THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-

GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL- versus -THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP),

Facts: Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law
obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground
that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the
Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however. It would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition,
representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These
circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding
international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international
law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.

ISSUE: WON THE MOA-AD WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral
declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did
not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a
whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations
involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated
merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere
fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of
states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such
commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse to the trust and
confidence essential in the relations among States.

In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina
Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali Presidents statement was not held to be a binding
unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel,
had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal
agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a
clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an
equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute
an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a
loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the
difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no
intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not
be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendmentsto the
legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not
in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would
give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to
the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change
is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.[184] Respondents, however,
may not preempt it in that decision.

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., Petitioner, v. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, THE PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER AND ASSESSOR OF NASUGBU,
BATANGAS, Respondents.

FACTS: THE Provincial Assessor had determined that the submarine cable systems described in
Capwire's Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property. CAPWIRE INC
CONTENDS THAT THEIR CABLE SYSTEM USED FOR COMMUNICATION TRAVERSES INTERNATIONAL
WATERS, OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES TERRITORY, THUS CANNOT BE SUBJECT IN REAL PROPERTY TAX.
ISSUE: WON submarine wires or cables used for communications may be taxed like other real estate.

HELD: YES. It easily belies Capwire's contention that the cable system is entirely in international waters.
And even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial sea but further
inward, in Prof. Magallona v. Hon. Ermita, et al.43 this Court held that "whether referred to as Philippine
'internal waters' under Article I of the Constitution44 or as 'archipelagic waters' under UNCLOS Part III,
Article 49(1, 2, 4),45 the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of (its)
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath." Further, under Part VI,
Article 7946 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly has jurisdiction with respect to cables laid in its
territory that are utilized in support of other installations and structures under its jurisdiction.

Facts: On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization
registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. IRRI opposed the petition
invoking Pres. Decree No. 1620 conferring upon it the status of an international organization and
granting it immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings under Philippine laws.

Issue: whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws.

Held: yes. There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides
that ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, provides for the immunity.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political
pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to
ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
Facts: Petitioners Rodrigo Lacierda, Erlinda Cruz-Lacierda, Jessica and Renan Saliente, Ruby Salde and
Armniel Sim (Lacierda, et al.) were all employees/officers of Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), an international agency which is immune from suits, it being clothed with diplomatic
immunity. Meanwhile, respondents Rolando Platon, Agnes Lacuesta, Dan Baliao, Amelita Subosa,
Merlita Junion, Teresita Hilado, Demetrio Estenor, Salvador Rex Tillo, Teresita Natividad, Teresa Mallare,
Jocelyn Coniza and Nelda Ebron (Platon, et al.) are officers and with the management of SEAFDEC, Aqua
Culture Development (AQC), an international organization composed of governments of Southeast Asia
created by virtue of a treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory.

Issue won immune from suit

Regarding the liquidation, such shall be made by submitting a statement of expenditures containing the
itemized breakdown of all expenses incurred, attaching therewith all copies of supporting documents
and evidences and receipts certifying the said expenditures (original copies will be kept by SEAFDEC). In
case there will be an excess in the amount consigned, the excess amount will be returned to JICA.

Lacierda, et al. were selected by SEAFDEC to take part in the training program. After such was
concluded, Lacierda, et al. submitted to SEAFDEC documents in support of their liquidation of
cash advances and claim for reimbursement of expenses but an audit of the same showed that hotel
receipts submitted were much higher that the actual amount that they paid on accommodation. Thus,
Lacierda, et al. were terminated for cause on the ground of misrepresentation or false statements
with intent to gain or take advantage and fraudulent machination for financial gain.

More than a year later, Lacierda, et al. filed a complaint against Platon, et al. alleging that they are suing
them in their individual and personal capacities for their commission of malicious, oppressive and
inequitable actionable acts. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and the person of Platon, et al., it holding that
assailed acts could only be performed by them in their official functions as administrators of SEAFDEC.

Held: yes. A careful analysis of the complaint will reveal that there is really nothing in the averments of
the complaint which indicate that defendants acted in their personal capacities or beyond the scope of
their official functions, except plaintiffs general allegation to that effect. On the contrary, what they
alleged were acts which could only be performed by the defendants in their official duties/functions as
executives or administrators of SEAFDEC, and could not have been done had they acted in their personal
capacities

China national v sanata maria

Facts:
Usa v ruiz

Doctrine: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the
legal nature of the act

Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval projects. Eligio
de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company
received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter
which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The company then
sued the United States of America and individual petitioners demanding that the company perform the
work on the projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
states. However, state immunity now extends only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by
virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US
government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

Lansang v ca

Facts: Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal
contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this
verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved.

With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to
clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate
the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against
the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state
which could not be sued without its consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.

Issues:

Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in
effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents from Rizal Park.

Held:

No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.

No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.

Ratio:

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done
in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from
the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of
GABI from Rizal Park