McFARLANE - Regional Organizations and Regional Security

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Regional Organizations and Regional

Security
a b c
S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G. Weiss
a
Queens University, Kingston, Ontario
b
Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies
c
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
Version of record first published: 09 Jan 2008
To cite this article: S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G. Weiss (1992): Regional Organizations and
Regional Security, Security Studies, 2:1, 6-37
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Regional Organizations and Regional Security
S. Neil M acFarlane and Thomas G . Weiss
bipolarity prevented war at the center of world politics. It did

O L D W AR
C little, however, to prevent serious conflict outside Europe and North
America. Arguably, it increased the incidence of conflict there, since the
freezing effect of bipolarity and mutual assured destruction on conflict in
Europe may have diverted the competitive impulses of East and West to safer
ground in the Third World.'
Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 15:25 29 June 2012
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
sphere of influence may increase the probability of local wars in Europe, as
events in Moldova, Ossetia, Yugoslavia, and Nagorno-Karabakh illustrate.
They also do little to reduce the likelihood of conflict elsewhere. Military
conflict and its consequences appear just as endemic today and for the
foreseeable future as they were in the past.
The end of superpower rivalry, however, does enhance the capacity of
multilateral organizations to manage and resolve civil and interstate conflict.'
The improvement of superpower relations and the subsequent disappearance
of the Soviet Union remove the blocking effect of Soviet-American competi-
tion on international organizations as they attempt to deal with regional
conflicts.
That multilateral management of conflict is a growth industry is evident
from the rapid recent increase in the number and kind of peace-keeping
initiatives undertaken by the United Nations. Since its intense mediation of
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end to the Iran-Iraq War,
the United Nations has mounted thirteen new operations, the same number
as in the previous forty years. In the first few months of 1992 alone, some
30,000 soldiers were added to the UN payroll with the massive new undertak-
ings in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Unpaid arrears approach one billion
dollars, while operations approved for the next twelve months are estimated
to cost three billion dollars.'
The question arises as to whether it is more appropriate to deal with loc al
conflict through multilateral organizations that are regional (for example, the
European Community) or universal (for ex ample, the United Nations) in
S. N eil MacFarlane is pro fessor of pol it ical scie nce at Queens Un iversit y, King ston , O nta rio;
Thomas G . Wei ss is associa te di rec to r of the Thomas J. W at son , Jr. In st itute for Internati onal
Stud ies a nd asso ciate d ean of th e faculty at Br own U nive rsi ty, Providence, Rh od e Island .
SE C U R IT Y ST UD IES. vol. 2. no. I. Aut um n 1992. pp.6-37.

Pu blished by Frank Ca sso Lo ndo n
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 7
scope. The traditional preference of policy makers in the United States has
been for regional management of regional conflict, a principle that was
enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter at the insistence of the United
States and Latin American delegations.' The successful completion of the
Gulf War has engendered a strong sense that the original security provisions
of the Charter are finally being implemented, including a renewed interest in
regional organizations.' Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's water-
shed report, An Agenda for Pcace.: contains a chapter on them and reflects his
own experience at the end of his diplomatic career as re sponsible for Egypt's
relations with the Organization of African Unity (o w ) a nd his doctoral
dissertation forty years ago.
The emphasis on regional bodies is not surpri sing and reflects both
cognitive and instrumental reasoning. There is reason to believe that regional
actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of regional

conflict. The UN is overstretched while the great powers dominating its
decision making are loath to multiply their n na ncia l responsibilities in
foreign policy. A group of eminent persons called together by the Swedish
prime minister agreed last year that "World leaders must now act deter-
minedly to build a new system for peace and secur ity, at both a global and
regional scale. "7
In this article, however, we argue that the hopes placed on regional
organizations are unduly optimistic, if not altogether misplaced. In the next
section we examine the general arguments for a nd aga inst a regional
approach to conflict management. We then examine a number of recent cases
of involving regional organizations in conflict management: the Association
of South-East Asian Nations ( ASEAN) in Cambodia; the OA U in va r ious recent
conflicts in Africa; the actions of the Economic Commun ity o f West African
States (E COWAS) in Liberia; and the Organization of American States ( O AS) in
both Nicaragua and EI Salvador. Finally, the European Community's
dithering in Yugoslavia is discussed as an illustration of the incapacity of even
well-endowed regional organizations to manage effectively conflicts in their
locale.
The theoretical discussion and the empirical cases suggest that regionalism
is not a promising approach to conflict regulation. Although it makes sens e to
strengthen regional organizations where possible, and some suggestions a re
made in the conclusion along these lines, they should not be viewed as a via ble
alternative to the United Nations in a conflict management role. Ill-founded
reliance on regional organizations could even result in neglecting the one
organization most likely to fulfil the role of regional conflict manager.
8 SECURITY STUDIES, vol.2, no. I
THE CAPACITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR CONFLI CT MANAGEMENT
There is reason to believe that regional organizations are the appropriate

locus for the management of local conflict, a position that was clearly
articulated at the outset of the present Charter regime; and even article 21 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations noted the validity of regional
understandings as a basis for maintaining peace. In fact, observers tend now
to overlook the fact that the relative balance between regionalism and
universalism was one of the most controversial aspects at the San Francisco
conference."
The creation of the Security Council with its enforcement power gave
globalism a significant edge over regionalism, but Chapter VIII on "Regional
Arrangements" was considered essential." The basic idea was to make efforts
to settle local disputes regionally before referring them to the United Nations,
and also for the Security Council to encourage the growth and capacities of
regional bodies.
Not only did the active use of the veto (279 to be exact) throughout the
Cold War prevent the utilization of the Security Council as anticipated in the
Charter, East-West tensions also meant that regional organizations provided
Washington and Moscow with convenient pretexts for keeping disputes out
of the United Nations. In the U.S. backyard, crises in Guatemala, Cuba,
Panama, and the Dominican Republic were relegated to the OAS, dominated
by the United States, rather than the Security Council. In the Soviet
backyard, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were in the jurisdiction of the
"socialist community" of the Warsaw Pact, dominated by the Soviet Union .
The supposed deficiencies of universal international organizations and the
resulting apparent strengths of regional ones are examined under three
headings : the ambiguity of "region" as a concept; the overstretched capacities
of the UN in the area of international peace and security; and better familiarity
with local crises of member states of regional organizations.
There is an evident lack of precision in Chapter VIII, whose opening
paragraph refers to "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are
appropriate for regional action." The Charter deliberately was drafted to
avoid a precise definition, thus allowing a flexibility for governments
fashioning instruments to foster international peace and security. While the
commonsensical notion of region is related to geography, the ambiguity of
the Charter means that a region can also be conceived geopolitically,
culturally, ideologically, and economically. Such groups could include treaty-
based organizations, pre- or post-dating the UN, or ad hoc mechanisms
created to deal with a specific issue of concern.
Thus, in addition to such geographic entities as the OAU or the OAS, the
Charter's definition also includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), the Islamic Conference, the Warsaw Pact, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Contadora Group.
In fact in the security arena, recent research points to the emergence of such
"subregional" units as the Gulf Cooperation Council (occ) or the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as significant players
of the future in the Third World. "
The concept of regionalism thus remains a conundrum for social scientists.
Karl Deutsch, for example, wrote: "For the political scientist the definition of
a region is considerably more difficult than the definition of a rose was to
Gertrude Stein. We cannot simply say, 'A region is a region is a region.' "II
However ambiguous the U N Charter and academic conceptions, "regional"
organizations themselves, whatever the species, have the flexibility to define
the nature of their jurisdiction and even their duration. This definitional
ambiguity can cause problems in the management of conflict if governments
expect more from an organization than it can provide, and it may also slow
down vigorous action by universal institutions.
A second issue concerns institutional wherewithal. The United Nations is
in serious financial difficulty and sorely lacks sufficient and qualified staff. '!
A quintupling of its peace-keeping budget from 1991 to 1992 to meet the
exigencies of Yugoslavia and Cambodia and perhaps Somalia - while
patterns of payment are unacceptably slow and unpaid arrears approach $1
billion - means that the organization is finding it increasingly difficult to
handle even those conflicts in which it has taken a role. There were political
reasons why the Gulf War was not commanded or controlled by the UN, but
there would have been no professional military capacity to do so had the allies
been willing. The ever-growing number of operations strains excessively
limited UN financial and human resources.
The great powers appear reluctant to pay for any substantial expansion of
UN conflict management responsibilities. The end of the Cold War
diminishes greatly the interest perceived by the West in many regional

conflicts. Great power resources are limited, among other things, by the
current global recession. In the post-Cold War context, governing elites and
publics seek to divert expenditure from foreign policy and security tasks to
long postponed domestic economic and social needs.
Domestic constituencies supporting UN activities are generally weak.
According to a recent public opinion poll conducted by the United Nations
Association of the USA, there has even been a drop among traditional
supporters and an unwillingness to increase expenditures by multilateral
institutions in spite of a steady recognition of the importance of the United
Nations. " For example, while the Bush administration has committed itself
to repaying arrears over a five-year period, Congress is recalcitrant about
10 SE CURITY STUDIES , vo l.2 , no. I
even the normal contribution to the U N budget. As the campaign began to

heat up and the situation in Yugoslavia soured, for instance, President Bush
initially told the UN Secretary-General to hold any more requests for peace-
keeping operations until after the November elections, although this sugges-
tion could not be respected.
Smaller powers traditionally active in peacekeeping are unlikely to pick up
more of the tab. They sh are the sam e economic problems of their larger
brethren. Canada is commonly considered the " back bo ne" of multi-
lateralism, but it has recently announced its desire to withdraw from the U N
operation in Cyprus after twenty-seven years." In short, the UN capacity to
undertake additional responsibilities is dubious, while the will of its domi-
nant members to do so is often weak.
The situation of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is an
eloquent testimony to these problems. In mid-1992 the United Nations was

falling behind schedule in implementing of the agreement on disarmament
and political transition, not least because the Khmer Rouge were refusing to
cooperate. Various member states contributing to the operation were trim-
ming their commitments. Forces in the field faced critical logistical problems
as a result of the failure of some supporting contingents to arrive. While the
Japanese parliament finally authorized the controversial use of its own
nationals in UN operations overseas, the world organization was still having
difficulty finding international personnel to staff five Cambodian govern-
ment departments. The capacity of the U N to sustain the operation through to
elections was drawn into question by the penury of the Security Council's
approach to operations in the field.
In this context, regional approaches to crisis management and conflict
resolution seem attractive. The members of these organizations suffer most
dramatically from the destabilizing consequences of war in their area. They
receive the refugees and bear the political, social, and economic consequences.
They receive, willingly or unwillingly, the combatants of neighboring
countries seeking sanctuary. They face the choice of pacifying and repatriat-
ing combatant and noncombatant aliens on their ternitory or of resisting hot
pursuit by those from whom these refugees have fled. Local conflict and the
consequent perceptions of regional instability dampen investment flows and
retard growth. They divert public resources into defense expenditures.
Regional powers and organizations have the greatest stake in the manage-
ment and resolution of conflict in their locale.
Moreover, regional actors are perhaps those best suited to mediation in
local conflicts. They understand the dynamics of strife and cultures more
intimately than do outsiders. Leaders 'a re far more likely to have personal
connections to protagonists in local conflicts, which may be used as a basis for
mediation. Involvement by other regional powers is less likely to be perceived
RE GI ONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 11
as an illegitimate interference than is that of extra regional organizations.

Finally, issues relating to local conflict are far more likely to be given full and
urgent consideration in regional fora than in global ones, since the latter have
much broader agendas and many more distractions.
That the three apparent advantages of regional institutions are benefits
more in theory than in practice will become obvious as we proceed through
case studies in the next section. In reality, these organizations are far less
capable than the United Nations to deal with regional security. The concept
of regionalism is inchoate and not useful as a policy tool to guide decisions
under Article VIII of the UN Charter. The institutional capacities of regional
organizations are extremely feeble, so much so that they have not been able to
carry out mandates in peace and security. Finally, the so-called comparative
superiority of organizations in the actual region in conflict - familiarity with
the issues, insulation from outside powers, need to deal with acute crises - are
more than offset by' such practical disadvantages as partisanship, local
rivalries, and lack of resources.
In short, there is good reason to doubt not just the will but also the capacity
of regional organizations to perform well in the management of conflict
within their areas. The end of the Cold War does little to change this
concl us ion.
S OME CA SE ST U DI E S O F R E GI O NA L OR G A NIZ ATI O N S IN A CTI O N
We turn now to a number of post-Cold War instances of conflict and conflict

management, accentuating the role of regional organizations and analyzing
the reasons for their general failure to make much of a difference. As noted
above, we discuss in turn the role of ASEAN in Cambodia, the OAU in the Horn
of Africa and Southern Africa, ECOW AS in Liberia, and the G A S in Central
America. The cases have been chosen to provide reasonably comprehensive
geographic coverage of the role of regional organizations in conflict regu-
lation in the Third World. As a "crucial casc," " we conclude this section with
an examination of the role of the European Community in the Serb-Croat
crisis of 1991-92.
The cases are structured comparatively. Instead of extensive narrative
accounts, we focus on five specific issues that ha ve a direct bearing on our
attempt to determine the significance of regional organizations in regional
security:
- To what extent does the regional organization's attempt to deal with a
local conflict reflect the divergent interests of member states and to what
extent does this impede an effective organizational response?
12 SE CURITY STUDIES , vol.2, n o .i
- To what extent do power imbalances at the regional level impinge on the

behavior of the regional organization and complicate conflict resolution?
- To what extent is a lack of inclusiveness an obstacle to effective conflict
management by the regional organization?
- What does the case suggest about the organization 's capacity to cope with
internal as opposed to interstate conflict?
- To what extent was or is the organization's response to the crrsis In
question constrained by financial and organizational limitations?
ASEAN'S Role in the Cambodian Conflict

During two decades of foreign occupation, genocide, and civil war about one-
third of the Cambodian population died. Nonetheless, in mid-1992 there still
appeared some chance that a more promising era might be ushered in by the
U N most comprehensive, and perhaps dangerous, operation since the Congo.
The present plans for the U N Transitional Authority in Cambodia consist of

some 15,000 troops and about half that many civilians to staff virtually every
level of government (finance, external affairs, national defense, internal
security, and information) and to oversee national elections. The bill for the
first fifteen months of U N T AC , excluding the repatriation of hundreds of
thousands of refugees, approaches two billion dollars. The UN is playing the
central operational role, and the major powers have helped diplomatically
since the end of the Cold War. But efforts by a sub-regional economic
organization, ASEAN, kept this issue alive on the international agenda until the
ebbing of the Cold War made action possible.
In 1970 the pro-United States Lon Nol seized power from Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, demanding the removal of what were then North
Vietnamese forces and abolishing the monarchy. The prince formed a
government-in-exile in Peking, and a civil war began between the newly-
installed government and the Khmer Rouge. The insurgent forces captured
Phnom Penh and took over the government in April 1975. Under the
leadership of the infamous Pol Pot, the new government's first act was to
evacuate all cities and towns, displacing almost the entire population to clear
jungle. In the process, at least one million persons were executed or died from
enforced hardships.
Vietnam sponsored a full-fledged invasion in 1978 to oust the Khmer
Rouge. In January 1979, with the support of the Vietnamese, a new
government, the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salva-
tion, was formed which soon triggered the second mass movement of
refugees into Thailand or as "boat people." What temporarily became
"Kampuchea" was isolated internationally except for Vietnam and the rest of
the Soviet bloc. Under the titular guidance of Sihanouk and with support
RE GI ONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RE GIONAL SECURITY 13
from China and the United States, a coalition, including the Khmer Rouge,
began a guerrilla campaign against the government and the Vietnamese. "
The countries in the region, whose own burgeoning economies were
disrupted by the confrontation between major powers and by refugees,
decided to maintain the pressure diplomatically. ASE AN joined with China and
the West in demanding the unconditional Vietnamese withdrawal and
recognized the ousted Pol Pot regime as "legitimate" rather than the
government in Phnom Penh, for purposes of occupying the seat in the United
Nations. ASEA N also backed rearmament of the opposition, which meant
strengthening the Khmer Rouge as well as groups loyal to Sihanouk and Son
Sann.
Vietnam remained in Cambodia, offering to withdraw only after the
exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from any future government and the removal
of the Chinese threat against Vietnam itself. Nonetheless, Hanoi began

slowly withdrawing its advisers as early as 1980 and its troops beginning in
1982. In fact, Vietnam dropped its conditions and had completed its
unilateral withdrawal by the end of 1989, reflecting the virtual end of Soviet
support and lack of interest in the region.
ASEA N diplomacy was then able to be combined with that of the permanent
five members of the Security Council beginning in Paris in August 1989. The
proposal of the "Perm 5" that emerged one year later became the mandate for
UNTAC : UN civilian personnel to supervise five key ministries and oversee
elections; and UN troops to disarm and cantonize all four Cambodian armies.
The complexity of external assumption of government power is obvious
enough, and the UN previous embarrassment in the Congo from 1960 to
1964 should give cause for some alarm. Moreover, the difficulties of the
military operations under UN auspices may be less obviously problematic, but
they merit serious scrutiny here. Each of the four factions is to move from its
operational bases and regroup into predesignated assembly areas (or "canton-
ments"). Once inside, 70 percent are to disarm and be integrated into the local
economy while 30 percent are to remain armed and form the basis for an
integrated national army. It is already obvious - particularly for the Khmer
Rouge who have always been the most volatile and unpredictable element in
agreements and negotiations and who have refused to disarm their fighters in
the countryside since June - that there are disputes about declared manpower
and firepower and that the proliferation of weapons is so extensive that
disarmament can probably not be ensured by cantonment alone.
ASEAN was useful in the diplomacy of the mid-1980s in dealing with a
conflict that was both internal as well as inter-state. And it was particularly so
when geopolitics changed and all five permanent members of the Security
Council backed the regional position. Some a rg ue that the continuing ability
of the Khmer Rouge to use Thailand is based on the desire of some military
14 SE CURITY STUDIES , vol.2, no.!
officers and private corporations to profit from illegal trade in timber and
narcotics. But ASE AN governments are different from members of most
regional institutions; they have a unified position and perception of interests.
But this small organization of only six members had no resources or mandate
to undertake the operational requirements of implementing the peace
process, which in fact may also be beyond the capabilities of the United
Nations. As one military observer has aptly noted: "If Cambodia turns out to
be less than a 'best-case scenario,' the international community must be
prepared to underwrite the security of the peace process."I;
In the interests of economic progress and trade amongst themselves, the six
members of ASEAN were able to overcome internal differences in view toward
Vietnam (especially between hard -liners in Thailand and the compromisers
in Indonesia), and about the relative importance of Chinese and Vietnamese
threats to stability. While a limited membership thus facilitated discussions, it

was a problem in another way. None of the countries of Indo-China
(Vietnam , Cambodia, Laos) was a member, nor was China or Japan; and all
of these countries played an essential role in fueling and eventually settling
the conflict. In some ways the weakness in membership permitted outside
mediation by the ASEAN countries; but neither their organization as a whole (it
is an economic group) nor the countries individually had sufficient leverage
or, eventually, military capacity to monitor the complex agreement among
the Cambodian factions.
TH E OAU AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: AN( ;OL A AND THE HOR N O F
AFRI C A
Two of the more troublesome complexes of conflict in the African security

system of the 1980s were the combined civil and regional conflict in Angola,
and the civil wars in Ethiopia and Somalia. 1M Both were in part produced by,
yet to a considerable degree autonomous of, the Cold War. To some extent
each was an instance of the negative consequences of the non-African
intervention that che OAU has been established to forestall. One would thus
have expected the organization to have taken an active role for this reason
alone.
Each resulted in widespread infrastructural destruction, loss of civilian
and military life (both directly and indirectly through famine resulting in
part from extended conflict and its disruption of economic activity), and
massive displacements of population. Each displayed an occasionally sig-
nificant potential for spillover, as neighboring states became involved in civil
disputes (for example, Zaire in Angola, or Sudan in Ethiopia) and in turn
invited retaliatory destabilization. The danger of regional escalation pro-
vided an additional incentive for regional involvement.
REGIONAL OR GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 15
Finally, the two conflicts touched in important respects on fundamental

norms specific to the organization. The AngolanlNamibian nexus of conflict
directly involved South Africa, and the OAU was committed in the first place
to supporting member states threatened by the South African regime, and in
the second place to the liberation of the black majority population from
apartheid. In the case of the Horn, both the Ethiopian and the Somali civil
wars drew into question the inviolability of the post-colonial legacy of states
and borders. The Eritreans clearly sought secession of their region from the
Ethiopian state. They have achieved this de facto with the collapse of the
Mengistu regime. Various groups in Somalia sought (and seek) the departure
of their regions from the Somali state. Northern Somalia has de facto severed
its ties to Mogadishu. Much of the political history of the OAU and the African
community of states has focused upon the avoidance of just this sort of
outcome to processes of civil conflict.

For all of these reasons, ceteris paribus, one would have expected a strong
response on the part of the regional organization. In neither case was such a
response forthcoming. This case is that of the dog that did not bark. The
Ethiopian case is particularly poignant because OAU headquarters are in
Addis Ababa. The picture of OAU functionaries observing through their office
windows the final battle for Addis between remnants of the Mengistu
dictatorship and Tigrean guerrillas is an eloquent metaphor for the role of
the organization itself with regard to these and other conflicts in Africa.
In the Angolan case, the African community in the late 1980s faced an
endemic civil war between UNITA and the MPLA government. This was
combined with direct South African intervention to retain a strategic glacis in
southern Angola to protect South Africa's hold over Namibia, and indirect
intervention through assistance to and training of UNITA. The Soviet Union
had supported the MPLA regime with military assistance since the winning of
Angolan independence in 1975. The United States, having abandoned the
field at the end of 1975 as a result of congressional prohibition on American
involvement in the war, resumed its active support of UNITA in 1985 after the
repeal of the Clark Amendment as part of the so-called Reagan Doctrine to
reverse communist gains in developing countries.
An agreement on termination of the South African involvement in Angola
and on independence for Namibia was reached in December 1988. Another
between UNITA and the MPLA on a political settlement of the internal war
followed within a year. Agreement was achieved on these issues among the
principal external participants (South Africa, the USSR, the USA, and Cuba).
In the changing international (and, in the South African case, domestic)
situation of the late 1980s, continuation of the war no longer served their
interests. A combination of external pressure from past patrons and war-
weariness produced the internal accord.
16 SECURITY STUDIES. vol .Z, no . \
The principal mediator was the United States, in the person of Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker." Additional assistance was
provided in the mediation of the internal accord by Portugal. In terms of
international monitoring, it was the United Nations that fielded the First UN
Angola Verification Mission ( UNAVEM) to verify the departure of Cuban
combat troops. This mission was extended and expanded into a second phase
in order to monitor the elections called for in the agreement in late 1992.
The OA U, by contrast, had no significant role. Opinion within the organiza-
tion was seriously divided between proponents and opponents of the MI'I.A
and UNITA. This division coincided to an important degree with divergences
in regional attitudes towards the United States and the Soviet Union. Zaire in
particular had a strong record of hostility to the MI'I.A and support of U N I T A .
When American assistance to UNITA resumed in the mid-1980s, it entered via
Zaire. Many of the organization's southern African members were vul-

nerable to South African reprisals in the event that the organization
attempted to act resolutely against South African intervention, and hence
they were not enthusiastic about going beyond rhetoric. An ambitious
initiative by the organization would have required technical, financial, and
military resources that it did not possess. Any attempt by the regional
organization to mediate the conflicts was severely circumscribed by its
exclusion of the principal regional power, South Africa. After years of
arguing that it would not deal with the United Nations because the world
organization had taken stances against the Republic, South Africa nonethe-
less cooperated with the UN ; there was never any question of dealing with the
OA U.
Ethiopia provides a further striking illustration of OA U paralysis in regional

conflict management. The victory of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime over
the Somalis in 1977-78 reduced the external threat to the country, but did
nothing to address the continuing internal one. The Ethiopian government
then turned its Soviet weaponry on the Eritreans and Tigreans, who were
unwilling to accept the status quo in Addis Ababa. By the late 1980s, despite
massive infusions of military assistance, the Ethiopian government was
losing substantial engagements in Eritrea, Tigre, and Gondar, and the
combined forces of the EI'L F and the TI'LF were approaching the capital. The
Soviet Union meanwhile had decided to scale down substantially its military
assistance to Ethiopia so that the regime could no longer recoup its losses of
equipment and personnel. Nor could it rely any longer on the assistance of
Cuban forces which had left in 1988-89, and which had been less than useful
in dealing with internal insurgency in any event.
The increasing desperation of the Ethiopian situation induced a second US
effort at mediation. The Carter Center and subsequently the State Depart-
ment attempted to produce a political settlement to forestall the final assault
R EGI O N AL O RGAN IZAT IONS AND REGI O N AL SECU RITY 17
o n Addis Ababa. The regime crumbled under heavy military pressure while
the talks progressed , removing one of the two parties to the negotiation.
It is aga in st rik ing ju st how unimportant th e OA U w as in a tt e m pt ing to halt
the bloodshed. In this instance, the organization was hampered by the
unwillingness of both parties to negotiate seriously until the final stages of the
conflict. There were again serious differences am ong African states regard-
in g Ethiopia, with a gener.alized rhetoric in favour of pea ce being accom -
panied by political a nd military su p port of th e va r ious parties to the conflict.
Libya in particular tended to su p po rt the central government while Sudan
a n d Eg ypt to va rying d egrees su p po rt ed th e E ri t rea ns . In this sense, they
repl ayed th eir ow n sp ec ific ri valries through com petit ive in vol vement in
Ethiopia. This proces s was not limited to th e continent. The Israelis played
out their ongoing co n flict with the Arabs (as well as their desire to buy
Ethiopian Jews out o f Ethiopia) through support of the center against Eritrea,
while seve ra l Arab Middle E astern countries provided assista n ce to the
Eritreans o n Islamic a nd geost ra tegic (control of the Red Sea) lines, as well as
o u t o f a n tipa t hy for Isr ael.
The orga n iza tio n w as also hampered by normat ive impediments to m ore
su bs ta n t ial in vol vement. The third sect io n o f OA U C ha rter Article III
proscribes interference in th e in te r nal affa irs o f member states. Here, as
elsewhere, this shibboleth impeded th e organ ization in its spo ra d ic efforts to
come up with a re sponse to th e co nflict. This norm reflect s the interest of
many o f th e region's leaders to av o id any precedent whereby international
bodies inter vene in ci vil di sputes. Many of th em a re potential o r act u a l
protagonist s in su ch co n flict. The fin al constraint w as fin ancial and bureau-
cra tic. T he o rga niza tion lacked th e res ources a n d in fr astructure to pl aya
sig n ifica n t role eve n if it had possessed the w ill to tr y.
Wh ile limitation s o f space prevent a length y d iscussion here, a cursory
a na lys is o f recent e ven ts in Somali a w ould fu rthe r su bs ta n tia te this lin e of
a rgu men t. The logical ext reme in civil w ars has occurred sinc e the flight o f
Siad Barre in January 1991. A people sh aring a common religion , language,
cu lt ure, a nd heritage ha s now been divided a m ong well-armed clans of the
sa m e eth n ic g ro u p. With one-third of its population at ri sk fro m sta rva t ion
because human itarian age ncies w ere unable to ha ve ac cess to civ ilia ns, the
U n ite d N ati ons was fin all y a ble in A ugus t 1992 to a u t ho r ize a SOO-member
infantry battali on fro m Pak ist an to prot ect the port of M ogadi shu a nd help
w ith food d istribution in th e city . O u ts ide the ca pita l, th e Security Cou nc il
subseq ue n tly approved a nothe r 3,000 sol diers for humanitarian purposes,
o nce th e parties agreed. The OA U , alo ng with the League of Arab St ates a n d
the Org ani zation of the Islami c Con ference, h ad participated in ea rl ie r
mediation efforts, but these or gani zations w ere un able to respond operation -
all y o r pol iti call y.
18 SECURITY ST UDIES, vol.2 , no.l
The OAU demonstrated incapacity to manage regional security has pro-

voked a degree of interest in the use of sub-regional organizations to fill the
gap. The argument is that subregions may well be more cohesive and
effective in coping with local conflict than their broader regional analogue. In
a w ay, this replicates at a still lower level the abstract case for focusing on
regional rather than universal organizations in the management of conflict.
ECOW AS efforts to address the Liberian crisis are an example of this approach.
Regional Management of the Liberian Crisis, 1990-92

West Africa has partially demonstrated a local capacity to find African
solutions to its own problems as was pointed out by Abbas Bundu, executive
secretary of the Economic Community of West African States, at the outset of
the organization's peacekeeping mission in Liberia." On 24 December 1989

the civil war in Liberia began when Charles Taylor entered Liberian
territory from Burkina Faso via the Ivory Coast at the head of a group of
guerrillas dedicated to the removal of President Doe. The Liberian govern-
ment's military response proved deficient, with the result that by July 1990
Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia ( NPFL) held almost all of the
countryside and was ready to enter Monrovia. At this stage, Prince Johnson's
forces broke off from the NI'FL and began to resist Taylor's entry into
Monrovia while pressing against the remnant of President Doe's forces. The
result was a month of massacre and countermassacre and the complete
breakdown of the Liberian state.
On the urging of Nigeria's President Babangida, and with the approval of
the O AU , a peace-keeping force under the auspices of ECO W AS and com prised of
Nigerian, Ghanaian, Gambian, Guinean, and Sierra Leone contingents was
deployed in August 1990. External actors, such as the United Nations and the
United States, supported the EC OWAS deployment, clearly preferring a
regional solution to the crisis when both were heavily preoccupied by the
Gulf crisis." The fact that some 1.5 million persons were displaced, the same
number that led to the humanitarian intervention in Kurdistan, was seem-
ingly not enough to trigger a response from outside the region.
After some hesitation, the initial 4,500-man force was strengthened,
ultimately reaching 10,000. The ECOWAS "Monitoring Group" (ECOMOG) began
a campaign to force the NP FI. out of Monrovia, clearing the city by the end of
September with the cooperation of Prince Johnson's forces. This setback for
the NPFL produced the November 1990 Bamako cease-fire accord, at which
time an interim government under Amos Sawyer was established.
Since the Bamako Accord there have been at least six multilateral
conferences sponsored by ECOW A S. In addition, there have been two all-
Liberian conferences inside the country - one in Monrovia in March and
R EGI O N AL O RGAN IZAT IONS AND R EGI O N A L SECU R IT Y 19
A p ril of 1991 a n d o ne sp onsored by th e NPFL in G ba rnga in April 1992 . In the

meantime, alt hough ov e rall vio le nce decl in ed significantl y as a re sult of the
ECOMOG deployment, low le vel s o f military con flict ha ve continued in the
co u n trysid e, in particular with the introduction from Sierra Leone of a

guerrilla force dedicated to wresting control of the countryside from Taylor.
As o f mid -1992 th e co u n t ry continues to be divided into two sections, one
d om in at ed by the interim gov e rn me n t a n d by ECO MOG largely in Monrovia,
and the othe r (tw elve o u t of thirteen counties) by the NPFL. The internal issues
preventing resolution a p pea r to be th e issue of w ho rul es, w it h T aylor see k ing
a maximum o f pow er a n d Sawyer a n d Johnson see ki ng to m arginalize h im.
There a re a lso m ore prosaic pe ace -keeping issu es su ch as the implementation
o f th e di sarmament a nd encampment provisions o f va rio us acc ords, a nd the
full depl oyment of ECOMOC; through the countryside a n d alo ng the borders in
order to est ablish a secu rity environment conducive to fr ee and fair elections.
The April 1992 m eetings o f the ECOWAS Com m ittee o f Fi ve with the
prot agon ists in the co n flict p roduced yet a nothe r agreeme n t on ho w to
implement di sarmament of the fac tions a nd a political tr ansition a nd was
foll o w ed by th e beg inning s of a n e xte ns io n o f ECOMOG co ntrol into NPFL- held
a reas. So fa r, this process is w ell beh ind sche d u le, has been accom pa nied by
sig n ifica n t NPFL obs t ruct ion, occasiona l e xchanges o f fir e, a nd little progress
in ge tt ing Taylor's forces in to ca m ps .
On th e whole and in sp ite of in cidences o f non -professional co nd uc t by its
so ld ie rs, ECOMOG co u ld be consid ered a relati ve succ ess. The level o f violence
and o f co lla te ra l d amage h as been sig n ifica ntly reduced . A measure of
sec u ri ty has be en restored . Yet the failure to p roduce a last in g sett le m e n t
suggests th at th is qual ified o pe ra tiona l success is fragi le. A n a lys is of the
reasons for t he slo w prog ress of th e q uest fo r a pol it ical settle me n t illustrates
m an y of th e p roblems a llu ded to ea rl ie r.
In th e fir st place, th e o rga n iza tio n has ne ver ac h ieved full un anim it y o n the
a p p ro p r ia te a pp roac h to th e Liber ian crisis. T a ylor en joyed a nd by so m e
reports co n tin ues to e n joy su bs ta n tial su p po rt fr om a number of franc ophone
members of ECOWAS ." T ogo, th e Ivory Coast, a nd Burkina F aso, a mo ng
o the rs, o pposed th e d eployment, a rgu ing th at it co n t ra ve ne d th e 1978 ECllW .\S
p rotocol o n nonaggression a nd st ress ing th e lim ited ca pacity of th e o rga niza-
tion to sus ta in a su bs ta n tia l mil itary o peratio n in th e field . The Ivory Coast
m a inta in ed a n o pe n bord er w ith l"I'FI.- hel d sectors of L ibe ria , a llowi ng th e
transp ort of esse n tia l m ilitary a nd ot he r su p plies. In so d oing , it frus t ra ted
e ffo rts of th e interim gove rn me nt to pressure Ta ylor into compromi se
through eco no m ic em ba rgo of a reas that he held. The 1vo ry Coast ha s
repeat edl y ca lled for th e repl acement of EOlMO(; with a United N ati ons
presence. In this in stan ce, regi onal act ors h a ve a di sproportionatel y st ro ng
interest in th e confl ict. T hey a lso perceiv e th eir interest s to d ive rge. Th is
20 SECU RIT Y STU D IE S. \'01.1. no.l
divergence has impeded resolution of the conflict, because parties to the

conflict can and do benefit from the differences of views.
These divergences of approach and policy reflect closely the power
imbalances of the region a n d the fear of the less powerful that Nigeria is
see k in g to establish a dominant regional role. The initial decision to deploy
came at the in itiative of Nigeria , by far the most powerful state in West
Africa. It was Nigerian in sistence that caused ECOWAS to ignore its restrictions
on involvement in the internal affairs of member states. The Ivory C oast a n d
other francophone sta tes resisted because of their di scomfort with th e
assertiveness of the regional hegemon, a position refl ectin g not ju st their ow n
concern a bo u t Nigerian preponderance, but that o f the ir traditional patron ,
France. Th is di scomfort has translated into prolonged su p po rt of T ayl or,
which in turn stiffe ns hi s resol ve to resist accommodations that might

weaken his own position. In other words, divergent interests in the context o f
an uneven di stribution of power ha ve impeded the capacity of this re gional
o rga n iza t io n to res ol ve this speci fic conflict."
By contrast , inclusiveness is not a problem here be cause a ll rel e vant sta te
actors in the region are m embers of ECOWAS . Nor on the whole is the limitation
on the capacity of regional organizations to in volv e themselves in internal
conflicts. Although the 1978 ECOWAS protocol supposedly prohibits acts o f
agg ressio n, usually interpreted to include intervention in the internal affa irs
o f member sta tes, Nigeria w as su fficie n tly power ful sim ply to ov e r ride
obj ections. At the sa m e time, Nigeria 's approach toward the in vol vement of
ECOWAS was expedient a n d perhaps e ven a bit ca valier. This re gional
organization is, afte r all, economic with no explicit political mandate a n d no

previous invol vement in the m aintenance of international pea ce and secu r ity.
The expa ns io n o f task s in this directi on m a y ultimately stiffe n th e o p posit io n
of members uncomfortable with the exercise o f Nig erian po w er.
The fin al issue is that o f o rga ni za t io na l re sources. The financi al sta tus o f
ECOWAS is parlous, largely due to th e in ca pa city o r unwillingness o f poorer
members to pa y their dues Yet, Nigeria's willingness pay the entire bill for
ECO MOG'S operations (which a t the initial level of depl oyment w as es t ima te d a t
fift y million d ollars a year a n d is no doubt at a bou t twice that lev el now )
o bv ia tes th e issue. H owever, to the e xten t that Nigeria pays th e cost s, the
o pe ra tio n is see n to a n eve n g rea te r d egree as a Nig erian , rather than a
co m m u n ity, initiative. A n d N igeria' s capacity to foot the bill is not infinite,"
particularly for th ose with eno ug h hi storical memory to recall that Nig eri a 's
participat ion in th e OA U o pe ra tio n in C ha d in 1981 found ered for lack o f
o u ts ide fun d s." The co u n t ry co n ti n ues to face se r io us econom ic problems of
its ow n, sym bo lized not least by the most recent and su bs ta ntia l deva lua tio n
o f the naira ea rl y in 1992.
Similar concerns arise in view o f the political situa t io n in N ig eri a. The
R EGI ON AL O RGA N IZ A T IONS A ND R EGI ONAL SEC U R IT Y 21
country is most of the way through a transition to democracy, having just

in stalled elected local and state administrations. The process will culminate
in 1993 in a presidential election. The attention of Nigeria's policy-makers is
in creasingl y focused on internal issues, which will become stronger if the
federal electoral process is accompanied by violence. This may cause the
Nigerians to cut short their ECOMOG in volvement. There is no guarantee that
a n elected federal g ov e rn m en t will sha re the foreign policy priorities of the
current military ad m in ist ra tion. This too m ay cause complications for
prolonged in volvement.
In sho rt, the ECOMO( ; experience is in so m e re spects a qualified success for
ECOWAS , but it also reveals a number of the same significant problems raised by
the O A U 'S failures in the preceding section. Although a final evaluation must
a wa it further evolution of the process of political tr ansition, the tentativeness
of our cha racte riza tio n of this "su ccess" illustrates the fragility of regional
organizations in fostering regional secu rity.
Th e OAS in Central A m erica

The a w k wa rd absence ov e r the last decade of the O rga n iza tio n of American
St ates. the main regional orga n iza tio n in the Western Hemisphere. in
w indi ng d ow n internal co n flicts in both Ni caragua a n d El Sal vador is
illus t ra t ive of st ruc t u ra l problems faced by other regional in stitutions. There
a re ine vit able tensions as th ey a tt em pt to deal w ith ci vil w ars spilling over
national boundaries. as w ell as paral yzing o pe ra tio na l a n d fin ancial con-
stra in ts. M oreover. these cases a re particularl y interesting in that the O .-\S is not
cha racte rized by an absence of industrial ized co u n t ries. both the US a nd
Ca na da are members. a ltho ug h C u ba is still left o u t as part o f W ashington 's
bl ockade of H a vana . It provides a n illustration of a regional body that is thus.
in th eory. m ore politicall y a n d fin anciall y via ble than. say . the O AU o r S:\ I>CC.
The appearance of sub-regi onal. ad hoc groupings is a n ad d ition a l va r ia b le of
sig n ifica nce in the analysis.
By th e mid-1 980s it had become clear th at neither th e contras in Nicaragua
nor th e Frente Farabundo M arti para la Liberacion N aci onal ( F~lI S) in E l
Sal vade r co u ld hope to evict th e go vernments there by force. In the ca se o f El
Salv ad or. yet another "fina l offe ns ive" had failed to spa rk a re volt. a sha ky
d emocracy under Presid ent Jose N apole on Duarte see med to be taking hold.
A t th e sa m e time it wa s al so ev id e n t th at the go vernment o f El Sal vad or
co u ld not d efeat th e guerrillas o u t rig h t. In N ica ragua . while th e fall-ou t from
the Ir an -contra a ffa ir, along with th e failur e of th e co n tras to pose a real
threat. put th eir via b ility in d oubt, th e Sandinistas co u ld a lso not w in th e wa r
ou t righ t a nd w ere fail in g to bring t he eco no my und er control. C ha nges in th e
Soviet U n io n indi cat ed th at Mosco w wou ld not ba il th em ou t.
22 SECURITY STUDIES, vol. Z, no.l
1986 was also the year when the original Latin-American effort to reach a
negotiated solution to the conflict in Central America, the Contadora process,
reached an impasse. The effort began in 1983 involving Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Panama; they were subsequently joined by a "support group"
composed of the newly democratic governments in Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Uruguay. Washington, which contributes the lion's share of the G A S
budget, prevented the organization from dealing with the wars in the area.
Hence, the Contad ora Group outlined a series of initiatives between 1983 and
1986 that aimed at treating the conflict as a Latin-American issue from which
the EastlWest rivalry should be separated. Not surprisingly, this effort
floundered in the face of the Reagan administration's view of the problems in
Central America as arising from "Soviet-Cuban expansionism" and
Washington's determination to fight back against international comrnun-
ism."
Changes in the Soviet Union, in U.S. policy, and in Central American
conditions had produced a deadlock in which the parties began to see
possibilities for compromise, a change emanating not from Washington or
Moscow or even from the rest of Latin America, but from Central America
itself. The first summit of Central American presidents was held in Guate-
mala in May 1986. Known as Esquipulas I, this session set the stage for
Central American summits that would ultimately serve as a vehicle for
successful regional negotiations.
It was President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica who seized the
initiative by presenting, in January of 1987, what would become known as the
"Arias Plan" and for which he would be awarded the Nobel Prize later that
year. Initially perceived by Nicaraguans as a United States-inspired provoca-
tion, the Arias Plan gathered political momentum in Central America. By
April the Nicaraguans had signed on to the plan, accepting it as a true Central
American initiative. On 7 August 1987 the Esquipulas II agreement was
signed, committing the different states in the region to the implementation of
the total Arias Plan. Between August 1987 and April 1990 there were six
Central American summits where agreements were hammered out on free
elections, confidence-building measures, disarmament, national reconcilia-
tion, and international ve r ifica t io n.
1989 marked a pi votal year in terms of the Central American conflict.
Early in his administration, President George Bush reached an agreement
with Congress to reduce sharply aid for the contras. The ailing president ofEI
Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte, was succeeded by an elected successor,
Alfredo Cristiani of the right-wing Arena Party. In Nicaragua the contras
had failed to regain the initiative; and in EI Salvador, the final guerrilla
offensive of November 1989 failed miserably.
In Nicaragua the Sandinistas began talks with the opposition about
REGIONAL OR GANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 23
implementing the national reconciliation process, agreeing to internationally

monitored elections in February 1990 with the Unified Nicaraguan Opposi-
tion (UNO) under Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. In February 1990, much to its
surprise, the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega Saavedra lost the
elections to the UNO coalition , and the new government pursued national
reconciliation.
In EI Salvador Cristiani proved sincere in his search for peace with the
FMLN. Over the course of two years of discussions in Mexico City brokered by
the U N , the two parties pursued their discussions, finally agreeing to a

comprehensive peace plan for peace and reconciliation in EI Salvador on 16
January 1992. It guaranteed the safety of the FMLN, put restrictions on the
armed forces, and provided for the guerrillas to di sarm a nd participate in the
democratic process.
In Nicaragua, it is worth examining in some depth the main operational

activities with special relevance for future regional settlements: small arms
control, verification of arms reductions, and supervision of elections. The
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ON UCA) conducted the
most extensive military operations that can still be categorized as "observa-
tion." This operation was established in October 1989 in response to a request
by the Central American presidents for UN verification of the secu rity aspects
of two unresolved problems in Esquipulas II: the cessation of aid to irregular
forces; and the non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on others.
The first problem was understood to include the cessation of all form s of
military assistance to insurgents, and the second to prevent any act of
aggression aga ins t one sta te from the land, territorial sea, or airspace of
another. Spot checks and ad hoc investigations were made by highly mobile
teams of UN military observers based in sensitive border areas. In December
1989 ON UCA 'S mandate was expanded to ' include verification of any sub-
sequent agreements about the cessation of hostilities and demobilization of
irregular forces. Following the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990 and
agreements concerning the demobilization of the contras in March, ONUC A
thus became responsible for destroying weapons delivered by insurgents and
establishing of "security zones" where former contras awaited reintegration
into the economy.
After the United Nations had finished its task, the OAS fielded a little
known operation, the International Commission of Support and Verification
( CIAV/ O EA was the Spanish abbreviation). Paid for by the United States the
forty million dollars, one-year effort of civilian liaison in the countryside was
designed to keep contras from returning to war and the Sandinistas from
influencing unduly the reintegration of these former guerrillas into the local
economy.
Given that disarmament is a central requirement for lasting peace,
24 SECURIT Y STUDIES, vol.Z, no. 1
particularly in countries with large members of heavily-armed regular and

irregular forces, the precedent in Central America is of particular signifi-
cance." The fact that the U N - in particular a Venezuelan battalion that was
moved from Namibia to help out immediately - has the experience and
credibility in this area and that the OAS was only associated as "window
dressing" reflects the type of operational problems forced by regional
institutions. The expansion of UN capabilities to monitor the destruction of
Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as part of the comprehensive
cease-fire imposed by the Security Council after the Gulf War strengthens
this operational advantage of the world organization.
The United N ations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in
Nicaragua ( O N U V E N) was dispatched by the secretary -general following a
decision by Central American presidents that the Nicaraguan elections
should be internationally observed. This was the first instance of UN verifica-

tion of a domestic election in a sovereign state, rather than a plebiscite as in
Namibia, another precedent that appears significant for future settlements of
regional conflicts. Significantly, ONUVEN was an entirely civilian bod y who
spearheaded other civilian observers from private organizations and a lso
from the OAS. Not only d id the UN personnel orchestrate the el ection
observation, but they also ensured liaison with military personnel from ONUCA
providing security assistance. The distinction between the military and
civilian components within future operations is likely to be blurred as already
in the Haitian elections and as scheduled in Cambodia. The ability to
integrate a wide variety of experiences is likely to give the United Nations a
distinct advantage.
Perhaps no issue rai ses more red flags a bo u t sov ereignty than human
rights, which is why the use of both UN civilian and military personnel in the
UN Observer Mission in EI Salvador ( O N USAL) was noteworthy. During the
long and grueling civil war, non -governmental organizations had routinely
reported human rights abuses, but there had been little international verifica -
tion." The deployment of military and civilian observers prior to the ceasefire
was a significant advance, which indicated confidence in the world organiza-
tion; a n d it was a n important task-expansion by the United Nations in
relationship to the sh ibbolet h of domestic jurisdiction enshrined in Charter
article 2(7) a n d so dear to Third World governments.
The adva n ta ges of a universal rather than a regional body were thus aptl y
illustrated in both the urc-b roke red assistance a n d negotiations for Nicaragua
and EI Salvador. In Nicaragua, it was not the established regional body of the
O AS, but rather ad hoc mechani sms, the Contadora and Lima Support Groups
and afterwards the Central American presidents themselves who led the way
diplomatically while the UN wa s the logical choice for operations. In fact , an
e xa m in a t ion of evidence over a longer period in the region suggests that
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL S EC U R IT Y 25
"virtually all of the successful mediation efforts of the inter-American system

succeeded because of ad hoc arrangements utilized by forceful per-
sonal ities. " 2Q
The ebbing in the Cold War finally permitted the United States to respond
favorably to the UN secretary-general's initiative, after years of trying to keep
the conflicts within the bailiwick of the OAS where they were officially
deadlocked. In the words of Alvaro de So to, the secretary-general's special
representative in Central America who was the principal UN negotiator, "the
United Nations and the Secretary-General were the preferred vehicles
because an extraregional dimension was involved.":"
Hence, the existence of bitter tensions within the region and the involve-
ment of outside support were combined with a paucity of experience and
resources, both operational and financial, to create insuperable obstacles for
effective action by the OAS in both Nicaragua and EI Salvador, a situation not
peculiar to the Americas.
The O AS is particularly prone to the influence of the one remaining
superpower among its membership. In concrete matters of conflict manage-
ment, the OAS'S main experience was as a surrogate in 1968 for the U.S.
"peace-keeping" operation in the Dominican Republic, hardly a model for
the future from the point of view of Latin Americans. While the organization
runs a number of military training efforts through its Inter-American
Defense Board, there are no capacities or procedures for multilateral opera-
tions in either inter-state or civil wars.
The European Community in Croatia : The "Crucial Case"

As noted earlier, it is useful to complement the cases of efforts by regional
organizations in the Third World to manage local conflicts with considera-
tion of a case where a First World organization attempted to resolve a
regional conflict. The regional organization in question, the European
Community, is composed of countries possessing organizational, personnel,
and financial resources of which most Third World regional entities could
only dream . That is why the Economist wrote: "The rising star is the EC . After
its flop in the Gulf show, the community is defying the critics who concluded
that it could never perform convincingly in foreign policy. Yugoslavia will be
remembered as its first big part. ?" Even prior to the implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty, the members of the EC, rhetorically in any event, are
strongly committed to the expansion of the political role of their organization
and to the development of consensual perspectives on the major foreign
policy issues of the day.
One would expect that if any regional organization were to show promise
in the area of conflict management and resolution, it would be this one. In
26 SECURITY STUDIES, vol.2, no. I
this respect, the European Community serves as a "crucial case" where the
generalizations of this analysis are least likely to hold. However, if hypotheses
hold with regard to this case, then they are likely to be valid across the
universe of cases.
As the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe collapsed, the release of political
control unleashed a rapid upsurge of ethnic nationalism. " Yugoslavia's
constitutional structure, ethnic demography, and historical heritage were
eminently predisposed to rekindling civil conflict. Concern over potential
Serb domination brought Slovenia to the point of a referendum on inde-
pendence in December 1990. An overwhelming majority supported seces-
sion. Croatia followed in May of 1991, with 94 percent of the voting
population - the Serbian minority having abstained - opting for inde-
pendence. On 25 June 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia declared their
independence. After Slovenia set up independent customs posts, the central

military establishment, with the encouragement of Serbian president Slobo-
dan Milose vic, decided to challenge the Slovene secession. They went into
action at the end of June 1991, but they failed to make substantial headway
against Slovene territorial militias.
The European Community made repeated efforts at arranging a ceasefire,
culminating in the Brioni Conference, where foreign ministers of the
community defined a settlement between Serbia and Slovenia. It involved the
return to barracks of the Serb-dominated federal army, a three-month period
of negotiation, and Slovene collection of federal duties at customs posts on the
territory of the Republic of Slovenia. They also offered to provide constitu-
tional advisers and a truce observation team.
The Slovene episode ended rather quickly when the Yugoslav army
returned to barracks after 4 July. This retreat apparently had little to do with
the European Community's initiative, but more with the army's difficulties
in operating in Slovenia, where any isolated units were at the mercy of rather
effective Slovene territorials. A return to barracks obviated many of these
tactical and operational problems.
At the political level, it was reasonably easy to compromise on Slovenia,
with which Serbia has no common frontier and in which there is no
substantial Serb minority. Matters were different in Croatia, where 12
percent of the 4.6 million people were Serbs, many of whom were clustered
along the frontier with Serbia. By mid-July of 1991 fighting had shifted to the
eastern Slavonia and Krajina regions. It involved Serbian irregulars and
federal army troops acting more or less in unison against Croatian militia and
police units. It lasted until the end of the year, when a cease-fire negotiated by
U N special envoy Cyrus Vance held . The world organization deployed the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) , a 14,400-strong peace-keeping operation to
separate Croat and Serb forces and to replace the federal army in the enclaves
REGIONAL OR GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 27
of Croatia that it had controlled . U N units were deployed in the late winter of
1991-92 and, although there has been no formal peace agreement between
Serbia and Croatia, hostilities have ended. That the cease-fire held may have
more to do with the Serbs attaining their objectives in Eastern Croatia than
with the pressure of the international community.
The European Community was not idle. The United States made clear in
the summer of 1991 that it viewed the crisis to be a European matter and
preferred that the EC take the lead. The U N took a similar position. With the
spread of the conflict, the community extended its monitoring mission from
Slovenia to Croatia in the late summer. In August the community declared its
readiness to sponsor a conference and laid out principles for a settlement
(notably guarantees of human rights and against any forcible change of
borders) . As fighting worsened, the Community made repeated efforts to
arrange cease -fires, threatening economic sanctions if cooperation were not

forthcoming; and it held a number of sessions of its peace conference chaired
by Lord Carrington.
Despite all of these maneuvers, however, the regional organization's
initiatives did little, if anything, to curb the violence in Croatia; and
ultimately the lead in peace-keeping devolved to the United Nations. There
are several reasons for this signal failure, not least that the conflict itself was
intrinsically difficult for outsiders to manage. There was an almost total lack
of clearly defined fronts, an interweaving of military and paramilitary units
with the civilian population, ambiguous lines of command and authority, and
significant autonomy enjoyed by local commanders. And all of this took place
in the context of the deep historical animosity between the two peoples ".
Leaving aside these practical problems, the capacity of the EC to take an
effective stand on the Yugoslav issue was constrained by serious differences in
preference and in policy among its principal member states. In the first
instance, France was far more committed to the retention of some kind of
Yugoslav confederation than was Germany. As the republics of Slovenia and
Croatia and then Macedonia made clear their intention to depart, this
preference translated itself into seriously divergent perspectives on the
recognition of new sta tes. France and its allies in the Community resisted
recognition and preferred an effort at the constitutional reconstruction of the
Yugoslav state. Germany, and to some extent Denmark, leaned far more
strongly towards formal acknowledgement of the de facto dissolution of the
Yugoslav state.
Ultimately, Germany forced this issue when it departed from the
consensus-building mechanism on 16 December 1991, announcing that it
would recognize Croatia and Slovenia on the 19th, whatever the other
members did. With some difficulty, the Germans were persuaded to post-
pone their action until 15 January, ostensibly to leave time for the search for
28 SECURITY STUDIES. \'01.2. no . 1
alternatives short of the dismantlement of the Yugoslav Federation. In return

the Community as a whole agreed to recognize those countries requesting
recognition at that time and qualifying for it by virtue of their acceptance of
frontiers and their protection of minority rights. \,
German and French differences on the question of Yugoslavia reflected in
part the close German historical connection with and substantial domestic
support for Croatia and France's analogous relationship with Serbia. I I ,
However, the failure to agree on an appropriate and effective European
Community response to the Yugoslav crisis also reflected power imbalances
within the region. French diplomacy drew in part on the growing concern
about rising German power and the possible recreation of a German
economic and political space in Eastern Europe.
European responses were also hampered by the exclusive character of the
Community and other western European organizations. Yugoslavia was not

a member of the EC, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the
Western European Union (WEU), the latter two being arguably more appro-
priate in the management of security problems. A NATO response was
precluded in the first place by American opposition, but also by the alliance's
lack of mandate to deal with "out of area" operations. Nor was the WEU treaty
configured to deal with civil conflicts outside of western Europe.
The CSCE was the only European organization with a regional security
dimension of which Yugoslavia was a member, but its rules of decision by
consensus, coupled with the diversity and divergent interests of its members,
rendered it useless as a means of addressing the crisis in Croatia. And no
doubt the same constraints will apply in future crises. Moreover, it lacked any
significant institutional infrastructure or resources, a situation that does not
appear likely to change soon. Both NATO and WEU have subsequently approved
the creation of special units for peace-keeping in Europe, linked to the 52-
member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csct.). Internal
disputes among members - not just among warring parties but between also
France and the US over American troops in Europe - are likely to handicap
future CSCE decision-making.
A lack of expertise, military capability, and financial strength did not
impede the EC in any significant way. The European Community finally
abdicated its efforts to manage the crisis in favor of the United Nations,
fundamentally reflecting the imbalances of power and resources within the
region and divergences in view.
While we have examined the case of Croatia, the need for Europe and the
United States to seek a UN Security Council blessing for humanitarian relief to
the civilian population threatened by the regular Serbian Army and by
paramilitary Serbs in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina
reflected a similar reality in the summer and fall of 1992. I t was UN - rather
R E GI O N A L O RGAN IZA T IONS AN D RE C;IONA L SECU R IT Y 29
than EC , WE V , or I\: A T O - forces that entered Saraje vo to provide secu rity for the
tenuous lifeline o f food a nd m edical su p plies th at w as o r ig in a lly begun in
Jul y. The o ngoing d iscussions to ad d 3,000-6,000 m ore V I\: soldiers to esc o rt
co nvoys involve I\: A T O tro ops, but under a blue V I\: banner. It was th e
inefficie ncy of EC effo rts to m ediate the Bosn ian crisis th at induced Fran ce in
pa rtic u la r to call for a b ro ad en in g of international effo rt s a t conflict resolu -
ti on. This produced the internati onal con ference o n the Bosnian co n flict in
L ond on a t the e nd o f A ugus t, in which V I\: Secret ary -General Bout ro s
Boutros-Ghali pla yed a prominent role.
The conference resulted in the a p po in tme n t o f V I\: e nvoy Cy rus V an ce to
sha re the re sponsibilities of m ediation w it h L ord Ca r ringto n 's repl ac ement,
L ord O we n. The co n fe re nce ado pte d a set of general principles and an act io n
progam in volving the esta blish me n t o f six w orking groups to tackle sp ecifi c
co m po ne n ts of the process of pacification. The basic problem with this

a pp roac h w a s that exte rn al ac to rs lacked the leverage to induce loc al parties
to th e co n flict to cooperate. The peace conference avoid ed the difficult choic e
of ei the r forcing the Serbs a nd Muslims to ac q u iesce in the creation of a
federal Bosnian sta te o r acce pti ng the fait accom pli of Serbian victory. The
result w as the co n ti n ua tio n of the w ar a n d it s broadening into conflict
between C roa ts a nd M us lims as well.
O n the w hole, the Yugosla v case is aga in a clear exa m p le of the failur e of a
reg ional o rga ni za tio n to m an age co nflict. The cr ucia l case sus tai ns the
ge ne ra l,pro positio n that suc h o rga n iza tions a re unpromisin g mechan isms fo r
the m anagement of regi onal co n flict.
C< )I\: CL VS I< )I\:S
O u r theoretical di scu ssion a nd case-st ud ies illustrate the fund am ental

p robl ems of re sorting to regi onal o rga n iza t io ns to e n h a nc e regional security.
The ca ses underline, in the fir st place, how difficult it is for any regi onal
o rga n iza tio n to intervene suc cess fu lly in ac t ive civ il co n flict. Re gi onal
org anizations a re, however, es pecia lly hand icapped . Except under e xce p-
tional circ u msta nces they ha ve neither su fficien t military capacity nor
dipl omat ic leverage to mit igate o r re sol ve regi onal co n flicts.
Upo n closer exa mi na tio n m an y of the fact ors os te ns ib ly fav oring regi onal
o rga niza t io ns a re, a t best , questi onable , o r, a t w orst , fictitious. Regi onal
ac to rs do tend to suffe r m ost fro m the des t r uc tive co n seq ue n ces of co n flict
in vol vin g their ne igh bors. A t the sa m e t ime th ey fre q ue n tly h a ve sta kes in
these co nfl icts , a re co m mi tted to o ne side o r a nothe r, a nd sta n d to benefit by
influencin g the o u tco me unil aterall y. Frequentl y they a re active participan ts.
In th is se nse th eir st r uc t u re of interest is m ore co m p lex than m an y
30 SECURITY STUDIES. vol.Z, no.l
proponents of regional organizations suggest. Their shared interest in the

public good of regional stability is often accompanied by unilateral interest in
obtaining specific favorable outcomes to the conflict in question.
Since a favorable outcome for one regional power is likely to enhance its
regional position at the expense of others, the latter are likely to oppose such
initiatives. In the terminology of international relations theory, we have
simultaneous absolute gain (stability) and relative gain (power) considera-
tions. There is no certainty that the former will predominate. Indeed, the
recent literature provides compelling arguments to the effect that co-
operation and regime maintenance are particularly difficult where questions
of relative gain are prominent, as they are in the realm of national security ."
Such relative gain issues are far more likely to be prominent in regional
international relations than they are at the global level, where, in the post-
Cold War era, they tend to be submerged.

Situating crises in their regional historical and political contexts enhances
the overall argument considerably. In Africa, the paralysis of the OA U in
curbing intervention and in managing the civil war in Angola reflected deep
disagreement among its own members about the desirable outcome of the
process of liberation. This disagreement was manifested in the more or less
even split in the vote on the government's membership of the organization in
1976.
With its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the O A U appeared particularly inept
in helping to end the Ethiopian civil war. The lack of any substantial OAU
initiative also reflected the fact that other African states were deeply
implicated in the conflict in pursuit of perceived national interests which
diverged one from another. Similar difficulties were evident in OA U efforts to
cope with crises in Chad and the Western Sahara. In Somalia, OA U efforts are
critically handicapped by the reluctance of members to sanction international
intervention in internal conflict.
In South Asia it is hard to see how any regionally based initiative to settle
the Afghan civil war might have succeeded, not only because of the presence
of Soviet forces but also because India had no interest in seeing a pro-
Pakistani or Islamic fundamentalist regime replace that of Najibullah in
Kabul. To take a more extreme case, the capacity of the South Asian
Association for Cooperation (SAARC) to act as a neutral mediator of conflict
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is extremely problematic; the two
principal members of the organization are the very states involved in the
conflict. Elsewhere on the continent, efforts by A SE A N to resolve the Cam-
bodian conflict were handicapped by differing conceptions of Chinese and
Vietnamese threats to the region.
In Central America the ability of the OAS to deal effectively with civil wars
in Nicaragua and El Salvador was inhibited greatly by the American pursuit
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION S AND REGIONAL SECURITY 31
of a unilateral agenda of preventing revolution in El Salvador and reversing it

in Nicaragua . The capacity of the European Community to come up with an
effective response to the civil war in Croatia was significantly constrained by
deep differences of opinion between France and Germany on the crisis; and a
number of disagreements among NATO members prevented military
humanitarianism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Regional organizations replicate within themselves power imbalances. As
such, they may be used by the more powerful expanding their influence at the
expense of the weak. Nigeria's manipulation of ECOW AS is perhaps the most
obvious case in point. This problem has appeared, or is likely to appear, in
regions where power imbalances are so substantial that it is not possible for
weaker states in coalition to balance the strong. Cases in point include South
Africa in southern Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, India in South Asia,
Indonesia in South-East Asia, and the United States in the Americas.

A further concrete problem with regional organizations as managers of
conflict is that frequently their membership is not inclusive and, therefore,
their coverage of their own region is partial. OA U conflict management in
southern Africa has been inhibited by the organization's exclusion of the
region's major military and economic power. The same might be said of
ASEAN'S role as a conflict manager given the historical exclusion of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia; this situation will not really change once these
anomalies are rectified in light of the vast differences in levels of economic
development. The Arab League excludes one of the three major regional
powers (Iran). The ( ;CC excludes two of three (Iraq and Iran). In a number of
these instances (the OAU in Southern Africa, the ( ;C C in the Gulf, and ASEAN),
the consciousness of the organization is, or was, defined in large part by its
members' opposition to the threat posed by the excluded parties. The premise
of these organizations has been partiality, hardly a capacity for neutral
intervention and security management.
Moreover, these organizations have traditionally demonstrated their
greatest structural weaknesses in dealing with civil war, a principal category
of regional conflict that many observers see as the main growth industry for
international conflict managers. " This shortcoming follows in part from the
international legal impediments associated with the doctrine of noninter-
ference in internal affairs, which have proven extremely acute for many
countries in the Third World preoccupied with exerting control over their
own tenuous bases for power. "
Perhaps most importantly, in numerous instances the reluctance to become
involved in civil conflict reflects the sensitivity of regional powers to the
creation of precedents that might subsequently justify intervention in their
own countries. Taking Africa as a case in point, a great number of regimes
are threatened by the possibility of civil conflict. As a group, therefore, they
32 SECURITY STUDIES. yoU. no. I
are extremely cautious about fostering norms in regional politics that would
legitimize regional intervention. The OA U record in coping with civil conflict
is very poor, and its respect for sovereignty has verged on slavishness. While
this weakness was shared during the Cold War by the United Nations," it is
likely to play more strongly at the regional level.
For all of these reasons, the general case for reliance on regional organiza -
tion is weak . However, even if they were in theory the appropriate instru -
ment for conflict management, their organizational, financial, and military
capacities as well as fund of peace-keeping and conflict management ex -
perience are generally vastly inferior to those of the United Nations. For
example, the Arab League's intervention in the Lebanese civil conflict was
largely a fig leaf for one member to pursue a long-standing desire to form a
"greater Syria." And such results hardly suggest enthusiasm with regard to
the capacity of this reasonably well-endowed regional organization to

contribute to conflict resolution.
Comparing the frequency of regional conflict in Africa with the paucity of
substantive attempts by the OA U to manage such conflict and the persistent
reliance of the region on external intervention for purposes of regional
security leads to great skepticism concerning the capacity of that organization
as it now stands to contribute substantially to the security of Africa. This is
not surprising. The OA U has almost no staff, no research resources, and is in a
chronic financial crisis. While the OAS has a staff and even runs military
training for officers through the IAI>H, its domination by the United States has
largely discredited the institution in the peace and security arena. In fact,
during the Nicaraguan and El Salvador mediation efforts, the OAS had to take
a clear secondary position to the United Nations. Other regional organiza -
tions that have been active in regional conflicts, including AS E AN and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSC E), exist on paper and
during intergovernmental sessions, but they have virtually no institutional
infrastructure.
At the same time the United Nations is overstretched with new and very
large operations cropping up on every continent. Given the increasing
demands that threaten to outstrip its resources, it would appear desirable to
shift some of the burden to regional institutions. The question thus arises as
to whether the international community could not determine on a case-by-
case basis the comparative advantage of specific regional institutions. How
could such institutions, either constituted by treaty or formed on an ad hoc
basis to meet a crisis, work be st in tandem with the UN ? In the words of UN
secretary -general Boutros-Ghali in his recent report to the Security Council:
Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,
RE GI ON AL O RGAN IZA T IO N S A N D RE GI ONAL SE C URITY 33
but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and

cooperation with United N ations efforts could not only lighten the
burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of
participation , consensus and democratization in international affairs."
In attempting to determine a possible division of labor between universal

a n d regional organizations to meet the exigencies of particular regional
conflicts, di stinctions shou ld be made between Europe and the Third World
as well as between the use of outside military force s to keep the peace and
diplom atic measures to build th e basis for ne gotiations. In Europe UN
diplomacy could well be combined with the use of NATO forces under a UN flag
in regional di sputes, as a p pea rs increasingly likely in humanitarian relief in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Third World , this di vision oflabor could be
reversed; the UN would deploy its troops a nd work closely with regional
partners in diplomatic arm-twisting.
NATO constitutes a unique pool of trained, a rm ed , logi stically-supported ,
and coordinated soldiers who co u ld be deployed rapidly to keep the peace as

decided by the Security Co u ncil. N ow that E astern European countries a n d
the republics of the former So viet Union a re colla bo ra ting acti vel y w ith NATO,
they w ould be unlikel y to ob ject to the use of troops in Bosnia or N agorno-
K arabakh. Moreo ver, Britain, France, and th e United States would h a ve
already agreed in the Security Co u ncil to field su ch a force under the UN flag.
This eventuality w as foreseen in C h a rt e r article 53, which provides that the
Security C ou n cil can utilize regional a rrang em en ts for enforcement under its
a u t ho ri ty.
A co m pa ra ble readiness d oe s not ex ist in ot her re gi ons o f the world , for
wh ich UN sold ie rs a re the be st solu t ion . While purely U N forces w ould
probabl y never be feasible in conflict s in vol ving su ch m aj or Third W orld
powers as Iraq , India, o r Pakist an ," their use elsewhere w ould certainl y be
pl ausible a n d desir able. This is not the plac e to discuss th e much-needed
improvements in the professionalization o f these international military
operations." But these improvements a re possible and , assuming their
implementation, UN forces shou ld then be co m b ined with the use of regional
diplomacy.
In terms of peace-mak in g a n d m ediation, some potentiall y useful illustra-
tions resulted from sc ru tiny o f Cen tra l America a n d Ca m bo d ia w he re sub-
regi onal d iplo m a t ic effo rt s we re esse n t ia l to negotiations a nd the su ccessful
implementation of peace plans by the United Nations. In addition , the
common interest wou ld be served if procedures were found to fa cilitate a
more regular exchange of information. The U N secretariat shou ld arrange
periodic consultations with the secreta riats of regional organizations on
developments affect in g regional sec u rity, a nd these sou rces sh ou ld be in -
34 SECURITY STUDIES, vol.2, no. 1
corporated into what should become the secretary-general's routine briefings

of the Security Council and as an input into a functioning early warning
system. Part of the information should be an analysis of the economic and
social indicators that are normally at the root of regional conflicts. The
Security Council could then take a variety of actions - not only military, but
also mandatory sanctions or help with elections - to support and endorse the
action taken by regional organizations."
The end of the Cold War has opened up new possibilities to enhance
regional security at the same time that it has permitted the eruption of a
variety of regional conflicts. The opportunities for peace-keeping, peace-
making, preventive diplomacy, and enforcement require a greater attention
to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations and regional
organizations. Analysis, and not rhetoric, should determine policy. The
preceding analysis strongly suggests that regionalism is not a promising

approach to conflict mitigation and containment in most circumstances.
Moreover, improvements in regional organizations should not take place at
the cost of neglecting the United Nations, the one organization most likely to
fulfil the role of regional conflict manager.
Finally, although the foregoing suggests that there are numerous reasons
to prefer globalist rather than regionalist approaches to conflict resolution,
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina among others indicates that it is no panacea.
A focus on the comparative advantages of different levels of institutional
approach to conflict resolution should not obscure that success in the
management of regional conflict also requires the political will to search for
peace on the part of the parties to the conflict.
NOTES
I. For a discussion of these issues, see Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, eds., Third
World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, (991); Brian Job,
ed., The Insecurity Dilemma : National Security ofThird World States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, (992); and Thomas G . Weiss and James G . Blight, eds., The Suffering Grass:
Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1992).
2. See James N . Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, (992); and Thomas G. Weiss, ed ., Collective Security in a Changing World
(Bou ld er, Colo.: Lynne Rienn e r, forthcoming).
3. See Thomas G. Weiss and [ar at C ho pra, UN Peacekeeping : An ACUNS Teaching Text
(Hanover: ACUNS, 1992).
4. In a recent address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke fervently both of the desirability of "decentralizing"
peacekeeping responsibilities and of the necessity of doing so, given the financial and
organizational constraints under which the United Nations was operating. With regard to
American attitudes, and to take an example from the cases considered below, Leonard
R EGI O N AL O RG AN IZAT IONS A N D R EGI O N AL SE CU R IT Y 35
Robinson, d eputy ass ista nt sec re ta ry of sta te for Afr ica, de cla red in 1991: " W h ile we are
no t o p posed to a technical ass ista nce te am from th e UN going to Liberia to ass ess the
si t ua tio n , we w ould prefer to see th e resolution of the L iberian c r isis rem ain in A fr ican
h and s." C ited in West Africa , 23-29 September 1991, p. 1580.
5. Eve n prior to th e Persian Gulf, reg iona l o rga niza tio ns we re see n to be a possibl e g rowi ng
facto r in inte rnatio na l peace a nd secu r ity. See P et e r Frorn uth , ed ., A Succ essor Vision: The
United Nations of T om orrow (La n ha m, Md .: U n ive rsi ty Press of A m e rica, 1988), part icu-
larl y p. 64, "S tre ngthe n ing Coo pe ra ting w ith Re g ional Bod ies."
6. Boutros Boutros-Chali, A n Ag enda fo r Peace (New York : U ni ted Na tio ns , 1992), paras.
60-65 .
7. See Th e St ockh olm In itiat ive on Global Security and Governa nce (Stoc k ho lm : Prime
Minist er 's Office , 1991 ),5.
H. See Franci s O . Wilcox, " Reg io na lis m a n d th e United N at ions," International Organizatio n
19, no . 3 (Su m me r 1965 ): 789-8 11; a nd T om J. F ar er, " T he Role of Regi onal Collec t ive
Sec ur ity A r ra nge me n ts ," in W eiss, ed. , Collecti ve Secu rity in a Changing World.
9. See Lel and M . G oodrich a nd E d va rd H amb ro , Charter of the Un ited N ation (Boston :
W orld Peac e F oundati on, 194 9), 309- 18.
10. See William T. Tow, Subregional Secu rity Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder, Colo .:
L ynn e Rienner, 1990).
II. K arl W . D eutsch, N ationalism and Its A lternatives (New York : Kn opf, 1969), 93. The
a u tho rs a re g ra tefu l to Ben jamin Ri vlin wh o recall ed thi s quote in h is " Reg io na l
A r ra nge me nts a nd th e U N Sys te m for Collec tive Sec ur ity a nd Con flict Re solution : A Ne w
Road A head?" (Pa pe r pr esented a t th e 1992 A n n ua l M eeting of t he Internat ional Stud ies
Associa tio n). Rivl iri's pa per is o ne of the few cr iti cal exa mi na tio ns of the performance of
reg io nal o rga n iza t io ns in secu rity m atters.
12. Th is the me is p redomi na n t in Agenda (n . 6).
13. See Jeffrey Laurent i, " A m e rica n Pu bl ic O pin io n a n d th e Un ited Nat io ns , 1992," UN.~ -USA
Occasional Paper no. 6 (New York : Ut\: A , 1992). As F red Bergsten put it : "Collec tive
lead ersh ip .. . mea n t th at the U ni ted Sta tes lend s a nd the U ni ted Sta tes co lle cts." Be rgs te n ,
"The Primacy of Eco nom ics," Foreign Policy , no. 87 (S u m me r 1992): I I.
14. Se c re ta ry-Ge ne ra l Bo u tros Bout ros -G ha li sha res th is desi re to wi nd up th e Cy p ru s
deploy me nt. See th e Economist , 23 M a y-I June 1992 , p. 44 .
15. The "c rucia l case" is o ne w he re th e h yp otheses a re least lik el y to h ol d . In th is in stance , the
EC diffe rs from th e o the r reg ional o rga n izat io ns un d er co nside rat io n beca use of the long
hi story of d eepen in g integrat ion a mo ng its m embers; th e sel f-co nscio u s e xte ns io n o f th e
pr ocess o f integ ra tio n in to th e foreign pol icy a nd de fe nce sp he res in th e lead up to th e
Maa stricht T rea ty a nd in th e tr eat y itself; th e m a ssi ve (by co m pa riso n) o rga n iz atio nal a nd
fin a nc ial resources of th e co m m u n ity; and th e a vai la bi lity o f large m obile and w ell
eq u ip pe d milita ry forces. On th e co nce pt o f th e "c ruc ia l case : ' see Jack Sny de r, " Ric h ness,
Rigor, a nd Rel ev an ce in th e St udy o f Sovi et F oreign Poli cy,"lntematiol/al Security 9 , no. 3
(W in te r 1984/ 85) : 106.
16. Fo r a di scussion o f thi s ea rly pe rio d, see Ben Ki ernan, H oII' Pol Pot Came to Pourer
(Lond on : Sc ho cke n, 1( 85). For th e lat er period , see Ki ernan 's "C a m bod ia 's Mi ssed
C ha nce," Indochina Neusletter, no . 72 (Nove m be r- Decem be r 1( 91 ); " De fe r ri ng Peace in
C a m bo dia," in (; . W. Breslauer, H . Krei sler . a nd B. Ward s. ed s., Beyond th e Co ld War :
Conflict and Cooperatio n in th e Th ird Wo rld . Interna t ional and Area Stu d ies Resear ch
Se ries no . 80 . U nive rsity ofCa lito r n ia, Berkel ey, 1991. pp. 59-82; a nd "The Mak in g of the
Par is Ag ree me nt o n C a m bodia . 1990- 91. " d raft paper p resen te d to th e Ea st A sian
In st it ut e a t Col u mbia U n ive rsity. For a discuss io n of th e c:--: plan wi th pa rticu la r
referen ces to re fugees. see Cambodia : .:j Time/or R etum . R econciliation an d Reconstruction
(Was hi ngton . 1>.<:': Refug ee Po licy ( ;roup. 1( 91 ).
17. John Mac k inlav. " L' l' i\lo nito rs in Ca m bodia H a \"C a Big T a sk Ahead," Christia n Scie nce
M onitor, 28 Octobe r \941. p. 14.
18. Rece n t d eta ils of t he e vo lu tio n of th ese co nrlic ts ar e : Robert Ja ster. T he 1988 Peace Accords
36 SECURITY STUDIES, vol.2, no . I
and the Future of Southwestern Africa, Adelphi Paper no. 253 (London: IISS, 1991); and
Samuel Makinda, Security in the Horn of Africa, Adelphi Paper no . 269 (London : IISS,
1992).
19. For his account, see Chester A. Crocker, "Southern African Peace-making," Survival 32,
no. 3 (May/June 1990): 221-32.
20. As cited in West Africa, 1-7 July 1992, p. 1087.
21. The United Nations took up the Liberian issue at a meeting of the Security Council called
at the request ofthe Ivory Coast in January 1991. The Council resolved to call on all parties
to respect the Bamako ceasefire accord and to cooperate fully with the ECOW AS operation.
West Africa, 4-10 February 1991, p. 139.
22. Prior to the deployment of NPFL to Liberia at the end of 1989, Taylor and his men were
resident in facilities in Burkina Faso. They were granted permission to transit the Ivory
Coast on their way to Liberia. President Campaore admitted that several hundred soldiers
from Burkina Faso accompanied Taylor to Liberia and participated in early stages of the
war. The linguistic split is not absolute, however. Guinea, for example, has strongly
supported the majority position and contributed troops from the outset of ECOMO(; 'S
deployment.
23. In September of 1991, for example, a commentator in West Africa noted that the Ivory
Coast's obstinate opposition to the ECOMOG deployment reflected France's unwillingness
to see Nigeria emerge as a dominant regional power. West Africa, 23-29 September 1991,
p. 570.
24. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwy betrayed exactly this concern in a May 1991
comment on the feasibility of a permanent ECOW AS force : "The problem here would be
one of cost. How do you maintain such a force on a permanent basis? Our economies are
so weak and the cost of maintaining this [Liberian] particular operation is biting deep into
our finances." West Africa, 27 May-2 June 1991, p. 42.
25. For a discussion , see F . T . Liu, "The Significance of Past Peacekeeping Operations in
Africa to Humanitarian Relief,' in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Humanitarian Emergencies and
Military Help in Africa (London : Macmillan, 1990), 24-37.
26. See Bruce Bagley, The Contadora Process (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1987); and Jack
Child , ed., Conflict in Central America (London : Hurst, 1986).
27. In actuality, the first such precedent occurred under British auspices in Zimbabwe. See
John Mackinlay, "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1979/
80," in Weiss, ed., Humanitarian Emergencies, 38-60.
28. For a discussion of the lack of a monitoring capacity in the development of the human
rights regime, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989); and David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization ofHuman
Rights (Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, 1991).
29. Ronald Scheman and John W. Ford, "The Organization of American States as Mediator,"
in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice
(Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1985), 197-231.
30. For a discussion of new possibilities, see Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F . Treverton,
eds., Alternative To Intervention (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
31. Alvara de Soto, "Case Study: The Peace Process in Central America," The Changing Role
ofthe United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping (Document produced by the
Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore and the UN Department of Public Information,
13-15 March 1991),50.
32. The Economist, 13 July 1991, p. 16.
33. For a discussion with reference to Yugoslavia, see John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict,
Adelphi Paper no. 270 (London: IISS, 1992).
34. In this context, one is tempted to agree with the commentator who noted that there might
not have been much that outsiders could do in attempting to resolve the conflict. The
Economist, 12 October 1991, p. 49.
35. Germany, however, refused to be bound by the conclusions of the Badinter Commission,
established by the EC to assess the claims of Yugoslav republics for recognition.

36. It bears mention that French and German policies are not the only political impediment to
effective community policy on Yugoslavia. Greek reservations about the potential
irredentism of an independent Macedonia, and the Greek nationalist aversion to other
states carrying the name of what they perceive to be a Greek region have prevented any
community action on the recognition of Macedonian independence. For an intriguing
account of the international diplomacy surrounding all of the issues in the former
Yugoslavia, see John Newhouse, "T he Diplomatic Round : Dodging the Problem," New
Yorker, 24 August 1992, pp . 60-71.
37. On this point, see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation : A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 62, no. 3
(Summer 1988): 488-507; and John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in
Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. I (Summer 1990): 44.
38. See James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Augustus Richard Norton, "The
Security Legacy of the I 980s in the Third World," in Weiss and Kessler, eds., Third World
Security, 19-34. See also the arguments made by a group of Third World intellectuals
under the chairmanship of Julius Nyrere, The Challenge to the South (New York : Oxford
University Press, 1990).
39. See Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia
or Growing Pains ?" International Studies Quarterly 33, no. I (March 1989); 67-79; and
Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State-
Making in a Comparative Perspective," in Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma, 63-80.
40. For a discussion of the international legal argumentation, see [arat Chopra and Thomas
G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention,"
Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 15-117. For a diverse set of essays, see Gene M .
Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and
International Intervention (forthcoming).
4 1. Agenda, pa r. 64.
42. The Secretary-General himself agrees in Agenda, par. 43 : "Forces under Article 43 may
perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a
major army equipped with sophisticated weapons."
43. For a di scussion of these issues, see John Mackinlay and [arat Chopra, "Second Generation
Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly I '5, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 113-34.
44. For a lengthier discussion of these possibilities, see James S. Sutterlin, "United Nations
Decision Making: Future Initiatives for the Secretary-General and the Security Council,"
in Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World .

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Regional Organizations and Regional

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S. Neil M acFarlane and Thomas G . Weiss

bipolarity prevented war at the center of world politics. It did

SE C U R IT Y ST UD IES. vol. 2. no. I. Aut um n 1992. pp.6-37.

actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of regional

THE CAPACITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR CONFLI CT MANAGEMENT

There is reason to believe that regional organizations are the appropriate

Charter's definition also includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

diminishes greatly the interest perceived by the West in many regional

even the normal contribution to the U N budget. As the campaign began to

eloquent testimony to these problems. In mid-1992 the United Nations was

as an illegitimate interference than is that of extra regional organizations.

S OME CA SE ST U DI E S O F R E GI O NA L OR G A NIZ ATI O N S IN A CTI O N

We turn now to a number of post-Cold War instances of conflict and conflict

- To what extent do power imbalances at the regional level impinge on the

ASEAN'S Role in the Cambodian Conflict

The present plans for the U N Transitional Authority in Cambodia consist of

of the Chinese threat against Vietnam itself. Nonetheless, Hanoi began

threats to stability. While a limited membership thus facilitated discussions, it

Two of the more troublesome complexes of conflict in the African security

Finally, the two conflicts touched in important respects on fundamental

outcome to processes of civil conflict.

Zaire. Many of the organization's southern African members were vul-

Ethiopia provides a further striking illustration of OA U paralysis in regional

The OAU demonstrated incapacity to manage regional security has pro-

Regional Management of the Liberian Crisis, 1990-92

the organization's peacekeeping mission in Liberia." On 24 December 1989

A p ril of 1991 a n d o ne sp onsored by th e NPFL in G ba rnga in April 1992 . In the

co u n trysid e, in particular with the introduction from Sierra Leone of a

divergence has impeded resolution of the conflict, because parties to the

which in turn stiffe ns hi s resol ve to resist accommodations that might

organization is, afte r all, economic with no explicit political mandate a n d no

country is most of the way through a transition to democracy, having just

Th e OAS in Central A m erica

implementing the national reconciliation process, agreeing to internationally

the U N , the two parties pursued their discussions, finally agreeing to a

In Nicaragua, it is worth examining in some depth the main operational

particularly in countries with large members of heavily-armed regular and

should be internationally observed. This was the first instance of UN verifica-

"virtually all of the successful mediation efforts of the inter-American system

The European Community in Croatia : The "Crucial Case"

independence. After Slovenia set up independent customs posts, the central

arrange cease -fires, threatening economic sanctions if cooperation were not

alternatives short of the dismantlement of the Yugoslav Federation. In return

Community and other western European organizations. Yugoslavia was not

co m po ne n ts of the process of pacification. The basic problem with this

C< )I\: CL VS I< )I\:S

O u r theoretical di scu ssion a nd case-st ud ies illustrate the fund am ental

proponents of regional organizations suggest. Their shared interest in the

Cold War era, they tend to be submerged.

of a unilateral agenda of preventing revolution in El Salvador and reversing it

Indonesia in South-East Asia, and the United States in the Americas.

the capacity of this reasonably well-endowed regional organization to

but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and

In attempting to determine a possible division of labor between universal

and coordinated soldiers who co u ld be deployed rapidly to keep the peace as

corporated into what should become the secretary-general's routine briefings