Ansi-Isa 67.04.01 2006

AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-

Related Instrumentation
Approved 16 May 2006
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Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

Provided by IHS under license with ISA Sold to:TIVENCA, 01609099
No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS Not for Resale,2006/11/17 14:17:23 GMT
STANDARD
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-

Related Instrumentation
Approved 16 May 2006

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ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation
ISBN -10: 1-55617-994-4
ISBN -13: 978-1-55617-994-5
Copyright 2006 by ISAThe Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society. All rights
reserved. Not for resale. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
(electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior written
permission of the Publisher.
ISA
67 Alexander Drive
P. O. Box 12277
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709
USA

3 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
Preface
This preface, as well as all footnotes and annexes, is included for information purposes and is
not part of ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006.
The standards referenced within this document may contain provisions which, through reference
in this text, constitute requirements of this document. At the time of publication, the editions
indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on
this document are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions
of the standards indicated within this document. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of
currently valid International Standards. ANSI maintains registers of currently valid U.S. National
Standards.
This document has been prepared as part of the service of ISAThe Instrumentation, Systems,
and Automation Society, toward a goal of uniformity in the field of instrumentation. To be of real
value, this document should not be static but should be subject to periodic review. Toward this
end, the Society welcomes all comments and criticisms and asks that they be addressed to the
Secretary, Standards and Practices Board; ISA; 67 Alexander Drive; P. O. Box 12277; Research
Triangle Park, NC 27709; Telephone (919) 549-8411; Fax (919) 549-8288; E-mail:
standards@isa.org.
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The ISA Standards and Practices Department is aware of the growing need for attention to the
metric system of units in general, and the International System of Units (SI) in particular, in the
preparation of instrumentation standards. The Department is further aware of the benefits to
USA users of ISA standards of incorporating suitable references to the SI (and the metric
system) in their business and professional dealings with other countries. Toward this end, this
Department will endeavor to introduce SI-acceptable metric units in all new and revised
standards, recommended practices, and technical reports to the greatest extent possible.
Standard for Use of the International System of Units (SI): The Modern Metric System, published
by the American Society for Testing & Materials as IEEE/ASTM SI 10-97, and future revisions,
will be the reference guide for definitions, symbols, abbreviations, and conversion factors.
It is the policy of ISA to encourage and welcome the participation of all concerned individuals
and interests in the development of ISA standards, recommended practices, and technical
reports. Participation in the ISA standards-making process by an individual in no way constitutes
endorsement by the employer of that individual, of ISA, or of any of the standards, recommended
practices, and technical reports that ISA develops.
Instrument setpoint drift is a problem that has led to numerous abnormal occurrence reports
(now referred to as "Licensee Event Reports"). Section 50.36, "Technical Specifications," of
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 50, Washington, D.C., 1987, requires that,
where a Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) is specified for a variable on which a safety limit
has been placed, the setting be so chosen that automatic protective action will correct the most
severe abnormal situation anticipated before a safety limit is exceeded. Inappropriate selection
of a setpoint that does not allow sufficient margin to account for instrument accuracy, the
expected environment, and minor calibration variations can result in calculated drift allowances
insufficient for the instrument used. Protective instruments are provided with setpoints where
specific actions are either initiated, terminated, or prohibited. Setpoints correspond to certain
provisions of Technical Specifications that are incorporated into the facility operation license.
The single most prevalent reason for the drift of a setpoint out of compliance with a technical
specification has been the selection of a setpoint that does not allow a sufficient margin between
the technical specification limit to account for instrument accuracy, the expected environment,
and minor calibration variations. In some cases the setpoint selected was numerically equal to
the technical specification limit and stated as an absolute value, thus leaving no apparent margin
for uncertainties. In other cases, the setpoint was so close to the upper or lower limit of the
Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 -4-
instruments range that instrument drift placed the setpoint beyond the instruments range thus
nullifying the trip function. Other causes for drift of a setpoint out of conformity with the technical
specifications have been instrumentation design inadequacies and questionable calibration
procedures.
ISA sponsored a review of the setpoint drift problem in April 1975 by establishing the SP67.4
Subcommittee (now renumbered as SP67.04). The Committees review indicated that a more
thorough consideration of setpoint drift was necessary in the design, test, purchase, installation,
and maintenance of nuclear safety-related instrumentation.
The 1987 revision was made to provide clarification and to reflect current industry practice. The
term "trip setpoint" was made consistent with the terminology used in the NRC Standard
Technical Specifications and reflected what previously was known as "upper setpoint limit."
Many of the changes provided in the 1994 revision reflect the Improved Technical Specification
program (a cooperative effort between industry and the USNRC). With the issuance of ISA-
RP67.04, Part II, Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related
Instrumentation, this document became Part I. Additional changes were made to reflect the
inclusion of the Recommended Practice, Part II to this standard.
The 2005 revision addressed a concern with the basic concept of determining a single allowable
value as an acceptance criterion for testing. A single value didnt support doing testing in
various plant modes or with reduced setpoints. The single value often only applied to rack-
mounted equipment exclusive of the sensors, which are usually the largest error contributors.
And finally, there were questions regarding the appropriateness of using statistical combination
methods when actual uncertainties had been measured in the field. As a result, the 2005
revision recommended one or more performance tests, whose results would have to support the
Technical Specification requirements for the system.
This document was developed to specifically address the establishment and maintenance for
individual safety-related instrument channels.
This standard is intended for use primarily by the owners of nuclear power plant facilities or their
agents (nuclear steam system suppliers, architect/engineers, etc.) in establishing procedures for
determining setpoints, setpoint margins, and test routines in safety-related instrument channels.
However, it is equally applicable to large-scale nuclear production reactors.
This standard uses statistical nomenclature, which is customary and familiar to personnel
responsible for nuclear power plant setpoint calculations and instrument uncertainty evaluation.
It should be noted that this nomenclature may have different definitions in other statistical
applications and is not universal, nor is it intended to be. Furthermore, in keeping with the
conservative philosophy employed in nuclear power plant calculations, the combination of
uncertainty methodology for both independent and dependent uncertainty components is
intended to be bounding. That is, the resultant uncertainty should be correct or overly
conservative to insure safe operation. In cases where more precise estimation of measurement
uncertainty is required, more sophisticated techniques should be employed.
Adherence to this standard will not itself suffice to protect the public health and safety because it
is the integrated performance of the structures, the mechanical systems, the fluid systems, the
instrumentation, and the electrical systems of the plant that limit the consequences of design-
basis events. On the other hand, failure to meet these requirements may be an indication of
system inadequacy. Each application for a construction permit or an operating license for a
nuclear power plant is required to develop these items to comply with Title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations, Chapter 1, Part 50. Applicants have the responsibility to assure themselves and
others that this integrated performance is adequate.
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5 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
ISA Standards Subcommittee SP67.04 operates under SP67, the Nuclear Power Plant Standards
Committee, W. Sotos, Chairman.
CAUTION ISA ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS

INSTITUTE WITH REGARD TO PATENTS. IF ISA IS INFORMED OF AN EXISTING PATENT
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PATENT TO EITHER GRANT A ROYALTY-FREE LICENSE FOR USE OF THE PATENT BY
USERS COMPLYING WITH THE STANDARD OR A LICENSE ON REASONABLE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS THAT ARE FREE FROM UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION.
EVEN IF ISA IS UNAWARE OF ANY PATENT COVERING THIS STANDARD, THE USER IS
CAUTIONED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD MAY REQUIRE USE OF
TECHNIQUES, PROCESSES, OR MATERIALS COVERED BY PATENT RIGHTS. ISA TAKES
NO POSITION ON THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF ANY PATENT RIGHTS THAT MAY BE
INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARD. ISA IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
IDENTIFYING ALL PATENTS THAT MAY REQUIRE A LICENSE BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE STANDARD OR FOR INVESTIGATING THE VALIDITY OR SCOPE OF ANY PATENTS
BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION. THE USER SHOULD CAREFULLY INVESTIGATE RELEVANT
PATENTS BEFORE USING THE STANDARD FOR THE USERS INTENDED APPLICATION.
HOWEVER, ISA ASKS THAT ANYONE REVIEWING THIS STANDARD WHO IS AWARE OF
ANY PATENTS THAT MAY IMPACT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD NOTIFY THE
ISA STANDARDS AND PRACTICES DEPARTMENT OF THE PATENT AND ITS OWNER.
ADDITIONALLY, THE USE OF THIS STANDARD MAY INVOLVE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS,
OPERATIONS OR EQUIPMENT. THE STANDARD CANNOT ANTICIPATE ALL POSSIBLE
APPLICATIONS OR ADDRESS ALL POSSIBLE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH USE IN
HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. THE USER OF THIS STANDARD MUST EXERCISE SOUND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT CONCERNING ITS USE AND APPLICABILITY UNDER THE
USERS PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE USER MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE
APPLICABILITY OF ANY GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY LIMITATIONS AND
ESTABLISHED SAFETY AND HEALTH PRACTICES BEFORE IMPLEMENTING THIS
STANDARD.
THE USER OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE
IMPACTED BY ELECTRONIC SECURITY ISSUES. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT YET
ADDRESSED THE POTENTIAL ISSUES IN THIS VERSION.
The following individuals served as active voting members of the ISA SP67.04 subcommittee:
R. Queenan, Voting Member Chairman Scientech/NUS Instruments

C. Sossman, Voting Member Vice Chairman Washington Safety Mgmt Solutions LLC
R. Webb, Managing Director Consultant
L. Bates Enstat Inc.
W. Brown Consultant
R. Burnham Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
F. Burrows Consultant
T. Burton Florida Power & Light Co.
R. Calvert Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
D. Cottingham Entergy Operations
M. Dougherty Rosemount Nuclear Instruments Inc.
M. Eidson Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
T. Fleischer Entergy Operations Inc.
R. Fredricksen Exelon Nuclear
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ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 -6-
W. Frewin Nebraska Public Power District

H. Garg Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Gotcher MTI Industrial Sensors
J. Guider Constellation Energy
J. Hartman Hart Enterprises Inc.
D. Hooten CP&L Nuclear Engineering & Services
J. Hunsicker AmerGen Energy Company LLC
T. Hurst Hurst Technologies Corp.
R. Jarrett Tennessee Valley Authority
S. Kincaid K & K Services
J. Mauck Consultant
R. Neustadter Consultant
R. Nuelk Nuclear Management Co.
J. Parker Hurst Technologies
E. Quinn BusinessAmerica Corp.
B. Rogers Prairie Island
C. Rupp Cerupp Llc
R. Schwartzbeck Enercon Services Inc.
J. Snelson Progress Energy H B Robinson
W. Sotos STP Nuclear Operating Co.
C. Tuley Westinghouse Electric Co.
P. VandeVisse American Electric Power
J. Voss Isys Consulting Co.
The following individuals served as voting members of ISA SP67:
NAME COMPANY
W. Sotos, Voting Member Chair STP Nuclear Operating Co.

T. Hurst, Voting Member Vice Chair Hurst Technologies Corp.
R. Webb, Voting Member Managing Director Consultant
W. Brown Consultant
T. Burton Florida Power & Light Co.
R. Calvert Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
M. Dougherty Rosemount Nuclear Instruments Inc.
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H. Garg Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Guider Constellation Energy
K. Herman Bechtel National Inc.
R. Queenan Scientech/NUS Instruments
E. Quinn Technology Resources
J. Redmon Southern California Edison
B. Rogers Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
C. Sossman Washington Safety Mgt. Solutions LLC
S. Sykes Triconex Co.
C. R. Tuley Westinghouse Electric Co.
P. VandeVisse American Electric Power
M. Widmeyer Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

7 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
This standard was approved for publication by the Standards and Practices Board on 5 April
2006.
NAME COMPANY
I. Verhappen, President Syncrude Canada, Ltd.

F. Amir E I Du Pont Co.
D. Bishop Consultant
M. Coppler Ametek Inc.
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B. Dumortier Schneider Electric

W. Holland Consultant
E. Icayan ACES Inc.
A. Iverson Ivy Optiks
R. Jones Consultant
K. P. Lindner Endress + Hauser Process Solutions
T. McAvinew Jacobs Engineering Group
A. McCauley Chagrin Valley Controls Inc.
G. McFarland Emerson Process Management
R. Reimer Rockwell Automation
J. Rennie Consultant
N. Sands E I Du Pont Co.
H. Sasajima Yamatake Corp.
T. Schnaare Rosemount Inc.
A. Summers SIS-TECH Solutions LLC
J. Tatera Tatera & Associates
R. Webb Consultant
W. Weidman Parsons Energy and Chemicals
J. Weiss KEMA Inc.
M. Widmeyer Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
C. Williams Eastman Kodak Co.
M. Zielinski Emerson Process Management

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9 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
Table of Contents
1 Purpose .......................................................................................................................... 11
2 Scope ............................................................................................................................. 11
3 Definitions ...................................................................................................................... 11
4 Establishment of Setpoints .............................................................................................. 13
4.1 Safety Limits ............................................................................................................... 13
4.2 Analytical Limits .......................................................................................................... 13
4.3 Trip Setpoints ............................................................................................................. 14
4.4 Choosing Trip Setpoints .............................................................................................. 14
4.5 Combination of Uncertainties....................................................................................... 16
4.6 Performance Test Acceptance Criteria ......................................................................... 17
5 Documentation................................................................................................................ 17
6 Maintenance of safety-related setpoints........................................................................... 18
6.1 Testing ....................................................................................................................... 18
6.2 Replacement............................................................................................................... 18
7 References ..................................................................................................................... 19
8 Informative References ................................................................................................... 20
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11 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
1 Purpose
The purpose of this standard is to define the bases for establishing safetyrelated and other
important instrument setpoints associated with nuclear power plants and nuclear reactor
facilities.
2 Scope
This standard defines the requirements for assessing, establishing, and maintaining nuclear
safety-related and other important instrument setpoints associated with nuclear power plants or
nuclear reactor facilities. The scope includes instrumentation-based setpoints that assure
compliance to one or more design limits.
3 Definitions
3.1 Analytical limit (AL):

limit of a measured or calculated variable established by the safety analysis to ensure that a
safety limit is not exceeded.
3.2 As found:
the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is found after a period of operation and
before recalibration (if necessary).
3.3 As left:
the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is left after calibration or final setpoint
device setpoint verification.
3.4 Design basis:

the design basis for protection systems is as defined in Part 4, Safety System Design Basis, of
IEEE Standard 603-1980. (See IEEE Std. 603.)
3.5 Drift:
a variation in sensor or instrument channel output that may occur between calibrations that
cannot be related to changes in the process variable or environmental conditions. (ANSI/ISA-
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67.06.01-2002)
3.6 Error:
the arithmetic difference between the indication and the ideal value of the measured signal. (See
ANSI/ ISA-51.1-1979 (R1993).)
3.7 Final setpoint device:

a component, or assembly of components, that provides input to the process voting logic for
actuated equipment.
NOTE Examples of final setpoint devices are bistables, relays, pressure switches, and level switches.
3.8 Instrument channel:

an arrangement of components and modules as required to generate a single protective action
signal when required by a plant condition. A channel loses its identity where single protective
action signals are combined. (See IEEE Std. 603.)

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 12
3.9 Limiting safety system setting (LSSS):

Limiting safety system settings for nuclear reactors are settings for automatic protective devices
related to those variables having significant safety functions. Where a limiting safety system
setting is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be so
chosen that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a safety limit is
exceeded. (10CFR50.36-2002).
3.10 Nuclear safety-related instrumentation:

that which is essential to the following:
a) Provide emergency reactor shutdown;

b) Provide containment isolation;
c) Provide reactor core cooling;
d) Provide for containment or reactor heat removal; or
e) Prevent or mitigate a significant release of radioactive material to the environment
or is otherwise essential to provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant or nuclear
reactor facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
3.11 Performance test:
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a test that evaluates the performance of equipment against a set of criteria. The results of the
test are used to support an operability determination.
3.12 Reference accuracy (also known as Accuracy Rating as defined in ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979

[R1993]):
a number or quantity that defines a limit that errors will not exceed when a device is used under
specified operating conditions. (See ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979 (R1993).)
3.13 Safety limit (SL):

a limit on an important process variable that is necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of
physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. (See 10CFR,
50.36[c][1][i][A].)
3.14 Sensor:
the portion of a channel that responds to changes in a process variable and converts the
measured process variable into an instrument signal (See ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979[R1993]).
3.15 Trip setpoint limiting (LTSP):

the limiting value for the nominal trip setpoint so that the trip or actuation will occur before the AL
is reached, regardless of the process or environmental conditions affecting the instrumentation.
3.16 Trip setpoint nominal (NTSP):

a predetermined value for actuation of a final setpoint device to initiate a protective action.
3.17 Uncertainty:
the amount to which an instrument channels output is in doubt (or the allowance made for such
doubt) due to possible errors, either random or systematic. The uncertainty is generally identified
within a probability and confidence level.
Additional definitions related to instrumentation terminology and uncertainty may be found in

ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979 (R1993) and ANSI/ISA-37.1-1975 (R1982).

13 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
4 Establishment of Setpoints
Setpoints of nuclear safety-related instruments shall be selected such that resultant actions will
correct the monitored condition or mitigate the consequences of the monitored condition.
The importance of the various types of setpoints differs, and as such it may be appropriate to
apply setpoint determination requirements of different levels of rigor. For automatic setpoints that
have a significant importance to safety, a rigorous setpoint methodology should be used - for
example, those required by the plant safety analyses and related to Reactor Protection System,
Emergency Core-Cooling Systems, Containment Isolation, and Containment Heat Removal.
However, for setpoints that may not have the same level of importance, the setpoint
determination methodology could be less rigorous - for example, those that are not credited in
the safety analyses or do not have limiting values. In all cases, the methodologies utilized shall
be documented and appropriate justification for their use shall be provided.
The discussions in the remainder of Section 4 are written for safety-related trip or actuation
setpoints with rigorous requirements; the discussions are applicable in general for setpoints with
less rigorous requirements.
NOTE: Although the scope of this standard is limited to nuclear power plants and nuclear reactor facilities, the same
principles apply to setpoints for other nuclear facilities.
4.1 Safety Limits

Nuclear power plants and nuclear reactor facilities include physical barriers that are designed to
prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Safety limits (SL) are chosen to maintain the
integrity of these physical barriers. Safety limits can be defined in terms of directly measured
process variables such as pressure or temperature. Safety limits can also be defined in terms of
a calculated variable involving two or more measured process variables, such as departure from
nucleate boiling ratio.
4.2 Analytical Limits

The Analytical Limit (AL) is the value of a given process variable at which the safety analysis
models the initiation of the instrument channel protective action. ALs are documented in the
safety analysis calculations and/or the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Performance of the safety analyses with conservative ALs demonstrates that the established
Safety Limits and other acceptance criteria are not exceeded during normal plant transients,
Anticipated Operational Occurrences, and other design basis transients. Note that only specific
trip functions and/or safeguards features are required to operate for each postulated event.
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ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 14
4.3 Trip Setpoints

Trip setpoints are chosen to assure that a
trip or safety actuation occurs before the
process reaches the AL. Trip setpoints are
also chosen to assure that the plant can Plant Process
operate and experience expected
operational transients without unnecessary
trips or safeguards actuations. Safety Limit
The limiting trip setpoint (LTSP) is Analytical Limit

the least conservative value of the
nominal trip setpoint that still
protects the AL. Limiting Trip
The nominal trip setpoint (NTSP) can

be more conservative than the LTSP Range of Nominal
due to plant conditions or as a Trip Setpoint
compensatory action.
The actual trip setpoint is known only

at the time of measurement, as
instrument uncertainty (including Range for Operating
drift) will cause the actual trip Transients
setpoint to vary over a small range.
It is the as-found or as-left value Normal Operation
when measured.
See the figure for a graphical relationship between these values.

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4.4 Choosing Trip Setpoints

The choice of a LTSP requires determining the Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU). The TLU
represents the expected performance of the instrumentation under any applicable process and
environmental conditions. Note that the trip or actuation is only required to mitigate certain
postulated events; only the process and environmental conditions that occur during those
postulated events need be considered. The LTSP and NTSP for a trip or actuation on an
increasing process would be:
LTSP = AL TLU
NTSP = AL TLU Margin
where margin is discretionary or may be chosen based on the methodology applied. Data used
to calculate the TLU should be obtained from appropriate sources, which may include any of the
following: operating experience, equipment qualification tests, equipment specifications,
engineering analysis, laboratory tests, and engineering drawings. The TLU shall account for the
effects of all applicable design-basis events and the following process instrument uncertainties
unless they were included in the determination of the analytical limit, considering as a minimum
the following:
a) Instrument calibration uncertainties caused by:
1) calibration standards;
2) calibration equipment;

15 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
3) calibration method; and

4) setting tolerance.
b) Instrument uncertainties during normal operation caused by:
1) reference accuracy, including conformity (linearity), hysteresis, dead band, and

repeatability;
2) power supply voltage changes;
3) power supply frequency changes;
4) temperature changes;
5) humidity changes;
6) pressure changes;
7) vibration;
8) radiation exposure;
9) process effects;
10) instrumentation transfer functions;
11) analog-to-digital conversion; and
12) digital-to-analog conversion.
c) Instrument drift
All instruments may not have the same calibration interval. The drift used should be
based on instrument specific calibration intervals.
d) Instrument uncertainties caused by design-basis events
Only uncertainties specific to the event and required period of service should be used.
The use of different uncertainty components for the same process equipment for different
events is permitted. Any residual effects of a design-basis event shall also be included.
The following are examples of these effects:
1) Temperature effects
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The uncertainties associated with event-specific temperature profiles shall be

used where possible. If these are not available, use the uncertainty associated
with a bounding temperature.
2) Radiation effects
The uncertainties associated with event-specific radiation exposure shall be used

where possible. If these are not available, the uncertainty associated with a
bounding radiation exposure (including Total Integrated Dose and rate effects)
may be used.
3) Seismic/vibratory effects
The uncertainties associated with a safe shutdown or operating basis earthquake

shall be used, as appropriate.
e) Process-dependent effects
The determination of the trip setpoint allowance shall account for uncertainties
associated with the process variable. Examples are (but are not limited to) the effect of
fluid stratification on temperature measurement, the effect of changing fluid density on
level measurements, and process oscillations or noise.

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 16
f) Calculation effects
The determination of the trip setpoint allowance shall account for uncertainties resulting
from the use of a mathematical model to calculate a variable from measured process
variables. An example is (but is not limited to) the determination of primary side power via
the secondary side power calorimetric.
g) Dynamic effects
The behavior of a channels output as a function of the input with respect to time shall be
accounted for, either in the determination of the trip setpoint or included in the safety
analyses. Normally, these effects are accounted for in the safety analyses.
h) Calibration and installation bias accounting
Any bias of fixed magnitude and known direction due to equipment installation or
calibration method shall be either eliminated during calibration or accounted for in the
uncertainty analysis.
Additional guidance on determining TLUs can be found in ISA-RP67.04.02-2000, Methodologies

for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation.
4.5 Combination of Uncertainties
The uncertainty terms discussed above can be either deterministic, statistical, or some
combination and shall be combined using appropriate techniques. The result of the combination
shall be a value that represents the performance of the instrumentation, either with a 95%
probability, or (where information is limited) with high probability as justified by reasonable basis.
Square-root-sum-of-squares (SRSS) and arithmetic are appropriate techniques for combining

uncertainties. Alternate techniques, including probabilistic modeling, stochastic modeling, or a
combination of these techniques may also be used.
Additional guidance on combining instrumentation uncertainties can be found in ISA-RP67.04.02-

2000, Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related
Instrumentation.
4.5.1 Square-root-sum-of-squares method

It is acceptable to combine uncertainties that are random, normally distributed, and independent
by the SRSS method. When two independent uncertainties, ( a) and ( b), are combined by this
method, the resulting uncertainty is ( c), where c = SQRT(a + b).
4.5.2 Arithmetic method

It is acceptable to combine uncertainties that are not random, not normally distributed, or are
dependent by the arithmetic method. In this method, the combination of two dependent
uncertainties, (+a, -b) and (+c, -d), results in a third uncertainty distribution with limits + (a+c), -
(b+d).
4.5.3 Test Interval and Scope

The time between tests and the test scope may affect the magnitudes of some of the
uncertainties. Therefore, the uncertainty analysis shall include consideration of the test scope
and limiting test interval.
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17 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
4.5.4 As left Limits

The uncertainty analysis should determine an as left band, bounding the equipment performance
after calibration. This tolerance should be included in the TLU such that leaving the equipment
anywhere in the as left band will assure a trip before the AL is reached.
4.6 Performance Test Acceptance Criteria
Instrumentation that implements safety-related or important to safety setpoints shall be

periodically tested to verify the equipment performs as expected. This may consist of one or
more performance tests.
The acceptance criteria for all performance tests shall be based on a prediction of the expected
performance of the tested instrumentation under the test conditions. The acceptance criteria
should avoid masking equipment degradation. The criteria shall be developed from the same
data and using the same (or more conservative) combinational techniques as that used to
determine the TLU. Only those effects expected to be present during the test shall be included
in the calculation of the performance test acceptance criteria. These are typically limited to:
setting tolerance;
instrument uncertainties during normal operation including drift; and
measurement and test equipment uncertainties.
The performance test acceptance criteria may also be known as the as-found and as-left limits
(or band) for the test being performed.
Some Technical Specifications include an allowable value (AV). If an AV is included, it should

be an upper limit of a performance test acceptance criterion.
5 Documentation
The various aspects of the uncertainty calculation (e.g., instrument uncertainties, process
effects, calculation methods, data sources, and assumptions) shall be documented.
a) The method(s) by which setpoints are calculated shall be documented. The

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documentation may include, as appropriate, the following:
1) The relationship between the analytical limit, the acceptance criteria, the NTSP, the
LTSP, the as-found limit, and the as-left limit;
2) The uncertainty terms that are addressed;
3) The method used to combine uncertainty terms; and
4) Justification of statistical combination methods (other than SRSS or arithmetic
combination).
b) The setpoint calculations shall be documented. The documentation may include, as

appropriate, the following:
1) A description of the instrument channel, including the manufacturer and model

number of all devices that contribute to the channel uncertainty;
2) The relationship between instrument and process measurement units;
3) The analytical limit;
4) The basis for selection of the limiting and nominal trip setpoints;
5) Data used to select the limiting and nominal trip setpoints, including the source of the
data;
6) Assumptions used to select the trip setpoint, e.g., ambient temperature limits for
equipment .calibration and operation and their bases;

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 18
7) Known installation and calibration bias values that could affect the setpoint;
8) Correction factors used to determine the setpoint, e.g., pressure compensation to
account for elevation difference between the trip measurement point and the sensor
physical location; and
9) Accuracy of the measurement and test equipment used in the calibration or functional
testing.
c) Performance test acceptance criteria and their bases shall be documented.

d) Performance test data shall be documented, including as-left data and as-found data.
6 Maintenance of Safety-Related Setpoints
The following addresses those aspects of safety-related instrument setpoint maintenance

necessary to support the trip setpoints. This information is supplemental to other industry
standards that give guidance in maintenance of safety-related setpoints.
6.1 Testing
Periodic channel tests shall be performed at an appropriate test interval to ensure that the
instrument channel is functioning in compliance with the safety analysis or uncertainty analysis
and to verify that trip setpoints remain within their established limits during operation. Formal
documentation of the test results is necessary to support the investigation and resolution of any
occurrence where a limit is exceeded. Exceeding a limit in either a high or low direction may
indicate degraded performance and inability of the instrument channel to meet its intended
function.
This verification shall be achieved by recording as-found data to determine the setpoint in terms
of the measured or derived process variables, prior to any adjustment. As-found data should be
the data taken during the first traverse in the direction of concern during the test. If multiple
traverses are performed, the results of the traverse with the largest deviation shall be utilized.
If as-found data indicates that an acceptance criterion was exceeded, appropriate corrective
action shall be taken. This action should include, as required, investigation to determine the
cause of the finding, evaluation of operability, interim compensatory actions, trending, and
appropriate corrective action to prevent a re-occurrence. Possible actions for consideration are:
a) adjustment of testing frequency;

b) setpoint revision (in the conservative direction);
c) reevaluation of the trip setpoint or acceptance criterion (as applicable);
d) evaluation of equipment installation and environment;
e) evaluation of calibration (equipment and technique);
f) repair or replacement of the device; or
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g) procedure change to implement supplemental actions
6.2 Replacement
The performance of replacement materials, parts, and components shall be evaluated with
respect to instrument uncertainties and the continued validity of the trip setpoint, the test
acceptance criteria, the uncertainty analysis, and all related requirements and conditions.

19 ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006
7 References
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (IEEE)
Standard 338, Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating
Station Class 1E Power and Production Systems
Standard 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations
Available from:
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IEEE
445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331
Tel: (732) 981-0060
INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS AND AUTOMATION SOCIETY (ISA)
ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979 (R1993), Process Instrumentation Terminology

ISA-RP67.04.02-2000, Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear
Safety-Related Instrumentation
ANSI/ISA-67.06.01-2002, Performance Monitoring for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrument
Channels in Nuclear Power Plants
Available from:
ISA
67 Alexander Drive
P.O. Box 12277
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Tel: (919) 549-8411
UNITED STATES CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR)
Title 10 Part 50 Paragraphs 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) and 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Available from:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

NEI 96-07, Rev. 1, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, November 2000
Available from:
Nuclear Energy Institute,
Attn: Publications Office
Suite 400
1776 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20006-3708
Tel: 202-739-8000 ext 8148 or 8054

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 20
8 Informative References
ISA has developed standards for the nuclear industry through SP67, Nuclear Power Plant
Standards Committee (NPPSC). ISA and other standards of possible interest to the reader are
listed below.
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ANSI)
ANSI/ASME NQA-1, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities
Available from:
ANSI
11 West 42nd Street
New York, NY 10036
Tel: (212) 642-4900
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (IEEE)
Standard 352, Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power
Generating Station Protection Systems
Available from:
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IEEE
445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331
Tel: (732) 981-0060
INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS AND AUTOMATION SOCIETY (ISA)
ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999, Nuclear-Safety-Related Instrument Sensing Line Piping and

Tubing Standards for Use in Nuclear Power Plants
ANSI/ISA-67.01-1994, Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety
Applications
Available from:
ISA
P.O. Box 12277
Tel: (919) 549-8411
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1: Information to Licensees Regarding NRC

Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions
Available from:
Qualex International
P.O. Box 255
Rockville, MD 20848-0255
Tel: (301) 770-8952

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Developing and promulgating sound consensus standards, recommended practices, and
technical reports is one of ISAs primary goals. To achieve this goal the Standards and Practices
Department relies on the technical expertise and efforts of volunteer committee members,
chairmen and reviewers.
ISA is an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) accredited organization. ISA administers
United States Technical Advisory Groups (USTAGs) and provides secretariat support for
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) committees that develop process measurement and control standards. To
obtain additional information on the Societys standards program, please write:
ISA
Attn: Standards Department
67 Alexander Drive
P.O. Box 12277
ISBN -10: 1-55617-994-4
ISBN -13: 978-1-55617-994-5
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AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD

Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-

Approved 16 May 2006

Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-

Approved 16 May 2006

Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

ISBN -10: 1-55617-994-4

ISBN -13: 978-1-55617-994-5

Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

--``,,,`,,,``,``,,,`,``-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`--- Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

CAUTION ISA ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS

R. Queenan, Voting Member Chairman Scientech/NUS Instruments

W. Frewin Nebraska Public Power District

The following individuals served as voting members of ISA SP67:

W. Sotos, Voting Member Chair STP Nuclear Operating Co.

H. Garg Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

I. Verhappen, President Syncrude Canada, Ltd.

B. Dumortier Schneider Electric

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

Copyright The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

3.1 Analytical limit (AL):

3.4 Design basis:

3.7 Final setpoint device:

3.8 Instrument channel:

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

3.9 Limiting safety system setting (LSSS):

3.10 Nuclear safety-related instrumentation:

a) Provide emergency reactor shutdown;

3.11 Performance test:

3.12 Reference accuracy (also known as Accuracy Rating as defined in ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979

3.13 Safety limit (SL):

3.15 Trip setpoint limiting (LTSP):

3.16 Trip setpoint nominal (NTSP):

Additional definitions related to instrumentation terminology and uncertainty may be found in

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

4.1 Safety Limits

4.2 Analytical Limits

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

4.3 Trip Setpoints

The limiting trip setpoint (LTSP) is Analytical Limit

The nominal trip setpoint (NTSP) can

The actual trip setpoint is known only

See the figure for a graphical relationship between these values.

4.4 Choosing Trip Setpoints

a) Instrument calibration uncertainties caused by:

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

3) calibration method; and

b) Instrument uncertainties during normal operation caused by:

1) reference accuracy, including conformity (linearity), hysteresis, dead band, and

d) Instrument uncertainties caused by design-basis events

The uncertainties associated with event-specific temperature profiles shall be

The uncertainties associated with event-specific radiation exposure shall be used

The uncertainties associated with a safe shutdown or operating basis earthquake

Copyright 2006 ISA. All rights reserved.

h) Calibration and installation bias accounting

Additional guidance on determining TLUs can be found in ISA-RP67.04.02-2000, Methodologies

4.5 Combination of Uncertainties

Square-root-sum-of-squares (SRSS) and arithmetic are appropriate techniques for combining