On Narrativity

Author(s): Algirdas Julien Greimas, Paul Ricoeur, Paul Perron and Frank Collins
Source: New Literary History, Vol. 20, No. 3, Greimassian Semiotics (Spring, 1989), pp. 551-562
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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 On Narrativity*

AlgirdasJulienGreimas and Paul Ricoeur

RICOEUR: It is a pleasuretoshareonceagaina discussionsession

with ProfessorGreimas. Our paths have often crossed over
the years and our friendshiphas increased along withthese
exchanges. Let me firstsay how my own agenda led me not only to
cross Greimas's path but also led me along the same road withhim.
Coming fromthe disciplinesof phenomenologyand hermeneutics,I
was firstinterestedin the way semioticsresponds to the aporias of
hermeneutics,whichis fundamentallybased on the notion of preun-
derstandingthatis necessarybefore scientificdiscourse on literature
and more specificallyon narrativecan be elaborated.
My initialconvictionwas, and to a large extentstillis, thatwe have
a firstmode of understandingnarrativeconfigurationbefore having
the slightestnotion about semiotics.When linguistsspeak of pho-
nemes theyare dealing withobjectsthathave no social or institutional
existence.Narratives,by contrast,already have theirsocial functions,
and theyare understood in a certainway in social intercourseamong
writers,narrators,readers, and speakers, for example. Therefore,
if I may so call it, has in a sense its own
thisfirstorder intelligibility,
rules which are, if not thought out, at least understood. The best
document concerningthis type of understandingprior to any semi-
otics is provided by Aristotle'sPoetics,which has a very articulate
systemof categoriesthat ignores the differencebetween deep struc-
tures and surface structures.Aristotlespeaks of the "mythos"as the
configurationof incidencein the storyand uses the term"sustasis"to
referto a sortof systemof events.But the kind of intelligibility linked
to our acquaintance withthe way storiesare plottedis closer to what
Aristotlein the restof his workcalled "forensis,"thatis to say, prac-
ticalintelligence,whichis closer to the way we use our intelligencein
ethical and political mattersthan it is to the kind of episteme that
functionsin physicaland social sciences at theirsystematiclevel.

* This discussion was the

closing session of a colloquium on the "Universals of
Narrativity"held at VictoriaCollege, Universityof Toronto, on June 17, 1984 during
the FifthInternationalSummer Institutefor Semioticand StructuralStudies.

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552 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

My firstapproach to semioticswas thereforeto considerthe kind of

rationalityit introducedin thisfieldas being a second-orderrational-
itythat has as its object not narrativesthemselvesbut the preunder-
standingwe have of them. Hence, I would say thatthe rationalityat
work in semioticsderives fromthis first-order without
intelligibility,
being subordinatedto it,for it has itsown functionpreciselybecause
it introducesa new kind of rationalityintothisfirst-order intelligence
and understanding.This can be compared to what happens in the
field of history,where there is a sense of belonging,a traditionof
having expectations of the future. Thus, there is a kind of inner
intelligence,an intelligibilityof the historicalitythatcharacterizesus.
But when historiansbring their rules of explanation to bear on a
topic, an inquiry and a dialectic is introduced between first-order
the intelligibility
intelligibility, of being historical,and historiography,
the writingof history.
My main theme would thereforebe thatto explain more is to un-
derstand better,and it is in the exchange between understanding
better and explaining more that semioticsmakes sense for me. It
increasesthe readabilityof textswhichwe have alreadyunderstoodto
a certain extent withoutthe help of semiotics.Hence the following
three problems that we shall discuss since ProfessorGreimas kindly
accepted the format of my own questions, for which I am most
grateful.
The firstproblem I would like to raise is the relationshipin Grei-
mas's semiotic system between deep structures,with their para-
digmatic principles,and superficialor surface structures.1I would
like to go even furtherand raise the problem of the relationship
between these deeper structuresand the textunderstood at the locus
of figuration,the figurativelevel of the story.My hunch here would
be thatifthe rulesof transformation thatbelong to a logic of narrative
have a narrativecharacter,it is to the extent that theygo from the
peripeteia of the surface to the dynamics,withoutwhich the system
would not exist. My claim here is thatsurfaceis more than a kind of
reflectionof deep structure,it is more than the instantiationof nar-
rative rules that can be construed at the deeper level. Something
happens at the level of figurationthat makes the dynamismof the
processesdescribed possible. In otherwords,to use vocabularyfamil-
iar to semioticians,in the shiftfromparadigmaticstructuresto their
syntagmatization, the historicizationof the storyoccurs at the surface
and then it is by reflectionof the surface at the deep level that the
deep level itselfmay be said to transform,to provide transformations
froma firststate of effectto a last stateof effect.
To illustratethis point I will take two examples, the second from

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ON NARRATIVITY 553
Greimas's work itself.The firstexample is the studyby one of Grei-
mas's formerstudents,Louis Marin, on narrativein the Gospels, in
which he examined the role of the traitorwho may be defined as an
opponent.2 In the actantialsystemit is easy to recognize the place of
the traitorin the system,but the factthatthistraitorisJudas, and that
he has individualcharacteristics, is not secondary.For we can see that
in the developmentof the character,say fromMark toJohn, there is
an increasing enrichmentthat at the same time enriches the story
itself,the plot itself.In Mark,Judas is simplyone of the twelveapos-
tleswho shares the same meal withJesus. He fulfillsthe prophecythat
the Son of Man will be delivered to His enemies, but there is some-
thingcontingentat everymoment,sinceJudas is a proper name that
connectsthe functionof deliveringthe Son of Man to the traitorwho
makes treasonhappen. Making somethinghappen thereforeseems to
introduce a contingency,the equivalent of what Aristotlecalled the
peripeteia,whichbelongs, I think,to the surfaceof the text.It would
thereforeseem to me that we cannot apply to the relation between
deep structuresand surfacestructuressomethingwhichwould be too
close, forexample, to the unfortunatedistinctionbetween infrastruc-
ture and superstructurein Marx, where the superstructurewould be
a mere reflectionof the infrastructure. We have here instead a dia-
lecticof a kind thatneeds to be recognized.
I will take my second example from Greimas's wonderful book,
Maupassant:TheSemiotics ofText:PracticalExercises,
a 250-page analysis
of a 6-page shortstory,"Two Friends."3The surfaceof the textnar-
rates the storyof a failed fishingexpedition that will end with a
reversalof roles because theenemywho has captured the unfortunate
fishermendoes not succeed in making them confess they are spies
and thatthe fishingexpeditionis a cover story.The twofriendsrefuse
to accept the role of spies, and theyare executed by a firingsquad.
The importanteventis thattheyare cast intothe waterand givenback
to the fish.At the end of the tale the Prussianofficercatches the fish
and has them friedup for himself.According to Greimas's analyses,
in fact, it is the unfortunatefishermenwho offer the fish to the
officer. Greimas comes to this conclusion by constructingall the
proper semioticsquares. He sets in the rightplace the oppositions
between life and nonlife,death and nondeath and thereforeall the
exchanges among the four poles of the square. But it seems to me
there is somethingdecisive that does not belong to the model as a
logical model, namely, the way in which the homologation of the
individual charactersis made in relation to the roles. This homolo-
gation of the sun with cold life, the empty sky with cold nonlife,
Mount Valerian withcold death, and the waterwithcold nondeath is

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554 NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY

brought about through the initiativeof the enunciator. It is very

importantfor thishomologationto be decisive since it gives the clue
to the whole storyand makes the immersionof the unfortunatefish-
ermen into a quasi resurrection.The enunciator's initiationof this
veryhomologationmakes the storyunique. This is the storyin which
the miraculous fishingexpedition in the end becomes the loser's vic-
tory.Therefore one could ask if it is not the surfaceof the text that
provides the element of contingencyand the series of unpredictable
decisions which keep the storymoving. Pushing this to the limit,I
would say finallythatthe deep structurereflectsthe surfaceand not
the contrary.
GREIMAS: In order to understandthe questions raised by Professor
Ricoeur and the objectionsthatcould be made to semiotictheory,it is
necessaryforme to make the followinggeneral points.I feel thatnot
only in semioticsbut also in linguisticsmore generally,and, again, in
the whole of the social sciences,the firstmajor methodologicalstep
necessaryis the identificationof pertinentlevels. It is only when a
scientificprojectpositsthe objectsit wishesto describeor constructat
a specific level, and not at ten differentlevels, that it can hold a
coherent discourse on these objects. This constitutes,I believe, the
superiorityof linguisticsover the other human sciences. Yet, this is
also the general rule to be followedifone wishesto carryout rigorous
semioticpractice.Thus, the distinctionbetweenthe deep and surface
levels is an importantmethodologicalchoice. When developing mod-
els of descriptionof narrativestructures,it is necessaryonce again to
identifytwolevels: an abstractdeep level and a more concretesurface
level. The differencebetween the two is that the surface level is an
anthropomorphiclevel, because all syntax of natural languages is
anthropomorphic.There exist subjects,objects,beneficiaries;quali-
ficationsare attributedto subjects,for example. Linguistsgenerally
tryto hide this fact,but it cannot be hidden when one investigates
discourse froma semanticperspective.This narrativelevel of an an-
thropomorphicnaturepositsrelationsbetweensubjectand object,the
sender and receiver,whichare fundamental.The deeper level we try
to establishis the level of abstractoperations,thatis to say,operations
in which the operatingsubjectis no longer a human subjectbut,just
as science demands, a substitutablesubject. This is what guarantees
the transmissibility of scientificknowledge. Often people do not un-
derstandthe necessityI feltto positthe existenceof thisdeep abstract
level.
As to the semioticsquare, it could be a square or a cube or a circle.
The shape is of no importancewhatsoever.It was necessaryto for-
mulate a minimum number of relational tools, and in this case, a

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ON NARRATIVITY 555

fundamentalstructureof discoursethatwas as simpleas possible.The

other problem raised is related to the passage fromone level to an-
other. When passing fromthe surfacelevel, whatalwaysraised prob-
lems forChomsky'sgenerativegrammaris thathe wanted to keep the
equivalence of forms between the unfolding at one level and the
syntactic at theother,
unraveling insemiotics,
whereas whenpassing
fromone levelto anotherleveltowardthe surface,we posita pro-
gressiveincreasein signification.
Hence,thereis an increasein mean-
ing as we go from deep structurestoward the surface, and this in-
crease in meaning must be distinguishedfrom the increase in
horizontalmeaning which Paul Ricoeur spoke about. Withina story,
meaning increases syntagmatically. We notice-simply, for example,
by consulting a reader such as the one published by Dell Hymes on
Language in Cultureand Society-that three thousand human commu-
nitiesfabricateproverbs,riddles,stories,and so on in the same way,
and thattheynarratethese by using formswhichare, mutatismutan-
dis, identical.4Consequently,when we speak about semio-narrative
structureswe are in factdealing withkindsof universalsof language,
or rather with narrativeuniversals. If we were not afraid of meta-
physicswe could say that these are propertiesof the human mind.
The collectiveactantpossesses these narrativeuniversalsand so does
humanity.However, the semio-narrativelevel must be distinguished
fromwhatI call the discursivelevel since individualsare the ones who
fabricatediscourse. They do so by using narrative structuresthat
already exist,thatactuallycoexistwithindividuals.I thusimagine the
subject of enunciation as a kind of funnel into which the narrative
structures are poured drop by drop, and from which discourse
emerges. This discourse,thatis the product of the instanceof enun-
ciation,can also be divided into levels of depth, a thematiclevel and
a figurativelevel. This I feel is the beginningof an answer to your
question.
The set of constraintsthat is presupposed, that exists prior to all
discourse,language, and thought,is so great that many semioticians
do not know how to come to grips withit. For example, in his inau-
gural discourse at the Colletgede France, my friendRoland Barthes
said thatlanguage was fascist.I believe thathe attributedtoo great an
honor to fascism.We live by our organs, by our desires, in a circum-
scribed world, and our possibilitiesare limited. There are a great
manyrestrictivethingsin human activity,and there is nothingfascist
or communist about this. It is simply a question of the common
human condition.However, ifwe raise the question of the instanceof
enunciation,then all of the loversof libertycan take heart. The sub-
ject of enunciation partakes of all possible liberties.Once again a

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556 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY

semioticdeviationappears where each one makes use of all the pos-

sible specificitiesand libertiesof discourse. We should take things
much more seriously.The characteristicsof discursivesemioticsand
what happens withthe settingintodiscourse,or withdiscursivization,
is essentiallya phenomenon of spatialization,temporalization,and
actorialization.Actantsalso are transformedinto actors. But to say
thatdiscourseis dependent upon space and timeis already to inscribe
discourse,as well as the subject pronouncingit,withinexteriority.In
fact,itcorrespondsto projectingdiscourseoutside the I, the subjectof
enunciation,and startingto relate storiesabout the world.
This level of discourse is extremelyimportantand is probablythe
least studied of all in semiotics.It is also the least organized since we
have onlya veryfewideas and projectsto create models to account for
it. In any case, a hypotheticalprovisional distinctioncan be made
between the thematicand figurativelevels. For example, when Cha-
teaubriand says that"mylifewas as sad as the autumn leaves carried
offby the wind,"you can see that"mylifewas as sad" is thematic,let
us say, more abstract than "the autumn leaves carried off by the
wind." But one part of the sentencesays the same thingas the other.
They can thus be superimposed,and we obtain a metaphorthat will
be the figurativelevel. The figurativeis a way of speaking in either
temporal or spatial figures,and if we examine our own discourse we
note thateverythingbelongs to one or theotherof these.The concept
of figuresis of major theoreticalimportanceforus not only,as some
claim, because in paintingwe distinguishabstractart fromfigurative
art, but also because this term,which is taken from Hjelmslev's lin-
guistictheory,correspondsto the nonsign,or the semanticpartof the
sign. On the other hand, "figure"also permitsus to exploit the con-
cept of "gestalt,"the psychologyof forms.The problem is to know
how discourse is composed-not with these photographicrepresen-
tationsof objects,but withschemata,so to speak, of objects-and how
it is used in the most diverse situations.Chains of figuresessentially
constituteso-callednarrativediscourse; and what narrative,fromthis
perspective,happens to correspondto is the exploitationof narrative
structuresfrom the deep level. We use parts of the narrativestruc-
tures thatwe need, and we set themin our own discourse and clothe
our own discourse in a figurativemanner. Yet theredo existmore or
less abstractdiscourses.
RICOEUR:Figures are much more than a garment.What I mean to
say is thatat thislevel thereis more than an investment,in the sense
of an instantiation;in fact,there is somethingproductive. Precisely
what is productiveis that you cannot have spatialization,temporal-
ization, and actorializationwithoutplot. The differentkinds of plot

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ON NARRATIVITY 557

produced in the historyof narrativeshow us thatwhatwe are dealing

with is not merelyan application and projectionat the surface,but
thatthereis somethingreallyproductivewhichfollowsrules,and that
these rules forplot constructionbelong to the figurativelevel. Hence,
there is productivityof the figurativelevel. I would like to returnto
thisproblemlater.The pointI wantto make here is thatthe figurative
level provides the dynamicsfor the rules of transformationand that
theyare projectedbackwardsfromthe surfaceto the deep structures.
GREIMAS: You are rightto take me to task for having said that the
figurativeclothed narrativestructures.This is a bad metaphor and
certainlynot the way to express the problem. One should firstof all
take into account thatthe mode of existenceof narrativestructuresis
a virtualmode of existence. Narrativestructuresdo not exist per se
but are a mere momentin the generationof signification.When the
subject of enunciationsays something,he uttersa durativediscourse
and proceeds by means of figuresthatare linked up. It is the figures
that bear the tracesof narrativeuniversals.
RICOEUR: I want to approach the problem froma differentangle.
Are therenot waysof dealing withnarrativewhich,in a sense, bypass
this distinctionbetween deep structureand surface structure?Be-
cause of all the difficultiesin connectingthe levels, the freedom of
enunciation,and also the constraintsof the last level, I insistthat on
thislast or thirdlevel, thislevel of figurativization
has its own rules.
Let us startwitha commentmade a few decades ago by Kate Ham-
burger in her book The Logic ofLiterature,5 when she writesthat the
great feat of narrative-"epic," in her own terms-is to explore minds
in the third person narrative,to take all the narrative procedures
throughwhichwe makejudgments on the thoughts,feelings,actions
of third persons, and to transferthem into firstperson narrative,
therebycreatinga pseudoautobiography.If we thensay thatthe func-
tion of narrativeis to provide a kind of mimesisof other minds, we
need new categories,and we need to know whetherthese categories
belong to the developmentof yourown semiotics,or whethertheyare
foreignto it. This is not a critiquebut, rather,a question.
Let us thereforelook at what is required if we begin thisway, the
way Dorritt Cohn did in her work TransparentMinds,6where she
showed that narrativesalways have this functionof exploring other
minds. If we do so, we get constraintsof anotherkind whichare more
of a typologicalthan a structuralnature. This is the route firstfol-
lowed by Stanzel in his attemptto work out a typologyof narrative
situationsand, more powerfully,by Lubomir Dolezel in his attemptto
set up a dialecticbetween the discourse of the narratorand the dis-
course of the character.The next step is to introducethe categoryof

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558 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

narrator,a kind of figurethatis the part of the textwhere someone

says somethingabout other minds. You thereforehave the narrator's
discourse, the character'sdiscourse, and then it is necessary to de-
velop a typologyto showwhattheconstraintsare. But myclaim would
be thattheseconstraintsbypassthe distinctionbetweendeep structure
and surfacestructurein yoursemiotics.They belong to othersystems
of categorization,and I would like to know how these systemsinter-
sect with yours. Here, notions such as point of view and narrative
voice would have to be introduced. (When I speak about point of
view, I am thinkingabout the work done by the Tartu School, Us-
pensky,for example, who tried to show that the interplaybetween
points of view is a principle of composition.) If, like Dorritt Cohn
followingKate Hamburger,we speak of proceduresbetweennarrator
and character, we are in fact attemptingto structureenunciation
itself.This is, I think,a thirddimensionwhichshould be added to the
Proppian categoriesof functionsand actantsthatyou have expanded.
We would then be dealing withenunciation,withthe enunciatorin-
scribed in the textas narrator,but also withcharacters.If I raise the
point it is because I thinkthat ultimatelythe figurativehas its own
dimension,its own structuration, which are more a part of a sort of
typology than of a logic of transformation.
I would also add thatI question yourown theorywhen you say that
there is an increase in meaningfulnesswhen we proceed from deep
structuresto surface structures.My question is, where does this in-
crease in meaningfulnesscome from?I do not thinkthatit is implied
onlyin the transformative capacitiesof the deep structures,whichare
constraints.7But it is a new kind of constraintthatbelongs to the level
of figurativization and all the resources provided by notions such as
narrator,characters,point of view,narrativevoice, and so on. These
are constraintsof a differentkind which are immediatelyfigurative
but not by derivation.I am aware thatyour school of thoughtis not
a closed systembut is proceeding step by step,fromthe mostabstract
to the more concrete. I feel you have reached the point precisely
where you have to come to gripswithcontributionsthatdo not come
fromyourown semiotics.The developmentof the thirdstage of your
semioticsrequires that either you reject these categories or you re-
constructthem withinyour own systemof reference.
GREIMAS:I have alwaysclaimed that semioticsis not a science but
rathera scientificproject,stillincompleteor unfinished;and I leave
the taskof completingand transforming it,startingfroma fewtheo-
reticalprinciplesthat I have attemptedto establish,to futuregener-
ations of semioticians.To begin withthe deep structuresand go to-
ward the surface structures is perhaps a question of strategy.

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ON NARRATIVITY 559

Personally,and on an anecdotal level, I was troubledby the way Katz

and Fodor presentedsemanticsas an appendix to Chomskian theory.
They simplytook sentences,aligned them next to one another, and
establishedconnectionsbydrawinglines.They thoughtthatdiscourse
could be structuredin thisway. I found the same thingin Germany,
where a type of textlinguisticswas developed that also treated only
surface phenomena.
The second point you raised is related to the increase in significa-
tion that resultsfrompassing fromone level to another. Firstof all,
theway I presentthingsis not bymeans of a combinationof elements;
thatis to say,I do not usuallystartwithsimpleunitsand thencombine
them to arrive at a more complex level. The problem as I see it is
related to the passage frommeaning to signification.As a linguistI
see this in the procedure of articulation,a sort of continuous explo-
sion. The productionof meaning is the productionof difference,the
productionof oppositions,and when discourse happens it takes place
by a sort of series of successiveexplosions that produce the totality,
the richnessof discourse. On the other hand, we can verywell imag-
ine thatan analystdealing witha realized discourse would begin with
the surface before going on to the deep structures.That would be
another way of proceeding.
The thirdpoint I would like to bringup is related to point of view.
What I will say about thisdoes not come directlyfrommy own per-
sonal research but fromwork done by one of my students,Jacques
Fontanille, who wrote a thesis on the problem of point of view in
discourse.8He studied cinema, painting,Marcel Proust,advertising,
and also quantum theory.He made use of common knowledge, es-
peciallywhen dealing withthe concept of the narratorthatyou your-
self mentioned. From a linguisticperspective,we notice that,in ad-
dition to modalities, there exists the fundamental element of the
modulationof sentencesconstitutedby aspectualities.These aspectu-
alities can be imagined and described only if one posits an observer
who is watchingthe processbeing actualized,whetherit happens to be
inchoative,durative,or terminative.Thus, natural language already
utilizesthe simulacrumof the observerto account for linguisticphe-
nomena, even at the level of the sentence. If one examines narrative
discourse one sees that these observers can be situated anywhere.
When analyzinga textby Proustone noticesthatthe observerchanges
point of view at almost every sentence. What Fontanille did was to
posit that all discourse has a cognitivelevel and that it is at thiscog-
nitivelevel that a diad-two actants-is located: the observer-actant
and the informer-actant. Between the two a sort of exchange of in-
formationtakes place thatcan be integratedinto the total or partial

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560 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

knowledge of eitheractantaccording to thewishof thesubjectof

enunciation, whocan be a narrator. Thiswouldthenbe a case of
syncretism between theactor-subject oftheenunciation and theob-
server.However,thisis nota generalizable actantial structure. I
wouldtherefore insistontheneedtodistinguish inthenarrative flow
between different levels--especially thecognitive andthepragmatic
levels,forexample.
As forthelastquestionrelatedto figurativity, I mustsaythatI
attacha greatdealofimportance toresearch beingdoneinthisarea.
Duringa year-long seminar givenovertothestudy oftheseproblems
someprogress wasmade,butitstillisnotsatisfying, sincethislevelof
analysisis extremely complex.Myfirstobservation is thatwe can
encounter figurative expression at differentlevelsofdepth.To take
a verysimplecase,forexampleindirect discourse, whenI saythatit
iswarm, thiscanmean"openthewindow." Therefore, "itiswarm" is
a figureforsayingsomething else.Anothertypeis parabolicdis-
course,whichis foundforexamplein theGospels.If youtakethe
parableoftheProdigal Sonyoucanseethatthefouror fivepartial
parables, which do not startat exactly thesamepoint,narratethe
story Each is
figuratively. parable displaced a little in relationto the
other, but one can establish, bypartial parables speak, com-
so to the
monthematic levelthatcan accountforthefigurativization of the
whole.Thisis another of
way grasping figurativity,type dis-
the of
coursewhichwehavestudiedmost.
Finally,figurativity is foundat thedeeplevelofdiscourse, as was
for
illustrated, example,by Denis Bertrand in his thesis on Zola's
Germinal.9 In Zola'sstoryaboutminers livingunderground, spatial
configurations andspatialfigures aretransformed andbecome, so to
speak, an autonomous language. When we read the novel we think
thatthelivesof theminers are beingnarrated but,in fact,whatis
narrated is thegreatmystery of themediation within thisunder-
ground universe. Spatiality becomes an almost abstract sortof lan-
to
guage speak about something other than surface figurativity.
Thesefewexamples aremeantsimply topointoutthatwhatI callthe
discursive levelofsemiotics isa levelinwhichthereisan articulation,
a levelatwhich otherlevelsofdepthcanbe found.The problematics
oflevelsisa strategy becausethenumber oflevelscanbeincreased or
diminished inordertofacilitate theanalysisand theconstruction of
themodel.
RICOEUR: I findthisanswersatisfactory, satisfactory becauseI ac-
knowledge and welcome this capacityof semioticsto expand. But I
wonder whetherthe initialmodel is not undermined by this expan-
sion, and whether the price to pay for such an expansion is not a

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ON NARRATIVITY 561

complete reformulationof the basic termsof depth and surface. It is

not by chance you ended up speakingabout the depth of the surface,
which,if I may say so, now has a meaning quite differentfromyour
originalusage. We are no longer dealing withthe idea thatthere are
logical, semantic rules having a logic of transformationwhich are
subsequently invested with anthropomorphicroles, and that then
those anthropomorphicroles are once more investedin figures.Here
figureitselfhas depth, and a quite differentuse is being made of the
termfigurethanof the termfigura,to whichAuerbach devoted one of
his most extraordinaryessays. Here we are dealing withthe polyse-
manticcapacityof discourse,and it is no longer possibleto know ifwe
are at the level of the depth of the surface. The same storymay be
read in differentwaysbecause itis multilayered,and thismultilayered
nature of any storycalls for the role of a reader, which we have not
discussed at all. I thinkthat by necessitywe have to reintroducethe
dialecticbetween the textand the reader because of this polyseman-
ticism.I will give one example of bringingout the complexityof the
figure,to which we bring meaningfulnessbut also introduce some-
thingthat Kermode called secrecy.He took the example of parables
and the stronginterpretationgiven themby Mark. Parables are nar-
rated in order not to be understood,thatis to say,thereis an increase
of secrecy.The actual titleof his work is The GenesisofSecrecy.'oWe
thereforehave to take into account the possibilityof another kind of
deep meaning,and in so doing we join up withthe whole traditionof
symbolismconcerningthe fourmeaningsof the scriptures,forexam-
ple. This is a traditionwhich,I think,has a scope quite differentfrom
that of deep structureas it is defined by semiotics.Finally,the best
stories, those of Kafka for example, are not intended to increase
intelligibilitybut to increase perplexityand to call into question the
reader's understanding.Here productivityof the surface level is all
the more strikingas itincreasesboth meaningfulnessand puzzlement.
GREIMAS:I agree in part withwhat you say. Nonetheless, I would
like to make a briefobservation.What scientificstatuscan be given to
thistype of task? Both of us have been speaking about intelligibility,
but intelligibilitycan be situated at differentlevels. We can under-
stand the main line, the essential;we can also attemptto understand
the greaterand greatercomplexityof discourse. I once investigated
automatic translation.At that time it was said that to translatethe
syntaxof simplesentencesthe computerhad to carryout 2000 binary
operations. Now, if we were to take a shortstoryas complex as Mau-
passant's "Deux amis," we could ask how many binary operations
would be necessary to analyze such a text. At each level I feel we
would reach the sum of severalmillionat least. Discourse is a complex

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562 NEWLITERARY
HISTORY

object and so is the world. Hence, thereare no objectionsin principle

if we deepen our knowledgeof thisphenomenon.
Now, regardingaccessibilityto the secret that language is, I agree
withyou, except thatthe hidden willperhaps remain hidden because
we wish to hide things,or because we cannot speak about them. No
matter.I would simplysay thatwe linguistsor semioticianshave ex-
tremelypoor tools to speak about the secret of language. To speak
about meaning or signification, one of the rare means we have at our
is
disposal transcoding, that is, take a discourse,a sentence,and to
to
translateit into another discourse, with other words, in a different
way. This is how we understand what the firstsentence or the first
discourse signified.Operations of transcodingare the only means we
have to grasp significationand, consequently,when I take a parable
such as the Prodigal Son, I am obliged to tryand translateit. In doing
so perhaps I have not exhausted the totalityof meaning, which is
regrettable,but unfortunatelyit is impossibleto do otherwise.

PARIS
(Translated and adapted by Paul Perron and Frank Collins)
NOTES

1 See also, in thisissue, Paul Ricoeur, "Greimas's NarrativeGrammar."

2 Louis Marin, Semiotique de la Passion: Topiquesetfigures(Paris, 1971).
3 AlgirdasJulienGreimas,Maupassant:TheSemiotics ofText:PracticalExercises,tr.Paul
Perron (Amsterdam,1988).
4 See Language in Cultureand Society:A Readerin Linguistics and Anthropology,ed. Dell
Hymes (New York, 1964).
5 Kate Hamburger, The Logic ofLiterature, tr. MarilynG. Rose (Bloomington,Ind.,
1973).
6 DorrittCohn, Transparent Minds:NarrativeModesforPresenting in Fic-
Consciousness
tion(Princeton,N.J., 1978).
7 For a detailed discussionof thispoint,see Jean Petitot-Cocorda,Morphogenkse du sens
(Paris, 1985), esp. pp. 260-68. See also Paul Perron,Introduction,On Meaning:Selected
Writingsin SemioticTheory,by Algirdas Julien Greimas, tr. Paul Perron and Frank
Collins (Minneapolis, 1987), pp. xxiv-xlv.
8 Jacques Fontanille,Le SavoirPartage:Simiotique etthioriede la connaissance
chezMarcel
Proust(Paris, 1987).
9 Denis Bertrand,L'espaceet le sens: "Germinal" Zola (Paris, 1985).
d',mile
10 Frank Kermode, TheGenesisofSecrecy:On theInterpretation ofNarrative(Cambridge,
Mass., 1979).

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