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] 1 2 Bacasmas
v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.] 3 Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan [G.R.
No. 191411. July 15, 2013.] 4 People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.] 5 Jose v.
Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.] 6 Avelino y Bulawan v. People [G.R. 181444. July
17, 2013.] 7 People v. Marvin Cruz [G.R. 201728. July 17, 2013.] 8 Anita Mangila v. Judge
Pangilinan et.al. [G.R. 160739. July 17, 2013.] 9 People v. Victorino Reyes [G.R. 173307.
July 17, 2013.] 10 People v. Clara [GR No. 195528. July 24, 2013.] 11 People v. Roman
[G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.] 12 Lihaylihay and Vinluan v. People [G.R. No. 191219.
July 31, 2013.] 13 Lee v. Lee [GR No. 181658. August 7, 2013.] 14 Chavez v. Fria [GR No.
183014. August 7, 2013.] 15 Neri v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 202243. August 7, 2013.] 16
Hasegawa v. Giron [G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.] 17 People v. Pepino-Consulta [G.R.
No. 191071. Aug. 28, 2013.] 18 People v. Amistoso y Broca [G.R. No. 201447. August 28,
2013.] 19 Republic (PCGG) v. Bakunawa [G.R. NO. 180418, AUGUST 28, 2013.] 20 People
v. Manalili y Jose [G.R. No. 191253. August 28, 2013.] 21 Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No.
160316. September 02, 2013.] 22 Kummer v. People [G.R. No. 174461, September 11,
2013.] 23 Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.] 24
People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013.] 25 Singian vs.
Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos.195011-19. September 30, 2013.] 26 Chua v. Executive Judge-
MTC Manila [G.R. No. 202920. October 2, 2013.] 27 Ramirez v. People [G.R. No. 197832.
October 2, 2013.] 28 People v. Cuaycong [G.R. No. 196051. October 2, 2013.] 29 Carbajosa
v. Judge Patricio [A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834. October 02, 2013.] 30 Jadewell Parking v. Judge
Lidua Sr. [G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.] 31 People v. Dizon [G.R. No. 199901. October
9, 2013.] 32 People v. Galicia [G.R. No. 191063. October 9, 2013.] 33 People v. de Jesus y
Mendoza [G.R. No. 190622. October 7, 2013.] 34 People v. Hadji Socor Candidia [G.R. No.
191263. October 16, 2013.] 35 People v. Jose y Lagua [G.R. No. 200053. October 23, 2013.]
36 Century Chinese v. Ling Na Lau [G.R. No. 188526. November 11, 2013.] 37 People v.
Castillo y Alignay [G.R. No. 190180. November 27, 2013.] 38 People v. Roberto Velasco
[G.R. No. 190318. November 27, 2013.] 39 People vs. Montevirgen [G.R. No. 189840.
December 11, 2013.] 40 Antiquera y Codes v. People [G.R. No. 180661. December 11,
2013.]
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 6 | P a g e xxx xxx xxx In Banal vs. Tadeo,
Jr., we declared: "While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it
gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Based on the violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases as herein
discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or
the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable
to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or
omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is
not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to recover
the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners' alleged
malfeasance. People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.] FACTS: On July 2, 1980,
respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent married
Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of
his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted
respondent's petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003,
private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with
Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy. On February
5, 2008, Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1)
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished. RTC Denied the motion. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special
civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals and
for which said court granted. ISSUE/S: WON the grant of Motion to Quash by Court of
Appeals proper. HELD: As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of
the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on
a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 7 | P a g e that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground of
extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. An examination of the information filed
against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute
the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, as held in Antone: To conclude, the issue on the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter
contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing
that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following
the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion
to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in
the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence. Jose v. Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: Carolina filed two
Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu, one concerning 14 Chinabank checks totalling P1.5 million and the other pertaining to
10 Chinabank checks in the aggregate amount of P2.1 million. However, the checks were
dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa. In her two Counter-Affidavits,
Purita claimed that her transactions with Carolina are civil in nature; they are mere loans and
the checks were issued only to guarantee payment. In a Joint Resolution dated December 7,
2004, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. The corresponding
Information was filed against her. Stressing that her transactions with Carolina did not
constitute estafa, Purita promptly filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). THAICD The DOJ found merit in Purita's Petition for Review. It ruled that the
transactions between Purita and Carolina do not constitute estafa and are merely contracts
of loan because Carolina was not deceived into parting with her money. On the contrary,
Carolina parted with her money on the expectation of earning interest from the transactions.
Hence, the DOJ reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor in its July
5, 2005 Resolution Carolina moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated
October 27, 2005. Thus, pursuant to the DOJ's directive, City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Sellon
moved for the withdrawal of the Information before the RTC. RTC, in its December 9, 2005
Order, denied the motion by simple stating that the motion in unmeritorious. The CA
ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the Resolution of the DOJ.
The December 9, 2005 Order of the RTC merely stated that the motion to withdraw was
'unmeritorious' while the March 10, 2006 Order only declared that Purita's defense was 'a
matter that must be addressed to the trial court'.||
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 12 | P a g e Was there failure in the part of
the prosecution to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence? HELD: Yes. The
Supreme Court defines Chain of Custody as the duly recorded authorized
movement and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court and finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. To establish the chain of
custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. In Mallillin
v. People, it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to
present a clear picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug
recovered by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Accused is acquitted. People v. Roman [G.R.
No. 198110. July 31, 2013.] FACTS: The accused-appellant, Wilson Roman, was charged
with murder. The incident happened in the morning of June 22, 1995, at the wedding party
when the accused-appellant hacked Vicente Indaya, the victim, with his bolo. The victim was
hit on his head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he fell on the
ground and then died. There were several witnesses including Elena Romero, Asterio
Ebuenga, Martin Borlagdatan, Elisea Indaya, Ramil Baylon, SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos
and Dr. Teodora Pornillos. Each testimonies were positive, clear and consistent in all material
points. However, there was a different version of the incident according to the accused-
appellant. He said that on that day, he went to the house of his parents-in-law to bring the
bamboos. On his way back, he met his close friend who invited him to come to the wedding
party. At the venue, he pacified his brother-in-law and Indaya, the victim who were having a
heated exchange of words and told the victim to leave. After 20 minutes, the victim came
back. He got mad because he was pacified by the accused-appellant and threatened to kill
him. But he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving, he heard a
shout that he was about to be hacked. Then, he saw the victim, aiming to hit him with a bolo,
but he was able to get the bolo. He lost control of himself, he hacked the victim instead. His
testimony was supported by Delia Tampoco.
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 13 | P a g e The Regional Trial Court and
Court of Appeals rendered a decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant
may invoke self-defense. 2. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.
HELD: 1. No. Self-defense was used as an alibi, an inherently weak defense for it is easy to
fabricate. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It is a statutory and
doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful
aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life, limb
or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a
weapon. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b)
the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must
be unlawful. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong.
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim
of self-defense shrinks into incredulity. It is worth noting that the incident transpired in broad
daylight, within the clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no wonder that the
testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent in all material points. They all
confirmed that before the crime was consummated, the victim was only walking in the yard,
unarmed. There was not the least provocation done by the victim that could have triggered
the accused-appellant to entertain the thought that there was a need to defend himself. The
victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that could show that he was out to inflict harm or
injury. On the contrary, the witnesses all point to the accused-appellant as the unlawful
aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he collapsed lifeless on the
ground. Moreover, the severity, location and the number of wounds suffered by the victim are
indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm not merely that he wanted to defend himself from
an imminent peril to life. Also, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one
bolo, specifically that which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been recovered
from the crime scene. This belies the accused-appellants claim that the victim was also
armed at the time of the incident. 1. Yes. There was treachery and accused-appellant
contention that he should be convicted only of homicide, not murder was dismissed.
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 25 | P a g e The trial court noted that
during AAAs cross-examination, her testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, as she
remained consistent on material points. The trial courts assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Moreover, this Court has held time and
again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence,
considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the
wrong committed against her. Although she failed to report the incident immediately, such
reaction is deemed normal considering that she was only 10 years old at that time. With
regard to the results of the medical examination, this Court holds that the absence of
laceration and semen does not preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the crime
of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants private part is not at all
necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the
entry or at the very least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is
proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the
complainants vagina, consummates the crime.32 Likewise, the absence of semen in
AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape. The presence or absence of
spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of rape.
Moreover, it has been held that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due to a
number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of
the vagina or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse. The first
element of statutory rape, (a) that the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented, was
substantiated by the presentation of the Birth Certificate of the victim, while the second
element, (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim, was evidenced by the
testimony of the victim herself. Thus, the lower court was correct in sentencing accused-
appellant to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No. 160316.
September 02, 2013.] FACTS: At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea,
a house boarder of the Platas, met the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky
Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others. Because of verbal exchanges,
this irked Jose Gregorio and slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. In
the course of the melee, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a
balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him. While Dela Pea
was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and
pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby,
tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier
Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran and proceeded to the
police station to seek assistance.||| Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for
Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal Possession
of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata
(Ruben) and
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 28 | P a g e Thence, no, she does not
have to be arraigned again. Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65.
September 11, 2013.] FACTS: Disini, and company were charged with corruption of public
officials by the Sandiganbayan, penalized under Art. 212, in relation to Art. 210 of the RPC
and violation of Sec. 4(a) of RA 3019, for having allegedly conspired with the former
President Ferdinand Marcos, in appropriating public funds for their personal use amounting
to billions of pesos. Disini filed a motion to quash, arguing among others, that the criminal
Informations filed against him failed to comply with the required substance and form of
information, thereby violating his right to be informed as the accused. ISSUE/S: Did the
Information comply with the required substance and form? HELD: Yes. the Informations filed
complied with the required substance and form. An Information must state every single fact
or circumstance that constitutes an element of the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to
dismiss or to quash may be properly sustained. Included in the things that must be in the
Information are: (1) the name of the accused, (2) the designation of the offense given by the
statute, (3) the acts or omissions constituting the offense, (4) the name of the offended party,
(5) the approximate date of the commission of the crime, and (5) the place where the crime
was committed. Note that, when the offense has been committed by more than one person,
all of them must be included in the Information. After factual examination, the SC held that
the Informations filed against him and his companions were able to comply with the
prescribed forms and substance of an Information. Hence, his motion to quash could not be
properly sustained. Withal, the Informations filed against Disini and company complied with
the required substance and form. People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25,
2013.] FACTS: The accused has been charged for violation of the comprehensive dangerous
drugs act of 2002. Two separate information was charged against the accused. The
prosecutors version is as follows. SPO2 David received reports from the barangay office
about drug-dealing activities. SPO2 David together with his team on a weekly basis
conducted a surveillance on the area. They were able to confirm that indeed the accused
was conducting drug-dealing activities. Thereafter SPO2 David with his team conducted a
test-buy. David together with a civilian asset conducted a test buy and was able to obtain
P200 worth of shabu from the asset. Afterwards the team of SPO2 David conducted a buy-
bust operation. SPO2 David went to Enriquez who was at the sari-sari store. The team were
right across the sari-sari store hiding behind a dump truck. SPO2 David immediately gave to
Enriquez P200 without saying anything. Enriquez thereafter went to get a sealed pack of
shabu and handed it over to SPO2 David. SPO2 David after receiving the shabu signaled his
team and arrested the accused. The version of the defense on the facts are as follows.
Enriquez was eating alone where suddenly a team of police officers in
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 40 | P a g e shabu. She again denied the
allegation but the two women told her to undress. When she asked why, they answered that
her back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she was having her menstrual period.
Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove her
underwear. They later frisked her body but failed to recover anything. Thereafter, the two
women asked for money as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu
from her. At this moment, Cadidia became afraid and called her relatives for money. Her
relatives arrived at the airport at around 1 oclock in the afternoon of the same day but
she failed to talk to them because she has already been brought to Camp Crame for drug
examination. She called her relatives again to ask forP200,000.00 and to bring the amount at
7 oclock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived on the agreed day and time
but managed to bring only P6,000.00 which the police officers found unacceptable. As a
consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings. After the arrest, the following
Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic
Act No. 9165. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the trial court
found accused- appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended
that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them instructed the
accused-appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear. Another contradiction pressed
on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the
illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with statement
of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room, they
immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant. The People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the
prosecutions witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded
for they failed to affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole. In its decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the alleged
contradictory statements of the prosecutions witnesses did not diminish their credibility
as they pertained only to minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the
crime. It emphasized that the more important matter was the positive identification of the
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drug.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime charged despite the conflicting testimonies given by the witnesses. HELD: The
contention of the accused is untenable. The Supreme Court ruled that in cases involving
violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the
judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they
are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, the SC affirmed the findings of the lower
court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses. Upon review, the SC found
no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic
sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she
turned over the accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang, in turn,
testified that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room,
Criminal Procedure Cases (July-December 2013) 41 | P a g e they handed to him what was
taken from the accused. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken
recollection of events. Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a
whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.
What is essential is that the witnesses testimonies corroborate one another on material
details surrounding the commission of the crime. Indeed, travellers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. People v. Jose y Lagua [G.R. No. 200053. October 23, 2013.] FACTS: This case
involves the accused being charged and convicted for the crime of kidnapping. The RTC as
well as the CA affirmed this conviction. The accused questions the validity of these
convictions in which the Supreme Court affirmed. However, an issue regarding the validity of
imposing liability for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping was further
looked into by the court in this case for the reason that the RTC and CA differed in their
rulings regarding the amount to be awarded as civil indemnity. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the
accused is liable for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping and if so, how
much is apt for civil indemnity HELD: The petition was denied. In People v. Bautista, the
court ruled the following amounts to be imposed: PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity which is
awarded if the crime warrants the imposition of death penalty; PhP 75,000 as moral
damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, without need of
proof; and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. Even though the penalty of death was not
imposed, the civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 was still proper because the said award was not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. This Court ordered Bulauitan to pay Editha P75,000.00 as civil indemnity 37 and an
additional P35,000.00 as moral damages. The CAs imposition of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages was sustained, but Mangahas was held to only be solidarily liable with
Bulauitan up to the amount ofP25,000.00 awarded by the RTC. The difference of P75,000.00
between the RTC and the CAs awards shall be Bulauitans sole liability. The
additional liabilities for civil indemnity and damages, which this Court imposes solely upon
Bulauitan, are in accordance with Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.