China and International Socialization

China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations
Author(s): Ann Kent

Source: Global Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3 (JulySept. 2002), pp. 343-364
Published by: Lynne Rienner Publishers
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800349
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Global Governance 8 (2002), 343-364
China's International Socialization:

The Role of International
Organizations
_ /3&\ _
Ann Kent
The many questions surrounding China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its potential compliance with WTO rules
direct scholarly attention toward the record of its compliance with
the norms, rules, and treaties of other international organizations and the
role of these bodies over the past three decades in facilitating China's
international socialization. Managerial theorists like Abram and Antonia
Chayes contend that international organizations contribute significantly to
the socialization of participating states. International organizations and
their treaties not only ensure transparency, cut transaction costs, build
capacity, and enhance dispute settlement, but also, through a process of
"jawboning," persuade states parties to "explore, redefine and sometimes
discover" their own, and mutual, interests.1 They subject states to a
process of interaction and mutual pressure for consensus that helps
regulate their conduct. Particularly in the less political and more publicly
discreet and less political forums, international organizational
participation may blunt the sharp edges of nationalistic stances. In this
sense, international organizations may be understood broadly as the
institutional representations of interdependence, constituting a "collective
organizing response to a multiplicity of 'traffic' control problems in a
world of contradictory trends."2 Moreover, they bring to bear a wide
range of pressures that may appeal as much to a state's short-term
interests as to its ideals.3
International organizations also represent a challenge to the state, at
once confirming sovereignty and constraining it. Management of the
challenge of participation is thus a highly complex matter. For each
state it is a question of steering between the benefits for sovereignty that
membership in international organizations and regimes entails and the
potential threat to sovereignty that it implies.4 For these reasons, when
scholars seek a benchmark of China's international socialization in the
post-Cold War era, nothing could be more appropriate than to look to
the nature of its participation in international organizations and their
343
344 China's International Socialization
rules and treaties. The crucial question is whether such participation,

while promoting China's interests and status, has also inculcated in it a
corresponding sense of accountability, reflecting respect for the norms
of the international community and an awareness of interdependence.
International socialization has been defined as "the process that is di
rected toward a state's internalization of the constitutive beliefs and prac
tices institutionalized in its international environment."5 In other words,
socialization is not only a process but also an outcome. As a process, it
may be assessed by comparing China's instrumental purposes and moti
vations in participating in international organizations against its practical
readiness over time to make concessions and accept costs as a result of
organizational participation. As an outcome, it may be evaluated on the
basis of China's international behavior and the extent of its implementa
tion of international norms in domestic legislation and social practice.
Also relevant are questions of consistency and uniqueness. To what extent
does China's participation reflect a linear development and learning
process, and how is China different in its participation from other states?
In this article, I briefly outline China's attitude to international or
ganizations and its reasons for joining them. I then discuss evidence of
socialization in its participation and practice and assess whether inter
national organizations have influenced China to accept the requirements
of cooperation, respect for international rules, and accountability in
today's globalized world.
China's Approach to International Organizations
The importance of international organizations in China's foreign rela

tions cannot be overestimated. Following the Chinese communist revo
lution in 1949 and the development of the Cold War, Taiwan occupied
the "China" seat in the United Nations (UN), excluding mainland China
from mainstream international politics. UN recognition of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate representative of China
in 1971 therefore became a symbol of China's r?int?gration into the
international community.6 Despite its sudden international prominence,
China embarked on a methodical learning process in the UN and was
slow to participate in many of the UN's affiliated agencies, not joining
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the Confer
ence on Disarmament (CD) until well after Mao's death in September
1976. By the turn of the century, however, its growing participation in
international organizations provided both a source and measure of its
expanding power. Whereas in 1966, China had been a member of only
Ann Kent 345
one intergovernmental organization (IGO) and fifty-eight international

nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), by 2000 it had become a mem
ber of as many as fifty IGOs and 1,275 INGOs.7
The PRC's newcomer status in the world of international organiza
tions has meant that the last thirty years have involved a steep learning
curve, mediated by its own ambitions, changing perceptions, and unique
perspectives. Its interaction has changed over the years, from the aloof
posture of a spectator sizing up the game to active participation and a
lively and astute promotion of its national interests. China's complex
identity as an incipient great power, a permanent member of the Secu
rity Council wielding a veto, a member of the exclusive Permanent Five
(P-5) nuclear club, a developing state that is the chief beneficiary of
World Bank loans, and a socialist state previously exploited by imperi
alist powers has given rise to conflicting concerns and idiosyncratic be
havior. Its Marxist principles and political culture continue to shape its
particular motivations, perceptions, and responses to international or
ganizations. In particular, the doctrine of self-reliance and a fierce de
fense of sovereignty, if less egregious than in the Maoist years, remain
constant influences underlying policy responses. At the same time, its
awareness of its economic and strategic potential and its importance as
a market for the developed world lead it to behave like a great power,
even if it is not yet one. This creates an assumption of its dominant role
in world affairs and of its equivalence with other great European pow
ers, if not yet with the United States.
Although China's leaders appreciate that membership in international
organizations has enhanced China's power and facilitated its participa
tion in globalization and modernization, they are also aware of the prob
lems posed by international citizenship, in particular the threats posed
by economic interdependence for North-South relations, the centrifugal
and centripetal pressures that it exerts on the economy, the social and
environmental ills that it entails, and the possible impact on China's
economic growth rate.8 These reactions mirror the general Chinese am
bivalence about globalization (quanqihua), which, unlike the concept of
modernization (xiandaihua), is seen to place China at serious risk of
losing control over its own policies.9 Its ambivalence explains China's
insistence that interdependence must not undermine state sovereignty.
While formally recognizing international organizations as subjects of
international law, it has denied that they are "supranational" or are po
litical entities in the same sense as sovereign states. For this reason,
China prefers to use bilateral mechanisms for the resolution of interstate
or intrastate conflict and views international relations from a realist?or
as some would have it, cultural realist?rather than liberal perspective.10
Tactics
Nevertheless, international organizations provide the stage on which
China projects its power, and they constitute a source of international
prestige, status, and domestic legitimacy11 as well as the means for solv
ing the problems inherent in globalization. In each international forum,
China invokes whichever aspect of its complex identity is best suited
to promoting that power. Such flexibility allows it to operate inter
nationally as a "Club of One."12 Separateness and ambiguity enhance
China's power, despite Gerald Segal's claims to the contrary in his con
troversial thesis querying whether China "matters."13 For instance, as a
permanent member of the Security Council, China is the most powerful
state, precisely because it stands alone with a veto at an extreme policy
position. Thus, "it is constantly using its veto or, rather, the threat to
veto (actually or only implicitly), and so it is constantly making a dif
ference."14 In contrast, the United States is also at an extreme point but
is arguably less powerful than China because other Western veto mem
bers adopt similar policy positions.
China's role as a developing nation, on the other hand, allows it to
free ride where possible.15 For instance, although a member of the Per
manent Five, China's contribution rate for the UN's regular budget is
below 1 percent. This rate, which in 1979 had been reduced, at China's
request, from a rate of 5.5 percent to 0.79 percent,16 compares with the
25 percent paid by the United States and the 19.9 percent paid by Japan,
a country that is not even a member of the Permanent Five. China, how
ever, insists on adhering to the "principles on contributions that we must
follow."17 The United States is now attempting to increase China's con
tribution so that its own share may be reduced.
Principles
China's attitude to international organizations and to the international
community in general is heavily influenced by moral principles. These
include the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the rights to na
tional self-determination and independence.18 Within the context of
international organizations, the most important of the Five Principles is
sovereignty, which is defined solely in terms of state power and is pro
vided formal legitimacy in Article 2 para. 7 of the UN Charter. China's
formal view of sovereignty is an absolute one, and far from the restric
tive concept articulated by the UN secretary-general.19 This is due partly
to historical grievance and partly to the domestic, normative costs of its
international interaction. For liberal democracies, cooperative behavior
Ann Kent 347
and acceptance of interdependence are not as costly, because such be

havior normally coheres with domestically observed standards and
goals. In China's case, international cooperation and interdependence
often conflict with the perceived needs of domestic stability, with the
authority of party leaders, and with the norms of domestic culture.
In contrast to its moral principles, China's pragmatic goals are ba
sically to preserve an external environment conducive to its own inter
nal development and to enhance its international status. Yet the rela
tionship between moral principles and pragmatic policies is also a
symbiotic one. China's moral stance disguises its pragmatic goals and
blurs the degree to which it is actually prepared to negotiate its sover
eignty. Moral, particularly Maoist, principles also provide a refuge to
which to return when domestic pressures and interests require a more
assertive foreign policy stance.
China's attitude to international law is also heavily influenced by
domestic principles. The reliance of its domestic political culture on
ethics rather than on law, on moral consensus rather than on judicial
procedure, and on benevolent government rather than on checks and
balances has its resonances in China's international policies.20 So too
have domestic notions of hierarchy, power, and personal relationships
(guanxi). As in its domestic law, moreover, the force of precedent in its
practice of international law is weak. Although China criticizes other
states for not following precedent, or for establishing an unacceptable
precedent, in its own international organizational behavior it often does
not invoke the same standards of consistency.
Despite China's authoritarian political system, its international poli
cies are also highly sensitive to domestic political pressures, whether re
sulting from disputes among political factions or manifestations of so
cial instability. Even the most outward-looking of China's political
leaders, like Premier Zhu Rongji, are alert to any signs that foreign or
trade policies might have a negative domestic impact. Needless to say,
such sensitivity alters existing patterns of compliance and, in particular,
is likely to present problems in China's future relations with the WTO.
While routine activities in international organizations help stabilize the
nature of its participation, international bodies of a more political char
acter often reflect the volatility of its policy shifts.
Finally, even when exercising increasing power and influence, and
despite the gradual erosion of its Marxist convictions, China is still
inclined to stress the North-South divide and to lament undue Western
influence on the international system. Thus, in its activities in international
organizations, China not only is motivated by a system-maintaining and
system-exploiting approach, but also, paradoxically, as it has become more
powerful and confident, has effected a partial return to a system-reforming

approach that, in its view, redresses the imbalances and injustices of the
past.21 Above all, China is concerned to make a shift from the current
unipolar concentration of global power to a multipolar world. International
organizations have become a principal vehicle for this reform agenda.
Goals in International Organizations
In recent years, China scholars have emphasized the role of inter

national regimes and international organizations in promoting China's
national goals and interests. Participation has had the effect of protect
ing and extending China's sovereignty, projecting and enhancing its
international status, maintaining its strategic independence, preserving
an external environment conducive to its own developmental goals, and
promoting internal developmental aims through foreign investment, ex
panded trade, technology transfer, and development assistance.22
By contrast, scholars have been less inclined to highlight China's
continuing use of international organizations as vehicles of global reform.
This is partly because China's approach to reform is more restrained than
in the Maoist years and is exerted more indirectly and discreetly through
global institutions. Yet China still seeks to extend its influence on inter
national law and to promote the interests of the developing world.
In the initial years of China's participation in UN specialized agen
cies, former chairman of the China International Law Society, Huan
Xiang, pointed out that since "Third World countries" were now in the
majority, they had "an important place in shaping and developing
the principles, rules and regulations of international law."23 He believed
the most outstanding contribution of the Third World was its affirmation
of national self-determination as a legal principle, its formulation of the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as "fundamental principles of
international law," and its strengthening of the principle of sover
eignty?in particular, economic sovereignty.24 The Third World had pre
cipitated changes on the question of state responsibility and on the idea
that the giving of economic aid was a "legal responsibility" rather than
a "dispensation of favor." It had emphasized the importance of "territo
rial integrity" and had played a role in "substituting a new law of the
sea for the old" by developing "the idea about the right over 200 nauti
cal miles of sea areas." It had opposed the unequal treaties imposed on
developing states by colonial powers and had made contributions to the
laws of war.25 Although such principles are articulated less forcefully in
China today, and although they are now seen as complementing and
Ann Kent 349
enriching, rather than replacing, general principles of international law,

they continue to animate the thinking of Chinese international lawyers
and policymakers.26
As a "Club of One" in the UN, China does not pose as a leader of
the Third World; rather, it achieves a balance between promoting its
own fundamental interests and representing those of the developing
world. China's identification with this world has contemporary political
significance as well as deep historical roots. In its continuing effort to
shift the current locus of global power from the United States to a more
differentiated, multipolar environment, the developing states remain an
important power base. Thus, although China's efforts to promote the
New International Economic Order (NIEO) did not succeed, it has re
newed calls for its establishment.27 China has also used its membership
of multilateral financial and development institutions to attempt to re
distribute international power. Where its interests do not cohere with
those of other developing states, it remains silent. While China has vig
orously supported Third World candidates for the secretary-generalship
of the UN, it is not as outspoken about the formula for the reform of the
Security Council. It supports the idea of greater Third World represen
tation but not of an extension of access to the veto.28
The Impact of International Organizations on China
It is clear that China has succeeded in promoting its goals, values, and
interests in international organizations, but at the same time it has been
sensitive to the influence of international organizations. China's political
culture has some negative effects on its international behavior, but in gen
eral it now prefers to be seen as part of a global consensus rather than as
a spoiler of international harmony. Indeed, China has relied in its diplo
macy in international organizations on the UN norm of consensus. In the
UN Security Council, for instance, rather than wielding an outright veto,
China prefers to hint strongly at the dangers of a lack of consensus and
then to negotiate a draft resolution more favorable to its position.
The socialization of a state within international organizations is,
however, more difficult to measure than its success in promoting its
goals. Robert Keohane has hypothesized that participation in inter
national organizations leads states to redefine their interests in terms
that correspond with treaty norms.29 This article proposes a new meas
ure of socialization for China (and other nonliberal states), constituting
three main indices: China's readiness to redefine its actual interests, in
cluding its implementation of international norms in domestic law and
practice; China's preparedness to renegotiate its sovereignty in response

to organizational and treaty pressures; and the degree to which China
shows a readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of
organizational participation. Clearly there is an overlap between these
three core indices, but they also function separately, and each is more
apparent in some organizational contexts than in others. To be mean
ingful, the indices must show evidence that international norms have
been internalized, whether through domestic implementation in Chinese
legislation or in institutional and social practice. Otherwise, policy
changes could be seen as mere tactical adjustments rather than as evi
dence of socialization.
Redefinition of Interests
Over time, China's participation in organizations like the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and UN human
rights bodies has led it to redefine its self-interest.30 After joining the
CD in 1980, China initially supported the right of developing countries
to acquire nuclear capacity. However, the meeting in Geneva in January
1985 between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of
state, at which agreement was reached on the reopening of disarmament
negotiations, prompted a reassessment. According to Chinese policy
makers, this development, the process of its participation in the CD, and
pressure from developing states led to the gradual realization that its ex
isting position supporting proliferation was not good for global security.
This conceptual advance led to its accession to the Nuclear Nonprolif
eration Treaty (NPT) in 1992, a development that, in the eyes of West
ern strategic observers, marked the most decisive turning point in
China's position on arms control.31
In the case of the ILO, from the early 1990s, the same indications
of worker and peasant unrest that had initially prompted China's resist
ance to ILO standards, and that were responsible for a more authoritar
ian and nationalistic foreign policy stance in 1993, began to combine
with international organizational imperatives to produce new instances
of China's compliance with ILO standards. Nationalistic sentiments that
focused attention on the condition of Chinese workers in foreign in
vestment enterprises (FIEs) encouraged China's informal development
of collective bargaining practices, particularly in Western-dominated
enterprises.32 There was also growing Chinese government awareness
that, as modernization and the rationalization of industry proceeded, so
cial restructuring had to keep pace. For this purpose, external standards
Ann Kent 351
promoted by the ILO began to provide a convenient and readily acces

sible model.
China's interest in obtaining organizational power within the ILO
was also clearly thwarted by the opposition of the worker and even em
ployer groups that formed half of the ILO's democratic tripartite system
of organization and two-thirds in the case of the ILO Governing Body
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). China's failure to meet
standards such as freedom of association reportedly undermined their
support for its candidacy for chairmanship of the ILO Governing Body
and led to the position being filled by the Philippine secretary of labor
and employment, Nieves Roldan-Confesor.33
In the face of such domestic and organizational pressures, China's
informal compliance with selected ILO labor standards began to im
prove, as did its declaratory policy on ILO standards?such as collec
tive bargaining, tripartism and worker participation?if not the core
right of freedom of association. The former standards were incorporated
into China's new labor law of 1 January 1995.
The redefinition of interests has been most clearly reflected in
China's new domestic legislation in areas corresponding to the norms
and rules of the international organizations and treaties to which it is a
party, particularly in the field of human rights. In that arena, China in
troduced a plethora of new laws that appeared to move away from the
previous emphasis on security and state-oriented goals to a greater con
cern with the rights of the individual. They included the new Prison
Law and the State Compensation Law (1994); the PRC Law on Judges,
the PRC Law on Procurators, and the People's Police Law (1995); the
Lawyers' Law (1996); and major amendments to the Criminal Proce
dure Law (1996) and the Criminal Law (1997).34 In the environmental
field, a number of new laws?the amended Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Law and the Electric Power Law (1995), the Law on the Pre
vention and Control of Pollution of the Environment by Solid Waste
(1996), the Energy Conservation Law (1997), and the amended Marine
Pollution Law (2000)?gave expression to the international obligations
China had assumed under the Convention on Biological diversity and,
to a lesser extent, those it had assumed under the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Framework Convention on Cli
mate Change.35
China's redefinition of interests has also been reflected in its insti
tutionalization of norms through the establishment of bureaucracies cor
responding to the areas of its new international obligations. Communi
ties of experts within China that interact with their counterparts in the
West have been built up, and new institutions involved in policymak
ing and implementation have emerged, whether in arms control, in
international trade and finance, or in the environmental field. Financial
and institutional restructuring has been aimed at attracting foreign tech
nology, capital, and trade and at meeting international financial stan
dards.36 Where norms have been institutionalized, practical implemen
tation of China's treaty obligations has been enhanced. However, in
view of the weakness of its legal infrastructure, the need for public ed
ucation, the obstacles presented by localism and official corruption, and
the sheer scope of legislative change, China's practical implementation
of the new laws remains a persistent problem, particularly in the areas
of the environment and human rights.
Renegotiation of Sovereignty
Since the end of the Cold War, the state most frequently invoking a veto
threat in the Security Council has been China. Yet, because of compet
ing goals in its foreign policy, its participation has often involved a
trade-off between principle and prudence. Although such trade-off is
normal behavior for liberal states, for China the preparedness to rene
gotiate its sovereignty does not come easily and is a mark of its grow
ing international socialization. For instance, in cases of conflicting in
terests, China has often abstained in a Security Council vote on issues
of international humanitarian law. In other cases, as in the case of Res
olution 827 (1993), which set up an international tribunal charged with
enforcing international humanitarian law in Yugoslavia, China has voted
in the affirmative, although it later abstained from a similar resolution
on Rwanda. Despite its opposition to the principle of humanitarian in
tervention, it finally supported the entry of INTERFET (International
Force East Timor) into East Timor. Because of its short-term interests,
China has been persuaded to affirm resolutions that run counter to its
most cherished principle of the nonviolability of state sovereignty, con
tenting itself, in the case of Yugoslavia, with reminding the international
community of its principled position.37
Similarly, although China has reiterated its principled opposition to
a discussion of the Spratlys's issue in multilateral forums, in practice it
has been prepared to discuss issues of strategic importance in the
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum
(ARF). Thus, China and ASEAN have cooperated in drafting a Regional
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Key elements include funda
mental norms and principles contained in the UN Charter, the Five Prin
ciples of Peaceful Coexistence, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Ann Kent 353
Southeast Asia, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It
is to be noted that these constitute a judicious mix of international and
homegrown Chinese norms. Confidence-building measures include the
procedure for consultation and dialogue between civilian and defense
officials, the exchange of information, humane and just treatment of
each other's nationals, and a stipulation that there be no new occupation
of uninhabited sites in the South China Sea.38
China's participation in international human rights organizations,
whose norms constitute the most serious challenge to its sovereignty,
also demonstrates this flexibility. First, China chose to join human
rights bodies and to ratify treaties, like the UN Convention Against Tor
ture (CAT), whose norms did not appear to coincide with the values of
the Chinese leadership. China became a member of the UN Human
Rights Commission in 1981 and of the UN Sub-Commission on Pre
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1984. China
also acceded to other core human rights treaties: the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
in 1980, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) in 1981, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
in 1992. Although for many years China avoided signing the Inter
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
it signed the ICESCR in October 1997 and the ICCPR in October 1998.
Finally, in March 2001, China ratified the ICESCR. Its accession was
doubtlessly influenced by its desire to assume its rightful place on the
world stage as well as to have an input into negotiating treaties. Yet
these developments mark China's greatest formal advance in human
rights since 1949, even if the practical implementation of its treaty ob
ligations remains deficient. China has also allowed continued reporting
to the UN Human Rights Committee on the condition of human rights
in Hong Kong.39
In addition, the Chinese government has actively engaged in the
international human rights debate and embarked on a path of vigorous
human rights diplomacy. The source of such activity has been China's
need to reassert its sovereignty and retain the diplomatic initiative on
human rights. This has, paradoxically, obliged it to renegotiate its sov
ereignty and to admit that it is subject both to the norms and mecha
nisms of the international regime in general and to the jurisdiction of
UN human rights bodies in particular.
A renegotiation of sovereignty has also been the inevitable result of
social and economic change. For instance, initially China sought to
maintain control over overseas development assistance (ODA) by setting
up "counterpart agencies" (CPAs) whose major purpose was to monitor

and control foreign donors such as the World Bank, the Asian Develop
ment Bank, and UNDP. Until the early 1990s, multilateral aid remained
fairly strictly controlled, even though UN specialized agencies still in
fluenced the nature of early China projects. After this time, however, the
new global agenda of sustainable development, environmental protec
tion, poverty alleviation and good governance, together with the weak
ening of the constraints regulating contacts between local governments
and foreign NGOs, led to a restructuring of China's ODA system and an
undermining of the monopoly of the CPAs in ways that facilitated the
impact of the new agenda.40
Finally, trade globalization has prompted a renegotiation of China's
sovereignty, as it has in the case of other states. The negotiation of
China's accession to the WTO has been littered with milestones in the
gradual erosion of Beijing's control over its economic and financial
policies.41 Indeed, China has deliberately used WTO authority to en
force, in advance, changes in its domestic economy and financial sys
tem that might otherwise have been impossible. Specific examples in
clude the agreements to open its financial markets, with foreign banks,
insurance companies, and fund management groups playing a greater
role in the domestic financial system than ever before.42
Acceptance of Costs
China's acceptance of costs has been most apparent in its interaction
with the Conference on Disarmament and in its negotiations to join the
WTO. China opposed a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) well into
the 1990s but in 1996 relented, signing the treaty and giving up its ear
lier requirements of "no first use" and the continuation of "peaceful
nuclear explosions." China thereby agreed to a global moratorium on
testing, whether in the atmosphere, space, or underground, and to more
transparency. By extension, it also accepted intrusive monitoring of its
nuclear facilities. It ceased nuclear testing in late July 1996 and ac
cepted strict limits on sales of missiles, although rumors about its mis
sile technology sales to Pakistan and Iran persist.43 China has also given
a negative assurance that it will not be the first to use, or threaten to
use, nuclear weapons. It approved extension of the NPT in 1995 and
concluded a joint statement with the United States in 1994 to abide by
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).44 In Vienna in Octo
ber 1999, at the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, China promised to speed
up its ratification of CTBT, based on a full review of the treaty and the
Ann Kent 355
international security environment. The head of the Chinese delegation,

Sha Zukang, reiterated that, as a responsible and signatory state, China
would abide by the CTBT, actively support and participate in the
preparatory work of the treaty organization, and work to promote its
entry into force.45 Despite U.S. congressional rejection of the CTBT in
October 1999, President Jiang Zemin reiterated China's intention to rat
ify it, and it was duly submitted to the National People's Congress for
that purpose.46 Moreover, China's campaign against U.S. plans to intro
duce a National Missile Defense System and Theater Missile Defense
System, and to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
has been partly based on the argument that to undermine the authority
of a legitimately constituted nonproliferation agreement would be to
embark on a new global arms race.47 Rather than seeking to weaken
such international legal instruments, China has sought to strengthen
their legitimacy.
In the UN human rights treaty committees (CAT, CERD, CED AW,
CRC) and in the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of As
sociation, China has also accepted a tough and unrelenting process of
monitoring from 1990 to the present, thus exposing itself to extensive
public shaming. Despite this experience, it has not sought to withdraw
from its participation in these bodies and has gradually conformed to
strict reporting requirements.48
With respect to the environmental regime, Lester Ross has pointed
out that China is more likely to be a leader in international environ
mental regimes that are not perceived to constrain its development po
tential and less likely to lead in regimes imposing constraints. However,
as he also observes, China is not simply a "naysayer," but has com
menced a long-term course to formulate and implement environmental
policies that are increasingly strict and demanding.49
China's preparedness to accept the costs of organizational participa
tion is best illustrated in its successful negotiations to join the WTO. The
significance of its entry lies not solely in China's impact on the WTO
and on the globalization project generally; it represents China's most cal
culated gamble in the history of its entry into international organizations
and its most unqualified leap into economic interdependence. Not only
has China made sweeping concessions to the international community
during its multilateral and bilateral negotiations, it has taken unprece
dented steps to renegotiate the terms of its own sovereignty.
Why has China sought to join the WTO? Status, trading opportuni
ties, the pressures of globalization, and the desire to deepen restructur
ing within China are all motives. The WTO is seen as an "important
carrier of globalization" that will allow China to "become a respectable
member in the open international economic system," enabling it to enjoy

equal trading treatment and to take part in formulating trade regulations.
The WTO will have the crucial function of opening up China's services
industry; it will link China with the global economy, "bring about ra
tional allocation of resources," allow more Chinese enterprises to oper
ate outside the country, and facilitate foreign investment in China.50
China also needs the WTO to maintain its competitiveness. Finally, it
clearly hopes accession might facilitate better relations with Taiwan.51
In attaining these goals, however, China is shouldering considerable
costs. President Jiang Zemin has insisted, through his spokesman, that
"we absolutely will not sacrifice our national interests just for the sake
of membership of the WTO."52 For this reason, throughout the fifteen
years of accession negotiations, China has persisted in its request to re
ceive the benefits due a developing country in an incremental manner.
Nevertheless, China's accession to WTO will subject it to the WTO
Agreement, requiring it to enforce the WTO Understanding.53 The dy
namic of the WTO Understanding is that national judicial systems act in
compliance with international treaty obligations and norms, thereby, by
implication, overriding Chinese domestic judicial decisions and prac
tice. China will also become vulnerable to the WTO dispute settlement
system and to the courts. WTO membership will introduce enhanced
competition within China and will further erode central control over
commercial policy. It will require numerous policy changes, including
significant reductions in tariffs, removal of nontariff barriers and quo
tas, the opening up of China's service sector, further protection of in
tellectual property rights, and the elimination of many barriers to trade
in agricultural products.54 It will therefore create severe social strains
and exacerbate the already existing unemployment problem. It will re
quire increased legal transparency and greater political openness and ac
countability. Moreover, under the bilateral agreement negotiated in No
vember 1999 with the United States, China made asymmetrical
concessions in favor of the United States.55 In particular, the unparal
leled, extensive, and prolonged safeguards and antidumping provisions
that the United States negotiated will be available to other WTO mem
bers under the most-favored nation (MFN) principle.
Chinese economist Gao Shangquan has distinguished four chal
lenges WTO membership poses for China: a challenge to the competi
tiveness of some Chinese industries and companies on the world market;
a challenge to China's administrative system; a challenge to China's in
dustrial structure; and a challenge to the Chinese government's macro
economic control.56 However, China's accession carries with it chal
lenges not only for China but for the whole WTO system. In the process
Ann Kent 357
of implementing the rules, numerous obstacles will be met: problems

of the inadequacy of WTO regulations to accommodate a nonmarket
economy, including the inadequacy of existing surveillance machinery;
problems of cultural mismatch between China and other WTO mem
bers, leading to differences in the interpretation of rules; the inade
quacy of Chinese domestic financial and legal institutions; interference
from, and noncompliance of, China's subnational authorities; general
problems of domestic implementation; and the danger that Western
WTO members will initially engage in excessive dispute resolution
with China.57 Throughout, the main variable will be China's domestic
stability. This is now a critical source of concern, in view of Premier
Zhu Rongji's failure to create a universal social welfare system funded
through investments in capital markets to protect the unemployed and
other groups rendered vulnerable by accession.58 Thus, if during the
process WTO members place too much pressure on China, if its eco
nomic restructuring is pushed too fast and social stability is imperiled,
domestic unrest will increase; if, on the other hand, in the interests of
domestic stability, China does not fully implement the reforms it
has promised within the accepted timetable, it is liable to end up in
constant dispute with other WTO members,59 and globalization will be
the loser.
Despite these looming challenges and threats to its sovereignty, the
Chinese negotiator, Long Yongtu, described China's agreement with the
United States in November 1999 on the terms of China's entry as a
"win-win agreement." In March 2000, Premier Zhu announced that the
central government was reviewing and would revise existing laws, reg
ulations, and policies that obviously contradicted WTO rules in a bid to
guarantee conformity with the latter.60 All laws, regulations, and poli
cies concerning foreign trade and investment in China were reviewed
for possible revision and even repeal.61 At the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shanghai on 21 October 2001, Presi
dent Jiang Zemin undertook that "once inside the WTO, China will
strictly comply with the universally acknowledged market rules, imple
ment open, transparent and equality-based policies of trade and invest
ment and endeavor to promote a multi-directional and multi-level open
ing-up in a wide range of areas."62 Finally, on 11 December 2001, after
fifteen years of difficult, complex, and protracted negotiations, China
formally joined the WTO. In a period of economic transition marked by
the downsizing of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and wide
spread industrial unrest, it is significant that, for all its reservations, and
for all the clear political risks, China has persisted in its determination
to "join the world" (ru shi).63
358 China 's International Socialization
Conclusion
In its participation in international organizations, China, like most states,

seeks to promote its interests. But like most states, it also demonstrates
some preparedness to redefine those interests, to accept costs, and to rene
gotiate its sovereignty, except on matters of humanitarian intervention
and self-determination. When national interests and the principle of ab
solute sovereignty are seen to coincide, China makes a theoretical state
ment about the absolute nature of sovereignty. But in general, China's
power is enhanced by its preparedness to negotiate its sovereignty rather
than to impose blanket vetoes. Thus, in the Security Council, since 1981,
China has preferred not to use its veto but obtains numerous advantages
from hinting it might do so. As an aspiring great power, it is learning from
others to use its power in more subtle ways than before.
China's need for moral stature and quest for international status
thus help tone down the realism of its foreign policy, both in appearance
and reality. In many cases, this does not mean that China has internal
ized international norms but that it is prepared to be more pragmatic
about its interests than its statements of principle would suggest and to
make tactical adaptations. In other cases, it has internalized norms by
implementing them in domestic legislation, in domestic institutions,
and/or in domestic practice. The rigorous process of its engagement in
international organizations has clearly facilitated this progress. Despite
the costs it incurs, China continues to strongly support international or
ganizations and multilateralism and has acknowledged the inevitability
of global interdependence, accepting that just as the world needs China,
China needs the world.
At the same time, China's readiness to accept these manifold costs
must be balanced against the four major problems it has experienced in
implementing its obligations under international treaty and organiza
tional rules. The first is China's abiding concern with sovereignty, a
problem pervading all its decisions relating to organizational coopera
tion and causing intransigence in most cases relating to instances of per
ceived "interference," such as proposals by international organizations
to monitor Chinese conditions in situ. This is particularly the case in the
human rights and security regimes and, insofar as accession threatens
social stability, may afflict its relations with the WTO. The second is the
difficulty of implementing domestic legislation that it introduces in com
pliance with its international obligations. This is a notable problem in the
human rights, labor rights, and environmental regimes and may well
prove a problem in China's relations with the WTO. The third is its ten
dency to free ride where possible, using elements of China's complex
Ann Kent 359
identity, such as its status as a developing nation, to plead special treat

ment. The fourth is China's preference for consensual and bilateral
agreements, its dislike of adversarial procedures, and its culturally de
termined attitude to international and domestic law.
As a result, those looking for an easy answer to the question of
whether China has become "internationally socialized" in a definitive
sense are bound to be disappointed. In view of its isolationist and heav
ily ideological foreign policy before its entry into the United Nations,
it is remarkable that China has become so integrated into the inter
national system, albeit as a "Club of One," and that it has internalized
some important international organizational norms and rules. Integra
tion and, in specific areas, socialization have occurred, in large measure
because of the effects of international organizational participation. Yet
no necessary linear development or uninterrupted learning curve is evi
dent in China's overall record. While clearly committed to participation
in international organizations and to being seen as a cooperative mem
ber, and while tending to link its fortunes much more than before with
the developed world and other powerful states, China still feels obliged,
albeit somewhat less than in the past, to defend developing states; forge
new international norms, rules,and procedures; and oversee the redis
tribution of power in the international system. Identification with the in
terests of the developing world remains a constituent element of China's
own power. Given the complexities of its motivations, reflecting a mix
of self-interest, conformity, and dissent; given the increasing dissonance
between its international power and its domestic volatility; and given its
deep-rooted political culture and the still essentially introspective focus
of its foreign policy, China's compliance with particular rules and
treaties at any one time and within any specific issue area cannot be
guaranteed. Although today China is behaving much more like other
states, its international organizational policies and behavior will con
tinue to be individualistic and often unpredictable. ?
Notes
Ann Kent is research fellow, Australian Research Council, at the Centre for
International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National University,
Canberra. She is the author of books and articles on China, international or
ganizations, and human rights and is currently writing a book on China's par
ticipation in international organizations.
1. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty:
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995), pp. 1-33.
2. Samuel S. Kim, "China's International Organisational Behaviour," in

Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 405.
3. See Ann Kent, "China, International Organizations and Regimes: The
ILO as a Case Study in Organizational Learning," Pacific Affairs 70, no. 4
(winter 1997-1998): 517-532.
4. Ann Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of
Compliance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
5. Definition in Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the
New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," European Jour
nal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (March 2000): 111-112.
6. In 1999, China's vice-premier, Qian Qichen, identified the moment
China's legal rights were restored in the UN in 1971 as marking the resumption
of the country's status in the international community. See "Chinese Vice
Premier on China's 50 Year Diplomacy," Xinhua Newsagency, 24 September
1999, Reuters China News, 24 September 1999. On the other hand, retired Chi
nese diplomat Tian Jin has pointed out that "without China's participation, the
United Nations could not claim to be a true 'United Nations.'" See Tian Jin et
al., Zhongguo zai Lianheguo: gongtong dizao geng meihao de shijie (China in
the United Nations: Together creating a better world) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi
chubanshe, 1999), p. 36. For early history of China's relations with the UN, see
Tian Jin et al., Zhongguo zai Lianheguo, pp. 19-38; and Byron S. Weng,
Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change (New York: Praeger, 1972).
7. In terms of numbers of IGOs, in 2000 China ranked seventh behind
Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia in the Asia-Pa
cific region. In terms of its membership in INGOs, China was placed sixth in
the region behind Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand, and South Korea. See
Union of International Associations, ed., Yearbook of International Organiza
tions: Guide to Global Civil Society Networks 2000-2001 (Munich: K. G. Saur,
2001), pp. 37, 1468-1469. For history of its growing participation, see Xie
Qimei and Wang Xingfang, eds., Zhongguo yu Lianheguo: jinian Lianheguo
chengli wushi zhounian (China and the United Nations: Commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations) (Beijing: Shijie
zhishi chubanshe, 1995); and Shijie zhishi nianjian 1997/1998 (Yearbook of
world knowledge, 1997/1998) (Beijing: Shjijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998).
8. See Wang Yanjun, "Xuexi Jiang Zemin guanyu xianghu yicun di lun
shu" (Study Jiang Zemin's remarks on interdependence), in Waijiao xueyuan
xuebao, no. 2 (1999): 36-40.
9. See an excellent analysis in Russell Leigh Moses, "Chinese Views on
Globalization," ChinaOnLine Commentary, www.chinaonline.com/commentary,
accessed 26 June 2000.
10. Wang Jisi, "International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese
Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective," in Thomas W. Robinson and David
Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press), p. 498; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1995).
11. Yoichi Funabashi, Michel Oksenberg, and Heinrich Weiss, An Emerg
ing China in a World of Interdependence (New York: Trilateral Commission,
1994), p. 55.
Ann Kent 361
12. Former diplomat Tian Jin has identified China's "unique role" and
"unique position" in the UN: it is the largest developing country; it has an im
portant and responsible position in the Security Council; it is a large regional
and global state; its foreign policy has special characteristics; and it is the only
nuclear developing state. See Tian Jin et al., Zhongguo zai Lianheguo, pp. 7-8.
13. Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs 1$, no. 5 (Sep
tember-October 1999): 24-36.
14. Barry O'Neill, "Power and Satisfaction in the Security Council," in
Bruce Russett, ed., The Once and Future Security Council (New York: St Mar
tin's Press, 1997), p. 75.
15. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg list some other notable tac
tics: avoiding enduring commitments; making compliance with China's objec
tives the litmus test for friendly relations; mobilizing support for China's posi
tion in developing countries; and capturing the moral high ground and placing
the interlocutor on the defensive. See Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksen
berg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Coun
cil on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 25.
16. Statistics in Samuel S. Kim, "China and the United Nations," in Econ
omy and Oksenberg, China Joins the World, pp. 65-68.
17. Greg Torode, "Mission Impossible for UN Dues," South China Morn
ing Post, 19 March 2000, Reuters China News, 19 March 2000.
18. Shih Chih-yu, China's Just World: The Morality of Foreign Policy
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Kim, "China's International Organisational
Behaviour."
19. According to Kofi Annan, "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is
being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation.
The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice
versa." See "Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assem
bly," UN press release SG/SM/7136 GA/9596, 20 September 1999.
20. Wang Jisi, "International Relations Theory," p. 493.
21. Cf. Samuel Kim, who has characterized China's attitude to international
organizations as moving from a "system-transforming" approach during the ex
clusion period of 1949-1970, to a "system-reforming" approach in the 1970s, to
the "system-maintaining and system-exploiting" approach in the 1980s and
1990s. See Kim, "China's International Organisational Behaviour," pp. 431, 425.
22. For an excellent study of China and international regimes, see Econ
omy and Oksenberg, China Joins the World', see also David S. G. Goodman and
Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London:
Routledge, 1997); John R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg, China in World Poli
tics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 207-246; James V. Feinerman, "Chi
nese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team
Player?" China Quarterly, no. 141 (March 1995): 186-210; Jeannette Green
field, China's Practice of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992);
and Ann Kent, "China's Participation in International Organisations," in Zhang
Yongjin and Greg Austin, eds., Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign
Policy (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), pp. 132-166.
23. Huan Xiang, "Strive to Build Up New China's Science of International
Law," in Chinese Society of International Law, ed., Selected Articles from Chi
nese Yearbook of International Law (Beijing: China Translations and Publish
ing, 1983), p. 21.
24. These are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mu
tual nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and
mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.
25. Huan Xiang, "Strive to Build Up," pp. 24-40.
26. See, for instance, Wan Xia, "Huigu yu zhanwang: Gaige kaifang 20
nian guojifa zai Zhongguo di fazhan" (Looking back and ahead: The develop
ment of international law in China during twenty years of opening and reform),
Waijiao xueyuan xuebao no. 2 (1999): 63. See also Lu Song, "Guojifa zai guoji
guanxi zhong de zuoyong" (The role of international law in international rela
tions), Waijiao xueyuan xuebao, no. 1 (1997): 14. See also Hungdah Chiu, "Chi
nese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987," Oc
casional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies no. 1, School of
Law, University of Maryland, 1988.
27. "South Africa: Chinese President on New International Order," Xinhua
News Agency 25 April 2000, Reuters China News, 25 April 2000.
28. See discussion in Kim, "China and the United Nations," pp. 57-60.
29. As he has observed, "Institutions matter, even if they cannot enforce
rules from above, because they change actors' conceptions of their interests."
See Robert Keohane, "International Relations, Old and New," in Robert Goodin
and Hans-Dieter Klingeman, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (Ox
ford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 470 (emphasis in the original).
30. For China's participation in these organizations, see Xie Qimei and
Wang Xingfang, Zhongguo yu Lianheguo.
31. Based on interviews the author had with security NGOs in Geneva,
August-September 1998.
32. Collective bargaining is to be found in Western foreign investment en
terprises (FIEs), characterized by "human resource management patterns,"
rather than in the joint ventures with firms from newly industrializing countries
(NICs), often in south China, which adopt a more authoritarian approach to in
dustrial relations.
33. See Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, p. 137.
34. Ibid., pp. 204-205.
35. Lester Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," in Economy and
Oksenberg, China Joins the World, p. 305.
36. See, in particular, the following chapters in Economy and Oksenberg,
China Joins the World: Margaret Pearson, "China's Integration into the Inter
national Trade and Investment Regime," pp. 186-190; Nicholas R. Lardy, "China
and the International Financial System," pp. 207-216; Ross, "China and Envi
ronmental Protection," pp. 297-306; and Michael D. Swaine and Alastair Iain
Johnston, "China and Arms Control Institutions," pp. 90-135.
37. In the debate on Resolution 827, the Chinese delegate argued, "We
have always held that, to avoid setting any precedent for abusing Chapter VII
of the Charter, a prudent attitude should be adopted with regard to the estab
lishment of an international tribunal by means of Security Council resolutions
under Chapter VII. It is the consistent position of the Chinese delegation that an
International Tribunal should be established by concluding a treaty so as to pro
vide a solid legal foundation for it and ensure its effective functioning. . . . The
International Tribunal established in the current manner can only be an ad hoc
arrangement suited only to the special circumstances of the former Yugoslavia
and shall not constitute a precedent." Quoted in Nigel Thalakada, "China's
Ann Kent 363
Voting Pattern in the Security Council, 1990-1995," in Russett, The Once and
Future Security Council, pp. 84, 94.
38. Kavi Chongkittavorn, "Regional Perspective?ASEAN-China Ties Are
Getting Stronger," The Nation (Bangkok), 27 March 2000, Reuters China
News, 27 March 2000.
39. Peter K. Yu, "Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong's Succession to the
ICCPR," Pepperdine Law Review 27, no. 1 (1999): 53-106.
40. See detailed analysis in David Zweig, "The Open Door and Foreign
Donors: Can China Keep Control?" paper presented at the fifty-second annual
meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, 9 March 2000.
41. See Pearson, "China's Integration."
42. See David Hale, "The High-Stakes Game of Deeper Economic Re
form," ChinaOnLine Commentary, 15 February 2001, www.chinaonline.com/
commentary, accessed 20 February 2001, p. 4. See also Dorothy J. Solinger,
"Globalization and the Paradox of Participation: The Chinese Case," Global
Governance 7, no. 2 (April-June 2001): 173-197.
43. "China Helping Pakistan to Build Long-Range Missiles," The Hindu, 3
July 2000, Reuters China News, 3 July 2000; Bill Gertz, "Chinese Rebuff Sen
ators' Queries," Washington Times, 16 August 2001.
44. For detailed analysis, see Swaine and Johnston, "China and Arms Con
trol Institutions," pp. 90-135. See also Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards
Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Pol
icy 16, no. 2 (August 1995): 1-43; and Fran?ois Godement, "Does China Have
an Arms Control Policy?" in Goodman and Segal, China Rising, pp. 90-106.
45. "China to Speed Up Test Ban Treaty Ratification," Xinhua News
Agency, 7 October 1999, Reuters China News, 7 October 1999.
46. "Jiang Says China Wants to Ratify Nuclear Pact," Reuters China News,
24 October 1999.
47. See press briefing by Sha Zukang, China's disarmament ambassador, in
"China Willing to Talk with US over NMD Issue," People's Daily, 14 March
2001.
48. Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, pp. 84-145.
49. Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," pp. 300, 315.
50. Gong Wen and Zhang Xiangchen, "Comment on General Trend of
China's Entry into WTO," People's Daily, 7 May 1999, pp. 1-2.
51. See Shi Guangsheng, minister of foreign trade and economic coopera
tion, reported in "China's Stance on WTO Accession Unchanged," People's
Daily, 13 March 2001.
52. Vivien Pik-kwan Chan, "Opening Up Markets 'a Double-edged
Sword,'" South China Morning Post, 12 September 1999; "China Won't Sacri
fice National Interests to Join WTO," Kyodo News, 3 September 1999, Reuters
China News, 3 September 1999.
53. For fundamental legislative changes required for China to conform to
G ATT/WTO requirements, see Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System:
Globalization and Local Legal Culture (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 136-142.
54. For instance, under the agricultural agreement, brokered in Washington
in April 1999, the United States won substantial concessions: the average tariff
for agricultural products will be cut to 17 percent from 21.2 percent, with the
average tariff for U.S. priority products falling to 14.5 percent. All tariffs will
be phased out by 2004. Quantitative restrictions, except for major agricultural
products such as wheat, rice, corn, cotton, and table sugar, will be eliminated.
See Paul Mooney, "Post-WTO Shocks for China's Farmers," ChinaOnLine, 17
January 2000.
55. According to U.S. trade representative Charlene Barchevsky, it "se
cures broad-ranging, comprehensive, one-way trade concessions on China's
part, granting the United States substantially greater market access across the
spectrum of industrial goods, services and agriculture." See "Barchevsky on
China WTO, Congressional Trade Status Vote," 29 February 2000, available
online at http://www.chinaonline.com/commentary, accessed 13 March 2000
(emphasis added).
56. "Chinese Reform Expert Proposes Countermeasures for WTO Chal
lenges," Xinhua News Agency, 7 March 2000, Reuters China News, 7 March
2000.
57. See Pieter Bottelier, "The Impact of WTO Membership on China's Do
mestic Economy," Parts 1 and 2, available online at http://www.chinaonline.
com/commentary, 3 January 2001; and Zhao Wei, "China's WTO Accession:
Commitments and Prospects," Journal of World Trade 32, no. 2 (1998): 51-75.
For particularly valuable insights, see Deborah Cass et al., eds., China and the
World Trade System: Entering the New Millenium (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press, forthcoming).
58 See Economist Intelligence Unit, "Financial Reforms Delayed," online
at http://www.chinaonline.com; and Premier Zhu Rongji, "Report on the Work
of the Government," 5 March 2000, Part Vll.
59. See Bottelier, "The Impact of WTO Membership."
60. "Chinese Premier?China Must Rapidly Prepare for WTO Entry," Xin
hua News Agency, Beijing, 5 March 2000, Reuters China News, 5 March 2000.
61. "Legal Sector Braces for WTO," China Daily, 3 July 2000, Reuters
China News, 3 July 2000.
62. See text of Jiang's speech in People's Daily, 21 October 2001.
63. Long Yongtu, China's chief negotiator at the WTO, stated that China
will be capable of doing everything it promised in its agreement with the
United States on China's WTO accession, because these promises were consis
tent with China's interests, with China's reform policy, and with the process of
its participation in the globalization of the world economy. See "Long Yongtu
Stresses China's Unwavering Commitment to Opening Up," Xinhua News
Agency, 25 May 2000, Reuters China News, 25 May 2000. Cf. Robert G.
Kaiser, "Process May Take Years to Bear Fruit," Washington Post, 25 May
2000; and "China in the WTO: No Gold Rush," Canberra Times, 8 October
2001, p. 16.

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China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations

Author(s): Ann Kent

China's International Socialization:

rules and treaties. The crucial question is whether such participation,

China's Approach to International Organizations

The importance of international organizations in China's foreign rela

one intergovernmental organization (IGO) and fifty-eight international

and acceptance of interdependence are not as costly, because such be

powerful and confident, has effected a partial return to a system-reforming

Goals in International Organizations

In recent years, China scholars have emphasized the role of inter

enriching, rather than replacing, general principles of international law,

The Impact of International Organizations on China

practice; China's preparedness to renegotiate its sovereignty in response

promoted by the ILO began to provide a convenient and readily acces

up "counterpart agencies" (CPAs) whose major purpose was to monitor

international security environment. The head of the Chinese delegation,

member in the open international economic system," enabling it to enjoy

of implementing the rules, numerous obstacles will be met: problems

In its participation in international organizations, China, like most states,

identity, such as its status as a developing nation, to plead special treat

2. Samuel S. Kim, "China's International Organisational Behaviour," in

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