Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002) This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on
condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available from < http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html >
MalaysiaSingapore Relations:
Retrospect and Prospect
K. S. NATHAN
Introduction
This article on MalaysiaSingapore bilateral relations proceeds on the
assumption that the key issues involved are better analysed and
evaluated within the framework of political realism. Indeed, Sheldon
Simon, an American specialist on Southeast Asia, offers a pertinent
observation: Realism (or self-help) will continue as an important
analytical framework for understanding Southeast Asian security because
individual states still have unresolved conflicts with each other and
because no consensus exists whether external threats to regional order
exist or who they may be.1
385
All these eight factors emphasize both the role and consequences of
unit-level interactions and the constraints and opportunities arising
from the systemic structure of international politics.
It is argued that, for the purposes of this article, the trends, progress,
frictions, and salience in the MalaysiaSingapore relationship can be
evaluated on the basis of three criteria: (a) the historical factor in
bilateral relations, (b) the political economy of the relationship, and (c)
the key bilateral issues animating the relationship, namely, water, the
development of Malayan Railway land, pension fund withdrawals by
Peninsular Malaysians from Singapore, use of Malaysian airspace by
the Singapore Air Force, and the relocation of immigration checkpoints.
Malaysian Malaysia
The concept of a Malaysian Malaysia has always underpinned the
developmental approach of Singapores PAP in its strategy of building
a united Malaysian nation comprising all ethnic groups on the basis of
equality. For Singapores Lee Kuan Yew, an egalitarian approach in the
long run would ultimately produce the desired result of a dynamic and
progressive nation in which all communities can move up the socio-
economic ladder. Constitutional provisions to help the needy and
disadvantaged Malaysians regardless of ethnicity could have been drafted
a major enterprise to: (a) renovate the economy along more rational
market-based principles; (b) industrialize the country to keep pace with
international competition; and (c) develop all the necessary skills that
would enable Malaysia to cope with the information revolution, and to
manage both the positive and negative sides of globalization in the
twenty-first century. These new goals and priorities result also from the
expiry of the twenty-year New Economic Policy (197090) specifically
aimed at uplifting the socio-economic status and welfare of the Malay
or bumiputra population. The apparent success of socio-economic
restructuring, given that the system had not broken down despite
preferential and discriminatory policies in favour of Muslim/Malays,
has provided the foundation for a more enterprising approach to create
a bangsa Malaysia, or a Malaysian nation, in which policies are driven
more by need than by ethnicity. The policies are designed to create
greater synergies or interdependence among the various ethnic groups
in Malaysia which in turn would strengthen the current political
framework of Malay dominance an apparent contradiction in terms.
Indeed, the concepts of bangsa Malaysia and ketuanan Melayu, or
Malay supremacy, are directly in conflict with the philosophy of Vision
2020. To be sure, Vision 2020 is premised on expanding bumiputra
dominance of the political economy of Malaysia in which the other
ethnic groups would at best remain second or third-class citizens of
this multiracial nation. However, such contradictions become obfuscated
by economic prosperity that is, the governments ability to deliver on
the economic front even if some are getting more than others. Feelings
of relative deprivation can be skilfully manipulated by the government
to confer disproportionate benefits to a certain segment of the population.
In the Malaysian context, Malaysian security and Malay ethnic security
are virtually inseparable.14 This conception of security contributes an
additional source of tension in relations with Singapore which
emphasizes meritocracy to energize its political economy, and tends to
view national security as more a product of international rather than
local dynamics.
Malaysias major goal in the next thirty years is to reduce the heavy
dependence on Singapore as a re-export centre for Malaysian goods.
This necessarily entails upgrading the countrys technological and
industrial base, its sea-ports and airports, educational infrastructure,
transportation networks, and transforming the commodity composition
of bilateral ties (with Singapore) and international trade from low to
high value-added, especially manufactured goods and electrical and
electronic products. Another major area of transformation lies in the
structure of Malaysian overseas investments, including Singapore
from the real estate sector to the financial and business sectors and
arguing that it costs the republic RM2.40 to treat 1,000 gallons of water
which it sells to Johor at 50 sen per 1,000 gallons. The republic is
already feeling the pressure of securing additional water supplies well
before the 2061 cut-off point. Under an agreement with Johor, Singapore
draws about 1.527 billion litres of raw water daily, or less than 40 per
cent of Singapores daily requirements.
Awareness on both sides has grown substantially that the water
problem, if left unresolved, would almost certainly complicate other
bilateral issues so that any long-term resolution would require a
settlement on the basis of a comprehensive package covering other
contentious issues and irritants in the bilateral relationship. To this
end, Senior Minister Lee made two visits to Kuala Lumpur in August
2000 and again in September 2001. The latter visit was evidently
undertaken with greater urgency, stemming from Lees perception of
future trends in Malaysian politics carrying the prospect, even if remote
at this stage, of an Islamic-oriented government taking control of federal
power in a future election. It was Lees considered assessment that a
more stable and fair deal could be struck with the UMNO-led government
of Prime Minister Mahathir than with a future theocratic government
whose national and international priorities could be radically different,
thus rendering the relationship with Singapore more problematic.18
He also expressed the concern that a future government in Kuala
Lumpur that is more favourably disposed towards growing Islamic
militancy will not deliver.19 Lee also took the view that it was his
personal responsibility as Singapores first prime minister to reach
some form of finality on the matter of the water issue with a Malaysian
leader with whom he had become acquainted since 1965 prior to
Singapores separation from Malaysia. Settling the water issue as part
of a comprehensive package would help prevent the burdens of the past
revisiting successor governments on both sides of the causeway while
enabling them to adopt a more constructive and perhaps less emotional
approach to fostering good bilateral relations, both in the spirit of
ASEAN and in the context of globalization. On Malaysias part, Prime
Minister Mahathir has always maintained that the water issue must be
resolved together with other outstanding bilateral issues as a com-
prehensive package an approach reflecting convergence of national
interests between the two neighbours.
The skeletal agreement signed on 4 September 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur guarantees Malaysian supply of water beyond 2061 (upon
expiry of the 1962 agreement) at 1.33 billion litres per day compared
with Singapores request for 2.85 billion litres a day. However, the
price of water would increase fifteenfold in the near future, costing
Singapore an additional RM45 million each year. Malaysia, however,
has asked for 60 sen per 1,000 gallons. Beyond 2061, Malaysia has
offered to supply 350 million gallons a day, although this is less than
the 750 million gallons per day requested by Lee. Singapore agreed to
the lower figure although the ratio of raw water to treated water has yet
to be finalized. Prime Minister Mahathir has offered 100 million gallons
per day of raw water and 250 million gallons of filtered water. However,
Lees request is for 150 million gallons of raw water and 200 million
gallons of treated water, which would be supplied by a joint venture
between Johor and the Public Utilities Board (PUB) of Singapore. The
1990 agreement between Johor and the PUB would serve as a basis for
determining the price of filtered water. Raw water would be sold at 60
sen per 1,000 gallons, and would be reviewed every five years.20 In
addition, Singapore is obliged to give Malaysia twelve parcels of land
as a bonus for guaranteed water supply.
There is little doubt that concerns over Malaysias shifting political
landscape, coupled with economic recession in the republic, provided
sufficient incentives for Senior Minister Lee to broker a less than
balanced agreement in Malaysias favour as he was convinced that the
comprehensive pact was a sufficiently good trade-off for long-term
security.21 Nevertheless, the devil is in the detail, and it would take a
good deal of give-and-take by officials on both sides to iron out a
durable compromise that reflects confidence for the promotion of mutual
interests. The most recent round of discussions over water in Kuala
Lumpur in July 2002 has underscored basic differences of approach in
resolving this issue, especially in relation to the price mechanism.
Malaysia wishes to delink the pricing aspect from other issues in the
comprehensive package, while Singapore prefers to resolve all
outstanding bilateral issues as a package. Kuala Lumpur has in recent
times hinted more than once that the price paid by Singapore for raw
water from Johor is too low, pointing to the sale of water by China to
Hong Kong at RM6.80 per 1,000 gallons.22 Singapore holds to the view
that any formula to fix the price of water supplied by Malaysia to the
republic should apply only to future agreements, and cannot be
retrospectively applied to the 1961 and 1962 agreements.23
It should also be noted that Singapore has developed a realistic
approach to water security by exploring all other options to boost self-
sufficiency, especially in times of crisis. To the extent that Singapore
succeeds in significantly reducing its dependence on Malaysian supplies,
the scope for politicking over water would most certainly be narrowed.
Arguably, the pressure on Malaysia would be relaxed and the penchant
for Malaysian politicians to manipulate the bilateral relationship to
serve narrower political agendas would also cease. Thus, the degree of
success of Singapores water management strategies might prove crucial
reluctance to go ahead with the 1990 agreement was based on the fear
that it might eventually be forced to give up proprietary control over
some or all of KTMs land in Singapore.25
This issue has invariably become linked to the CIQ issue for
reasons that remain unclear. Singapore has argued that the two issues
are separate: ownership of KTM land as opposed to exercising sovereign
rights by another state on Singapores sovereign territory. Singapore
has maintained, using international conventions and legal practice,
that any exercise of sovereign rights by Malaysia on Singapores territory,
such as the stamping of passports, can only be done with the sufferance
of the Government of Singapore. Since both parties had agreed to move
the CIQ facilities to Woodlands, on the northernmost point of the
island, commencing 1 August 1998, it was improper of Malaysia to
detract from the agreement, as it did in June 1997 by insisting that it
would continue to operate at Tanjong Pagar after 1 August. Singapore
Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar informed the Singapore Parliament on
31 July 1998 that in a 17 July meeting between officials of both sides,
the Malaysian delegation fully understood that the CIQ and POA were
separate issues, and hence there was no question of Singapore taking
back KTM land merely by relocating its CIQ to Woodlands.26
The 1990 POA states that the KTM railway station would be
moved either to Bukit Timah first, or directly to Woodlands. In exchange,
under the 1990 POA, three parcels of railway land at Tanjong Pagar,
Kranji, and Woodlands would be jointly developed on a 6040 basis
with the Malaysian Government holding the larger share. However,
three years later, Prime Minister Mahathir expressed his displeasure
with the POA as it failed to include a piece of railway land in Bukit
Timah for joint development.
The September 2001 comprehensive agreement nevertheless helped
resolve this thorny issue which provided sufficient latitude to be
exploited for political purposes in times of economic or political
difficulties. Both governments have reached an understanding on the
Malaysian immigration checkpoint on the Kuala LumpurSingapore
railway line, which is to be moved from Tanjong Pagar to Kranji. The
issue over Malayan Railway land a very sensitive one for Kuala
Lumpur has now been resolved by Singapores agreement to offer
Malaysia another twelve plots of land in Bukit Timah (as mentioned
earlier). The linkage between an agreement on water and an agreement
on land concessions should not go unnoticed hence, the need for a
package deal as the most realistic as well as constructive approach to
bilateral relations.
Singapore also in-principle acceded to Malaysias demands to
build a new bridge to replace the JohorSingapore causeway, which
Chin Hock Seng noted that the withdrawal condition was not a form of
discrimination. In view of the fact that Singaporean workers can only
withdraw their CPF savings at age 55 whereas peninsular Malaysians
can do so at 50, the latter actually enjoy a more liberal withdrawal
regime.31
In any event, the fact that issues such as the CPF gets intertwined
with other more important issues testifies to the high level of sensitivity
that exists in a bilateral relationship, especially when it experiences
strains. This realization has informed the comprehensive package
approach to bilateral dispute resolution during Lees September 2001
visit to Kuala Lumpur. Singapore has adopted a more conciliatory
approach to the CPF issue. Upon achieving an overall package agreement,
Singapore would permit peninsular Malaysians to withdraw CPF funds
over a period of two years.
that give rise to occasional friction, tension, and strain, are either
neutralized or marginalized by the commitment of both leaderships to
improve the material well-being of their own peoples. Thus, it can be
argued that the evidence of the past thirty-seven years suggests that this
bilateral relationship is characterized by functional tension and co-
operation with the desire and momentum to co-operate taking
precedence over perceptual and structural differences. Both leaderships
have adopted a pragmatic approach to substantive issues without
allowing issues that have a localized political content to scuttle
meaningful co-operation. Indeed, it is possible to conclude that the
dictates of both realism and neorealism oblige the two causeway
neighbours to adopt a pragmatic and business-like approach to bilateral
relations.
Ultimately, national interest can only be best advanced when
pragmatism supersedes sentimentalism. Trade figures clearly point in
this direction: in 1998 alone, Singapore was Malaysias second largest
trading partner after Japan (with the United States in third position),
while Malaysia was also Singapores second largest trading partner
after Japan (with the United States also in third place). Current trade
and investment statistics further highlight the degree of interdependence
between the two countries. Bilateral MalaysiaSingapore trade alone
accounts for some 50 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade. In the first half of
2001, there was a staggering 4.8 million day trips into Malaysia from
Singapore, double that of the same period in 2000. Additionally,
Singapore companies had RM1.2 billion (S$0.6 billion) of manufacturing
investments in 149 projects approved in Malaysia in 2001 alone.
Moreover, based on Malaysian projections, Singaporeans will contribute
half of the tourism dollars that Malaysia hopes to earn in 2002.35 There
is little doubt that the character of bilateral relations reflects ongoing
historical, geographic, and cultural ties.
It is in this context that the two countries involvement in ASEAN,
the broader Asia-Pacific region, and globally should be viewed. Both
Malaysia and Singapore are committed to membership and development
of ASEAN, which protects the sovereignty of individual member-states
as well as promotes their individual and collective welfare. ASEAN is
valuable to both countries as a forum for development, security, and
regional co-operation. ASEAN is a useful mechanism for promoting
best practices in resolving bilateral disputes between member-states.
Recent developments following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
in the United States have clearly energized MalaysiaSingapore bilateral
relations in the security dimension. Both countries have co-operated
very closely to meet the threat of international terrorism linked to
al-Qaeda operatives in the region. Whatever might be the evidence,
both governments have taken the view that the threat of religious
terrorism is real, and the need to pool resources to counter that threat
is ever more urgent. Malaysias Anti-Terror Pact with the United States
(14 May 2002) appears to be a follow-up of the Tripartite Anti-Terrorism
Pact signed by three ASEAN members Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines on 7 May 2002 in Putra Jaya, Malaysias new Federal
Administrative Centre.36 Singapores own security links with the United
States, and Manilas co-operation with U.S. Special Forces in anti-
terrorism operations in the southern Philippines all attest to a higher
American security presence and co-operation with ASEAN in the post-
September 11 era. At a broader regional level, both Singapore and
Malaysia have been instrumental in the establishment of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) as a mechanism for security dialogue and co-
operation involving extra-regional powers. For Malaysia, as for Singapore
and other ARF members in Southeast Asia, the ARF is a confidence-
building institution even if the process of establishing a regional
multilateral security structure is problematic at this stage.
The operative factors that shape domestic and international policy
on both sides of the equation significantly affect the types of mechanisms
available and the compromises that can be reached. For Singapore, the
determining factors include its geography, demographic size and
character, resource scarcity, perceptions of vulnerability especially vis-
-vis immediate neighbours, preservation of territorial sovereignty, and
economic survival through interdependence and globalization of trade,
finance, and services. On the basis of similar criteria, the determinants
of Malaysias domestic and foreign policy can be stated as follows:
1. national sovereignty with particular emphasis on political integrity
and the territorial unity of the Malaysian Federation,
2. economic development and social justice in the context of a
multiracial society,
3. preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special
rights of the Malays,
4. a firm commitment to ASEAN and the promotion of other forms of
economic regionalism that advance national interests,
5. promotion of regional stability and security via ZOPFAN (Zone of
Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality), and
6. commitment to promote South-South co-operation aimed at
enhancing the economic welfare of the less developed world, and
support for human rights and social justice at the global level.
Formulations or conceptions of the national interest in such terms
invariably activate the need for adroit diplomacy to bridge the gap
between national aspirations and international realities, or to put it in
NOTES
1. Sheldon W. Simon, International Relations Theory and Southeast Asian Security,
Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (1995): 7.
2. For a concise and interesting account of the role of realism and neo-liberalism in
Southeast Asian foreign policies, see ibid., pp. 524.
3. Michael Leifer, Singapores Foreign Policy: Coping With Vulnerability (London:
Routledge, 2000), p. 15.
4. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Politics (New York:
St. Martins Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 8687.
5. N. Ganesan, Singapores Foreign Policy Terrain, Asian Affairs: An American
Review 19, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 6779.
6. T.S. George, Lee Kuan Yews Singapore (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), p. 169.
7. See Linda Y.C. Lims summation of MalaysiaSingapore relations on p. 136 of her
article, The Foreign Policy of Singapore, in The Political Economy of Foreign
Policy in Southeast Asia, edited by David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (New York:
St. Martins Press, 1990), pp. 12445.
8. For a fuller account, see Chin Kin Wah, The Management of Interdependence and
Change within a Special Relationship, in Malaysia and Singapore: Problems and
Prospects, edited by Azizah Kassim and Lau Teik Soon (Singapore: Singapore
Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 23048.
9. For details, see N. Ganesan, op. cit., p. 69.
10. The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998),
p. 616.
11. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford
University Press, 1991), p. 313.
12. Tim Huxley, Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance, Pacific Review 4,
no. 3 (1991): 210.
13. Lim, op. cit., p. 134.
14. For a more detailed analysis of the components of Malaysian security, see K.S.
Nathan, Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation, in Asian Security Practice, edited by
Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 513
48.
15. Sharon Ong, SingaporeMalaysia Bilateral Economic Relations: Competition and
Complementarity (B.A. Hons thesis, National University of Singapore, March
1997), pp. 1417.