HEALTH, SAFETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
BENEFITS
1. SARMIENTO V. ECC
Jose B. Sarmiento vs. Employees
Compensation Commission & Government
Service Insurance System (National Power
Corporation)
Facts
The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by
the National Power Corporation in Quezon City
as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of
her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager
of the budget division. The deceaseds illness was
a cancer known as differential squarrous cell
carcinoma, and sought treatment in various
hospitals. And on August 12, 1981,she
succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to
parotid carcinoma, and she was 20 years old.
Believing that the deceaseds fatal illness having
been contracted during her employment was
service-connected, Jose B. Sarmiento filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626. On September
9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services
Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that
the illness of Flordeliza was not caused by
employment and employment conditions.
Dissatisfied with the respondents decision of
denial, Jose Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS
requesting that the records of the claim be
elevated to the Employees Compensation
Commission for review pursuant to the law and
the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. The respondent Commission
affirmed the GSIS decision, it found that the
deceaseds death is not compensable because she
did not contract nor suffer from the same reason
of her work but by reason of embryonic rests
and epithelial growth.
Issue
Whether or not the deceaseds illness under PD
626, compensable?
Held
Under PD 626, a compensable illness means
illness accepted as an occupational disease and
listed by the Employees Compensation
Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions.
2. ILOILO DOCK V. WCC
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968
FACTS:
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January
29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a
mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way
home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20
meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a
private road commonly called the IDECO road.
The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say
anything before or after the killing. The motive
for the crime was and still is unknown as
Cordero was himself killed before he could be
tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing,
Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another
employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime
work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the
main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was
killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left
side of the road and two "carinderias" and a
residential house on the right side. The entire
length of the road is nowhere stated in the
record .According to the IDECO, the Commission
erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred
in the course of employment and in presuming
that it arose out of the employment; (2) in
applyingthe "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding
that Pablo's death was an accident within the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
ISSUE:
Whether the injuries are "in the course of" and
not "out of" the employment.
RULING:
The general rule in workmen's compensation
law known as the "going & coming rule,"
simplystated, is that "in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in, going to,
or coming from his place of work is excluded
from the benefits of workmen's
compensationacts."
This rule, however, admits of four well-
recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where
theemployee is proceeding to or from his work
on the premises of his employer; (2) where
theemployee is about to enter or about to leave
the premises of his employer by way of
theexclusive or customary means of ingress and
 egress; (3) where the employee is charged, result. The fall precipitated the onset of
whileon his way to or from his place of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in
employment or at his home, or during his the premature termination of her pregnancy
employment, withsome duty or special errand with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the
connected with his employment; and (4) where classroom floor brought about her premature
the employer, as anincident of the employment, delivery which caused the development of
provides the means of transportation to and postpartum septicemia which resulted in death.
from the place of employment. Her fall therefore was the
proximate cause
1
3. BELARMINO V. ECC That set in motion an unbroken chain of events,
leading to her demise. The right to compensation
BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION extends to disability due to disease supervening
COMMISSION185 SCRA 304GRIO-AQUINO, J. upon and proximately and naturally resulting
FACTS from a compensable injury. Where the primary
Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
Department of Education Culture and Sports employment, every natural consequence that
assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
Dimasalang, Masbate for11 years. On January 14, employment, unless it is the result of an
1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month independent intervening cause attributable to
of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the claimants own negligence or misconduct. Mrs.
classroom floor. She complained of abdominal Belarminos fall was the primary injury that
pain and stomach cramps but she continued arose in the course of her employment as a
reporting for work because there was much classroom teacher, hence, all the medical
work to do. On January 25, 1982, she went into consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her
home .Her abdominal pain persisted even after baby, her septicemia post partum and death are
delivery .When she was brought to the hospital, compensable.
her physician informed her that she was
suffering from septicemia post partum due to
infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was
discharged from the hospital, she died three days
thereafter .The GSIS denied the claim on the
ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of
death is an occupational disease and neither was
there any showing that the ailment was
contracted by reason of her employment. On
appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission, latter also denied the claim
affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS.
ISSUE
Whether of not the cause death of Mrs.
Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not
compensable.
HELD
NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia
post partum is compensable because an
employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs.
Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a
4. HINOGUIN V. ECC following conditions are satisfied: The employee
had been duly reported to the System; He died as
HINOGUIN V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION a result of injury or sickness; and The System has
COMMISSION172 SCRA 350FELICIANO, J. been duly notified of his death, as well as the
FACTS injury or sickness which caused his death. His
.Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin was a sergeant in A employer shall be liable for the benefit if such
company, 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry death occurred before the employer is duly
Division .The headquarters of the 14th Infantry reported for coverage of the System. Art. 167 (k)
Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva of the Labor Code defines
Ecija..On August 1, 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Grounds
Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog (a) For the injury and resulting disability or
sought permission from Capt. Frankie Besas, to death to be compensable, the injury must be the
go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. result of an employment accident satisfying all of
Capt. Besas orally granted them permission to go the following grounds:(1)The employee must
to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with have been injured at the place where his work
them considering that Aritao was regarded as a requires him to be.(2)The employee must have
critical place..The three soldiers went to Dft. been performing his official functions; and(3)If
Alibuyogs home for a meal and some drinks. At the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
around 7:00 PM, the soldiers headed back to the must have been executing an order for the
headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, Hinoguin employer.
and Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab
while Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the
tricycle driver. When they reached the poblacion,
Alibuyog dismounted from the tricycle. Not
noticing that his rifles safety lever was on semi-
automatic, he accidentally touched the trigger,
firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt.
Hinoguin in the left lower abdomen. Sgt.
Hinoguin died a few days after the incident.8.In
the investigation conducted by the 14th Infantry
Battalion, it was found that the shooting of Sgt.
Hinoguin was purely accidental in nature and
that he died in the lineof duty. The Life of Duty
Board of Officers recommended that all benefits
due the legal dependents of the late Sgt.
Hinoguin be given.9.However, when the father of
the deceased made a claim from GSIS, the same
was denied on the ground that the deceased was
not at his work place nor performing his duty as
a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his
death. This denial was confirmed by the ECC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin
compensable under the applicable statute and
regulations.
HELD
YES. The amended Implementing Rules provides
in part as follows: SEC. 1.
Conditions to Entitlement
(a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee
shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the
5. GSIS V. CA AND ALEGRE have been performing his official functions;
and(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere,
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM the employee must have been executing an order
(GSIS) vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS for the employer, it is not difficult to understand
and FELONILA ALEGRE, then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied
FACTS: the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
Private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time
husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for
officer assigned to the Philippine National Police a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.On nature proceeding as it did from no particular
December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle directive or permission of his superior officer.
and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of That he may be called upon at any time to render
Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 police work as he is considered to be on a round-
Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the the-clock duty and was not on an approved
Police Assistance Center located at said complex, vacation leave will not change the conclusion
confronted him regarding his tour of duty.SPO2 arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even situation where he was required to exercise his
directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was
tussle then ensued between the two which led to refusing to render one pointing out that he
the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. already complied with the duty detail. At any
On account of her husbands death, private rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
respondent seasonably filed a claim for death policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-
benefits with petitioner Government Service the-fact validation of their acts to place them
Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to within the scope of the guidelines rather than a
Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on blanket license to benefit them in all situations
August 7, 1995, the GSIS, denied the claim on the that may give rise to their deaths.
ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegres death,
he was performing a personal activity which was
notwork-connected which was later on affirmed
by the Employees Compensation
Commission(ECC. Private respondent finally
obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of
Appeals when it reversed the ECCs decision and
ruled that SPO2 Alegres death was work-
connected and, therefore, compensable. Hence;
GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to
the Supreme Court; reiterating its position that
SPO2 Alegres death lacks the requisite element
of compensability which is, that the activity
being performed at the time of death must be
work-connected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SPO2 Alegres death is
compensable pursuant to the applicable laws
and regulations.
HELD:
Taking together existing jurisprudence and the
pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the
employee must be at the place where his work
requires him to be; (b) that the employee must
6. VALERIANO V. ECC WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-
CONNECTED.
G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000CELERINO HELD:
VALERIANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE of "work connection" must be substantially
INSURANCESYSTEM, satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability
The Facts: sustained by reason of employment are
Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire compensable regardless of the place where the
truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the
Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, time of the injury, the employee was acting
petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, within the purview of his or her employment and
Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name performing an act reasonably necessary or
of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to incidental thereto .Petitioner Valeriano was not
Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a fire
dinner. On their way home at around 9:30PM, truck driver was related to the injuries he had
the owner-type jeepney they were riding in suffered. That he sustained the injuries after
figured in a head-on collision with another pursuing a purely personal and social function
vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and having dinner with some friends is clear from
Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the the records of the case. His injuries were not
strong impact of the collision, petitioner was acquired at his work place; nor were they
thrown out of the vehicle and was severely sustained while he was performing an act within
injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an
brought to several hospitals for treatment. On order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the
September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income conclusion reached by the appellate court that
benefits under PD 626, with the Government his injuries and consequent disability were not
Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits work-connected and thus not compensable.
was opposed on the ground that the injuries he
sustained did not directly arise or result from the
nature of his work .Under the present
compensation law, injury and the resulting
disability or death is compensable if the injury
resulted from an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment. It means that the
injury or death must be sustained while the
employee is in the performance of his official
duty; that the injury is sustained at the place
where his work requires him to be; and if the
injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee
is executing an order for the employer. The
aforementioned conditions are found wanting in
the instant case. The accident that the appellant
met in the instant case occurred outside of his
time and place of work. Neither was appellant
performing his official duties as a fireman at the
time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the
Bonanza Restaurant where he and his friends
had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant
sustained from the accident did not arise out of
[and] in the course of his employment
The Issues:
 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the
7. ALANO V. ECC Government Service Insurance System is a
proper party in employees' compensation cases
ALANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION as the ultimate implementing agency of the
COMMISSION Employees' Compensation Commission. We held
G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules
FACTS: refer to the said System in all aspects of
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee employee compensation including enforcement
during her lifetime, worked as principal of of decisions (Article 182 of ImplementingRules)."
Salinap Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m.
to 5:30p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M.,
while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee
inSan Carlos City on her way to the school, she
was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota
mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous
death. She is survived by her four sons and a
daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano,
brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim
for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf
of the decedent's children. The claim was,
however, denied on the same date on the ground
that the "injury upon which compensation is
being claimed is not an employment accident
satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law."
On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a
reconsideration of the system's decision, but the
same was denied and the records of the case
were elevated to this Commission for review.
(Rollo, p.12)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Dedicacion de Vera
can be compensable.
HELD:
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased
died while going to her place of work. She was at
the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach
her place of work on time. There was nothing
private or personal about the school principal's
being at the place of the accident. She was there
because her employment required her to be
there. As to the Government Service Insurance
System's manifestation, we hold that it is not
fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a
party respondent. As early as the case of La O
v.Employees' Compensation Commission, (97
SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and
recently, Clemente v. Government Service
Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August

8. LAZO V. ECC
SALVADOR LAZO vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION & 'arising out of and in the course of employment?
GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 78617June 18, 1990
FACTS:
Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central
Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main
office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty
is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00
o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the
petitioner rendered duty from2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as
the security guard who wasto relieve him failed
to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty
up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June
1986, when he asked permission from his
superior to leave early in order to take home to
Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.On his way
home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19
June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner
was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road.
As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken
to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment.
He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until
25 July 1986.For the injuries he sustained,
petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits
under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however,
was denied by the GSIS for the reason that It
appears that after performing your regular
duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to
10:00P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered
overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the
following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after
asking permission from your superior you were
allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal
matter that of bringing home a sack of riceand
that, while on your way home, you met a
vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your
injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is
evident that you were not at your work place
performing your duties when the incident
occurred. 1It was held that the condition for
compensability had not been satisfied. Upon
review of the case, the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission affirmed the decision
since the accident which involved the petitioner
occurred far from his work place and while he
was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the
present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within
the meaning of and intendment of the phrase
HELD:
We held that 'where an employee, after working
hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a
service truck of the company near his place of
work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell
to the ground and was run over by the truck,
resulting in his death, the accident may be saidto
have arisen out of or in the course of
employment, for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact standing alone, that the
truck was in motion when the employee
boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion
that he had been notoriously negligent, where it
does not appear that the truck was running at a
great speed.' And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock
&Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled
that'(e)mployment includes not only the actual
doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing
to and from the place where the work is to be
done. If the employee be injured while passing,
with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to
283
or from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect
a part of the employer's premises, the injury is
one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened
while the employee was engaged in his work at
the place of its performance.
9. MABUHAY SHIPPING V. NLRC
G.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991MABUHAY
SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS
MARITIME CO., LTD., vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION)
AND CECILIASENTINA,
FACTS:
Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by
petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services,
Inc.(MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner,
Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the
M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He
reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13,
1987.On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while
the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona
Pier,Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the
ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to
the mess hall and took a fire axe and challenged
those eating therein. He was pacified by his
shipmates who led him to his cabin. However,
later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to
the mess hall. He became violent. He smashed
and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler
Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero
touched his head and noticed blood. This
infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the
two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina
was takento the hospital where he passed away
on January 17, 1988. Ero was arrested by the
Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.On
October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a
complaint against petitioners with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
for payment of death benefits, burial expenses,
unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with
damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-
896. POEA rendered a decision favoring Sentina.
A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was
filed by petitioners which the respondent First
Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution
dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and
affirming the appealed decision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT AN EMPLOYER IS REQUIRED
TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS TO ANEMPLOYEE
WHO RAN AMUCK THAT RESULTED TO HIS
DEATH.
HELD:
The mere death of the seaman during the term of
his employment does not automatically give rise
to compensation. The circumstances which led to
the death as well as the provisions of the
contract, and the right and obligation of the
employer and seaman must be taken into
consideration, in consonance with the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. There are limitations to the liability
to pay death benefits. When the death of the
seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act
on his own life, and it is directly attributable to
the seaman, such death is not compensable. No
doubt a case of suicide is covered by this
provision. By the same token, when as in this
case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran
amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression
against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so
that in his own defense the latter fought back
and in the process killed the seaman, the
circumstances of the death of the seaman could
be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on
his own life directly attributable to him. First he
challenged everyone to a fight with an axe.
Thereafter, here turned to the mess hall picked
up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero
who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler
fought back The death of seaman Sentina is
attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus
is not compensable.

10. NAESS SHIPPING V. NLRC
Facts:
On the night of September 3, 1983, while the
vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas
enroute from Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt,
Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally
stabbed the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez,
during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from
which he jumped or fell overboard. An alarm was
immediately raised, and the vessel turned to
comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After
some time his floating body was briefly sighted,
but it disappeared from view even as
preparations to retrieve it were being made, and
was never seen again although the search went
on through the night and was called off only at
6:00o'clock the next morning. Under a Special
Agreement in the employment contract, between
the International Workers Federation (ITF) and
NAESS Shipping, NAESS is bound to pay cash
benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled
therein. For the death of Dublin his widow
Zenaida, by whom he had one child, Ivy, born
January 22,1971, collected the amount of
P75,000.00 under Clause A of the ITF Collective
Bargaining Agreement. She also filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) a complaint against NAESS for payment
of death benefits to US$74,512.00 under both
paragraph 17 of the cited Special Agreement and
what she claimed to be the also applicable
Singapore Workmens' Compensation Ordinance.
The POEA rendered judgment for the
complainant, holding Dublin's death
compensable under said Special Agreement and
ordering NAESS to pay complainant and her
child compensation benefits totalling
US$31,962.00 and her attorneys of record fees
amounting to US$3,196.00, the equivalents of
said sums in Philippine pesos at prevailing rates
of exchange .NAESS filed a motion for
reconsideration but was dismissed by the NLRC
for lack of merit, with an express affirmance of
the POEA decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that death
by suicide is compensable.
Held:
It makes no difference whether Dublin
intentionally took his own life, or he killed
himself in a moment of temporary aberration
triggered by remorse over the killing of the
second cook, or he accidentally fell overboard
while trying to flee from imagined pursuit, which
last possibility cannot be ruled out considering
the state of the evidence. There is no question
that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract
which on its face makes it unqualifiedly liable to
pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death
while in its service, regardless of whether or not
it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal
sense, of Dublin's life. No law or rule has been
cited which would make it illegal for an
employer to assume such obligation in favor of
his or its employee in their contract of
employment. Thus, contract, ... which are the
private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no
room for doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory,
no matter what their form may be, whenever the
essential requisites for their validity are present.
To compel payment of death benefits in this case
would amount not only to rewarding the act of
murder or homicide, but also inequitably to
placing on NAESS the twin burdens of
compensating both the killer and his victim, who
allegedly had also been employed under a
contract with a similar death benefits clause.
This argument, in confusing the legal
implications and effects of two distinct and
independent agreements, carries within itself the
seeds of its own refutation. On Dublin's part,
entitlement to death benefits resulted from his
death while serving out his contract of
employment; it was not a consequence of his
killing of the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez. If
the latter's death is also compensable, that is due
to the solitary fact of his death while covered by
a similar contract, not precisely to the fact that
he met death at the hands of Dublin That both
deaths may be related by cause and effect and
NAESS is the single obligor liable for
compensation in both cases must, insofar as the
factual and legal bases of such liability is
concerned, be regarded as purely accidental
circumstances.

11. VICENTE V. ECC
DOMINGO VICENTE, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
respondent.
Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner.
Ponente: SARMIENTO
FACTS:
all available indications, it appears that the
petitioners application for optional retirement
on the basis of his ailments had been approved.
Considering that the petitioner was only 45
years old when he retired and still entitled,
COMMISSION, under good behavior, to 20 more years in
service, the approval of his optional retirement
application proves that he was no longer fit to
continue in his employment. For optional
retirement is allowed only upon proof that the
employee-applicant is already physically
incapacitated to render sound and efficient
service.

[P]etitioner was formerly employed as a nursing The sympathy of law on social security is
attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own
Center in Quezon City. At the age of forty-five, terms, requires a construction of utmost
and after having rendered more than twenty-five liberality in its favor.
years of government service, he applied for
optional retirement under the provisions of
Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as
reason therefor his inability to continue working
as a result of his physical disability. The
petitioner likewise filed with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application
for income benefits claim for payment under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended.
Both applications were accompanied by the
necessary supporting papers, among them being
a Physicians Certification issued by the
petitioners attending doctor. The petitioners
application for income benefits claim payment
was granted but only for permanent partial
disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of
nineteen months

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner suffers from

permanent total disability.

HELD:

YES. The decision of the respondent Employees

Compensation Commission (ECC) was set aside.

RATIO:

[T]he petitioners permanent total disability is

established beyond doubt by several factors and
circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that from
12. GSIS V. CA AND BALAIS