J . EDUCATION POLICY, 1999, VOL . 14, NO.

1, 55 - 71

Education and globalization in Europe and East

Asia: convergent and divergent trends

Andy Green

E ducation researchers have only recently begun to assess the implications of globalization theory for their work .
This article examines the claims that globalization will lead to increasing convergence in education and training
systems through an analysis of key areas of reform in a range of E uropean and A sian states . The analysis highlights
the common contextual factors that are shaping policy - making and suggests that whilst there is considerable con-
vergence at the level of policy rhetoric and general policy objectives, there is less evidence of any systematic conver-
gence at the level of structures and processes in different countries . National education systems, though more
international, are far from disappearing.

E ducational researchers have only recently begun to take stock of the significance of
globalization theory in their own theoretical work. However, the implications of
this new body of social scientific thought for education studies are immense. 1
In its full- blown form globalization theory predicts the end of the national econ-
omy and the waning of the nation state as the primary unit of political loyalty , repre-
sentation and control ( R eich 1991, Waters 1995). It envisages a new `borderless
world ( Ohmae 1990) where time and space are compressed ( Harvey 1990) and
where national cultures are transformed by the forces of global communications and
cultural commodification. In one version this means the increasing standardization
of world culture; in another a process of `glocalization whereby the global and the
local - the universal and the particular - increasingly interpenetrate, creating a new
hybridity of cultural styles and mixes ( Robertson 1995). The potential effects on edu-
cation would be no less revolutionary. National education systems could no longer
perform their historic functions of promoting national cultures and identities and gen-
erating the human capital for national economies; governments would loose control
over their education systems and these would increasingly converge on global or
regional norms ( Usher and E dwards 1994). The national education system per se
would be obsolete.
I haveargued elsewhere ( Green 1997) that these futuristic scenarios are somewhat
overdrawn and unconvincing. Globalization theory itself, though often inspired and
challenging, is uneven in its logical rigour and empirical grounding. For a theory per-
taining to explain global historical trends in economics, politics and culture, it can
sometimes be strikingly parochial ( first- worldist), na vely ahistorical, and crudely
Andy Green is a P rofessor in E ducation at L ondon U niversity Institute of E ducation . His published
works include Education and State Formation ( M acmillan 1990) and, most recently , Education,
Globalization and the Nation State ( M acmillan 1997) . H e is currently engaged on an ESRC- funded com-
parative research project on S ingapore, S outh K orea, Germany and the UK entitled `E ducation and
Training for a High S kills E conomy .

0268- 0939/99 $ 12 00 1999 T aylor & F rancis L td.

56 ANDY GREEN

reductionist , resembling nothing so much in the latter as the laissez-faire international-

ism of nineteenth century liberal economists .
E conomic globalization theory is clearly on the safest ground, although even
here the trends observed often relate only to the three most developed regions of the
world ( E urope, North A merica and East A sia) and sometimes involve more an accel-
eration of past internationalizing trends rather than the putative `qualitative or epo-
chal shifts of the theorists ( Hirst and Thompson 1996). The case for political and
cultural globalization is on much weaker ground - whatever the reductions in
national sovereignty - given the absence of credible and democratic supra- national
political organization and with the resurgence of political and cultural nationalisms
following 1989 and in reaction to the very forces of cultural globalization ( Horsman
and M arshall 1994, S mith 1995).
A s regards education, there is very little evidence across the globe that nation
states are losing control over their education systems or ceasing to press them into ser-
vice for national economic and social ends, whatever the recent accretions of inter-
nationalism. In fact the opposite may be true. A s governments lose control over
various levers on their national economies and cede absolute sovereignty in foreign
affairs and defence, they frequently turn to education and training as two areas
where they do still maintain control ( A vis et al. 1996). The argument in relation to
educational convergence is, however, more complex, for whilst education systems
remain essentially national they may nevertheless be experiencing a degree of conver-
gence under the impact of international forces. The purpose of this article is to offer
some preliminary analysis of how this process may be conceptualized and tested and
how far it has gone. The frame of reference will be education systems in Europe and
E ast A sia.
Convergence between national education and training ( ET) systems, or aspects
of ET systems, may be analysed at two levels. The first, which we may term policy
convergence, occurs when the policy discourse and objectives in a variety of countries
becomes increasingly similar over time. The second, which we may term structural
convergence, is where the actual structures, processes and outcomes become more
similar. The former is of interest particularly to policy analysts and cultural theorists;
the latter is of more fundamental importance to social scientists, although they too
will be interested in the discourses which impact on and represent structural change.
There are three principal ways in which convergence may occur. One is through an
increase in policy borrowing, an instance of the wider process of cultural diffusion.
A nother is through the direct impact of supra-national authorities seeking to achieve
harmonization in particular areas of national educational practice. The third is
through the autochthonous response of national systems to common forces and prob-
lems. The direct jurisdiction of supra -national bodies over national education systems
is relatively limited, except with poorer countries for whom agencies like the World
B ank make reforms a conditions of aid. Policy borrowing may be seen as a by- prod-
uct of governments facing common problems. It is the third of the three forces that
may be seen as most fundamental.

Com m on contexts and problem s

Changes in ET policies over the past two decades have been driven by a number of
common or similar trends in demography , economics and culture. Demographic
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 57

trends have involved an ageing of populations and workforces. This process begun
somewhat earlier and is somewhat more advanced in most northern E uropean coun-
tries than in southern Europe, and has only recently begun in some of the East A sian
states, but it is becoming manifest in virtually all advanced states ( CERI 1996a,
OECD 1996a). The effects on education systems have been sudden and often dra-
matic. A geing has resulted in increased demands on social services at the same time as
aged- dependency ratios have risen, thus placing greater pressure on public resources
in general and education budgets in particular. The declining size of youth cohorts
has put pressure on school systems to rationalize school places, sometimes involving
difficult decisions about the closure of small , often rural schools. It has allowed gov-
ernments the options of reducing class sizes and/or costs in compulsory education
and of increasing participation rates in post-compulsory education without propor-
tionate increases in total costs. A s teaching forces age and have to be replaced it poses
new problems about teacher recruitment which have yet to be seriously faced in
many countries ( CERI 1996b). Most importantly, however, the ageing of popula-
tions and workforces have posed new demands on education and training systems
for the re- training of employees whose skills have become obsolescent and for meet-
ing the different needs of growing populations of retired and aged people. The ubi-
quitous call for lifelong learning is a direct response to this widespread demographic
phenomenon ( EC 1995, OECD 1996a).
Economic restructuring has had an equally direct effect on education and train-
ing. `Globalization refers to the accelerated international flows of goods, capital,
labour, services and information which have occurred in response to improved trans-
port, the seemingly limitless revolution in communications technologies, and the
deregulatory policies adopted in many countries during the past two decades. The
process has been characterized above all by the pace of scientific and technological
innovation, the enhanced importance of information in the advanced economies and
the greatly augmented role of multinational corporations ( MNCs) and foreign direct
investment in the world generally ( Waters 1995, OECD 1996a). The latter has been
particularly important since MNCs can now easily relocate their operations from
one country to another as economic advantages, in terms of labour and social costs,
skills, market access, political stability and public subsidies, dictate. This process has
greatly intensified global economic competition, particularly between the advanced
regions, both in the race to create the conditions which attract foreign investment
and in the struggle to improve productivity and market competitiveness in home-
based industries and services. Governments no longer see much scope in trying to
compete with the low wage, low cost economies around the world, especially as the
second wave of A sian tigers - including Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam - come on
stream and with the massive economic potential of China waiting in the wings.
A dvanced E uropean economies that wish to remain prosperous have little choice
but to movefurther into theknowledge- intensive, high-value- added areas of produc-
tion and services and to remain competitive with the other economies, not least in
E ast A sia, which are also moving rapidly in this direction ( EC 1995). The shift implies
an ever greater emphasis on information-rich, high quality production and services
where the premium is on rapid change and innovation.
Global economic forces have led to significant changes in the organization of
advanced economies. Industrial structures have changed with marked shifts in
employment from agriculture and primary industries to manufacturing and, latterly,
the service sector. There is much debate about whether the new jobs created have
58 ANDY GREEN

been more skilled than the ones lost but generally, and although there have been ex-
amples of de- skilling, the trend has been towards more employment in professional,
technical and administrative occupations, with an overall decline in semi- and un-
skilled employment ( R obinson 1997). Thesecond result has beentowards widespread
reorganization of work both in manufacturing and the services. Most common have
been the attempts to increase efficiency and profitability in organizations through
increased flexibility in the employment and utilization of staff . This has frequently
involved `downsizing , `de-layering and other forms of corporate re- engineering
where work intensification is achieved through enhancing the contractual flexibility
of labour through part-time, temporary and home employment and the removal of
job demarcations ( Keep and Mayhew 1993). The third effect, apparent in a minority
of organizations in the high skills, high tech areas of manufacturing, has been more
radical. Enterprises have sought to achieve high quality, efficient and flexible produc-
tion through restructuring along `post-Fordist lines. Typically this has involved
adopting flatter hierarchies with single status conditions, giving more responsibility
for quality control and product and process innovation to the shop- floor worker,
and requiring much greater functional flexibility from all staff . Flexible specialization
in production has been achieved through the use of CNC machinery and multiply -
skilled workers ( Piore and S abel 1984); `just-in-time systems of stock and process
control have been developed to reduce wasteful stacking of inventories, and new
quality control systems, like the Japanese `quality circles , have been introduced to
reduce production defects. A t the optimum, enterprises have introduced integrated
manufacturing systems relying on high levels of automation, maximal flows of infor-
mation, and the work of flexible teams of multi- skilled workers ( Hampden-Turner
and Trompenaars 1993).
These changes in work organization and the terms of international competition
have faced ET systems in the advanced countries with new challenges. In the first
place, the need to reduce social costs to encourage competitiveness and to attract for-
eign investment has led to tight budgetary controls which have forced expanding
education systems to be more cost- efficient. In the second place, there has been a gen-
eralized demand for higher levels of qualification and skill throughout the workforce.
A t one level this has meant education and training systems focusing on promoting
the social and personal skills which allow young people entering work to be flexible
and adaptable and quick to learn in rapidly changing work environments. A t another
level, it has meant promoting more widely a range of skills that are seen to be of sin-
gular important in modern working environments - the ability to communicate
well, handle information, work in teams, solve new problems, apply knowledge
and skills in different contexts, and to think conceptually and creatively. The latter is
particularly important in information-rich and highly integrated working environ-
ments which depend on the ability of staff to work in symbolic languages and to
think in `system terms ( R eich 1991).
E conomic restructuring and demographic change have had obvious and im-
mediate effects on education and training across the European U nion. However, no
less important, although sometimes more subtle, have been the effects arising from
widespread changes in cultures, values and lifestyles. These arise partly from the
changing patterns of work, leisure and family life, which are discernable in all
advanced states, and partly from the more indeterminate changes in values, attitudes
and identities, which have issued from economic change and the wider cultural
impact of the globalization process discussed above ( UNESCO 1996). One key issue
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 59

in E urope, though less in A sia, is the persistence of high levels of structural , often
long- term, unemployment with all the dangers of social exclusion which this entails
( EC 1995). A nother is the increasing pluralization of lifestyles, cultures and values
and the effects of increasing individualization on social cohesion in society. For both
youth and adults theseprocesses havemeant, above all, increasing levels of uncertainty
and risk ( Giddens 1994). In particular, the nature of youth transitions to work and
adult life have become both more protracted and more complex ( Chisholm 1992).
Likewise adult life-courses are less linear, less predictable and more variable than in
the past ( Watts 1997), even in A sian countries where large companies have tradition-
ally placed great stress on long-term employment. These deep-rooted changes have
major implications for education and training at all levels. Thevariety and uncertainty
of youth contexts and transitions pose special challenges for education and training.
They necessitate a diversity and flexibility of provision to suit those in different situa-
tions and with different aptitudes. A t the same time, they require a systematic pro-
vision which retains its coherence and transparency. They suggest the need for
multiple pathways, but pathways which are all valued and recognized and which
allow young people to change course and progress. The increasing complexity and
flexibility of these pathways and proliferation of personal choices which they engen-
der, put a premium on the availability of continuing and impartial counselling and
guidance ( EC 1995). The trends in adult life patterns all suggest increasingly complex
forms of articulation between paid work, parenting, caring, leisure and education
and training. To respond adequately education and training opportunities must be
made more flexible, not only in terms of the phasing of opportunities across life-
cycles but also in terms of the modalities and contents of learning ( UNESCO 1996).
There is a need to end the traditional `front-loading of education and to create more
age-related education and training opportunities.

Convergence and divergence in policies and practices

Common, or similar, demographic, economic and cultural changes in the contexts of

education and training across E urope and A sia have led to some clear convergences
at the level of policy discourse and general policy objectives.
Most countries havesought to extend young people s education through increas-
ing participation in post -compulsory education and training ( OECD 1996a). Rates
of participation in upper secondary education and foundation training have been
high for some time in some A sian and E uropean states, such as Japan, Germany,
S outh Korea and Sweden. Recently the laggard states, including the UK , S pain and
Portugal , have begun to catch up, so that many countries are now reaching threshold
levels of participation with a consequent convergence in rates across states ( CERI
1996a). Most countries have also sought to increase access to short and long cycle
higher education and rates of participation have also risen here, although there is as
yet less evidence of cross-country convergence ( CERI 1996b). Policy makers in
many states have also been concerned to increase adult participation in continuing
education or training, particularly where this is related to enhanced employability,
and this has led to a new international policy discourse around lifelong learning and
the `learning society . The latter notion has gained in popularity as it has become
apparent to policy makers that formal education alone cannot deliver at acceptable
public costs the necessary enhancement of learning throughout society to meet new
60 ANDY GREEN

work and social demands ( OECD 1996a). The `learning society notion, which
envvisages learning as a permanent process throughout the life cycle and occurring
in multiple sites from the family, to the school, the workplace and the community ,
has been made possible through advances in communications technologies which
allow more flexible and individualized modes of learning both at a distance and
within different kinds of institutions.
Interms of educational contents or objectives there have also beensomecommon
policy shifts, particularly within northern Europe. Higher education is becoming
increasingly internationalized both in its reach and curricula ( OECD 1996b). In the
EU, of course, this has been greatly supported by EC initiatives such as ERASMUS
and SOCRATES, whereas in A sian states such as Japan and S outh K orea, it has been
promoted through heavy government backing. In compulsory education, particu-
larly in northern Europe, there has been widespread policy interest in enhancing for-
eign language skills, IT and so-called transversal skills, like problem solving and
communications, although there is an absence of common definitions for these
( EURYDICE 1997) . In upper secondary education and foundation training in
E urope, there has been a common concern to bring academic and vocational learning
closer together, to make vocational skills teaching broader and more generic in
response to the fluidity of modern job roles, and to enhance the connection between
education and work, through various forms of alternance, work experience, and edu-
cation- industry partnerships ( Gordon et al. 1994, OECD 1994a, Lasonen 1996). The
motivation behind this is clearly the perception that schools acting alone are unable
to keep pace with the changing skills demands and technological sophistication of
the work place and the widespread belief that increased work relevance acts as a moti-
vator to learners ( Streeck 1987). This latter phenomenon has been less apparent in
E ast A sian states, but here there is widespread concern to enhance levels of creativity
and learning autonomy amongst students to meet the demands of changing work
roles ( KEDI 1996).
B udgetary restraints in most countries have placed increasing emphasis on
improving cost- efficiency in educational provision. This has led to a widespread inter-
est in new forms of quality control and performance evaluation at all levels of educa-
tion. It has also led to measures in many countries to decentralize educational
governance and control. Decentralization has been variously seen by governments as
a way to reduce central expenditure, to shift the burden of responsibility for unpopu-
lar measures, and to increase efficiency through giving more responsibility and moti-
vation to direct providers ( CERI 1995). The promotion of school choice and
diversity often associated with it has been a reaction to the increasingly diverse and
contradictory nature consumer demands, and to the strong pressure, particularly
from growing middle class constituencies, for credentials and desirable labour market
opportunities ( OECD 1994b).
In these and other areas there has been a clear tendency towards convergence
across a range of states in the general discourse and broad objectives of educational
policy. However, there is less evidence of convergence in the details of policy and in
the actual structures and processes in different countries. A t one level this is because
national education systems, whilst broadly pointing in the same directions, are start -
ing from different points and/or changing at different rates, so that there is little actual
convergence between two points in time. Higher education enrolments rates, for
instance, have risen in most countries in western Europe and East A sia during the
past ten years, but figures for the EU states show that despite this, and despite an aver-
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 61

age doubling of rates between 1975 and 1994, there has been little actual convergence
in statistical variations across countries ( CERI 1996a) . E qually there has been no sig-
nificant convergence for EU countries between 1985 and 1993 in public expenditure
on education either as a percentage of GDP or as a proportion of total public expendi-
ture ( CERI 1996b).
A t another level, the lack of convergence in national ET systems, despite the
common problems facing them, is due to the fact that they are responding in their
own particular ways which reflect the structures and value systems which underpin
them and which are the product of different patterns of historical evolution. The
structures of national systems are fundamentally determined by national differences
in industrial structures and labour markets arrangements, in political traditions and
institutions, and in cultures of citizenship and knowledge traditions. So long as there
are continuing national differences in theseareas it is likely that therewill also continue
to be major differences in educational systems.
Some of the basic differences in national structures can be readily seen. There is a
fundamental difference between secondary education systems which are selective,
and those which, in institutional terms at least, are comprehensive and non- selective.
The comprehensive system now broadly prevails in compulsory schooling in the
majority of East A sian and EU states, despite adoption of school choice policies in
some states. However, in countries proximate to Germany and most influenced by
German language and culture, such as A ustria, Switzerland, B elgium, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, selective systems still dominate, despite the creation in some
cases of parallel multi - lateral schools. The fundamental institutional difference in
systems of post- compulsory ET is that between systems which are predominantly
school- based, as in E ast A sia and most of western Europe, and systems which are pre-
dominantly work-based, as in A ustria, Germany and Switzerland ( OECD 1985).
N ew forms of alternance and school- work linkages haveonly partially eroded the dif-
ferencebetweenthese systems which crucially involve quite different modes of articu-
lation between schools, qualifications and work.
There are also fundamental differences in the modes of governance and regula-
tion of education and training systems in different countries. W hilst it is true that
there has been a general tendency in both Europe and E ast A sia to devolve more
power to lower levels this means quite different things in different cases.
Decentralization has variously meant devolving power to the regions, the regional
outposts of central government ( deconcentration), the local authorities, the social
partners and the institutions themselves. There are still clear differences between coun-
tries where the majority of power lies at the central government level ( A sia, France
and the Latin rim countries), countries where regional control predominates
( Germany, S witzerland and A ustria , to a lesser extent, and B elgium in terms of
language communities), countries where local control now predominates ( the
N ordics), and countries which have devolved substantial power to the institutional
providers and the markets ( Netherlands and the UK) . Similar differences exist with
regard to the regulation and governance of training.
These and other major fault lines have reduced the degree to which education
and training systems have converged in recent years, despite the common forces oper-
ating on them and despite the evident similarity in their overall policy aims and objec-
tives. Recent literature on trends in European systems generally support the view
that there has been such a mixture of convergence and divergence in the national
trends. Jallade, in his 1989 review of trends in vocational education and training
62 ANDY GREEN

( VET) across Europe ( Jallade 1989), found a number of areas of convergence but con-
cluded that national subsidiarity still dominates in this area: `The pressures affecting
E uropean national VET systems and the changing policies and structures they are
adapting seem driven more by stubborn national agendas, despite the evidence of
explicit transnational policy-borrowing, ( 1989: 23) . K elleher and S cott, in their
more recent review ( 1996), find some convergence due to supra- national regulation,
the role of trans- national business, the effects of organizational and technological
change in occupations and international policy borrowing. However, they conclude
that: `The consensus of diagnosis has been that European VET systems are responding
to a largely common set of pressures and problems with diverse solutions, which are
conditioned by their specific national institutions and histories ( see also Meijer,
1991). A shton and Green, writing most recently , conclude that :
There persists a substantial diversity in both skills formation and more generally economic systems . The
diversity in skills demand, they write, `has its origins not just in technological diversity but in the wider poli-
tico-economic differences across nations .. .even in the advanced industrialized world, it is too simple to
assume that all countries are converging to a common modern technology in which ever increasing and
broader skills are needed from modern national workforces. ( 1996: p. 28).

Ty pologies of education and training system s

V arious attempts have been made to create typologies of ET systems ( Caillods 1994,
A shton and Green 1996). They all suffer from the obvious defect that no typology is
going to fit perfectly with more than one national system, since the latter are all
unique in their own ways. However, the process can be useful in at least three ways.
Firstly , by developing heuristic models of ET systems we can begin to isolate the
key features which are characteristic of particular systems and which distinguish
them from others. Secondly , wecan begin to focus on the arrangement of thekey fea-
tures within each system and understand the modes of articulation, for instance
between schools, qualifications and the labour market, which provide their functional
unity. Thirdly , by seeking to group national systems according to type we can begin
to map the geography of similarity and difference, and through that mapping to
understand what are the common features across nations which constitute essential
functional elements of a particular model. The following typology offers five pri-
mary models of ET systems within western Europe and E ast A sia. The countries
which are most commonly associated with each model are Japan, Germany, France,
Sweden and the UK.

Japan

The `Japanese model, which also applies to a degree in S outh Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore, may be termed the `state developmentalist model of ET and arises out of
at least five distinguishing contexts and influences: the specific forms of East A sian
capitalism; the nature and role of the `developmental state ; the historical evolution
of traditional Confucian and `familiaristic patterns in East A sian culture and society ;
the effects of Japanese colonialism and occupation and in the `Tigers ; and certain spe-
cific post- war A merican influences in education ( though not in S ingapore) . Whilst
there is considerable variation within the East A sian region and between these coun-
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 63

tries, not least in relation to cultures, there is sufficient commonality in certain key
variables to produce a model of ET which is clearly identifiable with, and peculiar
to, these states.
East A sian capitalism has been notable for its strong export orientation, its high
rates of savings and investment and high manufacturing productivity ; and phenom-
enal rates of growth during the post- war period ( not withstanding the current eco-
nomic shocks) ( W orld Bank 1984, Wade 1990, Castells 1992). There has been much
discussion as to the causes of the so- called East A sian economic miracle, and many -
somewhat dubious - efforts to explain it in familiar neo-classical economic terms.
However, what stands out as most characteristic of the dynamic East A sian set is that
they are all late industrializing countries ( A msden 1992), whose modernization has
been forced through by strong `developmentalist states, after the pattern first estab-
lished by Japan during the Meiji R estoration ( Johnson 1995). This pattern later
evolved as the dominant developmental model for the region, first partially exported
through Japanese colonialism, and then coveted and comprehensively emulated in
the post- war period by hungry ex- colonial tiger economies, whose growth had
been kick- started by A merican cold war investment.
W hilst the central state bureaucracies have been the prime movers in develop-
ment in these countries, they have not sought to supplant the market but rather, in
R obert Wade s term, to `govern it, providing investment and strategic leadership
( Wade 1990). It is the thrusting capitalist firms and that have provided the engine of
economic expansion. The model again has come from Japan, in the form of the
giant conglomerates which first emerged as Zaibatsu in the pre-war period, and then
re- emerged, after the latter were dismantled by the A mericans, as the modern
Keiretsu, of which Mitsubishi is one of the oldest and most famous examples. These
conglomerates have played a massively important role in economic development,
not least because their size, internal cohesion, and peculiar patterns of cross ownership
of constituent companies have freed the latter from the pressures of take- over and
allowed them to prioritize long-term growth rather than short term profits for inves-
tors ( Fukuyama 1995, Hutton 1995). The other key constituent of A sian capitalism
has been the family and the traditions of group loyalty which are part of the
Confucian inheritance. These are represented in the paternalistic form of organiza-
tions and particularly of the large firms, whose organizational cohesion rests on the
so- called three- pillars of lifetime employment, seniority wages ( Nenko) and compliant
single company unions. The group loyalty principle also works within the networks
of small firms which act as semi- captive suppliers to the main companies and whose
workforces, having none of the benefits of lifetime employment, act as the buffers
between the main firms and the fluctuations of the market ( Fukuyama 1995).
The other A sian states have not, of course, managed to replicate this economic
model exactly. A s Francis Fukuyama has argued ( 1995), the Chinese societies, and to
some extent K orea, have traditionally had more inward- looking family structures
than Japan and have not experienced the Japanese advantage of strong relations of
`trust in broader civil society. They have consequently experienced more difficulty
in naturally evolving the large, professionally-managed firms which have been the
backbone of the Japanese success story . However, they have found their own ways
of engineering functional equivalents: S ingaporeby enticing in large foreign multina-
tionals, Taiwan through state- run industries and S outh K orea through deliberate
government action to consolidate the large private sector conglomerates ( or chaebol )
which attemp to mirror the Japanese Keiretsu. The enterprises in these countries do
64 ANDY GREEN

not achieve the same level of lifetime employment, but they often practice similar
forms of company paternalism, trading on similar traditions of group loyalty and
in-group cohesion.
The education and training systems which have developed within the frame-
work of E ast A sian capitalism also have a number of distinctive features in common.
They are generally highly centralized, despite recent liberalizing measures in Japan
and S outh Korea; they placea strong emphasis on the development of group cohesion
and conformism; and they exhibit a specific form of articulation between formal
school systems and labour markets that is not found elsewhere ( Green 1997).
Centralized control is evident in the relatively uniform institutional structures of
the public school systems, the detailed prescription of curricula, and the widespread
use of state- authorized textbooks, particularly in Japan. S ocial conformism and
group cohesion is fostered through classes in ethics, and through institutional rituals,
such as school exercise sessions, pledge recitals and, in Japan, collective class prepara-
tion of meals. It has also been underpinned through the adoption, at least in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, of the A merican 6- 3- 3 system of elementary , middle and
high schools, with compulsory elementary and middle school education typically
provided in comprehensive, unstreamed schools which operate automatic grade pro-
motion. Private day schools and evening crammer schools are, of course, abundant
in Japan and S outh K orea, but the former are regulated to conform with the public
school system, whilst the latter acts as a parallel system, complementing but not fun-
damentally undermining the structures of the public school system. Singapore has
inherited aspects of the B ritish system rather than the A merican model, and does exer-
cise streaming in its public schools; but the emphasis on social cohesion is no less
apparent.
The characteristic features of skills formation in the A sian model derive from the
distinguishing features of A sian capitalism, and the particular modes of articulation
between central governments, education systems, labour markets and firms in each
country. A common characteristic in all the developmental states is the belief that edu-
cation is a collective process of state formation, as well as individual development,
and in this perspective skills formation and citizen formation go hand in hand: the
major priority of the education system is to cultivate the social attitudes and personal
skills which are conducive to both to cohesive and orderly citizenship and to disci-
plined and cooperative labour. This is seen as more important than the cultivation of
specific technical skills, which, in any case, can often be learned on the job later.
Having said this, however, there are distinct variations within this model.
In the Japanesemodel, which is partially replicated in South K orea, the role of the
school system is to provide a sound general education a good grounding in basic skills
and core values and attitudes. General high schools predominate over vocational
high schools, which, in any case, provide a very only general vocational education.
U niversities offer very broad programmes of study even where they are specifically
vocational. It is the role of the firms to provide the occupational training and this the
large firms do exceptionally well, having the advantage of relatively stable work-
forces and thus less risk of losing training investment through trained employees
leaving for other jobs ( Dore and Sako, 1989; S tephens, 1991). Standards -based quali-
fications are not an important feature in the relationship between high school or uni-
versity graduates and the large firms since recruitment is based on recommendations,
company assessment tests and the reputatioin of the institution from which the
young person is graduating. However, in relation to the small firm sectors, where
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 65

employment stability and in company training are not so prevalent, different systems
have to operate. S pecific pre- employment occupational training is required and tran-
sitions to work are mediated through the currency of standards-based qualifications,
organized in both Japan and south K orea by state agencies.
Taiwan and S ingapore both deviate somewhat from this model. Taiwan has a
larger proportion of small firms ( Fukuyama 1995) than the other three and these are
unable to provide such extensive in-company training. To compensate for this, and
to ensure that more young people get pre- employment occupational training, the
government has expanded vocational high schools faster than general high schools -
a policy which is easier to achieve here than in Japan or K orea since the majority of
high schools here are state- run rather than private. S ingapore is a different case again
since a large proportion of its firms are foreign- owned multinationals which do not
normally operate long-term employment policies and which may not be so com-
mitted to in- company training. The school system is thus required to offer more
pre- employment vocational skilling. In order to achieve this the government has put
a strict quota on places in the academic junior colleges which feed the universities,
and channelled the remainder of middle school graduates througheither skills training
programmes in the Institute of Technical Education or vocational education courses
in one of the four lavishly endowed polytechnics. A dult skills training has also
received particular emphasis in Singapore, due to the relatively low levels of educa-
tion and training amongst the older members of the workforce. Much of this deliv-
ered through government run schemes or through joint industry -government
schemes, notably those negotiated with leading foreign multinationals when they
first came into the country ( A shton and S ung 1994).

Germany

The German system of ET, which is to some degreereplicated in A ustria , S witzerland

and the Netherlands , contrasts sharply with that of Japan, although economic struc-
tures are in some ways surprisingly similar ( Fukuyama 1995).
Germany, like Japan, is historically the product of a concerted process of `moder-
nization from above led by a dominant agrarian elite in Prussia , the country which
later spearheaded German unification ( Moore 1967). A s such, Prussia arguably lays
claim to being the first of the strong developmentalist states in the modern world.
A s in Japan, German identity has, historically , rested heavily on language and ethni-
city ; but here, in a more ethnically diverse society than Japan, ethno- cultural rather
than primarily political notions of citizenship and nationhood have been associated
with more particularistic cultural traditions and more differentionist tendencies
within education ( M cLean 1990, Brubaker 1992).
In its modern post-war incarnation, Germany emerged as a political economy
based on E rhardian principles of the `social market , a model which is now the domi-
nant form in E uropean social democracy, and which, at first sight, has few similarities
with Japanese capitalism. However, there are affinities. The economies in both coun-
tries are dominated by large firms, whoseparticular legal forms of ownership discou-
rage hostile take- over and encourage long-term investment and growth - in the
German case typically through close and sustained partnerships with banks whose
representatives sit on company boards along with worker representatives
( Fukuyama 1995, Hutton 1995) . L arge sectoral unions dominate the industrial rela-
66 ANDY GREEN

tions scene and management-labour relations are characterized in general by a spirit of

co-operationand compromise. A s in Japan, economic relations in Germany are distin-
guished by relatively high levels of `trust , but the cultural routes and institutional
bases are different ( Fukuyama 1995). Social capital in German civil society has been
accumulated through strong solidaristic traditions of Catholicism and professional
organization, the latter originating from the long-surviving craft guilds which were
the basis of the B ismarckian apprentice system, precursor to the modern Dual
System. A greements in Germany are more frequently codified in legal contract than
in Japan; there is also a complex neo-corporatist system of formalized interest group
bargaining which is absent in Japan. However, relations of `trust are equally crucial
to the organizational cohesion and long- termism which lies behind sustained eco-
nomic growth in both countries. The Federal Government has relatively little control
over the education system in Germany which, as in S witzerland and, to some degree,
A ustria , is organized on a regional basis. However, at the La nder level the system is
quite centralized and tightly regulated, with relatively little institutional or municipal
autonomy. Textbooks for instance are still authorized, although not as closely cen-
sored as in Japan. The school system consists almost entirely of state-run schools but
at the secondary level these are selective by academic ability . The tripartite division
of secondary schools into Gymnasien, Realschulen and Hauptschulen ( with a few com-
prehensive Gesamtschulen) is one of the distinctive markers of the German system and
is replicated in different ways in A ustria, Belgium, L uxembourg, the Netherlands
and German- speaking Switzerland.
V arious factors have no doubt contributed towards the preservation of this dis-
tinctive arrangement in these countries, but there are certain things held in common.
Most of the countries which still practice selection have been influenced by German
language and culture, not least the traditions of cultural particularism and differen-
tionism discussed above, and have strong neo-corporatist forms of organization.
They haveretained strong craft traditions, have high levels of unionization, and mani-
festly robust traditions of social partnership. These characteristics have acted to legiti-
mate a system which differentiates young people into different tracks leading,
usually, to different occupational destinations, but where each track retains its own
identity, status and social value ( CEDEFOP 1987, Gordon et al. 1994). In other coun-
tries, with more universalist cultural traditions, and with weaker craft traditions and
weaker occupational identities for manual and junior white collar workers, such
legitimacy for selective organization has not been sustainable, and comprehensive
reforms have followed.
A t the post -compulsory level, provision in Germany is predominantly work-
based, dominated by the much vaunted Dual System of apprentice training. This
typically combines in- company occupational training with two days per week in
the Berufsschule where students learn general educational subjects and vocational the-
ory. The system works relatively well in Germany because of strong company com-
mitment to training, because there exists a large cadre of Meisters who are trained to
supervise the training process; and because the unions and chambers of commerce
( Kammern) work in concert, and within the parameters of tight federal controls, to
ensure that training quality is maintained. The system also articulates effectively
with labour market organization. Germany has strong occupational labour markets
and a degree of labour market co-ordination which allows companies to provide
apprentice training without excessive cost, still allowing mobility between firms
( Marsden and R yan 1995). Sectoral agreements on pay in skilled jobs reduces the dan-
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 67

ger of poaching and, therefore, increases the incentive of employers to invest in train-
ing ( CEDEFOP 1987). S tandards-based occupational qualifications act as the crucial
exchange mechanism in these occupational labour markets. In fact, federal law deter-
mines the qualifications which are required for practice in a wide range of professional
and skilled occupations.
There are a number of countries where the apprentice system forms the domi-
nant part ( A ustria, Germany, Switzerland) or a major part ( Netherlands). The coun-
tries which have a strong apprentice systems are the same countries which operate
selective systems of lower secondary education ( excepting Belgium, and
Luxembourg ), and the two derive from similar causes. To operate successfully and
sustain social credibility , apprentice systems require certain underlying social con-
ditions, in addition to the existence of active occupational labour markets. Generally
there need to be strong traditions of social partnership and neo-corporatist organiz-
ation, since the systems are largely organized by the social partners and rely on their
good will ( CEDEFOP 1987). There needs to be a tradition of state intervention to
co- ordinate the roles of the different partners and of labour market regulation to
ensurethe close articulation of training, qualifications and work, which is the bedrock
of the system ( Green 1995). There also needs to be a strong tradition of professional
identity for manual workers and junior white collar workers since the basis of the
apprenticeship lies in the socialization of young people into these occupational identi-
ties ( Brown 1997). The countries which have these characteristics have, by and large,
maintained their apprentice systems successfully. Others, without them, have not.

France

Francehas provided the basis for what is the other dominant ET tradition within con-
tinental Europe and the model which applies, with some variations, through the
`Latin rim states. The French model, like the Japanese but unlike the German one, is
characterized by strong central control, comprehensive systems of compulsory
schooling, and school-based systems of upper secondary education. It also has mark-
edly encyclopedic knowledge traditions and a strong national cultural element, as in
Japan, although constituted on different principles. A ccording to the republican
ideal, it is the duty of the state to ensure that education is universal, that it provides
equal opportunities to all, and that it serves the national interests, not least promoting
national values and social solidarity. National education has thus `been organized in a
standardized way , based upon principles that are defined for the nation as a whole .
( Derouet 1991: 34)
The distinguishing characteristic of the French model derives from the French
R evolutionary notions of nationality and citizenship ( B rubaker 1992) . These are
based less on traditions of ethnicity as in Germany and Japan, and more on the state-
centred concepts of political membership, and the rights and duties that derive from
this. In theory, at least , nationhood is an inclusive concept which embraces all those
willing ( and eligible) to be citizens. Because it is ideally universal and inclusive, it
carries with it a strong imperative towards cultural assimilation, theoretically of the
particular to the general, in practice of the colonized and the immigrant towards the
dominant French culture. This tradition is reflected in the ET model in the relatively
homogeneous institutional structures and administrative systems, the breadth of cur-
ricula, and the continuing emphasis on civic education.
68 ANDY GREEN

U pper secondary education in the French model is predominantly school- based

with only a residual apprentice system which articulates mostly with old artisanal
occupations. However, the school- based model differs from that in Japan in that it
seeks to deliver substantial occupational training as well as general education,
although general education also forms a significant part of vocational courses as in
Japan. The reason for this lies in the structure of French labour markets. French firms
have a bias towards internal labour markets, as in Japan, but the average size of firms
is considerably smaller and many firms are unable to deliver extensive in company
training. The school system is thus under pressure to provide more pre- employment
training than is the case in Japan. A nother distinguishing feature of the French system
is its unrelenting credentialism. The labour market in France is determined to a large
extent by widespread sectoral agreements between unions and employers which link
qualifications with job recruitment and promotion and pay levels. E xternally-
assessed, state- validated certificates thus play a much more important role here than
in countries such as Japan where recruitment and promotion is based less on the hold-
ing of standards- based qualifications.
The final two models, pertaining to countries on the periphery of continental
E urope, are less widely generalized and will be considered more briefly.

Sweden

The S wedish ET model, shared to some degree by the other Nordic states, has a num-
ber of distinguishing features. Comprehensive, all-through Grundskulen have tradi -
tionally provided for the compulsory years of education in unstreamed classes with
automatic grade promotion. The immediate post- compulsory phase is predomi-
nantly school-based, with the dominant institution being the comprehensive high
school ( or Gymnasieskola in S weden) ( B oucher 1982). The apprenticeship forms an
important part in Denmark but is essentially school- led. Since the last world war the
N ordic states have generally had rather centralized systems of administration ( except-
ing perhaps Denmark) but there has been substantially devolution of control during
the last decade to the local or municipal levels, with Sweden also exercising a limited
degree of school choice and school- based management ( OECD 1994b) . The Nordic
states also have strong traditions of liberal adult education, notably in the Folk high
schools. P erhaps the most notable characteristic, however, of education in Sweden
and other Nordic states, has been its strong emphasis on equality and social solidarism.
The latter, in the post- war period, provided the rationale for strong central control
through the social democratic state, which also engaged in active labour market meas-
ures for unemployed and redeployed adults. The shift towards local control in recent
years marks a reversion to the notions of communitarian democracy which were the
original basis of the development of public schools in the nineteenth century ( Lauglo
1990, 1995).

England and Wales

The system of ET in England and Wales has its origins in the voluntarist traditions of
the V ictorian period, whose liberal, individualist philosophy acted to limit state con-
trol in education and maximize institutional autonomy ( Green 1990). Legislation
EDUCATION AND GLOBALIZATION 69

since 1988 has, of course, substantially modified the English patterns of educational
voluntarism which had, in any case, been in decline since the beginning of the cen-
tury. Centralized control over curricula and qualifications has brought England and
W ales closer in line with continental practice in one respect. However, this has been
accompanied by experiments in school choice and school- based management which
havegonefurther than elsewherein E urope in introducing competitive, quasi-market
relations into education and training, and this can be seen, in a sense, as a continuation
of one aspect of the voluntarist tradition under new conditions.
Initial post-compulsory education in England and Wales has been traditionally
categorized as a `mixed system ( OECD 1985) compromising both school-based and
work-based elements. This corresponds to the industrial structures which include a
mixture of both occupational and internal labour markets. In recent years, with the
delayed but substantial increases in post- compulsory participation in upper secondary
school and college education, the system has shifted towards being predominantly
school- based. However, the upper secondary system is markedly more differentiated
than the more integrated upper secondary systems of France and Sweden. A further
factor which marks out the system in England and Wales is the marked preference
for curricula specialization at the upper secondary phase with, uniquely, no tradition
of general education teaching on vocational courses. Instead, vocational education
has been determinedly competence-based, with core skills acting as a surrogate for
general education.

Policy convergence and structural difference

A s argued in the first part of this article, there is clear evidence of policy convergence
within Europe and East A sia around a range of broad policy themes: including, life-
long learning, internationalization in higher education; decentralization in regulation
and governance, increasing use of evaluation and quality control measures, and the
need to bring education and work closer together. However, this does not appear to
have led to any marked convergence in structures and processes. Indeed the different
models, sketched out above, would appear to be as distinctive as they were a decade
or so ago.
W hat is apparent is that each country has responded in practice to common prob-
lems in different ways in line with its particular traditions and ET model characteris-
tics. For instance, most countries have sought to become more international in their
educational outlooks. However, western and eastern patterns have tended to differ.
In the west internationalization has not generally ( except perhaps in the UK ) been
accompanied by any marked reassertion of national cultures in education. In A sian
states such as Japan, Korea and Singapore, on the contrary , there has been a marked
reassertionof national culture and values in education, at the same time as parts of edu-
cation - notably upper secondary and higher education - havesought to internationa-
lise through laying greater stress on foreign language learning, student exchange and
so on. Likewise, most countries have decentralized decision making to some degree.
However, how they have done this has depended very much on their particular
local traditions. Devolution of controls down to the institutional level in the UK has
given schools a considerable degree of autonomy, not least in their control over bud-
gets and their the hiring and firing of staff . In France, by contrast , decentralization
through regional devolution and deconcentration has had quite different effects.
70 ANDY GREEN

Deconcentration of power from central government to regional government agen-

cies has in some ways increased state power, provided a counter-balance to the genu-
inely decentralizing effects of devolution to regional assemblies. Schools have seen a
few, limited additional powers, particularly in relation to the curricula, but the state
still controls the hiring and firing of staff and thus the vast majority of educational
spending.
In the light of the growing emphasis on globalization within educational debates
there will inevitably be a continuing interest in the question of convergence and
divergence within education and training systems, and this is to be welcomed.
However, here, as in education research generally, there is a tendency to concentrate
on studies of policy discourse and policy change rather than structural analysis. Little
progress will be made on the comparative analysis of trends in education without a
renewed emphasis on the scientific analysis of the objective characteristics of educa-
tional structures and processes and the social and political contexts that influence
them.

Note

1. This article draws in parts on research on two projects: Convergences and Divergences in European Education Systems,
funded by the EU DGXX11 ( with A lison W olf and Tom L eney ) ; and Education and Training Routes to a High
Skills Economy, funded by the ESRC ( with Hugh L auder and Phil B rown).

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