterinvestigationthatthecasebere
docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that Judge Infante be fined in the amount of
[11]
P20,000.00, viz:

EVALUATION:The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction,bebailablebysufficientsuretiesorbereleasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedby
law(Sec.13,Art.III).

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a capital
offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail
whentheevidenceisstrong,regardlessofthestageofthecriminalprosecution(Sec.7,Rule114).

WiththeaforequotedprovisionsoftheConstitutionandtheRulesofCriminalProcedureasa
backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail to the accused dispense with the
hearingofApplicationforBail?

The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 0361, entitled Benito M. Occasion vs.
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The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 0361, entitled Benito M. Occasion vs.
FaustinoAnchetaforMurderwasconductedbyJudgeGregorioR.Balanag,Jr.,ofMCTC,Kiamba
Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of probable cause that an offense of Murder was
committedandtheaccusedisprobablyguiltythereof,hetransmittedhisresolutiontotheOfficeof
theProvincialProsecutor,togetherwiththerecordsofthecase,withNoBailRecommended.Upon
review of the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office of the Provincial
ProsecutorofSarangani,hefiledtheinformationforMurderagainstaccusedFaustinoAnchetabuta
bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the latter was recommended. Relying on the
recommendationoftheFiscal,respondentjudgegrantedtheApplicationforBailoftheaccused.

The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
(Art.248,RPC).Byreasonofthepenaltyprescribedbylaw,Murderisconsideredacapitaloffense
and,grantofbailisamatterofdiscretionwhichcanbeexercisedonlybyrespondentjudgeafterthe
evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable
beforeajudgecanproperlydeterminewhethertheprosecutionsevidenceisweakorstrong(People
vs.Dacudao,170SCRA489).Itbecomes,therefore,aministerialdutyofajudgetoconducthearing
themomentanapplicationforbailisfilediftheaccusedischargedwithcapitaloffenseoranoffense
punishablebyreclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment.Ifdoubtcanbeentertained,itfollowsthatthe
evidenceofguiltisweakandbailshallberecommended.Ontheotherhand,iftheevidenceisclear
andstrong,nobailshallbegranted.

Verily,respondentjudgeerredwhenheissuedanordergrantingtheapplicationforbailfiledby
theaccused(AnnexC)basedmerelyontheorderissuedbytheFiscal(AnnexA)recommendingbail
of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the
affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and
authoritytodeterminewhethertheevidenceagainsttheaccusedwhoischargedwithcapitaloffense
isstrongornot.

After the respondent judge has approved the property bond posted by the accused, the
complainant,asprivateprosecutorfiledaMotionforReconsiderationand/orCancelBailbondorin
thealternative,VeryUrgentMotiontoMotoPropriocorrectanApparentError.Onthehearingofthe
Motion on 29 April 2003, the Fiscal was absent but he (the Fiscal) was given five (5) days from
receiptoftheorderwithinwhichtofilehiscommentand,withorwithoutcommenttheincidentis
deemed submitted for resolution and, hearing of the Motion was reset to May 15, 2003. But the
Fiscal again failed to appear on said date and, the arraignment of the accused was set on 29 May
2003.On21May2003,respondentjudgeresolvedtodenytheMotiononthegroundthattheprivate
prosecutor was not authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or the Regional
StateProsecutortoprosecutethecase,subjecttotheapprovalofthecourt,pursuanttoSect.5,Rule
110RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure.

The need for an authority in writing from the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or Regional
StateProsecutortothePrivateProsecutortoprosecutethecase,subjecttotheapprovalofthecourt,
contemplates of a situation wherein there is no regular prosecutor assigned the court, or the
prosecutor assigned, due to heavy work schedule, cannot attend to the prosecution of pending
criminalcasestoexpeditedispositionofthecase.ThisprovisionoftheRulesofCriminalProcedure
does not prevent the offended party who did not reserve, waive nor institute separate civil action,
frominterveninginthecasethroughaprivateprosecutor.

Intervention of the offended party in Criminal Action Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 11, the offended party may
intervenebycounselintheprosecutionoftheoffense(Sec.16,Rule110[Supra]).

Whenacriminalactionisinstituted,thecivilactionforrecoveryofcivilliabilityarisingfrom
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waivescivilaction,reservestherighttoinstituteitseparatelyorinstitutesthecivilactionpriorto
thecriminalaction(Sec.1(a),Rule111[Supra]).

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TheoffendedpartyinCriminalCaseNo.113603didnotreservehisrighttoinstituteseparate
civilaction,hedidnotwaivesuchrightanddidnotfilecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction,so
theoffendedpartymayunderthelawinterveneasamatterofright.

TheauthoritytointerveneincludesactualconductoftrialunderthecontroloftheFiscalwhich
includestherighttofilepleadings.Accordingtorespondentjudge,headvisedtheprivateprosecutor
tocoordinatewiththefiscalandsecurehisapprovalinaccordwiththemandateofSection,5,Rule
110 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure: On this point, respondent judge again erred. The
rightoftheoffendedpartytointerveneisconferredbylawandtheapprovaloftheFiscaloreventhe
courtisnotallnecessary(Sec.1(a),Rule111,[Supra]).RespondentJudge,however,iscorrectwhen
hestatedthatthemotionsfiledbytheprivateprosecutorshouldbewiththeconformityoftheFiscal.

Respondentjudgeserrorsarebasicsuchthathisactsconstitutesgrossignoranceofthelaw.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
CourtistherecommendationthattheinstantI.P.I.beredocketedasaregularadministrativematter
andrespondentJudgebeheldorderedtopayafineofP20,000.00.

[12]
On March 31, 2004, the Court directed that the administrative case be docketed as a regular
administrativematter.

[13]
On December 01, 2004, the Court denied Atty. Gacals ancillary prayer to disqualify
Judge Infante from trying Criminal Case No. 113803 pending resolution of this administrative
matter.

Ruling

We approve and adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCAd, considering that they are
wellsubstantiatedbytherecords.WenotethatJudgeInfantedidnotdenythathegrantedbailfor
theprovisionalreleaseofAnchetainCriminalCaseNo.113803withoutconductingtherequisite
bailhearing.

I
Bailhearingwasmandatory
inCriminalCaseNo.113803

Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that the
hearingwasnolongernecessaryconsideringthattheaccusedhadnotfiledapetitionforbailthat
inasmuchasnoapplicationforbailhadbeenfiledbytheaccused,histwinordersofApril23,2003
were not orders granting an application for bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond
postedandthatAtty.Gacalsveryurgentmotionandothermotionsandwrittensubmissionslacked
therequisitewrittenconformityofthepublicprosecutor,renderingthemnullandvoid.

WecannotrelieveJudgeInfantefromblameandresponsibility.
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WecannotrelieveJudgeInfantefromblameandresponsibility.

ThewillingnessofJudgeInfantetorelyonthemererepresentationofthepublicprosecutor
that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutors recommendation had been proper, and that his
(public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in effect waived the need for a bail hearing
perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed an uncommon readiness to trust more in the public
prosecutorsjudgmentthaninhisownjudiciousdiscretionasatrialjudge.Heshouldnotdoso.

Judge Infante made the situation worse by brushing aside the valid remonstrations expressed in
Atty.Gacalsveryurgentmotionthusly:

ThisCourtisnotunawarethatthechargeofmurderbeingacapitaloffenseisnotbailablexxx
xxxx
Thephrasexxxapplicationforadmissiontobailxxxisnotanirrelevantbutasignificantinfusionin
the cited rule (section 8), the plain import of which is that bail hearing is preceded by a
motion/petitionforadmissiontobailfiledbyadetainedaccusedhimselforthrucounsel.
Thepeculiarfeatureoftheinstantcase,however,istheabsenceofapetition/motionfor
admissiontobailfiledbythehereinaccused.Onthecontrary,itistheconsistentpositionofthe
fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution evidence being merely circumstantial, is not
strong for the purpose of granting bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit
necessaryinthegrantofbailinvolvingcapitaloffense,isnotatalltimesandinallinstances
essentialtoaffordthepartytherighttodueprocessespeciallyso,whenthefiscalinthiscase
was given reasonable opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the propriety of
grant of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence is not strong for the
purposeofgrantingbail.

Further,whileitispreponderantofjudicialexperiencetoadoptthefiscalsrecommendationinbail
fixing,thiscourt,however,hadinadditionandinaccordwithSection6(a)oftheRevisedRuleson
CriminalProcedure,evaluatedtherecordofthecase,andonlyuponbeingconvincedandsatisfied
thattheprosecutionevidenceascontainedintheaffidavitsofalltheprosecutionwitnesses,noone
being an eyewitness are merely circumstantial evidence, that this court in the exercise of sound
discretionallowedtheaccusedtopostbail.
xxxx
Theconvergenceoftheforegoingfactorsabsenceofmotionforadmissiontobailfiledbythe
accused, the recommendation of the fiscal to grant bail, the pro forma motion of the private
prosecutor for lack of prior approval from the fiscal and this courts evaluation of the records
[14]
sufficientlywarrantsthegrantofbailtohereinaccused.


JudgeInfantespecificallycitedjudicialexperienceassanctioninghisadoptionandapprovalofthe
publicprosecutorsrecommendationonthefixingofbail.Yet,itwasnotconcealedfromhimthat
the public prosecutors recommendation had been mainly based on the documentary evidence
[15]
adduced, andonthepublicprosecutorsmisguidedpositionthattheevidenceofguiltwasweak
because only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infantes unquestioning
echoing of the public prosecutors conclusion about the evidence of guilt not being sufficient to
denybaildidnotjustifyhisdispensingwiththebailhearing.

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JudgeInfanteapparentlyactedasiftherequirementforthebailhearingwasamerelyminor
ruletobedispensedwith.Although,intheory,theonlyfunctionofbailistoensuretheappearance
oftheaccusedatthetimesetforthearraignmentandtrialand,inpractice,bailservesthefurther
purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the
[16]
judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail,
[17]
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal
prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person
chargedwithacapitaloffense,oranoffensepunishablebyreclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment
whentheevidenceofguiltisstrong,shallbeadmittedtobailregardlessofthestageofcriminal
action.

[18]
InCortesv.Catral, therefore,theCourthasoutlinedthefollowingdutiesofthejudgeoncean
applicationforbailisfiled,towit:

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation(Section
18,Rule114oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,asamended)

2.Wherebailisamatterofdiscretion,conductahearingoftheapplicationforbailregardless
orwhetherornottheprosecutionrefusestopresentevidencetoshowthattheguiltofthe
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections7and8,id)
3.Decidewhethertheguiltoftheaccusedisstrongbasedonthesummaryofevidenceofthe
prosecution

4.Iftheguiltoftheaccusedisnotstrong,dischargetheaccusedupontheapprovalofthebailbond
(Section19,id)otherwise,thepetitionshouldbedenied.[emphasissupplied]

II
JudgeInfantedisregardedrulesandguidelines
inCriminalCaseNo.113803

Ostensibly, Judge Infante disregarded basic but wellknown rules and guidelines on the
matterofbail.

1.
Incasenoapplicationforbailisfiled,
bailhearingwasnotdispensable

JudgeInfantecontendsthatabailhearinginCriminalCaseNo.113803wasnotnecessary
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JudgeInfantecontendsthatabailhearinginCriminalCaseNo.113803wasnotnecessary
because the accused did not file an application for bail and because the public prosecutor had
recommendedbail.

JudgeInfantescontentionisunwarranted.
EvenwherethereisnopetitionforbailinacaselikeCriminalCaseNo.113803,ahearingshould
stillbeheld.Thishearingisseparateanddistinctfromtheinitialhearingtodeterminetheexistence
ofprobablecause,inwhichthetrialjudgeascertainswhetherornotthereissufficientgroundto
engenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeencommittedandthattheaccusedisprobably
guiltyofthecrime.TheProsecutionmustbegivenachancetoshowthestrengthofitsevidence
[19]
otherwise,aviolationofdueprocessoccurs.

ThefactthatthepublicprosecutorrecommendedbailforAnchetadidnotwarrantdispensing
with the hearing. The public prosecutors recommendation of bail was not material in deciding
whethertoconductthemandatoryhearingornot.Forone,thepublicprosecutorsrecommendation,
[20]
albeit persuasive, did not necessarily bind the trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to
determinewhethertograntbailornotwasvested.Whateverthepublicprosecutorrecommended,
includingtheamountofbail,wasnonbinding.Nordidsuchrecommendationconstituteashowing
that the evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become
unavoidablycontrolledbytheProsecution.

Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to
[21]
determinewhethertheevidencefortheProsecutionwasweakorstrong. Hence,hisdispensing
withthehearingmanifestedagrossignoranceofthelawandtherules.

2.
Publicprosecutorsfailuretooppose
applicationforbailortoadduceevidence
didnotdispensewithhearing

ThattheProsecutiondidnotopposethegrantofbailtoAncheta,asinfactitrecommended
bail,andthattheProsecutiondidnotwanttoadduceevidencewereirrelevant,anddidnotdispense
with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge in Criminal Case No. 113803 made it still
mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own
searchingandclarificatoryquestionsfromwhichtoinferthestrengthorweaknessoftheevidence
ofguilt.Heshouldnothavereadilyandeasilygonealongwiththepublicprosecutorsopinionthat
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ofguilt.Heshouldnothavereadilyandeasilygonealongwiththepublicprosecutorsopinionthat
theevidenceofguilt,beingcircumstantial,wasnotstrongenoughtodenybailelse,hemightbe
regardedashavingabdicatedfromaresponsibilitythatwashisaloneasthetrialjudge.

JudgeInfantesholdingthatcircumstantialevidenceofguiltwasofalesserweightthandirect
evidenceintheestablishmentofguiltwasalsosurprising.Histrainingandexperienceshouldhave
cautionedhimenoughonthepointthatthelackorabsenceofdirectevidencedidnotnecessarily
meanthattheguiltoftheaccusedcouldnotanymorebeproved,becausecircumstantialevidence,if
[22]
sufficient, could supplant the absence of direct evidence. In short, evidence of guilt was not
necessarilyweakbecauseitwascircumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution refused to
satisfyitsburdenofproofintheadmissionoftheaccusedtobail.Shouldhehavefoundthatthe
publicprosecutorsrefusalwasnotjustified,hecouldhavethenhimselfinquiredonthenatureand
extentoftheevidenceofguiltforthepurposeofenablinghimselftoascertainwhetherornotsuch
evidence was strong. He could not have ignored the possibility that the public prosecutor might
[23]
haveerredinassessingtheevidenceofguiltasweak. Atanyrate,ifhefoundtheProsecutionto
be uncooperative, he could still have endeavored to determine on his own the existence of such
[24]
evidence, withtheassistanceoftheprivateprosecutor.

3.
JudgeInfantesgrantingofbailwithoutahearingwas
censurableforgrossignoranceofthelawandtherules

[25]
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His
roleintheadministrationofjusticerequiresacontinuousstudyofthelawandjurisprudence,lest

[26]
publicconfidenceintheJudiciarybeerodedbyincompetenceandirresponsibleconduct.

In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in
capitaloffenseswasinexcusableandreflectedgrossignoranceofthelawandtherulesaswellasa
[27]
cavalierdisregardofitsrequirement. Hewellknewthatthedeterminationofwhetherornotthe
[28]
evidenceofguiltisstrongwasamatterofjudicialdiscretion, andthatthediscretionlaynotin
thedeterminationofwhetherornotahearingshouldbeheld,butintheappreciationandevaluation
[29]
of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made
[30]
worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of
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Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of
[31]
soundjudicialdiscretionbutofwhimandcapriceandoutrightarbitrariness.

III
ImposablePenalty

WenextdeterminethepenaltyimposableonJudgeInfanteforhisgrossignoranceofthelawand
therules.

TheCourtimposedafineofP20,000.00ontherespondentjudgeinDocenaCaspev.Bugtas.
[32]
Inthatcase,therespondentjudgegrantedbailtothetwoaccusedwhohadbeenchargedwith
[33]
murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise, in Loyola v. Gabo, the Court fined the
respondentjudgeinthesimilaramountofP20,000.00forgrantingbailtotheaccusedinamurder
casewithouttherequisitebailhearing.Toaccordwithsuchprecedents,theCourtprescribesafine
of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commissionofanotherseriousoffensewillbemoreseverelydealtwith.

WHEREFORE,weFINDANDDECLAREJudgeJaimeI.Infanteguiltyofgrossignoranceof
the law and the rules and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern
warningthatarepetitionoftheoffenseorthecommissionofanotherseriousoffensewillbemore
severelydealtwith.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
disseminationtoalltrialjudges.

SOORDERED.




LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:
RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice
Chairperson


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TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROMARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

[1]
Rollo,pp.4445.
[2]
Id.,p.4.
[3]
Id.,pp.121123.
[4]
Rollo,pp18,6.
[5]
Id.,pp.6770,70.
[6]
Id.,p.70.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id.,p.67.
[9]
Id.,p.90.
[10]
Id.,pp.94103(boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext).
[11]
Id.,pp.205212.
[12]
Id.,p.213.
[13]
Id.,p.224.
[14]
Id.,pp.2223(boldemphasissupplied).
[15]
Id.,pp.101102.
[16]
Bascov.Rapatalo,A.M.No.RTJ961335,March5,1997,269SCRA220.
[17]
Tev.Perez,A.M.No.MTJ001286,January21,2002,374SCRA130Bangayanv.Butacan,A.M.No.MTJ001320,November22,
2000,345SCRA301,306.
[18]
A.M.No.RTJ97138,September10,1997,279SCRA1,18.
[19]
Directov.Bautista,A.M.No.MTJ991205,November29,2000,346SCRA223.
[20]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,A.M.No.RTJ991488,June20,2000,334SCRA1,9.
[21]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,supra.
[22]
Ganv.People,G.R.No.165884,April23,2007,521SCRA550.
[23]
MarzanGelaciov.Flores,supra,Note20.
[24]
Tev.Perez,AMNo.MTJ001286,January21,2002,374SCRA130.
[25]
Rule3.01,CodeofJudicialConduct.
[26]
Taboritev.Sollesta,A.M.No.MTJ021388,August12,2003,408SCRA602.
[27]
Bantuasv.Pangadapun,RTJ981407,July20,1998,292SCRA622.
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5/26/2017 A.M.No.RTJ041845
Bantuasv.Pangadapun,RTJ981407,July20,1998,292SCRA622.
[28]
Aleria,Jr.v.Velez,G.R.No.127400,November16,1998,298SCRA611
[29]
Gimenov.Arcueno,Sr.,A.M.No.MTJ94981,November29,1995,250SCRA376.
[30]
DelosSantosReyesv.Montesa,Jr.,A.M.No.RTJ93983,August7,1995,247SCRA85.
[31]
Baylonv.Sison,AMNo.9273600,April6,1995,243SCRA284.
[32]
AMRTJ031767,March28,2003,400SCRA37.
[33]
A.M.No.RTJ001524,January26,2000,323SCRA348.

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