Jose Yulo Agricultural Corporatio as a general rule in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
me land, the earlier in date prevails. In successive registrati
n Vs. Spouses Perla Cabaylo Dav
is
Wilson Go And Peter Go Vs. The
Estate Of The Late Felisa Tamio
De Buena Ventura
Timoteo Aguilar, Et.Al. V. Carlos
Belaong, Et.Al.
ons, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificat
e is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is deriv
ed directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust. In the present case, a trust was established between Felisa, on the one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., an
d Felimon, Sr., on the other, However, it was not an implied trust as concluded by the RTC and the CA but an express one. The execution of t
he September 21, 1970 letter unequivocally and absolutely declared Felisas intention of transferring the title over the subject property to Bell
a, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. for the purpose of securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise clearly stated that she was retaining her owner
ship over the subject property and articulated her wish to have her heirs share equally. Hence, by the virtue of the said letter ,an express was
established.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed, following th
e jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated. In this case, there was a repudiation
of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the compl
aint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on October 1 7, 1997, 54 or only a few months after the sale of the subject prop
erty to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has prescribed.
While on the 3rd issue, the Supreme Court ruled that they are not a purchasers in good faith since he has the knowledge of the existence of a
n annotation on the title covering the subject property and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any presump
tion of good faith on the part of Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fa
ct which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser.
An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of a decedent's real properties to warn thir
d persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encum
brance or lien on the real property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite the annotatio
n, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of excluded parties.
the court ruled that an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful or legal owner of land that has been wro
ngfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconveyto him the property, sp
ecifically the title.
Ma. Elena Divinagracia V. Corona
cion Parilla, Et.Al.
Sio Tiat King Vs Lim Et Al
Gr 185407
Sps Jalbay Vs Pnb
Gr 177803
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom nofinal determination of t
he case can be had. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, o
r equitable.30 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to a
ct, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. According to Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all perso
ns interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispens
able parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
According to Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature an
d extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons i
nterested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action f
or partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. x x x.
x x x The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually h
olding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial pro
cess for the recovery of the property.
One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The
judicial process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties
may be properly heard and adjudicated.
Matters regarding its ownership should be ventilated in a separate proceeding, as this case is limited to the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of possession following redemption.
The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title is not applicable to banks. Thus, before approving
a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage
and to verify the veracity of the title to determine its real owners. An ocular inspection is necessary to protect the true owner of the property a
s well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title.
the Court finds that PNB has complied with the required degree of diligence, prudence, and care in dealing with the mortgagor. There was als
o no sign or circumstance which could have possibly triggered suspicion on the banks part. Aside from the fact that the certificate of title to th
e subject lot is authentic and issued in the name of Emiliano Jalbay, he also appeared to have been the one occupying said property.
Javier Vs Lumontad
Spouses Suntay Vs Keyser Merc
antile, Inc.
Complaint was indeed one for forcible entry, petitioners case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Sec
tion 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without res
ort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has
been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the compl
aint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under s
aid conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendants act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strat
egy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demons
trate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter."
the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would neces
sarily imply the use of force,46 as what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint. Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner
only made a general allegation that respondents entry in the premises was made by means of force and intimidation47 and, consequently, th
at a forcible entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that a forcible entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the C
A thus erred in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership, other
wise known as an accion reivindicatoria
No res judicata, forum shopping and prescription in this case
The defense of res judicata must fail. The doctrine of res judicata is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from re-litigating is
sues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. Res judicata constituting bar by prior judgment occurs when the following
requisites concur: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Thus, the third requisite of res judicata is not present because the previous case was not adjudicated on the merits as it was denied on jurisdi
ctional grounds.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the elements of litispendentiamust be present, or the final judgment in
one case amounts to res judicata in another. Since there is no res judicata in this case, then there is no forum shopping either.
Domingo Vs Singson
Land Bank Of The Philippines Vs.
Belle Corporation
Carbonell Vs Carbonell
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said person's name would not be suf
ficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefe
asibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must con
cur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwith
standing the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the r
egistration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original registered owners, Macario and
Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject propert
y. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession - whether de facto or dejure; respondent t
hus has no right to exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive poss
ession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property.
A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not a mortgagee in good
faith. A mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and claim that he acted in good faith under
the belief that there was no defect in the title of the mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists or the willful closing of his e
yes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the mortgagor's title will not make him an innocent mortgagee for value if it afterwards dev
elops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted
with that
measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
There is forgery. No deviations from findings of lower courts because it was duly proven during trial
Petitioner here raises questions of fact. The court will not entertain questions of fact under rule 45 exceptions:
1. The conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
2. Inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. Grave abuse of discretion;
4 judgment based on misapprehension of facts;
5. Findings of fact are conflicting;
6. No citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
7. Findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
8. Findings of ca are contrary to those of the trial court;
9. The CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, that, if properly considered would justify a different conclusion;
10 the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
11 such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties
Republic Of The Philippines Vs. J The sc ruled that the ruling in Republic vs tan properties inc. should be followed where it states that applicants for land registration must pres
osefina Alona And Oscar O. Alon ent a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR secretary and certified as the copy by the legal custodian of the official records
a . Republic vs vega and rep vs Serrano which allow trial courts to grant applications for registration despite the absence of a certification from t
he DENR secretary are only applicable when the case is currently pending before the RTC at the time rep vsvega was promulgated.
In this case, the rtc resolution was issued on july 3, 2012, after the promulgation of rep vstan .thus, the rule requiring certification from the DE
NR secretary should be applied. Since respondents in this case failed to present a certified classification from the denr secretary, the ca and r
tcs ruling should be overturned.
UDPDC, The Compromise Agreement is declared INVALID and WITH NO EFFECT. A mere resolution does not suffice to approve PPA's claim of Php
-Versus 11,930,282.28 against MOD for no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution. Thus, while it is true that compromise agree
PPA Et Al ments between the parties in civil cases, they must be executed in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence.PPA's authority to admi
nister the Port of Dumangas was effectively superseded by the directive mandated by the DOTC Department Order to transfer the operation
of the same to the MOD.
The series of hold-over authorities as well as the final holdover permit granting UDPDC a three (3 )-month extension was clearly temporary in
nature. UDPDC's continued operation of the port was merely by PPA's tolerance, the holdover permits should have served as adequate notic
e to UDPDC that, at any time, its authority to remain within the premises of the port of Dumangas may be terminated. Thus, in view of the exp
iration of UDPDC' s permit to operate the port, and in the absence of any contract renewing the same, UDPDC cannot claim to have any right
to the administration thereof. The records of this case are REMANDED to the RTC, for the proper determination of the value of equipment an
d improvements introduced by petitioner on the Port of Dumangas.
Alicia Y. Laurel, Substituted By H
er Sole Heir And Legal The funda
mental test for non prosequitur is w
hether, under the circumstances, th
e plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to proceed
with reasonable promptitude. There
must be unwillingness on the part of
the plaintiff to prosecute. Petitioner'
s actuations indicate that she was n
ot at all unwilling to prosecute her c
ase, nor can it be said that she "refu
sed" to present her evidence.
Representative Juan Miguel Y. La
urel,
-Versus
Ferdinand M. V Ardeleon
Baltazar Ibot vs Heirs Of Francisc
o Tayco
Heirs Of Antero Soliva, V. Severi
no, Joel, Grace, Cenon, Jr., Renat
o, Eduardo, Hilario, All Surnamed
Soliva, Rogelio V. Roleda, And T
here was no accretion of inheritanc
e within the terms of Article 1015 of
the Civil Code
Sanvic Enterprises, Inc., Represe
nted By Its Manager, Santos Pora
que,
Generally, "in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If the plaintiff claims a ri
ght granted or created by law, the same must be proven by competent evidence. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence,"3
6 "or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the burden
of proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of t
he defendant's."37 In an action for reconveyance, however, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence bu
t by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.38
In the case at bar, the respondents failed to dispense their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they are entitled to the rec
onveyance of Lot No. 299.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness
of the defendant's claim.
In order to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove tw
o things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.
As to the first requisite, there is no doubt that the land sought to be reconveyed is Lot No. 299, a residential lot located at Pigcawayan, Provin
ce of Cotabato. As to the second requisite on title of ownership, the claims of the parties conflict.
it is clear mere claim of ownership will not suffice. An action for reconveyance should be maintained by the true owner. It will not suffice that t
he respondents are in possession of the land subject thereof.53 Thus, the scale of justice should tilt in favor of the petitioner and not the resp
ondents.
Article 1015 of the Civil Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assi
gned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs, c
o-devisees, or co-legatees.
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602, however, two requisites m
ust concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) that their intention was to secure an existing
debt by
way of mortgage.
The Pacto de Retro sale states that Juana, as vendor a retro, reserves for "herself, her heirs, or assigns the right of repurchase the property d
escribed above within a period of TEN (10) YEARS, from and after the date of this instrument, x x x."

Sps Roque Vs Ma. Pamela P. Agu
ado, Et Al
Narra Nickel Mining And Develop
ment Corp., Tesoro Mining And D
evelopment, Inc., And Mcarthur M
ining, Inc.,
Vs.
Redmont Consolidated Mines Co
rp.,
This Deed was executed in 1970, while Antero filed the complaint in 1991. Between these dates - 1970 and 1991 - none of the heirs exercise
d, or at the least attempted to exercise, this right of repurchase granted to them under the contract. Obviously, at the time Antero, et al. filed t
he complaint in 1991, the 10-year repurchase period under the contract had already lapsed.
the real intention of Juana and Cenon in this case was to enter into a Pacto de Retro sale, not an equitable mortgage. Obviously, therefore, A
ntero's reliance on paragraph 3, Article 1606 of the Civil Code is misplaced and his argument on this point cannot prosper.
The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another p
ersons name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.49 Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal cl
aim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser fo
r value.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold b
y the owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previ
ous sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the
purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property.
There is no double sale in such case.1wphi1 Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the
owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the in
tention of dividing the profits among themselves.50 On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it i
s difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships. Thus:
[T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordin
arily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not exac
tly the same, as those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the law has been to blur the distinctions between a
partnership and a joint venture, very little law being found applicable to one that does not apply to the other.51
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one from the ot
her; thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing
partnerships are applied.52
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and among petition

Consuelo V. Pangasinan And An
nabella V. Boromeo -Versus- Cri
stina Almazora Et Al.,
Annie Geronimo And Silverland
Alliance Christian Church Versu
s- Spouses Rodolfo And Estela C
. Calderon
Dela Rosa Vs. Batongbacal
ers and MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; con
sequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "ps
eudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibitio
n against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partners
hip should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the ele
ments of partnership are present.
the "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art
. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. Whe
n in the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership i
n the corporation, then it may apply the "grandfather rule."
Petirioners are barred by laches. First, Aurora and her family entrusted to Conrado the owners duplicate of the certificate of title of the subjec
t property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrados family had been staying in the subject property since 1912. Se
cond, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce their
right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come
out and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents ould be prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allow
ed to prosper.
There are 2 kinds of prescription; acquisitive and extinctive.
Acquisitive is the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time or adverse possession, while extinctive is one where rights are lost by lapse of tim
e. The action must fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute the suit within the
prescriptive period
1. HLURB has jurisdiction conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint. PD 957 spells out the quasi-judicial powe
r of the National Housing Authority now HLURB. It has the power to regulate the real estate trade and business involving subdivision and con
dominiums and the authority on cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
s or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
2. CA is correct that petitioners cannot use the property for religious purposes and as a church. This usage contravenes the land use poli
cy particularly prescribed in the subdivision plan and in the Development Permit. It violates the intended use of the subject lot, that is, for resid
ential use only.
Contract to Sell.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nev
ertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: ( 1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated a
 s a sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the debt when due gives
the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of the loan obligati
on.

Miranda Vs. Raymundo
A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals the utter frailty of petitioners' position because nothing therein suggests, even remot
ely, that the subject property was given to secure a monetary obligation. The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the instr
ument was executed with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property to the buyer in exchange for the price.
The SC upheld conclusion of the OCA that respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty for his failure to enforce the writ of execution issued
by the trial court. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute final judgments of the courts. If not
enforced, such decisions become empty victories of the prevailing parties. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their du
ties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and implementing its orders, they cannot afford to
err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.

It is clear that despite the trial court's numerous directives to the respondent sheriff to implement the writ, the same remained unimplemented
for more than four (4) years.

For failing to satisfactorily implement the writ, respondent sheriff displayed conduct short of the stringent standards required of court employe
es.
Sps. Fernando And Herminia Ver it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters tha
gara Vs Erlinda Torrecampo Sonk t flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of
in lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the highe restates water which naturally and without the intervention of man descends fro
m the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters. In this light, Sps. Sonkin sho
uld have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden
created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the perimet
er wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the National Building Code in the process.
Robert And Nenita De Leon Vs Gi
lbert And Analyn Dela Llana
Abliss Development Corp./Home
Guaranty Corporation V. Diaz
Mangaser V. Ugay
Notably, res judicata has two (2) concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment in which the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdi
ction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving t
he same cause of action before the same or other tribunal, while the secondconcept is conclusiveness of judgment in which any right, fact o
r matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of anaction before a competent court in which judgment is re
ndered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies wheth
er or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first case where the judg
ment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred.38 There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there i
s identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action.
The Court however clarified that res judicata only applies in reference to the cause of action raised by Gilbert in both ejectment complaints t
hat is, his entitlement to the de facto possession of the subject property based on breach of contract, which was resolved to be simulated and
, hence, non-binding. A subsequent ejectment complaint grounded on a different cause of action
: The Court ruled that Diaz was not a buyer in good faith, but BDC is still liable to Diaz because it acted in bad faith.
The court found BDC acted in bad faith by receiving payments from Diaz while knowing of Arrezas claim, and also receiving payments from t
he latter.
Diaz, on his part, cannot be considered in good faith since he failed to inquire diligently into the title of his predecessor. Even so, BDC is still li
able to return the amount paid, because there was unjust enrichment.
Both parties being in bad faith, the law will treat them as if they acted in good faith. Thus, BDC is also liable to pay the value of the improvem
ents that Diaz introduced on the subject property
While prior possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, this may be acquired not only by material occupation but also
by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will, such as juridical acts. This is true in this case, as Mangaser acquired the property
through the issuance of a free patent.
Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of Mangaser, the bare allegations of Ugay have no leg to stand on.
Javate vs Tiotuico Petitioner is correct in saying that respondents must resort to judicial process in order for them to obtain possession of the dispu
ted lot. However, petitioner is wrong in positing that the only appropriate judicial actions or proceedings that should have been tak
en by respondents are either ejectment or a reivindicatory suit. On the other hand, respondents were correct in asking the court to
issue a writ of possession.

In the instant case, while respondents' petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed ex-parte, a hearing was, noneth
eless, conducted when the RTC gave petitioner her day in court by giving her the opportunity to file various pleadings to oppose r
espondent's petition. To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively
through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. 8cralawred

Moreover, there is no dispute that petitioner remained in possession of the subject property prior to the issuance of the questione
d writ of possession. It is, thus, clear that respondents' resort, as a subsequent or third-party purchaser, to the petition for the issu
ance of a writ of possession is proper.
Teresita S. Lee vs Lui Man Chong Various tests in determining whether or not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. On
, e test of identity is the absence of inconsistency test where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior j
udgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.
The Court is of the view that, as aptly observed by the CA, the identity of the causes of action in the Annulment Case and the Recovery Case
becomes more palpable from the fact that in both cases Lee practically seeks the same relief. Ultimately, she prays that the Court recognize
and declare her right as a co-owner of the same and divest Chong of his ownership over at least one half of the subject properties.

In sum, absent any imprudent exercise of authority on the part of the CA, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate or depart from its rul
ing.
Spouses Alejandro Manzanilla An
d Remedios Velasco,
Vs.
Waterfields Industries Corporatio
n, Represented By Its President,
Aliza Ma,
Sps Ocampo vs Heirs of Dionisio
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the cond
itions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers tothe existence of the cause o
f action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pur
sued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish the cause ofaction of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentatio
n of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to h
ave been violated.
Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require p
roof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no suchadmission was made. "A
party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during trial, either by verbal or written manifestations orstipulations, or (c) in other
stages of the judicial proceeding.
"The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions:
(1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification,and
(2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another."
It does not, however, apply in this case since any benefit that the spouses Manzanilla may obtain from the subject premises cannot be said to
be without any valid basis or justification. It is well to remind Waterfields that they violated the contract of lease and that they failed to vacate
the premises upon demand. Hence, the spouses Manzanilla are justified in recovering the physical possession thereof and consequently, in
making use of the property. Besides, in violating the lease by failing to pay the rent, Waterfields took the risk of losing the improvements it intr
oduced thereon in favor of the spouses Manzanilla. This is because despite the fact that the lease contract provides that in case of terminatio
n of the lease agreement all permanent improvements and structures found in the subject premises shall belong to the lessors,41 it still violat
ed the lease.
Res Juricata
two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute
bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation be
tween the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or
other tribunal.
For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the following requisites must concur, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and

PNB vs Spouses Hippocrates An
d Melanie Pimentel,
Luis Uy, the property subject of the
mortgage was registered in the nam
e of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age,
married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos."
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any c
laim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover suc
h possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forc
ible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of Title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court
of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first i
nstance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that "prescription and laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system" because "und
er the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription o
r adverse possession."
It must be pointed out that this case does not involve the concept of novation, which presupposes that the original contract is still valid and su
bsisting when another contract supplanted the previous one. That is not the situation in this case. Once the mortgaged property was sold at p
ublic auction and title to the property has passed and had been consolidated in the name of the winning bidder, the duties and obligations of t
he parties under the loan and mortgage contract had been fulfilled and the contract extinguished. The original loan and mortgage contract ha
d been extinguished through payment or performance.
This is especially clear, if we consider the scenario where the winning bidder was some entity other than the creditor itself/himself. If some oth
er entity emerged as the winning bidder at the public auction and became the new absolute owner after the debtor failed to redeem the prope
rty, it would be obvious that the mortgage contract would no longer hold sway. Evidently, the mortgagor-mortgagee regime, or the first contrac
t, was extinguished and terminated once the winning bidder at the public auction became the absolute owner of the subject property. Thus, by
the time PNB and respondents entered into the subsequent contract of conditional sale, the mortgage contract was no longer existing.
PNB is already the absolute owner of subject property and entitled to its possession, it had all the right to dispose of subject property by enteri
ng into a NEW contract of sale. This new contract is now an entirely distinct and separate one, considering that, as discussed above, the mort
gagor-mortgagee relationship between herein parties had already been terminated and extinguished by the fulfillment of all the duties and obli
gations of the parties under said mortgage contract. In fact, as such absolute owner, PNB could have rightfully transacted the contract of sale
with any party other than herein respondents. Verily, therefore, this is not a case of novation, but the commencement of another contractual r
elation between herein parties.
ruled that the title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil st
atus of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
This Court
Substituted By Lydia Uy Velasqu
ez And Shirley Uy Macaraig, V. S
pouses Jose Lacsamana And Ro
saura* Mendoza, Substituted By
Corazon Buena,
Spouses Salvador P. Norberte, Jr
. And Elizabeth S. Norberte, V. Sp
ouses Felicisimo G. Mejia And El
vira C. Mejia And/Or Their Heirs,
Represented By Alexis Mejia-Que
rubin,
Sps. Chiu Hua Kiat (James Chiu)
And Lina Ng Chiu, V. Edison Llan
es
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living toget
her shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to s
ell the same even without Uy's consent.
the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the tr
ial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the purchase price and the consideration for the sale are fact
ual issues which cannot be raised in this petition.
The Court sustains the finding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The ownership of the subject property passed to the Spouses
Norberte by constructive delivery upon the execution of the March 28, 1988 contract of conditional sale between them and the Legaspis. Alth
ough denominated as conditional, a deed of sale is absolute in nature in the absence of any stipulation reserving title to the seller until full pay
ment of the purchase price. In such case, ownership of the thing sold passes to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery.7 In a contract
of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a contract to sell, on the other hand, the ownership i
s, by agreement, retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.8 Here, there was already a
perfected contract. The condition imposed was only on the performance of the obligations of the parties.9 As admitted by the Spouses Norber
te themselves, there is nothing in the Deed of Conditional Sale which expressly provides for the retention of title or ownership of the property
by the sellers until full payment of the purchase price. There is clearly no express reservation of title made by the Legaspis over the property,
or any provision which would impose payment of the price as a condition for the contract's entering into force.11 The absence of such stipulati
on indicates that what the parties have actually contemplated was a contract of absolute sale. Therefore, the Spouses Norberte were deemed
to have been unlawfully deprived of the lawful possession of the property by the Mejias upon the execution of the contract of conditional sale
on March 28, 1998. Unfortunately, they filed their complaint for ejectment only on November 6, 2003, way beyond the prescribed period of on
e (1) year within which the action should be commenced. However, the RTC should not have dismissed the case. Rather, it should have tried
it as one for accion publiciana, as if it had originally been filed with it, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Co
urt. It likewise failed to state any findings of facts and conclusions of law on which it based its affirmance of the MeTC Decision.
The main issue in an action for ejectment is possession de facto. Considering that Llanes' basis for resisting the action for ejectment was his
claim of ownership in his own right, the Court must now pass upon ownership provisionally in order to determine which party had the better ri
ght of possession. It is not disputed that the Chius were able to register the property in their name under TCT No. T-28111-Laoag City. Despit
e Llanes disputing the validity of the registration of their title, it cannot be denied that the property remained registered under the name of the
Chius during the pendency of this case. As such, they are entitled by law to the peaceful possession of the property conformably with the prin
ciple that whoever had a Torrens title over land had the right to its possession.21 The contention of Llanes that the Chius were not buyers in
good faith, which Branch 15 upheld, constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens title of the Chius. Such an attack was impermissible, and s
houldnot be
allowed in an unlawful detainer.
Carmencita Suarez Versus -Mr. A
nd Mrs. Felix E. Emboy,Jr.And M
arilou P. Emboydelantar,
Iglesia Filipina Independiente,
Vs.
Heirs Of Bernardino Taeza,
Sps Noynay vs Citihomes Builder And
of another.12 It requires the existence violation
Inc.,
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
As a general rule, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proce
edings.
x Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced by a proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they are e
ntered into without or in excess of authority or they do not comply with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties do not possess t
he required legal capacity.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that [i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, co
nsidereda trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person
who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the b
enefit of the cestui quetrust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an
express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise n
or any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgement
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise.
Development,
on the Cause of
part of the plaintiff, action has obligation
a correlative been defined as defendant
of the an act or omission bysuch
to respect which a party
right, and violates
an act ora omission
right of such defendant in
of a legalofright
the plaintiffs rights. A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the
complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
The complaint, however, may be dismissed for lack of cause of action laterafter questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

Land Bank vs Atlanta Industries i
nc
Rural Bank Of Cabadbaran, Inc. (
Rcbi) Vs. Jorgita Yap Et Al
Well-established is the rule that the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the seller/assignor.
By virtue of the deed of assignment, the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by exactly
the same conditions as those which bound the assignor. What can be inferred from here is the effect on the status of the assignor relative
to the relations established by a contract which has been subsequently assigned; that is, the assignor becomes a complete stranger to all the
matters that have been conferred to the assignee.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent
with what was pleaded.
As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH is in the nature of an executive agreement. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo
47 (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by internation
al law, "whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation,"48 and further
expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or ( b) executive agre
ements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrowe
r range of subject matters than treaties.
Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact embodied in the afore-quoted Section 4 of R.A. No.
9184, the RP, as borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate in t
he concrete to this case, the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord, primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and implem
entation of the bidding/procurement process in question
. Generally, documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by c
lear and convincing evidence.
In the present case, the respondents claim that their signatures were forged. Moreover, the witnesses to the instrument, denied having appea
red before the Notary Public. Thus, the presumption of regularity was negated.
The forged status of the SPA alone is already enough for the Court to declare the real estate mortgage contract null and void but only with res
pect to the shares of the other co-owners whose consent thereto was not actually procured by Erna. While Erna, as herself a co-owner, by vir
tue of Article 493 of the Civil Code, had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the said properties, she, could not, howeve
r, dispose of or mortgage the subject properties in their entirety without the consent of the other co-owners.
2. RBCIs claim as a mortgagee in good faith is untenable for the following reasons: first, the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith applies only
 to lands registered under the Torrens system and not to unregistered lands, as the properties in suit; and second, the principle is inapplicable
to banking institutions which are behooved to exercise greater care and prudence before entering into a mortgage contract.

3. Respondents are not guilty of laches. In this case, the complaint for nullification of the SPA was filed barely three years from respondents'
discovery of the averred forgery, which is within the four-year prescriptive period. A delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law a
nd is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief. An essential element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been influenced an
d has relied on the representations or conduct of the person sought to be estopped. Said element is, however, wanting in this case.

Extraordinary Development Corp Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or
oration (Edc) V. Herminia F. Sam inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission
son-Bico And Ely B. Flestado was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer leg
ally. Thus, since appellant EDCs rights over the subject property originated from the heirs of Juan, said corporation merely stepped into the
shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than what its sellers have.