AJ Manaligod IV: CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing

a. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017

b. Grace Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

c. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

d. Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

e. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 10183, July 30, 1993

f. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

2. Mandatory vs. Directory

a. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

b. Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967

a. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
 Facts: A lot was acquired, 7,716.60 sq. meter lot, by DMCI Project Developers, Inc that is intended
for the construction of a 46 floor ranging up to 165 meters building designated to be a condominium. the
property is located 870 meters behind Luneta park where the Rizal monument is located. The knights of Rizal
saw it as a possible nuisance in the eyes of people who upholds the integrity and beauty of the monument for
a 165 meter building could easily make the monument of Rizal as that of one puny monument. KOR filed
several actions in contradiction to the construction of the said condominium. DMCI-PDI was able to satisfy
the requirements and secure all necessary permits to carry on with its construction. KOR invoked the provision
of Section 15, Article XIV of the constitution, stating that, the state shall conserve, promote and popularise
the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources it being a self-executory provision of the
constitution due to its completeness.

Issue: Whether or not Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution may be invoked as the basis to
prevent the construction of Torre de Manila

Held: No. On its face, Section 15, Article XIV of the constitution is not a self-executing provision but
acts as a mere directory only. The congress passed R.A. no. 10066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of
2009 which delegates right to the National Commission on Culture and Arts to deal with matters involving the
preservation and promotion of historical and cultural heritage. in its definition, NCCA may stop the
construction, renovation, or rebuilding of a historical and cultural site if it would cause the diminution of its
physical integrity. note, however, that such definition of the powers vested to NCCA, it refers to the building
of the historical and cultural heritage itself, in this case, the Rizal monument, and not to another building or
project, in this case, Torre de Manila. Clearly, it does not cover Torre de Manila because Torre de Manila is
not one of the declared anthropological or archeological or heritage zone, meaning, R.A. 10066 is not
applicable. Torre de Manila would be standing 870 meters outside and to the rear of Luneta park. Such
construction may not be stopped on the basis of Section 15, Article XIV of the constitution on the ground that
it is not self-executory in character.

In discussing the dissenting and concurring opinions of other justices of the Supreme court;

Tijam, J.
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, i concur in the result reached by my distinguished
colleagues, J. Carpio, in his ponencia. In the contention of Section 15, Article XIV of the constitution, there is
no clear legal right to the protection of vista, sightline and setting thereof. it is open to different possible
interpretations which makes it as non self-executing for its possibility to have at least 2 meanings. In this
regard, J.Florentino P. Felicianos separate concurring opinion in the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran is
illuminating; that a clear legal rightt to protection of the vista, sightline and setting of the Rizal monument and
the Rizal park has not been established in legislation as an aspect of the constitutional policy to conserve,
promote and protect historical and cultural heritage and resources. it is settled that legislative failure to pursue
state policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in court.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Primarily, Section 15 and 15 of Article XIV of the Constitution is not a self-executing
provisions and requires legislative acts for it to give effect to the same. In this light, I join the ponencia in
finding that there is currently no such law which specially prohibits the construction of any structure that may
obstruct the sightline, setting or backdrop of a historical or cultural heritage or resource. The prohibition is
neither explicit nor deducible from any of the statutory laws discuss in the present petition. there are several
laws which consistently reiterate the states policy to protect and conserve the nations historical and cultural
heritage and resources. However, none of them definitely map out the boundaries of protection and/or
conservation, at least to the extent of providing this court with a reasonable impression that sightlines, vista
and the like of historical monuments are indeed covered by compulsive limitations.

In the dissenting opinion of Jardeleza, J, he states that, In this case of first impression, the Court was
asked to determine the constitutional dimensions of Section 15 and 16, Article XIV of the Constitution. These
section mandate the state to conserve and protect our nations historical and cultural heritage and resources.
We should decide this case conscious that we here exercise our symbolic function as an aspect of out power
of judicial review. Ours is a heavy burden; how we decide today will define our judicial attitude towards the
constitutional values of historic and cultural preservation and protection, involving as they often do fragile and
irreplaceable sources of our national identity. In constitutional construction, it is presumed to be self-
executing. The reason is that if the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This, however, does not make all constitutional provisions as self-executing. To determine
whether a provision is self-executing, the test is whether the provision is complete in itself as a definitive law,
or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. the provision must set forth a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional statuary or policy. Citing Oposa v. Factoran. Section 15 and
16, Article XIV of the constitution is not self-executing and are mere statements of principles and policy.
Enabling legislation is still necessary to define the scope, permissible measures and possible limitations of
such policy.
HOWEVER, at the time of the enactment of our constitution in 1987, there has already been a consistent
understanding of the term conservation in the culture, history, and heritage context as to cover not only a
heritage propertys physical1tangible attributes, but also its settings (e.g. surroundings, neighborhood,
landscapes, sites, sight lines, visual corridors, visual corridors and vista points). Setting is to be understood
as surroundings of the place.

b. Grace Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

 Facts: The case rooted from the filing of certificate of candidacy of Grace Poe-Llamanzares. Her
qualification to join in the presidential election race was tenable considering that she was a foundling. Estrella
Elamparo questioned her being a filipino citizen on the ground that being a foundling, it is impossible to
determine whether or not she is a natural-born filipino, a requirement to run for presidency. Prior to the
elections, Grace was found in Iloilo and was legally adopted. Grace took up her primary and secondary
schooling here in the Philippines but continued her college in the U.S. After college, she went home and met
her husband, they eventually moved back to the U.S and settled down. However, they were forced to hurry
back to the Philippines due to her fathers failing condition and decided to live in the Philippines sometime on
December of 2005. Upon settling here in the Philippines, she was able to secure all of transactions and
documents needed for her to permanently stay here in the Philippines. Tatad theorized that since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status. Tatad
invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of
the framers' intent to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen. Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory
and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.
He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.

Issue: Whether the contention that international conventions and treaties cannot be taken as a refuge
for foundlings to have a state on the ground that it is not self-executory

Held: No. The contention is untenable. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render
them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings
might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty 99.9% that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There
is no reason why this honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense
are not separate disciplines. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings.
c. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

Facts: The case involved a question as to whether or not The Filipino First policy enshrined under the
1987 constitution is one of self-executing wherein the state shall give preference to qualified filipinos in cases
involving concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic
partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision with respect to 51% as concessions covering national economy and patrimony

Held: Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes,
it has become a part of the national patrimony. Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a controlled
government-owned and corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. In addressing the issue on whether or not the provisions invoked by petitioner is one of self-
executing provision, we must follow the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy wherein the constitution is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Generally, some
constitutions are merely declaration of policies and principles which carries with it the fact that it calls for a
legislative act be it be enforced and recognised as an enforceable right. However, if the provision of the
constitution is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, it is self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. In the case at bar, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non- self-
executing unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing
d. Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts: The conflict ensued when a petition was filed questioning the validity of the concurrence of
Senate to Presidents ratification to the World Trade Organisation. In the petition filed, a statement which
contends that such act of the government is in clear violation of the Constitutional policy which provides that
the state shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and
to give preference to qualified Filipinos as well as to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. It was further contended that such policy of the constitution is one of
self-executing for it is clear as to its scope and application.

Issue: Whether or not such ratification by the state of the World Trade Organisation may be held as
unconstitutional for its clear violation of the Constitutional policy.

Held: No. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. While it is true that the state shall promote and
be bias, in favour of filipinos, in the patronisation of goods as well as labor, this only applies to fair competition
of enterprise. In the case at bar, the state is resilient in saying that it favors the filipino manufactured goods
and labor for it does not disallow the entry of foreign goods in the country. It concluded that such provision of
the constitution requires a legislative act before it be considered as a source of enforceable rights

e. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 10183, July 30, 1993

Facts: A group or minors, guided by their respective parents, filed a complaint praying to order
Factoran, then secretary of DENR, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel
all existing timber license agreement in the country and to cease and desist form receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. The defendant moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on two grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue raised was a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches. The trial court dismissed the
complaint based on the aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
seeking to rescind and set aside.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have cause of action in instituting the complaint
on the ground of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Held: Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow
that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind. Moreover, E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
serve as the bases for policy formulation and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary
government agency for the proper use and development of the countries natural resources. The right of the
petitioners and all they represent to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect
and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action.
f. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Facts: the sequence of events started when Pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy for president.
the same was not given due course through COMELECs resolution no. 6558 of 2004. The decision, though,
was not unanimous, urged Pamatong to file a motion for reconsideration and was docketed in COMELEC, the
same was reviewed and declared Pamatong, together with 35 other aspiring candidates as nuisance candidates
who could not wage national campaign and/or not nominated by any political party nor supported by the same.
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process
and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. In his Petition For Writ of Certiorari,
petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal
access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution

Issue: Whether or not Pamatong is correct in contending that Section 26, Article II of the 1987 of the
Constitution or the equal access to opportunities for public office vested him the constitutional right to run for
presidency

Held: No. The argument of Pamatong is without merit. In addressing his issue on the equal access to
opportunities for public office vested him an enforceable right to pursue his candidacy, There is none. What
is recognised is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause
of action before the courts. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may
be subjected to limitations as such that the COMELEC consider as nuisance candidates. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
VI. Mandatory vs. Directory
a. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

Facts: In the 1955 elections, the Nationalista party dominated majority of the seats in senate, with
Citizens party occupying the second largest of votes in the senate with Tanada as a senator and the president
of the same. In the election of Electoral Tribunal, Nationalista party, upon nomination of Primicias, was
represented by Laurel, Lopez, Primicias. On the other hand, Citizens party, upon nomination of Tanada, was
represented by him, alone. As supplementary, Primicias nominated Cuenca and Delagado, pursuant to Section
11 of Article VI of the constitution wherein the word shall was taken by its compulsory form or made it
mandatory by the respondents to fill in the remaining two other members of the Electoral Tribunal which
tanada failed to provide.

Issue: Whether the act of Primicias, taking the word shall as compulsory in the
text of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, in nominating two senators from
Nationalista party in order to fill in the deficiency of Tanada valid

Held: No. As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the construction
of the laws may be allowed. While it is true that the word shall carries with it the nature of being a
compulsion, it ignored the fact that it is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election. It shall
be taken into account the intention behind the law of the its framers. in its strict form, the word shall as taken
by the Nationalista party as compulsory is a clear violation to the very spirit of the law. The most vital feature
of the Electoral Tribunal is the equal representation of said parties, resulting to equilibrium maintained by the
justices of the SC as member of the said tribunals. It is clear that the intention of the framers of the law intended
to avoid the majority of a party to dominate over the Electoral Tribunal for it would naturally defeat the purpose
of equal and impartial representation. Such nominations by the nationalist party is deemed null and void.

b. Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967

Facts: That sometime on March, 1967, The Congress passed Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) nos.
1,2 and 3; (a) To increase the number of seats from 120 to 180; (b) to call for Constitutional Convention; (c)
and to amend Section 16 of Article VI of the constitution in order to make themselves as delegates to the
convention. Subsequently, a bill was passed and was approved by the president on June, 1967, RA no. 4913,
which provides for the amendments aforementioned in the RBH no. 1 and 3.
It was later questioned through a case filed by Ramon Gonzales and another by PHILCONSA questioning that
such approval by people be held, as a requirment, in a course of special elections and not of a general one as
to be construed in the text of the law.
 Issue: Whether or not a Constitutional amendment be submitted for ratification of the people in a
general elections?

Held: Yes. As far as the law is concerned, and following the statements expressly provided under
Article 15 of the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the provision which dictates
that the extension to people of the constitutional amendments for their ratification be held though special
elections. The basis of past cases which followed the special election requirement is one of only preferential
in nature and does not necessarily negate its authority in submitting the constitutional amendments in general
elections.

In the foregoing decision of this court, other Justices of the Supreme Court concurred the decision;
a. Makalintal, J., stating that, I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without
reference to extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is
sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as
enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
b.Bengzon, J.P, J., states that, It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that
no one can exercise any authority over the rights and interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner
authorized by law.
c. Fernando, J., concurred, At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion
prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies
the applicable principles. A few words may however be added.
d. Reyes, J.B.L., J., also concurred, I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote
of all the members of each legislative chamber, the highest majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter,
one higher even than that required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire consequences.

However, Sanchez, J., shared a separate opinion, stating that, And so, our approach to the problem of
the mechanics of submission for ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the basis of the spirit of the
Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the phraseology thereof. We underscore
this, because it is within the realm of possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths
of the Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important; Bill of Rights in its
entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some such situations the amendments ought to call for a
constitutional convention rather than a legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the
Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be adopted by a constitutional convention. And
then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids that proposals therefor be initiated by
Congress and thereafter presented to the people for their ratification.