ARTICLE IN PRESS

Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107

www.elsevier.com/locate/cageo

Examining the impact of the precision of address geocoding

on estimated density of crime locations
Yutaka Harada, Takahito Shimada
National Research Institute of Police Science (NRIPS), Department of Criminology and Behavioral Sciences, 6-3-1 Kashiwanoha,
Kashiwa, Chiba 277-0882 Japan
Received 18 March 2004; accepted 2 August 2005

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the precision of address geocoding on the estimated density of crime locations in a
large urban area of Japan. The data consist of two separate sets of the same Penal Code offenses known to the police that
occurred during a nine-month period of April 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001 in the central 23 wards of Tokyo. These
two data sets are derived from older and newer recording system of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD),
which revised its crime reporting system in that year so that more precise location information than the previous years
could be recorded. Each of these data sets was address-geocoded onto a large-scale digital map, using our hierarchical
address-geocoding schema, and was examined how such differences in the precision of address information and the
resulting differences in address-geocoded incidence locations affect the patterns in kernel density maps.
An analysis using 11,096 pairs of incidences of residential burglary (each pair consists of the same incidents geocoded
using older and newer address information, respectively) indicates that the kernel density estimation with a cell size of
25  25 m and a bandwidth of 500 m may work quite well in absorbing the poorer precision of geocoded locations based on
data from older recording system, whereas in several areas where older recording system resulted in very poor precision
level, the inaccuracy of incident locations may produce artifactitious and potentially misleading patterns in kernel density
maps.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Crime; Residential burglary; Address geocoding; Kernel density estimation

1. Introduction to such diverse areas as crime prevention studies

Geographic or spatial analyses of crime using
GIS have established its signicance in both
criminological research and criminal justice prac-
tices (Anselin et al., 2000). Their application extends
Corresponding author. Tel.: +81 4 7135 8001x 2600;
fax: +81 4 7133 9184.
E-mail addresses: harada@nrips.go.jp (Y. Harada),
takajin@nrips.go.jp (T. Shimada).
(Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and McEwen,
1998), the assistance of criminal investigation
(Rossmo, 1999), and Web-based dissemination of
local crime maps (Chicago Police Department). In
recent years, their use in analyzing crime patterns
has been viewed as an essential part of the efforts in
law enforcement agencies toward effective and
efcient crime control (Goldsmith et al., 2000; The
Task Force on Crime Mapping and Data-driven
Management, 1999).

0098-3004/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cageo.2006.02.014
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
A research topic in the geographic analysis of
crime that has attracted much attention is the
identication of crime hot spots, namely the
places or small areas in which disproportionately
large number of criminal incidents cluster. Identify-
ing crime hot spots has an important practical
implication, because there are accumulating pieces
of evidence that the more law enforcement efforts
are focused on high-crime places or high-crime time,
the more effective and efcient they would be in
controlling crime (Braga, 2001; Sherman and Eck,
2002). A variety of approaches have been proposed
for the identication and representation of crime
hot spots, ranging from visual examination of point-
pattern maps to highly sophisticated procedures
such as spatial ellipses (Block, 1995).
One of the methods used extensively in these
years in analyzing spatial clustering of offenses is
the kernel density estimation (Chainey and Reid,
1999; McLafferty et al., 2000). Originally developed
in the late 1950s as a method to produce a smooth
density distribution from a histogram, this techni-
que was later extended so that a smooth surface can
be produced from a point-pattern map (Levine,
2004, Chapter 8: Kernel Density Interpolation).
Kernel density estimation (Fig. 1) has a number of
advantages over other methods in searching crime
hot spots, including its ability of allowing irregular-
shaped hot spots and its suitability for examining
changes in those hot spots over time (Anselin et al.,
2000; McLafferty et al., 2000). Also, Chainey and
Raid (1999) emphasize that kernel density estima-
tion provides more statistically robust hot spot
maps, compared with other spatial interpolation
methods.
Another strength of kernel density estimation is
that it can address problems in geocoding large
amount of criminal incidents, at least to some
extent. As the number of geocoded incidents get
larger, it becomes increasingly difcult to visually
Fig. 1. Kernel density estimation.
1097
examine the spatial patterns of the incidents with a
point-pattern map, since dots conceal other dots,
giving a false impression of the true crime density
(McLafferty et al., 2000, p.80). Kernel density
estimation correctly takes such overlapping dots
into account in producing the patterns of offense
densities.
A related issue has a special relevance with
Japanese data. Unlike US and many other western
countries, Japanese addresses are not expressed as
street addresses, but expressed in the form of
nested polygons. For example, Metropolitan Tokyo
consists of 23 kus (wards), and each ku consists of
several (many) chos. Each cho is divided into
several chomes (usually represented by numbers
between 1 and 9). Each chome is divided into more
than 10 bans (blocks), which are generally restricted
by roads. The smallest unit in the geocoding is gou,
showing buildings, an apartment house, or an
independent house. The gure in the Appendix
shows chome and cho among these geocoding units.
Furthermore, Japanese address formats are not
uniform throughout the nation. Rather, there exist
at least two (or three) different address formats.
Although each address is expressed in only one of
these formats, it is quite common that, even within a
city, an address format is used in some areas, while
another format apply in other areas. Such a
situation makes address geocoding a very compli-
cated task in Japan, as described in the Appendix.
To cope with this, we have developed our own
schema of hierarchical address geocoding (Harada
et al., 2005; Shimada and Harada, 1997), so that as
many addresses can be geocoded as possible,
according to an best-effort principle. This schema,
however, raises a concern regarding different levels
of precision in address geocoding and may result in
artifactitious or misleading patterns in the kernel
estimation of offense densities.
Our study aims at obtaining insights into this
issue. An unique opportunity for our analysis was
provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment (hereafter, abbreviated as TMPD) in the year
2001, when the department revised its crime
reporting system so that more precise location
information than the previous years could be
recorded. We obtained two separate data sets
consisting of the same criminal incidents during a
nine-month period of April 1, 2001 through
December 31, 2001, recorded in older and newer
recording system, respectively, and examined
how such differences in the precision of address
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1098 Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107

Embezzlement Vandalism
information and the resulting differences in address-
geocoded incidence locations affect the patterns in

11,518
12,268
kernel density maps.

of lost articles
2. Data and methods

12,135
13,755
The data used in this study are derived from two
separate data sets of Penal Code offenses that

code offenses
occurred in the central 23 wards of Tokyo and

Intellectual Moral offenses Other penal

recorded by the TMPD, as shown in Table 1. The

25,889
28,475
rst data set was recorded using the older recording
system and covers the period of calendar year 2001
(namely, from January 1 to December 31). The
second data set was recorded using the newer
recording system and covers the period of Japanese
scal year 2001 (namely, from April 1 to March 31).

1095
1127
In the analyses that follow, we focused on the offenses
that occurred during the 9-month period between

offenses
April 1 and December 31, because these offenses were

2934
3897
recorded in both of the above two data sets.

vending machines
2.1. Comparing geocoded point locations

Residential Theft from Snatching Theft from

Point locations obtained by the newer, gou-level
address geocoding and those obtained by the older,

6618
5857
Penal code offenses in central 23 wards of Tokyo: (Calendar year 2001 and Fiscal Year 2001)

ban-level address geocoding were compared with

each other. The comparison was made with regard
to an offense type called akisu (in Japanese:

4296
4163
residential burglary that is committed while resi-
dents are out of home). We focused on this offense,
because the targets of residential burglaries are
vehicles

20,438
21,597
(residential) houses, to which the most precise
components of Japanese addresses, the gou-num-
bers, are assigned. Therefore, residential burglaries
burglary

can be located more precisely by address geocoding

171,296 13,936
177,469 15,994

than most other offenses when the addresses are

specied at the gou-level. As such, they are most
Felonious Violent Larceny

suited to examine the implications of using less

precise (ban-level) address information in place of
offenses offenses

more precise (gou-level) address information.

5490
6158

The comparison was carried out by the following

procedures

(1) A total of 13,936 akisu incidents that occurred in

Calendar 2001 207,762 1058
218,366 1240

the central 23 wards of Tokyo in the calendar

year 2001 (which was the last year when offenses
Total

were recorded using TMPDs old recording

system) were extracted from our Penal Code
offense database.
Fiscal 2001

(2) A total of 15,994 akisu incidents that occurred in

Table 1

the central 23 wards of Tokyo in the Japanese

Year

scal year 2001 (namely, from April 1, 2001 to

 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
March 31, 2002) were extracted from the newly
provided Penal Code offense data, which were
recorded using TMPDs new recording system
that started operating in April 2001.
(3) A total of a one-to-one match of the above two
data sets was performed, using the unique
incident ID number common to both old and
new data sets as the primary key.
(4) A total of the above procedure identied 11,096
matching records. These matching records in each
of the two data sets were extracted and mapped
on a large-scale digital map (Digital Map 2500,
published by the Geographical Survey Institute of
Japan) using our hierarchical address-geocoding
schema, as two separate layers.
(5) In order to measure the distance between the two
geocoded locations of the same incident, one
based on TMPDs old recording system (which
allows the precision only up to the ban-level), and
the other based on their new system (which allows
the precision up to the gou-level), an ArcGIS-
VBA program was written and run to create a line
shape connecting the two locations for each of the
11,096 akisu incidents. The distance was measured
as the length of each line shape, using the
XTools Pro v. 2.2 utilities for ArcGIS (Delaune
and Chikinev, 2005).
2.2. Comparing estimated densities
The grid cell size and the bandwidth for kernel
density estimation were set as 25  25 m and 500 m
radius, respectively. A rectangular area that covers
the central 23 wards of Tokyo consisted of
4042
4041
4000
3000
Count
2000 1787
1000
506
224
90 56 52 37 49 23 49 24 13 15 25 11 17 15 4
0 0
0 100
Fig. 2. Distribution of distances between BLAGC and GLAGC incident locations.
1099
1290  1288 cells. Among the rectangular area of
1,661,520 (1290  1288) grid cells, 1,008,844 cells
corresponded to the geographic area of the central
23 wards of Tokyo. The remaining 652,676 cells
were out of the area of the central 23 wards, and
therefore treated as no-data cells.
The impact of the differences of geocoded
incident locations on the estimated densities of
incidents were examined by comparing two grid
surfaces that correspond to the two point maps of
incident locations, made from old and new record-
ing systems of the TMPD. To be more specic, the
value of each grid cell estimated from the gou-level
incident locations was subtracted from the value of
corresponding grid cell estimated from the ban-level
incident locations, using the raster calculation tool
of the ArcView 9.0. The distribution of the
magnitude of the differences was examined in both
statistical and geographical terms.
3. Results
3.1. Differences in address-geocoded incident
locations
Fig. 2 shows the distribution of distances between
incident locations geocoded at gou-level precision
(hereafter, abbreviated as GLAGC, which stands
for a Gou-Level Address GeoCoding) and the
locations of the same incidents geocoded at ban-
level precision (hereafter, abbreviated as BLAGC,
which stands for a Ban-Level Address GeoCoding).
The minimum value of these distances is zero, where
GLAGC and BLAGC of an incident address results
100
Count
Cum. Pct. 80
60
Cum. Pct.
40
20
4 5 4 0 2 1
200 300 400 500 m
Distances
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1100 Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
Fig. 3. Geographic distribution of distances between BLAGC and GLAGC incident locations.
in an exactly same location. This does not mean,
however, that the geocoded location is in fact
accurate. Rather, such an apparent consistency
typically occurs when GLAGC could not nd a
gou-level address points in our address tables. As
mentioned earlier, our hierarchical address-geocod-
ing procedure steps back to a next-best precision
level when it fails to nd an address points at the
higher level of precision, so that as many addresses
can be geocoded as possible, according to an best-
effort principle. There are seven such cases in our
11,096 pairs of geocoded locations.
As expected, the distances between BLAGC
locations and GLAGC locations show a highly
skewed distribution. The maximum value of these
distances is 514.6 m, which corresponds to the only
case with a distance exceeding 500 m. Fifteen cases,
or 0.1% of all the 11,096 pairs, show distances
between 400 and 500 m, and 72 cases, or 0.6%, show
distances between 300 and 400 m. On the other
hand, 4042 cases, or 36.4%, show distances less
than 20 m. The mean distance is 35.6 m.
The location pairs with varying distances are not
distributed evenly in our study area. As shown in
Fig. 3, location pairs with larger distances, shown as
longer lines on the map, tend to be concentrated in
several specic areas. A major reason for this is
rooted in Japanese tradition of expressing ad-
dresses. As noted earlier, some areas of Japan
maintains older system of expressing addresses,
which does not allow ban-level address geocoding.
In consequence, when we attempt to geocode
addresses at ban-level in those areas, we are forced
to step back further to a cho-level geocoding. This
leads to greater discrepancies between the results of
our gou-level geocoding and (attempted) ban-level
geocoding.
Fig. 4 shows how the failure of ban-level
geocoding in those areas results in greater distances
between BLAGC locations and GLAGC locations.
In this gure, an open circle represents the location
of akisu incident geocoded at gou-level, whereas the
solid circle represents the location of the same
incident, geocoded at ban-level (but in fact with no
more precision than cho-level). It is obvious that, in
those areas where ban-level geocoding did not
perform well, a single location in (attempted)
ban-level geocoding tends to correspond to many
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
Fig. 4. Differences in the locations of address-geocoded incidents of akisu (gou-level AGC vs. ban-level AGC): example of areas where
address expressions do not allow ban-level geocoding.
incidents, which are in fact scattered around it. The
radial line segments running from the solid circle to
a number of surrounding open circles indicate this.
The gure also shows that the number of incidents
that correspond to a single (attempted) ban-level-
geocoded location and the distance between
BLAGC locations and GLAGC locations are both
much greater in these areas than the other areas
where ban-level geocoding performed better.
These results suggest that the poor performance
of ban-level address geocoding may produce an
artifactitious concentration of akisu incidents in
those areas. If this is the case, then kernel estimation
of incidence densities based on ban-level address
geocoding may also show misleading results. There-
fore, we examine such possibilities next.
3.2. The impact on estimated densities
The results of kernel estimation of the density of
akisu, geocoded at ban-level and at gou-level,
respectively, are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Here, the
cell size of the grid surface is set to 25  25 m and a
1101
xed bandwidth of 500 m is used for the kernel
density estimation. The density value of each grid
cell is measured as the estimated number of
incidents per square kilometer and is shown with a
ve-level gray scale.
A visual observation of these two maps reveals
their overall similarities with each other. The
geographic distribution of areas with higher esti-
mated incidence densities (e.g. over 80 incidents per
square kilometer) appears to be almost identical.
Such a resemblance indicates that the kernel density
estimation with a bandwidth of 500 m may work
quite well in absorbing the poorer precision of
locations given by ban-level address geocoding, as
far as the akisu incidents in the central 23 wards of
Tokyo are concerned.
A closer look, however, reveals that some
differences do exist between the two density
maps. Fig. 7 shows the differences between the
two estimated kernel density maps. The value of
each grid cell of this map is calculated by subtract-
ing the value of a grid cell of estimated density
based on gou-level geocoding from the value of
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1102 Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107

Fig. 5. Distribution of incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(ban-level AGC).

Fig. 6. Distribution of incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(gou-level AGC).

 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
Fig. 7. Differences in estimated incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(gou-level AGC results vs. ban-level AGC results).
corresponding grid cell of estimated density based
on ban-level geocoding. Thus, the cell values in Fig.
7 should be close to zero when the estimated density
values for the corresponding two grid cells agree
with each other, whereas the values should depart
from zero when there are greater discrepancies.
The raster calculation conrms that an over-
whelming majority, namely 986,990 or 97.8%, of all
the 1,008,844 grid cells fall within the value range
between 5 and +5. On the other hand, however,
there are a small proportion of grid cells with the
value less than 20 (777 cells, or 0.08%), and grid
cells with the value over +20 (427 cells, or 0.04%).
Again, the geographic distribution of those grid cells
with large absolute values of difference tends to
cluster in several specic areas. The comparison
between Figs. 7 and 3 suggest that areas where grid
cells with large discrepancy values cluster in Fig. 7
approximately correspond to the areas where a large
number of longer lines that represent greater incon-
sistency in address geocoding are found in Fig. 3.
Figs. 810 illustrate how differences in geocoded
incidence locations are related to the differences in
estimated incidence densities.
1103
In Fig. 8, incident densities estimated with ban-
level AGC results are overlaid on the point-pair
map shown in Fig. 4. Namely, the density of akisu
incidents in this gure is estimated using the
geocoded locations denoted by solid circles. Note
that a solid circle accompanied with many radial
lines indicates that there are (at least) as many
incidents geocoded onto that location with our ban-
level geocoding procedure (which in fact stepped
back to cho-level precision after it failed to nd
appropriate ban-level address points), as the number
of those radial lines. It is for this reason that high-
density areas are observed toward the top right-
hand corner of the gure, despite the fact that
relatively few solid circles exist in those areas. In this
sense, kernel density estimation with a bandwidth of
500 m appears to have worked as expected, since it
has transformed the locations where many incidents
coincide into a smooth surface of estimated
densities of incidents.
On the other hand, however, Fig. 9 indicates that
there are limitations. In this gure, the overlaid
density of akisu incidents are estimated with gou-
level AGC results, or the locations denoted by open
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1104 Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
Fig. 8. Distribution of incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(ban-level AGC): example of areas where address expressions do not
allow ban-level geocoding.
circles. A comparison of this gure with Fig. 8
reveals that one of the highest density areas toward
the top right-hand corner in Fig. 8 is no longer seen
in Fig. 9. This is because incidents denoted by the
two solid circles in the high-density area that is seen
only in Fig. 8 are in fact scattered around those two
solid circles, as denoted by the 18 open circles in
Fig. 9.
The inconsistency between the above two gures
can be depicted clearly in a density-difference map
shown in Fig. 10. This map reveals that the density-
difference grid cells tend to have large POSITIVE
values near the solid circles (or the locations given
by stepped-back ban-level geocoding), whereas the
grid cells tend to have large NEGATIVE values
near the open circles (or the locations given by gou-
level geocoding). As a result, an irregular pattern of
ups and downs in the density-difference grid surface
is observed in the areas where longer line segments
connecting the point-pairs cluster.
The above results suggest that this apparently
high-density area in Fig. 8 may be in fact an artifact,
caused by the inaccuracy of our (ban-level) address
geocoding. It also implies that smoothing with the
kernel density estimation (with a bandwidth of
500 m) may be insufcient in absorbing the poor
precision of geocoded locations, in case where
incidents are geocoded only at cho-level precision.
4. Concluding remarks
Our analyses using 11,096 pairs of incidences of
residential burglary (each pair consists of the same
incidents geocoded using older and newer address
information, respectively) indicate that the kernel
density estimation with a cell size of 25  25 m and a
bandwidth of 500 m may work quite well in
absorbing the poorer precision of geocoded loca-
tions based on data from older recording system,
whereas in several areas where older recording
system resulted in very poor precision level, the
inaccuracy of incident locations may produce
artifactitious and potentially misleading patterns
in kernel density maps.
It should be noted that the present analysis is
limited to a single offense type and a single set of
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
Fig. 9. Distribution of incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(gou-level AGC): example of areas where address expressions do not
allow ban-level geocoding.
parameters in the kernel density estimation. Further
analyses are needed for a better understanding of the
impact of the precision of address geocoding on the
estimated density of crime locations in a variety of
settings. Nevertheless, our analysis here appears to
have provided a starting point and to have suggested
a direction for future studies. By accumulating
empirical evidence along this line, we will be able to
develop practical guidelines, as well as caveats, for
legitimate and meaningful use of kernel density
estimation in the analyses of spatial patterns of crime.
Acknowledgements
We thank Dr. Tetsuya Shoji, Dr. Liang-Chi Hsu,
Dr. Chang-Jo Chung and anonymous reviewers for
their constructive reviews, which signicantly im-
proved this manuscript.
Appendix A:. Address-geocoding in Japan
In Japan, addresses are expressed in a format
widely different from those used in the United
1105
States and most European countries. A brief
illustration of typical Japanese addresses may
illuminate the difference.
Fig. A1 shows a map of Kabukicho area, one of
the largest and busiest amusement centers of Tokyo.
Imagine that a peep-show house has an address of
1-2-3 Kabukicho, Shinjuku, Tokyo. The rst
number of its address, namely, 1, is called a cho
or chome number. It refers to a part of
Kabukicho district, shown as Kabukicho 1
chome (which stands for the 1st sub-district of
Kabukicho) in Fig. A1. As such, the cho number
refers to a polygon shape. Similarly, the second
number in the above address string, namely, 2,
which is called a ban number, refers to a block, or
a group of several blocks, in which the peep-show
house is located. As such, the ban number also
refers to a polygon shape, or a multi-part polygon
shape, which is included in the above cho polygon
shape. On the other hand, the third number,
namely, 3 in the above address string, which
is called a gou number, approximates the
location (of the entrance) of a building, of which
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1106 Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107

Fig. 10. Differences in estimated incident densities of akisu (residential burglary)(gou-level AGC results vs. ban-level AGC results):
example of areas where address expressions do not allow ban-level geocoding.

Fig. A1. Kabukicho map.

 ARTICLE IN PRESS
Y. Harada, T. Shimada / Computers & Geosciences 32 (2006) 10961107
the peep-show house is a tenant. As such, the gou
number refers to a point shape included in the ban
polygon shape.
In the same way that a ban polygon is included
in a cho polygon, a cho polygon (e.g. Kabu- Delaune, M., Chikinev, M., 2005. XTools Pro. DataEast
kicho 1 chome, or the 1st sub-district of Kabu-
kicho, in Fig. A1.) is included in a larger polygon
that represents Shinjuku city. In turn, Shinjuku city
is included in a polygon that represents Tokyo
prefecture. Thus, Japanese (typical) address format
consists of the numbers and names of hierarchically
ordered areas (in other words, polygons) where a
lower-level polygon is always included in a higher-
level polygon. The only exception is the gou
number, which refers to a point and for which no
area is dened.
Mainly due to such a wide difference in address
formats between US and Japan, major GIS
packages including ArcView do not provide ad-
dress-geocoding features compatible with Japanese
address expressions, even in their Japanese
versions developed by local dealers. In fact, there
is practically no standardized address-geocoding
algorithm in Japan, as far as we know.
References
Anselin, L., Cohen, J., Cook, D., Gorr, W., Tita, G., 2000.
Spatial Analysis of Crime, Measurement and Analysis of
Crime and Justice, Criminal Justice 2000. U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D. C., pp. 213262.
Block, C.R., 1995. STAC hot-spot areas: a statistical tool for law
enforcement decisions. In: Block, C.R., Dabdoub, M., Fregly,
S. (Eds.), Crime Analysis Through Computer Mapping.
Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D. C.,
pp. 1532.
Braga, A.A., 2001. Effects of hot spots policing on crime. The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 578, 104125.
1107
Chainey, S., Reid, S., 1999. When is a hotspot a hotspot? A
procedure for creating statistically robust hotspot maps of
crime. In: Proceedings of the Third International Crime
Mapping Conference, Chicago Police Department, Citizen
ICAM, http://www.cityofchicago.org/ctznicam/ctznicam.htm.
Company. http://www.xtoolspro.com/index.html.
Eck, J.E., Weisburd, D. (Eds.), 1995. Crime and Place. Crime
Prevention Studies, vol. 4. Criminal Justice Press, Monsey
New York 361pp.
Goldsmith, V., McGuire, P.G., Mollenkoph, J.H., Ross, T.A.
(Eds.), 2000. Analyzing Crime Patterns: Frontiers of Practice.
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA 187pp.
Harada, Y., Shimada, T., Suzuki, M., 2005. Developing address-
geocoding support tools for digital map 2500. Reports of the
National Research Institute of Police Science (Research on
Criminology and Behavioral Sciences) 42 (1), 1427
(In Japanese).
Levine, N., 2004. CrimeStat III (Version 3.0): A Spatial Statistics
Program for the Analysis of Crime Incident Locations. The
National Institute of Justice, Washington, D. C.
McLafferty, S., Williamson, D., McGuire, P.G., 2000. Identifying
crime hot spots using kernel smoothing. In: Goldsmith, V.,
McGuire, P.G., Mollenkoph, J.H., Ross, T.A. (Eds.),
Analyzing Crime Patterns: Frontiers of Practice. Sage
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 7785.
Rossmo, D.K., 1999. Geographic Proling. CRC Press, Boca
Raton, FL 376pp.
Sherman, L.W., Eck, J.E., 2002. Policing for crime prevention.
In: Sherman, L.W., Farrington, D.P., Welsh, B.C., MacK-
enzie, D.L. (Eds.), Evidence-Based Crime Prevention. Rou-
tledge, London, England, pp. 295329.
Shimada, T., Harada, Y., 1997. Designing an address geocoding
software for a Community Security information System.
Reports of the National Research Institute of Police Science
(Reports on Prevention of Crime and Delinquency) 38 (2),
95105 (In Japanese).
The Task Force on Crime Mapping and Data-driven Manage-
ment, 1999. Mapping Out Crime: Providing 21st Century
Tools for Safe Communites. U.S. Department of Justice and
National Partnership for Reinventing Government, Washing-
ton, D. C.
Weisburd, D., McEwen, T. (Eds.), 1998. Crime Mapping and
Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 8. Criminal
Justice Press, Monsey, New York 424pp.