CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

DUE PROCESS: 37 Phil. 921

(1) Judicial Proceedings, (2) Administrative and Quasi-
Judicial Proceedings, (3)Academic Discipline,
(4)Deportation Proceedings, (5)Fixing Rates and
Regulation of Profession, (6)Closure Proceedings,
(7) Termination Proceedings
BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA ................................................... 1
JUAN CARVAJAL VS. CA, ET AL. ................................................... 2
STATE PROSECUTORS V MUROS ................................................. 3
WEBB V DE LEON ........................................................................ 4
PEOPLE VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.......................................... 5
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA,
BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, AND
PEPITO KAWIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ....................................... 7
PEREZ V. ESTRADA...................................................................... 8
FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his
parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to
P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due
to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed
an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however
left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a
non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to
sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court
further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that
itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco
petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente
surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for
the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no
due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

PEREZ V. ESTRADA...................................................................... 9
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
PROPIETOR, AND NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD VS. THE 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.
UNION, INC. ............................................................................. 10 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. PASCUAL ............... 11 the defendant or over the property subject of the
ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA V. JUDGE REYNALDO proceedings.
BELLOSILLO .............................................................................. 13 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA ............................................................ 14
FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS ................................................ 15
SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD V. TORCITA ............................... 16
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V CORONEL ............................... 17
JUSTICE SECRETARY V. LANTION ............................................... 18
GOV'T. OF THE USA VS. PURGANAN ......................................... 18
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG V. OLALIA ................................ 21
GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY ....................................... 22
ALCUAZ V. PSBA ....................................................................... 23
NON V. DAMES......................................................................... 24
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO
CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993................ 25
UP VS. LIGOT-TELAN ................................................................. 26
LAO GI V CA (1989) ................................................................... 28
PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ .......................................................... 28
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS V NTC ............................................ 30
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC .......................................................... 31
CORONA VS. UHPAP ................................................................. 32
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA .............................................................. 33
RURAL BANK VS. CA ................................................................. 34
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA ................................................. 35
AGABON VS. NLRC .................................................................... 36
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, VS. DARWIN PACOT,
ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO,
RHOEL LESCANO AND JONATHAN CAGABCAB. ......................... 37

Page 1 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
JUAN CARVAJAL vs. CA, et al.
280 SCRA 351

FACTS: This is a petition seeking the nullification of two

Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1999 and
May 25, 2000. On October 9, 1997, the Supreme Court promulgated
a decision, In G.R. No. 98328, penned by Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban. denying Juan C. Carvajal's petition to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The latter court upheld the trial
court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC Record No. N-60084 filed before
Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 71. in dismissing
petitioner's application for registration of title of a parcel of land in
Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent Solid Homes, Inc.
as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-
7873, situated in Antipolo City. On May 13, 1998, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a complaint for
annulment of title with damages against private respondent.
Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. N-7873 by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal
who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938, continuously,
openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to
the time of his death. On August 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioner's complaint. On August 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued the questioned resolution. The decretal portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, for being insufficient in form
and substance, the petition for certiorari should be, as it
is hereby, DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED."
The petition revealed that petitioner failed to comply with
Rule 46, Section 3, par. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requiring the statement of the material dates showing when notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was
received, when a motion for the new trial or reconsideration, if any,
was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
On May 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition filed on July 7, 2000.

HELD: The court ruled on denying the petition because the issues
raised are factual.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Blanco vs. Quasha, G.R. No.
133148, November 17, 1999. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would substantially
affect the disposition of the case.
There would be no end to litigations if parties who
unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of the appropriate
remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

The Court further Resolves to:
(a) GRANT the motion of private respondent
for a second extension of five (5) days from
September 5, 2000 within which to file a
comment on the petition for review on
certiorari; and
(b) NOTE the said comment thereafter filed.

Page 2 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
State Prosecutors v Muros
236 SCRA 505, 19 September 1994

Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the
ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of
the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar
involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in
violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the
Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11
cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2
newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national
circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign
exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his
belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department
in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested
the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu
propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the
announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has
made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to
take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse

of discretion in taking notice on the statement of the president lifting
the foreign exchange published in the newspaper as basis for
dismissing the caes?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for
gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that
there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353
which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper,
believing that the public announcement is absolute and without
qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes
a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before
its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the
newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official
text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take
judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal
knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law
requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should
be presented:

(1) The matter must be one of common and general

knowledge;
(2) It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain;
(3) It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction
of the court.

The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper
is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a
law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case
without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due
process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from
service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion
for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his
discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and
groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

Page 3 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
WEBB V DE LEON Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
247 SCRA 652 that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed interference.
with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that
crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in is to prosecute their violators.
their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The
credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest
against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to
due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation.
They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and
homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination
before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused?

HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely,
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause
that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested
committed it.

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information,

the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent
judges should have conducted searching examination of witnesses
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
given all the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more
evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Page 4 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
249 SCRA 54
Facts: In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen
Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them.
When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to
stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents
to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered
to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and
stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from
his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you?
(Show me your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the
accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering
to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the
sidewalk and asked accused: Why are you bothering us?
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a
gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body,
staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot
me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt
beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to
get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his
ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: Do you
want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television
backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came
to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming
for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a
gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will somebody help us? All the
while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to
Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered
Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made
no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away
from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could
not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled
around accuseds car, trying to put some distance between
them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two.
Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly
enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two.
He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the
upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive
away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help.
He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were
filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he
was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for
the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently
died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and
during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
Defense: Accused relied on the defense of denial and
alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident,
he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in
his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to
know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he
read the newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted
ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however,
claimed that said car ceased to be in good running
condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the
day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the
garage of his mothers house in Dasmarinas Village. He
has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that
although the car was not in good running condition, it
could still be used.
Ruling : The accused was convicted on the strength of the
testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified
him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his
out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of
Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar.
Appellant urges: First, that Leinos identification of him
outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
and the newspapers before he identified him; Third, that
Leinos interview at the hospital was never put in writing;
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the
description given by Leino to the CIS agents was
suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must
have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI
when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the
investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have
remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted
for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze
could not have been fixed only on the gunmans face. His
senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he
imbibed that night.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the
Page 5 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended
parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of
P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged

irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is
nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the accused in
an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal
that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons.

The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it

was incredible for Leino to have remembered the
accuseds face when the incident happened within a span
of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to
etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of
bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The
natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive
to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the
manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end
body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this
case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to
impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the
accused were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be
because the accused was the real culprit.

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman.
He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the following amounts:
P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and,
P1,000,000 as moral damages.
(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of
Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts:
P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83 as
actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning
capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral
damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor
as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended
party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity
for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual
damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and,
P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

Page 6 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN
BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT,
accused-appellants

G.R. No. 121039-45 October 18, 2001

FACTS: This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Courts

decision on the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay case that
drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle
of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, all those
charged appellants herein were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and
sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of seven
reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court ordered
all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims respective
families by way of civil indemnities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired

their right to a fair trial of the appellants?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they
were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal
trials, but the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a
fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard
off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts
does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.

Page 7 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Perez v. Estrada
AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001

FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng

Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country,
sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in
the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April
2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estradas

trial to the public.

HELD: No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage

of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process
rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened,
play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to
extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their
testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to
avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant,
telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to
excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective
presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is a
powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy
an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV

cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled
by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal
case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall
take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused
has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his
to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A
public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the
witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting
throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of
the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only
pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to

chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to
use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and
the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too
high to pay.

Page 8 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision

denying petitioners request for permission to televise and broadcast
live the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice,
as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict
between the right of the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of
the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights,
it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to
information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against
attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit
of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his

objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground
that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on
his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will
only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can
trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr.
Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder

case be allowed.

HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties
on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason
to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president.
By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the
motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the
vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual
recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7)
Justices vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan
of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for
live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later
will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan
shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

Page 9 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. No. 46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang

Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were members of the National Labor
Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The
National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio
dominates the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang
Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated
against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly
dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled in favor of
NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the
Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation that the lack of leather
materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial
evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union
affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration,
while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural

requirements prescribe special requirements of due process in
administrative cases.

HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly

constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact,
however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones
cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely

attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth.

Page 10 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual
259 SCRA 604
Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote
a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the
Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
irregularities and corruption were being committed by the
respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat,
Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau
of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal
and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered
to conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director
Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI
Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose
Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for
Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was
a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they
proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward
Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No.
2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent
judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and
so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz
believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in
view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum
of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in
all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was
thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta
and Olazo filed the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO
CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica,
near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is
attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told
Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge
PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not
receive the money because according to him there were plenty of
people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him
(Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at
the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to
him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing
envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and
after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and
signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already
received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered
the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject
denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after
a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between
the pages of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein
he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding
Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was
booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our
Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the
person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman,
with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for
Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge
Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.
Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant
conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and
Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing
of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial
wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only
after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence,
especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-
quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had
fallen short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in
the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent
SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone
who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but
who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous
case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous
letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not
specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged
respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge
could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise
defend himself from such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of
the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a
discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead
caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not
having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person
exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who
could possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by
the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought
before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary
investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge
gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido
Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he
had original jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time
before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the
NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to
bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing
Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries.
No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask
for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable
verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that,
despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in
search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was
found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside
so that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider
the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around
9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along
with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat,
Page 11 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges
chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an
envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that
what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told
Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is,
in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was
the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply,
respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the
envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope
fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it
inside the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his
chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the
door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told
respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked.
Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money
from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI
Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables,
drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and
the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search
of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the
envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido
Cruz to respondent judge.

Page 12 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of

the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel
of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite

not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time.
It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the
counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the
latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such
decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with
his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To
support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by
his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed
to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country
although she was willing to testify at that time.

Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the

assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently
based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard
to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that
she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and
recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence
adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the
charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was
the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis
of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The
complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence
of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit
cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant
being placed on the witness stand.

The employment or profession of a person is a property right within

the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also
to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of
the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront
the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process
would be infringed.

Page 13 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Lumiqued vs. Exevea
G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997

FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He

was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due
to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he
was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also
complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks
after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and
10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the
motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date
he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted
for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be

assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel,

which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may,
thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners
invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued,
however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below.
The investigation conducted by the committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he
could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or
the law.

Page 14 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Fabella v. Court of Appeals schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute
G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256. that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its
investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a
FACTS: teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to- of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent
work order to allpublic school teachers who had participated in general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an
walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to
demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt
cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino
filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents
to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having
taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service
laws.Administrative hearings started on December 1990.
Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of
the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they
were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee
for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the
investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove
their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally
constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action
assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the
investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents
guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty
as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which
specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the
committee to hear public schoolteachersadministrative cases
should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division. In
the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear
the administrativecharges against private respondents did not
include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section
9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have
no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by
them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for
the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of
a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement
that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that
Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are
members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective teachers
organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9
of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses
the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the
DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot
be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public

Page 15 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking
[GR 130442, 6 April 2000] alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The
omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty
Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further,
Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita
with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in
owned by the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was
with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been
Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance
pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.
Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman.
The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the
hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but
the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men
around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at
this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the
back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where
Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994,
12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint
for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal
Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that
Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious
confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating
incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of
domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board
found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties"
when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple
irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of
alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20
days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita
appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita
filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
(Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense
for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of
law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The
RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty
of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board
appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the
respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering
that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for

breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him
were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent

be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut
to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense
is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged
and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases
filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned
or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the
performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all
in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being

Page 16 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel
G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006
In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by
substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated
photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial
evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact,
absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in
evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
Facts: Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of
the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of
Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of
1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective
October 1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed.
In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a
meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del
Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group
opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting, attended by
more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for the lunch in the
amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736
dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for reimbursement of
her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against
the representation and entertainment account of her office. That very
same day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her
reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred
Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed
General Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint against herein
Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent]
falsified the cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by
making it appear that the (P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only
(P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original duplicate of
cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
The complainants evidence to prove falsification
consisted of an unauthenticated45 photocopy of the original
duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant
proprietor or employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest
to its due execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due
execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original
duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate
reflection of the actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct
of proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently
requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for
the admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of
the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence,
without probative value.
Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence
against respondent, there is no need for her to present additional
evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should
have dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first
place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent
Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge
against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and

so holds that respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of
DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to
Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is
disqualified from re-employment in the national and local
governments, as well as in any agency, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Let a copy of this decision be
entered in the personal records of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process

Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the
Ombudsman erred in the decision rendered.

Held: The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due
process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
lies simply in the opportunity to explain ones side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is
proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In this case,
respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly,
her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that
she knew the bases for the ombudsmans Decision. In fact, she very
ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our
review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached,
respondents insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg
to stand on.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary

for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not present
evidence to support his theory that the photocopy of the original
duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed
been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden
of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to the
conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.

Page 17 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Justice Secretary v. Lantion
[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution
11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United
States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201
(Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud
by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election
contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the
Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing
a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1
July 1999requested copies of the official extradition request from
the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed
with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to
give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez
to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The
trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a
vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of an extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition
in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the
summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and
in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the
Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon
while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the
DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and
PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an
international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of
the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an
extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation
stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required
by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The
concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus,
the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a
soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him
of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan
G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan
the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not
extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent
(extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987
Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when
evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of
private respondent held that said constitutional provision is
applicable only in criminal cases but not to extradition
proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the
Lantion case that the Ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
in court is only to determine whether theextradition request
complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person sought
is extraditable.
Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof
the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that
as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the
court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve
the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory
basis the applicant bears the burden of proving these exceptions with
clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its discretion
in denying bail to private respondent who considered him as a
flight risk when he fled the United Statesafter learning of the
criminal charges filed against him.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US
Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing
was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be
issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court
allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing
before issuance of warrant of arrest
2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition
proceedings
RULING:
Held:
Page 18 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process

Five Postulates of Extradition
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With
the advent of easier and faster means of international travel,
the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for
the purpose of committing crimeand evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes
that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a majority of
nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international
co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular
system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith
municipal and international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of
globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we
cannot afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both
parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust,
each other s legal system and judicial process.More
pointedly, our duly authorized representative s signature on
an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity
and the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights
of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies
our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition
to therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the
criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise,
the treaty would not have been signed, or wouldhave been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe
invoked by an extradite. There are other differences between
an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminalproceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of
evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while afugitive
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of
a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice
whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of
thenation s foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite. Given the foregoing, it is evident that
the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or
the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will
only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is
merely a measure of international judicial assistancethrough
which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored
to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determinewhether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive
branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries thepresumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the
Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state.
On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paintsa bad image of our country before the world community.
Such failure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on
reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to
therequesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other
words, the demanding government, when it has done all that
the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery
of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is underobligation to make the surrender.
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position
to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be
extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the
executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state
in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The
present extradition case further validates the premise that
persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the
requesting state right beforethe conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently
speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state,
as well as his predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the
will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
Due Process
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would berendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and
argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means
of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination
of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase
if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected
to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected
merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding --
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
anddetention of the accused.
Page 19 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked
by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons orthings to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or
affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the
present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting
the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If
the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures
more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called
for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be
justified in view of respondent s demonstrated predisposition to
flee.
Right to Bail
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa
case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken
tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in
the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases
against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of
every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed
under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the
nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a
judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the
exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the
vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is
ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes
the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.
Page 20 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007) human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.

Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong
Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of
the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed
by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice
and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited
in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to

bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings.
The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international
law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under
our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of

Page 21 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Guzman vs. National University,
G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986,

142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the
petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their
respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their
participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and
Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have
come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984,
they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were
active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of
the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the
petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year
1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to
Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in
leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of
respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their
records, and are not of good scholastic standing.

Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents'
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted
proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander,
noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case
for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant
for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is
the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published
rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-
enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS

ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-
ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS.

Page 22 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Alcuaz v. PSBA evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
[GR 76353, 2 May 1988] collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave
Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the
Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of
students of the Philippine School of Business Administration the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the
(PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were,
the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should
the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was
turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and
barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved
futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform
letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school
should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct
participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October
1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a
reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester
of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student
Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring
the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders.
Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of
the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan
Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his
clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared
to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the

refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer
has any existing contract either with the students or with the
intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is
no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right
of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always
been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107
of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-
examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the
minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5
had not been complied with.
The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the
school authorities in the interest of
justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective
jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to
factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual
findings are not supported by
Page 23 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Non v. Dames
[GR 89317, 20 May 1990]

Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano,

Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel
Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis
Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus
filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38)
seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial
court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial
court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege
to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they
adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester
of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly
signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and
regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected
students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades

when the cause for the action taken against them relates to possible
breaches of discipline.

Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions'
discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set
academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech
and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a
serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court
should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding
students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of
discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a
violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one
or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the
academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of
information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to
disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to
the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the
requirements of procedural due process have been complied with
(Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But
this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the
students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have
been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they
might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and
would only further aggravate the strained relations between the
students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle.

Page 24 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO
CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner
University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center.
Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required
respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students
received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In
the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The
Investigating Committee found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers
to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board
to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the
lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty
of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the
University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students
filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This
was granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining
order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated
to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was
granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and
20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which
quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to
respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were
given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to
answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start
of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-
Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14,
1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said
to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity
need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A
closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in
nature and that respondent students have no righ t to examine
affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
previous ruling in Alcuaz . Respondent students' contention that the
investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from
the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing
the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary
Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing
on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to
answer clarificatory questions.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent

students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly

procedural due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and
hearing.

The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of

disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not

met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit
within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the
records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted
written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements . Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were
Page 25 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
UP vs. Ligot-Telan
227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.)
truly the University of the People, U.P. administration
conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee
payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP),
popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad
consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P.
President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988
a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated
a portion of
the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the
interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include
reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give
undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by
working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a
questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source
of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances
from which the University may evaluate their financial status and
need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To
further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling
scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application
form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits
for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College
of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo
Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team
submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship
Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and
Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva,
head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services,
presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships
and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's
directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the
investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact
that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned
by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting
his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that
the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from
Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could
submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the
equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on
current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would
mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of
clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for
further
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would
mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification
stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United
States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been
legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-
paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him
guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about
the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed
upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and
required him to reimburse
all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily
make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru
outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter
automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P.
Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student
Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty
from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately,
plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with
legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal,
a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a
motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR
meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance"
of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a
scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that
it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was
made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there
was
as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge."
According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely
stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of
gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the
penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would
depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P.
President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by
stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece
of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would
ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and
deception from 1989 which had been established in the
investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993,
the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed
a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening,
the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent
Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty."
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against
President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right
to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty
of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition
of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of
the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error
to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice
of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules
do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not
exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed
to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time
did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any
of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that
Nadal was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because
the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as
the original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the
conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the
truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However,
Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was
"exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income
of
Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent
Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar
at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced"
yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional
insights into the character of Nadal through the information that
Page 26 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find
such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July,
12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a
"TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying
employment" but that she was supporting the education of his
brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as
a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the
income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court
also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the
professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may
prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one
spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery
in the practice of his profession. With this the court ruled that it
sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of
dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with
his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of
petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to
impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully
exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadals
right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to
DISMISS the petition for mandamus.

Page 27 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Lao Gi v CA (1989) hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive
180 SCRA 756 finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to
register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state
Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be
when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and observed. In the same law, it is provided that:
misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the No alien shall be
Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and deported without being
that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the informed of the specific
CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. grounds for deportation
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of nor without being given a
preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their hearing under rules of
MFR was also denied. procedure to be
prescribed by the
Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in Commissioner of
alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this Immigration.
for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying The acts or omissions
that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by that they are charged of
Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation case must be in ordinary
against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks language for the person
further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the to be informed and for
CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was the CID to make a proper
denied. judgment. Also, the
warrants of arrewst must
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They be in accordance with
argued that they werent subject to immediate deportation, the the rules on criminal
presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of procedure.
appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didnt make a On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation
ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses. is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private
party to intervene.
Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the
deportation?
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine 180 SCRA 218
if they are really aliens
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was
Ratio: granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities
Section 37 of the Immigration act states: as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals
in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
charged against the alien: Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the
this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but
port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ... it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground
charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the
Page 28 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis
Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act
(EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which
were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing
powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean
that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to

fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid
delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that
delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of
the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this
case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and
must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates
was done without due process since no hearing was made in
ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

Page 29 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Radio Communications v NTC by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper
G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987
arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless
Facts: RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957
telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication
under legislative franchise granted byRepublic Act No. 2036 (1957).
systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television
The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon,
broadcasting systems;
Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman,
The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of
Samar (1983).
the Public ServiceCommission and the Board of Communications
Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the
no longer exists because of the changes effected by the
NTC to operate radio networks in the same areas.
Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.
RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by
Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC
Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in
ruled against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the
operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.
operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.
Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.
sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is
In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had
subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power
sections that was still in effect even if the Public
through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.-
Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.
statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction,
exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to
supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises
those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions authority
likewise to those already established and in operation .
except with respect to the fixing of rates
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D.
And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without
No. I insofar as it amends thePublic Service Law (CA No. 146, as
possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public
amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its
Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience,"
provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise
Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative
under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications system
franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a
anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers
operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the
thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public
aforementioned areas
works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the
frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
license for such case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the
Ratio:
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a
Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission
precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas
was abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized
where it desires to operate.
regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the
Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks.
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the
The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations
petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio
amended.
telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman,
The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of
Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity
Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau
appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public
were abolished and their functions were transferred to the National
respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable
Telecommunications Commission
public utility regulations.
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in
particular operators ofpublic service communications; and
nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject
determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation
to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislaturewhen the
of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where
common good so requires.
charges or rates are established by international bodies or
associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or

Page 30 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
Globe Telecom vs NTC 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999
435 SCRA 110 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.

FACTS: On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public

respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart
alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to
grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS.

Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999,

interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts
failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section
6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the
mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present
petition.

Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack
of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required
for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the
situation into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls
squarely within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-
service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-
9-95) their implementation of SMS interconnection
is mandatory.The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe
have been providing SMS without authority from it.

Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC
from taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its
previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed
for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum
shopping rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in
declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that
the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged
that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative
penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was
sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due
process. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum,
Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision
regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature
and does not require the prior approval of the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NTCs order is not supported by

substantial evidence.

HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum

circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and
any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS
should be made with proper regard for due process and in
conformity with the PTA; the assailed Order violates due process
for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision
rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe
despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have
afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated

Page 31 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
CORONA VS. UHPAP PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing
283 SCRA 31 Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;

PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing

Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created
through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to control, regulate, The respondents are permanently enjoined from
supervise pilots and the pilot age profession. implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to
said charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued No costs. SO ORDERED
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and
corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all
existing regular appointments which have been previously
issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and
that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one year from
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by
the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance to regulate and improve pilot services by
instilling discipline and give better protection to port users.
PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly
provides that, aspiring pilots must have a license and train as
probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance,
are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA
itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until they reach the age
of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after publication in
the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the
DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA
Board of Directors [as governing body] has exclusive
jurisdiction to review, recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed
to the Office of the President, which first issued a restraining
order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA-AO, and
after PPAs answer, then dismissed the appeal/petition and
lifted said order, stating, through Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-
AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act
of PPA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not
forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such
exercise is property right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with
the requirement in the PD to consult only with relevant
Government Agencies and (d) finally finding affirmative relief
with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-
AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent
restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant
Executive Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of
the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess

of jurisdiction.

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

violate respondents right to exercise their profession and t
heir right to due process of law.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules

that:

Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a
capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating

Page 32 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA
220 SCRA 536

FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable

loans extended by Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP),
totaling approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP
amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they
were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related
to PBP owners themselves. Subsequently and during the
same year, several blind items about a family-owned bank in
Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders
appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in
PBP and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the banks
demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P
143.955 million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted
by the Supervision and Examination Sector, the Monetary
Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship.
PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed
the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers
Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the
subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral
for the banks overdraft obligation but which was not approved
due to disagreements between the parties. Since no other
rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3
years its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate and
swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion. Consequently, the CB
Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it
considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There
being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed
rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution instructing
Central Bank management to advise the bank that the
conservatorship may be lifted if PBP complies with certain
conditions.

Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP

filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the
resolutions issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith.
Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining order and
subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a motion
to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions
were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial
court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing

the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB
resolutions as arbitrary.

HELD: The following requisites must be present before the

order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The
appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of
record representing the majority of the capital stock of the
bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within
ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority
stockholders of the order placing the bank under
conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after
hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith.

In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than
3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after
the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also
beyond question that the complaint and the amended
complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock.

Page 33 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
RURAL BANK VS. CA
162 SCRA 288

FACTS: Petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi is a juridical entity existing

under the laws of the Philippines. Buhi started its operations on
Dec. 26, 1975. Under the law, Central Bank has charge of the
supervision and examination of Rural Banks. However, Rural Bank
of Buhi refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial
assistance was suspended.

Upon general examination of Buhis affair and operations

conducted by DRBSLA and represented by Consolacion Odra,
director of DRBSLA, there was a massive irregularities in its
operations (consisting of loans and fictitious borrowers). Thereby,
Odra submitted a report recommending the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance
with Sec. 29 of the RA 285 as amended, the designation of the
Director DRBSLA, as receiver thereof.

Rural Bank of Buhi filed a motion to dismiss averring that the

petition alleged a valid cause of action and that the respondents
have violated the due process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Monetary Board of Central Bank is

correct in placing the Rural Bank of Buhi under receivership in
accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285.

HELD: The decision of the CA is hereby modified. There is lacking

that convincing proof prerequisite to justify the temporary
restraining order issued by the court.

We hereby order the remand of this case to the RTC for further
proceedings but we lift the temporary restraining order issued by
the trial court in this order.

Page 34 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA SO ORDERED.
GR 112844, June 2, 1995

FACTS: On May 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Makati,

Branch 61, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner in Civil
Cases Nos. 90-3490 and 91-685, upholding the validity of an
auction sale over a piece of land and ordering the issuance of
a new Certificate of Title in favor of herein respondent.

On August 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from

the adverse decision of the RTC.

On March 26, 1998, petitioner received a Notice to File

Appellants Brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had 45
days or until May 10, 1998 to file its brief. Since May 10 was
a Sunday and May 11 was a holiday, petitioner had until May
12, 1998 to file it.

On May 7, 1998, or five days before its deadline, petitioner

allegedly filed by mail an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief, praying for an
additional period of 60 days or from May 13, 1998 to July 13,
1998 within which to file the brief.

On July 13, 1998, the last day of the extension prayed for,
petitioner filed its appellants brief.

On July 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division)

dismissed the appeal in a resolution, for failure to file the
appellants brief within the required period of 45 days from
receipt of notice to file the same. It was further noted by the
CA that the appellants brief, received only on July 13, 1998,
was without any accompanying motion for leave to admit the
same.

The CA found that: Record shows that a notice to file brief

dated March 17, 1998 was received by appellant on March 26,
1998. Consequently, the 45-day period within which to file
appellants brief expired on May 10, 1998.

On July 2, 1998, the Judicial Records Division (Civil Cases

Section) submitted a report stating that no appellants brief
has been filed in this case.

However, the appellants brief was received by this court on

July 13, 1998, without any accompanying motion for leave to
admit the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions made by the CA are:

filed out of time and and filed without a motion for leave for its
admission.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23, 1998 and February
26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The
denial of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325 due to the late
filing of the Appellants Brief pursuant to Rule 50 (e) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL.

Costs against petitioner.

Page 35 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
AGABON vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004

Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of

Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged in the
business of selling ornamental construction materials.

They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23,

1999, when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.

The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the

LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on appeal.
The CA sustained the NLRCs decision

The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding

of abandonment, and claiming that the company did not
comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed

for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the finding of
abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking
employment elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to
sever the ER-EE relationship.

Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a

written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a
hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of
termination stating the grounds therefor): There was no due
process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the
last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse
that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer
lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they should have still
sent a notice as mandated by law.

For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held

liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of
due process.

Page 36 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT,
ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL
LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods

Processing Corporation until the latter terminated their employment
because the corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not
disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA
complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor
Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees
and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date of termination. Respondents filed
complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and
nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against
JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the
termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with
full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible.
The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered respondent
JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full
backwages from the time their employment was terminated.

Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an

employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected
without the employers compliance with the notice requirement
under the Labor Code?

Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents

dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes
enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is
established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement
under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the
instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50,
000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered
JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service. In all cases of business
closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the employer, the
affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent
with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic
force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The
exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations
is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved,
in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is
lost for obvious reasons.

Accordingly it is wise to hold that:

1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer

failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction
to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee.
2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the
employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process
was initiated by the employers exercise of his
management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but
ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount
of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-
compliance with statutory due process.

Page 37 of 37
Constitutional Law II Cases
Due Process