Akbayan vs COMELEC The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal
Political Law Election Laws Right of Suffrage Extension of Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of
the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on
December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day
registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that
there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC
invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days
before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-
election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension
of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8,
RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular
election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which
is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then
enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting
honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to
the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings
that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the
additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of
voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and
then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time,
the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special
registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth
voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any
actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the
voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their
pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons,
which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)
FACTS:
In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No.
8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10,
2010.
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon
it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections;
that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election
acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational
and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period
set forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every
national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day
period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A.
8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this
grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common
underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot
be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners
had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer
would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where
he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate
for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of
the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts.,
Old Balara, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position
of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming
that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of
choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056
May 21, 2001
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Datu Inocencio Siawan against Judge Aquilino. A. Inopiquez, Jr. of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of
power, and misconduct in connection with the latter's handling of a criminal case (Crim. Case No. 584)
and two election cases for inclusion of voters (Election Case Nos. 333 and 292.) .
In Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco . . ., the accused then
was charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions , involving, as the complaint states, a
"paquiao" contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy.
Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; In the course of the proceedings after the prosecution had already
presented its witnesses, the complaint was dismissed on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance
executed by complainant Restituto C. Pedrano. This Affidavit of Desistance is opposite to the earlier
affidavit of the same complainant, which was made the basis of the Complaint. Prior to the issuance of
the Affidavit of Desistance ,accused Seco had filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a Motion for
Inhibition of the Presiding Judge now respondent in this case .The meat of this motion for inhibition is
that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in the
proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the complainant. Without addressing the issues
raised by accused Seco, respondent denied her motion for inhibition in his order, dated May 22, 1987.
Apparently realizing that the motion for disqualification was meritorious, respondent, after partially
hearing the case, dismissed it on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Restituto
Pedrano. But, as Seco sued Pedrano for damages for filing the criminal case, respondent judge ordered
the withdrawal of Pedrano's affidavit of desistance from the record and recalled his order dismissing the
criminal case. Respondent then revived Criminal Case No. 584 only to dismiss it again, saying the
complainant in the criminal case could always refile it. He then inhibited himself on the ground of
delicadeza citing his relationship to counsel for the private prosecutor. When Criminal Case No. 1181
was filed against accused Seco, based on the same facts as Criminal Case No. 584, respondent, to
whom the case was again assigned, issued an order, dated April 28, 1994, inhibiting himself, reiterating
that he is related to the private prosecutor which was later denied by the RTC of Ormoc city and soon
thereafter, respondent judge in an Order dated September 5, 1994 dismissed Criminal Case No. 1181. A
Motion For Reconsideration re the Order of dismissal was filed by the private complainant. The
respondent judge issued the Order of November 14, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration
complainant to which the respondent judge directed accused's counsel, to file comment to the motion;
a second motion for reconsideration was again filed by the private complainant and the respondent in
an Order dated December 23, 1994 directed anew the accused's counsel for another comment; Atty.
Custodio Caete complied and filed his comment dated December 26, 1994 and later a supplemental
comment. Criminal Case No. 1181 was finally laid to rest on February 17, 1995 as per admission of
complainant
(b)Election Case Nos. 333 was a petition for inclusion of a voter in the voter's list. Respondent judge
admits that the petitioner, retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr., is his uncle. Nonetheless, he
justifies his failure to recuse himself on the ground that the petition of Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr. was
meritorious.
(c) In Election Case No. 292, on the other hand, the seven petitioners, all surnamed Herbas, alleged
that they were refused registration on February 1, 1992 at Brgy. San Sebastian, Matag-ob, Leyte by the
Board of Election Inspectors; and that they have not voted for two consecutive elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr is guilty of grave abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law for his mishandling of the 3 cases mentioned above. .
HELD:
Respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for
violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months
for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law
(a) Complainant's counsel in Criminal Case No. 584 was Atty. Eusebio Otadoy, Jr. Respondent admits
that he is related to Atty. Otadoy. Although respondent is not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to Atty Otadoy, the evidence shows that because of his relationship not only to
Atty Otadoy but also to those helping the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, one of whom, Guillermo
Laurente, is respondent's father-in-law, while the other one, Atty. Felix Sun, is his brother-in-law,
respondent judge acted with obvious partiality for complainant in the criminal case.
It is obvious that respondent got entangled in his own maneuverings in his desire to favor and protect
the complainant Restituto Pedrano and those helping the latter .Respondent could have recused himself
from the moment his disqualification was sought by the accused Seco in Criminal Case No. 594.
Respondent hung on to the case as long as he could until this case was filed against him. But then he
realized that it was untenable for him to continue hearing the criminal case not only because of his
relationship to Atty. Otadoy but also to Atty. Felix Sun and Edgardo Laurente, both of whom were his
brothers-in-law, who were actively participating in the prosecution of the criminal case.
Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to
counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a judge
may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid
reasons. (Rule 137, 1 of the Rules of Court.)
It may also be added that a well-meaning judge may not just order the reopening of an already
dismissed criminal case or direct the removal of a vital evidence on record without first going over the
record of the case.
We are referring to the irregular actuations of respondent in the same Crim. Case No. 584 wherein he
granted the motion of the private prosecutor to withdraw or detach the Affidavit of Desistance executed
by the private complainant 1) without the approval of the private prosecutor; 2) despite the fact that
the dismissal of the case was already final; and 3) stating in the order that the accused was not yet
arraigned, when the truth is the prosecution has already rested when the case was dismissed on
December 22, 1992
(b) Respondent judge's contention is without merit. Rule 137, 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
....
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree;
....
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Under these provisions, respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it
was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a
conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge.
(c) The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No. 292
named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that the
board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted on such inclusion
proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice posted in a conspicuous
place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or
municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set for the hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the
above provision.
The Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and
correction of names of voters. --- (a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion,
or correction of names of voters shall be received.
(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state the
place, day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a
copy thereof by registered mail or by personal delivery
The failure of respondent to observe the requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion
or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because it can be assumed
that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN v.
COMELEC and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN G.R.
No. 135927 June 26, 2000 BUENA, J.:
CASE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order issued
by the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost
precinct"
FACTS: On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of
voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar
thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be
annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari. On September 18,
1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the respective BEI of the
questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the
petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters. On October 31, 1997, the incumbent
mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other
oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23 barangays, filed an "Answer in Opposition"
which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact
that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the
purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. After hearing
and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an
Order dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation.
The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty.
Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous
incisive investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation
conducted." Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a
memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar
Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality
of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts. It was found out
that:
(1) in Barangay Padian Torogan, there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no roof,
and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that no single human
being could possibly reside in these two structures. Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan
means a cemetery not a residential place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the
COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285.
(2) In Barangay named Rakutan, the ocular inspection was stopped by the Madalum Municipal Chief of
Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun On the basis of the foregoing, Election
Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its
1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan
and Rakutan were uninhabited. On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads: Xxx (2) finds
Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and shall be excluded from the special election to be conducted in
Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu, to immediately resume the investigation, the remaining
ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to the Commission with dispatch, allowing it to
submit partial findings if necessary.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-
Torogan as ghost precinct. NO.
HELD: The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one
declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not mention any specific
precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily
contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election precinct in the said place. The determination
of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said
precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual
findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive
upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon
review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and
verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there
were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the
registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually
have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact
that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local
government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU)
may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.
In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be
done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the
mandatory requirement of a plebiscite 16 conducted for the purpose in the political units affected. The
findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers
to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. The assailed order having been
issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse
of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is
unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right
of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded
from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified
to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent
voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of
suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost
votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
FOOTNOTES: The Commission shall establish all election precincts. The precincts actually established in
the preceding regular elections shall be maintained, but the Commission may introduce such
adjustments, changes or new divisions or abolish them, if necessary; Provided, however, That the
territory comprising an election precinct shall not be altered or a new precinct established within forty-
five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election or a referendum plebiscite.
Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 7160. Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit
may be abolished when its income, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than
the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the
national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be. The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged. Sec. 10, R.A. 7160. Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit
or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Election (COMELEC)
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such
action unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Art. V, Section 1, 1987 Constitution. Suffrage
may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.