ITALIAN BATTAGLIONE FUCILIERI GREECE 1940

Headquarters: 1 Cmd, 1 infantry

1 Fucilieri Mortar Platoon
--3 Mortar Sections each: 1 81/14 mortar
1 Regimental Gun Platoon
--2 Gun Sections each: 2 65/17 gun, 2 pack mules
3 Fucilieri Companies each
--Headquarters: 1 Cmd
--1 Machine Gun Section: 3 Mod 37 HMG
--1 Mortar Section: 6 Brixia 45mm mortar
--3 Fucilieri Platoons each
----2 Fucilieri Squads each: 4 infantry

Notes:
The Fucilieri, or riflemen, represent the bulk of Italy's forces in Greece. Unlike their
comrades in the desert, the Fucilieri in Greece are more or less prepared to achieve
victory.

Support

Anti Tank Platoon

2 Anti Tank Sections each: 2 47/32 ATG, 2 TL37 tractor

Pioneer Platoon
Headquarters: 1 Cmd
2 Pioneer Squads each: 3 pioneer, 1 Brixia 45mm mortar

Cannon Battery
2 Gun Sections each: 2 75/13 gun, 2 limber

Howitzer Battery
2 Howitzer Sections each: 2 100/17 howitzer, 2 limber

Light Anti Aircraft Platoon

2 Anti Aircraft Sections each: 1 20/65 on 3-ton truck

ITALIAN BATTAGLIONE ALPINI GREECE 1940

Headquarters: 1 Cmd, 1 infantry
1 Alpini Mortar Platoon
--3 Mortar Sections each: 1 81/14 mortar
1 Regimental Gun Platoon
--2 Gun Sections each: 2 65/17 gun, 2 pack mules
3 Alpini Companies
--Headquarters: 1 Cmd
--1 Machine Gun Section: 3 Mod 37 HMG
--1 Mortar Section: 6 Brixia 45mm mortar
--3 Alpini Platoons each
----2 Alpini Squads each: 4 infantry

Notes:
The Alpini were the most elite troops Italy deployed in Greece. Their special mountain
training enabled them to make the furthest penetrations into Greek territory.

Support

Pioneer Platoon
Headquarters: 1 Cmd
2 Pioneer Squads each: 3 pioneer, 1 Brixia 45mm mortar

Cannon Battery
2 Gun Sections each: 2 75/13 gun, 2 limber

BATTAGLIONE CAMICIE NEREGREECE 1940

Headquarters: 1 Cmd, 1 infantry

3 Black Shirt Companies
--Headquarters: 1 Cmd
--1 Machine Gun Section: 3 Mod 37 HMG
--1 Mortar Section: 6 Brixia 45mm mortar
--3 Black Shirt Platoons each
----2 Black Shirt Squads each: 4 infantry

Notes:
Upon mobilization, the Fascist Militia (Camicie Nere or CCNN - Black Shirts) started to
mobilize their units, designating them as 'Assault' and 'Mountain' battalions for field use,
to differentiate them from the strictly territorial administrative battalions within the
CCNN Zones from which they were raised. During the June 1940 French Campaign some
infantry divisions had one or two of these CCNN 'assault' battalions attached. Later,
complete CCNN assault Legions would be assigned to just about all the infantry divisions.
The conscript riflemen of the CCNN only have very basic training, and much of that is
very old fashioned.

Support

Anti Tank Platoon (Regio Esercito)

2 Anti Tank Sections each: 2 47/32 ATG, 2 TL37 tractor

Fucilieri Mortar Platoon (Regio Esercito)

3 Mortar Sections each: 1 81/14 mortar

Pioneer Platoon (Regio Esercito)

Headquarters: 1 Cmd
2 Pioneer Squads each: 3 pioneer, 1 Brixia 45mm mortar

Fucilieri Company (Regio Esercito)

Headquarters: 1 Cmd
1 Machine Gun Section: 3 Mod 37 HMG
1 Mortar Section: 6 Brixia 45mm mortar
3 Fucilieri Platoons each
--2 Fucilieri Squads each: 4 infantry

Cannon Battery (Regio Esercito)

2 Gun Sections each: 2 75/13 gun, 2 limber

Howitzer Battery (Regio Esercito)

2 Howitzer Sections each: 2 100/17 howitzer, 2 limber

Light Anti Aircraft Platoon (Regio Esercito)

2 Anti Aircraft Sections each: 1 20/65 on 3-ton truck

ITALIAN CORPS SUPPORT UNITS GREECE 1940

Tankette Platoon
1 Section: 1 Cmd L3/35, 1 L3/35
1 Section: 2 L3/35

Notes:
The small tankettes of the 'Centauro' Division could have been valuable if used in he
right terrain and in the right season. However, in Greece they were deployed in areas
with few roads that had already been churned to mud and many had to be left behind in
the 1940 Italian retreat.

Tankette Flame-Thrower Platoon

1 Section: 1 Cmd L3/35 Lanciafiamme, 1 L3/35 Lanciafiamme
1 Section: 2 L3/35 Lanciafiamme

Notes: Some of the L3 tankettes used by the 'Centauro' armored division were equipped
with flame-throwers. The little tankettes struggled in the mud and mountainous terrain,
but when they could bring their deadly weapons to bear on the Greeks, they mercilessly
cleared the way for the Italian troops and tanks.

Bersaglieri Platoon
Headquarters: 1 Cmd
3 Bersaglieri Squads each: 2 Bersaglieri

Notes:
The Bersaglieri (light infantry9 are the elite of Italy's infantry. In Mussolini's invasion
army, three light Bersaglieri battalions accompanied the tanks into battle where the use
of mobility and firepower was expected to overcome the enemy.
It was the men of the Bersaglieri that counterattacked the Greek encicrclement of the
Alpini Division 'Julia' allowing the Alpini mountaineers to break out and rejoin the rest of
their comrades.

Cavalleria Platoon
Headquarters: 1 Cmd
3 cavalleria Squads each: 2 cavalry

Notes:
The cavalry detachments of the regiments 'Lancieri di Aosta' and 'Lancieri di Milano'
were able to penetrate deep into Greece along he coastal roads as they advanced largely
unopposed. However, when the offensive broke down, they were forced to retreat back
to Alabania, taking heavy casualties during Greek counterattacks.

Howitzer Battery
2 Howitzer Sections each: 2 105/28 howitzer, 2 limber

ITALIAN INFANTRY DIVISION GREECE 1940

Headquarters
1 Artillery Regiment
--Headquarters
--1 Anti Aircraft Battery (mot): 8 20/35 AAG
--1 Artillery Battalion
----3 Batteries each: 4 100/17 howitzer
--1 Artillery Battalion
----3 Batteries each: 4 75/27 field gun
--1 Artillery Battalion
----3 Batteries each: 4 75/13 pack howitzer
2 Infantry Regiments each
--Headquarters
--1 Mortar Company: 6 81mm mortar
--1 Gun Company: 4 65/17 field gun
--3 Infantry Battalions each
----1 Machine Gun Company: 8 HMG, 18 45mm mortar
----3 Rifle Companies
1 Camicie Nere Legion
--Headquarters
--1 Machine Gun Company: 4 HMG, 18 45mm mortar
--2 Camicie Nere Cohorts each
----Headquarters
----1 Scout Platoon
----1 Machine Gun Company: 4 HMG
----3 Rifle Companies
1 Mortar Battalion
--Headquarters
--3 Mortar Companies each: 6 81mm mortar
1 Engineer Battalion (semi-mot)
--Headquarters (semi-mot)
--1 Engineer Company (semi-mot)
--1 Engineer Signals Company (semi-mot)
--1 Searchlight Platoon

References:
http://www.niehorster.org/019_italy/40_organ/div_inf_40.html

ITALIAN ALPINA DIVISION GREECE 1940

Headquarters
1 Mountain Artillery Regiment
--Headquarters
--2 Mountain Artillery Battalions each
----3 Batteries each: 4 75/13 pack howitzer
2 Mountain Infantry Regiments each
--Headquarters
--1 Medical Platoon
--1 Field Hospital Company
--1 Pack Animal Transport Company
--3 Mountain Infantry Battalions each
----Headquarters
----1 Mortar Platoon: 4 81mm mortar
----3 Rifle Companies each: 3 HMG, 3 45mm mortar
1 Mountain Engineer Battalion
--Headquarters
--1 Engineer Company
--1 Engineer Signals Company
--1 Searchlight Platoon
--1 Bridge Equipment Platoon

References:
http://www.niehorster.org/019_italy/40_organ/div_alpini_40.htm

ITALIAN INVASION OF GREECE - OCTOBER, 1940

BRIEFING NOTES

1.Introduction
On October 28th 1940, at 5:30 a.m., an ultimatum was delivered to Greece by the Italian
Embassy in Athens. They were required to cede various coastal positions and
strategically important islands to the Italians within three hours. General Metaxas , head
of the Greek Council of State, refused these demands and later on the 28th October an
Italian invasion of Greece (from the previously conquered Albania) began.

Over the next few weeks, the Italians were repulsed by the Greeks and pushed back into
Albania. Britain and the Commonwealth sent troops and equipment to help the Greeks,
and Churchill's ideas of a "Balkan Confederation" seemed a little less far-fetched...

But then Hitler and the OKW, disturbed by this turn of events, sent German forces into
Greece to prop up the faltering Italians. The Greeks and British/Commonwealth forces
were pushed back, and Greece fell to the Axis.

The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was one of Mussolini's major wartime
disasters. A totally inadequate Italian army blundered into the mountains of north-west
Greece, where it was defeated, thrown back into Albania, only to be rescued by the
German invasion of Greece the following year.

2.The Road to War

War with Greece in 1940 was far from inevitable. Whilst King George and sections of the
Greek political elite had anglophile tendencies, Greece was led by General Metaxas, a
dictator who had far more in common with the Axis leaders than the western
democracies. It was the policy of Mussolini and his pro-Albanian clique including Foreign
Minister, Count Ciano, Jacomoni, governor-general of Albania and the commanding
general, Visconti Prasca which drove Italy to war with Greece.

Hitler's strategic plans required that the Balkans remain quiet. In the summer of 1940
German troops had secured the Rumanian oilfields, Bulgaria was pro-German and the
Yugoslavian Prince Regent supported the axis. Even Turkish neutrality was being
undermined. Yet it had been agreed that the Balkans would be in Mussolini's sphere of
interest and the Italian dictator was jealous of Hitler's success.

3.The War plans

The original Italian plan (known as Contingency G) was a limited territorial expansion
into the Epirus region for which the nine Italian divisions in Albania were deemed
sufficient. However, this was expanded in a second phase to the total occupation of
Greece at a meeting only two weeks before the invasion at which the naval and air force
chiefs were not even present. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Badoglio, who had
previously indicated muted objections to the war, argued that 20 divisions would be
required. Visconti Prasca asked for only three extra mountain divisions and some
support units. Even these were to be fed in when the initial objectives had been
achieved. His motives for refusing reinforcements can only be a matter for speculation.
However, the fact that a more senior general might command a larger army, probably
influenced his thinking.

For such a modest army to be successful required several favourable factors including:
strategic and tactical surprise; a supporting invasion by Bulgarian forces; diversionary
attacks on the poorly defended mainland; massive air support; and treachery in the
Greek armed forces.

Unfortunately for the Italians the Greeks knew the approximate date of the invasion and
King Boris of Bulgaria declined Mussolini's invitation to participate. This meant the Greek
army was well established in the invasion area with the possibility of shifting
reinforcements when Bulgarian neutrality became clear. No diversionary attacks were
planned (even the island invasions were called off at the last moment) and a winter
offensive coupled with negligible air planning minimised the value of Italian air
superiority. Despite optimistic views expressed by commanders in Albania and
substantial investment in bribes, there was no evidence that Greek forces would collapse
due to internal dissent.

The Greek operational plan was very simple. It consisted of two lines using the natural
defensive features of the rivers and mountain ranges. In Epirus the army was to follow
the principle of elastic defence avoiding major losses. In Macedonia the first line was to
be used as a platform for an offensive onto the Koritsa plateau.

4.The Forces.

Italian Army (CinC General Visconti Prasca)

Julia Alpini Division (Pindus Front): 10,800 men & 20 guns

XXV Army Corps 'Tsamouria' (General Carlo Rossi, Epirus Front)

23rd Infantry Division 'Ferrara': 12,785 men & 60 guns +3,500 Albanians
51st Infantry Division 'Sienna': 9,200 men & 50 guns
131st Armoured Division 'Centauro': 4,037 men & 24 guns + 163 light tanks (90
serviceable)
Littoral Group (coast, two cavalry regs. and one reg. of Grenadiers): 4,823 men & 32 guns

XXVI Army Corps 'Corizza' (General Gabriele Nasci, Macedonian Front)

49th Infantry Division 'Parma': 12,000 men & 60 guns
29th Infantry Division 'Piemonte': 9,300 men & 32 guns
19th Infantry Division 'Venezia' (Marching from Yugoslav front to XXVI Corps): 10000
men & 40 guns
53rd Infantry Division 'Arezzo' (Yugoslav Front): 12000 men & 32 guns

The Italian Corps were only established four days before the invasion.

Greek Army (CinC General Alexandros Papagos)

Epirus Front - VIII Division + Colonel Davakis' detachment - 15 battalions & 66 guns

Pindus Front - 3 reinforced battalions & 6 guns

Macedonian Front - IX Division + 4th Inf. Brig. - 22 battalions & 90 guns

The Greek second line had a further seven battalions in position.

Italian 'standard' divisional organisation in 1940 was 2 (3 btn.) regiments usually with 2
Blackshirt battalions attached. Greek divisions had 3 (3 btn.) regiments. Artillery support
was similar with 9 batteries. The Italians were better provided with light mortars and the
Greeks had more MGs. Both the Italian and Greek divisions had limited AA and ATG
provision. Supply services were poor on both sides although this was more vital to the
Italians who had only 107 lorries in Albania out of an estimated requirement of 1,750.

In the air, the Italian Air force in Albania had 55 bombers and 107 fighters (more than
half CR42 & 32's). They could also count on support from Brindisi in the form of 119
bombers, 20 JU87's and 54 fighters. The tiny Greek air force had only 27 bombers and 38
fighters serviceable. However, Italian air-ground co-operation was negligible with the
Albania air commander, General Ranza being based in Tirana, many miles from army HQ.
The supporting squadrons in Italy were not even in telephone contact.
5.The Campaign

The Italian offensive was launched on 28 October in driving rain that deprived the army
of air cover. The Littoral group moved slowly down the coast while the Tsamouria Corps
advanced through the mountains towards Kalpaki where the only resistance it met with,
was the Colonel Davakis' dettachment (2,500 men).

On their left the Julia Alpini Division split into two regimental battle groups either side of
Mount Smolikas with the objective of seizing the Metsovon pass. In Macedonia the XXVI
Corps (primarily the Parma Division) was thinly spread in defensive positions.

Rapidly rising rivers and mud tracks resulted in slow progress with Greek screening
forces falling back onto prepared positions. Despite the difficulties the Aosta Lancers in
the Littoral Group gained a bridgehead over the Kalamas River. The Tsamouria Corps
made slow progress on what were little more than mountain tracks with the Centauro's
tanks simply sticking in the mud where they had to be abandoned. The Julia Division in
the centre began to create a wedge in the Greek position despite the conditions and
Papagos responded with infiltration attacks that almost surrounded the Italians.
Bersaglieri reinforcements helped extricate the Division only after heavy losses.

On 6 November the Italian command was reorganised into two armies:

9th Army
29th Infantry 'Piemonte', 53rd Infantry 'Arezzo', 49th Infantry 'Parma' & 19th Infantry
'Venezia' Divisions in Western Macedonia.
3rd Alpina 'Julia' and 47th Infantry 'Bari' (diverted from cancelled Corfu invasion)
Divisions on the Pindus.
2nd Alpina Division 'Tridentina' in reserve.

11th Army
23rd Infantry 'Ferrara', 131st Armored 'Centauro' and 51st Infantry 'Sienna' Divisions
To be reinforced by four divisions in preparation for an offensive after 5 December.

General Soddu subsequently replaced Visconte Prasca.

With the Italian offensive grinding to a halt, Papagos shifted the X and XV Divisions to
the Macedonian front to join the IX Division (C Corps).
The Italians had dug in on the Devoli River with their backs to the Morava massif. XV
Division in the north made spectacular advances in freezing conditions around Mount
Ivan whilst IX & X Divisions pushed the Italians back off the mountains exposing the key
valley town of Korce which was abandoned on the 21 November.

Italian reinforcements where thrown into the line piecemeal often without supporting
arms and into a chaotic command structure. The loss of Koritsa and Erseke exposed the
left flank of the 11th Army on the coast which was forced to retreat deep into Albania
whilst being vigorously counterattacked by fresh Greek divisions. By 10 January the
Klisura junction had been captured and Italian units only managed to stabilise the line
south of the port of Vlore. Even this was due more to the lengthening Greek supply lines
than effective Italian resistance. Marshall Cavallero replaced General Soddu.

The Greek strategy was now to capture Vlore then stabilise the line so that divisions
could be redeployed to the Bulgarian front. It was becoming increasingly obvious that a
German invasion was likely. The assault supported by RAF squadrons made some
progress but ground to a halt in bad weather.

The Italians again reinforced up to a total of 28 divisions (4 Alpine, 1 Armoured and 23

Infantry) totalling 526,000 men. On 9 March their spring offensive used seven divisions
in a limited attack between the Vijose River and Mount Tommorit. The 14 Greek
divisions holding the Albanian front gave some ground until the attack was called off on
25 March after heavy casualties on both sides. This remained the position until April
when the German invasion of the Balkans moved through the Pindus capturing Ioannina,
sealing the Greek army in Albania.

Losses

The Italian casualties amounted to approximately 13,755 killed 25,067 missing

(presumably KIA) and 63,242 wounded. The Greek losses totaled 14,562 men, including
the 1,237 missing (presumably KIA) and 67,485 wounded. The Greeks suffered most of
their casualties in the course of the Italian spring offensive (Operation "Primavera"-1,263
dead, 4,036 wounded. The Greek I (1st) Infantry Division accounted 559 dead, 2,067
wounded). In addition, the Greeks took some 23,000 Italians as POWs. The Italians
captured 2,392 Greeks.

References:
https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=57911

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Italian_War

http://www.niehorster.org/019_italy/40_organ/_40_organisations-list.html