Use at own risk

LLB111A
Persons and
Family
Relations
CASE DIGESTS

Rehne Gibb Larena

Table of Contents
CASE 01 Taada vs Tuvera..........................................................................................................................................2
CASE 02 Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union N.U.B.E. vs Vega...................................................3
CASE 03 Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Angeles................................................................3
CASE 04 De Roy vs Court of Appeals.......................................................................................................................5
CASE 05 Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs Social Security Commission...................................................5
CASE 06 Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan vs Carino........................................................................7
CASE 07 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals...........................................................8
CASE 08 Rodriguez vs Director of Prisons..............................................................................................................9
CASE 09 People vs Patalin, Jr....................................................................................................................................10
CASE 10 Larga vs Ranada, Jr....................................................................................................................................11

CASE 01 Taada vs Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Cruz, J.:

Petitioners: Lorenzo M. Taada

Respondents: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera
Ponente: Cruz, J.

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FACTS

Petitioners lead by Lorenzo M. Taada are seeking for reconsideration/clarification of an April 24,
1985 Court decision affirming the necessity for the publication of some decrees. They are
specifically asking the following questions: 1) What is meant by law of public nature or
general applicability; 2) Must there be a distinction between laws of general applicability and
those that are not; 3) What is meant by publication; 4) Where is publication be made; 5) When
is the publication be made?

The defense, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed. Further, they insisted that the clause,
unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant dispensability of the publication
requirement, and that in any case, the decision was not binding for it was not concurred in by at
least eight (8) members of the Court.

ISSUE/S

1) W/n publication of laws is indispensable for them to be effective and binding.

2) W/n publication need be in the Official Gazette only.
3) W/n all types of laws need to be published for them to be binding and effective.

HELD

The clause, until it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication for the latter is indispensable. An omission of such would curtail due
process in that it would deprive the public the knowledge of laws that are supposed to govern
them. This is enshrined in Section 6 Article III of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern, which certainly is pertinent to laws.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition of their effectivity. Presidential decrees, or proclamations, executive orders,
administrative rules and regulations enforcing existing laws, charters of cities, laws naming
public places, circulars issued by the Monetary Board filling the details of the Central Bank Act,
are all required to be published. Since the provision of Article 2 of the Civil Code categorically
mentioned the Official Gazette as the means of publication, then it is the only platform duly
recognized.

CASE 02 Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union

N.U.B.E. vs Vega
G.R. No. 105364, June 28, 2001
Kapunan, J.:

Petitioners: Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union N.U.B.E.

Respondents: Hon. Benjamin Vega
Ponente: Kapunan, J.

FACTS

In 1985, the Central Bank filed with Branch 39 of RTC-Manila a Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311.
During its pendency, Congress enacted RA 7169, entitled An Act to Rehabilitate the Philippine
Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And
For Other Purposes, providing for the rehabilitation of PVB. It was signed into law by President
Corazon Aquino on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, respondent Judge Vega still continued issuing
orders in line with the liquidation of PVB. Thus, petitioners, PVB Employees Union-N.U.B.E.
represented by Perfecto V. Fernande, filed an instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for
Preliminary Injunction and application ex parte TRO enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding
with the liquidation. Petitioners argue that the liquidation court became functus officio with the
passage of RA 7169, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
Respondents claim that RA7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE/S

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W/n the liquidation court can continue with its proceedings when Congress had mandated the
rehabilitation and reopening of PVB?

HELD

Liquidation connotes settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so
that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. On the other hand, rehabilitation
connotes reopening or reorganization. Clearly, the two are on the opposite ends of the spectrum
and cant proceed simultaneously. Section 10 of RA 7169 provides that the Act shall take effect
upon its approval. Therefore, it immediately took effect on February 24, 1992. Respondent Judge
is hereby enjoined from further proceeding with Case No SP-32311.

CASE 03 Philippine International Trading Corporation vs

Angeles
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996
Torres, Jr., J.:

Petitioners: Philippine International Trading Corporation

Respondents: Hon. Presiding Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS

Herein petitioner, Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC), issued Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which applications to the PITC for importation from the PROC must
be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC
carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or simply, at one is to
one ratio.

Herein private respondents, Remington Industrial Sales Corporation (Remington) and Firestone
Ceramic, Inc. (Firestone), applied to PITC to make importations from PROC and were granted
authority to do so. However, having failed to comply with submission of export credits equivalent
to the value of their importations, further applications were withheld, such that both were barred
from importing goods from PROC.

Remington and Firestone filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus to declare as null and void
and unconstitutional A.O. No. SOCPEC 89-08-01. Said petition filed at the RTC-Makati Branch 58
of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles. Hon. Angeles ruled in favor of private respondents,
thus, the filing of this Petition for Review on Certiorari by petitioner. The court, in its January 4,
1993 decision held that 1) LOI444 and PD1071 creating PITC and directing all issues of trade
between the Philippines and the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) to be coursed through PITC
were repealed by EO 133 of President Corazon Aquino, 2) none of the trade protocols of 1989,
1990, 1991 has empowered PITC to formulate such A.O., 3) the A.O. is tantamount to an
international agreement that should have complied with Sec 21 Art VII of the Constitution,
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate., and 5) A.O. is null and void as it was
not published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
contrary to Article 2 of the Civil Code.

However, in light of subsequent events, in its Constancia, Remington expressed its desire to have
the present action moot and academic as they were already allowed to trade with PROC without
restrictions as the assailed A.O. was amended by PITC Board Resolution Nos 92-01-05 and 92-03-
08. PITC however disagrees, since Remington had incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting
of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service provided by the PITC to the former,
which are still outstanding. Remington then argued that they have no obligation since the A.O.
was null and void to begin with.

ISSUE/S

W/n the failure to publish the A.O. in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines rendered it null and void.

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HELD

As stated in Taada vs Tuvera, all statutes including Administrative Rules and Regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing laws pursuant also to
a valid delegation. Clearly, the assailed A.O. falls under this category as its purpose is to enforce
and implement P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133, and is thus required to comply with
the publication clause. As it was only published in the National Administrative Register in its
amended form, it did not comply with Article 2 of the Civil Code, thus making it null and void.

CASE 04 De Roy vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
Cortes, J.:

Petitioners: Feliza P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos

Respondents: Court of Appeals
Ponente: Cortes, J.

FACTS

A special civil action for Certiorari filed by Felisa P. De Roy praying for declare null and void two
resolutions of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Bernal vs De Roy, C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
The court applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. vs Japzon that the 15-day
grace period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Petitioners contend that said rule is inapplicable as it is not published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE/S

W/n judicial decisions be published in the OG for them to be applicable as precedents to

subsequent cases.

HELD

There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions before they can be
applicable to future cases. It is the duty of counsel as lawyer to be updated of the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. The instant
petitions are denied for lack of merit.

CASE 05 Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs Social Security

Commission
G.R. No. L-16704, March 17, 1962
Barrera, J.:

Petitioners: Victorias Milling Company, Inc.

Respondents: Social Security Commission
Ponente: Barrera, J.

FACTS

Respondent Social Security Commission (SSC) issued Circular No. 22 effectively changing the
definition of the term compensation pursuant to RA 1792, amending RA 1161, that eliminates
bonuses, allowances overtime-pay as part thereof.

"Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System,
will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will
comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2%
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."

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Upon receipt of copy, herein petitioner, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote to SSC stating its
protest to said circular as it contradicts Circular No. 7 dated 7 October 1957. Petitioner also
questioned the lack of authority of SSC to promulgate such circular as it needs the approval of
the President and its publication in the Official Gazette. The SSC however ruled that Circular No
22 is not a rule or regulation that is bound by such requisites, but a mere administrative
interpretation of a statute of policy or opinion of how the law should be construed. Petitioner
henceforth filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S

W/n Circular No 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of RA 1161

empowering the SSC to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out provisions and purposes of this Act.

HELD

A rule or a regulation is a new law made by the agency, in its quasi-judicial capacity, with the
force and effect of a valid law. Whereas, rendering an opinion or giving a statement of policy
merely interprets a preexisting law. Sec 8(f) of RA 1161 which reads as:

"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration
in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
(3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally
required to do so."

was amended by RA 1792 to read:

"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in
excess of P500.00 received during the month."

This compelled SSC to release Circular No 22 to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or
understanding of the commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did
not edit said law and merely circularized how it should be construed. Therefore, it is merely an
advice to employers-members of the System and did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

CASE 06 Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan vs Carino

G.R. No. L-65894, September 24, 1987
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

Petitioners: Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan, duly represented by Mayor Ricardo F. Lim
Respondents: Jose Carino, et al.
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS

Petitioner, Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan, filed Civil Case No. 35 before the Court of
First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch IV seeking authority to demolish the
structures built by private respondents alongside the rock causeway of petitioners wharf. After
series of postponements and failure of private respondents to appear at the scheduled hearing of
said case, the lower court granted petitioners motion to consider non-appearance as waiver and
consider the case submitted for decision. Respondents then went to the Court of Appeals praying
for certiorari. On June 9, 1979, CA dismissed petition for lack of merit.

On October 10, 1980, CFI rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, respondents on
February 2, 1982 were required to submit copies of their record on appeal together with proof of
service thereof upon the appellee within 15 days from receipt of notice regarding their appeal.
After a series of extensions, and non-compliance of respondents, the Acting Clerk of Court of CA
in an Entry of Judgment, certified the resolution dismissing private respondents appeal had
become final and executory on September 27, 1982. On February 1, 1983, a writ of execution
was issued to enforce the October 10, 1980 CFI decision.

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Before execution could be proceeded, respondents filed a motion dated April 12, 1983 asking CA
that the records of the case be recalled from the court of origin. They argue that under the
Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983, implementing the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 29, printed records on appeal are no longer required and their right to be heard
on appeal be upheld. Petitioner, in its opposition, counterargued that such rule is only retroactive
for pending cases and not those deemed final and executory.

"Sec. 18. The ling of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with except in the cases referred
to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) hereof. "No appeal bond shall be required for an
appeal."

xxx xxx xxx

"Sec 19(b). In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be
thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required."

ISSUE/S

W/n Section 18 and 19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 are
applicable to cases deemed final and executory.

HELD

As a general rule, invocation of the right to appeal has been liberally applied. Equally important
is that this right be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
The above-mentioned provisions clearly apply retroactively to pending cases only. Otherwise, it
would deprive the prevailing party of their right to the execution of judgment in their favor.

CASE 07 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of

Appeals
G.R. No. 97998, January 27, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

Petitioners: Development Bank of the Philippines

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Benito Salvani Pe
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS

Herein is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the right of private respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land
foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners (in
Gauvain vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973) Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan. OCT No P-2404
was issued on November 24, 1969 for a 26,064 sq. meter parcel of land acquired by respondent
Pe from the Bureau of Lands through free patent covered by Free Patent No. 46128 issued on
October 29, 1969. Barely three months thereafter, he mortgaged the land in question together
with another lot to secure a commercial loan from DBP.

After respondent failed to pay his loan for more than 7 years, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on
June 18, 1977. On September 29, 1979, DBP sold the lot to the petitioners. On July 12, 1983,
claiming he is within the legal period giving him the right to repurchase, he offered in writing to
repurchase the lot for P327, 996.00. DBP countered that the value has increased to
P3,066,739.62. On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec 119 of
Commonwealth Act 141 with Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. The court ruled in favor
of Pe. The CA affirmed the decision. A motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied.

ISSUE/S

W/n petitioners right to repurchase the lot under free patent has lapsed.

HELD

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Proper application of Sec 119 of C.A. 141 as amended is in order. As provided, Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow,
or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. Respondent court ruled
that the period of repurchase should be counted from the expiration of the one year period to
redeem citing Belisario vs Intermediate Appellate Court decision in 1988, to wit:

". . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every conveyance of
land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land Act,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within
the period of five years from the date of conveyance. The five-year period of redemption
fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure
begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed
in an extrajudicial foreclosure. ( Manuel v. PNB, et al, 101 Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still
had five (5) years from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act
3135) within which to exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act."

which reversed the previous rulings enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., and Tupas v.
Damasco, et al., to the effect that the five year period of repurchase should be counted
from the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale. Belisario should only be applied after
1988 pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code expressing the legal maxim, lex prospicit, non
respicit. Relying on the rulings in Monge and Tupas which were the prevailing jurisprudence at
the time, Pes right to repurchase expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the appellate court is REVERSED.

CASE 08 Rodriguez vs Director of Prisons

G.R. No. 37914, August 29, 1932
Villa-Real, J.

Petitioners: Manuel Rodriguez

Respondents: The Director of Prisons
Ponente: Villa-Real, J.

FACTS

Herein is an original petition for habeas corpus filed by prisoner Manuel Rodriguez praying for his
immediate release on the ground that he is illegally detained and that he has already served the
penalty corresponding to his offense. Petitioner pleaded guilty for the crime of estafa in the Court
of First Instance Manila and was sentenced to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of presidio
correccional in accordance to paragraph 3 Article 534 of the Old Civil Code and is the minimum
of the medium degree of said penalty in its minimum and medium degrees. The penalty provided
in the Revised Penal Code, article 315, paragraph 3, for the same offense is arresto mayor in the
maximum degree to prision correccional in the minimum degree, that is, from four months and
one day to two years and four months, of which the medium degree is from one year and one
day to one year and eight months.

ISSUE/S

1) W/n the provisions of the RPC with reference to the crime of estafa are more favorable
than those of the Old Penal Code.
2) W/n in habeas corpus proceedings, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of
guilt established for the first time in Art 13 Par 7 of the RPC can be considered.

HELD

As provided for in Article 22 of the RPC, to wit:

"ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so
far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."

retroactive effect of penal laws shall be observed in so far as they are more favorable to the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal. As the provisions of Art 315 Par 3 of RPC
for the same offense are more favorable to petitioner and as he is not a habitual criminal, the
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more lenient penalty provided thereof must be imposed upon him, which is 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor.

The mitigating circumstances, as their name indicates, serve to lessen the penalty fixed by law,
and whenever they are present courts are bound to take them into consideration, according to
article 77, in connection with article 80, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, and article 62, in
connection with article 64, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.

Having served for 7 months and 29 days, he has already served his sentence and is entitled to
be released immediately. The respondent is hereby ordered to set petitioner at liberty.

CASE 09 People vs Patalin, Jr.

G.R. No. 125539, July 27, 1999
Melo, J.:

Petitioners: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras
Ponente: Melo, J.

FACTS

Accused-applellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before
Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City with the crime of robbery with physical injuries
(Mijaque and Patalin) under Criminal Case No. 18376, and robbery with multiple rape under
Criminal Case No. 18305. The court subsequently found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of robbery with multiple rape.
Because the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review. Herein, petitioners contended that the penalty cannot be imposed as the same was
abolished upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution specifically invoking Section 19(1) Article
III, to wit:

SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death
Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.

ISSUE/S

W/n the crimes charged committed in 1984 punishable by death was lowered to reclusion
perpetua by virtue of Sec 19(1) Art III of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding a subsequent
statute reimposing the death penalty.

HELD

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the felon. Indeed, the abolition of the death penalty retroactively affected and
benefited accused-appellants. The subsequent reimposition does not affect them and can only be
prospectively applied. Wherefore, the penalty imposed for Criminal Case No. 18305 is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

CASE 10 Larga vs Ranada, Jr.

G.R. No. 79576, August 3, 1988
Feliciano, J.:

Petitioners: Celso M. Larga

Respondents: Hon. Santiago Ranada, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 137
Ponente: Feliciano, J.

FACTS

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Herein is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction praying
for the orders of respondent Judge Ranada on denying petitioner Larga Motion to Quash and
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, in Criminal Case No. 29102. The case was filed by
Special Prosecutor Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr. upon learning that petitioner failed to remit employee
contributions as one of the owners of Bistcor Diesel Calibration Service to Home Development
Mutual Fund from January 1984 to February 1987, violative of Section 23 of P.D. 1752 or the
Human Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980, which provides;

Section 23. Penal Provisions. Refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent
to comply with the provisions of this Decree, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees, particularly with respect to registration of
employees, collection and remittance of employee savings as well as employer
counterparts, or the correct amount due, within the time set in the implementing rules and
regulations or specific call or extension made by the Fund Management, shall constitute an
offense punishable by a fine of not less, but not more than twice, the amount involve or
imprisonment of not more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the Court, apart from the Civil liabilities and/or obligations of the offender or
delinquent. When the offender is a corporation, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
members of the governing board and the President or General Manager, without prejudice
to the prosecution of related offenses under the Revised Penal Code and other laws,
revocation and denial of operating rights and privileges in the Philippines, and deportation
when the offender is a foreigner.

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner argued that the issuance of Executive Order No. 90 of 17
December 1986 extinguishes him of criminal liability as Section 10 thereof had made
contributions voluntary, and that consequently, the court has lost its jurisdiction to try and
sentence petitioner. Private respondent HDMF countered that Sec 10 of EO 90 merely amended a
portion of PD 1752 and that it is to be applied prospectively, thus making non-remittance prior to
January 1987 still punishable under PD 1752.

Sec. 9. Funding Sources. To enable the Social Security System, the Government Service
Insurance System and the Home Development Mutual Fund to provide improved benefits to
their members and to generate the necessary long-term funds for housing, a rationalization
of all employer and employee contributions for all social insurance and provident fund
benefits is hereby directed to include the following:

a. Raising the Social Security System maximum compensation, inclusive of the Cost of
Living Allowances, as a basis for contributions from P1,000.00 to P3,000.00;

b. Making contributions to the Home Development Mutual Fund voluntary on the parts of
both employees and employers;

c. Instituting a single mandatory contribution rate for employees and employers for all
social insurance programs.

Sec. 10. Home Development Mutual Fund as Voluntary Fund. In the implementation of
the above rationalization program, the following shall govern the operations of the Home
Development Mutual Fund:

a. All existing contributions together with their accumulated earnings shall be retained in
the Home Development Mutual Fund until their maturity in accordance with existing
rules and regulations.

b. Membership in the funds for new private and government employees and their
respective employees shall be voluntary after December 31, 1986.

c. After December 31, 1986, existing members, both employees and employers, shall have
the option to continue or discontinue new Fund contributions.

d. To encourage provident fund savings for home acquisition, all government

instrumentalities, agencies and corporations shall match the voluntary contributions
made by government employees in accordance with existing ratios. Private employers
are urged to match the contributions of their employees who opt to continue their
membership in the Fund.

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ISSUE/S

W/n Sec 9 and 10 of EO 90 has extinguished the criminal liability of petitioner for non-remittance
of voluntary contribution during the period prior to the enactment thereof.

HELD

It should be made clear that Sections 9 and 10 of EO 90 had the effect of modifying Section 4 of
PD 1752, which provides:

Section 4. Fund Coverage. Coverage of the Fund shall be mandatory upon all employees
covered by the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System, and
their respective employers.

Such coverage may be extended to other working groups, with or without employer
contributions, as may be determined by the Board of Trustees.

Such effect rendered fund coverage as voluntary only after December 31, 1986. By any means
did it not purport to eliminate the obligatory character of fund coverage. The court cannot give
retroactive effect to Sections 9 and 10 of EO 90 even though the provisions are favorable to
petitioner, against the express terms of the amending provisions themselves. It also did not
purport to decriminalize all prior violations of PD 1752. In view of the foregoing. Court resolves to
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

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