Republic of the Philippines It should be observed preliminarily that, under the former rules of procedure,
SUPREME COURT when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on was in writing or
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5028 November 26, 1952
FELIPE CABAGUE and GERONIMO CABAGUE, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MATIAS AUXILIO and SOCORRO AUXILIO, defendants-appellees.
Generoso F. Obusan for appellants.
Pedro M. Tagala for appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
According to the Rules of Court parol evidence is not admissible to prove an
agreement made upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise
to marry.1 This litigation calls for application of that rule.
In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to
recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously
agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo.
The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised such marriage to
plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and
spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; (b) that relying upon such
promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and (c) that without
cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract was oral,
unenforceable under the rule of evidence hereinbefore mentioned. And the court
dismissed the case. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs
reproduced their complaint and defendants reiterated their motion to dismiss.
From an order of dismissal this appeal was perfected in due time and form.
not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for demurrer. Under the new Rules
"defendant may now present a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract
was not in writing, even if such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint.
The fact may be proved by him." (Moran Rules of Court 2d ed. p. 139 Vol. I.)
There is no question here that the transaction was not in writing. The only issue is
whether it may be proved in court.
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the
other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe
Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and
Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise
to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro
for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is
admissible.2 However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to
enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague
and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual
promise to marry".3 Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro
"on a mutual promise to marry."
Consequently, we declare that Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro
for such damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual
matrimonial promises.
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, in an extended opinion in which all of the
SUPREME COURT evidence adduced during the trial of the cause is carefully analyzed reached the
Manila conclusion "of fact that plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of P516 sued for
and that Carlos Bolifer and Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said
EN BANC amount," and for the reason that the evidence did not sufficiently show that the
plaintiff had suffered any additional damages, rendered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum of P516 together with the interest at
G.R. No. L-8166 February 8, 1916
the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910, and costs.

JORGE DOMALAGAN, plaintiff-appellee,

From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court and made the following
vs.
assignments of error:
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.

1. In holding to be proven the fact of the delivery by the plaintiff of the

M. Abejuela for appellant.
sum of P516 to the defendant, Carlos Bolifer; and
Troadio Galicano for appellee.

2. In holding to be valid and effective the verbal contract entered into by

JOHNSON, J.:
the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage.
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Misamis, on the 17th of December, 1910. It was not presented to the Supreme
The first assignment of error presents a question of fact. The lower court found
Court until the 11th of January 1916. Its purpose was to recover of the defendant
that a large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had delivered
the sum of P516, together with damages estimated in the sum of P350 and
to the defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in the
interest, and costs.
complaint. Taking into consideration that the lower court saw and heard the
witnesses, together with the further fact that there is an abundance of
In support of his claim the plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the lower court, we are not
he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he inclined to disturb its judgment for any of the reasons given by the appellant in
was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano support of his first assignment of error.
Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer, that later, in the
month of August, 1910, he completed his obligation under said contract by paying
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant calls our attention
to the defendant the said sum of 500, together with the further sum of P16 "as
to the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
hansel or token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said
Action. The appellant argues that by virtue of the provisions of said paragraph and
Bonifacio Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to
by virtue of the fact that the agreement upon which the plaintiff relies and under
Laureano Sisi; that immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia Bolifer
which he paid to the defendant the sum of P516 had not been reduced to writing,
he demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with
he could therefore not recover. The appellant contends that a contract, such as the
the interest and damages; that the damages which he suffered resulted from the
one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing.
fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was obliged to sell certain real
We have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of
property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff
which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. That part of
To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for relief provides:
the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. Upon the
issue presented the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence the
 In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be error. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum ordered.
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:

1. . . .

2. . . .

3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a

mutual promise to marry.

It will be noted, by reference to said section, that "evidence " of the agreement
referred to "can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its
contents." As was said above all of the "evidence" relating to said "agreement" was
admitted without the slightest objection.

Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid
and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section
provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is
evidence by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method
by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that
said contract are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps
those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly
valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not
made in confirmity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper
objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove
the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make
no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one
in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing,
it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
(Anson on Contracts, p. 75; Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387;
Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241, 246; Kuenzle and Streiff vs. Joingco, 22
Phil. Rep., 110, 112; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil. Rep., 485, 489.)

For the foregoing reasons we find nothing in the record justifying a reversal or
modification of the judgment of the lower court based upon either assignment of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision
of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed
with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954,
to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February
16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the
order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through
plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth
day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except
as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were
increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our
laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a
teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was
almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City
of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse
in his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on
June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July
24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which
was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of
Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of
said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation
to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the
enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an
adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is
necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been
published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be
obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may
have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article
refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the
refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled
in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it
best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code
Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of
marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The
subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect
treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to
furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to
betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage,
and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code,
under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the
future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of
the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of
sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the
engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in
case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of
fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the
parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and
civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry
may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the
aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent
or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian
may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only
material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and
moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and
grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage
engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and
moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the
engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from
the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set
forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil.,
866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the
rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
 Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more
progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to
marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a
time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are
doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949,
p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of
the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for
breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts
is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly
after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as
moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to
the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization
and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction

power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded
to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a
woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for
seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him
under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals,
and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present
case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because,
the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly
pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income
 Republic of the Philippines PAKING
SUPREME COURT
Manila Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

EN BANC Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as
actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, attorney's fees; and the costs.
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
will be deemed submitted for resolution."

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and,
what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of
an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.

Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am
leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why
That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July
6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment
by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief
that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON

APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts
constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit
of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as
scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions
instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani
vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now
as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained
for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas,
40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that
the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of
the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our
ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated
in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to
marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it
so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to
law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn.,
7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will
have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking
an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing
appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December,
1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff
consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly
until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the
latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in
IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby
plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child
that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support
and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus
P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown
to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that
the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and
directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of
this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
 An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity
not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur.
the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of 662)
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral allegations there are as follows:
damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.
of action.
Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and
residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the summons;
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time
the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and
dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in
the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig.
July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the
tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of
plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123). V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for
a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the
country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her
of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong,
the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since
 about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and
purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever

actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-
appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review
and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is
the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed
with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for
the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted
and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to
the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief
and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent
and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in
his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses,
and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an
award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian
citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan
City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
 2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year
medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July,
1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum
of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the
sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to
pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that
was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity
and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the
time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant
started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was
good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in
their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that
they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later
returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October,
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until
the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted
 a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a
barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still
single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou,
he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that
the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis
and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining
the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she
was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant
and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In
fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
and then concluded:
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise,
she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p.
50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to
plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-
56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he
was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love
affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City
but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff.
It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff,
a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his
lust on her. 11
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
 surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to
our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been
enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of
the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning,
defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower
court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy;
he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he
has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner,
he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that
even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same
is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and
had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue
of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless
the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result
of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties
before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule.
Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate
these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93
Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
 the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above
quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report
of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided
in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm:
"A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise
of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved.
The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American
 or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums
are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and
so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made
her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud
and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus,
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to
the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all
cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must
be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated
to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the
woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which
a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where
there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept.
30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral
damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can
be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still
subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in
the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when
the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the
woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it
cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
 But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh
the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman
under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a
girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability,
even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties
are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the
doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the
private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain
high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her
to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear
that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent
on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very
beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying
with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing
that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New
Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or
intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not
be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting
her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving
approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of
their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant

petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Panganiban September 9, 1933
JOSE R. PAGANIBAN, complainant,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent.
The Respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney are
before us on the representations of the Solicitor-General that the respondent
appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not be proceeded against for
professional malpractice. The respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary
public he legalized the document which is the basis of the complaint against him,
and that the document contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good
customs, but by way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal
character of the document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife,
subscribed a contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that
time a regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in question
had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney
Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at lease, some
knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been fully informed because
of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an
agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to
take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with
another man, without opposition from either one of them.
Two questions are suggested by the record. The first concerns the points of
whether or not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose. The second
concerns the point, on the supposition that the contract did sanction an illicit and
immoral purpose, of whether a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a
notary public.
The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the
Spanish Penal Code, as modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however,
that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given
application, it is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended
party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage. In this instance,
if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either
one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose
of the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes,
with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party
consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency
and is not matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the
contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.
Passing to the second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of
the court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has been
guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public there is not attached such
importance under present conditions as under the Spanish administration. Even so,
the notary public exercise duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the
notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and to take part
in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been
admitted to the practice of law, and such, in the commingling of his duties as
notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or
immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment. (See 2 Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258, 1259; In re Chappell
[1909], 115 N.Y.S., 868; In re Bernard [1912], 136 N.Y.S., 185; In re Arctander
[1879], 1 N.W., 43; In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil.,
173; U.S. vs. Kilayko [1916], 34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs. Capinpin and Albea [1918],
38 Phil., 492.)
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating circumstances,
there may be taken into consideration (1) that the attorney may not have realized
the full purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no
falsification of facts was attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent
as a notary public has been revoked. Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to
exercise clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to severe
censure. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General
against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and
praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting
a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time
a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The
respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he
could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his
wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the
respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was
stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and
wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving
whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After the
execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked
the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such
could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would
there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his
diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out
not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11,
1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to
show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the
evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of
the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to
whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the
respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that
he had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle
either of them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit
A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had
made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties
who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation
Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses
Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and
prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The
advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of
the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of
law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition
that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his
remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness
or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the
responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment
of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case,
respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly
negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his
disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority,
however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the
Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said
investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes,
respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document
cancelling the previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 804-CJ May 19, 1975
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1 According to Selanova, in 1972 his father was already dead and his mother was
Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with
gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated
November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that
either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived their
"right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would
commit against the other.
Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression
that he was aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it
and gave it his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (where they were residing) to approve
the agreement. That pretension is disbelieved by the Judicial Consultant.
Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and
the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
He argues that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage "an unqualified and literal legal
construction" would lender nugatory the aforequoted provisions of article 191. He
cites Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259, August 30, 1968,
24 SCRA 837 as authority for the propriety of an extrajudicial agreement for the
dissolution during the marriage of the conjugal partnership as long as the
agreement is subsequently approved by the court.
However, the respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in
the Lacson case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage should be "secured beforehand."
Respondent Judge surmised that Selanova's complaint was instigated by a lawyer
whose case was adversely decided by the Judge. That speculation was denied by
Selanova who also belied Judge Mendoza's version that the complainant and his
wife, Avelina Ceniza, "together with their parents", came to the office of Judge
Mendoza and solicited his help in the amicable settlement of their marital
imbroglio.
ninety-one years old. They could not possibly have come to Judge Mendoza's
office. Selanova said that only he and his brother-in-law, Arcadio Ceniza, an alleged
classmate of Judge Mendoza, were the persons who went to the Judge's office. But
that version may be inaccurate and oversimplified, considering that the agreement
was signed before Judge Mendoza not only by Selanova but also by his wife and
two witnesses, Lamberts M. Ceniza and Florencio C. Pono.
Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy.
In his letter of April 8, 1975 he asked for a compassionate view of his case
considering his forty-three years' service in the government (he started his public
career in 1932 as a policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also
cited the financial predicament of his big family occasioned by the delay in the
payment of his retirement and terminal leave pay.
The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation
because actually no factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of
evidence. Respondent Judge admitted that he was responsible for the execution of
the questioned document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties",
which he caused complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to
sign.
In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the
spouses by allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife
the residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed
either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their
personal separation. The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the
following provisions of the Civil Code:t.hqw be a witness against the other. Those covenants are contrary to law, morals and
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was
void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15, De La Rosa
vs. Barruga, L-2368, June 30, 1950, 4 ROP Digest 171, sec. 29).
On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who
authenticated agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either
spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.
Thus, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, a lawyer was severely censured for
having notarized a document containing "an agreement between the husband and
the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the
wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from
either one of them". The document was prepared by another person.
In that case this Court noted that while adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, "they still remain crimes" and a contract legalizing their commission is
"contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable". Since the notary's commission was already revoked, this Court did
not disbar him. The fact that he "may not have realized the full purport of the
document to which he took acknowledgment' was considered mitigating.
Severe censure was also administered to a notary of Cebu City who ratified a
document entitled "Legal Separation", executed by husband and wife, wherein
they agreed that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced
their rights and obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry,
renouncing any action to which they might be entitled and each promising not to
good customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family
(Biton vs. Momongon, 62 Phil. 7).
In the Santiago case respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had
been separated for nine years) a document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia,
that they authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing
whatever right of action one might have against the other. When the husband
inquired if there would be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his diploma
which was hanging on the wall and said: "I would tear that off if this document
turns out not to be valid." The husband remarried. The respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law or being
careless in giving legal advice (In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66).
In Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277, Attorney Celestino M. de Leon prepared an
affidavit wherein he declared that he was married to Vertudes Marquez, from
whom he had been separated, their conjugal partnership having been dissolved,
and that he was consorting with Regina S. Balinon his "new found life-partner," to
whom he would "remain loyal and faithful" "as a lawful and devoted loving
husband for the rest of" his life "at all costs". Attorney Justo T. Velayo notarized
that affidavit. This Court reprimanded Velayo and suspended De Leon from the
practice of law for three years.
In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal
prohibition against contracts for the personal separation of husband and wife and
for the extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership, prepared the said
void agreement which was acknowledged before him as "City Judge and Notary
Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently,
he did not study the new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been
cognizant of its aforecited article 221).
Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest
desire to terminate the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we
are of the opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he
deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the
aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not
be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that there are
no causes for depriving him of such benefits.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80965 June 6, 1990
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE VICENTE DE
LEON, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for Macaria de Leon.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Jose Vicente de Leon.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 06649 dated June 30, 1987 the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig in SP Proc. No. 8492 dated December 29, 1983; and its resolution dated
November 24, 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of
Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon was born
from this union.
Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured
due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home.
Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained
American citizenship.
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of
San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said
divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support and distribution of
properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine
resident and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in
abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts
to obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement
with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We quote in
full, as follows (pp. 40-42, Rollo):
March 16, 1977
Mrs. Macaria Madrigal de Leon
12 Jacaranda, North Forbes Park
Makati, Metro Manila
Dear Dora Macaria:
This letter represents a contractual undertaking among (A) the
undersigned (B) your son, Mr. Jose Vicente de Leon,
represented by you, and (C) yourself in your personal capacity.
You hereby bind yourself jointly and severally to answer for the
undertakings of Joe Vincent under this contract.
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the following are
agreed upon:
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself in a joint
and several capacity:
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and
encumbrances and subject to no claims in any form whatsoever
the following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter
referred to as the wife:
A. Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier
St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong,
Rizal, Philippines.
C. The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang, Rizal
(Corner lots, 801 s q. meters each). (Fully paid).
D. 2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
(Lot 18 Block 22 Westborough Unit No. 2). (Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
2) $30,000
3) $5,000
2. To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance
every year to any designated assignee of the wife for the care
and upbringing of Susana Lichauco de Leon which is hereby
pegged at the exchange rate of 7.50 to the dollar subject to
adjustments in the event of monetary exchange fluctuations.
Subsequent increase on actual need upon negotiation.
3. To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining
exclusively to the wife except as herein provided.
Obligations of the wife:
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance
with Philippine law and in this connection to do all that may be
necessary to secure said separation of property including her
approval in writing of a joint petition or consent decree.
2. To amend her complaint in the United States before the
Federal Court of California, U.S.A. entitled "Sylvia Lichauco de
Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible with the
objectives of this herein agreement. It is the stated objective of
this agreement that said divorce proceedings will continue.
3. All the properties herein described for assignment to the
wife must be assigned to Sylvia Lichauco de Leon upon the
decree of the Court of First Instance in the Joint Petition for
Separation of Property; except for the P100,000, $30,000 and
$5,000 which will be paid immediately.
4. This contract is intended to be applicable both in the
Republic of the Philippines and in the United States of America.
It is agreed that this will constitute an actionable document in
both jurisdictions and the parties herein waive their right to
object to the use of this document in the event a legal issue
should arise relating to the validity of this document. In the
event of a dispute, this letter is subject to interpretation under
the laws of California, U.S.A.
5. To allow her daughter to spend two to three months each
year with the father upon mutual convenience.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Sylvia de Leon t/ SYLVIA L. DE LEON
CONFORME:
s/t/MACARIA M. DE LEON
with my marital consent:
s/t/JUAN L. DE LEON
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of
P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as
stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership, the main part of which reads as follows (pp. 37-38, Rollo):
5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child,
petitioners have agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership
and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms
 and conditions-this document, a pleading being intended by
them to embody and evidence their agreement:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The following properties shall be adjudicated to petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon. These properties will be free of any
and all liens and encumbrances, with clear title and subject to
no claims by third parties. Petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon fully
assumes all responsibility and liability in the event these
properties shall not be as described in the previous sentence:
Sedan (1972 model)
Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium,
Ortigas Ave., comer Xavier St.,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
Apt. 702, Wack-Wack Condominium,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang Rizal (corner
lots, 801 sq. meters each) (Fully paid)
2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot
18, Block 22 Westborough Unit 2) (Fully paid)
The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
$30,000.00 at current exchange rate
$5,000.00 at current exchange rate
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order dated February 19, 1980
approving the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 143, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership
of the Spouses is DISSOLVED henceforth, without prejudice to
the terms of their agreement that each spouse shall own,
dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her separate
estate, without the consent of the other, and all earnings from
any profession, business or industries shall likewise belong to
each spouse.
On March 17, 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the above-mentioned order.
However, Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia
made a verbal reformation of the petition as there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from the alleged date of
separation in April, 1973 and that there was no notice given to him that Sylvia
would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the joint petition
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, on April 20,
1980, Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that
she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was granted.
On October 29, 1980, Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her
complaint in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-
Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital
relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, before any hearing could
be had, the judicial reorganization took place and the case was transferred to the-
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On December 29, 1983, the trial court rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the complaint in
intervention in favor of the intervenor, declaring null and void
the letter agreement dated March 16, 1977 (Exhibits 'E' to 'E-
2'), and ordering petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon to restore
to intervenor the amount of P380,000.00 plus legal interest
from date of complaint, and to pay intervenor the amount of
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of
suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered affirming the order of the Court
dated February 19, 1980 declaring the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco De Leon
DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her share
of the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in
accordance with the agreement embodied in paragraph 5 of
the petition, except insofar as the adjudication to petitioner
Sylvia L. De Leon of the properties belonging to and owned by
Intervenor Macaria De Leon is concerned.
 Henceforth, (a) each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her separate estate, present and
future without the consent of the other; (b) an earnings from
any profession, business or industry shall likewise belong to
each of them separately; (c) the minor child Susana De Leon
shall stay with petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon for two to
three months every year-the transportation both ways of the
child for the trip to the Philippines to be at the expense of the
petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon; and (d) petitioner Jose Vicente
De Leon shall give petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon the sum of
P4,500.00 as monthly support for the minor child Susana to
commence from February 19, 1980.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter-
Agreement is the termination of marital relations;
2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and documentary evidence
proving that Macaria de Leon's claims of threat, intimidation and mistake are
baseless; and
3) The trial court erred in finding that Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of
the Letter-Agreement; and further, failed to appreciate evidence proving Macaria
de Leon's material breach thereof.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, the present petition.
The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the subject
matter of the Letter-Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. The main issue,
therefore, is whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. The third paragraph of
the Letter-Agreement, supra, reads:
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination
of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are
agreed upon: (emphasis supplied)
It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it
is subject to interpretation. There being a doubt as to the meaning of this word
taken by itself, a consideration of the general scope and purpose of the instrument
in which it occurs (see Germann and Co. v. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 1 Phil. 63) and
Article 1374 of the Civil Code which provides that the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly, is necessary.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was
the termination of property relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose
Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination
of marital relationship.
We sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, to wit (pp. 44-
46, Rollo):
On page two of the letter agreement (Exhibit' E'), the parties
contemplated not only to agree to a judicial separation of
property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce
proceedings (paragraphs 1 and 2, Obligations of the Wife,
Exhibit 'E-1'). If taken with the apparently ambiguous provisions
in Exhibit E' regarding termination of 'relations', the parties
clearly contemplated not only the termination of property
relationship but likewise of marital relationship in its entirety.
Furthermore, it would be safe to assume that the parties in
Exhibit 'E' not having specified the particular relationship which
they wanted to peacefully and amicably terminate had intended
to terminate all kinds of relations, both marital and property.
While there could be inherent benefits to a termination of
conjugal property relationship between the spouses, the court
could not clearly perceive the underlying benefit for the
intervenor insofar as termination of property relationship
between petitioners is concerned, unless the underlying
consideration for intervenor is the termination of marital
relationship by divorce proceedings between her son Jose
Vicente and his wife petitioner Sylvia. The last sentence of
paragraph 2 under "Obligations of the Wife" unequivocally
states: "It is the stated objective of this agreement that said
divorce proceedings (in the United States) will continue. "There
is merit in concluding that the consideration by which
Intervenor executed Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' was to secure freedom
for her son petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon, especially if Exhibit
'R'-Intervenor, which is (sic) agreement signed by petitioner
Sylvia to consent to and pardon Jose Vicente De Leon for
adultery and concubinage (among others) would be considered.
In the light, therefore, of the foregoing circumstances, this
Court finds credible the testimony of intervenor as follows:
Q Will you please go over the Exhibit 'E' to
'E-2'- intervenor consisting of three pages
and inform us whether or not this is the
letter of March 16, 1977 which you just
referred to?
A Yes, this is the letter.
Why did you affix your signature to this Exh.
'E'-intervenor (sic)?
A Because at that time when I signed it I
want to buy peace for myself and for the
whole family.
Q From whom did you want to buy peace
and/or what kind of peace?
A I wanted to buy peace from Sylvia
Lichauco whom I knew was kind of
'matapang;' so I want peace for me and
primarily for the peaceful and amicable
termination of marital relationship between
my son, Joe Vincent and Sylvia. (Deposition
dated September 6, 1983-Macaria de Leon,
p. 6-7)
This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or
consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having
executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital
relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia
Lichauco de Leon.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the
contract is void and inexistent from the beginning.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set
up the defense of illegality be waived.
But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social
institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulations...
From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court
is of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's
undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of
marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to
Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or
obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is
 contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void. the Letter-Agreement. In resolving this issue, the trial court said (pp. 148-
(emphasis supplied) 151, Rollo):

Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to the In her second cause of action, intervenor claims that her signing
spouses and not those belonging to a third party, who, in the case at bar., is of Exhibits 'E' to 'E- 2' was due to a fear of an unpeaceful and
Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made troublesome separation other son with petitioner Sylvia
to appear that the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was Lichauco de Leon. In support of her claim, intervenor testified
able to prove that the questioned properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor as follows:
Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence.
Q Will you please inform us how did Sylvia
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was Lichauco disturb or threaten your son or
the termination of property relations, We agree with the respondent court that yourself?
(pp. 46-47, Rollo):
A Despite the fact that Sylvia Lichauco
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes voluntarily left my son Joe Vincent and
the following provisions of the Civil Code: abandoned him, she unashamedly nagged
Joe and me to get money and when her
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: demands were not met she resorted to
threats like, she threatened to bring Joe to
court for support. Sylvia threatened to
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
scandalize our family by these baseless
wife;
suits; in fact she caused the service of
summons to Joe when he went to the
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the United States. (Intervenor's deposition
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the dated Sept. 6, 1983, p. 8).
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that it was
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and intervenor and petitioner Jose Vicente who initiated the move
in this regard, the ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e., to convince her to agree to a dissolution of their conjugal
construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided partnership due to the alleged extra-marital activities of
it by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: petitioner Jose Vicente de Leon. She testified as follows:
"The interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity" (see Equitable Banking Corp. vs. IAC, G.R. No.
Q Now in her testimony, Macaria Madrigal
74451, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 518).
de Leon also said that you threatened her
by demanding money and nagged her until
Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds from she agreed to the letter agreement of
the unlawful consideration solely of Macaria, applying the pari delicto rule, it is March 1977, what can you say about that?
clear that she cannot recover what she has given by reason of the Letter-
Agreement nor ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. On her part,
A I think with all the people sitting around
Macaria raises the defenses of intimidation and mistake which led her to execute
with Atty. Quisumbing, Atty. Chuidian, my
 father-in-law, my sister-in-law and I, you
know, it can be shown that this was a
friendly amicable settlement that they were
much really interested in settling down as I
was. I think there were certain reasons that
they wanted to get done or planned, being
at that time Jose was already remarried and
had a child. That since she then found out
that since she was worried about what
might be, you know, involved in any future
matters. She just wanted to do what she
could. She just want me out of the picture.
So in no way, it cannot be said that I nagged
and threatened her. (TSN dated December
8, 1983, p. 137-138)
In resolving this issue, this Court leans heavily on Exhibit 'R'-
intervenor, which was not controverted by petitioner Sylvia. A
reading of Exhibit 'R' would show that petitioner Sylvia would
consent to and pardon petitioner Jose Vicente, son of
intervenor, for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage,
with a sizing attached; that is, the transfer of the properties
subject herein to her. There appears some truth to the
apprehensions of intervenor for in petitioner Sylvia's testimony
she confirms the worry of intervenor as follows:'... being at that
time Jose (De Leon) was already remarried and had a child. That
since she (intervenor) found out that, she was worried about
what might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She
just want me out of the picture." The aforesaid fear of
intervenor was further corroborated by her witness Concepcion
Tagudin who testified as follows:
Q Now, you mentioned that you were
present when Mrs. Macaria De Leon signed
this Exhibit 'E-2, ' will you inform us
whether there was anything unusual which
you noticed when Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon
signed this Exhibit 'E-2'?
A Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon was in a state of
tension and anger. She was so mad that she
remarked: 'Punetang Sylvia ito bakit ba niya
ako ginugulo. Ipakukulong daw niya si Joe
Vincent kung hindi ko pipirmahan ito. Sana
matapos na itong problemang ito
pagkapirmang ito,' sabi niya.' (Deposition-
Concepcion Tagudin, Oct. 21, 1983, pp. 10-
11)
In her third cause of action, intervenor claims mistake or error
in having signed Exhibits '1' to 'E-2' alleging in her testimony as
follows:
Q Before you were told such by your
lawyers what if any were your basis to
believe that Sylvia would no longer have
inheritance rights from your son, Joe
Vincent?
A Well, that was what Sylvia told me. That
she will eliminate any inheritance rights
from me or my son Joe Vincent's properties
if I sign the document amicably. ...
(Intervenor's deposition-Sept. 6, 1983, pp.
9-10).
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that intervenor
could not have been mistaken in her having signed the
document as she was under advice of counsel during the time
that Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was negotiated. To support such claims
by Sylvia Lichauco De Leon, the deposition testimony of Atty.
Vicente Chuidian was presented before this Court:
Atty. Herbosa: Now you mentioned Atty.
Norberto Quisumbing, would you be able to
tell us in what capacity he was present in
that negotiation?
Atty. Chuidian: He was counsel for Dona
Macaria and for Joe Vincent, the spouse of
 Sylvia. (Deposition of V. Chuidian,
December 16, 1983, p. 8)
The New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud is voidable.
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it
should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of
the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into a contract. ...
The preponderance of evidence leans in favor of intervenor
who even utilized the statement of the divorce lawyer of
petitioner Sylvia (Mr. Penrod) in support of the fact that
intervenor was mistaken in having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'
because when she signed said Exhibits she believed that fact
that petitioner Sylvia would eliminate her inheritance rights and
there is no showing that said intervenor was properly advised
by any American lawyer on the fact whether petitioner Sylvia,
being an American citizen, could rightfully do the same.
Transcending, however, the issue of whether there was mistake
of fact on the part of intervenor or not, this Court could not.
see a valid cause or consideration in favor of intervenor
Macaria De Leon having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2.' For even if
petitioner Sylvia had confirmed Mr. Penrod's statement during
the divorce proceedings in the United States that she would
undertake to eliminate her hereditary rights in the event of the
property settlement, under Philippine laws, such contract
would likewise be voidable, for under Art. 1347 of the New Civil
Code 'no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance.
We do not subscribe to the aforestated view of the trial court. Article 1335 of the
Civil Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is
compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon
the person or property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if
the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the determining
cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the
threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there
being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men
can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it
produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from
whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia
threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family
by baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of
adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain properties to her, is
obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to mistake as a vice
of consent, neither is Macaria's alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-
Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance
rights from her and Jose Vicente, the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil
Code, supra. It does not appear that the condition that Sylvia "will eliminate her
inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the contract. Rather,
such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof which, as discussed
earlier, is the termination of marital relations.
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws.
However, the pari delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur
actio" and "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy
to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not
apply in this case. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent Court that (pp. 47-
48, Rollo):
... [C]onsequently, intervenor appellees' obligation under the
said agreement having been annulled, the contracting parties
shall restore to each other that things which have been subject
 matter of the contract, their fruits and the price or its interest,
except as provided by law (Art. 1398, Civil Code).

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the
proper law to be applied. It provides:

When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal

purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties
before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any
damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the
courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow
the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or
property.

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been
accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium
to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria.
Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she
was before the transaction was entered into.

With the conclusions thus reached, We find it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the respondent

Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and its resolution dated November 24, 1987
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel
Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon
Portugal, defendants-appellants.
Placido Ramos for plaintiff-appellee.
Cajulis, Trias and Viniegra for defendants-appellants Trias, et al.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration known
as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282,
2284, 2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong
materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong
materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff
claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were
acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted
marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all
surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first
husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda
are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots
Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with
the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot
No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that
plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned;
that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-
owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-
owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as
conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -
and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to
the properties described in the complaint, or that said properties had been
administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way
of special and affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the
complaint had been inherited by the defendants from their deceased father
Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession
and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly,
quietly and adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and
that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in
the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief
the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and
that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further
presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount
being what was contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when
running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a
counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in
value to the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the
value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the plaintiff had
appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties
mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint properties of the plaintiff and the
defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and
control of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and
profits thereof during the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim
against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of
the properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the
complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang, Cavite
and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias,
answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations
contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the
cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings,
and the defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming
any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the
claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under
certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to
Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C.
Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have
been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims
is in the possession of the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo
Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany
or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the
Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to
marry them; that accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the
presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado
Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to
sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses had signed the
same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the
President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the
records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration
of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the contracting parties
because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the
Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic
copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month
of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed
therein; but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps
the person who kept the register forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the
registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived
in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was
baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law
of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized
child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry
of said birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and
the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased
wife, as husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as
husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-
Trias) was signed by the parties defendants themselves. The document contains
the following significant statement or admission: .
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the
said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all
surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with
Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed
Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage with Fabian
Pugeda..
.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots
Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property will be
administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said
purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings, rentals and
income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of
the said property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our
deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and
education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and
documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in
fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out
not only by the chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses
to the celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the
fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife
for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were
actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage
we cite the following authority: .
 Art. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than
a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless
such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question
arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by
evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter wasin articulo mortis, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.
(Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the
fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S.,
p. 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian
Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916
until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court
to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands
subject of the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de
Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale
in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow
Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The different lots, the dates of their acquisition
and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended to
this decision as Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero
declared that the lots in question were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated
to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided
among his 6 children at the rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer,
as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both
marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda
in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants
presented a motion for new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four
documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-
117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V.
Moran approving the project of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of
Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite
for the consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales
who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that
the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question
amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the
spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that
lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the
total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages
should participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the actual
contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment of the lands.
The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders
judgment: .
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264,
2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21
lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion
of percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were
fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby
declared conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the
installments for these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C.
Ferrer, they do not loss the character of conjugal property for payments
were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer
contributed in the payment for the installments of these 21 lots
amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the
children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the
hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be
 distributed among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first
and second marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the
installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be
conjugal between them one half of which must go to the children or
heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or
heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which
commenced after the death of his mother who died on February 11,
1934, must render an accounting of his administration within three (3)
months time from the date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim
that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the decision of Judge
Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence.
They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the
three main issues set forth above. As the issue of marriage has already been
considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to
whether the land subject of the action may be considered conjugal properties of
the first marriage or of the second or of both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various
lots is necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the
friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual occupants (actual
settler and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act
expressly declares that the land are not public land in the sense in which this word
is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the
provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.) .
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .
Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained,
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government
has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so
held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the
United States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so
held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued
and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and
twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...
Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate
shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so
fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the
certificate, and he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the
Government in that amount together with all accrued interest. ....
Provided however, That every settler and occupant who desires to
purchase his holding must enter into the agreement to purchase such
holding by accepting the said certificate and executing the said receipt
whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands,
and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to comply with this
requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be
ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or
sold as in case of unoccupied lands: ....
Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every
parcel of land sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment
of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has
been made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all
respects subordinate to its prior claim.
Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the
issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the
execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall
be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon
showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the
purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the
giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the
 holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons
who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the
title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate,
upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the
requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall
have sold his interest in the land before having complied with all the
conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall
be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon
presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for
registration. (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance
executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in
full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and
upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But
the law provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and
interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs in
accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands, et al.
vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr.
Justice Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the
actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the
purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a
mere lien holder or mortgagee.
... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or
parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price,
altho the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection,
the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any
accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last installment
belongs to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different
from a sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case
of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of
land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to
an applicant or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to
occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act
141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of
1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the
certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price
agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his
widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the
new husband has the same right as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As
indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the
payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the
buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs
at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of
the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria
C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even after the
marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that
even after said marriage the certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer
and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C.
Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the
fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian
Pugeda himself, thus: .
Mr. Viniegra:
Q De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por
los demandados, recibia Vd. su participation?
A No, seor.
Q Nunca? .
A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of
Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations have been paid
annually from the products of the land.
Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said
 proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that
what you mean to say ? .
A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of
the lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna
participation?
A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of
the lands.
Mr. Viniegra: .
Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products
after paying the Bureau of Lands? .
A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to
the Bureau of Lands - that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some
obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of
some big lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .
A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My
mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G.
Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at
bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of
the estate left by said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands
Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of partition in said special proceedings
submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of
Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C.
Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion
that the friar lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of
conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another
compelling legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial
pronouncement on said nature of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even
before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was
appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in
Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An
inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929,
was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the
properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of the action,
and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was
adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half
adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was
decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by
Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the
Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a
lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever
appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the
proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar lands
or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a
conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project
of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant
had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any
claim to the properties in the said intestate proceedings during its pendency now
bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said
properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had,
through the joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in productivity from 900
cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements
such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the
installments remaining unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said
lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to
the children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the
settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only
portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could claim any
participation is the one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal
properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C.
Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown, but the fact
that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since his
marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer
to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C.
Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the
expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful improvements
introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was
not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil
Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate
properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But
even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars
plaintiff' action to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934,
whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After
the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was
not heard from for 14 years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claim
for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred. 1wph1.t
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the
improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also
applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have
been made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C.
Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal partnership property of said
spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to
plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935 and is mark
Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of partition of the properties of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children with
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation
that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or
improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not
sign it.
The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as
one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that
defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the
properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law
assigns to him. But in spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him
until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later
brought this action.
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this
action. Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion of the estate
left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be
deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge
Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of
such share to plaintiff on the ground of prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to
consider the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia
Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C.
Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo
Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said
deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff
and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in
usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his
wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the decree
entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts,
one part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified,
by eliminating the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share
of each of her heirs to one-eighth.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby
dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio
C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense
that all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-
eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed.
Without costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J. and Padilla, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio
V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor
of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while
Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes.
However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he
was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso
be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be
declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of
Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that
his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held
in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to
the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor,
being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null
and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of
sufficient legal grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed,
respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that
portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court
found that while petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent
raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they
pertain to only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to
the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory
that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible
to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether
he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his
resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be
noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much depends upon
the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as
minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given
license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up
to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and
without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as
prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19,
1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-
1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to
solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new
church up to the end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as
neither the head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the
United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a
copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he
was formerly a minister of the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed
his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage
in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a
special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned
over his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on August
21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact
he has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to
that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility
and probative value, we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding
of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he
belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date
of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious
organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why
did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered
with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not
only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to
keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary
for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to
solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory
(Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the
cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon
the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise
imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in
the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And what is more,
he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation
as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a
municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as
evidence certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its
acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but,
considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out
above, one cannot help but brand them as self-serving or as documents merely
prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his
disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine
the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered
the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination thereof
one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not
with such seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities
of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All these
lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and
acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent."
We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the
office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared
elected, having obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this
Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express
provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such
provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two
cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.
. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court
cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been
elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality
of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray,
52 Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code,
does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible the
contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law
contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing of the contest
by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied
the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs.
Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Paras C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador,
Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her
late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right
to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal
acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then
Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June
2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage
of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to
the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize
the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that
the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that
their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon
of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage
license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault
and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent
judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued
marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he
eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge,
she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this
Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification
that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February
2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of
the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter
could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said
office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue
the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of
his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent
judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.1wphi1.nt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent
judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within
the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held
that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to
marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that
his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding
and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are
not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may
be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the
integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the

Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro
Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.
Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al.
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as follows:
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's
next of kin, and hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore
and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described in
the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without
cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the
subsequent marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a
natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the
defendants and appellants.
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law
raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de
Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During
her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The
registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1,
1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named
Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit
B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana
Perez, no mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana
Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years
of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day,
July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the
plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro
Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required
by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that
Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent
marriage of his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent
marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before
or after the celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be
effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have
been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil
Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary.
Article 131 provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother as
follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the
record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in
the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging
his paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the
father himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal
Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural
child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the
cases mentioned in the next preceding article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been
acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any of the
provisions above quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has
voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry
certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in
the law, for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no
doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed by Pedro
Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio
Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the
municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data for recording the birth of
Melecio Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the
civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal provision
regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth
in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit
2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of
the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil.,
350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no longer considered public
documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or
Flaviana Perez, either before or after their marriage. 1awph!l.net
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the
Civil Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires that the natural
child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons
setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to
acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded
to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent to
establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate
of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his
father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the
court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his
being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer
amounts to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of
the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her
marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had
been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to
acknowledge the appellee as her son.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by
compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not
legitimate him.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants
absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may
have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court,
assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been
validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children,
namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born
on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his
family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name
of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman
by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and
void for being bigamous an action she sought to protect the rights of her children
over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and
valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from
1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of
Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and
marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
 d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the
early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation
of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla
issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September
1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were
destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the
Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish
as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born
on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio
and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio
that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took
care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that
Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her
allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing
the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as
single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had
a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all
surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her
capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was
initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own
right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and
attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Teclas petition, as well
as Peregrinas counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE"
filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA
is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged
disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and
void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally
witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on
30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at
the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the
failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its
part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June
2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of
marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause
of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a
probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the
priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during
the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to
Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more
records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as
regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it,
likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are
records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which
starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as
requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and
[Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving
assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even
produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to
prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband
and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial
court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno,
created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to
the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented
by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently,
in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing
precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union,
it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized
as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other
proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v.
Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract,
both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as
"secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified
this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and
the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by
secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.
Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at
all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the
most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution
may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue
by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may
be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as
a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the
affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial
and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to
be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness
to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of
Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally
witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on
30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at
the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on
the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of
marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon,
Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner
Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
SUPREME COURT arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
Manila some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was
not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed
THIRD DIVISION a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage
until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil
vs. Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent. effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
DECISION license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
VELASCO, JR., J.:
11 July 2003
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision. MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the
purpose or intents it may serve.7
Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
on advice of his counsel.8
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January
and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that
the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated
July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the
Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that
their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario
Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and
a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him
the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage,
it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted
the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that
he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8,
1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract
by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,
1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not
read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy
case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that:
(a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on
January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all
the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of
the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married
on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license
is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9,
1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against
the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in
Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of
Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE
OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL
BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED
IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus
held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING
AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor
with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the
conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from
the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family
Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license
had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians
of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no
such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of
the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating
that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It
is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of
the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove
the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came
from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and
a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so,
further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her
and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case
of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It
cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that
Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam)
T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of
his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from
his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of
the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void
ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as
it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it
was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent
on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant
complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known
that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites
the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of
Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by
constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
 state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were "separated."
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife
for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption
from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law
excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and
basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a

diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano
was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage.
And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code
allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to
Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract
of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period
or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on
the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that
a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage,
the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local
civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period.
Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because
of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born
to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous
and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence
it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for
the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article
40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for
failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-
trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7
dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage
and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and
valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore,
void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out
those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention
of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is
used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on
the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien
to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and
to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties
may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact
assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only
for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to
deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to
gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
"merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an
immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States
courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages
where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack
of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to
be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of
being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order
to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of
the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy
by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this
inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event
the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes.
Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when
no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO,
AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and
EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA
PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,
TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-
G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime.
His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix,
Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio
himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is
still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia,
Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora
Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children,
namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son
of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely:
Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita
Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido,
while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves
Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey
of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second
thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on
February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the
annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition"
and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to
execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and
fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and
that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate
and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in
1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the
partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings
that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:t.hqw
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment
as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children
and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia
Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia
Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido,
deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo
Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion
Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido;
and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan
B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido;
Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471,
506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should
be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to
Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age,
married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age,
married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age,
married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married
to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to
Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to
Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should
be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of
age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8
belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead
leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to
Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to
Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same
goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido,
of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow;
1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead
with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of
age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to
Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to
Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child,
the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud
Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio
Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8
goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion
Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24
goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares
and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5)
equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be
divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6)
declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be
divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly later; and
(6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is
Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without
adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages,
they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred:
(1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and
Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of
Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong;
and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down.
Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the
assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the
appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the
theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their
contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three
children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated
by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower,
as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio
Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly
established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was
evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish
regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under
the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina
Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title
issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was
not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption,
especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be
overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In
the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind
this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world
is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that
both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason
is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was
married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because
"during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers
from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an
eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five
children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage
and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots
Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong
to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court
of Appeals said:t.hqw
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be
noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B
to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there
is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio
Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In
other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late
Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second
marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and
contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses
that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their
lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals,
the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal against the petitioners.
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said
the appellate court:t.hqw Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.1wph1.t

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Muoz Palma, J., is on leave.
Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be
considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this
point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the
certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered
owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the
previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered
in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal
(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil.
288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption
becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse
in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody
else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal
presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the
contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the
conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.

In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to
prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido
and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional
5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio
Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of
error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and,
consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this
Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the
evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of
witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or
relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the
probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between
an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus
defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.2

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for
appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing
him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de
Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of
the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On
February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage
gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null
and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first
marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge
for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor
General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to
Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a
previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs.
Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is
not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein,
Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary
formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without
merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis.
Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant
contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:1wphl.nt
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita
de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as
dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved".

Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says "La santidad
e importancia del matrinonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mismos de
su nulidad; esta ha de someterse precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente,
y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por
nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la
validez del matrimonio, y de consiguente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de
dicha declaracion de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este
articulo."(3 Viada, Codigo penal p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose
Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established
in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the
marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the
family exist."

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for
appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant
and appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant
guilty of bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima,
contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine
Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage
with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of
Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who
was then an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo,
and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and
testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said
marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As
the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo
where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his
first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2").
After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu,
the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked
as a teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy
marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the
hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol
to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage
with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
(See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused
made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the
Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said
second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the
said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio
Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the
accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33,
40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express
provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration
of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage
with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol,
either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such
marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada,
5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs.
Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50
Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613)
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that
appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven
 consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case
above-quoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental
principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle
we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs.
Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab
initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express
provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife,
whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first
wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was
a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not
prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to
his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to
SUPREME COURT correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria
Manila Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the
petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for
FIRST DIVISION a more detailed proceeding,

G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983 Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent
and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order,
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance,
vs.
dismissed the case, stating:
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru
counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the reasons therein
Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.
mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of
the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente. proper remedy because the issue involved is marital
relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction
The Solicitor General for respondents. because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art.
412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this,
and up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a
sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed
in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the law.

The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are
"declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC.
the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
SO ORDERED. 1

The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with
private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November
1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty,
sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the
prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until
his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of
Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente."
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by
respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of
entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving
spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the
entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It
is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim No costs.
of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private
respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has SOORDERED.
appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar
is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are
involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be Relova, J., is on leave.
established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it
was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. in the
ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as
with their substance. 4

Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted
for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of
petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded,
then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner.
Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
therefore, be validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer
be discussed.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second

marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding
local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such
as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be
correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more
positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set
aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of
the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the
latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong,
Bulacan.
 Republic of the Philippines (2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
SUPREME COURT to someone else.
Manila
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the
SECOND DIVISION existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been
agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 Orders of therespondent Judge-

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, (1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit
vs. the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will
not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
PARAS, J.:
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July,
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact
Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
VOID under the law.
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first
husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital
union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the
validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to SO ORDERED.
present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the
first husband; and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for
bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial
question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City
Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an
information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court
of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to
Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of
private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was
based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the
marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping
on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and
private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced
by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New
Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that
Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or
decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to
suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent
judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as
one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court
in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited
by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order
dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the
resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal
case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching
upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second
wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was
required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The
doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the
present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that
the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be
the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly
different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had
been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the
second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it
was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming
that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of
the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The
lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely
abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought
by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the
second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar.
We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the
aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for
having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise,
Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the
ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was
private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint
for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was
still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the
civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the
present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato
cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of
marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case
at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's
second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without
the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained
by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in
entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and
private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together
as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one
day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that
it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was
only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than
the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that
petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured
through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the
latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously
married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the
respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must
be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the
criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial
issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It
also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria
Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had
a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the
parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies
officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void.
He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also
averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.
He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage
to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to
petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his
claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She
submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3,
1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was
submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null
and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March
29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These
documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner,
are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil
marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before
the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982.1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991.
Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does
not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial
decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact
no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a
marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for
this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second
marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his
first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not
have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code
on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision
in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private
respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein
petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly
support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE
VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL
DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT
OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME
MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage
is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve
this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on
the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss
jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of
nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate
court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are
applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the
appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is
now needed and must be read into the provisions of law previously obtaining.5
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent
for this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within
the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the
bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,9 under
which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any
person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the
Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the
matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases
involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused
contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The
second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the
ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the
existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying
that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the
right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in
their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband.
The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void
ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And
since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the
right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice
and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the
ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she
was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year.
The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in
1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the
ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void
without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family
Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held
that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),22 the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family
Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48,
50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances
of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial
judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his
first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage
took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation
of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at
that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of
petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate
courts finding that despite private respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting
marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus,
coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier
petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed
petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the
civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on
a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the
interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social
institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil
ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only
to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly
could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her
before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the
absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls
"his own deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys
fees.1wphi1 Although the appellate court admitted that they found private
respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not
award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded
in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to
private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for
filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.27There are other remedies.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are
reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and
the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long
as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where
both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on
3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean
Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went
to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not
received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria
of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus
and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under
Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately
final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the
ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the
Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that
the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal to technical rules.

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition xxx xxx xxx
assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez- Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Lorino,5 the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code.
The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing. summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since
a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CAs
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
to the CA, to wit:
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
"immediately final and executory."
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring
supplied.) xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for
the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The
Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed
the appeal outright on that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition
for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a
few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic
appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved
the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court,8 a record on
appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action
for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls
under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding,
as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable
her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary
proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special
proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was
not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal
when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded
our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme
Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding
under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated
that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning
the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the records straight
and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled
in Republic v. Tango:9
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine
our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings
in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From
the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice
of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and executory
and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced
the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse
was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner
cites Republic v. Nolasco,10 United States v. Biasbas11 and Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the
RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his
absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after
giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a
seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that
respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is
already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this
Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than
does Article 83 of the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either
that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or
is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the
Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco
cited United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that
he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion
was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent
therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was
already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the
following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define
what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester
que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act.1wphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which
may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the SO ORDERED.
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which
usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far
as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.

The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny

the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-
founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals

dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August
27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed
be order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantors husband, presumptively dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by: (1) the respondents inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever
she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerrys expression of
animosity toward the respondents father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that
the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor
heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husbands
declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She
claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged
that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-
law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever
she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved
futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition
and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4)
years had passed without the former receiving any news about the latter or his
whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent
Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its
August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners petition, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the
latters order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The
Petition The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that
although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not
appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that
they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to
justify the declaration of her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the
respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband.
Likewise, the petitioner invites this Courts attention to the attendant
circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted
and the respondents resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41
of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is
already dead.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Courts Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings,
such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
[underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to
an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the
courts.8 Modification of the courts ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer
permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-
Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are
"immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the
RTCto give due course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the
entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for
it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the
Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law
are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any
of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition
for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics
supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy.
While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's
judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become
final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the
trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary
remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case
of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine
our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings
in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioners resort to certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively
dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who,
for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with
him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil
Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded
belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences
between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the
Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil
Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive;
or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack
of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the
present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing
of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouses whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an
analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that
the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent
wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captains aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for
her in malls during his free time;
 (5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the
NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present
spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he
allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wifes absence after the OSG filed its
notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a
"well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her
"well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of
the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made
inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouses whereabouts. The
present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media.
Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death
of his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his
efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all
proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouses investigations
were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled
that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her
alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked
through the patients directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1wphi1 It can
be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking
of the patients directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned
nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of
the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with
the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present
conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had
been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her
absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons,
from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouses bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends
from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented
as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents
claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence
proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts. In sum,
the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are
insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As
held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or
not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the States Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses
in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach.
This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing
to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well.
It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for
relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we
consider the States policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the familys foundation25 and since it is the
states policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to
uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this
sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouses Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the
present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal
prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might
come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively
dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is
effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient
proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is
effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly
comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared
presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard
required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully
observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court,
on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard
this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.