BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU vs.
Heirs of where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
FRANCISCO PASTOR (G.R. No. 138896. June 20, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to
expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated
April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent
domain is an exercise of the power to take private property
for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of
action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the
action also involves real property is merely incidental. An
action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with
this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the
MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have
been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000 "The instant action is for
eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax declaration
of the land involved that its assessed value is only One
Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a
pure question of law. In a Resolution dated July 28, 1999,
the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted
out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999,
as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied
in the resolution of July 14, 1999."
ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over
cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the
assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD: The RTC as an expropriation suit is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
The test to determine whether it is so was laid down by the
Court in this wise: "A review of the jurisprudence of this
Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of
the contract (specific performance) and in actions for
support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of
first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the
second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time
that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted
allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission
of June 11, 1901)."
In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have two phases: "'The first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
'of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.' An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it
finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be
done by the Court on the merits. The second phase of the
eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of 'the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken.' This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the
taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the
main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
 IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE vs. HON.
EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL (G.R. No. 173915. February
22, 2010)
FACTS: On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of
Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners. In
her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R,
respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police
Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of
other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante
uttered words, which when translated in English are as
follows, "How many rounds of sex did you have last night
with your boss, Bert? You fuckin' bitch!" Bert refers to Albert
Gacusan, respondent's friend and one (1) of her hired
personal security guards detained at the said station and
who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners' close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad,
Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling
the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent
prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorney's fees; P20,000.00 litigation
expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC
of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued
that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because
the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total claim. On June 24, 2004, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-
Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation. The trial court held that the total claim of
respondent amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the
jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85465, before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14,
2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended
Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the
trial court denied their motion in an Order dated September
17, 2004.
On January 23, 2006, the CA found that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion and granted their petition for
certiotari. The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly
falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations
show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within
the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals
added that the totality of claim rule used for determining
which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the
instant case because plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages
was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her
claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. The
Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can
amend her complaint by increasing the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the ground
that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint
and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a
matter of right under the Rules.
ISSUE: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No.
Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued
declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional amount of
first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to
P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the
second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00
became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with
OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator on May 13, 2004. Based on the foregoing,
there is no question that at the time of the filing of the
complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCC's jurisdictional amount
has been adjusted to P300,000.00.
But where damages is the main cause of action, should the
amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be the
sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or
should the total amount of all the damages claimed
regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages,
nominal damages, and attorney's fees, etc., be used? In this
regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 19 is instructive:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever
kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondent's main action is for damages. Hence, the other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g.,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses,
are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main
action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint.
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion,
on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC's
order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a
petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While
it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment
cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the
original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to
confer jurisdiction on the court , here, the RTC clearly had
jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the
complaint was then still a matter of right.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO (GR Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
No. 176492. October 20, 2014) Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent
Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they
were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod
City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to
maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked
Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January
29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 3.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September Here, the subject property's assessed value was merely
17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
this wise: required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro
Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore,
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal
property of the former Spouses Leonardo and
Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT
No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City,
which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to
the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose
to remain.

Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On

July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the
MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied
Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to
Barrido.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on

November 16, 2006. It held that since the property's
assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the
MTCC's jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying
on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the
equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO
TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

HELD: No. the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of

real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the
recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG (G.R.
No. 164594. April 22, 2015)
FACTS: Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita),
acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter
Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the
Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought
to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel
sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were
once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their
financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while
Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael
the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However,
after Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael
allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting
the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.
March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the
petition, and reversing the RTC's decision. The CA declared
that the "appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2,
Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to
the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael's
contention, the MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any
settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount
involved.
ISSUE: Whether the MCTC, through Angelita's motion for
execution, is expressly authorized to enforce the kasunduan
under Section 417 of the Local Government Code?
HELD: Yes.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government
settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode of enforcement
"kasunduan" wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the of an amicable settlement. The provision reads:
amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan
Section 417. Execution. The amicable settlement
was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and
or arbitration award may be enforced by execution
the members of the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo.
by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of
After about one and a half years from the date of the the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
execution of the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita settlement may be enforced by action in the
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur appropriate city or municipal court.
and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the
The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is
kasunduan. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion
judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through the
for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's alleged violation
institution of an action in a regular form before the proper
of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
City/Municipal Trial Court. The proceedings shall be
On January 17, 2000, the MCTC rendered a decision in favor
governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court.
of Annabel.
Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under
Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC the second mode and filed a motion for execution, which was
committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-99.
the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was
A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it
necessary for the petitioner to establish the genuineness and
contains the material requirements of an initiatory action.
due execution of the kasunduan. In its November 13, 2000
First, the motion is sufficient in form and substance. It is
Decision, 6 the RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan City upheld the
complete with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting
MCTC decision, finding Michael liable to pay Annabel the
the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff
sum of P250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to assail the
and the defendant; it contains the prayer for the MCTC to
validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to
order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a
dispute Annabel's claims or the applicability of the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160.
It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (i) an
nature of the pleading are the allegations in the body and not
amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by
the caption. Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed
the Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or
was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original action
after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in
that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule
the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a
6 of the Rules of Court that the complaint should allege the
mere Motion for execution; and (ii) the MCTC does not have
plaintiff's cause of action and the names and residences of
jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00
the plaintiff and the defendant. Angelita's motion could
(as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of
therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as
MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00. In its March
a motion/special proceeding. For this reason, Annabel has
13, 2001 Order, the RTC granted Michael's Motion for
filed the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the
Reconsideration, and ruled that there is merit in the
Local Government Code.
jurisdictional issue he raised. It dismissed Angelita's Motion
for Execution, and set aside the MCTC Decision. The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the
MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13,
award issued by the Lupon. We again draw attention to the
2001 Order, but the motion was subsequently denied.
provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that
Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On
after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of
the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in
the appropriate city or municipal court. The law, as written,
unequivocally speaks of the " appropriate city or municipal
court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no
distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature
of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the
law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or
municipal courts regardless of the amount.
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES and FRANCIS MARTIN D.
GONZALES vs. GJH LAND, INC. (formerly known as S.J.
LAND, INC.) (G.R. No. 202664. November 10, 2015)
FACTS: On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C.
Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a
Complaint for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status
Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary
Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly
known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak
Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II
(respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to
enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they
purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1,
2010. Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions
for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the
books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for
sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders,
hence, their plea for injunction.
After filing their respective answers to the complaint,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the
case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be
heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of
Muntinlupa City. In an Order 14 dated April 17, 2012, Branch
276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It
found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs
designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was
specifically designated by the Court as the Special
Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction
over the case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the
matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that they filed the case with the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the
same to Branch 276 by raffle. As the raffle was beyond their
control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences
of the wrong assignment of the case, especially after paying
the filing fees in the amount of P235,825.00 that would be for
naught if the dismissal is upheld.
ISSUE: whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa
City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter
(The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to
be followed when a commercial case such as the instant
intra-corporate dispute has been properly filed in the
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court
but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular
branch of that station.)
HELD: Yes.
At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly
categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case,
more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute, considering that
it relates to petitioners' averred rights over the shares of
stock offered for sale to other stockholders, having paid the
same in full. Applying the relationship test and the nature of
the controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly
rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and
pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, 24 hence,
intra-corporate, which should be heard by the designated
Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-
03-03-SC 25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2,
Section 5 of RA 8799.
Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August
8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 28 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A was transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general
jurisdiction. The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as
courts of general jurisdiction stems from Section 19 (6),
Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, known as
"The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980". To clarify, the
word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally
used by the legislature to particularize the fact that the
phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the
phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other
words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases
enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise
known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts.
Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the
transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first implemented,
they were transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs
for raffle between or among its different branches, unless a
specific branch has been designated as a Special
Commercial Court, in which instance, the cases were
transmitted to said branch. It was only on November 21,
2000 that the Court designated certain RTC branches to try
and decide said SEC cases without, however, providing for
the transfer of the cases already distributed to or filed with
the regular branches thereof. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the
Court issued SC Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 38
directing the transfer of said cases to the designated courts
(commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the
Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the
commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property courts in
one RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special
Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure and to
promote expediency. Accordingly, the RTC branch so
designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as
well as those involving violations of intellectual property
rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed in the
Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Courts.
The objective behind the designation of such specialized
courts is to promote expediency and efficiency in the
exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated
under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such designation has nothing
to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs
under RA 8799 since in the first place, the Court cannot
enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be
removed, given that the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of
legislative prerogative.
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-
corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such
filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the nature of the action.
Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a
regular branch, i.e. , Branch 276, instead of being assigned
44 to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256 . This error may have
been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e.,
"Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order,
TRO and Damages," which, however, contradicts and more
importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that
clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute.
The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is
only a matter of procedure that is, an incident related to
the exercise of jurisdiction and, thus, should not negate
the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was
not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch
276 should have first referred the case to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only
designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e. ,
Branch 256.
Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC
acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special
commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the
Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a
commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling
among the said special branches. Meanwhile, if the RTC
acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the
nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court
branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to
which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as
a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only
one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said
RTC has multiple branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special
branches.
For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that
the same principles apply to the inverse situation of ordinary
civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to
its branches designated as Special Commercial Courts. In
such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should then be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an
ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should
then order the raffling of the case to all branches of the same
RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal rules, and
the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any
difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a
commercial case only to branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-
raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is
permissible due to the fact that a particular branch which has
been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not
shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases
under the imprimatur of statutory law.
Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth,
the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is
wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of
action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as
a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to the
sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as
Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as
a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off
among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as
a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the nearest RTC with a designated
Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial
region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case
was referred to should re-docket the case as a
commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has
only one branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole
special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple
branches designated as Special Commercial
Courts, raffe off the case among those special
branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is
wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case.
Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC
(including its designated special branches which, by statute,
are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same
as regular branches), as provided for under existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the
appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On the
other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly
credited, and any excess, refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires
that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its
caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may,
upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio, be
dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due
rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in
application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are
deemed superseded.