Law on NatRes (23-49) 1
SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI,
HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO
MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN
MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.;
G.R. No. 134308; December 14, 2000; PANGANIBAN,
J.:
Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been
classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such
land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be
registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof
of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept
of owner for a period of thirty years.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997
Decision1 and the June 23, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The decretal
portion of said Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the appellees
application for registration is hereby DISMISSED."3
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City (Branch 157),4 which was reversed by the appellate
court, granted petitioners application for registration in this
wise:5
"WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the
whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed,
and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the
registerable title of the applicants to the land described in
their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its
technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of Ususan,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an
aggregate area of 2,112 square meters; and individual and
separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said
land are hereby ordered registered in the names of the
applicants, as follows:
1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the
name of Susana Menguito, of legal age, widow, Filipino
citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St.,
Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;
2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of
legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino citizen, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,
Metro Manila;
3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito,
of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and
postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, with
residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro
Manila;
7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,
Metro Manila; and
8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and
Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Zenaida Carag, all with residence and postal address at T.
Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to
the Commissioner of Land Registration Authority for the
issuance of the decree of registration and the
corresponding certificates of title in favor of the applicants
pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized
by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at
Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for Registration of Title
was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the
deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-
Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA
MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-
LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO.
Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the
application reads:
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the
land hereinafter described brought under the operation of
the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property
Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title
thereto registered and confirmed,
AND DECLARE:
1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of
eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of
Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are

bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227
(lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-
F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and
corresponding technical descriptions, x x x;
2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for
the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No.
B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;
3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief,
there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons
having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by
inheritance;
5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in
the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more
than thirty years;
6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to
the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties
are as follows:
a) Pilar Menguito
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
b) Andres Filemon
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
c) Beatriz Dumagat
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
d) Maura Cabanatan
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
e) Pateros-Taguig Road
c/o The District Engineer
Pasig, Metro Manila
7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship,
residence, and postal address, are as follows:
SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI,
married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA,
married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO,
married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married
to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO, married to
Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all
of legal age, Filipinos, and with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 2
8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not
applicable in the instant case, the applicants hereby apply
for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended;
9. That the following documents are attached hereto and
made part hereof:
(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227
(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227
(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:
Lot 6045-A
Lot 6045-B
Lot 6045-C
Lot 6045-D
Lot 6045-E
Lot 6045-F
Lot 6045-G
Lot 6045-H
Lot 6045-I
Lot 6045-J
Lot 6045-K
(d) Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate
(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351
xxx xxx xxx
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).
"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued
a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to: the Solicitor
General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau,
the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in
the application, informing them that the application is
scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The
addressees were then ordered to present such claims as
you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to
submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you
appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your
default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be
adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and
the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will
forever be barred from contesting said application or any
decree entered thereon (Exhibit A).
"Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5,
1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. C, C-1, C-1-
A).
"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its
Opposition to the application for registration contending:
1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in

question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b],
C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of
applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in the application,
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12,
1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not
appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended
possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application
for registration within the period of six (6) months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No.
892. From the records, it appears that the instant
application was filed on July 31, 1990.
4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to
private appropriation. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-
6).
"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of
the application for registration and for the declaration of
the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25,
1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered
a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of
counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of
General Default against the whole world, except as
against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and
Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written
opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer
of Evidence, submitting therewith the following
documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. F);
(2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J,
inclusive (Exhs. F to F-10, inclusive); (3) Engineers
Certificate (Exh. G); (4) Extra-judicial Settlement and
Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12,
1985 (Exh. H); (5) description of the land and the
apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.H-1
and H-2, respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. I, J,
K, L, M, N and O) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. O, O-1,
P. P-1, Q and R); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated "On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying
May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro
Menguito (Exh. S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated
November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants (Exh. T).
"On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its
Manifestation and Opposition to applicants formal offer of
evidence. The said manifestation reads:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 3
It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A,
B, C, D, relative to jurisdictional requirements. It has no
objection to Exhibits E, F, F-1, to F-10 relating to the
plan and the technical description of the lots being applied
for and Exhibit G which is the Engineers certificate.
It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial
settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for
being self serving. It objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M
and N for being incompetent and insufficient proof of
possession of the lot in question by applicants or their
predecessors-in interest. In fact the said tax declarations
do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent
and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945.
It objects to Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being
incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since
June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit S as being self-
serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan
ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo
Menguito the same cannot be accepted in evidence,
applicants not having first laid the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence. It objects to the first
page of Exhibit T, being self-serving and a mere
photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the
supposed acknowledgment of the instrument appears,
refers to different parcels of land other than those being
applied for.
WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed
to prove their title to the lands applied for, it is respectfully
prayed that the application for registration be denied and
that the land applied for be declared as part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests
that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of
its opposition. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).
"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the
whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed,
and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the
registerable title of the applicants x x x
"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the
Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the afore-
quoted decision, to which a written opposition was
interposed by the applicants.
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the
lower court had failed to consider the legal requirements
for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is

alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed
the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely
since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in
question had been classified as alienable or disposable
and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for
our consideration:
"Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the
findings of facts of the trial court."
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in
rejecting petitioners application for the registration of their
respective titles.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners Titles
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,9 as
amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to
lands of the public domain in this wise:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter."
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 107310 clarified paragraph
"b" of the said provision by specifically declaring that it
applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.11
Law on NatRes (23-49) 4
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners
were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the
land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and adversely since June 12, 1945.
The records show that petitioners failed to establish these
two requisites.
Classification of the Land
To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis
supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.12 Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title."13 To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant.14 Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable.
Period of Possession
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able
to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for
confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration
thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is that
they have failed to establish possession of the lots in
question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely

-- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June
12, 1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original
possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly
belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son
Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly
passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land
from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of
their predecessors, who had supposedly been in
possession thereof even before the Second World War.
There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support
such claim.
Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying
real estate taxes since 1974.15 Their predecessors-in-
interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the
land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito
had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943.16
However, they did not present any documents or any other
satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General
statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not
proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.
Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by
petitioners during the hearing of their application for
registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six
children, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of
petitioners application. Still, she was not presented as a
witness.1wphi1
There can be no question that Cirilos children were the
best witnesses, because they could have substantiated
petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been
donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even
have in their possession documents that can adequately
support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners
presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of
Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners
built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilos children nor the
documents that they might have had in their possession
were presented.
Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim
that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land. Because they are of recent
vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax receipts
(Exhs. "O". "O1", "P", and "P-1") and the Municipal
Treasurers certifications of tax payments (Exhs. "Q" and
"R") presented in evidence are incompetent and
insufficient to prove petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interests possession of the lots in question.
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate
courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the
records,18 but found no reason to modify the assailed CA
Decision. Much as we want to conform to the States
Law on NatRes (23-49) 5
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of
alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain
true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the
laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect
titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that petitioners
have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance
with the legal requirements for registration of imperfect
titles.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EULALIA
PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-
appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
be ordered cancelled and that the registration case
pending before the same court covering the property
described therein be given due course and that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of
limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint was
filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or
issuance of patent over the property was issued
"sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while
the transfer certificate of title covering the same was
issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which
calls for the cancellation of said decree and title has,
therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four
years, which cannot be done, because the title has already
become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court
sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence
the present appeal.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No.
3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof
since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the
whole world and up to the present time he is the only one
who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at
present the subject of registration proceedings pending in
the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372,
L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that sometime in
September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without
exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that
defendants had not complied with the knowledge that
defendants had not complied with the requirements of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent

in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of
title was issued in their name by the register of deeds; that
said title was procured by defendants through frauds,
deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the
lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands
has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering
said land because it is a private property of plaintiff. For
these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be
cancelled.
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957
(amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141),
provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceeding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was
observed that where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth
Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the court an application therefor being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No.
2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No.
141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the
matter:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has
been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years. ... When on August 15, 1914,
Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-forty
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on
December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he
began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being
so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. ... In favor
of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumption juris
et de jure established paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
Law on NatRes (23-49) 6
requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of
an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption,
of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land
over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in
his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple
of the lot in question, with the improvements thereon,
situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has
been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly,
openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that
up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from
the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is
present the subject of a registration proceeding pending in
the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372,
L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as
stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have
acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the
same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had
become private property and, therefore, is beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the
homestead patent and the original certificate of title
covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of
the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having
been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court
merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's
action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of
fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,1
which theory does not apply here because the property
involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to
be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the
trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without
giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have
been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the
ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable,

rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial
court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ANGELA
RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.; G.R. No. L-
24066; December 9, 1925; VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against
Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for
judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute
owner of the parcel of land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by
the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the
ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela
Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the
sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands
denied each and every allegation contained therein and,
as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before
its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance
with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both
parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession
of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the
costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the
Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the
following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment
rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question
is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land;
the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to
Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title
issued by the register of deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial
filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio
Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12,
reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B).
After having been in possession thereof for about eight
years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold
Law on NatRes (23-49) 7
it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed
of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood
gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which
he had paid the price of the property. The possession and
occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi
has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without
any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September
13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said
land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the
complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain
possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the
purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his
possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P).
After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi
and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant
the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921,
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Armed with said document, Angela Razon required
Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he
refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry
and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua,
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and
M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the
questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of
error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has
been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands,
yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her
claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on
August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase
of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-
four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio
Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he
sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated
when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of
time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario

vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449
1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through
his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond
the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director
of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question
being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private
property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial
sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an
action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the
judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all
its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.; G.R. No. 144057
January 17, 2005; TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the
Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The
appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18,
1998, which granted the application for registration of a
Law on NatRes (23-49) 8
parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent
herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age
and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D,
Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks
judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of
land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees,
such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in
addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the
subject land. At present, there are parcels of land
surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles
by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-
in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend
to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and
confirmed in the name of Naguit.6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied
for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive
Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7
However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration
in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the
order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8.
On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in
toto the Hence, the present petition for review raising a
pure question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000.
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding
that there is no need for the governments prior release of
the subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of
P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of
Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required
period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified
as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land
was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land
was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, bears close examination.
It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 9
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result
if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is

already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in
Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted
that "to prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15
In that case, the subject land had been certified by the
DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court
concluded that the alienable status of the land,
compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927,
sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that
the subject property was released and certified as within
alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in
1972 that the lands in question were classified as
alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the
property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nt Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest
land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question
was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals.
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the
lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona fide
claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier,
by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, which reads:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 10
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936,
the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for
at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D.
No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public
Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public
domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same
type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and
the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent

jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have
the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms
its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of
owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown
earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no
bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the
subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession
by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since
1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made
by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was
established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year
old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well
as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although
tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership.2
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of
land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or
for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of
Law on NatRes (23-49) 11
doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens
system. That she has been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and
without any opposition from any private person and the
government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly
settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.; G.R.
No. 179987 April 29, 2009; TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become
formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the
informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a
generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted
to title these people and have not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems
in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles.
In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals
have their own papers, their own forms of agreements,
and their own systems of registration, all of which are very
clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia
to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a
different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what
private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin
American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
- Hernando De Soto
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently
in possession of persons and entities other than the
Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable
as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Sections
14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In
doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but
also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of

informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately
been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to
decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and
the legal principles that have developed our public land
law, though our social obligations dissuade us from
casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
(RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting
documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being
Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not
cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested
that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial
was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982."7
Law on NatRes (23-49) 12
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
any period of possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property
was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March
1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not
be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree was based on the
Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the
Court of Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed
the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this
Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11 which
was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by
the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first
place since the requisite notice of hearing was published
only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural
land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable
property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the

period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on
11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral
arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for
the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their
respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation
of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners
further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and
adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v. Imperial
Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 13
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years
ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According
to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of
the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been "converted" into private
property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to
Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers
to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under
the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming
that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to
the particular factual circumstances surrounding the
subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public
Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20 Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are further classified
according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles" through "judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies
the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to
the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present
wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by
P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was
changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain." The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered.23 This is
not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a
larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was
changed from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since
June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936,
the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for
at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D.
No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act
No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the
various laws relative to the registration of property,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 14
including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1)
that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration
Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-
interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or
the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act
and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree
warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the
possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the
right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first
time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that
has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who

has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect
or complete his title by applying with the proper court for
the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-
quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare
that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under
Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the
period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been
amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following
section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of
this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12)
hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of
time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to
the period fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position
that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been
declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Law on NatRes (23-49) 15
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result
if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable,
as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The
contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to
the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that
date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail
of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta
since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite
publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need
to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of
Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated
that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession" That
statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in
Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section
14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did
not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to
1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1).
It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14(1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling
Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to
Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to
12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any
doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the
final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in
favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27 since in the latter, the
application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two.
Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in
Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable
Law on NatRes (23-49) 16
only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively
from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not
so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No.
32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This
is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court
of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the
ground that the property still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question
are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law
would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect
title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents
as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to
overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private
respondents were able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land
even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of
them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent
member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration
under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days
after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in
Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six
(6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed
nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in

Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with
respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion
concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion,
thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and
the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.[30 ] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have
the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2),
unlike in this case where petitioners have based their
registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession
only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can
properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on
prescription as the possible basis for application for
Law on NatRes (23-49) 17
original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the
public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands.
The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code
concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired
by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith,34 as well as just title.
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the
Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands.
The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically
allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State.
Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is
whether Section 14(2) does encompass original
registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the
State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we
ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct
origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957,
which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by
granting the right to seek original registration of alienable
public lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court

of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis
supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of
P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the
reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications
for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the
30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at
least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse
possession for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period
rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977.
At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year
period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a
material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under
the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the
Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without
any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as
such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep.
Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar
to our earlier finding with respect to the present language
of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the
point of reference.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 18
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws"
to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the
same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which
does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the
principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly,
we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our
interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand
on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the
object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the
commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a
declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of lands
of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the

commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that patrimonial property
of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
"[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that
those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope
and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands
already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment
of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to
the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all
lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by
the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The
duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws
in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy
is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be
illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 19
entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting
the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in
turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41
The President is authorized to sell portions of the military
camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law
itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
"alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject
military lands have become alienable and disposable.
However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that
these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and
Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public
service" or "the development of national wealth" under
Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It
is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a
private person or entity that such lands become private
property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because
they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from
ruling that the period of possession before the public
domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession
of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial
cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section
14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription
under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession
during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites
of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles

registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by
the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the
thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year
period available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year
period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under
the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither
superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under
that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists
with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set
forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures
correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the
Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership
over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of
the State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The
first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with
just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil
Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of
Law on NatRes (23-49) 20
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527,
and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45
provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the
transmission of ownership, and which would have actually
transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner.
This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription.
Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title
necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner
and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor
before the completion of the required period of
possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the
State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to
run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period
has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private
land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods
prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the
property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically
becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property,
the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is
apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title

brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years
following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of
persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of
now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since
12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
Law on NatRes (23-49) 21
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and
other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at
bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back
their possession, according to their own evidencethe
Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness
of the legal doctrines established in this decision.
Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this
ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly,
and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility

to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared
alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing
habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among
the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system
and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition
of these public domain lands, such as through homestead
or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the
grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that
system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable
limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on which
they have lived and raised their families. Many more have
tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their
hands. They have been regarded for generation by their
families and their communities as common law owners.
There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion.
It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of
land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of
the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble.
This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease
the requisites for the conversion of public dominion
property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every
aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to
the persons family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by
Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.; G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013; BERSAMIN, J.:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 22
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application
of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanans application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal
in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February
23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the
ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the
land subject of the application for registration as alienable
and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice
of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property
by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without
regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
Law on NatRes (23-49) 23
previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8
and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the
land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed
by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of
the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the

State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such
character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership
if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land,
with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21
The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive
act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on
the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article
425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of
the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only
be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
Law on NatRes (23-49) 24
agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in
the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national
park, or when public land is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of
public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by
a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify
or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be
used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of,
to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires
possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The
use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable"
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in
mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the
applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order
for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain,
the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as
agricultural.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 25
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June
12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12,
1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns,
and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue
of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a
result of satisfying the requisite period of possession
prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason
that the property subject of the application of Malabanan
need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may
run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title
being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where

all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of
their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of
years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still
prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears
out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and
procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject
to area limitations.
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to
the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to
wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicants possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes
the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
Law on NatRes (23-49) 26
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non
in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot
be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.; G.R. No. 107427
January 25, 2000; YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,1
which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.2
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on September 30, 1992.3
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six
hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located
in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime
in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr.,
acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and

Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding
Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said
parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a
Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax
Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued
to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 The case was docketed as
L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director
of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor
his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to
the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application,
and that the subject land is part of the public domain.5
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended
on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo
against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of
by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria
Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor
Leonardo.6
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration
case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court7
where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-
77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the
application on July 22, 1985,8 this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint
do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting
the application of petitioner.9 The Solicitor General
promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29,
1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order.10 It
also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution of September 30, 1992.11
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following
grounds
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that
the commencement of thirty (30) year period mandated
under Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only on March 27, 1972
in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau
of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20,
1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR
in DRAWING conclusion and inference that prior to the
Law on NatRes (23-49) 27
declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1972,
the parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant
was part of the forest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeal ERRED and failed to
consider VESTED RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and
his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908.12
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts
his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the
other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the
subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972,13 petitioner did not have
any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.
In Republic vs. Doldol,14 the requisites to acquire title to
public land were laid down, as follows
. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided
for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A.
No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. (emphasis in the
original).
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated
that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant
must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this
score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to
show that the parcels of land subject of his application are
alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was
conclusively shown by the government that the same were
only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27,
1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since
1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such
possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.15
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,16 where a homestead patent issued to the
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the
ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was
still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court
ruled as follows
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also
states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration. The applicant must show
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. This petitioners failed to do.1wphi1.nt
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead
patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest,
the subject land belong to the inalienable and
undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab
initio because at the time the homestead patent was
issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the
original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not
then authorized to dispose of the same because the area
was not yet classified as disposable public land.
Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the
Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land
were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore,
the same could not be the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable.17 In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom
and open to disposition.18 Indeed, it has been held that
Law on NatRes (23-49) 28
the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.19
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject
Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested
rights under which his case may fall. We only find on
record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development20 from which no indication of such
exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his
application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no
need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE,
SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO
BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE, Respondents.; [G.R.
No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]; PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal
of the decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated
February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled
"EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES," affirming the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, which
dismissed petitioner Republics petition for review of the
decrees of registration issued pursuant to the decision
rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of
the private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by
them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated
March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry
as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under Republic
Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a
portion of Lot No. 622 Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796,
797, 798 and a portion of Lot No. 324 Lot Nos. 791
and 799 more particularly identified and delineated in

the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340,
Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and Sgs-3339, approved by the
Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register their
titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and
possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the
original owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein Respondents, has always been
continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in
the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years
(Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting
the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of
the Philippines be notified thereof by furnishing the
Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, a copy of said Order together with Respondents
petition by registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an
opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the
petition once the area involved is found to be within the
timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution
(Record on Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification, however, the
Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion of the
timberland already released by the government from the
mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his
Opposition (Record on Appeal, p. 8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his
opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in
truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the
subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have complied
with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them
to a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of its decision
dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19),
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-
3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and
their technical descriptions are hereby APPROVED, and
pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby
adjudicates in favor of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr.,
married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe, single;
Amparo Bernabe, single and Elisa Bernabe, single, all
Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein
applied for as follows:
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.
3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 29
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby directed to
issue the corresponding decrees of registration therefor."
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of
Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818,
all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands
and the Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General,
filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration
under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the
corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds
that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to
the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the
petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings; that
the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open
cadastral proceedings are portions of the public domain,
admittedly within the unclassified public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about
July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have
a registerable title to the land subject matter of the
proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to
decree the confirmation of registerable title to respondents
over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not
qualify under the provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended, and that under the circumstances, respondents
employed actual fraud in procuring title over the parcels of
land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the
Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The trial court
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit as
there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a
decree of registration. If the Solicitor General was not
notified of the subsequent hearings, it was because he
delegated his appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan. Besides the setting aside or review was filed out
of time. (2) The petition states no cause of action, the
parcels of land involved in the actions having been already
transferred to innocent purchasers for value long before
the Solicitor-General even filed the petition for review
(Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until
the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for
August 16, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the
Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer,
respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to
dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended
Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after
having fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land
involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale
purporting to convey various lots composing portions of
the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious

considerations in an obvious attempt to remove the
parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of
Act 496, but in truth, the aforementioned third parties are
not innocent purchasers for value, being mere dummies of
the petitioners, holding the parcels of land involved only in
trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970,
respondents filed their answer to the Amended Petition for
Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order
denying petitioners Amended Petition for Review (Record
on Appeal, p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20,
1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First Instance
of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution of a special
Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.
Hence this petition.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court,
through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to
require the respondents to comment thereon. On May 30,
1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the
decision of respondent Court and the questioned
resolution were not rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion exercised by
respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to
give due course to the Petition and denied the urgent
motion of respondents for leave to file a supplemental
and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on
November 29, 1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976.
Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on
May 5, 1976, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE
LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
BECAME AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON JULY 6, 1965
WHEN THE SAME WERE RELEASED FROM THE
FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY
LACK THE REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS
POSSESSION TO ENTITLE THEM TO A GRANT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING
OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN
QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF NOTICE TO
THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 30
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE
LOTS IN QUESTION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO
THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL
SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REVIEW
CONSTITUTES FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE
TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY
ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES
THERETO.
The governments cause is meritorious.
I
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private
respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the
Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC
Cadastral Record No. 1097, declaring the lot in question
as public land. It must be stressed that said lot was
declared public land by virtue of a court decision which
has become final and as held by the Supreme Court
aforesaid decision is res judicata. (Republic v. Estenzo,
120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that
the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral
proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and
the decision therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622
was released as an agricultural land for disposition under
Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The lower court
ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of
registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942, providing for the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter."
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not
the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the
subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the
aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are

incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v. Director of
Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano v.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v.
Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Director of Lands v.
Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera
(120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings
was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified
for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141,
the facts being that private respondents could only be
credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession
and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6,
1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio
Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No.
267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had
been segregated from the forest zone and released by the
Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition
under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19).
Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence,
neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-
interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite
period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary
party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the
Solicitor-General, should have been furnished copies of all
court orders, notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases,
in order to bind the government. Failure to give such
notice deprives the State of its day in Court, and renders
the decision void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly
notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of
subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision
itself promulgated by the lower court on December 19,
1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan,
admittedly the duly authorized representative of the
Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as shown in
a telegram dated January 19, 1968. (Record on Appeal, p.
47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426
[1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored
principle of agency ruled that the service of the questioned
decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be
Law on NatRes (23-49) 31
service on the Solicitor-General, and added that technical
transgressions relative to the filing and service may be
brushed aside when the adverse party (this time the
Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the
Solicitor-General) is aware of the matter which his
adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it
appears that the party is already informed by one means
or another of what he is to be notified, the required service
becomes an empty gesture and strict observance thereof
is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28
SCRA 890 [1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor
General was so apprised of the decision of the lower court
in question as there is no proof that the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy thereof.
Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed
a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court, the
Provincial Fiscal on March 21, 1969 manifested that he
was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of the
District Forester. (Respondents Brief, p. 44).
It will be observed however that later decisions of the
Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the matter of
giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more recent
case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985],
it was established that the Solicitor-General is the only
legal counsel of the government in land registration cases
and as such, he alone may withdraw the Governments
appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be
furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions
and as held the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal
should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor-Generals
Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from
the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with
that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in
the case at bar, had no power to decide whether or not an
appeal should be made. They should have referred the
matter to the Solicitor-General and without copies of court
orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by
either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to
the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding
effect on the government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-
124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended was
filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the
same Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid
decrees of registration, on the ground of actual fraud.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or
dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof
through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree and (4) that the property

has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
(Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, Et. Al. v.
Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however
that the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of
fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or
collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. (Libudan v.
Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a showing of
actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual malice. (Rublico
v. Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private
respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over
parcels of land of the public domain as it is a matter of
record that the land in question was opened for disposition
and alienation only on July 6, 1965. The matter was
threshed out in the lower court and the decision of the
latter was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Actual malice
is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in
pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be
annulled within one (1) year from entry of said decree,
there is more reason to hold that the same is true if
entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal
infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong
v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack of
jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case.
(Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]). Thus, on
both counts, the case at bar can properly be the subject of
review, it having been shown that the Solicitor-General
was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy
of the assailed decision but more importantly, the lower
court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open
the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as
amended by R.A. No. 2061.
IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question
are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule
that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L.
Strong Machiner Co., Et Al., 37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without
the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value in contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void,
when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-
disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540
[1979] underscoring supplied). In the case at bar, it will be
noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower
court counted the period of possession of private
respondents before the same were released as forest
Law on NatRes (23-49) 32
lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to
qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they
were still non-disposable. Thus, under the foregoing
rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent
purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from
the titles of private respondents which were not validly
issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain,
may be cancelled.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First
Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED,
because the lots in question still form part of the public
domain. The certificates of title issued over them are
hereby ordered CANCELLED. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.
APOLONIO BAUTISTA, JR., Respondent.; G.R. No.
166890; June 28, 2016; BERSAMIN, J.:
The applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must trace his possession of the subject land to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Any length of possession that does not
comply with the requirement cannot support the
application, which must be then dismissed for failure to
comply with Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act)
and Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
The Case
The Government appeals the adverse judgment
promulgated on September 30, 2004, 1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Subic, Zambales rendered on
November 17, 1998 in LRC Case No. N-12-10-96 entitled
In Re: Application for Land Registration of Lot 17078 of
Cad. 547-D, Subic Cadastre2granting the application of
respondent Apolonio Bautista, Jr. for the judicial
confirmation of title of Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-0, Subic
Cadastre.
Antecedents
After acquiring Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic Cadastre,
located in Capisanan, Subic, Zambales from Mario Jardin
on February 15, 1971 and Cornelia Villanueva on May 25,
1973, Apolonio, Sr. had the property declared for taxation
purposes. He had been the sole and exclusive possessor
and occupant from the time of acquisition until his death,
with no party questioning his possession and ownership,
or staking any adverse claim against him thereon.3 He
died in 1987, and was succeeded by his children, namely:
respondent Apolonio, Jr. and his siblings. Apolonio, Sr.'s
children executed an extra-judicial settlement of their
father's estate, whereby Apolonio, Jr.'s brothers and
sisters waived their rights in his favor. Thus, the property
was declared for taxation purposes in Apolonio, Jr.'s name
under Tax Declaration No. 014-0432A of the Municipality

of Subic, Zambales. There were no arrears in real estate
taxes.4 The declared value was 73,040.00. 5
On October 21, 1996, Apolonio Jr. commenced LRC Case
No. N-12-10-96 in the MTC. He later on testified that his
father had been in actual possession since 1969, and had
eventually acquired the land from Jardin and Villanueva
through the notarized Deeds of Absolute Sale dated
February 15, 1971, and May 25, 1973; and that his father
had paid taxes on the land.
The Government did not interpose any timely objection to
the testimony of Apolonia, Jr. It did not also object to the
documentary evidence (i.e., the deeds of absolute sale
and tax declarations) offered by him.1wphi1 Hence, the
MTC admitted all the evidence presented by Apolonia, Jr.
In due course, the MTC granted Apolonia, Jr.'s application,
and declared him as the owner in fee simple of the land,6
and confirmed his ownership thereof. 7
The Government appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which, on September 30, 2004,
promulgated its assailed decision affirming the ruling of the
MTC.8 The CA pointed out that the Government did not
present evidence against the claim of Apolonio Jr.; and
that the Government did not timely object to his testimony
on the ground of its being hearsay.
Issue
In this appeal, the Government reiterates that the
testimony of Apolonio, Jr. on possession, being hearsay,
had no probative value; that the alienation of public land
should always undergo careful scrutiny; and that the Court
should carefully re-examine the factual issues that could
alter the result of the case. 10
The Government points out that Apolonio, Jr. had given
only general statements pertaining to the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of his
father since 1971; that such statements were mere
conclusions of law, and did not prove the alleged
possession; that because the application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title was filed on October 21,
1996, the applicable law was Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public land Act), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; that,
accordingly, the required period of possession must be
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier," as stated in Republic v.
Doldol, 11 a more stringent requirement the non-
compliance with which was fatal to his cause.
Lastly, the Government points out that tax declarations or
tax receipts did not suffice to prove ownership of land in
fee simple; that although it was the State's policy to
encourage and promote distribution of alienable public
lands as an ideal of social justice, stringent safeguards
must be adopted and applied to prevent the lands from
going to the wrong hands; and that Apolonio, Jr.'s reliance
Law on NatRes (23-49) 33
on hearsay evidence showed his unfitness to own the
land.
In response, Apolonio Jr. insists that he had duly
established his lawful occupation of the land as owner in
fee simple; that the Government did not timely object to his
testimony, and did not also controvert his evidence; that
the property had been properly identified; and that the
lower courts had observed the legal safeguards and
guidelines in granting his application for judicial
confirmation of his ownership in fee simple.
Ruling of the Court
We reverse.
The Government has correctly insisted that the requisite
period of possession of the property should conform to
that provided for in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has
limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to citizens
of the Philippines "who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. x x x" The provision is reprised by
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), adopting the length of possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
We note that in its amendment of the Public Land Act that
took effect on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No.
1073 changed the length of the requisite possession from
"thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application" to possession "since June 12, 1945, or
earlier." Republic v. Naguit15has explained this change
thusly:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in
1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest
the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the
public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However,
this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time
by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. xxx
Based on the records before us, Apolonia, Jr. presented
only himself to establish the possession and ownership of
his father, Apolonia, Sr., who was his immediate
predecessor-in-interest. He did not present as witnesses
during the trial either of the transferors of Apolonia, Sr. -
that is, Mario Jardin or Cornelia Villanueva - to establish

the requisite length of the possession of the predecessors-
in-interest of the applicant that would be tacked to his own.
His personal incompetence to attest to the possession of
the property within the time required by law underscored
the weakness of the evidence on possession, particularly
as it has not been denied that the applicant had arrived in
the Philippines only on November 28, 1987. Considering
that the possession and occupation of the property in
question by Apolonia, Jr. and his predecessors-in-interest
were not shown in the records to have been "since June
12, 1945, or earlier," the application must be rejected.
We should stress that only the title of those who had
possessed and occupied alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain within the requisite period could be
judicially confirmed. Indeed, alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-
in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 16
That the Government did not timely object to the
admission of the testimony of Apolonia, Jr., or of the other
evidence presented by him was of no consequence to the
success of the application. If he had no personal
knowledge of the facts establishing the possession of
property for the requisite period, no court can give any
value to his assertion, particularly as it was conceded by
him no less that he had no personal or direct competence
to know the truth of his assertion. It was one thing for the
trial court to admit the evidence, but quite another to give it
any worth for purposes of judicial adjudication.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 30, 2004; DISMISSES the
application of respondent Apolonia Bautista, Jr. for the
judicial confirmation of his imperfect title in LRC Case No.
N-12-10-96; and ORDERS Apolonia Bautista, Jr. to pay
the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF
PARAAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAAQUE,
CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAAQUE, and CITY
TREASURER OF PARAAQUE, respondents.; G.R. No.
155650; July 20, 2006; CARPIO, J.:
The Antecedents
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No.
903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the
Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter").
Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 34
Executive Order Nos. 9091 and 2982 amended the MIAA
Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers
the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the
runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then
under the Bureau of Air Transportation.4 The MIAA
Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or
any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.5
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061. The
OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA
negotiated with respondent City of Paraaque to pay the
real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some
of the real estate tax already due.
On 28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real
Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA's real estate tax
delinquency is broken down as follows:
1992-1997 RPT was paid on Dec. 24, 1997 as per
O.R.#9476102 for P4,207,028.75
#9476101 for P28,676,480.00
#9476103 for P49,115.00
On 17 July 2001, the City of Paraaque, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on
the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport
Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real
estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of
OGCC Opinion No. 061.
On 9 August 2001, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147
clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061. The OGCC pointed out
that Section 206 of the Local Government Code requires
persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of
exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate
tax.
On 1 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals
an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The petition sought to restrain the City of
Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands
and Buildings. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 66878.

On 5 October 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. The Court of Appeals also denied on
27 September 2002 MIAA's motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, MIAA
filed on 5 December 2002 the present petition for review.7
Meanwhile, in January 2003, the City of Paraaque posted
notices of auction sale at the Barangay Halls of Barangays
Vitalez, Sto. Nio, and Tambo, Paraaque City; in the
public market of Barangay La Huerta; and in the main
lobby of the Paraaque City Hall. The City of Paraaque
published the notices in the 3 and 10 January 2003 issues
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The notices announced the
public auction sale of the Airport Lands and Buildings to
the highest bidder on 7 February 2003, 10:00 a.m., at the
Legislative Session Hall Building of Paraaque City.
A day before the public auction, or on 6 February 2003, at
5:10 p.m., MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-Parte
and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order. The motion sought to restrain
respondents the City of Paraaque, City Mayor of
Paraaque, Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Paraaque,
City Treasurer of Paraaque, and the City Assessor of
Paraaque ("respondents") from auctioning the Airport
Lands and Buildings.
On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) effective immediately. The Court
ordered respondents to cease and desist from selling at
public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Respondents received the TRO on the same day that the
Court issued it. However, respondents received the TRO
only at 1:25 p.m. or three hours after the conclusion of the
public auction.
On 10 February 2003, this Court issued a Resolution
confirming nunc pro tunc the TRO.
On 29 March 2005, the Court heard the parties in oral
arguments. In compliance with the directive issued during
the hearing, MIAA, respondent City of Paraaque, and the
Solicitor General subsequently submitted their respective
Memoranda.
MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to
the Airport Lands and Buildings in the name of MIAA.
However, MIAA points out that it cannot claim ownership
over these properties since the real owner of the Airport
Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. The
MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to devote the Airport Lands
and Buildings for the benefit of the general public. Since
the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
and public service, the ownership of these properties
remains with the State. The Airport Lands and Buildings
are thus inalienable and are not subject to real estate tax
by local governments.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 35
MIAA also points out that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter
specifically exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate
tax. MIAA insists that it is also exempt from real estate tax
under Section 234 of the Local Government Code
because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic. To justify the exemption, MIAA invokes the
principle that the government cannot tax itself. MIAA
points out that the reason for tax exemption of public
property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the
tax creditor.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government
Code, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of "government-owned and-controlled
corporations" upon the effectivity of the Local Government
Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
statutory construction is that the express mention of one
person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international
airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section
193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents
assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
Respondents also cite the ruling of this Court in Mactan
International Airport v. Marcos8 where we held that the
Local Government Code has withdrawn the exemption
from real estate tax granted to international airports.
Respondents further argue that since MIAA has already
paid some of the real estate tax assessments, it is now
estopped from claiming that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
The Issue
This petition raises the threshold issue of whether the
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws. If so exempt, then the real
estate tax assessments issued by the City of Paraaque,
and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments,
are void. In such event, the other issues raised in this
petition become moot.
The Court's Ruling
We rule that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments.
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second,
the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of
the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation
Respondents argue that MIAA, being a government-
owned or controlled corporation, is not exempt from real

estate tax. Respondents claim that the deletion of the
phrase "any government-owned or controlled so exempt
by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local Government
Code withdrew the real estate tax exemption of
government-owned or controlled corporations. The deleted
phrase appeared in Section 40(a) of the 1974 Real
Property Tax Code enumerating the entities exempt from
real estate tax.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled
corporation is not exempt from real estate tax. However,
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-
owned or controlled corporation as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent
of its capital stock: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
"organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is
not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is
not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares. Section 10 of the MIAA Charter9 provides:
SECTION 10. Capital. The capital of the Authority to be
contributed by the National Government shall be increased
from Two and One-half Billion (P2,500,000,000.00) Pesos
to Ten Billion (P10,000,000,000.00) Pesos to consist of:
(a) The value of fixed assets including airport facilities,
runways and equipment and such other properties,
movable and immovable[,] which may be contributed by
the National Government or transferred by it from any of
its agencies, the valuation of which shall be determined
jointly with the Department of Budget and Management
and the Commission on Audit on the date of such
contribution or transfer after making due allowances for
depreciation and other deductions taking into account the
loans and other liabilities of the Authority at the time of the
takeover of the assets and other properties;
(b) That the amount of P605 million as of December 31,
1986 representing about seventy percentum (70%) of the
unremitted share of the National Government from 1983 to
1986 to be remitted to the National Treasury as provided
for in Section 11 of E. O. No. 903 as amended, shall be
converted into the equity of the National Government in
the Authority. Thereafter, the Government contribution to
the capital of the Authority shall be provided in the General
Appropriations Act.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 36
Clearly, under its Charter, MIAA does not have capital
stock that is divided into shares.
Section 3 of the Corporation Code10 defines a stock
corporation as one whose "capital stock is divided into
shares and x x x authorized to distribute to the holders of
such shares dividends x x x." MIAA has capital but it is not
divided into shares of stock. MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares. Hence, MIAA is not a stock corporation.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has
no members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines
a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of its
income is distributable as dividends to its members,
trustees or officers." A non-stock corporation must have
members. Even if we assume that the Government is
considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make
MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock corporations
cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA
to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the
National Treasury.11 This prevents MIAA from qualifying
as a non-stock corporation.
Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-
stock corporations are "organized for charitable, religious,
educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes,
like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers." MIAA
is not organized for any of these purposes. MIAA, a public
utility, is organized to operate an international and
domestic airport for public use.
Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation,
MIAA does not qualify as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. What then is the legal status of
MIAA within the National Government?
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a
government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a

government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA
exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,12
police authority13 and the levying of fees and charges.14
At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order."15
Likewise, when the law makes a government
instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department
framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that
transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous
body"16 will make its operation more "financially viable."17
Many government instrumentalities are vested with
corporate powers but they do not become stock or non-
stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before
an agency or instrumentality is deemed a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Examples are the Mactan
International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports
Authority, the University of the Philippines and Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities
exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as
stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes
loosely called government corporate entities. However,
they are not government-owned or controlled corporations
in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative
Code, which is the governing law defining the legal
relationship and status of government entities.
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of
Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to
the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local
governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the
power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes
taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power "subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide."18
Law on NatRes (23-49) 37
When local governments invoke the power to tax on
national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rule is
that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a
person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against
taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed
against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However,
when Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national
government instrumentality. As this Court declared in
Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.:
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of
exemptions running to the benefit of the government itself
or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that
has to be handled by government in the course of its
operations. For these reasons, provisions granting
exemptions to government agencies may be construed
liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such agencies.
There is, moreover, no point in national and local
governments taxing each other, unless a sound and
compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds
from one government pocket to another.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax
national government instrumentalities for rendering
essential public services to inhabitants of local
governments. The only exception is when the legislature
clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the
delivery of essential public services for sound and
compelling policy considerations. There must be express
language in the law empowering local governments to tax
national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether
such power exists is resolved against local governments.
Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states
that "unless otherwise provided" in the Code, local
governments cannot tax national government
instrumentalities. As this Court held in Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation:
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the
operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal
government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L
Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the
National Government over local governments.

"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made
reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the
States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state
or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them."
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140,
emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat
National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"
(U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as
the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra)
cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation
of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
20
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the
Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not
of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like "roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State," are owned by the State. The term "ports"
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
Law on NatRes (23-49) 38
and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and
thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and
domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public
does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and
Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by
the government of a tollway does not change the character
of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for
the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly
through the taxes they pay the government, or only those
among the public who actually use the road through the
toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system
is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the
public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the
character of the property whether it is of public dominion or
not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public
dominion as one "intended for public use." Even if the
government collects toll fees, the road is still "intended for
public use" if anyone can use the road under the same
terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The
charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that
can use the road, the speed restrictions and other
conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public
character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as
the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the
bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA.
The collection of such fees does not change the character
of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often
termed user's tax. This means taxing those among the
public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all
the public including those who never use the particular
public facility. A user's tax is more equitable a principle
of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its
Charter calls the "principal airport of the Philippines for
both international and domestic air traffic,"22 are
properties of public dominion because they are intended
for public use. As properties of public dominion, they
indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce
of Man
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to
public use and thus are properties of public dominion. As
properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. The Court
has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are
outside the commerce of man. As early as 1915, this Court

already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas that
properties devoted to public use are outside the commerce
of man, thus:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for
public use in provinces and in towns comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains,
and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by said towns or provinces."
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use,
the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw
or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to
lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas.
In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the
defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality
exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not
dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything
which is not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of
this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of
Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which says:
"Communal things that cannot be sold because they are
by their very nature outside of commerce are those for
public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands,
rivers, fountains, etc." (Emphasis supplied)
Again in Espiritu v. Municipal Council, the Court declared
that properties of public dominion are outside the
commerce of man:
xxx Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the
public in general. They are outside the commerce of man
and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties. While in case of war or
during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied
temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was
tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the
emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use
must also cease, and the town officials should see to it
that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the
public and free from encumbrances or illegal private
constructions.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion,
being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject
of an auction sale.25
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not
subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public
or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy. Essential public services
will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will
happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel
Law on NatRes (23-49) 39
the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for
non-payment of real estate tax.
Before MIAA can encumber26 the Airport Lands and
Buildings, the President must first withdraw from public
use the Airport Lands and Buildings. Sections 83 and 88 of
the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
"remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
other than timber and mineral lands,"27 provide:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the
public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic
of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including
reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal
pastures or lequas communales, public parks, public
quarries, public fishponds, working men's village and other
improvements for the public benefit.
SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under
the provisions of Section eighty-three shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry,
sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by
proclamation of the President. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation
withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public
use, these properties remain properties of public dominion
and are inalienable. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings
are inalienable in their present status as properties of
public dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution
or foreclosure sale. As long as the Airport Lands and
Buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership
remains with the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The authority of the President to reserve lands of the
public domain for public use, and to withdraw such public
use, is reiterated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and
Private Domain of the Government. (1) The President
shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public
use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of
the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until
otherwise provided by law or proclamation;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no question, therefore, that unless the Airport
Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or presidential
proclamation from public use, they are properties of public
dominion, owned by the Republic and outside the
commerce of man.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and
Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12,
Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities
like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the
Republic, thus:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
Whenever real property of the Government is authorized
by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the
authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another
officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality,
by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
In MIAA's case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport
Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive
head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the
Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such
deed of conveyance.28
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a
Reorganization
The MIAA Charter, which is a law, transferred to MIAA the
title to the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of
Air Transportation of the Department of Transportation and
Communications. The MIAA Charter provides:
SECTION 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport
Authority. x x x x
The land where the Airport is presently located as well as
the surrounding land area of approximately six hundred
hectares, are hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned
to the ownership and administration of the Authority,
subject to existing rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and
other appropriate government agencies shall undertake an
actual survey of the area transferred within one year from
the promulgation of this Executive Order and the
corresponding title to be issued in the name of the
Authority. Any portion thereof shall not be disposed
through sale or through any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
Law on NatRes (23-49) 40
SECTION 22. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible
Assets. All existing public airport facilities, runways,
lands, buildings and other property, movable or
immovable, belonging to the Airport, and all assets,
powers, rights, interests and privileges belonging to the
Bureau of Air Transportation relating to airport works or air
operations, including all equipment which are necessary
for the operation of crash fire and rescue facilities, are
hereby transferred to the Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 25. Abolition of the Manila International Airport
as a Division in the Bureau of Air Transportation and
Transitory Provisions. The Manila International Airport
including the Manila Domestic Airport as a division under
the Bureau of Air Transportation is hereby abolished.
x x x x.
The MIAA Charter transferred the Airport Lands and
Buildings to MIAA without the Republic receiving cash,
promissory notes or even stock since MIAA is not a stock
corporation.
The whereas clauses of the MIAA Charter explain the
rationale for the transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings
to MIAA, thus:
WHEREAS, the Manila International Airport as the
principal airport of the Philippines for both international
and domestic air traffic, is required to provide standards of
airport accommodation and service comparable with the
best airports in the world;
WHEREAS, domestic and other terminals, general
aviation and other facilities, have to be upgraded to meet
the current and future air traffic and other demands of
aviation in Metro Manila;
WHEREAS, a management and organization study has
indicated that the objectives of providing high standards of
accommodation and service within the context of a
financially viable operation, will best be achieved by a
separate and autonomous body; and
WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1416, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, the President
of the Philippines is given continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government, which authority
includes the creation of new entities, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the
Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to
transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize
a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a
separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the
beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA
itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any

ownership rights over MIAA's assets adverse to the
Republic.
The MIAA Charter expressly provides that the Airport
Lands and Buildings "shall not be disposed through sale or
through any other mode unless specifically approved by
the President of the Philippines." This only means that the
Republic retained the beneficial ownership of the Airport
Lands and Buildings because under Article 428 of the Civil
Code, only the "owner has the right to x x x dispose of a
thing." Since MIAA cannot dispose of the Airport Lands
and Buildings, MIAA does not own the Airport Lands and
Buildings.
At any time, the President can transfer back to the
Republic title to the Airport Lands and Buildings without
the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. Under
Section 3 of the MIAA Charter, the President is the only
one who can authorize the sale or disposition of the Airport
Lands and Buildings. This only confirms that the Airport
Lands and Buildings belong to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts
from real estate tax any "[r]eal property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines." Section 234(a) provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The
following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
This exemption should be read in relation with Section
133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits local
governments from imposing "[t]axes, fees or charges of
any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities x x x." The real properties owned by the
Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic itself
or in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the
National Government. The Administrative Code allows real
property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name of
agencies or instrumentalities of the national government.
Such real properties remain owned by the Republic and
continue to be exempt from real estate tax.
The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real
property to an agency or instrumentality of the national
government. This happens when title of the real property is
transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the
Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such
arrangement does not result in the loss of the tax
exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
states that real property owned by the Republic loses its
Law on NatRes (23-49) 41
tax exemption only if the "beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
person." MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not a
taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that the
Republic has granted to MIAA the beneficial use of the
Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make
these real properties subject to real estate tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that
MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real
estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is
subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has
granted the beneficial use of such land area for a
consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land
area is subject to real estate tax. In Lung Center of the
Philippines v. Quezon City, the Court ruled:
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to
private entities as well as those parts of the hospital
leased to private individuals are not exempt from such
taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied
by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its
patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from
real property taxes.29
3. Refutation of Arguments of Minority
The minority asserts that the MIAA is not exempt from real
estate tax because Section 193 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 withdrew the tax exemption of "all persons,
whether natural or juridical" upon the effectivity of the
Code. Section 193 provides:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions
are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
The minority states that MIAA is indisputably a juridical
person. The minority argues that since the Local
Government Code withdrew the tax exemption of all
juridical persons, then MIAA is not exempt from real estate
tax. Thus, the minority declares:
It is evident from the quoted provisions of the Local
Government Code that the withdrawn exemptions from
realty tax cover not just GOCCs, but all persons. To
repeat, the provisions lay down the explicit proposition that
the withdrawal of realty tax exemption applies to all
persons. The reference to or the inclusion of GOCCs is
only clarificatory or illustrative of the explicit provision.

The term "All persons" encompasses the two classes of
persons recognized under our laws, natural and juridical
persons. Obviously, MIAA is not a natural person. Thus,
the determinative test is not just whether MIAA is a GOCC,
but whether MIAA is a juridical person at all. (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
The minority posits that the "determinative test" whether
MIAA is exempt from local taxation is its status whether
MIAA is a juridical person or not. The minority also insists
that "Sections 193 and 234 may be examined in isolation
from Section 133(o) to ascertain MIAA's claim of
exemption."
The argument of the minority is fatally flawed. Section 193
of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption of all juridical persons "[u]nless otherwise
provided in this Code." Now, Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code expressly provides otherwise,
specifically prohibiting local governments from imposing
any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities.
Section 133(o) states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of
Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to
the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local
governments cannot impose any kind of tax on national
government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local
governments are devoid of power to tax the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities. The taxing
powers of local governments do not extend to the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, "[u]nless
otherwise provided in this Code" as stated in the saving
clause of Section 133. The saving clause refers to Section
234(a) on the exception to the exemption from real estate
tax of real property owned by the Republic.
The minority, however, theorizes that unless exempted in
Section 193 itself, all juridical persons are subject to tax by
local governments. The minority insists that the juridical
persons exempt from local taxation are limited to the three
classes of entities specifically enumerated as exempt in
Section 193. Thus, the minority states:
x x x Under Section 193, the exemption is limited to (a)
local water districts; (b) cooperatives duly registered under
Republic Act No. 6938; and (c) non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions. It would be
belaboring the obvious why the MIAA does not fall within
Law on NatRes (23-49) 42
any of the exempt entities under Section 193. (Emphasis
supplied)
The minority's theory directly contradicts and completely
negates Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code.
This theory will result in gross absurdities. It will make the
national government, which itself is a juridical person,
subject to tax by local governments since the national
government is not included in the enumeration of exempt
entities in Section 193. Under this theory, local
governments can impose any kind of local tax, and not
only real estate tax, on the national government.
Under the minority's theory, many national government
instrumentalities with juridical personalities will also be
subject to any kind of local tax, and not only real estate
tax. Some of the national government instrumentalities
vested by law with juridical personalities are: Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,30 Philippine Rice Research
Institute,31 Laguna Lake
Development Authority,32 Fisheries Development
Authority,33 Bases Conversion Development Authority,34
Philippine Ports Authority,35 Cagayan de Oro Port
Authority,36 San Fernando Port Authority,37 Cebu Port
Authority,38 and Philippine National Railways.39
The minority's theory violates Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code which expressly prohibits local
governments from imposing any kind of tax on national
government instrumentalities. Section 133(o) does not
distinguish between national government instrumentalities
with or without juridical personalities. Where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
Section 133(o) applies to all national government
instrumentalities, with or without juridical personalities. The
determinative test whether MIAA is exempt from local
taxation is not whether MIAA is a juridical person, but
whether it is a national government instrumentality under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. Section
133(o) is the specific provision of law prohibiting local
governments from imposing any kind of tax on the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 133 of the Local Government Code starts with the
saving clause "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code."
This means that unless the Local Government Code
grants an express authorization, local governments have
no power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. Clearly, the rule is local governments
have no power to tax the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities. As an exception to this
rule, local governments may tax the national government,
its agencies and instrumentalities only if the Local
Government Code expressly so provides.
The saving clause in Section 133 refers to the exception to
the exemption in Section 234(a) of the Code, which makes
the national government subject to real estate tax when it
gives the beneficial use of its real properties to a taxable

entity. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax The
following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 234(a), real property owned by the
Republic is exempt from real estate tax. The exception to
this exemption is when the government gives the
beneficial use of the real property to a taxable entity.
The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is the
only instance when the national government, its agencies
and instrumentalities are subject to any kind of tax by local
governments. The exception to the exemption applies only
to real estate tax and not to any other tax. The justification
for the exception to the exemption is that the real property,
although owned by the Republic, is not devoted to public
use or public service but devoted to the private gain of a
taxable person.
The minority also argues that since Section 133 precedes
Section 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code, the
later provisions prevail over Section 133. Thus, the
minority asserts:
x x x Moreover, sequentially Section 133 antecedes
Section 193 and 234. Following an accepted rule of
construction, in case of conflict the subsequent provisions
should prevail. Therefore, MIAA, as a juridical person, is
subject to real property taxes, the general exemptions
attaching to instrumentalities under Section 133(o) of the
Local Government Code being qualified by Sections 193
and 234 of the same law. (Emphasis supplied)
The minority assumes that there is an irreconcilable
conflict between Section 133 on one hand, and Sections
193 and 234 on the other. No one has urged that there is
such a conflict, much less has any one presenteda
persuasive argument that there is such a conflict. The
minority's assumption of an irreconcilable conflict in the
statutory provisions is an egregious error for two reasons.
First, there is no conflict whatsoever between Sections
133 and 193 because Section 193 expressly admits its
subordination to other provisions of the Code when
Section 193 states "[u]nless otherwise provided in this
Code." By its own words, Section 193 admits the
superiority of other provisions of the Local Government
Code that limit the exercise of the taxing power in Section
193. When a provision of law grants a power but withholds
such power on certain matters, there is no conflict
Law on NatRes (23-49) 43
between the grant of power and the withholding of power.
The grantee of the power simply cannot exercise the
power on matters withheld from its power.
Second, Section 133 is entitled "Common Limitations on
the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units." Section
133 limits the grant to local governments of the power to
tax, and not merely the exercise of a delegated power to
tax. Section 133 states that the taxing powers of local
governments "shall not extend to the levy" of any kind of
tax on the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. There is no clearer limitation on the
taxing power than this.
Since Section 133 prescribes the "common limitations" on
the taxing powers of local governments, Section 133
logically prevails over Section 193 which grants local
governments such taxing powers. By their very meaning
and purpose, the "common limitations" on the taxing
power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing
power. If the taxing power of local governments in Section
193 prevails over the limitations on such taxing power in
Section 133, then local governments can impose any kind
of tax on the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities a gross absurdity.
Local governments have no power to tax the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, except as
otherwise provided in the Local Government Code
pursuant to the saving clause in Section 133 stating
"[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code." This exception
which is an exception to the exemption of the Republic
from real estate tax imposed by local governments
refers to Section 234(a) of the Code. The exception to the
exemption in Section 234(a) subjects real property owned
by the Republic, whether titled in the name of the national
government, its agencies or instrumentalities, to real
estate tax if the beneficial use of such property is given to
a taxable entity.
The minority also claims that the definition in the
Administrative Code of the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporation" is not controlling. The minority
points out that Section 2 of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code admits that its definitions are not
controlling when it provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific
words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular
statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxxx
The minority then concludes that reliance on the
Administrative Code definition is "flawed."
The minority's argument is a non sequitur. True, Section 2
of the Administrative Code recognizes that a statute may
require a different meaning than that defined in the
Administrative Code. However, this does not automatically

mean that the definition in the Administrative Code does
not apply to the Local Government Code. Section 2 of the
Administrative Code clearly states that "unless the specific
words x x x of a particular statute shall require a different
meaning," the definition in Section 2 of the Administrative
Code shall apply. Thus, unless there is specific language
in the Local Government Code defining the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporation" differently
from the definition in the Administrative Code, the
definition in the Administrative Code prevails.
The minority does not point to any provision in the Local
Government Code defining the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation" differently from the
definition in the Administrative Code. Indeed, there is
none. The Local Government Code is silent on the
definition of the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation." The Administrative Code, however, expressly
defines the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation." The inescapable conclusion is that the
Administrative Code definition of the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation" applies to the Local
Government Code.
The third whereas clause of the Administrative Code
states that the Code "incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles
and rules of governance." Thus, the Administrative Code is
the governing law defining the status and relationship of
government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities. Unless a statute expressly provides for a
different status and relationship for a specific government
unit or entity, the provisions of the Administrative Code
prevail.
The minority also contends that the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation" should apply only to
corporations organized under the Corporation Code, the
general incorporation law, and not to corporations created
by special charters. The minority sees no reason why
government corporations with special charters should
have a capital stock. Thus, the minority declares:
I submit that the definition of "government-owned or
controlled corporations" under the Administrative Code
refer to those corporations owned by the government or its
instrumentalities which are created not by legislative
enactment, but formed and organized under the
Corporation Code through registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In short, these are GOCCs
without original charters.
xxxx
It might as well be worth pointing out that there is no point
in requiring a capital structure for GOCCs whose full
ownership is limited by its charter to the State or Republic.
Such GOCCs are not empowered to declare dividends or
alienate their capital shares.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 44
The contention of the minority is seriously flawed. It is not
in accord with the Constitution and existing legislations. It
will also result in gross absurdities.
First, the Administrative Code definition of the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporation" does not
distinguish between one incorporated under the
Corporation Code or under a special charter. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Second, Congress has created through special charters
several government-owned corporations organized as
stock corporations. Prime examples are the Land Bank of
the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines. The special charter40 of the Land Bank of the
Philippines provides:
SECTION 81. Capital. The authorized capital stock of
the Bank shall be nine billion pesos, divided into seven
hundred and eighty million common shares with a par
value of ten pesos each, which shall be fully subscribed by
the Government, and one hundred and twenty million
preferred shares with a par value of ten pesos each, which
shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of
Sections seventy-seven and eighty-three of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the special charter41 of the Development Bank
of the Philippines provides:
SECTION 7. Authorized Capital Stock Par value. The
capital stock of the Bank shall be Five Billion Pesos to be
divided into Fifty Million common shares with par value of
P100 per share. These shares are available for
subscription by the National Government. Upon the
effectivity of this Charter, the National Government shall
subscribe to Twenty-Five Million common shares of stock
worth Two Billion Five Hundred Million which shall be
deemed paid for by the Government with the net asset
values of the Bank remaining after the transfer of assets
and liabilities as provided in Section 30 hereof.
Other government-owned corporations organized as stock
corporations under their special charters are the Philippine
Crop Insurance Corporation,42 Philippine International
Trading Corporation,43 and the Philippine National
Bank44 before it was reorganized as a stock corporation
under the Corporation Code. All these government-owned
corporations organized under special charters as stock
corporations are subject to real estate tax on real
properties owned by them. To rule that they are not
government-owned or controlled corporations because
they are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission would remove them from the reach of Section
234 of the Local Government Code, thus exempting them
from real estate tax.
Third, the government-owned or controlled corporations
created through special charters are those that meet the
two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the

Constitution. The first condition is that the government-
owned or controlled corporation must be established for
the common good. The second condition is that the
government-owned or controlled corporation must meet
the test of economic viability. Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.
The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to
create "government-owned or controlled corporations"
through special charters only if these entities are required
to meet the twin conditions of common good and
economic viability. In other words, Congress has no power
to create government-owned or controlled corporations
with special charters unless they are made to comply with
the two conditions of common good and economic
viability. The test of economic viability applies only to
government-owned or controlled corporations that perform
economic or commercial activities and need to compete in
the market place. Being essentially economic vehicles of
the State for the common good meaning for economic
development purposes these government-owned or
controlled corporations with special charters are usually
organized as stock corporations just like ordinary private
corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with
corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability.
These instrumentalities perform essential public services
for the common good, services that every modern State
must provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not
be economically viable since the government may even
subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities
are not the "government-owned or controlled corporations"
referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no limitation when the
legislature creates government instrumentalities vested
with corporate powers but performing essential
governmental or public functions. Congress has plenary
authority to create government instrumentalities vested
with corporate powers provided these instrumentalities
perform essential government functions or public services.
However, when the legislature creates through special
charters corporations that perform economic or
commercial activities, such entities known as
"government-owned or controlled corporations" must
meet the test of economic viability because they compete
in the market place.
This is the situation of the Land Bank of the Philippines
and the Development Bank of the Philippines and similar
Law on NatRes (23-49) 45
government-owned or controlled corporations, which
derive their income to meet operating expenses solely
from commercial transactions in competition with the
private sector. The intent of the Constitution is to prevent
the creation of government-owned or controlled
corporations that cannot survive on their own in the market
place and thus merely drain the public coffers.
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, proponent of the test of
economic viability, explained to the Constitutional
Commission the purpose of this test, as follows:
MR. OPLE: Madam President, the reason for this concern
is really that when the government creates a corporation,
there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt
from the test of economic performance. We know what
happened in the past. If a government corporation loses,
then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers' money through
new equity infusions from the government and what is
always invoked is the common good. That is the reason
why this year, out of a budget of P115 billion for the entire
government, about P28 billion of this will go into equity
infusions to support a few government financial
institutions. And this is all taxpayers' money which could
have been relocated to agrarian reform, to social services
like health and education, to augment the salaries of
grossly underpaid public employees. And yet this is all
going down the drain.
Therefore, when we insert the phrase "ECONOMIC
VIABILITY" together with the "common good," this
becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state
capitalism to excuse themselves from the responsibility of
meeting the market test so that they become viable. And
so, Madam President, I reiterate, for the committee's
consideration and I am glad that I am joined in this
proposal by Commissioner Foz, the insertion of the
standard of "ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR THE ECONOMIC
TEST," together with the common good.45
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, explains in his textbook The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary:
The second sentence was added by the 1986
Constitutional Commission. The significant addition,
however, is the phrase "in the interest of the common
good and subject to the test of economic viability." The
addition includes the ideas that they must show capacity to
function efficiently in business and that they should not go
into activities which the private sector can do better.
Moreover, economic viability is more than financial viability
but also includes capability to make profit and generate
benefits not quantifiable in financial terms.
Clearly, the test of economic viability does not apply to
government entities vested with corporate powers and
performing essential public services. The State is
obligated to render essential public services regardless of

the economic viability of providing such service. The non-
economic viability of rendering such essential public
service does not excuse the State from withholding such
essential services from the public.
However, government-owned or controlled corporations
with special charters, organized essentially for economic
or commercial objectives, must meet the test of economic
viability. These are the government-owned or controlled
corporations that are usually organized under their special
charters as stock corporations, like the Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines.
These are the government-owned or controlled
corporations, along with government-owned or controlled
corporations organized under the Corporation Code, that
fall under the definition of "government-owned or
controlled corporations" in Section 2(10) of the
Administrative Code.
The MIAA need not meet the test of economic viability
because the legislature did not create MIAA to compete in
the market place. MIAA does not compete in the market
place because there is no competing international airport
operated by the private sector. MIAA performs an
essential public service as the primary domestic and
international airport of the Philippines. The operation of an
international airport requires the presence of personnel
from the following government agencies:
1. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to
document the arrival and departure of passengers,
screening out those without visas or travel documents, or
those with hold departure orders;
2. The Bureau of Customs, to collect import duties or
enforce the ban on prohibited importations;
3. The quarantine office of the Department of Health, to
enforce health measures against the spread of infectious
diseases into the country;
4. The Department of Agriculture, to enforce measures
against the spread of plant and animal diseases into the
country;
5. The Aviation Security Command of the Philippine
National Police, to prevent the entry of terrorists and the
escape of criminals, as well as to secure the airport
premises from terrorist attack or seizure;
6. The Air Traffic Office of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, to authorize aircraft
to enter or leave Philippine airspace, as well as to land on,
or take off from, the airport; and
7. The MIAA, to provide the proper premises such as
runway and buildings for the government personnel,
passengers, and airlines, and to manage the airport
operations.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 46
All these agencies of government perform government
functions essential to the operation of an international
airport.
MIAA performs an essential public service that every
modern State must provide its citizens. MIAA derives its
revenues principally from the mandatory fees and charges
MIAA imposes on passengers and airlines. The terminal
fees that MIAA charges every passenger are regulatory or
administrative fees47 and not income from commercial
transactions.
MIAA falls under the definition of a government
instrumentality under Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code, which provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The fact alone that MIAA is endowed with corporate
powers does not make MIAA a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Without a change in its capital
structure, MIAA remains a government instrumentality
under Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. More importantly, as long as MIAA
renders essential public services, it need not comply with
the test of economic viability. Thus, MIAA is outside the
scope of the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporations" under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The minority belittles the use in the Local Government
Code of the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation" as merely "clarificatory or illustrative." This is
fatal. The 1987 Constitution prescribes explicit conditions
for the creation of "government-owned or controlled
corporations." The Administrative Code defines what
constitutes a "government-owned or controlled
corporation." To belittle this phrase as "clarificatory or
illustrative" is grave error.
To summarize, MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
because it is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or
controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet
the test of economic viability. MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing essential public services pursuant to Section
2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is not

subject to any kind of tax by local governments under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The
exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not
apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under
the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only
if the beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic
is given to a taxable entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
properties devoted to public use and thus are properties of
public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned
by the State or the Republic. Article 420 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied)
The term "ports x x x constructed by the State" includes
airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least
intended for public service. Whether intended for public
use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion. As properties of public
dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by
the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.
4. Conclusion
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs the
legal relation and status of government units, agencies
and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA
is a government instrumentality and not a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of
the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not
subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local
governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its
real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the
specific real property leased becomes subject to real
estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and
Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are
subject to real estate tax by the City of Paraaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public use, are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State
or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically
mentions "ports x x x constructed by the State," which
Law on NatRes (23-49) 47
includes public airports and seaports, as properties of
public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties
of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no
doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also
repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not
subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE
the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals of 5
October 2001 and 27 September 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
66878. We DECLARE the Airport Lands and Buildings of
the Manila International Airport Authority EXEMPT from
the real estate tax imposed by the City of Paraaque. We
declare VOID all the real estate tax assessments,
including the final notices of real estate tax delinquencies,
issued by the City of Paraaque on the Airport Lands and
Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority,
except for the portions that the Manila International Airport
Authority has leased to private parties. We also declare
VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of the
Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International
Airport Authority. No costs. SO ORDERED.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN,
represented by BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR, vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF BURUANGA, AKLAN, represented
by the HON. PROTACIO S. OBRIQUE; G.R. No. 149145
March 31, 2006; CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed
by the Roman Catholic Bishop1 of Kalibo, Aklan, seeking
the partial review of the Decision2 dated January 31, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52626.
Likewise sought to be reviewed is the Resolution dated
July 18, 2001 of the appellate court denying the
petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Some time in 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo,
Aklan, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) thereof a
complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of title
to land with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4164 and raffled to Branch 1 of the said
RTC.
The complaint alleged, among others, that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo is the lawful owner and
possessor of a parcel of residential and commercial land
(Cadastral Lot No. 138) located at the poblacion of the
Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The said lot, with an area
of 9,545 square meters, is a block bounded by four streets
on all sides. It is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of commercial and residential land known as
Cadastral Lot No. 138, GSS-06-00012, located at
Poblacion, Buruanga, Aklan, containing an area of NINE

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY- FIVE (9,545)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. Bounded on the North
by Viven Ostan Street; on the East by the Provincial Road;
on the South by Nitoy Sualog Street; and on the West by
Emilio Ostan Street, and declared for taxation purposes in
the name of the Roman Catholic Church, Buruanga,
Aklan, under Tax Declaration No. 6339 (1985) and
assessed at P23,850.00, including the improvements
thereon.3
In 1894, the Roman Catholic Church was built in the
middle portion of the said lot and has been in existence
since then up to the present.
The complaint further alleged that some time in 1978, 4 the
Municipality of Buruanga constructed its municipal building
on the northeastern portion of the subject lot after it
obtained the permission of Fr. Jesus Patio, then parish
priest of Buruanga. The municipality promised to
remove all the improvements it constructed thereon if and
when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed the
said land.
In October 1989, the said municipal building was razed by
fire allegedly perpetrated by members of the New Peoples
Army. On November 25, 1989, the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Kalibo, through its counsel, wrote to the Municipal
Mayor of Buruanga requesting the officials of the said
municipality to refrain from constructing its new building on
the same site because it is the property of the church.
Further, it needed the said land for its social action
projects. The letter reads in part:
I am writing you on behalf of my client THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, a corporation
sole and represented by Bishop Juan N. Nilmar requesting
you and the Honorable Members of the Municipal Council
(Sangguniang Bayan) to refrain from constructing your
new Municipal Building on the same site where your old
Municipal Building was burned down because it is
constructed on the property of the Church.
Please be informed that the land of the Church is needed
for its social action projects and additional building, hence,
kindly relocate your New Municipal Building in your own
land located along Emilio Ostan Street, known as
Cadastral Lot No. 87.
With respect to your other public buildings such as the
Rural Hospital, Buruanga Community Medicare Hospital,
the Basketball Court and the Grandstand which are all
occupying the Church property, you can continue using
the same land subject to your recognition of the true
ownership of the property of the Church The Roman
Catholic Church of Buruanga, Aklan, under the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, the lawful administrator
of all church properties in the Province of Aklan.5
Law on NatRes (23-49) 48
On March 12, 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo
wrote the Department of Public Works and Highways of
the said province requesting the said office not to issue
any building permit to the Municipal Mayor and/or the
Municipality of Buruanga in connection with the
construction of its municipal building on the land owned by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo.6
These letters went unheeded as the construction of the
new municipal building on the same site proceeded.
Consequently, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo filed
the complaint a quo and prayed that it be declared the
lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138. It likewise prayed
that a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin the
said municipality and its authorized representatives from
constructing the new municipal building thereon and that
the latter be directed to pay damages to the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo.
In its Answer,7 the Municipality of Buruanga, represented
by Mayor Protacio Obrique, denied that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo ever acquired ownership and
possession over the land subject of the complaint. It raised
as affirmative defenses that the said lot was surveyed as
property of the municipality on February 3, 1909 in
accordance with Section 58 of Act 926 by A.W. Bushell
and approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 15, 1909. 8
Thereafter, a decree was issued on March 14, 1919 in
favor of the Municipality of Buruanga under Case No.
12871 of then Court of Land Registration, Bureau of
Lands.
It was further alleged that the said land was again
surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Buruanga
under Act No. 2259 and denominated as Lot No. 138
GSS-06-00012 from the approved cadastral map and that
the said municipality alone had possessed the said land
under the claim of title exclusively for over fifty (50) years,
exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other
claimants.
The Municipality of Buruanga urged the court a quo to
dismiss the complaint and, instead, declare it the absolute
and exclusive owner of the disputed lot.
On November 29, 1990, the court a quo issued the Order9
appointing Geodetic Engineer Rodrigo Santiago of the
Bureau of Lands as
Commissioner and directing him to identify and delineate
the lot in question.
In compliance therewith, Engr. Santiago submitted the
Commissioners Report and Sketch stating in part:
That as per order of the court dated November 29, 1990 to
delineate the land[in] question, the undersigned court
commissioner notified both parties and the schedule of
survey was January 12, 1991 but it was postponed and

moved to January 15 as requested by the representative
from the Municipality of Buruanga.
That the land in question involved was pointed to me by
the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga,
identified on the plan as [L]ot 138 located at Poblacion
Buruanga with survey no. GSS-06-00012 approved by the
Director Lands last February 19, 1985, listed as Public
Plaza on file in the CENR Office Land Management
Sector, Kalibo, Aklan.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 49
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
1. The identity of the lot in question which is Lot 138
consisting of Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C as reflected in
the commissioners sketch with an area of 9,544 square
meters and subdivided as follows:
Lot 138-A 2,319 square meters
Lot 138-B 3,836 square meters

That the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga Lot 138-C 3,389 square meters
pointed also the boundary between the Public Plaza and
2. Lot 138-B is the present site of the Roman Catholic
the Roman Catholic Church.
Church of Buruanga.11
The Technical Descriptions are as follows:
The parties also agreed that the sole issue for resolution is
Lot 138-A (Public Plaza) who between the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo and
the Municipality of Buruanga is the owner of Lot 138.
corner 1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision dated
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m. October 30, 1995 declaring the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibo as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B
3-4 N88 - 54W 71.31 m and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner and
possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the said lots being
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m. public plaza for public use.

containing an area of 2,319 square meters The court a quo found that of the various tax declarations 12
presented by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo to
Lot 138-B (Roman Catholic Church) support its claim, only one referred to a portion of Lot 138.
Said tax declaration13 covered the church site and the
1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m.
parish house situated within Lot 138-B. The other pieces
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m. of evidence14 could not be relied upon because they
contained hearsay information relating to the disputed lot
3-4 N88 - 54W 71.31 m. that occurred before the affiants were born. The affidavit
executed by Fr. Jesus Patio15 stating that he was the one
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m. who gave verbal permission to then Municipal Mayor
Pedro Omugtong to construct the municipal building on the
containing an area of 3,836 square meters vacant lot owned by the church was not accorded any
evidentiary value because he (Fr. Patio) did not testify
Lot 138-C (Public Plaza) during the trial.

1-2 N81 - 19W 87.70 m. On the other hand, the court a quo did not give credence
to the Municipality of Buruangas Exhibit "1," a microfilm
2-3 N06 - 33E 38.90 m.
enlargement of a plan showing that the land consisting of
12,615 square meters was subject of Land Registration
3-4 S83 - 17E 80.35 m.
Case No. 12871. The plan showed that the survey was
4-1 S03 - 17E 42.57 m. approved on May 15, 1909 and the notations therein
indicated that a decree was issued on March 14, 1919. But
containing an area of 3,389 square meters no such decree was shown. It was further found by the
court a quo that the plan was requested from the Bureau
Consistent with the above technical description, the sketch of Lands Survey Division on December 22, 1976.
submitted by Engr. Santiago showed the delineation of Lot However, the same was not duly certified by the issuing
138 into three parts: Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C. The government agency. Even assuming that the disputed lot
municipal building stood on Lot 138-A; the Roman Catholic was indeed subject of a land registration proceeding and a
Church stood on Lot 138-B and the municipal health decree had been issued therefor in March 1919, the
center and the Buruanga Community Medicare building Municipality of Buruanga, despite lapse of decades, failed
stood on Lot 138-C. It also showed that portions of Lots to take the necessary judicial steps for the issuance of a
138-A and 138-C were being used as public plaza. title in its name based on the decree. Neither did it take

any other course of action that would render its title thereto
indefeasible.
The court a quo, however, gave probative weight to the
testimony of Manuel Sualog, Chief of the Lands
Management Section of the Department of Environment
and National Resources, who was presented by the
Municipality of Buruanga. Sualog testified that the disputed
lot was the public plaza of the said municipality. Standing
thereon are the Roman Catholic Church and its parish
house, the new municipal hall, the rural health center, the
barangay community hospital and a basketball court.
During the court a quos ocular inspection conducted on
May 7, 1992, the town was celebrating its town fiesta. It
observed that the public was using the whole plaza (in
Lots 138-A and 138-C) for the festivities. Also, the
existence of the health centers, basketball court and the
municipal hall showed that portions of the disputed lot
were being used by the public.
Upon inspection of the church, the court a quo further
observed that it was indeed an old stone structure and
probably built in 1894, the year carved on its left side
entrance. It described the church as "vintage turn-of-the
century colonial Filipino church architecture. Moss and
ficus grow out of its wall crevices. The age of the church
shows that it has been occupying that particular space for
almost one hundred (100) years long enough for the
plaintiff to have possessed it in the concept of owner
continuously, adversely and publicly against the whole
world."16
The court a quo held that the facts of the present case
were similar to those in Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 17
where the Court ruled that:
For the above reasons, x x x it should be held, as we do
hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied by the
church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a
public plaza of said town, of public use and that in
consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the
complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both
instances.18
The dispositive portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, is
declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B with
an area of 3,836 square meters in the Commissioners
Report as against the defendant;
2. Defendant Municipality of Buruanga is declared the
lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-A with an area of
2,319 square meters and Lot 138-C with an area of 3,389
square meters in the Commissioners Report, said lots
being public plaza destined for public use.19
Law on NatRes (23-49) 50
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo seasonably filed its
appeal with the Court of Appeals. It sought the reversal of
that portion of the court a quos judgment adjudicating the
ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C to the Municipality of
Buruanga.
During the pendency of the case in the appellate court, the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved to submit
additional evidence to support its claim of ownership over
the entire Lot 138. The additional evidence consisted of
affidavits of old residents of Buruanga stating that the
municipal building was constructed on the disputed lot only
in the late 1950s. Prior thereto, the municipal building
stood at a place called Sunset Park, a block totally
different from the disputed lot. The said motion was denied
by the appellate court on the ground that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo had already been accorded full
opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo.
The Municipality of Buruanga did not file its appellees
brief with the CA. On January 31, 2001, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification
the decision of the court a quo. The CA affirmed the
ownership of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo over
Lot 138-B but reversed the court a quos ruling relative to
the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C. The appellate
court declared the said lots property of public dominion,
hence, not owned by either of the parties.
The CA stated that the court a quo correctly relied on the
ruling in Harty, which was reiterated in Bishop of Calbayog
v. Director of Lands,20 where the Court held that the public
plaza and public thoroughfare were not subject to
registration by the church. In the latter case, it was ruled
that since neither the Church nor the municipality
presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive
possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only
indubitable fact was the free and continuous use of the lot
in question by the residents of the town, which had no
other public plaza to speak of other than the disputed lot,
there was a strong presumption that the same had been
segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the
municipality therein.
As mentioned earlier, the appellate court reversed that
portion of the court a quos judgment declaring the
Municipality of Buruanga as the owner of Lots 138-A and
138-C which form part of the public plaza. Citing Articles
41921 and 42022 of the Civil Code, the appellate court
classified these lots as property of public dominion; hence,
not susceptible to private ownership by the Municipality of
Buruanga. The said lots are merely under its jurisdiction
and administration. Being intended for the common and
public welfare, they could not be appropriated either by the
State or by private persons.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Lots 138-A

and 138-C are declared property of public dominion not
owned by either of the parties.23
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved for a partial
reconsideration of the appellate courts ruling that Lots
138-A and 138-C, being the public plaza, are property of
public dominion. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo
averred that the appellate court erred in affirming the
finding of the court a quo that these lots comprise the
public plaza. It maintained that it owned the entire Lot 138.
The appellate court denied the motion for partial
reconsideration, hence, the recourse to this Court by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo (the petitioner).
The Petitioners Arguments
The present petition for review on certiorari alleges that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
RELYING UPON THE CASES OF HARTY V.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, TARLAC (13 Phil. 152
[1909]) and BISHOP OF CALBAYOG V. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS (45 SCRA 418 [1972]) TO SUPPORT ITS
CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE
OWNER OF LOTS 138-A AND 138-C.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT LOTS 138-A AND 138-C [WHICH ARE
WITHIN THE ORIGINAL LOT 138] ARE PROPERTIES
OF THE PUBLIC [DOMAIN] AND NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY THE PETITIONER.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
PETITIONERS OWNERSHIP OF THE ENTIRE LOT 138
WAS GRANTED AND RECOGNIZED UNDER SPANISH
LAW, AND AFFIRMED IN THE TREATY OF PARIS.24
The petitioner clarifies that it is seeking a partial review of
the appellate courts Decision dated January 31, 2001
classifying Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public
dominion and not susceptible to private ownership and
that the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
ownership thereof. It is not contesting the portion of the CA
decision upholding its ownership over Lot 138-B.
The petitioner opines that the case of Harty, relied upon by
the court a quo and the CA to hold that Lots 138-A and
138-C comprise the public plaza, are inapplicable because
the facts therein are not similar to those of the present
case. The petitioner points out that the public plaza
referred to in Harty was the lot across the street from the
church lot. It was not referring to the land surrounding the
Catholic church and the convent of the town of Victoria,
which was bounded by streets on each of its four sides.
Thus, when the Court in Harty limited the ownership of the
church to the land "occupied by the church of the town of
Victoria and its parish house," it was not confining the
ownership to a portion of the lot on which the church and
Law on NatRes (23-49) 51
parish house were situated. Rather, the Court in Harty
referred to the entire lot or block (bounded by a street on
each of the four sides) on which the church and its parish
house were erected.
The petitioner asserts that the following facts that have
been established support its claim of ownership over the
entire Lot 138 as against the claim of the Municipality of
Buruanga (respondent municipality):
[a] The church is built in the middle of Lot 138 (which is
now Lot 138-B). It was built therein in 1894. The church
was almost 100 years old (at the time the case was
instituted with the trial court in 1990). x x x
[b] The Municipality of Buruanga is an old municipality
constituted or created during the colonial period, when the
Philippine Islands was under the Spanish sovereignty. x x
x
[c] No building was built on Lot 138 earlier than or at about
the same time as the church. No municipal building was
built around the church for many decades after 1894. x x x
[d] The municipal hall of Buruanga was built on what is
now Lot 138-A only in the late 1950s. x x x
[e] It was not controverted by the private respondent that
then Mayor Omugtong of Buruanga sought and obtained
the permission of the then parish priest, Fr. Jesus Patino,
to allow the municipal government to build its municipal
hall on Lot 138-A in the late 1950s only. x x x
[f] No evidence was adduced by private respondent that it
had obtained title of Lot 138-A or 138-C from the church
(the owner of these lots) or that its possession of any
portion of Lot 138 was adverse to that of the church. x x x
[g] When the municipal hall was burned down by the NPA
rebels in 1989 the church asked the municipal government
to relocate the municipal hall elsewhere since it (church)
needed the lot for itself.
[h] Because the municipal government resisted and for the
first time exhibited a possession adverse to the church, the
petitioner promptly filed the instant suit before the lower
court for quieting of title to the subject lot (the entire Lot
138) and to be declared the owner of such property.
[i] The church has been in continuous, open, adverse,
notorious possession of the entire Lot 138 in the concept
of owner since at least 1894 until the late 1950s. x x x
[j] No evidence has been shown that Lots 138-A and 138-
C were devoted for public use or for use as a public plaza
before 1894 or even at about the time the church was built
on Lot 138. x x x
{k] The only evidence as to the supposed character of Lot
138-C as a public plaza is a survey plan allegedly
approved on 15 May 1909 denominated as [GSS]-06-

00012, Buruanga Settlement Project, approved only in
1984. Petitioner was not notified of this survey. x x x
[l] The real property tax declaration presented by private
respondent to establish its supposed possession (Exhs. 4,
4-a, and 4-b, Record, pages 45-47) covered the year 1992
only.
[m] Witness Jaime S. Prado, Sr. (who was born on 17
December 1905 and coming to the age of reason when he
was about 10 years old) testified that as far as he can
remember (since he was grade 1) he was brought to mass
by his elders at the church of Buruanga, which was the
very same church as of the time he testified in 1992, and
was active in church activities in that church (e.g., tsn, 9
January 1992, pages 5, 16); that the property of the
church was bounded on all four sides by the very same
streets that bounded it at the time he testified (ibid., at
page 6-8).
[n] Private respondent indirectly judicially admitted that it
has no title (Torrens or otherwise) to the subject properties
when its star witness (the incumbent Mayor Protacio
Obrique of Buruanga) testified that the properties in the
poblacion of Buruanga are not covered by any title (tsn, 27
July 1992, page 5).25
The petitioner contends that the pronouncement in Bishop
of Calbayog, cited by the appellate court, does not support
its decision. Instead, it actually supports the petitioners
claim of ownership over Lot 138, including Lots 138-A and
138-C. In the said case, the lot (Lot 2) that was declared
by the Court as plaza was a separate and distinct lot
separated from the church lot (Lot 1) by a provincial road.
Lot 1, held to be owned by the church in the said case,
included not only the space occupied by the church, belfry,
convent, parish school and nuns residence, but also the
empty space which only had concrete benches as
improvements thereon and which was used as a public
playground.
The petitioner also cites Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v.
Director of Lands,26 where the Court recognized that under
the Laws of the Indies (Leyes de las Indias), the law in
force in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish regime,
the property of the church in the pueblos consisted of one
parcel of land which meant "not only the two buildings but
also the land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings,
that is, the parcel which by itself constitutes one whole
piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and
within which said buildings, the church and the convent,
are situated."27
According to the petitioner, the appellate court erred in
affirming the finding of the court a quo that Lots 138-A and
138-C comprise the public plaza. Unlike in Harty, no
evidence was allegedly adduced to show that from the
time respondent municipality was created these two lots
had been set aside for the public.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 52
Harty is not applicable, the petitioner expounds, because it
was indubitably established therein that the "plaza was
used without let or hindrance by the public and the
residents of Victoria ever since its creation." In contrast, in
the present case, there was allegedly no evidence to show
that Lots 138-A and 138-C were set aside as the public
plaza, or for any public purpose, when the Municipality of
Buruanga was created during the Spanish period. The
evidence, in fact, show that the entire Lot 138, bounded on
all its four sides by streets, belonged to the church and it
had continuous use and occupation thereof since 1894
when it constructed its church in the middle of Lot 138. No
such use of Lot 138-A and 138-C as the public plaza for
the same length of time or from 1894 had been shown.
The petitioner assails the reliance by the appellate court
on the court a quos statement during its ocular inspection
on Lot 138 in 1992 that it observed that the property was
occupied by the Roman Catholic Church, a parish house,
the municipal hall and three of its municipal edifices, and a
basketball court. Based on this observation, the court a
quo concluded, and the appellate court affirmed, that Lots
138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza. The petitioner
objects to this conclusion stating that the same cannot
overcome the evidence in favor of the church as to its
ownership over these lots traced back to 1894 when it
constructed the church in the middle of Lot 138 or what is
now Lot 138-B.
It reiterates that under the Laws of the Indies, when a
municipality was created, the church was assigned a
property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its
four sides by streets, and that the public plaza was
situated not on the same parcel of land assigned to the
church but on a distinct lot separated by a street from that
assigned to the church.
The petitioner likewise argues that even if it, as the owner
of the entire Lot 138, allowed respondent municipality to
build its municipal hall on what is now Lot 138-A in the late
1950s by mere tolerance of the parish priest, it does not
necessarily follow that Lot 138-A had become property of
public dominion. It does not allegedly lose its possession
or ownership over the property if the possession or use by
another of the same is by mere tolerance.
Respondent municipality, through its Mayor Protacio
Obrique during his testimony, allegedly admitted that
respondent municipalitys lot was located in a portion
designated as Lot 2 in its Exhibit "1." The said lot was
along the beach and separated from Lot 138 by Emilio
Ostan Street. The alleged import of this admission is that
the entire Lot 138 (designated as Lot 1 in Exhibit "1") was
assigned solely to the church since a different lot was
assigned to respondent municipality.
The petitioner avers that Buruanga is an ancient Spanish
town and that when it was created the Spanish authorities
assigned a distinct and separate lot for its municipal
government or pueblo where it could build its municipal

hall or casa real. It could thus be assumed that the casa
real of respondent municipality would be built at about the
same time as the church or around 1894. The petitioner
contends that nothing in the evidence suggests that the
casa real was built on Lot 138 during the said period. It
was only in the late 1950s that the municipal hall was built
thereon upon the permission granted by the parish priest.
Refuting respondent municipalitys view that it is
unthinkable that the church would be given a bigger
property than the municipal government, the petitioner
submits that such notion is not far fetched considering that
the primary aim of the Spaniards at the time was to spread
the Catholic faith to the colonies.
That the entire Lot 138 belonged to the petitioner is
allegedly supported by the practice during the Spanish
period, as shown by the layout of the church convent and
church plaza in practically all the old towns in the
Philippines and the early cases28 decided by the Court, to
invariably provide the church with spacious grounds
bounded by the four principal streets of the town.
Even without any document or certificate of title thereto,
the petitioner bases its claim of ownership over Lot 138
under the Spanish Law as recognized and affirmed under
the Treaty of Paris. It cites Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church v. Municipality of Placer29 where the Court
recognized that the church is entitled not only to
possession of its properties but to ownership thereof.
Bishop of Jaro was again invoked by the petitioner as the
Court explained therein that it did not find it strange that
the church was unable to exhibit a written title to its
property since the Laws of the Indies in force during the
Spanish regime dictated the layout of the towns and
assigned the locations of the church, square and
government administration buildings. The provisions of the
Laws of the Indies pertaining thereto were held to be
sufficient to secure the registration in the name of the
church of its land.
The petitioner asserts that even granting arguendo that Lot
138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish regime or is
not owned by it pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, still, it
had acquired ipso jure or by operation of law a
government grant, a vested title, to the disputed lot by
virtue of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof since 1894. In support
of this contention, the petitioner cites Subsection 6 of
Section 54 of Act No. 926, which became effective on July
26, 1904, and which provided that:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period
of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
Law on NatRes (23-49) 53
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
It is allegedly clear that as early as July 26, 1904, when
Act No. 926 took effect, the petitioner had already
acquired a government grant, a vested title, to Lot 138.
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, approved on
November 9, 1919, which amended Act No. 926, is
similarly cited by the petitioner. It provided that:
(b) Those who by themselves or their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, a land
registration proceeding instituted would, according to the
petitioner, "in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time,
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested."
In addition to its arguments on the merits of the case, the
petitioner assails the appellate courts denial of its motion
to submit additional evidence which would have showed
that the casa real of respondent municipality, together with
its plaza (Sunset Park Plaza), was located on a distinct lot
(Lot 2) separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street.
The petitioner urges the Court to reverse and set aside the
portion of the appellate courts decision declaring Lots
138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion and to
declare the petitioner the absolute owner of the entire Lot
138. In the alternative, the petitioner prays that it be
allowed to submit additional evidence of its ownership over
Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Respondent Municipalitys Counter-arguments
For its part, respondent municipality contends that, except
for the figures 1894 etched on the left wall of the church,
the petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that
it had continuous possession of the entire Lot 138 since
the turn of the twentieth century. The petitioner is allegedly
of the mistaken belief that because it possessed Lot 138-
B, it must have likewise possessed Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Respondent municipality claims that it is the one that has
been exercising acts of exclusive ownership over the
disputed lot.

The petitioner has allegedly misread Harty and Bishop of
Calbayog in claiming that in cases involving the church,
the lot adjudicated to it invariably consisted of the entire
block, bounded by a street on each of the four sides, and
the public plazas were situated in separate blocks. While it
may true that many church properties occupy an entire
block in certain municipalities, it is allegedly equally true
that other church properties occupy only portions thereof
depending on the exigencies of the locality at the time
when the church was being established.
In those instances that the Court allegedly adjudicated an
open space in favor of the church, the local government
was not shown to have exercised dominion over the
property and the church has consistently established some
control over it, like the putting up of a religious monument
thereon. On the other hand, in the present case,
respondent municipality insists that it has laid adverse
claim over Lot 138 as early as 1909 when it applied for title
over it and was even issued a decree over the said lot.
Respondent municipality places its actual, public and
adverse possession of Lot 138 at the latest in 1958 when it
built its old municipal hall on the said site. Its occupation
prior thereto could also be allegedly presumed from its
actual possession thereof.
The petitioner has allegedly failed to establish that the
construction of the old municipal building in 1958 was by
mere tolerance on its part. Respondent municipality harps
on the failure of the petitioner to present as its witness Fr.
Patio, the parish priest who supposedly gave respondent
municipality permission to construct its municipal building
on the disputed lot. Respondent municipality denies ever
seeking such permission. Further, the tax declaration
(Exhibit "B") of the petitioner only pertained to Lot 138-B
proving that its ownership was limited to the said lot and
did not extend to Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Respondent municipality avers that it is already contented
with the decision of the appellate court although the latter
allegedly erred in concluding that Lots 138-A and 138-C
are property of public dominion without taking into
consideration that respondent municipality applied for the
issuance of title covering the disputed lot and was issued a
decree thereto in 1919. The admission of Mayor Obrique,
during his testimony, that respondent municipality owned
the lot along the beach (Lot 2) and situated across the
street from Lot 138 could not be allegedly taken to mean
that the Mayor was disclaiming ownership over Lot 138.
Respondent municipality theorizes that in those cases 30
that the Court upheld the ownership of the church over a
subject property, the same have ever since remained the
property of the church and have been in its peaceful
possession. Further, there were no adverse claimants and
the primary issue being resolved was whether, despite
non-compliance with procedural requirements, title may be
granted in favor of the church.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 54
Respondent municipality distinguishes the present case
from those cases in that there is an open contest over the
ownership and possession of Lots 138-A and 138-C and
respondent municipality has in its favor actual and adverse
possession thereof. It emphasizes that there is nothing in
fact and in law that would support the petitioners bare
claim of ownership and possession over Lots 138-A and
138-C. On the contrary, there is allegedly strong evidence
showing respondent municipalitys exercise of proprietary
and governmental rights over the said lots where it has
constructed permanent structures, e.g., municipal building,
community hospital, health center, social hall/basketball
court, and where public functions are openly conducted.
Respondent municipality urges the Court to dismiss the
petition and, instead, to affirm the decision of the court a
quo declaring it the lawful owner and possessor of Lots
138-A and 138-C.
Issue
The substantive issue to be resolved is whether the
appellate court correctly declared Lots 138-A and 138-C
as property of public dominion, hence, not susceptible to
ownership by either the petitioner and respondent
municipality.
Since respondent municipality no longer sought the review
of the assailed decision of the appellate court, the Court
shall mainly resolve the merits of the petitioners claim of
ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C vis--vis the
appellate courts holding that they are of public dominion,
hence, not susceptible to private ownership.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied.
The Laws of the Indies and the cases cited
by the petitioner do not support its claim
of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C
The petitioner anchors its claim of ownership over Lots
138-A and 138-C on its theory that the entire Lot 138,
bounded on all its four sides by streets, was assigned to it
as far back as 1894 when the church was built in the
middle of the said lot. The cases it cited allegedly stand for
the proposition that "under the Laws of the Indies, when a
municipality was created, the church was assigned a
property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its
(four) sides by streets, and that the public plaza was
situated not on the same parcel of land assigned to the
church but on a distinct parcel of land separated from the
parcel of land assigned to the church by a street."31
This allegation fails to persuade. The pertinent provision of
the Laws of the Indies relating to the designation of a
parcel of land for the church upon the establishment of a
town or pueblo during the Spanish regime reads:

Ley viij. Que se fabriquen el Templo principal en el sitio, y
disposicion, que se ordena, y otras Iglesias, y
Monasterios.
En lugares Mediterrneos no se fabrique el Templo en la
plaza, sino algo distante de ella, donde est separado de
otro qualquier edificio, que no pertenezca su comodidad
y ordenato, y porque de todas partes sea visto, y mejor
venerado, est algo levantado de suelo, de forma que se
haya de entrar por gradas, y entre la plaza mayor, y
Templo se edifiquen las Casas Reales, Cabildo,
Concejo, Aduana, y Atarazana, en tal distancia, que
autoricen al Templo, y no le embaracen, y en caso de
necesidad se puedan socorrer, y si la poblacion fuere en
Costa, dispngase de forma que en saliendo de Mar sea
visto, y su fbrica como defensa del Puerto, sealando
solares cerca de l, y no su continuacion, en que se
fabriquen Casas Reales, y tiendas en la plaza para
propios, imponiendo algun
moderado tributo en las mercaderas: y asmismo sitios en
otras plazas menores para Iglesias Parroquiales, y
Monasterios donde sean convenientes.32
The above provision prescribed that the church be built at
some distance from the square, separate from other
buildings in order that it may be better seen and
venerated, and raised from the ground with steps leading
to it. It decreed that government administration buildings,
including casas reales, be built between the main square
and the church and at such distance as not to shut the
church from view. In cases of coastal towns, the church
was to be constructed in such location as to be seen by
those coming from the sea and serve for the defense of
the port.
The other provisions of the Laws of the Indies on the
establishment of new towns or pueblos in the archipelago,
including the designation of lands for the church, casa
reales (municipal buildings) and public squares, had been
discussed by the Court in this wise:
xxx
The executive authorities and other officials who then
represented the Spanish Government in these Islands
were obliged to adjust their procedure, in the fulfillment of
their duties with regard to the establishment and laying out
of new towns, to the Laws of the Indies, which determined
the course that they were to pursue for such purposes, as
may be seen by the following:
Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of
the Indies, provides, among other things:
"That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it,
there must be at least thirty residents, and each one of
them must have a house," etc.
Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 55
"Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in
the manner provided for, of not more than thirty nor less
than ten residents, shall be granted the time and territory
necessary for the purpose and under the same
conditions."
It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the modern
pueblos of the Archipelago were formed by taking as a
basis for their establishment the barrios already populated
by a large number of residents who, under the agreement
to build the church of the new pueblo, the court-house and
afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained from the General
Government the administrative separation of their barrio
from the pueblo on which it depended and in whose
territory it was previously comprised. In such cases
procedure analogous to that prescribed by the Laws of the
Indies was observed.
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the
administrative authority of the province, in representation
of the Governor-General, designated the territory for their
location and extension and the metes and bounds of the
same; and before the allotting the lands among the new
settlers, a special demarcation was made of the places
which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for
the erection of the church, and as sites for the public
buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa
real, as well as of the lands which were to constitute the
commons, pastures, and propios of the municipality and
the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town
were laid out, as may be seen by the following laws:
Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of
the Indies, provides:
"The district or territory to be given for settlement by
composition shall be allotted in the following manner:
There shall first be set apart the portion required for the
lots of the pueblo, the exido or public lands, and pastures
amply sufficient for the stock which the residents may
have, and as much more as propios del lugar or common
lands of the locality; the rest of the territory and district
shall be divided into four parts one of them, of his
choice, shall be for him who takes upon himself the
obligation to found the pueblo, and the other three shall be
apportioned equally among the settlers."
Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other
things:
"That, between the main square and the church, there
shall be constructed the casas reales or municipal
buildings, the cabildo, concejo, customs buildings," etc.
Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs among other
things:
"That the viceroys shall have set aside such lands as to
them appear suitable as the common lands (propios) of
the pueblos that have none, therewith to assist in the

payment of the salaries of the corregidores, and sufficient
public lands (exidos) and pasture lands as provided for
and prescribed by law."
Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the
following:
"Such viceroys and governors as have due authority shall
designate to each villa and lugar newly founded and
settled the lands and lots which they may need and may
be given to them, without detriment to a third party, as
propios, and a statement shall be sent to us of what was
designated and given to each, in order that we may have
such action approved."33
Nowhere in the above provisions was it stated that the
parcel of land designated for the church of the town or
pueblo was, in all cases, to be an entire block or bounded
on all its four sides by streets. The petitioner thus
erroneously asseverates that the said ancient laws sustain
its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138.
Neither can it find support in the cases that it cited. A
careful review of these cases reveal that, in those
instances where the Court upheld the claim of the church
over a parcel of land vis--vis that of the municipality or
national government, the ownership and possession by
the church of the same had been indubitably established
by its exclusive exercise thereon of proprietary acts or acts
of dominion.
For example, in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, 34
which according to the petitioner supports its case, the
Court adjudicated in favor of the church the ownership of
Lot 1 (except the portion thereof occupied by a public
thoroughfare) including not only the space occupied by the
church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns residence,
but also the empty space which only had concrete
benches as improvements thereon.
With respect to the empty space (eastern portion of Lot 1),
the Court noted the following:
x x x The eastern portion of Lot 1, the area in contention,
is an empty space except for concrete benches along the
perimeter. A partly cemented path runs across this lot from
east to west leading up to the front or entrance of the
church and appears to be an extension of Anunciacion St.,
which runs from the bank of the Catarman river up to
Mendiola St. In the middle of this path, half-way between
Mendiola St. and the church, is a statue of the Sacred
Heart of Jesus.
xxx
x x x The Roman Catholic Church had made no
improvements on this eastern portion of Lot 1, which at
present is being used as a public playground, although a
bandstand stood there for about three years after it was
constructed in 1926 by the members of an orchestra which
Law on NatRes (23-49) 56
was organized by a Fr. Ranera and which used to give
musical performances on the bandstand. On the feast of
Corpus Christi the parishioners would construct an altar on
this lot and hold the procession there.35
It is apparent that the Court adjudicated to the church the
ownership of Lot 1 (except a portion thereof which was a
public thoroughfare) because the latter was able to
establish that it had exercised acts of possession or
ownership over the same including over its empty space.
In particular, the empty space was used for religious
functions, such as the Feast of Corpus Christi and the
procession held on the occasion and the church did not
ask for any permit from the local authorities whenever it
used the said space for such activities.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that, at
one time after the church was built in 1894 in the middle of
Lot 138 (now Lot 138-B), it exercised acts of ownership or
possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C as well.
It must be emphasized that the petitioners allegation that
it merely tolerated the construction of not only the
municipal building but also the other improvements
thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community
Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
grandstand, has remained unsubstantiated. The affidavit
of Fr. Patio was correctly not given any credence since
he was not presented on the witness stand; thus,
considered hearsay. Hearsay evidence is generally
excluded because the party against whom it is presented
is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine
the person to whom the statement or writing is attributed.36
The testimony of Mr. Jaime S. Prado, Sr., an octogenarian
and resident of Buruanga, cannot likewise be given any
credence because it consisted only of a bare assertion
that the church building and the land on which it was built,
bounded by streets on all its four sides, were the
petitioners property.37 He based this statement on the fact
that as a child he heard masses at the church with his
parents. This assertion, without more or without any
corroborative evidence, is not sufficient to establish the
petitioners ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C
especially in light of the fact that Mr. Prado is not
competent to testify on the matter because he had no
actual personal knowledge with respect to any
transactions involving Lot 138:
FISCAL DEL ROSARIO:
Q Now, when you were President of the Parish Council,
have you access of any documents relating to church
properties in Buruanga, Aklan?
A Never.
Q Now, you have stated that the boundaries of the
property of the[R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch in Buruanga,
Aklan has previous names thus, the present name of

Viven Ostan, Nitoy Sualog and Emilio Ostan is at present
now. My question is, what was the previous names of
these roads?
A Of Nitoy Sualog, that was Malilipayon Street. The
Provincial road street, before that was Kaaganhon street,
West, Emilio Ostan, before that was Kahaponanon Street
and instead of Viven Ostan, that was Kabulakan Street.
Q So, you will agree with me Mr. Witness so, that previous
names is not in any way related to the names of former
parish priest[s] of Buruanga, Aklan or saints, am I right?
A No, sir.
Q You know very well Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor
Pedro Omugtong?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, do you remember if there was any transaction of
them during your lifetime?
A This Padre Patinio and I were close friends. Mr.
Omugtong met Patinio [,] talked together about the land
they agreed [,] and I dont know what is there (sic)
agreement but the building was constructed then.
Q Were you present during the talked (sic) of Rev. Jesus
Patinio and Mayor Pedro Omugtong?
A No, sir.
Q You identified in this Exhibit "F" as Municipal Hall, Rural
Health Unit Hospital, the Buruanga Community Hospital,
Basketball Court and the Grandstand. Now, my question
is, are these buildings constructed by the [R]oman
[C]atholic [C]hurch?
A Not one.38
Even the affidavits of the other residents of Buruanga,
which were also properly considered hearsay, made no
mention of any instance where the petitioner exercised
acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C. These
affidavits uniformly stated:
That we have been residing in this Municipality since birth
and that we have full knowledge of the site where the
church now stands;
That during the Pre-Spanish time, the site of the town
proper was swampy, fishermen used to fish in the swamp,
trees of different kinds grows (sic) along the beach;
That when the Spaniards arrived in our town, they
introduced education and religion;
That because there was no site for the church, the
Spaniards forced the inhabitants to work for the filling up of
Law on NatRes (23-49) 57
the swamp, men are hauling stones[,] and women [,] sand
and gravel;
That after so many years of hard labor the swamp was
filled up and then the friars build a church in the center of
the town;
That as far as we are concerned the site where the church
now stand and the surrounding area and the site where
the present Municipal building now stands is even the part
of the property of the church and not the property of the
municipality as allege (sic) by the Mayor;
That we execute this affidavit with our own free act and
voluntary deed.39
The information proffered by these affidavits could not
have been based on the personal knowledge of the
affiants because they obviously were not yet born when
the events they narrated took place.40
Like in Bishop of Calbayog, the Court in Hacbang v.
Director of Lands41 adjudicated to the church the
ownership of two parcels of land, designated as Lots 1 and
2 despite the opposition of the Director of Lands who
claimed that a portion on the eastern part of Lot 1 and the
entire Lot 2 were public plazas. The Court affirmed the
ownership of the church over these lots upon the following
findings:
It is inferred from the foregoing facts which are held to
have been indisputably established by the evidence, that
the disputed portion of lot No. 1 as well as the entire lot
No. 2 belongs to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of
the Diocese of Samar and Leyte. It cannot be denied that
said church, for more than half a century, was in the
possession of said lands together with the church, belfry
and convent which existed first on lot No. 1 and later
provisionally on lot No. 2. The fact that the catholic
cemetery was located on lot No. 2 and that the stone posts
and pillars were later erected thereon, thereby converting
it into a place for the celebration of the Way of the Cross,
conclusively proves that the property belonged to the
church and that the latter's possession has constantly
been under claim of ownership.
x x x [I]t must be presumed upon these facts that said
portion formed part of the parcels of land assigned and
adjudicated by the authorities to the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in said town for the erection of the
church, belfry, convent and cemetery, all of which, as
everybody knows, are necessary for the practice and
celebration of the cults of said religion.42
The proprietary acts exercised by the church over the
disputed lots consisted of the construction thereon of the
church, belfry, convent and cemetery. Moreover, it
conducted thereon the Way of the Cross and other
religious celebrations.

Unlike in the Bishop of Calbayog and Hacbang, in the
present case, the petitioner has not shown that it
exercised proprietary acts or acts of dominion over Lots
138-A and 138-C, to the exclusion of others, to buttress its
claim of ownership over these lots.
Neither can the petitioner rely on Roman Catholic Bishop
of Jaro v. Director of Lands43 where the Court categorically
made the finding that the lot in question (Lot 3) had been
in the possession of the church, as owner, for a time
sufficiently long for purposes of prescription. In a prior
case44 involving the said lot, the Court adjudged that the
church was "entitled to the possession of the following
property situated in the Municipality of Sibalom: The
Church of Sibalom, the convent, contiguous to the same,
and the land occupied by these two buildings."
The Court interpreted the phrase "land occupied by the
church and its convent" to mean "not only the two
buildings, but also the land adjacent and contiguous to
said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself constitutes
one whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by
streets, and within which said buildings, the church and
the convent, are situated."45
Significantly, the parcel of land that was adjudicated in
favor of the church was the "land adjacent and contiguous
to said buildings," i.e., church and convent. The word
"adjacent" has been defined as follows:
The word "adjacent" is of Latin derivation. An examination
of its original use clearly indicates that in order that things
shall be adjacent they shall be thrown near together.
Webster in his International Dictionary defines "adjacent"
as "lying near, close or contiguous; neighboring; bordering
upon;" and gives as synonyms the words "adjoining,
contiguous, near."
Roque Barcia in his "Diccionario General Etimolgico de la
Lengua Espaola," in defining the word "adjacent," uses
as synonyms "inmediato, junto, prximo." Things cannot
be "inmediatas, juntas, prximas" where other objects
intervene.
Vicente Salva in his "Nuevo Diccionario Francs-Espaol"
defines the word "adjacent as "qui est situ aupres, aux
environs."
Black in his Law Dictionary defines "adjacent" as "lying
near or close to; contiguous. The difference between
adjacent and adjoining seems to be that the former implies
that two objects are not widely separated, though they
may not actually touch."
Harpers Latin Dictionary as revised by Lewis and Short, in
defining the word "ad-jaceo," which is equivalent to the
English word "adjacent," says it means "to lie at or near, to
be contiguous to, to border upon."
Law on NatRes (23-49) 58
The Universal Encyclopedia defines an adjacent angle as
"an angle contiguous to another, so that one side is
common to both angles."
In the case of Miller v. Cabell (81 Ky., 184) it was held that
where a change of venue was taken to an adjacent county
it must be taken to an adjoining county.
In the case of Camp Hill Borough (142 Penn. State, 517),
it was held that the word "adjacent" meant adjoining or
contiguous.
In the case of In re Municipality, etc. (7 La. Ann., 76), the
court said: "We think the word adjacent, applied to lots, is
synonymous with the word "contiguous."
In the case of the People v. Schemerhorne (19 Barber
[N.Y.], 576), the court said: "The interpretations given to
the adjacent by Walker are lying close, bordering upon
something."46
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "contiguous" as "in close
proximity; neighboring; adjoining; near in succession; in
actual close contact; touching in at a point or along a
boundary; bounded or traversed by."47
Applying the foregoing definitions, the "land adjacent and
contiguous" to the church and the parish house in the
present case is the land comprising Lot 138-B. On the
other hand, Lots 138-A and 138-C are the lands adjacent
and contiguous to the municipal building, rural health
center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball
court, Rizal monument and grandstand thereon.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro therefore is not squarely
applicable to the present case because of significant
factual differences. Specifically, in the former, the buildings
or structures on the disputed land all belonged to the
church; hence, this fact was construed by the Court in
favor of the church as constituting its exercise of acts of
dominion over the land adjacent and contiguous to these
buildings. On the other hand, the municipal building, rural
health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital,
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, all
standing on Lots 138-A and 138-C, are not owned by the
petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has not shown that it
had, at any time, exercised acts of dominion over these
lots. Consequently, given its tenuous claim of ownership,
Lots 138-A and 138-C,
the lands adjacent and contiguous to the buildings and
improvements which admittedly do not belong to the
petitioner, cannot be adjudicated to the latter under the
circumstances.
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu,48 cited in
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro, is also unavailing to the
petitioner because the Court, among others, simply
explained therein that the word "church" refers to the land
upon which the church stands, and not to the church

building itself. In the present case, the petitioners
ownership has not been limited by the court a quo and the
appellate court to the church structure itself but also as
including Lot 138-B, on which it stands.
In Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. Municipality of
Placer,49 the Court definitively recognized the juridical
personality and proprietary rights of the church citing the
Treaty of Paris50 and other pertinent Spanish laws. It held
therein that the church not only was entitled to the
possession of the church, convent and cemetery of Placer
but was also the lawful owner thereof.
It bears stressing that the crux in the foregoing cases,
particularly Bishop of Calbayog, Hacbang and Jaro, is that
the church had indubitably established its exercise of
exclusive proprietary acts on the lots that were subject of
the controversy. The same cannot be said with respect to
the petitioner in relation to Lots 138-A and 138-C. In fact,
not one of the enumeration ([a] to ([n]) made by the
petitioner in its Petition for Review as allegedly showing its
ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C categorically
establishes that it exercised thereon exclusive proprietary
acts or acts of dominion.
The ruling in Harty v. Municipality of
Victoria is applicable to the present case
Contrary to the stance taken by the petitioner, the ruling in
Harty v. Municipality of Victoria51 is applicable to the
present case. The said case involved the dispute between
the church and the Municipality of Victoria over the parcel
of land that surrounded the parish church of the said town,
and which was called the public plaza of the same. The
Court therein held that "the whole of the land not occupied
by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house,
is a public plaza of the said town, of public use." It justified
its conclusion, thus:
xxx
From the evidence presented by both parties it appears
that the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio
of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was
converted into a town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this
end they must have laid out the streets and the plaza of
the town, in the center of which were situated the church
and parish house from the commencement, and at the
expiration of about twelve years the parish of said town
was constituted and the priest, who was to perform the
office of curate, was appointed; that from the very
beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church
and the parish house was known as a public plaza,
destined to the use of all the residents of the recently
founded town; public performances and religious
processions were held thereon without hindrance either on
the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said
town.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 59
It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old
barrio, being interested in the conversion of the barrio into
a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the
center of the future town which was subsequently called
Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza with its
church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building
destined for the use of the municipality and the local
official at the time called the gobernadorcillo and later on
capitan municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all
the towns in these Islands, under the old administrative
laws.
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro
Taedo, who owned the space of land where the church
and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it
to the Catholic Church, the only one known at the time, but
proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the
said Taedo comprehended the whole of the large tract
which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town.
It was a custom observed by all the towns established
administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the
Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was
always reserved for plazas, commons, and special and
communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the
said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the
town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town,
more than twelve years prior to the appointment of a
permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to
suppose that the late Vicente Taedo donated the land
now occupied by the church and parish house in said
municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but
not to the parish curate, because at the time there was no
curate at the new town of Victoria.
Even though all the remaining space of land which now
forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been
owned by the said Taedo, it must be presumed that he
waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople,
since from the creation or establishment of the town, down
to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of
said town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has
not been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the
principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole
of said land to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic
Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it
being a public plaza destined to public use and was not
private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or
of the Province of Tarlac.
It should be noted that, among other things, plazas
destined to the public use are not subject to prescription.
(Art. 1936, Civil Code.) That both the curates and the
gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees and
plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act
of private ownership, but evidences the public use thereof,
or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the said
plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.

Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the
Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or
proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now
forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in
possession thereof under the form and conditions required
by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said
plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public
and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its
creation. For the above reasons, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that it
should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of
the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria
and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of
public use, and that in consequence thereof, the defendant
is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as
to the costs of both instances.52
The petitioner argues against the applicability of Harty as it
makes much of the fact that the disputed lot therein was
situated across the street from the church lot. When the
Court therein limited the ownership of the church to the
land "occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its
parish house," it did not allegedly confine its ownership to
a portion of the lot on which the church and parish house
were situated but to the block occupied by these
structures.
To the Courts mind, however, whether the disputed lot
was on the same block as the church or separated
therefrom by a street was not the crucial factor which
constrained the Court in Harty to rule against the churchs
claim of ownership over the said property. Rather, it was
the fact that the church was not able to prove its
ownership or possession thereof. The ruling on this point
is reiterated below:
Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the
Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or
proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now
forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in
possession thereof under the form and conditions required
by law, x x x53
As applied to the present case, that Lots 138-A and 138-C
are on the same block as the lot on which the church and
its parish house stand do not necessarily make them (Lots
138-A and 138-C) also the property of the petitioner
absent any evidence that its ownership or possession
extended to these lots and under the conditions required
by law.
Contrary to its submission, the petitioner had
not acquired ipso jure or by operation of law
a government grant or title to the entire Lot 138
The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that
the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the
Law on NatRes (23-49) 60
Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to
the Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since
1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or
by operation of law upon the petitioner a government
grant, a vested title, to the subject property. It cites
Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926 54 and
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874.55
This contention is likewise not persuasive.
One of the important requisites for the application of the
pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is the
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation" of the land by the applicant. Actual
possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.56 The phrase
"possession and occupation" was explained as follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession
and occupation." Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the order [sic]. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to
qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his
possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this
Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
Lasam v. The Director of Lands:
x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands. But it should be
observed that the application of the doctrine of
constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that
among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to
the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant." While,
therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession," possession under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45
of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The
mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot
justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense
tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
fiction. x x x
xxx
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;

exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.57
Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure
built thereon. However, the record is bereft of any
evidence that would tend to show that such possession
and occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C
beginning the same period. No single instance of the
exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of
dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the
municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center,
Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court,
Rizal monument and grandstand, was by its tolerance
does not constitute proof of possession and occupation on
its (the petitioners) part.
Absent the important requisite of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereon since 1894, no government grant or title to Lots
138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure
or by operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim.58
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public
plaza and are property of public dominion;
hence, not susceptible to private ownership
by the petitioner or respondent municipality
The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and
138-C comprise the public plaza and are property of public
dominion; hence, may not be the object of appropriation
either by the petitioner or respondent municipality. In
support thereof, it cited Bishop of Calbayog ratiocinating:
This ruling [referring to Harty] was, in fact, reiterated in
Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands (45 SCRA 418)
involving the same question of ownership of the land
which surrounded the parish church of the town. The
Supreme Court therein declared that the public plaza and
public thoroughfare are not subject to registration by the
church; that since neither the Church nor the municipality
presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive
possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only
indubitable fact is the free and continuous use of Lot 2 by
residents of Catarman, and the town had no public plaza
to speak of other than the disputed parcel of land, there
Law on NatRes (23-49) 61
was a strong presumption that the same had been
segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the
municipality of Catarman. x x x59
As can be gleaned, the above discussion principally
pertained to Lot 2, a public plaza the ownership of which
was disputed by the Bishop of Calbayog and the
Municipality of Catarman.
The appellate court correctly cited Bishop of Calabayog.
However, the ruling therein pertaining to a portion of Lot 1
occupied by a public thoroughfare is more apropos to the
present case. To recall, in the said case, the application of
the Bishop of Calabayog as to the eastern portion of Lot 1
was also being opposed by the Municipality of Catarman
on the ground that it was part of the public plaza. As
mentioned earlier, the Court upheld the ownership of the
church over Lot 1 including not only the space occupied by
the church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns
residence, but also the empty space which only had some
benches as improvements thereon. Significantly, the
portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare
(Nalazon Street) was ordered excluded from the
application for registration filed by the church. The Court
therein made the following findings with respect to the
public thoroughfare:
Admittedly Nalazon St. was originally merely a trail used
by the parishioners in going to and from the church. But
since 1910, when it was opened and improved as a public
thoroughfare by the municipality, it had been continuously
used as such by the townspeople of Catarman without
objection from the Church authorities. The acacia trees
along both sides of the street were planted by the
municipality in 1920, although these trees
were cut down recently upon order of the priest. There is
no proof that the Church merely tolerated and limited the
use of this street for the benefit of its parishioners,
considering that the street traverses the entire length of
the poblacion from south to north and that Lot 1, on which
the church stands, is located almost at the center of the
poblacion. The street does not stop on Lot 1 but extends
north toward the sea, passing along the lot occupied by
the Central Elementary School and the Northern Samar
General Hospital. Thus, it is clear that Nalazon St. inside
Lot 1 is used by the residents not only in going to the
church but to the public school and the general hospital
north of Lot 1.60
In the present case, the following improvements now stand
on Lots 138-A and 138-C: the municipal building, rural
health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital,
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand. Except
for the construction of the municipal building, the other
improvements were made on Lots 138-A and 138-C, and
continuously used by the public without the petitioners
objection. Further, there is no proof that the petitioner
merely tolerated the construction of these improvements.
On the other hand, the free and continuous use by the

public of Lots 138-A and 138-C, as found by the court a
quo and affirmed by the appellate court, incontrovertibly
establishes that they are property for public use.
On this point, Articles 420, quoted anew below, and 424 of
the Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
Property for public use of provinces and towns are
governed by the same principles as property of public
dominion of the same character.61 The ownership of such
property, which has the special characteristics of a
collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by
virtue of their application to the satisfaction of the
collective needs, is in the social group, whether national,
provincial, or municipal.62 Their purpose is not to serve the
State as a juridical person, but the citizens; they are
intended for the common and public welfare, and so they
cannot be the object of appropriation, either by the State
or by private persons.63
The appellate court committed no reversible error in
denying the petitioners motion for reception of
evidence
In denying the petitioners motion for reception evidence,
the appellate court reasoned that based on the records,
the petitioner was already accorded the full opportunity to
present its evidence in the court a quo and that the
evidence to be introduced in the desired hearing would not
directly establish its ownership of the disputed lots. 64
The petitioners motion for reception of evidence filed with
the appellate court stated that the additional evidence that
it sought to submit consisted of affidavits of old residents
of Buruanga attesting to the fact that "the old municipal
building was in fact at a place called Sunset Park prior to
its transfer to the present site."65 These affidavits would
allegedly establish that respondent municipality could not
be the owner of Lots 138-A and 138-C which it had neither
possessed nor occupied.66
The appellate court did not err in denying the petitioners
motion for reception of evidence. Indeed, the petitioner
was already given full opportunity during the trial in the
court a quo to adduce any and all relevant evidence to
Law on NatRes (23-49) 62
substantiate its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138.
In no sense, therefore, may it be argued that it was denied
due process of law.67
With the reality that those documents were never
presented and formally offered during the trial in the court
a quo, their belated admission for purposes of having them
duly considered in the resolution of the case on appeal
would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.68
In any case, as correctly stated by the appellate court,
these affidavits would not directly establish the petitioners
ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated July 18, 2001 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52626 are AFFIRMED in toto. SO
ORDERED.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.; [G.R. No. L-
27873. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN,
Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF
MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.; [G.R. No.
L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;
CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED
IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE
LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted
to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP
NOT ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case
of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas
(56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that
the ares covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone
and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It
bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and
to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE
CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET,
RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that
he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration
in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us
question the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with
the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land
sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of
645,703 square meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and
Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In
due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R.
No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of
Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove
Law on NatRes (23-49) 63
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said
portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque
Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on
Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an
opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated
117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest
of the land containing 527,747 square meters was
adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan
and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of
Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of
Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-
R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the
private litigants that have been shown to have a better
right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a
little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio
Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it
was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question
that must have to be considered is whether after all, the
title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not
amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and
evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955
when the application was filed which would place it at
1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that
period, the land was a classified forest land so much so
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee
before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber
within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of
Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a
forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the
property was converted into a fishpond was sometime
after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
application; but only after there had been a previous
warning by the District Forester that that could not be done
because it was classified as a public forest; so that having
these in mind and remembering that even under Republic
Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years
after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in
order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable

title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that
not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that
during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed
by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a
registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years
before filing of the application, he had been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its
claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and
even before and applicants and their predecessors had
made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to
deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had
felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the
conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better
right to possess because this Court foresees that this
litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is
always better that the findings be as complete as possible
to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is
hereby reversed; the application as well as all the
oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of
Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no
more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of
Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had
been in the possession of private persons for over thirty
years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No.
1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in
accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of
absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of
the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on
the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners
also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare
said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest
land.chanrobles law library : red
Law on NatRes (23-49) 64
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on
the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is,
whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding
that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification
of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no
big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already "private land" better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry
v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent
and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-
grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the
Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885
does not divest such land of its being classified as forest
land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have
been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it
must have been a thickly forested area as testified by
Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry
was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime
in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but
only after a previous warning from the District Forester that
the same could not be done because it was classified as
"public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome
the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish
grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing
of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on
the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141
as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never
ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case
does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had
always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the
Law on NatRes (23-49) 65
period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property
Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as
public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon
the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by
this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G.
R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
J. H. ANKRON,petitioner-appellee, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
objector-appellant.; G.R. No. L-14213 August 23,
1919;JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. Its purpose was to have registered, under the
Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated,
bounded and particularly described in the plan and
technical description attached to the complaint and made
a part thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part
of the Director of Lands. The oppositor[objector] alleged
that the land in question was the property of the
Government of the United States under the control and
administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were
presented by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered
by the oppositor. After hearing and considering the
evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano, judge,
reached the following conclusions of fact:
1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one
parcel of land as marked and indicated on the plan and
technical description presented;
2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at
the north, the exact description and extension of which
does not appear, has been cultivated and planted for more
than forty-four years prior to the date of this decision;
3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and
planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of
ownership, and that they lived thereon and had their
houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not

planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon
they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;
4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred
and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to
the applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at
which time all of the said former owners moved o n to
adjoining lands where they now reside;
5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the
applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to
have been open, notorious, actual, public and continuous
for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim
was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other
claims;
6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty
(150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut
trees, a dwelling house, various laborers' quarters, store-
building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized
iron and other buildings and improvements on said land.
Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and
decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name
of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to
the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to
open a road thereon in the manner and conditions
mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with
reference to the opening of the road, as found in said
decision, are that the applicant give his consent, which he
has already done, to the opening of said road which
should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow
approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject
to the subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of
the province of Davao.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this
court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not
sufficiently identify the land in question. In reply to that
argument, the record shows that a detained and technical
description of the land was made a part of the record. The
evidence shows that the boundaries of the land in question
were marked by monuments built of cement. The
oppositor neither presented the question of the failure of
proper identification of the land in the lower court nor
presented any proof whatever to show that said cement
monuments did not exist.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends
that the appellant failed to prove his possession and
occupation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites
for registration of land imposed by said section 54,
paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural
publicland as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his
predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
Law on NatRes (23-49) 66
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no
effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was
agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in
interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for
a period of more than forty years prior to the
commencement of the present action. No question is
raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the
right of the Moros to acquire the absolute ownership and
dominion of the land which they have occupied openly,
notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of
years. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132
[212 U. S., 449].)
Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that
said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been
fully complied with and that the petitioner, so far as the
second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to
have his land registered under the Torrens system.
Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends
that portions of said land cannot be registered in
accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the
reason that they are manglares. That question is not
discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however.,
refers the court to his discussion of that question in the
case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry(39 Phil. Rep., 560).
By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is
found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of
section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with section 1820 of
Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of
Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include
all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age."
Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest
reserves of whatever character."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government(10 Phil. Rep.,
175), which decision has been follows in numerous other
decision, the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined
by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was held to mean
"those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands).
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the
registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of
"public agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the
moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the
petition for registration must be denied. If the evidence
shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land,
the petition for registration must be denied. Many
definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry,"
and "mineral" lands. These definitions are valuable so far
as they establish general rules. In this relation we think the
executive department of the Government, through the

Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of
the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148,
define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end
that the people of the Philippine Islands shall be
guaranteed in "the future a continued supply of valuable
timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If
the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely
define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future
would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts
would be greatly aided in determining the question
whether the particular land is forestry or other class of
lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry(supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the
particular land in question belongs to one class or another
is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals.
While, as we have just said, many definitions have been
given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and
that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe
to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to
show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it
bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of
timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in
that particular case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by
the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter
case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral,
is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Law on NatRes (23-49) 67
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
"public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry
or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil.
Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.)
In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so
order and decree, that the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby affirmed, with the condition that
before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be
made of the lands to be occupied by the road above
mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the
original plan upon which the petition herein is based. It is
so ordered, with costs.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE
etc.; G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001; PARDO,
J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming
the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board2 (hereafter DARAB) ordering the
compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
(hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two
parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a
total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the
parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean
potable water to the Canlubang community, and that
ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.3
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over
the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime
in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case 4 with the
Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a
right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of
counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of
private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate
complaints for forcible entry against respondents.5
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents
petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under
the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of
coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or
representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. 6
During the meeting, the following were present:
representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the
Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of
Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and

some potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus
and recommendation of the assembly that the landholding
of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a
"Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of
the property on the ground that the area was not
appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was
rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that
the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not
entitled to any land as beneficiaries.7
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with
the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection
stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-
10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable
for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification
of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao,
Laguna.8
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a
summary investigation report and forwarded the
Compulsory Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).9
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded
his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C.
Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Development, DAR forwarded two (2) Compulsory
Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of
SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to
the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further
review and evaluation.10
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition11 to petitioner, stating that petitioner's
landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891,
containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares,
valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively,
had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters12
separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and
the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution,
sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of
compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the
two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to
the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 68
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim
folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the
Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the
SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S.
Galvez wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to
forward the two (2) claim folders involving the property of
SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the
land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank
of the Philippines stating that its property under the
aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage
because they had been classified as watershed area and
were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD
turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the
Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for
proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on
September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution
asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds
with the summary land valuation proceedings.13
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows:
(1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the
coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the
CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of
the parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR,
through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant
Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director
of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues
raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance
of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice
of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is
covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D
also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the
said property. During the consideration of the case by the
Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion
specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing
to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the
administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on
March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma.
Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote
the Board requesting for its assistance in the
reconstruction of the records of the case because the
records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for
SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case
was on indefinite leave and could not be contacted. The
Board granted counsel's request and moved the hearing to
April 4, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the
Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC's petition for
exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative
valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case
was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing
were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During
the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject
property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and
marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the hearing on April
23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month
to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy
Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented.
The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that
the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as
"industrial Park" per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No.
45-89 dated March 29, 1989.14
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute
the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991,
petitioner filed a petition15 with DARAB to disqualify private
respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to
address the issue of beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial
Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision,16 finding
that private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC
property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the
Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for
P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
Board hereby orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the
compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine
Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2)
Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should
there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if
none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount
Law on NatRes (23-49) 69
in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation;
"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to
cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;
"4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the
Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation
survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title
Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by
the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines;
"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said
landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the
same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents
to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna."17
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna,
Branch 24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-233318
ruling that respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision. 19 On
November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal
portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB
decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian
Court on the issue of just compensation." 20Hence, this
petition.21
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution
which reads:
"G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering the
compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by counsel
for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993
which required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety
bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing
a temporary restraining order prayed for, manifesting that
it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with the
Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official
receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the
Temporary Retraining Order prayed for.
"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from

enforcing its decision dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB
Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993,
and which ordered, among others, the Regional Office of
the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal
and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate
possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall
have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and to distribute the same through the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the
farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal
Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department
of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and
in their behalf and under their authority from entering the
properties involved in this case and from introducing
permanent infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private
respondents from further clearing the said properties of
their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees and
other vegetation, effective today until further orders from
this Court."22
The main issue raised is whether the property in question
is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire
property formed part of a watershed area prior to the
enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of
acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In
the case at bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform
sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property
under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For
purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place
in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place
where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the
offer of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance
with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of
written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform
the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP
shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land
within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a
deed of transfer in favor of the government and other
muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall
conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
Law on NatRes (23-49) 70
the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the
LBP and other interested parties to submit fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision.
The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after
it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this act, the DAR shall
make immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate
of Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring
the matter to the court23 of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding,
the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be
identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice
of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where
the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of
acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed
of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the
certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution
of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in
favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of
title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of
transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the
owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the
DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from
notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall
decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and
the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment,
or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter,
the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian
courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated
branches of the regional trial court as special agrarian
courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority
mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory
acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners
and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on
how the identification process shall be made. To fill this
gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating
procedure in the identification of such lands. The
procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with
the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered
under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist
should include such information as required under the
attached CARP masterlist form which shall include the
name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT
number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered
under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which
the landowners have already filed applications to avail of
other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall
contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report
findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicant's Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information
contained in the above-mentioned forms have been
examined and verified by him and that the same are true
and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the
Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the
said conference meeting shall also be sent to the
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative, and the other interested parties to discuss
the inputs to the valuation of the property.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 71
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and
solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of
the participants thereon. The landowner shall also ask to
indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting
shall be signed by all participants in the conference and
shall form an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him
by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the
valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series
of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF
valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO
and all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the
MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the
property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be
mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000
per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case
folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation forms
and his recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall
be furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from
the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land
valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel
directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly
authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP
Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the
landowner personally or through registered mail within
three days from its approval. The notice shall include
among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition,
and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value,
the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the order of acquisition. However, in case of
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing
to determine just compensation, in accordance with the
procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13,
series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's

decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare
and submit to the Secretary for approval the required order
of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of
acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated
bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary
shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall
take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified
beneficiaries."
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an
updated master list of all agricultural lands under the
CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the
required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory
Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by
CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of
Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/
meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also
sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries,
the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to
the valuation of the property and solicit views,
suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At
the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his
retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall
complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and
verification of the property by the PARO shall be
mandatory when the computed value of the estate
exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the
valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with
his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The
DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the
signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject
property. From this point, the provisions of R. A. No. 6657,
Section 16 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two
notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter
of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the
landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer
beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR
A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of
acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the
CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of
coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and
its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps
designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
Law on NatRes (23-49) 72
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State's police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes
retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of
police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also
a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the
property in question. However, payment of just
compensation was not in accordance with the procedural
requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP
bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP
Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either."24
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of
Appeals DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory
acquisition of petitioner's property.25 Here, petitioner
pressed the question of whether the property was a
watershed, not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No.
1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to
any surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within
the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection,
management or administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river
and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds
generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was
the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The
answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the
property as watershed area. The parcels of land in
Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning
Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in

1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution 26 voiding
the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as
Park and declaring that the land is now classified as
agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to
issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police
power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land
uses as present and future projection of needs." 27
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform28
we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the
effectivity of the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired
for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land
as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey
showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital
part of a watershed area.29
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in
dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area for
watershed purposes." Ecological balances and
environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land
must be aware of this deadly combination. In the case at
bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for
compulsory acquisition simply because the land was
allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC,
hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to
CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth
study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the
fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an
area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In
a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development
Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding
the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-
an river watersheds, they concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is
situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering
the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks,
the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize
and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the
land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the
Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding
reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean
destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas
of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people
have little if no direct interest in the protection of the
Law on NatRes (23-49) 73
Matang Tubig structures they couldn't care less even if it
would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be
considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with
sound watershed management. More so, the introduction
of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection
of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately
stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds
would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed
degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy
and program be immediately formulated and implemented
before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given
financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in
need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed
management plan and program be formulated and
implemented by the Canlubang Estate in coordination with
pertinent government agencies."30
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team
headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who
holds a doctorate degree in water resources from U.P. Los
Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his
doctorate degree in watershed management from
Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M.
Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and
Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in
1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a
Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993
(Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions
on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates
at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:
"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question
must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological
and environmental considerations, among others.
Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP
beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger
view of the situation be taken as one should also consider
the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream
if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for
watershed purposes.

"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if
possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected
farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to
protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent
watershed reserved."31
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
watershed. The most important product of a watershed is
water which is one of the most important human necessity.
The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply
of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss
of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational
responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that
during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that
the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which
exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.
6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses
including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church
sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers, and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this
Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof
showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded
from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP
because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of
land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the
DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the
DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature
of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the
DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be
stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on
December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final
decision on the case. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 74
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, etc. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA
CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES,
respondents/intervernors.; G. R. No. 107764
October 4, 2002; CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals,2 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No.
25597, which declared null and void the Decision 3 dated
January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-
59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a
parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the
land registration court an application for registration of a
parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766
square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity).
The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known
as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey
Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On March 24, 1986,
petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to
include additional co-applicants.4 Subsequently, more
applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners"
for brevity).5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its
Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of the
oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since
time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid
all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to them,
there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares
of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-
interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known
predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in

actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the
property in the concept of owner. He had the property
surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and
"W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and
Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva,
who inherited the property. He had the property
resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit "X"
and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado
Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from
Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the
Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed
the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax
purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration
No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and
testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from
Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3
February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the ownership of the
property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the
grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner,
attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her
name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958,
under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under
Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and
under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina
Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna
Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1"
to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO
TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from
Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ,
DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO
TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA,
JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE
TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION,
CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE
MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON
and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property
in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA,
CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold
their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 75
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and
FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January
1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")."6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant
provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor
General. For failure of the oppositors to present their
evidence, the land registration court issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision based on the
evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the
order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this
date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite
due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order
submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of
the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners,
the land registration court held that petitioners had
adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable
rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We
quote the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as
follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from
the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open,
public and notorious possession by the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and
said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy
Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo
and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel
for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid
by the Applicants and the previous owners and said
property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to
palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented
sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said
property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the
Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all
Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private
rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 "private rights" is proof of
acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of
public lands.

In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-
195, by "private rights" means that applicant should show
clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish government or
by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands xxx" (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as
above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to
which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private
rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented
by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the
area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed
Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974
which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977
known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
(Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor
General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the
decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had
become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of
the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that
the land registration court order the Land Registration
Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over
the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration
court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether
the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the
query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23,
1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated
January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as
alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration
court issued an order directing the Land Regulation
Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration
in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that
there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it
subject to private appropriation.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 76
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees
Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates
of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed
with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise
opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which
is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is
inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual
occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene
verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6,
1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as
represented by their respective counsels agreed that the
only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is
part of the public domain.8
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and declared null and void the
decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration
court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the
1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987
Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a
public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas,
176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to
present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for
as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the
bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the
technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau
of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March
2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively
negate the allegation in private respondent Collados
application that "said parcel of land known as Psu-162620

is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land
application and are not within any government reservation
(Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent
court could not have missed the import of these vital
documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as
it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the
respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the
case.
"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by
petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director
of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the
same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x
Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was declared to
be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains
that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is
with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands
are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot convert the same into private property. And
courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the
forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172
SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to
law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 339)."9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME
FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR
Law on NatRes (23-49) 77
INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over
the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33"
for brevity) dated July 26, 190410 established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede
that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the
technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the
main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is that "all
Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to
private rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving
clause that the reservations are "subject to existing private
rights, if any there be." Petitioners contend that their claim
of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their
known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid
claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the
presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable.
They conclude that private rights were vested on
Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus
excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.11 The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14,
Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias12 which laid the foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 13 Upon
the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
"lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura
Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of

all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to
the state.15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands through the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that
the governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No.
926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity)
amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains
to this day as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
other than timber and mineral lands.17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which
took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all
registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens
system.18 The Torrens system requires the government to
issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in
the title is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title
or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
Law on NatRes (23-49) 78
quieted upon issuance of the certificate.19
PD 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11,
1978,20 amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu
of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the
public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There
was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor
of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and
the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of
natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point
to secure recognition of the states power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew
that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they
were not certain whether it was continued and applied by
the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the
Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred
the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources
the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated
the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV24 on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation". The
1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in
Section 2 of Article XII25 on "National Economy and
Patrimony".
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands
of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated in the Philippine
Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas,
oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also,
features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of
property devoted to park and recreational purposes." 26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,27 the Court had occasion to discourse on
watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether

the parcel of land which the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed
area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent
watersheds." However, the Court also recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of
a watershed. The most important product of a watershed
is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be
answered now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to
any surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within
the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection,
management or administration of such waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to
protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB),
a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river
watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded
as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is
situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering
the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks,
the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize
and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the
land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the
Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding
reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean
destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas
of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people
have little if no direct interest in the protection of the
Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it
would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be
considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
Law on NatRes (23-49) 79
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with
sound watershed management. More so, the introduction
of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection
of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately
stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds
would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed
degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy
and program be immediately formulated and implemented
before the irreversible damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of
Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-
evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land
involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed
by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed
reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population
growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked
human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present
and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat,
natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did
petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights
over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome
the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain and that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from
an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived
from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant,
a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con
el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title
through purchase.29 Or, that he has had continuous, open
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period
of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an

imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners application for registration was filed on April
25, 1985.30 As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that
the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued."31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the
Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly
upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete
the required period of possession, whether under the
original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of
EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD
1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot
either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from
the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for
two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the
parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO
33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot
became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the
time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the
Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81
years prior to the filing of petitioners application.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 80
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in
1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed
reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section
48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest
lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is
axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private
ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of
Appeals,32 the Court declared that inalienable public lands
-
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. "
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals33 is in point. In
Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land.
They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation
No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in
Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573
itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private
rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the state. The facts show that
petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land
prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He
filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973,
more than three (3) years after the issuance of
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land,
as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was
no longer open to private ownership as it has been
classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private
rights," in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted
as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the
claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so
many number of years, declared the land for taxation
purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes
[which are] accepted by the government, and [his]
occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and
unmolested and recognized by the government.
Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-
year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969,
albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession

required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as
amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the
"private rights" recognized and respected in Proclamation
No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director
of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the
protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a
military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was
acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public
lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he
has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty
(30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and possession of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free
patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the
presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an
interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open and notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had
attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of
the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from
the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on
June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No.
1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from
the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso
Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-
162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area.
Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered
alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED
BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH
SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE
SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE
PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER
XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in
Law on NatRes (23-49) 81
me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended
by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915,
which established the Watershed Reservation situated in
the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and
reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land
of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the
provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision
survey in accordance with the development plan to be
prepared and approved by the Department of Local
Government and Community Development, which parcels
are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio,
being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated
in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan,
being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from
BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to
point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N
30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33
m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6;
thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38
W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to
point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence
Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to
point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to
point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to
point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West
636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of
three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares,
more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio,
being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of
public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point
marked "1" on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m.,
more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due
West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to
point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m.
to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence

Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to
point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence
Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E
1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to
point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence
S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E
704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to
point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence
s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an
area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225)
Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change
based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by
Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977.
Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of
the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary
Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A
(of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite
purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.34
Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE
21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE
RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO
AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF
LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING
THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970
THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS
RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283,
dated June 21, 1974 which established the townsite
reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing
the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land
embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 82
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-
41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite
Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San
Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-
12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-
24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-
26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San
Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-
37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the
Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the
identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change
based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which
covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan
Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the
Executive Department is needed to declassify land which
had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and
to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.35 Unless and until the land
classified as such is released in an official proclamation so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove
the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the
Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that
the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R).
The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City

MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of
1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the
reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to
be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina
Watershed Reservation established under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No.
1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established
the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by
proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as
Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong
Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under
the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief,
Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum
dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a
reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered
by the reclassification, is contradicted by several
documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the
land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration
court a Report37 dated March 2, 1988, signed by
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part
of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the
application for registration. The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this
Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 83
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated
in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the
case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index
Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described as
Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of
registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record
No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on
April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al.,
pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the
Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-
162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the
Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the
recommendation that the application in the instant
proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining
supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter38 dated November 11, 1991, the
Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo,
Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR.
The letter states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San
Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY
SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in
Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2,
1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
"x x x
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private
property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public
domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry
Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for
rejection (Underlining supplied)." Copy of the letter is
attached herewith as Annex "3" and made an integral part
hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to
petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant]
application is the technical description39 of the Lot signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description
categorically stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and
insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had
been officially released from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of
land is included within a watershed reservation duly
established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant
case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be
part of such Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither
petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners
possession as of the filing of their application on April 25,
1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the
issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not
change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva
allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance
of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more
because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April
18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly
situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now
fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by
petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this
case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of
judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course
to the Republics petition for annulment of judgment which
was filed long after the decision of the land registration
court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30,
1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the
Law on NatRes (23-49) 84
decision on April 23, 1991.41 Petitioners point out that the
Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the
petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of
BP Blg. 12942 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision
had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover,
petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed
the petition for annulment after the land registration court
issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land
Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision
on the ground that the land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which
was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of
judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the
principle of res judicata. They insist that the land
registration court had jurisdiction over the case which
involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is
estopped from questioning the land registration courts
jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in
the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed
reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land.
The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-
162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a
watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the
Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural
infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment
of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court
never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of
the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore
null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 43 as
follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-
registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title
No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at
any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which
is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this
case override concerns over technicalities and rules of
procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,44 which involved the
registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea,
the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and

estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands.
The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the Government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does
estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if
its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State of the public properties
registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued
by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry
Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29,
1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of
the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the
parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied,
developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed
a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then
DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the
parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest
Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of
the aforementioned area from the MWR for development
under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June
5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO
33 and placed the same under the DENRs Integrated
Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33,
DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS
AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF
LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS
BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS
SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public
domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso,
Law on NatRes (23-49) 85
Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry
Program of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on plan, being
identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation;
thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty
(1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive
Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this
Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF
Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years
1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the
proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs.
Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates
of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by
the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its
ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.45 The DENR
awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in
Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other
barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants
the DENR had conducted.46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31,
1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8,
1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land
registration court to assert their rights and to protect their
interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition,
intervenors learned that the land registration court had
already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991

confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel
received a copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate
judgment and for new trial before the land registration
court. According to intervenors, the land registration court
could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991,
enjoining the land registration court from executing its
decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its
petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were
thus constrained to file a petition for intervention before the
Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 47 provides in
pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of
judgment by the trial court," as Section 2, Rule 19
expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized
exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice.
Mago vs. Court of Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court
allowed the motions for intervention even when the case
had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court
held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for
intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the
proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x
and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said
judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the
period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the
rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules
therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper
aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
Law on NatRes (23-49) 86
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as
the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the
actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this
was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates
of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in
issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any
relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question
remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot
fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if
only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for
ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at
least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival
camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the
DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number
of criminal cases between the two rival groups including
malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application
of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important
picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null
and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch
71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No.
269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, vs. RUPERTO A.
VILLAREAL, ; G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989;
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal
classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they
are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest
lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they
are considered public agricultural lands, they may be
acquired under private ownership. The private
respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged
by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land for more
than forty years. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the
Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in

nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks
that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner
and the private respondent agree that the land is
mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of
contention between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it
is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The
issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back
to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American
organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or
forest lands. This classification was maintained in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935,
until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to
include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to
provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the
present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the
charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural
lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition
was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber
or forest lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and
so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6
promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares
were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide,
in which grows various kindred plants which will not live
except when watered by the sea, extending their roots
deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of
the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to
some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well
as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although
these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion
that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that
term is used in the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they may be
disposed of without impairment of the public interest in
what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting
Law on NatRes (23-49) 87
manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the
same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of
the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and
prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands
and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically
declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove
swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This
it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became
effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest
reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this
definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of
Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the
Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos
madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees
growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a
tree in English but a bush, and land which has only
bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be
called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare
or nipa swamps does not change the general character of
the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-
quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural
lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of
July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in
the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which
vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the
trial court should have considered them agricultural lands.
If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants
are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda.
de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933,
more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for
a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the
land covered by the application there are mangrove lands
as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this
opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable,
inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove
lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase
is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was
merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in
1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v.
Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that
the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The
decision even quoted with approval the statement of the
trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove
species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit
only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not
of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into
public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They
do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court,
citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the
ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there
is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that
the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of
swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it held,
again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
Law on NatRes (23-49) 88
forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding
that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big
trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the
Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute,
which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land,"
were not private properties and so not registerable. This
case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan
case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels
there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that
should resolve once and for all the question of whether
mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially
belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands
of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide
for more categories of public lands). The legislature having
made such implementation, the executive officials may
then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our
public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the
courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the
legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the

executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating
with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the
Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our
natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the
President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9
of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition
shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to
which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-
public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
make the classifications provided for in this section, and
may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands
from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative
Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves-
Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the
Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by
Law on NatRes (23-49) 89
proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves
and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest
reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed
of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by
proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest
reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest
reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as
though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest
reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following
conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own
discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or
unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny.
The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges
but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as
pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood
as covering only those lands over which ownership had
already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917
became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative
of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where
the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early
as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and
for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by

the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and consequent
ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be
released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may
issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the
mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16
to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain,
however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is
ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of
Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under
the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has
the authority to determine whether forest land is more
valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for
private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of
lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands
are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority
to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other
purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for
fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which can be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases cannot commence until after the forest land has
been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into
private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were
agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent
offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably
meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record
contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the
informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original
transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been
satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion
Law on NatRes (23-49) 90
posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry
of property and that the land has been under the actual
and adverse possession of the private respondent for
twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.
17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this
case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private
respondent were practically the only basis used by the
appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over
the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in
countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not
established his right to the registration of the subject land
in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares
form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not
be the subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of
private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him.
This decision is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI,
respondents.; G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991;
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
annul and set aside; (a) the decision* of the Court of
Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP No.
13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge Ruben C.
Ayson, et al." declaring that both the petitioner and private
respondent hold possessory titles to the land in question,
and (b) the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between
December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of
six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better
known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called
Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location
of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the
Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia

mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold
by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the
earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed
of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then
petitioner Atok has been in continuous and exclusive
ownership and possession of said claim up to the present
(Rollo, Annex "B", p. 21).
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the
Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together
with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been
declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view
of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease
was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim (Rollo,
Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a
lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide,
Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon
sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration
No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below the
lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for
him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut.
And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he
was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said
house that people came to take pictures and told him that
the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has
been paying taxes on said land which his father before him
had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed
Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a
construction was being undertaken at the area of the
Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi.
Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take
pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security guards went to the place of the construction
to verify and then to the police to report the matter (Rollo,
Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry
and detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex "C", p.
32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal
Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby
ordered dismissed. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, Branch VI,
presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p.
3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 91
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon dated January 29, 1987
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new
one entered in its place ordering the defendant Liwan
Consi and all those claiming under him to vacate the
premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet immediately, and to restore possession thereof to
the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove
and demolish his house constructed in the premises of the
land of Fredia mineral claim at Tuding, Benguet, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, Petition, p. 4). On
March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the subject forcible entry action. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "C" p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral
land or agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of
Natural Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose.
Thus, there is a chance that the subject property may be
classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the
mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi
as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the
property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the
basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law,
Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of
equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold
possessory titles to the land in question the petitioner
through his long term occupancy of the same; the
respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim
locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim
within which the subject lot is found. But it was established
that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial
possession of the subject lot since before the Second
World War in the concept of owner and in good faith.
(Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK (Rollo, Annex
"D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an
individual's long term occupation of land of the public
domain vests him with such rights over the same as to
defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.

The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership,
the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the
requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the
said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As
the land had become the private property of the locators,
they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in
question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed
between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not
only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to
grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim
and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a
valid location of mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public and the property of the locator.
When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the
effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by
the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested right by
virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining
laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v. Montana Mining
Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have
exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by
Law on NatRes (23-49) 92
them and the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends
that his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of
said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the
same.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
288 1988, this Court held:
. . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest
of the de la Rosas had already been in possession of the
subject property, their possession was not in the concept
of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they are claiming it as agricultural land.
They were not disputing the rights of the mining locators
nor where they seeking to oust them as such and to
replace them in the mining of the land. . . .
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's
possession of the subject lot no matter how long did not
confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral
claim while private respondent's possession started only
sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer
in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was
really petitioner who was in actual physical possession of
the property. Having been deprived of this possession by
the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for
ejFectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be
declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive
right to the property in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and
the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and

Benguet dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG, RIZAL,
respondents.; G.R. No. 156951 September 22,
2006
x-------------------------------------------x
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
intervenor
x-------------------------------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented
by HON. SECRETARY ANGELO T. REYES, and the
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, GENERAL NARCISO L.
ABAYA, intervenors
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 173408 September 22, 2006
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, MGEN. MARCIANO ILAGAN
(Ret.), MGEN. PONCIANO MILLENA (Ret.), BGEN.
JUANITO MALTO (Ret.), BGEN. RAYMUNDO JARQUE
(Ret.) and COL. DOMINADOR P. AMADOR (Ret.),
petitioners, vs. L/T. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON,
JR., respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two petitions having, as
common denominator, the issue of ownership of a large
tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines seeks to nullify and set aside
the Decision1 dated January 28, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the
dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 71, of the Republics complaint for declaration of
nullity and cancellation of a land title against the herein
private respondent, the Southside Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SHAI).
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners
Rene Saguisag and five (5) retired military officers pray
that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the present
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), be asked to show cause why he should not be cited
for contempt for having announced time and again that the
military officers and their families in the contempt action
would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of
Law on NatRes (23-49) 93
the main petition even before the issue of ownership
thereof is finally resolved by the Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2
to the petition in G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA), followed by the
Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP,
joined causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought
leave to intervene. The Court, per its Resolutions dated
September 3, 2003,3 and September 29, 2003,4
respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the
corresponding petitions-for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both
petitions were ordered consolidated.
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast
against the following backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 4235 establishing a military reservation
known as Fort William McKinley later renamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The
proclamation "withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and
reserve[d] for military purposes, under the administration
of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the [certain] parcels of
the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated in
the several towns and a city of what was once the
Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers
three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2
(portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A).
Parcel No. 3 with an area of 15,912,684 square meters
and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128 square meters
are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort
McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from
Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the American
Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic
Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular
area (100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue
excluding certain defined areas from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for
disposition. These are Proclamation No. 4616 and
Proclamation No. 462,7 both series of 1965, excluding
portions of the reservation and declaring them the AFP
Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to
be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 274 8 and R.A.
7309 in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as
amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172
dated October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to
the same laws aforementioned, save those used or
earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions
of the reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan,
Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all in Taguig,
Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and
Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the
BCDA the power to own, hold and administer portions of

Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it
by the President10 and to dispose, after the lapse of a
number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.11
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of
nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99
hectares, more or less, known as or are situated in what
is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort
Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military
officers, both in the active and retired services, and their
respective families, have been occupying housing units
and facilities originally constructed by the AFP on the
JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation
organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers.
Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1508412 - in its name to the
bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084
particularly describes the property covered thereby as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of
Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area,
Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of
(398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on
subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of
plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang (sic)
Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an
area of (1,320) SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring
added.)
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30,
1991 on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale13
purportedly executed on the same date by then Director
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total
purchase price as written in the conveying deed was
P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation
conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land
scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30,
1991 deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.
The results of the examination undertaken by NBI
Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied
in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-
1093.14 Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of
the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA)
containing the signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." designated as "Q-961" .
Law on NatRes (23-49) 94
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of
SHAI containing the signature of "ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR." ... designated as "Q-962.
xxx xxx xxx
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and
sample/specimen signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." were written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the
specimens, submitted, under stereoscopic microscope and
magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic enlargement
reveals that there exist fundamental, significant
differences in writing characteristics between the
questioned and the standard/sample signatures
"ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn,
painstaking laborious manner in execution of strokes; that
of the standard/sample signatures show free, rapid
coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of
execution of letters/elements.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a product of TRACING
PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the
standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR."
were not written by one and the same person.
The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR."
marked "Q-961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon
process.
REMARKS:
The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the
signatures of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." are still in the
process of examination.15
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 17316 directing the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards
the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired
by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a
bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the
OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the
RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent
SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883
and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the

Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement
of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the complaint,
the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing,
inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying
deed is spurious as the purported signature thereon of
Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of
(i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment
of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is
inalienable, being part of a military reservation established
under Proclamation No. 423.17
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI
denied the material allegations of the complaint and
countered that the impugned title as well as the October
30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the
Republic is estopped to deny.18 SHAI also alleged paying
in full the purchase price indicated in the deed as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C dated
October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in
the course of which the Republic, as plaintiff therein,
marked (and later offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale
dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No.
15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI
adopted Exhibits "A" and "B" as its Exhibits "1" and "2,"
respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would
appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due
execution and genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness
NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who
testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the
signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the
same document and denied ever signing the same, let
alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of
the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that
he could not have had signed the conveying deed
involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its
being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the
first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved
around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs
application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and
Psd-76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. 20
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing
expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion
Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and
testified that Palads signature in Exhibit "A" (same as
Exh. "1") is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI
president, likewise testified, saying that applications to
purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one
Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment in full of
the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register
of Deeds of Rizal, also testified about his having endorsed
to Palad a letter-inquiry he received from SHAI respecting
the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter
dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. "10"), according to Atty.
Law on NatRes (23-49) 95
Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be
genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on the
basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale.22
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10"
and an LMB official would disclaim transmitting the same
to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics
complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint
dated November 15, 1991 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In not so many words, the trial court considered the
parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part
of the FBMR.
Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA
whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 59454.
In the herein assailed Decision24 dated January 28, 2003,
the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold
abstract submission that the CA "completely ignored,
overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of
substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect
the outcome of this case."
In its COMMENT To Petition,private respondent SHAI
parlays the "what-can-be-raised" line. It urges the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that the issues
raised therein, particularly those bearing on the
authenticity of Exhibit "A"/"1," are mainly questions of
fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability of the area
purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during
the pre-trial stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of
the reasons proffered above.
While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its
inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from
absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,25 citing Floro v.
Llenado,26 for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that
would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of the
[CA], summarized in and subsequent cases as follows:
1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on

speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the
judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of
facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ; 7)
; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion;
and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the
purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above,
foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner
Republic being barred from raising the issue of
inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the same at
the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the
general rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,27 is that the determination of
issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that
the rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory,
conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial out of
the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings.
And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the
procedure to be observed in pre-trials is, as Bergano v.
Court of Appeals28 teaches, citing Gicano v. Gegato,29
subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the
importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with
inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the demands
of justice so require.30
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be
generally observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses
an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the question of
inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more
legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not
really present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is
central to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its
basic complaint, passed upon by the CA and, before it, by
the trial court31 and of which at least one witness (Palad)
was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in
question at the time of the land alleged sale was part of
the [FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do you know
whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of
disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is
already part of those government lands that has been
assigned to other government agencies that is no longer
within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say
on that because the proclamation to the effect was
reserving this for particular purpose under the DND . 32
(Words in bracket added.)
Law on NatRes (23-49) 96
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from
private respondent SHAI. It even cross-examined said
witness.33 The rule obtains that the introduction of
evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the
pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring
jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.34
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we
now consider the clashing assertions regarding the
JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period material,
alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and,
therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private
conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the
inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same
having not effectively been separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are
correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any
of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.35
Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other
disposition until again declared alienable.36 Consistent with
the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a
military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not
open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore,
not registrable,37 unless it is in the meantime reclassified
and declared as disposable and alienable public land.38
And until a given parcel of land is released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone and
reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as
disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military
reservation remains,39 even if incidentally it is devoted for
a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So
it must be here.
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject
of the questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the
FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No.
423. And while private respondent SHAI would
categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not
presented evidence that "subject land is within military
reservation,"40 and even dared to state that the JUSMAG
area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per
se,41 its own evidence themselves belie its posture. We
start with its Exhibit "2" (petitioners Exh. "B"), a copy of
TCT No. 15084, which described the area covered thereby
measuring 399,922 square meters as a "portion of Parcel
3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort
Bonifacio." Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" -
the deed of sale - which technically described the property

purportedly being conveyed to private respondent SHAI as
follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a
portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag
(sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx
(Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as
described in private respondents Exhibits "1" and "2,"
formed part of that wide expanse under Proclamation No.
423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land
of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These
include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area
constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside
the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant
point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of
the Compilation Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside
Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu 2031 42 prepared in
September 1995 and certified by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates
in colored ink the outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by
Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-
square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT No. 15084,
defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the
violet-colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of
Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084
was and is still part of the FBMR, more particularly within
the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3 of the
reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the
intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate
proceedings, has maintained all along this thesis. Towards
discharging its burden of proving that the disputed
property is part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic
need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square
meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been
reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of
the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more precise,
Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance of
which courts can and should take judicial notice of under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.43
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying
complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process,
it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations
specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No.
15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area
considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce
of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed to have
glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain
admissions made by the private respondent, the most
basic being those made in its answer to the Republics
allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its complaint. To
the Republics allegations that the property covered by
TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs
answer thereto reads:
Law on NatRes (23-49) 97
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs
5 of the complaint, the truth of the matter being that
in the Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands Certificate
(sic) that he is "authorized under the law to sell" the
subject property and that the "lots were duly awarded by
the [LBM] to the vendee.44 ( Emphasis and word in bracket
added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the
petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the
complaint, the formers denial to such allegations on the
inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No.
15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the
rules on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is
required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified
or termed "specific" by the pleader.45 The defendant must
specify each material factual allegation the truth of which
he absolutely denies and, whenever practicable, shall set
forth the substance of the matters upon which he will rely
to support his denial.46 Else, the denial will be regarded as
general and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission
of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was
to enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general
denial of the Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT
No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the
process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to admit the
reality of such averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had
more than sufficiently established its claim on the
inalienability of the parcels of land covered by TCT No.
15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the
issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of
evidence to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that
said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes,
effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423,
devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it should
be for the cogency of SHAIs claim respecting the validity
of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. "A"/"1") and its
TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") rests on the postulate that
what it purportedly bought from the LMB had ceased to be
part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise
put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had been
withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for
disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over
the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden
by reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not,
because it cannot even if it wanted to, pointed to any
presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed
parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse
still, its own Exhibit "5,"47 a letter dated March 19, 1991 of
then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia,
to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot but
be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed

land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation.
The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-serving to private
respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:
This is in connection with your move to make a petition to
President Aquino regarding the possible exclusion of
Southside Housing Area from the military reservation and
for its eventual allotment to the military officers
presently residing thereat. Allow me to state that I
interpose no objection . I find it helpful to our officers
to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation . (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard
put to understand how the CA could still have found for
SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently swayed by what
SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees48 that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that ,
then President Diosdado Macapagal issued
Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square
meters more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987,
then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio
containing an area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the
6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square
meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the
areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square
meters, what is only left is 160,857 square meters or more
or less 16 hectares .49
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land
with the following disquisition:
The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now
petitioners] reliance on Proclamation No. 493 [should be
423] in insisting that the land in litigation is inalienable
because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit
serous consideration. While it is true that, under the said
July 12, 1957 Proclamation, then President Carlos P.
Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio for
military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly
calls our attention to the fact, among other matters, that
numerous exceptions thereto had already been declared
through the years. The excluded areas under
Proclamation No. 461, dated September 29, 1965 and
Proclamation No. 172, dated October 16, 1987 alone
already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket
added.)
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for
concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a
springboard to justify speculative inferences. Per our
count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military purposes
Law on NatRes (23-49) 98
roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not
7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and
172 excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square
meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of
the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for
military purposes to a rationalization that they must have
been excluded from the reservation because 6,892,338
square meters had already been withdrawn from
Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to
stress, factual speculations do not make for proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private
respondent SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate
court - had not pointed to any proclamation, or legislative
act for that matter, segregating the property covered by
TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the
same as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the
public domain classified as a military reservation remains
as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the
same is released from such classification and declared
open to disposition.50 The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale
purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its
authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying
medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable
parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance
that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is
unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not
usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its
officials or agents.51
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the
private respondent are, or at least at the time of the
supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the
purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact,
the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area from the ambit of
Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such
hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent
SHAI. The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 352
of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas
had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is
not very clear under existing jurisprudence,53 the fact
remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited
from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public
lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write
finis to this disposition. An appropriate closure to this case
could not be had, however, without delving to an extent on
the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of
Sale which necessarily involves the question of the
authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature
thereon.

With the view we take of the case, the interplay of
compelling circumstances and inferences deducible
therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that
the deed is spurious. Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on
the deed is a forgery. The Court perceives no reason why
he should lie, albeit respondent states, without elaboration,
that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding "criminal
prosecution".54 The NBI signature expert corroborated
Palads allegation on forgery.55 Respondent SHAIs expert
witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs
findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the
PNP cancel each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila,
possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo.
Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless
proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before
the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the
Rizal Registry and there stamped "Received" by the entry
clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30,
1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other
words, the whole conveyance and registration process
was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is
quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while
in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have
a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land
application to purchase required under Section 89 of the
Public Land Act.56 There is also no record of the deed of
sale and of documents usually accompanying an
application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation
report and the property valuation. The Certification under
the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and
issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records
Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena
issued by the trial court57 attest to this fact of absence of
records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization
and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally
looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry
pertaining to SHAI.58
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI
states that the "deed of sale specifically meritorious Official
Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October 1991, (sic) as
evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase
price.." An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best
evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R.
No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment,59 it
failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A
Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC
Cash Division, LMB, states that "OR # 6030203 in the
amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is
not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the
National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central
Law on NatRes (23-49) 99
Office."60A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any
of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly
presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its
presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in
the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.61
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for
SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the
corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500
and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs
witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could
not have come to pass without the participation of a cabal
of cheats out to make a dishonest buck at the expense of
the government and most likely the members of SHAI. No
less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos)
testified that a "facilitator" did, for a fee, the necessary
paper and leg work before the LMB and the Registry of
Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and
issuance of the certificate of title in question. 62 Ms. Santos
identified Eugenia Balis, a geodetic engineer, as the
"facilitator"63 who "facilitated all these presentation" of
documents,64 and most of the time, "directly transacted"
with the LMB and the Register of Deeds leading to
acquisition of title.65 Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms.
Santos testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least
fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not
appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present
her as witness.66
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio
land involved in this and the NOVA area litigations is, as
described in the Report of the FactFinding Commission,67
"so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land
complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and
Separation Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million)
seem like petty shoplifting in comparison."68 The members
of private respondent SHAI may very well have paid for
what they might have been led to believe as the purchase
price of the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality,
however, is that the over P11 Million they paid, if that be
the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the
commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and
did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be
some memorials of such payment.
At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring
the petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what
rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing
unjust to this approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt
in G.R. No. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were,
the question raised by the petitioners therein respecting
the ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of
the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain
in the housing units each may be occupying is now moot

and academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed
revulsion over the efforts of the military establishment,
particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their
respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before
G.R. No. 156951 could be resolved, is understandable as
it is justified. We thus end this ponencia with a reminder to
all and sundry that might is not always right; that ours is
still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the
civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not
treat lightly any attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise,
with its processes and proceedings. A becoming respect
to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court
is a must for the orderly administration of justice to
triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is
GRANTED and the appealed CA Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale dated
October 30, 1991 (Exh. "A"/"1") purportedly executed in
favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084
(Exh. "B"/"2") of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on
the basis of such deed are declared VOID. The Register of
Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby
ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI
and the area covered thereby is DECLARED part of the
Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has,
in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation
from such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its
members, representatives and/or their assigns shall
vacate the subject parcels of land immediately upon the
finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases
Conversion and Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not
speak any further thereon other than to deny as we hereby
similarly DENY the same. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs. MELITONA
ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD AND
ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD, CARLOS
ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND
EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO
ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil
Cases Division), respondents.; G.R. No. L-66807
January 26, 1989; SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming two orders of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Laguna 2 dismissing its petition for "annulment
of title and reversion. 3 The facts appear in the decision
appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel of land
Law on NatRes (23-49) 100
situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was
amended after the land was divided into two parcels,
namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2
with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan
Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed
ground that applicants and their predecessors have not
been in possession of the land openly, continuously,
publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not
ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that
barrio folk also opposed the application. (LRC Case No.
189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 4922 of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated
January 16, 1956, supplemented by orders issued on
March 21, 1956 and August 13, 1956, defendants were
declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot
2, was declared public land. Decree No. N-51479 was
entered and Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated
October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court
of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the barrio
folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968,
judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the
defendants therein to return possession of the premises to
herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants
therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of
the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies
from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 52, and the defendants from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction
affecting the area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite
notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada,
Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, representing plaintiff
Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the court a
quo dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion
for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied
by the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It
appears that the appeal was dismissed by this Court for
failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was
perfected on time. Plaintiff went to the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on the action of this Court. On
November 19, 1982, the Supreme Court set aside the
dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to
reinstate and give due course to plaintiffs appeal.

In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims
that the decree and title [rendered and issued in LRC
Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the
1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1, Psu-
116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio, 5 for the
following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of
Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of the
same survey plan containing 2.8421 hectares, had since
time immemorial, been foreshore land reached and
covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs.
Ayala y Cia, L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al.,
vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30,
1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually
now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga,
Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by the barrio people
since the American occupation of the country in the early
1900's where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since
the early 1900's have filled up and elevated the land to its
present condition of being some feet above the level of the
adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of
the same survey plan so much so that this barrio site of
Aplaya where there are now sixty-eight (68) houses
occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no
longer reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna
de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio
people, the land in question would not have been fit for
human habitation, so much so that defendants and their
predecessors-in-interest could not have acquired an
imperfect title to the property which could be judicially
confirmed in a registration case, as in fact said defendants
and their predecessors-in-interest have never been in
actual possession of the land in question, the actual
occupants thereof being the barrio people of Aplaya; 6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that
under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court,
dismissal was proper upon failure of the Republic to
appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the judgment,
dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long
become final, titles to the properties had been issued (in
favor of the private respondents), and that res judicata,
consequently, was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as
it sustained the lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition
for failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial; and (2) in
holding that res judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of
Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is
Law on NatRes (23-49) 101
well-established that the State cannot be bound by, or
estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official
or agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935
Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged
moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There
is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before
private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to be
raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less
the acquiescense of public officials, is the controlling norm
...
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines 9
and Nilo v. Romero, 10 cited by the Court of Appeals in
support of its decision, are not applicable. In Ramos, we
applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of
the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant
had been "erroneously' represented in the complaint by
the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor,
on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could
have ably defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it
is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were
voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it
could not be said that the Government had been
prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an
impediment to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 11 this Court stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic
v Animas, et al., . supra), and the cancellation may be
pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action
cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land
registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not
apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment
to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final judgment; (2)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality
of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al.,
91 SCRA 113)... 12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of
the private respondents were foreshore land, the land
registration court could not have validly awarded title

thereto. It would have been without the authority to do so.
The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal
from the decree of registration could not have validated
the court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public
dominion or of private ownership ." 13 Property is of public
dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;
14 or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. 15
All other property of the State, it is provided further, which
is not of the character mentioned in ... article [4201, is
patrimonial property, 16 meaning to say, property 'open to
disposition 17 by the Government, or otherwise, property
pertaining to the national domain, or public lands. 18
Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers
to things held by the State by regalian right. They are
things res publicae in nature and hence, incapable of
private appropriation. Thus, under the present
Constitution, [w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated.' 19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks
running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of
public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands,
and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds,
which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public
works, even if constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands
belonging to private persons, to the State, to a province, or
to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such
lands;
Law on NatRes (23-49) 102
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public
establishments. 20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands
and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private
individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the
respective owners of such lands, and those situated upon
lands of communal use belong to their respective pueblos.
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the
lands subject of the Republic's reversion efforts are
foreshore in nature, the Republic has legitimate reason to
demand reconveyance. In that case, res judicata or
estoppel is no defense.
Of course, whether or not the properties in question are,
indeed, foreshore lands is the core of controversy.
According to the trial court, the aforementioned parcel of
land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, 23 and hence, available
disposition and registration. As we have pointed out, the
Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore laud, it
is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel
foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake .
Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions
of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and
brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by
the Pasig River. According to the definition just quoted,
Laguna de Bay is a lake.
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio
de San Jose further tells us, "we must resort to the legal
provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and
their beds and shores, in order to determine the character
and ownership of the parcels of land in question. 26 The
recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article
74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of
lakes ... is the ground covered by their waters when at
their highest ordinary depth. 27 and in which case, it forms
part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's
waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been
defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during
the dry season, such depth being the regular, common,
natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the
year . . . 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the

portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the
bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot
therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of
the public dominion, and land capable of registration as
private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as
follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides...
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to
the flow of the tide.
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its
proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these
principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling,
in the first place, because it is not a trier of facts, and in
the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in
arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We therefore
remand the case to the court a quo to determine whether
or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We,
consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the
trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC.,Petitioner,
vs. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.,Respondent.; G.R. No.
146616 August 31, 2006; CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed
on September 18, 1973 a foreshore lease application over
the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its
name, located in Loboc, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City,
including Lot 3309. It eventually withdrew the application
and filed on March 1976 a petition for registration over the
same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICOs
representative could no longer be contacted.
It appears that WESVICO ceased to hold operations and
its properties including Lot 3309 were foreclosed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which later
consolidated its ownership thereon. 1
On July 7, 1983, F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the
Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City, District Land Office VI-1 a
foreshore lease application 2 over a foreshore land, a
portion of which is adjacent to Lot 3309. The application
was docketed as FLA (VI-1) 176.
In the preliminary investigation report 3 on F.F. Cruz FLA
(VI-1) 176, Senior Special Investigator Ramon Torre who
Law on NatRes (23-49) 103
personally visited and examined the land applied for
recommended that the application be given due course.
District Land Officer Norberto Bernas thereafter submitted
to the Director of Lands a report, 4 together with relevant
documents including the preliminary investigation report.
The pertinent portion of Bernas report reads:
. . . I personally visited the area applied for by the herein
applicant and found that the same is actually occupied and
used by them as a sanctuary of their marine equipment
which they are using in their construction work of the Iloilo
Port. The applicant has also introduced some facilities on
the area applied for in the repair and maintenance of said
equipment. A portion of the land applied for has
already been filled up by the applicantas they are in
need of a land area for the repair and maintenance of their
equipment and in the loading and unloading of materials
that they use in the construction of the Iloilo City Port.
x x x x 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner Siain Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN), who purchased
from the DBP the properties previously owned by
WESVICO including Lot 3309, 6 filed on September 29,
1986 a foreshore lease application 7 over the foreshore
land adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land
subject of F.F. Cruzs foreshore lease application
overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application,
SIAIN filed on January 9, 1987 a protest 8 alleging that it
being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping
area, it should be given preference in its lease.
On March 6, 1987, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Iloilo
City, by Resolution No. 174, 9 approved the
recommendation of its Committee on Finance that "for the
mutual interest" of F.F. Cruz and SIAIN, SIAIN would get
70 linear meters and F.F. Cruz would get 60 linear meters
of the disputed area, in light of its finding that, among other
things, both SIAIN and F.F. Cruz would "contribute
substantially to the economic growth of the City of Iloilo."
Concurring with the Sangguniang Panglungsod, the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) through its Director, by Order
10 of July 15, 1989, dismissed SIAINs protest in this wise:
. . . While it cannot be denied that protestant is now the
registered owner of the property adjoining the foreshore in
question, the disputed foreshore cannot be considered to
have been built or formed by means of accretion but is a
reclaimed land made by respondent F.F. Cruz and
Company for the purpose of utilizing the same in the
loading and unloading of their equipment and materials
and for the repair and maintenance of said equipment
which respondents use in the reclamation of the Iloilo City
Port. This is supported by the findings of the District Land
Officer Norberto Bernas who, in his letter dated February
18, 1984 to this Office, reported that he personally visited

the foreshore in question and found that the same is now
actually occupied and used by the respondent
company as a sanctuaryof its marine equipment which it
is using in its construction work of the Iloilo City Port and
that a portion of the land applied for has already been
filled up by the applicant to be utilized in the repair and
maintenance of its equipment and in the loading and
unloading of materials it uses in the construction of the
Iloilo City Port. It is therefore clear that the foreshore in
question is neither an accretion nor an accessory to
protestants property. While protestant SEI appears to be
owner of the property adjacent to the disputed foreshore, it
cannot be considered as a riparian owner within the
contemplation of the aforementioned law. 11 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the LMB disposed:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the protest of SIAIN
Enterprises, Inc. be, as it hereby it is, dismissed and this
case, dropped from the records. Both Foreshore Lease
Application Nos. (VI-5) 220 and (VI-1) 176 of SIAIN
Enterprises, Inc. and F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. respectively,
shall be amended in such a way that SIAINs application
shall cover SEVENTY (70) linear meters of the disputed
foreshore adjoining Lot 3309 while F.F. Cruzs application
shall cover SIXTY (60) linear meters thereof. Accordingly,
both applications shall be give due course in accordance
with the provisions of the Public Land Law, otherwise
known as Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. 12
(Underscoring supplied)
SIAIN appealed to the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), arguing that
the LMB:
1. . . . made [a] false assumption of fact when it
considered the foreshore area under . . . controversy as
reclaimed land;
2. . . . committed a grave error in not considering the
preferential right of the riparian owner/littoral owner, . . . to
apply for a lease over the foreshore under controversy;
[and]
3. . . . erred in awarding sixty (60) linear meters of the
foreshore under controversy to [F.F. Cruz]. 13
By Decision 14 of May 6, 1997, then DENR Acting
Secretary Antonio G.M. La Via set aside the LMB Order,
the pertinent portions of which decision read:
It is blatant error to consider the contested area as
reclaimed land as it has no basis in fact, in law and
jurisprudence.
The area in question is unquestionably a natural
foreshore for which various applicants prior to the
herein parties have applied. CRUZs F.L.A. No. (VI-1)
176 itself which was filed on July 7, 1983, long after it
Law on NatRes (23-49) 104
had allegedly filled up the area undeniably shows
CRUZs admission that it is a foreshore and not
something else.
The assumption that the contested area is a reclaimed
land runs smack against the provision of Article 5 of the
Spanish Law on Waters of August 3, 1866 stating that:
"Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission,shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless
otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
We cannot find in the records anything to show that a
"permission" was ever sought by or granted to, CRUZ for
the alleged reclamation of the land in question.
xxxx
It is by reason of the Director of Lands erroneous
classification of the contested area as "reclaimed"
that he awarded 60 linear meters thereof to CRUZ.
However, as heretofore discussed, the said area in
question is clearly a natural foreshore and SIAIN is
correct in claiming it to be so. Hence, the law that
applies in this case is Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 which was issued by the Secretary of the
then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources . . .
xxxx
It is an undisputed fact that SIAIN is the registered owner
of the land adjoining the foreshore area in controversy.
Hence SIAIN is the riparian/littoral owner insofar as the
contested foreshore area is concerned and should enjoy
the preferential right to lease the entire one hundred thirty
(130) linear meters of said area adjoining its property,
which includes the sixty (60) linear meters thereof
awarded to CRUZ in the questioned Order.
x x x x 15 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring partly in the
original and partly supplied)
The DENR Acting Secretary thus ordered that the
application of F.F. Cruz be amended to exclude the
disputed foreshore area adjacent to Lot 3309 and that
SIANs application be given due course.
F.F. Cruz appealed to the Office of the President,
contending that the DENR Acting Secretary acted with
grave abuse of discretion:
I. IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU THAT
THE CONTROVERTED AREA IS A RECLAIMED LAND
UNDERTAKEN BY APPELLANT F.F. CRUZ . . .
II. IN RULING THAT [SIAIN] HAS A PREFERENTIAL
RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE; [and]

III. IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT DECISION
CONSIDERING THAT HE IS NOT EMPOWERED BY
LAW OR RULE TO ISSUE THE SAME. 16
By Decision 17 of March 12, 1999, the Office of the
President, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora, reversed the decision of the DENR Acting
Secretary and reinstated that of the LMB in this wise:
Records reveal that WESVICO, who may be considered
as the real riparian owner, had previously availed itself
of the preferential right to apply for the foreshore area
adjacent to its property. However, it withdrew its
application, and instead sought the titling of said
property via a petition for registration filed with the
court, which eventually archived the case for
petitioners lack of interest. In net effect, WESVICOs
preferential right adverted to, albeit initially pursued,
was thereafter abandoned due to its voluntary
withdrawal of the corresponding application and its
erroneous resort to some other mode of acquisition,
i.e., the filing of a petition for registration. Consequent
to such abandonment, it may be said that WESVICO
had already waived its preferential right over the
controverted area at the time SIAIN purchased the
adjacent property. As vendee, SIAIN was subrogated
not only to the rights and actions of its predecessor-
in-interest, WESVICO, but also to the absence/lack of
those.
Also decidedly going for CRUZ is the fact that it
applied for the disputed area, occupied the same and
introduced improvements thereon long before SIAIN
filed its own lease application. Subject to certain
exceptions, it is axiomatic in public land grant that he
who is first in time is preferred or stronger in law
Priore in tempore, potior jure.
It may be, as stated by the DENR, that the contested area
abuts upon the titled property of SIAIN, a circumstance
which ordinarily would accord that firm a preferential right
to lease the property in question, the rule being that a
riparian/littoral owner enjoys preference over the abutting
foreshore lands formed by accretion or alluvial deposits.
xxxx
. . . The principle thus enunciated in Santulanproperly
applies where the adjoining lot is a natural foreshore,
meaning that the foreshore was formed by what may
rightfully be considered as accretion, or the settling down,
by natural causes, of soil, earth and other deposits. But
such is not what it obtains in this case, contrary to the bare
assertion of the DENR Acting Secretary that the "area in
question is unquestionably a natural foreshore." . . .
xxxx
Law on NatRes (23-49) 105
Not being the product of accretion, the disputed strip of
foreshore land cannot be the proper subject of a riparian
or littoral claim.
xxxx
The actuality of the DENR not formally granting CRUZ a
permit to undertake reclamation works on the disputed
area can be conceded. But in the light of the Bernas
report, . . . there can be no quibbling that CRUZ occupied
and raised, thru filling, the area to its present level, with
the implicit consent, if not approval, of lands authorities.
That consent and/or approval have been given may be
deduced from the fact that the Bureau of Lands required
the payment of, and received from appellant, the amount
of P40,032.00 as occupation fee. Any suggestion that
CRUZ, after paying the occupational fee, merely planted
itself on the disputed area without as much as dredging
and filling the same is unacceptable. In a very real sense,
therefore, the reclamation work undertaken by CRUZ was
with the proper permission, or at least the acquiescence of
the Bureau of Lands, the agency which, following Insular
Government v. Aldecoa (19 Phil. 505), is empowered to
grant such permit in behalf of the DENR Secretary. 18
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In its petition for review before the Court of Appeals, SIAIN
raised the issues of 1) whether the disputed area is
reclaimed land or foreshore land and if found to be
foreshore land, 2) whether SIAIN has preferential right to
lease the same. 19
By Decision of July 3, 2000, 20 the appellate court
dismissed SIAINs petition, ruling that there is no
justification to digress from the findings and conclusions of
the Office of the President and the LMB and that
administrative matters within the executive jurisdiction can
only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law.
Hence, the present petition for review filed by SIAIN.
SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves
that the disputed area is foreshore land and not reclaimed
land as found by the Office of the President. It invites
attention to F.F. Cruzs own declaration in its foreshore
lease application that the disputed area is a "parcel of
foreshore land." To SIAIN, this declaration is equivalent to
a judicial admission which does not require proof and is
conclusive as to it.
Further, SIAIN argues that the records reveal that the only
evidence relied upon by the Office of the President is the
Bernas report which speaks of a portion allegedly filled-up
by F.F. Cruz, the identity, location and size of which were
never established; and that there is no evidence to prove
that the filled-up portion is one and the same as the
disputed area, but that even assuming that it is, F.F. Cruz
cannot have a better right over it as the reclamation was

made without the necessary permit, hence, it cannot be
allowed to benefit from its own wrongdoing.
Furthermore, SIAIN contends that there can be no waiver
of preferential right over the disputed property, no advice
from the Director of Lands having been communicated to
WESVICO, DBP or SIAIN of their preferential right to lease
the adjacent foreshore land, and therefore, the 60 days
within which they are supposed to apply 21 has not begun
to run.
The key to the present controversy lies in the classification
of the disputed area.
The DENR Secretary found that the disputed area is a
"natural foreshore," hence, it concluded that SIAIN, being
a littoral owner (owner of land bordering the sea or lake or
other tidal waters 22), has preferential right to lease it as
provided in paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936 which reads:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the
property adjoining foreshore lands or lands covered
with water bordering upon shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and
regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he
applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he
receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right. 23 (Emphasis
supplied)
The DENR Secretary found the LMBs classification of the
disputed area as "reclaimed" erroneous for lack of basis in
fact, law and jurisprudence.
On the other hand, while the Office of the President
recognized the preferential right of littoral owner
WESVICO, it held that it had waived its preferential right
and SIAIN, as successor-in-interest, was subrogated to
WESVICOs right or lack of it.
The Office of the President went on to hold that since the
disputed area is already reclaimed land, it cannot be
subject to littoral claim, SIAIN, not being the littoral owner
within the contemplation of the law, citing Santulan v. The
Executive Secretary 24 which elucidated on the principal
reason for giving a riparian or littoral owner preferential
right, thus:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral
owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land
abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that,
while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the
public domain, such lands, when they are no longer
Law on NatRes (23-49) 106
washed by the waters of the sea are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast guard service," shall be
declared by the Government "to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof."
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential
right of the littoral (riparian according to paragraph 32)
to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.
The reason for the preferential right is the same as the
justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner for
the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the
destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral
lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea
should gain by its recession. 25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, as reflected above, the Office of the
President, finding that F.F. Cruzs occupation and
introduction of improvements on the contested area long
before SIAIN filed its lease application, held that "it is
axiomatic in public land grant that he who is first in time is
preferred or stronger in law."
The petition is impressed with merit.
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not
remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject
to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought
the disputed foreshore area into existence. Such foreshore
area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its
reclamation. It was "formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea." Following Santulan,
the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as
affirmed by the appellate court, littoral owner WESVICO
cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its
preferential right to lease the disputed area when it
subsequently filed an application for registration thereover.
For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the
area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential
right remained, however. Its move to have the contested
land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than
proves its interest to utilize it.
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICOs petition
for registration which, as stated earlier, was archived by
the trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO
would not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore
lease application. Parenthetically, the petition for
registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of
lack of interest but because it ceased operations due to
financial reasons.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July
3, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The May 6, 1997 Decision of then Acting Secretary
Antonio G.M. La Via of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources is REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant-appelle, vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA,
objector-appellant. JUSTA DE GUZMAN, ET AL.,
objectors-appellees.; G.R. No. L-14869 October
27, 1920; MALCOLM, J.:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were begun to settle the
title to a considerable tract of land situated in the Province
of Rizal. Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the
municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and various private
individuals. The judgment of the trial court adjudicated the
parcels in question to the private claimants. From this
judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
and the municipality of Cainta appealed, but subsequently
the appeal of the latter wad dismissed for failure to
prosecute. The contest has thus narrowed down to one
between the Church as appellant and various individuals
as appellees.
A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By
stipulation during the trial, and by admission of counsel for
appellant, Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to
lot 2187. As to lot 2186, the only evidence before us,
confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Mamerta
Roxas went into possession of the same in 1895; and
when counsel for the Church made his offer to present
rebuttal testimony, he failed to mention this lot. Likewise,
as to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before us,
confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Antonio,
Benito, and Gervasio dela Paz went into possession of the
same in 1896; the record states that "ambas partes dan
por terminadas sus pruebas," while counsel for the Church
in making his offer of rebuttal testimony again failed to
include these two lots.
A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the
nine remaining cadastral lots. To understand it, a brief
narration of the course of the proceedings in the trial court
will have to be made.
The trial as to the land now before us opened with a
stipulation to the effect that the composition title of the
Church with the spanish Government included this land.
The Church presented one witness and rested. The
private oppositors then called their respective witnesses.
Each endeavored to prove title by possession, best
understood by the following table:
Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to
present additional testimony with reference to lots 2176,
2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, or
Law on NatRes (23-49) 107
the lots above enumerated in the table. Three witnesses
were called to the stand, but each time, before any
pertinent testimony could be secured from them, an
objection was made by counsel for the oppositors that the
proof related to the evidence in chief of the Church, and
this was sustained by the court.
To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident
that when an admission was made of the royal title, the
Church had shown that it was the legitimate owner of the
land to which it refers. The most perfect title could,
however, be lost by abandonments. When, therefore, the
private oppositors showed possession for the prescriptive
period, they had made their case, and the burden of proof
had shifted. To overcome this burden, it was then
incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that such
possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely
possession through the tolerance of the Church.
This brings us to the specific consideration of assignment
of error No. 2 of the appellant to the effect that the court
erred in refusing to admit evidence tendered by this
claimant and appellant in answer to rival claims. A correct
ruling can most appropriately be arrived at by a
consideration of the nature of cadastral proceedings, with
reference to the usual rules of trial practice and evidence.
The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is that the
title to the various lots embraced in the survey may be
settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding
in rem, promoted by the Director of Lands, somewhat, akin
to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial
decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no
defendant. In another sense, the Government is the
plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants. (Act No.
2259, sec. 10.) The trial is conducted in the same manner
as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to this court, now abolished, the
Land Registration Act provides that it "shall conform, as
near as may be, to the practice in special proceedings in
courts of first instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2) The Code of
Civil Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the
Cadastral Act, prescribes the order in which the trial must
proceed. (Secs. 56, 132). The usual rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence govern registration proceedings.
Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious
surprises and annoying delays in the administration of
justice are to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given
piecemeal. The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his
case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation
of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court.
"The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has
been said by an eminent author, "is, that material
testimony should not be excluded because offered by the
plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in
rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for
the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his

case injuriously." (1 Thompson on Trials, sec.
346.)1awph!l.net
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law.
While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons,"
to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in
the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer
evidence upon their original case." (Sec. 132.) These
exceptions are made stronger when one considers the
character of registration proceedings and the fact that
where so many parties are involved, and action is taken
quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules
should not always be expected. Even at the risk of
violating legal formul, an opportunity should be given to
parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in
support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so
require. (Rodriquez vs. Director of Lands [1915], 31 Phil.,
272; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural
[1919], 39 Phil., 996.)
We believe that the offer of counsel for the Church could
property be classified as evidence in denial of an
affirmative fact; but that even if not technically rebuttal
evidence, yet in the interest of justice and the
ascertainment of the truth it should be received. Whether
such evidence would be sufficient to overcome the case
which exists in favor of the claimants of the nine lots
cannot now be determined.
In so far as the judgment relates to lots No. 2186, 2187,
2213, and 2214, it is affirmed, and in so far as it relates to
lots Nos. 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190,
2191, and 2192, it is reversed, and the record shall be
returned to the lower court for the taking of additional
evidence under the offer of counsel for the Church found
on page 83 of the stenographic notes. No finding as to
costs is made in this instance. So ordered.
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner,
vs. MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:; G.R. No. L-48480 July 30, 1943
Whether in a cadastral case, the judge may upon motion
of adverse claimants order the cancellation of the
claimant's answer and keep the latter from introducing
evidence to prove his ownership because the case is
barred by a prior judgment, is the legal question at issue in
this case. An order to that effect issued by the Court of
First Instance of La Union, is impugned by Fabian B.S.
Abellera in a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real
estate involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and
others who are either the same parties in this case or the
latter's predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the
land. But his complaint was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance on two grounds: (1) prescription in favor of
defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of these lands to
Law on NatRes (23-49) 108
him had not been formally accepted according to Article
633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second
ground aforementioned (Abellera vs. Balanag G.R. No.
11970, promulgated March 22, 1918, and reported in 37
Phil. 865).
It appears in that decision of this Court that after the
perfection of the appeal, Abellera executed a public
document formally accepting the donation of the land, and
presented and deed of acceptance together with proofs of
notification of acceptance to the donor, as ground for new
trial. This Court held that this was not newly-discovered
evidence, and that Abellera had not acquired title to the
hacienda until the execution of the deed of acceptance
and the notification thereof to donor. This Court added:
So that whether rights he may have to institute and
maintain a new action of ejectment in reliance upon his
claim that he has acquired title to the hacienda, since the
date of the dismissal of this action, it is clear that the
present action was properly dismissed on the ground of
failure of proof of title in the plaintiff at the time when the
action was instituted and later when judgment of dismissal
was entered by the trial court.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned
decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another
action for recovery of the land against the same
defendants in the previous case. The second suit was later
dismissed by the Court of First Instance and transferred to
cadastral case No. 5 which included the haciendain
question that had in the meantime been subdivided into
lots. When the cadastral case came up before the Hon.
Meynardo M. Farol at Aringay, La Union, in July 1941,
Fabian B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso
de Guzman and others appeared as adverse claimant.
The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's claim
over the lots concerned be dismissed on the grounds of
res judicataand prescription.
A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the
previous case (37 Phil., 865) convinces us that there is no
res judicata. We merely held that Abellera had not
acquired title to the hacienda until the execution of the
deed of acceptance and the notification thereof, and we
clearly refused to prevent Abellera from instituting a new
action based upon his assertion that he had acquired title
to the estate since the dismissal of his original action.
The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription,
is not involved in the present proceedings.
The next question is: Did the cadastral court, on the
ground of res judicata, have any power to entertain the
motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him from
presenting evidence to prove his ownership of these lots?
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral
and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases
when two conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to
supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and
convenience.
If the nature and objective of the cadastral scheme are
kept in view, a motion to dismiss in a cadastral case on the
ground of prior judgment would seem to be out of place.
The Government initiates a cadastral case, compelling all
claimants in a municipality to litigate against one another
regarding their respective claims of ownership. By this
plan, all the private lands in a town are registered in one
single collective proceeding. Thus, the piece-meal and
isolated registration of lands, so inadequate in more ways
than one, is avoided. The principal aim is to settle as much
as possible all disputes over land and to remove all clouds
over land titles, as far a practicable, in a community. To
attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all
claimants ample freedom to ventilate whatever right they
may assert over real estate, permitting them, in keeping
with the law of evidence, to offer proofs in support of their
allegations. To countenance the contrary opinion, by
suppressing the presentation of evidence in support of
claims, would but serve to perpetuate conflicts over land,
for such stifled affirmations of ownership will fester like
wounds unskillfully treated. No sufficient leeway having
been give all claimants to demonstrate the strength and
consistently of their alleged rights, the stability of decrees
of title is jeopardized.
In Haw Pia vs. Roman A. Cruz(G.R. No. 48506), we
declared that the Court of First Instance in a cadastral
proceeding cannot appoint a receiver because its
jurisdiction is special and limited. We declined in that case
to apply the new Rules of Court by analogy.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral
case res judicatais available to a claimant in order to
defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless
prior judgment can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
The order appealed from is hereby reversed. Petitioner
herein shall in the cadastral proceedings be allowed to
present evidence to prove his claim over the lots in
question. With costs against the adverse claimants who
are respondents herein. So ordered.
SEVERINO GAYAPANAO, TEODORO GAYAPANAO,
LAURO GAYAPANAO, SALVADOR GAYAPANAO,
RAYMUNDA GAYAPANAO-RAMOS, HEIRS OF
ELEUTERIO GAYAPANAO and HEIRS OF ROBERTO
GAYAPANAO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Law on NatRes (23-49) 109
and SIMEONA GAYAPANAO-NOVENARIO,
respondents. G.R. No. L-68109 July 17, 1991; FERNAN,
C.J.:p
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners
Severino Gayapanao and his siblings question the
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) 1
in AC-G.R. No. CV-59589, entitled "Severino Gayapanao,
et al. vs. Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario" upholding the
validity of the sale of two (2) hectares of the ten-hectare
homestead land by their father in favor of their sister
Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario.
Briefly, the facts of the case as found by the Appellate
Court are as follows:
. . . the 2-hectare land subject of this case is part and
parcel of a homestead lot registered in the name of
Constantino Gayapanao under Original Certificate of Title
No. 3625 (Exhibits B and 2, Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p.
2). The homestead application of the late Constantino
Gayapanao over the said lot was approved on September
7, 1931 (Exhibit C, Ibid., p. 5) and the final order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937, (Exhibit A, Ibid., p. 1). On July 13,
1939, the Homestead Patent Title was issued in the name
of Constantino Gayapanao married to Aurelia Maamo
(Exhibit D, Ibid., p. 2). On November 15, 1938, the late
Constantino Gayapanao executed a private deed entitled
Kasulatan ng Bilihan in favor of Serafin Novenario and his
wife, Simeona Gayapanao over 20,000 square meters of
the homestead land (Exhibit 4, Defendants' Folder of
Exhibits, p. 8).
Constantino Gayapanao and his wife Aurelia Maamo died
intestate on December 22, 1942 and September 29, 1966,
respectively (Record on Appeal, p. 70) . . .
On January 2, 1974, Severino, Teodoro, Roberto,
Salvador, and Lauro, all surnamed Gayapanao,
Raymunda Gayapanao-Ramos and the heirs of Eleuterio
Gayapanao filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro Civil Case No. R-317, a Complaint for
Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Appointment of
Receiver against their sisters Gloria Gayapanao-Saet and
Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario (private respondent
herein) who were then occupying the subject homestead
lot. Both defendants filed their Answer to the complaint.
On March 11, 1975, the court a quo rendered a decision 3
declaring as null and void Exhibit 4, the contract of sale
between Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario and her father
Constantino Gayapanao for having been executed within
the five-year prohibitory period provided under Section 118
of the Public Land Law, 4 and at the same time declaring
as valid Exhibit 5, the deed of sale executed by Teodoro
Gayapanao in favor of his sister Gloria Gayapanao-Saet
covering the former's hereditary share in the homestead
lot. Accordingly, the lower court ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
A. Adjudicating unto plaintiffs SEVERINO, ROBERTO,
SALVADOR, LAURO, RAYMUNDA and the heirs of
ELEUTERIO, all surnamed Gayapanao and Simeona
Gayapanao-Novenario one-ninth 1/9 each of the intestate
estate of the deceased Constantino and Aurelia Maamo
covered in and embraced by Original Certificate of Title
No. 3625 and the remaining two-ninths (2/9) to Gloria
Gayapanao-Saet, she having purchased the one-ninth
(1/9) hereditary share of plaintiff Teodoro Gayapanao;
B. Authorizing the herein parties to agree among
themselves to cause the relocated survey of the entire
land in question covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
3625 so that their respective shares may be properly
delineated;
C. Ordering the parties to submit the necessary project of
partition after the relocation survey has been executed not
later than three (3) months after entry of this judgment in
order to terminate tills proceeding;
D. Declaring as null and void document marked Exhibit
"4", the same having been executed one year prior to the
issuance of the patent, but Exhibit "5" is confirmed and
declared valid.
WITHOUT special findings as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario moved to reconsider, but
failed. She then sought relief before the IAC which, finding
the sale in her favor to be perfectly valid, set aside the
decision of the lower court and entered a new one
dismissing the complaint against her.
Hence, this appeal filed by Severino Gayapanao, et al.
after their motion for reconsideration was denied 7 by the
respondent appellate court.
In upholding the sale of a portion of the homestead lot by
Constantino Gayapanao to his daughter, herein private
respondent Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario, the
respondent court interpreted the prohibition against the
alienation or encumbrance of the homestead land under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law as referring to an
alienation or encumbrance in favor of a third person
outside the family circle of the original homesteader.
Since, according to the appellate court, the conveyance
involved herein was made in favor of Simeona
Gayapanao-Novenario, who is one of the nine (9) children
of the original homesteader and who is the "continuity of
the personality of her father for all legal intents and
purposes," such sale is "not in contravention of the
avowed policy of the State, which is to preserve and keep
to the homesteader and his family the land granted to him
by the State." 8
Law on NatRes (23-49) 110
We rule otherwise. The pertinent portion of Section 118 of
the Public Land Law provides:
Except in favor of the government or any of its branches,
units or institutions land acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations or corporations.
The provision of law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the
grant is mandatory. From the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five (5) years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired
under free patent or homestead provisions cannot be
subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period. The only exception
mentioned by the law is the sale or encumbrance in favor
of the government or any of its branches, units or
institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled that a
sale of homestead within the five (5) year prohibitive
period is void ab initio and the same cannot be ratified nor
can it acquire validity through the passage of time.
In the case of Arsenal vs. IAC, 10 we said:
The above provisions of law are clear and explicit. A
contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or
encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period of
five (5) years from the date of issuance of the patent is
void from its execution. In a number of cases, this Court
has held that such provision is mandatory (De los Santos
vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405).
It is dangerous precedent to allow the sale of a homestead
during the five-year prohibition to anyone, even to the
homesteader's own son or daughter. As aptly put by the
petitioners, a clever homesteader who wants to circumvent
the ban may simply sell the lot to his descendant and the
latter after registering the same in his name would sell it to
a third person. This way, public policy would not be
subserved.
Moreover, the sale to a descendant is not one of the
exceptions contemplated by law. Only the government or
any of its branches, units or institutions is given the right to
acquire homestead by purchase at any time and even
during the five-year prohibitory period. To hold valid the
sale at bar would be to throw the door open to schemes
and subterfuges which would defeat the law prohibiting the
alienation of homestead within five (5) years from the
issuance of the patent.

The respondent Court cited the case of Lasud v. Lasud, 11
in support of its decision. Said case is not applicable to the
case at bar, considering that the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud sold
the inherited homestead to his brother Santay Lasud and
the latter's wife twenty-one (21) years after the patent was
issued to his father the homesteader. On the other hand,
the questioned conveyance in the case at bar was done
within the five year prohibitory period. Furthermore, what
was involved in the Lasud case is the right of therein
plaintiff under Section 119 of the Public Land Law to
redeem the portion sold. In contrast, the case at bar
centers on Section 118 of the same law
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision in Civil Case
No. R-317 of the then Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro is REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondent. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ISABELO GARCIA, DOMINGO COLORADO,
RAYMUNDO DE GUZMAN, INOCENCIO PADAMA,
IGNACIO RAMOS, LEON DE GUZMAN and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF
COTABATO, defendants-appellants.; G.R. No. L-11597
May 27, 1959; PADILLA, J.:
Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato decreeing the reversion to the State
of a homestead land covered by Patent No. V-532 and
original certificate of title No. V-17 issued by the Registrar
of Deeds in and for the province of Cotabato. The
dispositive part of the judgment is:
IN VIEW THEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff:
(a) ordering defendant Isabela Garcia to return the owner's
Certificate of Title No. V-17 to the Register of Deeds;
(b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cotabato that
homestead patent No. V-532 be returned to the Bureau of
Lands for cancellation;
(c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cotabato to cancel
Certificate of Title No. V-17; and
(d) declaring hereby reverted to the public domain as
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines the land
covered by said Certificate of Title No. V-17, with costs
against the defendants.
Only questions of law are raised.
From the pleadings, stipulation of facts and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties, the following facts are
gathered: Sometime before the last war appellant Isabelo
Garcia and his wife Tagumpay Dumaguindin acquired by
purchase the homestead rights of Lingasa Bapanialag to a
Law on NatRes (23-49) 111
parcel of homestead land situated at Mabay, Kiamba,
Cotabato, containing an area of 23.21 hectares
(Homestead Application No. 182259 [E-90722]). The
transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources upon recommendation of the Director
of Lands and Patent No. V-532 was issued in favor of the
appellant Isabelo Garcia and his wife. Three years and
three months after the issuance of the homestead patent,
or on 14 April 1950, for and in consideration of the sum of
P11,000, by an instrument executed and acknowledged
before a notary public the appellant Isabelo Garcia and his
wife sold and conveyed to Domingo Colorado, Raymundo
de Guzman, Inocencio Padama, Ignacio Ramos and Leon
de Guzman 19 hectares of the homestead land (Exhibit A).
The vendees took possession of the part sold to them. The
deed of sale was not submitted to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources for approval nor
presented to the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province
of Cotabato for registration.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 partly
provides:
Except in favor of the Government or any its branches,
units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provision shall not be subject to encumbrance
of alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, association, or corporations.
Section 124 of the same Act provides:
Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of section one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-
three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally
issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively,
and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
As the sale of the 19 hectares of the homestead land was
made within the prohibitive period of five years three
years and three months after the issuance of the
homestead patent is null and void,1 and is a cause for
reversion of the homestead to the State.
Appellants' defense set up in the court below was that the
document Exhibit A was intended merely as a mortgage
on the improvements and crops existing on the 19
hectares of the homestead land to secure the payment by
instalment of a loan, only that it was drawn up by mistake
as an absolute sale upon the insistence of the vendees. If
 Law on NatRes (23-49) 112
it was drawn up as an absolute sale upon the insistence of
the vendees, then there was no mistake committed. The
document Exhibit A is also so clear worded as to preclude
an interpretation other than what the parties had intended
it to be a deed of absolute sale of the 19 hectares of the
homestead land. Moreover, as found and held by the trial
court:

. . . as stated in Annex "A", the improvements on the land

only consist of 50 coconut, 5 mango trees, 1 nangka tree,
bananas and other fruit trees. It is unbelievable that
defendants Domingo Colorado, Raymundo de Guzman,
Inocencio Padama, Ignacio Ramos and Leon de Guzman
would grant a loan of P11,000.00 for such a small security
as those improvements specified above. Then if it is true
that the transaction had between them is only a loan, to be
paid by instalment every year, the defendants failed to
produce any evidence that any instalment has ever been
paid, taking into consideration that already elapsed more
than five (5) years from that time up to the hearing of this
case.

The fact that the appellant Isabelo Garcia moved to the

municipality of Bislig, province of Surigao, and abandoned
his homestead in Kiamba, Cotabato, is proof that he sold
19 hectares of his homestead.

Appellants contended that, under section 50, Act No. 496,

the operative act to convey and affect lands registered
thereunder is the act of registration, that inasmuch as the
deed of sale Exhibit A was never registered there was
actually no conveyance made of the 19 hectares of the
homestead land, and that for that reason there was no
infringement of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No.
141. To constitute a violation of the section just referred to,
it is enough that the homestead be encumbered or
alienated within the prohibitive period of five years; it is not
necessary that the encumbrance or alienation be
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. To
uphold the appellants' contention would defeat the very
prohibition established by law, for no party to a prohibited
sale or conveyance would register such an illegal
transaction. Besides, the vendees already, had taken
possession of the part sold to them.

Even if only 19 out of the 23.21 hectares of the homestead

land had been sold or alienated within the prohibitive
period of five years from date of issuance of the patent to
the grantee, such alienation is a sufficient cause for
reversion to the State of the whole grant. In granting a
homestead to an applicant, the law imposes as a condition
that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated
within five years from the issuance of the patent. The sale
or alienation of part of the homestead violates that
condition.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs

against the appellants.