Case Digest on People vs.

Donato
PEOPLE V. DONATO [198 S 130 (1991)] - The doctrine of waiver extends to the rights and privileges of
any character, and since the word "waiver" covers any conceivable right, it is the general rule that a
person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he
is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled whether secured by contract,
conferred

with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy.
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) Those in which the state,
as well as the accused, is interested, and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the
nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived, those of the second may be.
(Commonwealth v. Petrillo).
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as the rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the right to counsel and to remain silent, and the right to be heard.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right personal to the
accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

People Vs. Judge Donato

198 SCRA 130
G.R. No.79269
June 5,1991

Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed
before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed
that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996,
942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every
two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of
his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 158754 / AUGUST 10, 2007
TOPIC: RULE 114 - BAIL

An Information was filed for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The
case was assigned to respondent Sandiganbayan. The amended information referred to, like the original,
charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the former President and several others, with plunder, defined
and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659.

The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy and
his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

Jinggoy filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial
and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not
in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information . In the alternative,
he also prayed that he be allowed to post bail

He filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."

Respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Jinggoys "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and
"Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." His alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of
all accused.

Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded
to arraign him. He refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him.

From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for
certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Jinggoy filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The Ombudsman opposed the
motion.

Jinggoy filed with the SC an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On the same day, the SC referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court
to make a report.

The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a copy of the Sandiganbayans
Resolution denying Jinggoys motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." According to the graft court, basing
its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy "failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for
that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."

The SC dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No. 148965, on the following rationale:

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence
of guilt.

This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based
its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence
on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.

Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to

determine if the evidence of [Jinggoys] guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to [him].
Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution
filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the
parties of their respective memoranda.

Respondent Sandiganbayan granted the omnibus application for bail.

Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted bail to respondent considering that the undisputed
fact clearly evidences that respondent, even without a finding of conspiracy, is equally guilty and liable as
accused Joseph Estrada himself by his indispensable

Held: No. The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable.

To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to
bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of
the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:

It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that
he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this
case seems remote if not nil.

The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10,
2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who
usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long
as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable
name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any
suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give
up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice.

Petitioners first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the public respondents rejection of the
theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first level
of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next level
of which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioners logic goes following this theory, respondent
Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
from "jueteng" under par. (a) of the amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the
conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions and
kickbacks from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other illegal sources
under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And since the central figure
in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all those within
the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo which, as here, also involves multiple levels of
conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead accused is a former President no less, the prime
suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government official a former Judge who later rose
to hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense,
to be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo and
Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo
in a scandal case. Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead.
Evidence pointed to a conspiracy led by a certain "Ben Ulo" (who appears to be the mastermind) and a
group of confidential agents of the Department of National Defense, one of whom was the triggerman.
Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General tagged Ben
Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroys demise. The
conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping with the conspiracy
between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom was the triggerman.

Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui
Wong, featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby.
Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found with multiple
stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among "Sampaloc hoodlums" who
had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the neighbors of the "Sampaloc hoodlums" was a classmate
of Victor. In the end, on the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his classmate
together with all the "Sampaloc hoodlums" guilty of murder.

Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner presently argues:

It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with former Gov.
Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and of former Gov. Singson
involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the
regular collection of jueteng protection money for accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy between accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson,
agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate
beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached an agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed
the plan and participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng protection
money, i.e., collecting P3 Million in jueteng protection money every month; remitting P2 Million thereof to
former Gov. Singson for delivery to accused Joseph Estrada and retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.

Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since he is as guilty and
liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of Plunder.

As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing
sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoys release on bail.

As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his
virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually
dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced.
Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail
application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent
Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of the main case. In the words of
the public respondent:
As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically stated herein that in making the above
pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of this
case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with respect to accused Estrada. This Court
[Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt is
strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail. xxx.

Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies
that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayans ongoing
determination of the facts and merits of the main case.

Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the
crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to
cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the
second argument attempts to establish an "implied conspiracy" between Jinggoy and his father - hence,
the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent
Jinggoy is nonetheless "equally guilty" as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation
and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.

By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Venturing into the gray areas of the concept of conspiracy,
petitioner cites the following obiter defining "implied conspiracy," thus:

When by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same felonious object,
with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing
a closeness of formal association and concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That
would be termed an implied conspiracy.

From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous documents and
transcripts of stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had been deep inside the web of "implied
conspiracy" under the second argument of this petition. From the "implied conspiracy" theory, it then shifts
gears to embrace the "equally guilty" hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.

Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the fundamental principle
that the Court is not a trier of facts remains. Petitioners second and third arguments are to be sure relevant
to the proceedings for the grant or denial of bail that were pending before in the Sandiganbayan. They are
of little moment here where the only issue now is whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting bail to the private respondent.

With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation
of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is
warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court,
from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As jurisprudence teaches:

xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from
making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence
that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

Petitioners last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have the Court reverse in this case its earlier holding
in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his other co-
accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph
describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and
name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The
predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense.
This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating
a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two
predicate acts that of ordering the (GSIS) and the (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate
acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the
former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the
predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose
Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration
of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth . As the Amended Information is worded, however, it
is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the
former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly committed as
related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the
former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4
billion. (Emphasis added.)1avvphi1

Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for
predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now
argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and
later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other
constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c" and "d".25

We disagree.

At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that were
inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the
Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoys
participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b," "c" and "d," did not
change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For
when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended
Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In
legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No.
148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light
of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended
Information.

In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions
evidence, it determined that the evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis
of that determination, resolved to grant him bail.

As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court which adds an
appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed
resolution of March 6, 2003:

xxx Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in case of conviction,
[respondent Jinggoys] criminal liability would probably not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
(Underscoring in the original; Words in bracket added).

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 158754 / AUGUST 10, 2007
TOPIC: RULE 114 - BAIL

An Information was filed for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The
case was assigned to respondent Sandiganbayan. The amended information referred to, like the original,
charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the former President and several others, with plunder, defined
and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659.

The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy and
his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
Jinggoy filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial
and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not
in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information . In the alternative,
he also prayed that he be allowed to post bail

He filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."

Respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Jinggoys "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and
"Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." His alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of
all accused.

Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded
to arraign him. He refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him.

From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for
certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Jinggoy filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The Ombudsman opposed the
motion.

Jinggoy filed with the SC an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On the same day, the SC referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court
to make a report.

The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a copy of the Sandiganbayans
Resolution denying Jinggoys motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." According to the graft court, basing
its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy "failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for
that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."

The SC dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No. 148965, on the following rationale:

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence
of guilt.

This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based
its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence
on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
 Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of [Jinggoys] guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to [him].

Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution
filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the
parties of their respective memoranda.

Respondent Sandiganbayan granted the omnibus application for bail.

Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted bail to respondent considering that the undisputed
fact clearly evidences that respondent, even without a finding of conspiracy, is equally guilty and liable as
accused Joseph Estrada himself by his indispensable

Held: No. The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable.

To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to
bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of
the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:

It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that
he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this
case seems remote if not nil.

The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10,
2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who
usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long
as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable
name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any
suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give
up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice.

Petitioners first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the public respondents rejection of the
theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first level
of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next level
of which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioners logic goes following this theory, respondent
Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
from "jueteng" under par. (a) of the amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the
conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions and
kickbacks from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other illegal sources
under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And since the central figure
in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all those within
the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.

Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo which, as here, also involves multiple levels of
conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead accused is a former President no less, the prime
suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government official a former Judge who later rose
to hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense,
to be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo and
Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo
in a scandal case. Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead.
Evidence pointed to a conspiracy led by a certain "Ben Ulo" (who appears to be the mastermind) and a
group of confidential agents of the Department of National Defense, one of whom was the triggerman.
Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General tagged Ben
Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroys demise. The
conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping with the conspiracy
between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom was the triggerman.

Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui
Wong, featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby.
Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found with multiple
stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among "Sampaloc hoodlums" who
had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the neighbors of the "Sampaloc hoodlums" was a classmate
of Victor. In the end, on the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his classmate
together with all the "Sampaloc hoodlums" guilty of murder.

Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner presently argues:

It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with former Gov.
Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and of former Gov. Singson
involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the
regular collection of jueteng protection money for accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy between accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson,
agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate
beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached an agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed
the plan and participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng protection
money, i.e., collecting P3 Million in jueteng protection money every month; remitting P2 Million thereof to
former Gov. Singson for delivery to accused Joseph Estrada and retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.

Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since he is as guilty and
liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of Plunder.

As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing
sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoys release on bail.

As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his
virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually
dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced.
Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail
application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent
Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of the main case. In the words of
the public respondent:

As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically stated herein that in making the above
pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of this
case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with respect to accused Estrada. This Court
[Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt is
strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail. xxx.

Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies
that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayans ongoing
determination of the facts and merits of the main case.

Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the
crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to
cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the
second argument attempts to establish an "implied conspiracy" between Jinggoy and his father - hence,
the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent
Jinggoy is nonetheless "equally guilty" as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation
and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.

By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Venturing into the gray areas of the concept of conspiracy,
petitioner cites the following obiter defining "implied conspiracy," thus:

When by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same felonious object,
with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing
a closeness of formal association and concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That
would be termed an implied conspiracy.

From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous documents and
transcripts of stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had been deep inside the web of "implied
conspiracy" under the second argument of this petition. From the "implied conspiracy" theory, it then shifts
gears to embrace the "equally guilty" hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.

Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the fundamental principle
that the Court is not a trier of facts remains. Petitioners second and third arguments are to be sure relevant
to the proceedings for the grant or denial of bail that were pending before in the Sandiganbayan. They are
of little moment here where the only issue now is whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting bail to the private respondent.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation
of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is
warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court,
from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As jurisprudence teaches:

xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from
making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence
that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

Petitioners last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have the Court reverse in this case its earlier holding
in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his other co-
accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph
describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and
name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The
predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense.
This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating
a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two
predicate acts that of ordering the (GSIS) and the (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate
acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the
former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the
predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose
Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration
of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth . As the Amended Information is worded, however, it
is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the
former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly committed as
related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the
former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4
billion. (Emphasis added.)1avvphi1
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for
predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now
argues:

It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and
later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other
constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c" and "d".25

We disagree.

At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that were
inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the
Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoys
participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b," "c" and "d," did not
change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For
when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended
Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In
legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No.
148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light
of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended
Information.

In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions
evidence, it determined that the evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis
of that determination, resolved to grant him bail.

As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court which adds an
appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed
resolution of March 6, 2003:

xxx Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in case of conviction,
[respondent Jinggoys] criminal liability would probably not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
(Underscoring in the original; Words in bracket added).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No. 42318
which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders[2] of the lower court granting accused-respondents
Motion for Bail and denying petitioner Peoples Motions to Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995 and
to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995 confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In
a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which
petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however,
granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is constrained to grant bail
for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00. (Italics supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the
prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty. Romulo Tolentino, State
Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find that the claim of the People
that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is
unimpressed with merit. We are not inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent courts
exercise of its discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. We do not find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be accorded the
findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage (not available to Us) of having observed first-hand
the quality of the autoptic proference and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the
accused. Differently stated, in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared to
supplant the exercise of the respondent courts discretion with that of Our own.

Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the following sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE
PROVING RESPONDENTS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting accused-respondents
application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented during the hearing.Said
order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by the accused through
counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by the prosecution is not strong. This is so
because the crime of rape is not to be presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts
between man and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such presumption. It
is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled
to prevail, not necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise
reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication
of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable
doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction
or the acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino,
G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the offense of rape the facts and
circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent thereto may provide conclusion whether they may
negate the commission thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate,
they do presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant case,
the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof were mostly brought
out during the cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof
is to test accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised
Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick
Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 oclock from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the
former knew that it was for a joy ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded
to the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same municipality, where
she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille
even followed the accused in going down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows
voluntariness on the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape should
not be received with precipitate credulity.On the contrary, an insight into the human nature is necessary (People
v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it
shall be believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because the aphorism
that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
in itself in conformity with the common experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance
than in cases involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the offended party
Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took
four (4) shots there shows that there (was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick
Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small cigarette,
presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the prosecution, however, failed to present any portion
of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from
the said cigarette would cause dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335,
par. 2 Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino,
Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the offended party, Cecille
Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the
offended party, placed them on her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently
pushed the head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended party was no
longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has been presented to show that the offended
party suffered an injury much less any part of her pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was
an overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the offended party (People v.
Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in the offense of rape are
relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People
v. Erogo, 102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 oclock in the early morning of July 21, 1994, the
offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latters companions all boarded the same jeepney going back
to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of
grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the house of Roderick
Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony of the offended party shall not be accepted
unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused though innocent
(People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the courts to
exercise the most painstaking care in scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v.
Dayag, L-30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for
medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among others, that there was a healed laceration on the
hymen, her laceration might have been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even
a year, prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by repeated
penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party might have experienced sexual
intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court,
Moran, op.cit, vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander of Lagonoy, Camarines
Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for
medical treatment before the same physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the
said physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said offended party claim they
were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such, there were contradictions on material points, it
becomes of doubtful veracity (People v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia,
G.R. No. 13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by the accused subsequent to
the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from failing to include
some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial court also misapplied some well-established doctrines of
criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the following circumstances duly presented in the
hearing for bail:

First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape against respondent
(People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on her psychiatric
examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear,
sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive
signs and symptoms. These abnormal psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable
to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of guilt (People v. Flore, 239
SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by intoxication and inhalation
of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, no bail was recommended in the
information constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all) the accused (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA
284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that respondent succeeded in
forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her
declarations remain unrebutted.
Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament, torment and suffering
due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained about the incident. Instead of helping her,
Florece threatened to harm her and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille
are positive statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by
respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).

Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the lacerations suffered by
Cecille might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6) months or even a year prior to the examination
(Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995) thus implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is
highly misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell how old is an old hymenal laceration because she cannot
indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she could not point the exact
cause (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9, 1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable
in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257
SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victims genitalia is not
an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime.The examination is
merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr. Decena positively testified that the wounds could have been
caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim (Page 6, TSN, December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecilles
testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that respondent burned her right side of the stomach thrice.

The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with its rule-
making powers,[3] the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following provision:

Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.[4] (Italics supplied)

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.[5] As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right. The grant
or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the
lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of
its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts
findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is strong.[6] Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the
law is administered.[7] Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference
of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes
all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.[8] Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused.[9] (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather
whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially bound to decide
which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined
above.[10]
This Court has observed that the lower courts order failed to mention and include some significant factors
and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the
testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter
manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom.[11] This particular testimony
should have been considered and included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the
unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have been
noted as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence against the party making
it.[12]
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this Court has likewise
observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the lower court, in its order,
intoned the following doctrine that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with common experience and observation of mankind.
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she willingly went
with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the crime, complainant
allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise, never protested nor cried while they
were on their way to accused-respondents house. Because of those findings, the lower court doubted the
credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual acts between
a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In overcoming such presumption, much depends on the
credibility of the complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of complainant in filing the
rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken into consideration.The following
rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more credible:

It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink gin with the help of his
friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More,
respondent and his friends blew smoke into her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever
she attempted to leave the place, she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994).

Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun (Page 17, TSN,
November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be viewed in light of the
victims perspective and the offenders physical condition (People v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further,
physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will because of fear for life and personal safety.(People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405
[1995])

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the incident in question. At her age, it is
reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin must have rendered her
dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or reason. The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille
of reason, will and freedom must be viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in rape cases, submission does not necessarily imply
volition. (Querido , 229 SCRA 745 [1994])

It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accused-respondent,
she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the trial court that Cecille must
have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with them in the first place is, therefore, bereft
of any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride does not
mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that force and violence in the offense of rape are relative terms, depending
on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. The lower court enunciated this
doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual act since the prosecution was unable to
show that complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither
was there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted overpowering and overbearing moral influence over
the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it readily concluded
that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence to complainants allegation
that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the
marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not
imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or intimidation to show that Cecille had
broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have
sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate Cecilles claim by presenting the
examining physician who testified that Cecille suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus
area. Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainants allegation that she was forced to smoke a small cigarette,
presumably marijuana, due to the fact that the prosecution failed to present any portion of that so-called small
cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would
cause the said offended party to suffer weakness and dizziness. Said ratiocination is trifling and
unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as complainant categorically asserted that what made her weak and
dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the
smoke alone. In any case, complainant could not be expected to produce that portion of that so-called small
cigarette. Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge - that four
shots of gin have a weakening and dizzying effect on the drinker, especially one as young as the fifteen-year
old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower courts misinterpretation
of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which would have shown a very strong
likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The following pieces of evidence cited in the
summary of the assailed order are indications of misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after complainants physical
examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended party is already experienced in sexual
intercourse, after the examining physician had testified that the hymenal lacerations might have been sustained
a month, six months or even a year prior to the examination.Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that
Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell how old is an old hymenal laceration because she cannot indicate
when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she could not point the exact cause.
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with concern and agrees with petitioner,
in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in
indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime. Further, in crimes against
chastity, the medical examination of the victims genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful
prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.[13] And contrary to the theory
espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual
intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the cigarette burns
indicated that the lesions near complainants umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably, however, the lower
court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that the wounds could have been
caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim which corroborates Cecilles testimony that respondent burned
her right side of the stomach thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abused its discretion and showed
manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to be considered in
supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be remembered that the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo[14] is not absolute nor
beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very
nature, involves the exercise of the judges individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude
for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: But discretion when applied to a court of justice,
means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded indicate that
they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This irregularity is even more
pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines cited to support the grant of the bail
application. This Court cannot help but observe that the lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the
evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by its non sequitur justifications, misleading or
unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not
misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainants allegation that
accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte
stating that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations which are traceable to the rape incident, and
(3) the unrebutted offer of compromise, are indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of accused-
respondent.
Lending credence to petitioners case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations,
no bail was recommended in the information. According to Baylon v. Sison,[15] such recommendation
constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of evidence
are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise
of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalang,[16] discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of
the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those
principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of right. This Court has reiterated this mandate in
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge
Rapatalo[17]which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; (Italics supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise,
petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.[18] A summary is defined as a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement.[19]
There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary of the evidence in the order is an
extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence presented during
the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure
to include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior
hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference
would be that they were not considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due
process, for due process means not only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for
the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.[20] Second, the summary of the evidence
in the order is the basis for the judges exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete compilation or
restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court cannot exercise
judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that some
prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or
selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for
a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary that
is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin,[22] the absence of a summary in the order
would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an incomplete summary
would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of
validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,[23] said order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the order
granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the resolution dated
December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated March 24, 1995 in Criminal
Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall
immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and
thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This resolution is immediately executory.

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001]

FACTS:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to
set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa
by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one
(1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed
twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under
the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in
an order dated February 17, 1999.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by
respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount,
effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing
bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant
Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for
the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He
prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be
posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the
amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative
the liberty of abode and right to travel?

RULING:
No. Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment
for twenty years --- the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed
by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite
the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant
petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal
nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the
evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights.
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and
function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will
show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.

G.R. No. 122737 February 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SERGON MANES and RAMIL MANES, accused-appellants.

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal taken by accused Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the
judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, 2 Iloilo City, convicting them of murder and sentencing them to
each "suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided in Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code" and "to indemnify the family of their victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P21.250.00 as expenses
for the burial, wake and other related matter and to pay the costs."

We affirm the conviction.

On July 12, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, an
information charging the accused with murder, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 23rd of June, l991, in the Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose
armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and
shut Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which they were then
provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death immediately thereafter. 3

The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.

On July 22, 1991, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. On October 18, 1991, the trial
court ordered the case archived for failure to locate the two accused.

On June 24, 1992, or about a year after, accused Sergon and Ramil Manes were arrested in Romblon,
Romblon. On July 6, 1992, they were brought to Iloilo City.

Upon arraignment on September 17, 1992, both accused pleaded not guilty to the information, and,
thereafter, the court proceeded to try the case.

Meantime, on August 25, 1992, the accused filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution.
The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at
any stage of the trial.

The prosecution presented six witnesses, 4 two of whom were eyewitnesses to the crime, while the defense
presented three, 5 two of whom were the accused themselves.

On January 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, finding the accused, Ramil Manes and Sergon Manes, guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt, they are therefore sentenced to each suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code and
they are also ordered to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 plus
P21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and other related matter and to pay the costs. 6

On February 10, 1995, both accused appealed to this Court. 7

In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider
defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of
Tamorite's unlawful aggression.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

(a) According to the prosecution

(b) According to the accused

According to accused Ramil Manes, in the afternoon of June 23, 1991, he was at home cooking. At around
5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay basketball court, which was about
ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger
brother Sergon Manes lying on the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of
whom he identified as Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista and Jose Cubita. They kept on boxing and kicking
his brother prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on top of the table and
brought it with him to the basketball court.

While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor Tamorite from
stabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was
about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired
another shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to
the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second shot because he saw the group of Alan
Catequista approaching, armed with guns. 12Ramil and his brother Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a
year later when they were arrested in Romblon.

We find the facts as those established by the prosecution's evidence.

The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder.

Appellants contend that the trial court committed a serious error of law when it went on with the trial of the
case without hearing the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times.

Under the law, 13 in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no
right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the
accused. 14

While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such
right may be waived expressly or impliedly. 15

In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only
in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the
earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail.

What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death,
and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 16
To exculpate himself, appellant Ramil claims defense of relative. This must likewise fail. Article II or the
Revised Penal Code provides the requisites of defense of relative.

The most essential of these elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Ramil Manes contends
that he came to the defense of his younger brother, Sergon, who was being attacked by Nicanor Tamorite,
Alan Catequista and Jose Cubita, together with several others. He claimed that these persons boxed and
kicked his brother in different parts of the body.

If, indeed, more than three persons attacked Sergon Manes, he would have suffered injuries or even a
scratch on his body. There was none. In fact, prosecution witness Alan Catequista testified that in no instance
did he, Nicanor Tamorite and Jose Cubita attack Sergon Manes.

The truth of the matter is that it was Ramil Manes who approached the victim, pointed a .38 caliber revolver at
him and said "It is bad luck that you did not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now, I will be
the one to kill you." While Nicanor Tamorite tried to hide from Ramil, Sergon suddenly appeared from behind
and stabbed Nicanor Tamorite at the back using a fan knife. Unlawful aggression clearly came from accused-
appellants, not from the victim Nicanor Tamorite.

Jose Cubita, another companion of the victim who witnessed what transpired that fateful afternoon of June
23, 1991, corroborated the testimony of Alan Catequista that the accused-appellants were the aggressors.
Despite the fact that Nicanor Tamorite was unarmed and outnumbered, the brothers Ramil and Sergon
Manes persisted in executing their plan to the point of chasing the fleeing victim.

Ramil Manes testified that while chasing Nicanor Tamorite who was about ten meters away from him, he fired
only two shots; one in the air as warning shot and another in the direction of Nicanor. The second shot hit the
victim who fell to the ground. Ramil fled the scene right after the second shot. The autopsy report revealed,
however, that Nicanor Tamorite sustained not only one but three gunshot wounds. There were also stab
wounds, one at the right side of the chest and another at the upper left back of the victim. 17

Assuming for the sake of argument that Nicanor Tamorite was carrying a knife while pursuing Sergon, who
was allegedly unarmed, it is highly questionable how the victim sustained the stab wounds considering their
location. The accused Ramil himself testified that no one approached Nicanor Tamorite as soon as he fell to
the ground so as to account for the presence of the stab wounds. Neither did the accused adduce evidence to
explain how the victim could have sustained those stab wounds.

The behavior of accused Ramil Manes subsequent to the killing further negates his claim of defense of
relative. If indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was then under attack, he would not
harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. Instead, he made no such report. Persons who
act in legitimate defense of their persons or rights invariably surrender themselves to the authorities and
describe fully and in all candor all that has happened with a view to justify their acts. They lose no time in
going to the punong barangay, the municipal mayor or the police and lay before them all the facts. 18

As regards Sergon Manes, he claims that he should not have been convicted of murder because he was an
innocent victim of the unlawful aggression of the deceased. He denies that he stabbed the latter. This denial
must fail in light of the positive identification and testimony of prosecution witnesses, Alan Catequista and
Jose Cubita, that the unlawful aggression came from accused appellants. Moreover, the autopsy report
conducted by Dr. Leticia Austria-Tobias on June 24, 1991 supports the prosecution's theory that accused shot
and stabbed the victim.

We need not tackle the remaining assignments of error which obviously must fail in light of the foregoing
discussion.
However, as pointed out by the solicitor general, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation exists when the following requisites are present:

1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;

2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and

3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow

him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 19

Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder, must be established
by clear and positive evidence. Mere presumptions and inferences are insufficient no matter how logical and
probable they may be. 20 The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the existence of the requisites of evident
premeditation. No direct evidence was presented regarding the time the accused planned to kill the victim. It was
not established that the appellants persistently and continuously clung to this resolution despite the lapse of
sufficient time for them to clear their minds and overcome their determination to commit the same.

The trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder.

Treachery exists "when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make." 21 Where the victim was totally
unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be
considered as treacherous. 22 In the instant case, Nicanor Tamorite was seated when Ramil Manes approached
him with a .38 caliber revolver in his hand. Sergon Manes took advantage of this preoccupation of the victim with
Ramil Manes by surreptitiously attacking and stabbing him at the back, while he was not in position to defend
himself against his aggressors.

The manner by which Nicanor Tamorite was assaulted reveals a concerted action towards the
accomplishment of a single criminal intent. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the appellants before,
during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. 23

On the other hand, the trial court must not have appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and aid of armed men because these are in absorbed treachery. 24

Consequently, we sustain the trial court's conviction of the accused, including the civil liability imposed
against them. However, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength and aid of armed men are not to be appreciated.

WHEREFORE, We AFFIRM the judgment of the convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil
Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties of the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00
plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.