Critical reflection journal

Frege

1. Initial journal

a. My initial approach to the text is that this is much more analytic than I had expected,

and perhaps more complex as well. I had that that philosophy of language would be less

logic based, but upon reading Frege its pretty obvious that there is no way around the

interdependency of language and formal logic because all logical constructions gain

coherence from their logical elements.

b. He speaks about the cognitive difference between the terms a=a and a=b, at first

thought this is difficult to digest, but I think that I am understanding this more after

rereading the text. It seems that the cognitive difference between a=a and a=b means

that words themselves can carry a different meaning even when they are referring to

the words themselves.

2. After class journal

a. I thought that it was very interesting after talking in class about the differences in

meaning in a way that there seems to be some level of abstraction between a word or

language and the real world itself. Because a=b and a=a can mean the same thing but

have a cognitive difference implies that there must be some sort of level of thinking

between the two ideas where the cognitive difference may not reference to a physical

difference but a difference at the level of the psyche.

Russell

1. Initial journal
 a. For Russell I felt like he may have been easier to understand and clearer in his

writing than frege, however the thoughts seem to be more abstract and

complicated.

b. He seems to place special importance on the way that people place modifiers on

language. For example, a person vs the person has a completely different meaning.

He divides up what a sentence can refer to in order to avoid the contradictions

between when we refer to statements. He also makes a contrast between the

concept and the constitutient for example when we say, I met a unicorn. Obviously

the structure still makes grammatical sense. However, it does not refer to an actual

creature that lives in the world. While his distinction does make logical sense, it also

seems a bit trivially true and im unsure why this is considered to be of crucial

significance? Maybe this sort of logic can give larger philosophical problems with a

greater level of clarity?

2. After class journal.

a. The concept of the excluded middle made a lot of sense to me. It does seem like a

logical dilemma that a statement with no referent can actually have a sort of

paradox where the statement is either true or false, yet there is nothing of

substance actually being referred to in the first place. I guess that also leaves me the

question of if we speak about something that is dealing with is non-existent, doesnt

talking or writing about that concept then bring that idea into existence at least in a

conceptual realm?

Donnellan and Mckay

1. I am having trouble understanding the first donnellan reading, he keeps claiming that

description carries a referential quality to it, but also that it carries some other type of

quality that is unclear to me. Hopefully we can discuss this at greater length in class.

More specifically he speaks about the attributive vs referential use, but I still dont quite

grasp it.

2. Upon first reading of Mckay, I dont understand why reference is not able to depend

upon an audience. It seems like the speaker of the reference could also be the audience

in question and that even if the people around them do not hear the reference, they

would still know that they succeeded in their reference. I also dont know why the

scenarios that he presents would be especially damning, it seems reasonable to say that

you failed to refer to something because the audience does not speak English, in fact it

seems trivially true.

a. Wow the intractability of language expressed by the humpty dumpty portion of

the text is really intriguing. It means that language is inherently restrictive in

nature and that it confines a persons world to mere

3. His reply that the terms that mckay uses to indicate reference easily fit within the

catagories he created (although im still not exactly clear on what those differences are

exactly. And secondly that he doesnt quite lead to the dire consequences that mckay

elaborates. This second reply seems to align quite closely with my reading as well. I

think mckay is largely making a big deal out of nothing.

Kripke - lecture one

1. Before class

a. Intitial thoughts on the writing is that his writing is clear and a bit more relatable

compared to other readings in this class. I think this is mostly because of Kripkes use of

examples that are relatable and intuitive. This gets me to the next thing that appeared

to me, what does he mean by intuitive? There does not appear to be any sort of

definition or clarification on this point.

b. Overall though, I like his argument about the differences in necessity, contingency, and

apriori knowledge. However, it is a bit difficult to follow at some point. Hoping this is

cleared up. My main problem is that I dont understand how something that is

contingently true can be known apriori. Also, on the point where he mentions that the

number is planets is odd is contingent and the number nine is odd is necessary seems

like a bad example. Im not sure how to explain my thought here, but how are those

referring to the same thing? Sure, at the time of writing, they were both technically

nine, but one is in the context of variable celestial bodies and one is in the context of an

abstract number.

c. Why does he keep referencing Nixon?

2. After class journal.

a. Makes more sense now, especially in reference to the hypothetical example. I was

unsure what he was trying to establish with the hypothetical that Nixon might not have

been. However, in class it occurred to me that this is all very dependent on an

understanding of free will. It seems like when he talks about how things might have

been, then that assumes that those results were not locked into place based on the

physical laws of the universe. If someone takes a hardcore determinist approach to the
 world that there would never be a might have been what happened had to happen

and there is no way around it.

Kripke Lecture two

a. This lecture places a much stronger emphasis on the aspect of naming and what

a name truly means. He begins by laying out the basics of cluster theory but

does not accept them. He believes a that a name clearly picks out one individual

thing and that to say a person is dependent on their actions would lead to a

strange result where if a famous person did not perform their actions, then they

would not be that person. I.e. if Aristotle had not taught anyone, would he not

be Aristotle anymore? Of course he would be, says kripke.

b. Im not sure if this is something I agree with. It seem so me that there can be

two different concepts of a person. One of Aristotle the teacher and one of

Aristotle the person who lived in Athens x years ago. If information was

provided that Aristotle actually never taught anyone then the concept of

Aristotle the teacher no longer exists, and the meaning of the name does

change. Perhaps I can agree with Frege here? But the problem is not one

between Eminem and Marshall Mathers, but Aristotle and Aristotle.

Kripke Lecture three

a. This lecture was the most difficult to digest for me. Here he gives more information about

what makes something to be known apriori vs aposteriori and he really rests upon the

understanding of essence. He believes that essence is something that is necessarily true

however it can only be understood or investigated empirically. I am having a hard time

conceptualizing this phrase of essence because its comes across as a bit arbitrary. Which
traits are essential and which traits arent. Even if Kripke does a good job delineating which

fall characteristics fall into their respective categories, he gives no WHY for how he is able

to make these categories, at least none that are convincing to me.