G.R. No. 199448 November 12, 2014 ROLANDO S. ABADILLA, JR., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BONIFACIO P.

OBRERO
and BERNABELA N. OBRERO, Respondents.

The petitioner claims that they are the rightful owners of the disputed property. Thus, an ejectment proceeding
cannot be commenced against them. The Supreme Court ruled that "ejectment proceedings are summary
proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the premises or possession de facto." "Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the
action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession."

G.R. No. 205664 June 9, 2014 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its REGIONAL DIRECTOR TERESITA
DOMALANTA, Petitioner, vs. MARIANO TULIAO, Respondent.

In actions for recovery of possession, the plaintiff must show proof to support his claim of his right to possession of
the property. The defendant in turn must show proof to controvert the plaintiffs claim; otherwise the court will
rule for the plaintiff. Thus, when a landowner filed an action for recovery of possession against a public school
which built a gymnasium on a parcel of land which the owner allowed the school to use as an access road for the
schoolchildren, and the plaintiff showed as evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over the property,
the lone testimonial evidence the DepEd presented is not sufficient to controvert the landowners case. In
addition, the landowners claim is not barred by laches when the schools possession of the property is not
adverse, and when the landowner brought suit two years after he learned that the school is constructing a
gymnasium over the property.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang
Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty years. The application was raffled to the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly designated
the Jose Velazco, Jr. to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both.

Ruling:
No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that 216 petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
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acquisition by prescription.
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G.R. No. 189061 August 6, 2014 MIDWAY MARITIME AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATION, represented by its
Chairman/President PhD in Education DR. SABINO M. MANGLICMOT, Petitioner, vs. MARISSA E. CASTRO, ET AL.,
Respondents.

The petitioner is a lessee of a parcel of land and disputes the title of the owners of the building built on the land
they are leasing. The Supreme Court ruled that it is settled that "[o]nce a contact of lease is shown to exist
between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that
the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee." Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

G.R. No. 193426 September 29, 2014 SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., Petitioner, vs. BERNARD
C. FERNANDEZ, Respondent

Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their use or trade outside of the
casino which issues them. Since casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding
representative value it is with more reason that the Court should require SBL to prove convincingly and
persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it. If SBL cannot prove
its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.

G.R. No. 207266 June 25, 2014 HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS CHAN, Petitioners, vs. PAZ
LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK, Respondent.

A tax declaration is not a proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the
absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. H

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AGRARIAN

SPS. AMADEO CUAO and

AURORA CUAO,
Petitioners,

-versus- G.R. No. 107159

COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

The Case

This is an appeal via certiorari to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which, affirming the
judgment of the trial court, held that the private respondents were tenants of the late Andres Cruz and accordingly
eligible to exercise a right of redemption in respect of the land they were working on which was sold to petitioner
Cuao spouses.

The Facts

The respondents were the tenants of the late Andres Cruz. After the death of the latter, the ownership of
the land was passed on to his two daughters Cecilia Cruz-Mendiola and Carmen Cruz-Dolor whom without previous
notification to private respondents executed a contract to sell the land to the Cuao spouses, the herein petitioner
on November 8, 1980. On June 19, 1981, they consummated the sale for a total stated consideration of
PhP787,500.00 again without the knowledge of the private respondents.

Four days later, on June 23, 1981, spouses Cuao obtained a loan of PhP1,500,000.00 and, to secure that
loan, constituted a mortgage on the subject land in favor of the lender, First Summa Savings and Mortgage Bank,
now known as PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank (PAIC).

On June 24 1981, the deed of sale in favor of the Spouses Cuao was registered. On that same day,
Transfer Certificates of Title covering the five (5) lots into which the original 20.5691 hectares had been divided,
were issued in the name of petitioners Spouses Cuao.

On November 1981, private respondents commenced suit against the Cuao spouses claiming that, as
tenants or agricultural lessees they were entitled to redeem the land pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844 (
Known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code) as amended by R.A.6389.

On July 5, 1989, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the private respondents and said
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its entirety, hence the herein petition for review.
The Issues

1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN EXISTING SHARE TENANCY AND AGRICULTURAL LEASE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LANDOWNER(S) AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS?;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN ELEMENTS OF PERSONAL CULTIVATION BY THE TENANTS OR

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AGRICUTURAL LESSEES, CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED TENANTS HAD AVAILED THEMSELVES OF
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THE SERVICES OF THE PAID LABORERS TO CARRY OUT SOME FARM OPERATIONS?;
 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION IN THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ISSUED IN THE
NAME OF THE PETITIONERS THAT THE LAND WAS NOT TENANTED, WAS CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT
NO TENANCY OR AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP EXISTED IN RESPECT OF SUCH LAND?

The Courts Ruling

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that all the elements of a share tenancy an
agricultural lease relationship existed between the landowner(s) and private respondents and that accordingly,
private respondents were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of Andres Cruz and later of his two daughters
and ultimately of petitioners Cuao spouses.

As to the issue of whether there is a personal cultivation, the Supreme Court rules that the fact that the
tenant did not do all the farm work himself but temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the service of the
others to assist him, was not taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement imposed by
the statute.

As to the issue of the conclusiveness of the annotation, the Supreme Court believed and held that such
annotation cannot be regarded as conclusive upon the courts of justice as to the legal nature and incidents of the
relationship between the landowner(s) in this case and private respondents.

And finally, to the right to redeem the land involved, in view of the Supreme Court conclusion that private
respondents were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of the owner(s) of that land, it follows that private
respondents were entitled to redeem the land upon the alienation thereof by the two daughters of Andres Cruz in
favor of the herein petitioner. The right of redemption is statutory in character, that is to say, it is created by and
rests upon the provisions of a particular law. It attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law. (Hidalg0 v.
Hidalgo 33 SCRA 105, 1970)

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