Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
in the Philippines
Sharing Knowledge on
Community-Driven Development
The KALAHI-CIDSS Project
in the Philippines
Sharing Knowledge on
Community-Driven Development
2012 Asian Development Bank
Cataloging-In-Publication Data
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent.
ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any
consequence of their use.
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term
country in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any
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ADB encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and noncommercial use with proper
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Note:
In this report, $ refers to US dollars.
iii
Tables and Figures
Tables
1The Main Principles of KALAHI-CIDSS 2
2Eligibility Screening Tool to Select Municipalities for Implementation of Community-Driven
Development Led by Local Government Units 9
3Framework for the Assessment of KALAHI-CIDSS 12
4 Assessment Municipalities and Villages 14
5 Wealth-Ranking Criteria for Talaingod and Barotac Viejo 17
6 Groups or Individuals with the Greatest Influence on the Selection of Subprojects 25
7Respondents Preparedness to Contribute to the Operation and Maintenance of Subprojects 30
Figures
1The Community Empowerment Activity Cycle 3
2 KALAHI-CIDSS Institutionalization Framework 7
iv
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
CDD community-driven development
CEAC community empowerment activity cycle
DILG Department of the Interior and Local Government
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
FGD focus group discussion
GRS grievance redress system
IRA internal revenue allotment
KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Kapit Bisig Laban sa KahirapanComprehensive and Integrated Delivery
of Social Services: Kapangyarihan at Kaunlaran sa Barangay
KC-1 KALAHI-CIDSS-1
KC-1/Ext KALAHI-CIDSS-1/Extension
LGU local government unit
MCT municipal coordinating team
MDC municipal development council
MDF municipal development forum
MDP municipal development plan
MIAC municipal interagency committee
MIBF municipal inter-barangay (intervillage) forum
MLGU municipal local government unit
NSCB National Statistical Coordination Board
O&M operation and maintenance
PSA participatory situation analysis
PNPM-Mandiri Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat-Mandiri
PRC project review committee
SET sustainability evaluation tool
Glossary
barangay village
bayanihan voluntary labor or in-kind contribution
v
Acknowledgments
T
his study, entitled The KALAHI-CIDSS in the Philippines: Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven
Development (CDD), is one of the four CDD studies conducted in the Peoples Republic of China,
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines under the ADB regional capacity development
technical assistance project, Sharing Knowledge on CDD in Asia and the Pacific (RETA 7543).
ADB thanks Raul Gonzalez for conducting the study and preparing this report, and acknowledges the support
of survey respondents and FGD participants including (i) Department of Social Welfare and Development and
KALAHI-CIDSS (KC) national management; (ii) KC regional directors and staff; and (iii) barangay and munici-
pal government officials, community volunteers, and village residents in study areas in Mulanay, Quezon;
Talaingod, Davao del Norte; and Barotac Viejo, Iloilo. The valuable assistance of research associates, inter-
viewers, and the KC staff members who took considerable time to provide data and professional insights
facilitated the conduct of the study.
The report greatly benefited from the practical comments and overall supervision of Yukiko Ito, RETA 7543
project officer, as well as from the guidance of Babken Babajanian, the previous project officer, who concep-
tualized the study content and methodology and reviewed the initial draft of this report. Rowena Mantaring,
RETA 7543 consultant, provided research assistance and comments on the earlier drafts and coordinated
the editing of the report. The logistical support of Honey May Manzano-Guerzon facilitated the budget-
ary requirements of the study, while the valuable assistance of Princess Lubag made the publication of this
reportpossible.
vi
Executive Summary
T
his assessment examines the extent to which countrys 42 poorest provinces, representing over
KALAHI-CIDSS, a community-driven develop- 50% of all provinces in the Philippines.
ment (CDD) project in the Philippines, has
enhanced service delivery and governance in benefi- Toward the latter part of KC-1 in 2008, DSWD
ciary communities. The assessment was conducted in launched the Makamasang Tugon pilot. Implemented
three municipalities (one in each of the three major in 33 municipalities in 17 KALAHI-CIDSS provinces,
island groups of the Philippines) and nine villages in the pilot sought to institutionalize the CEAC into the
these three municipalities. Four major areas of study local planning processes of participating LGUs and to
are considered: community participation, subproject transfer responsibility for implementation of KALAHI-
utility and sustainability, accountability and transpar- CIDSS at the local level from DSWD to municipal
ency, and institutional impacts on village and munici- governments (a modality known as LGU-led imple-
pal governments. The assessment involved a survey mentation). The lessons of the Makamasang Tugon
of 180 residents in 6 villages and focus group discus- pilot have been incorporated into the design of
sions with local government officials, community the current phase of KALAHI-CIDSS-1/Extension
volunteers, and KALAHI-CIDSS staff. (KC-1/Ext). The extension, started in early 2011, oper-
ates in 48 provinces, the original 42 plus 6 addi-
The development objective of KALAHI-CIDSS is the tional provinces. KC-1/Ext has received funding
empowerment of local communities through their from the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge
involvement in the design and implementation of Corporation, a donor from the United States.
poverty reduction projects and improved partici-
pation in local governance. Its theory of change Following are the major findings of the assessment.
involves four assumptions. First, effective participa-
tion in the community empowerment activity cycle
(CEAC) enables villagers to address their develop- Community Participation
ment needs. Second, residents participation ensures
that the community-based subprojects they select (i) Village assemblies provide a means for citizen
and implement reflect local needs and that services participation in planning and budgeting, but
delivered are of good quality. Third, citizen participa- they entail costs. Poor households have to
tion in KALAHI-CIDSS increases accountability and forego a portion of the time that they would
transparency in governance. Fourth, engagement otherwise utilize for livelihood and other
of local governments with community residents survival activities. The time and effort spent
through the CEAC facilitates institutionalization of can be costly; in some instances people have
participatory, transparent, and accountable princi- to walk 3 to 4 hours to reach a meeting venue.
ples and practices into the planning and budgeting (ii) Despite some weaknesses, the municipal
processes of local government units (LGUs). inter-barangay (intervillage) forum (MIBF) is an
effective mechanism for subproject selection
The first phase of KALAHI-CIDSS (KC-1) was imple- and the allocation of development resources.
mented from 2003 to 2010 at a cost of $182 million, Several innovations have been introduced to
with 54% funded through a World Bank loan and the the MIBF to address these weaknesses.
remainder from the national government through (iii) Competition in the MIBF is a double-edged
its Department of Social Welfare and Development sword. The competition element is the main
(DSWD), beneficiary communities, and participating energizing element for the high degree of
local governments. KC-1 was implemented in the community participation in KALAHI-CIDSS,
vii
viii Executive Summary
butit also gives rise to politicking and of subproject processes and benefits. There
collusion, practices that run counter to the is widespread satisfaction among residents
principles of CDD. with the subprojects and the services that
(iv) Women are actively involved in the they deliver to the community. Residents also
implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS and actually believe that they participate effectively in
may be more active than the men. subproject selection. Communities believe
(v) Contrary to the popular notion that the that the decisions of their village officials
poorest members of a community have reflect community priorities. Given the
neither the time nor the inclination to above, it is more likely that village officials are
become involved in community affairs, they credible to residents and that these officials
are strongly involved in the selection and and residents often have a confluence of views
implementation of subprojects. In several on community priorities.
instances, the poorest have been the most (ix) Not surprisingly, villages whose proposed
articulate in expressing their concerns at subprojects are not funded are frustrated
village assemblies and in advocating for at losing. It is especially frustrating for
certain subprojects. residents when their villages do not receive
(vi) Talaingod, the only assessment municipality funding even once during the three cycles of
where an indigenous tribal group comprises implementation; when this happens, residents
the majority of the population, is one of the of villages that have not received any funds
major successes of KALAHI-CIDSS. This success for subprojects (henceforth referred to as
is due to the adjustments that were made nonprioritized villages) begin to believe that
to the CEAC that facilitated the participation their failure is due to a conspiracy among
of the indigenous population. There were the other villages. While this belief may be
three adjustments: the recruitment of tribal unfounded, its persistence is a sign that
members as community facilitators, dealing there are no effective mechanisms to address
with the tribe on the basis of its ancestral the negative feelings and, more important,
geographic boundaries and leadership the outstanding needs of these villages.
structure, and the use of indigenous practices From the perspective of these villages,
and innovative educational tools to facilitate the two primary interventions of KALAHI-
understanding by illiterate tribe members. CIDSS, capacity building and grants for
(vii) Communities recognize the significant community subprojects, represent a single
contributions of volunteers to KALAHI-CIDSS. integrated package. If this is an appropriate
More important, community volunteers characterization, these communities are
are not judged according to the norms of unlikely to appreciate efforts to build their
traditional village leadership, such as financial capacity unless they also receive funding for
capability, extra village linkages, or the their proposed subprojects.
ability to access external resources. Instead,
volunteers are valued for their honesty,
commitment to serve the community, good The Utility and Sustainability of
moral values, and facilitation skills. Community Subprojects
volunteers are perceived as a new type of
community leader for whom residents have (i) Most residents consider their community
different expectations. subprojects to be useful, especially in terms
(viii) The five most influential people in subproject of transportation and access to goods and
selection include three local government services. While the nature and focus of
officialsthe village captains (ranked first), subprojects supported by KALAHI-CIDSS
other village officials (second), and mayors is the delivery of social services, these also
(fifth). The other two are community residents have positive effects on household income.
(ranked third) and community volunteers For example, roads facilitate the transport of
(fourth). The influence of local government agricultural goods and this results in better
officials in village-level subproject selection prices since the goods are fresh when they
should not be interpreted as elite capture arrive at the market.
Executive Summary ix
and Talaingod, reported improvements in same time, are seeking funds from national
their planning processes and the resulting agencies and legislators. Mulanays municipal
development plans. Improvements included government believes that the best strategy
(a) incorporation of village plans into municipal to attract development funds is to maintain
development plans (MDPs), (b) inclusion of good development performance and utilize
human capital investments in MDPs, (c)better- its funds to provide counterpart equity to the
prepared and higher-quality plans, and funds of external donors. This strategy has
(d)public review of draft plans. been successful. Mulanay has been able to
(ii) Mulanay has made the most progress in attract several donors to fund its projects.
institutionalizing participatory budgeting into (vi) Institutionalization of CDD principles
local government operations. The municipality and practices in Mulanay and Talaingod
achieved this by establishing complementarity has occurred because of the presence
in the functions of the municipal development of champions within local government
council (MDC) and the municipal development structures. CDD champions at the grassroots
forum (MDF), two entities with overlapping level are village heads and councilors,
memberships. The MDF, which has broader many of whom had previously served as
citizen participation than the MDC, assumes KALAHI-CIDSS community volunteers. They
the functions of municipal planning and tend to be strong advocates of the KALAHI
approval of village subprojects and resource way. Support from mayors is crucial to the
allocation. The MDC reviews, adopts, successful implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS
and confirms decisions of the MDF. The and institutionalization of CDD within the
arrangement has transformed the MDC from municipal structure. Equally important is
a planner to a facilitator of development the recruitment of CDD advocates into key
planning with broad-based community positions within the municipal bureaucracy.
participation. Much of the success in Mulanay and Talaingod
(iii) In the three assessment areas, decisions on is due to their recruitment of former members
municipal projects, including procurement of area coordinating teams who are now
processes, remain largely with local leading the municipal coordinating teams
government officials. In Talaingod, the during the Makamasang Tugon phase.
municipal government has made a conscious (vii) Adoption of CDD principles and practices
effort to bring its services closer to and to be faces the same constraints at the village and
more responsive to village residents through municipal levels. These constraints include
its Caravan of Municipal Front-Line Services to (a)turnover of local chief executives who have
the Villages. The caravan calls for the mayor become CDD advocates; (b) insufficiencies in
and key municipal departments to hold office the Philippine Procurement Law that inhibit
for 1 month in each village of the municipality. the participation of community residents in
During the caravan, frontline service units the management and implementation of
of the municipal government implement village subprojects; (c) concern of government
priority projects identified previously through officials regarding their accountability for
community consultations. village funds when residents are allowed
(iv) Of the three assessment municipalities, to manage the subprojects and funds are
Talaingod has crafted the most progressive misused or problems are encountered during
legislation to institutionalize CDD principles implementation; and (d) the absence of a
and practices. The municipal government national government directive or enabling
has enacted an ordinance that calls for the legislation to encourage and support LGU
establishment of a municipal coordinating adoption of CDD principles and practices.
team and articulates guidelines on
participatory planning and budgeting. The assessment concludes that KALAHI-CIDSS is an
The provincial legislature is reviewing the effective and well-managed project, with positive
ordinance and is expected to approve it. effects on several dimensions of poverty. Recipient
(v) All three assessment municipalities are communities and participating local governments
trying to increase tax revenues and, at the all value KALAHI-CIDSS.
Executive Summary xi
Locally led CDD implementation is an ambitious Finally, the experience of KALAHI-CIDSS to date
proposition. While some municipalities may be in a has sufficiently demonstrated its viability and cost-
position to assume this lead role, many will not be. effectiveness as a mechanism to fund priority commu-
With the introduction of the Makamasang Tugon nity investments identified by residents themselves.
pilot, KALAHI-CIDSS can be implemented using two Given this effectiveness, what are the challenges in
modalities: regular implementation, in which DSWD scaling up CDD as a national development strategy
takes the lead role, and Makamasang Tugon, in which to address poverty and improve governance in the
the municipal government assumes leadership. Philippines?
Perhaps a third option should be formulated that
represents a middle ground between these two The adoption of CDD as a national strategy in the
modalities. current Philippine Development Plan (20112016) is
a welcome development and an important first step.
(viii) There are clear benefits and challenges in the An enabling law or presidential order will eventually
management of a CDD program by a national be required to translate this strategy into a national
government agency. Advantages include scale, program.
strong prospects for long-term sustainability, and
replication of the CDD approach by other national Scaling up CDD as a national strategy for service
agencies. The major disadvantage is the threat delivery and improved governance will need to
of bureaucratic capture, which can manifest address key challenges and constraints to the insti-
itself through centrally determined deadlines for tutionalization of CDD, such as the absence of more
synchronized field implementation, bureaucratic stable and longer-term funding for CDD activi-
procedures and financial regulations, and turf ties, laws that inhibit community participation in
issues with other government agencies. subproject implementation and monitoring, lack
of bottom-up planning and budgeting processes
The continuing challenge is howtoinsulate the CDD within the national government, top-down delivery
program and its communities from having to deal of community projects by national agencies, and
with and work through the debilitating policies and local governments that run contrary to CDD prin-
procedures of a government bureaucracy. ciples and practices.
Context of the KALAHI-CIDSS:
KKB Project
1. This report presents the findings of an assess- participate in more inclusive Local Government Unit
ment of the 8-year KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the planning and budgeting. The acronym, LET-CIDSS,
Philippines. The assessment of this community- summarizes the basic principles that guide its imple-
driven development (CDD) initiative is part of an mentation: localized decision making, empowerment,
ongoing regional technical assistance project of the transparency, community priority setting, inclusive-
Asian Development Bank (ADB) that seeks to build ness, demand-driven, simple, sustainable (Table 1).
the capacity of ADB developing member coun-
tries to introduce or scale up community develop- 5. Capacity-building and implementation sup-
ment operations. The outputs of the ADB initiative port, community grants, and monitoring and evalua-
are 4 country studies on CDD, knowledge-sharing tion are the three main components of KALAHI-CIDSS.
through publications and workshops, and a CDD Grants for community subprojects are provided to
learning network. participating municipalities with each municipalitys
allocation equal to the number of villages within its
jurisdiction multiplied by approximately $14,000 per
The KALAHI-CIDSS Approach year for 3years. Since the grant to a municipality is not
enough to meet the funding needs of proposed sub-
2. Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive projects from all villages within the municipality, funds
and Integrated Delivery of Social Services: Kapang- for subprojects are allocated through a competitive
yarihan at Kaunlaran sa Barangay (KALAHI-CIDSS, community priority-setting process. This competi-
for short) is a CDD initiative of the Government of tive element is possibly the defining characteristic of
the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and KALAHI-CIDSS and the single most important feature
Development (DSWD).1 KALAHI-CIDSS seeks to reduce that differentiates it from other community develop-
poverty and vulnerabilities to poverty by addressing ment programs in the Philippines with CDD charac-
a lack of capacity and resources at the local level and teristics, such as the Mindanao Rural Development
limited responsiveness of local governments to com- Program, the Agrarian Reform Communities
munity priorities. Development Program, and the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao Social Fund.
3. KALAHI-CIDSS reflects recognition by the
Government of the Philippines of the endemic and wide- 6. The initial period of engagement between
spread nature of poverty. Its design drew inspiration KALAHI-CIDSS and a participating community extends
from two major antipoverty programsthe DSWDs for 3 years.2 A DSWD-recruited area coordinating team,
Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services consisting of an area coordinator, engineer, financial
Program and Indonesias Kecamatan Development analyst, and community facilitators (at a ratio of one
Program, a CDD initiative started in the 1990s. facilitator for every three to five villages, depending on
accessibility), is deployed in each target municipality to
4. KALAHI-CIDSS seeks to empower communities lead local implementation and assist participating vil-
in targeted poor municipalities to achieve improved lages. All villages in a target municipality are eligible to
access to sustainable basic public services and to participate in KALAHI-CIDSS.
1
The literal translation ofKapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services: Kapangyarihan at
Kaunlaran sa Barangay is Linking Arms against PovertyComprehensive Delivery of Social Services: Empowerment and Development
of the Village.
2
KALAHI-CIDSS engagement can be extended into the Makamasang Tugon phase (LGU-led implementation mode), depending on the
performance of the participating municipality.
1
2 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
This principle emphasizes the importance of community discussions and decision making,
Localized Decision
including the formulation and implementation of projects and other interventions to address
Making
problems that community residents have identified.
The project invests heavily in capacity-building activities that progressively develop the
capabilities of the people, including analysis of local conditions, design of appropriate
development interventions, and implementation of development projects. Capacity building
Empowerment takes place throughout the community empowerment activity cycle in which communities
realize their individual and collective strengths, acquire and develop community and project
management skills, and increase their confidence to engage local governments in periodic
dialogues to improve resource allocation and delivery of basic services.
Peoples participation is the projects core requirement and the prerequisite to the success
of all activities and interventions. Village assemblies provide opportunities for people to
participate and be informed about the physical and financial status of subprojects.
Transparency Consultation on community issues or problems promotes responsibility and accountability.
The KALAHI-CIDSS multilevel monitoring system, including the use of nongovernment
organizations and media as independent monitors and the grievance monitoring and
resolution mechanism, supports transparency.
Selection of subprojects and capacity-building activities is the product of a collective
Community Priority
decision-making process. Projects are prioritized for funding by a municipal inter-barangay
Setting
(intervillage) forum whose members are elected by the participating villages.
The entire community, including formal and traditional leaders, representatives of different
sectors, individuals, groups, and local organizations, are encouraged to participate in KALAHI-
Inclusiveness
CIDSS. Special efforts ensure the participation of women and indigenous people. Broadening
the base of participation prevents elite capture of project activities and benefits.
KALAHI-CIDSS supports communities with prioritizing their own needs and problems,
designing their own subprojects, and making decisions on how resources are used.
Demand Driven Residents develop ownership of the subprojects they have identified, developed, and
implemented, so the subprojects have better outcomes and are more sustainable than
would otherwise be the case.
KALAHI-CIDSS procedures and other requirements are simple and are designed to facilitate
Simple
understanding, appreciation, and involvement of all stakeholders.
Communities are required to develop and implement viable plans for sustainability for each
Sustainable
subproject to ensure that they deliver intended benefits over the long term.
Note: To avoid confusion, KALAHI-CIDSS is referred to as a project; the activities supported by KC at the village level are referred to
as subprojects.
7. The cornerstone of the KALAHI-CIDSS participatory situation analysis (PSA), which is a col-
approach is the community empowerment and lective assessment of conditions by community vol-
activity cycle (CEAC). Each village that entered unteers chosen by their peers. The analysis involves
KALAHI-CIDSS since the project started in 2003 went visual tools, such as resource and social maps, time
through the CEAC three times (approximately once division of labor, Venn diagrams, and the like. Village
each year) during its engagement with the project. residents subsequently validate the results of the
There are four stages in the CEAC: social prepara- PSA at a barangay (village) assembly or meeting.
tion, subproject identification and development,
subproject selection and approval, and subproject 9. The major activity during subproject identifi-
implementation (Figure 1). cation and development is the criteria-setting work-
shop, where village representatives determine the
8. Social preparation involves training to iden- quantitative and qualitative criteria for the selection
tify communities problems and propose solutions. and ranking of village proposals. Sample criteria for
The key activity during social preparation is the subproject selection can include responsiveness to
Context of the KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Project 3
BA = barangay (village) assembly, EC = executive committee, MDC = municipal development council, M&E = monitoring and
evaluation, MIAC = municipal interagency committee, MIBF = municipal inter-barangay forum, O&M = operation and maintenance,
PSA = participatory situation analysis, SP = subproject
Note: Although this figure uses the term project to describe the community empowerment activity cycle at the local level, such
projects are considered to be subprojects at the village level here and elsewhere in the report.
Source: KALAHI-CIDSS National Project Management Office. Field Guide for KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Area Coordinating TeamsCEAC
Operations Manual. Unpublished. 5 February 2007.
a priority problem, beneficiary reach, quality of ben- intervillage meeting (known as the municipal inter-
efits, and cultural acceptability. The criteria guide vil- barangay forum) for the competitive ranking of sub-
lages in the selection and preparation of their sub- project proposals using the criteria selected earlier.
project proposals. When all proposals have been ranked, the municipal
grant is allocated first to the amount needed for the
10. A community can propose any subproject it highest-ranked subproject, and then to the second
considers important for its development except for highest-ranked, and so on, until the municipalitys
activities that have adverse social or environmental grant has been fully committed.
impacts or microcredit activities that involve the
lending of funds. Based on KALAHI-CIDSS-1 (KC-1) 12. Communities with approved proposals then
experience, subprojects likely to be proposed and move to the fourth stage, subproject implementa-
supported include water systems, access roads, tion, monitoring, evaluation, and operation and
schools, health stations, and day care centers. maintenance (O&M). During subproject implementa-
Together, such subprojects accounted for 80% of tion, community residents find new ways of working
all KALAHI-CIDSS community grants during the first with each other, engage local government officials
phase of KALAHI-CIDSS. for technical support and counterpart resources, and
learn about procurement and financial management.
11. In the subproject approval phase, democrati- O&M plans and arrangements are also completed at
cally elected village representatives convene in an this stage.
4 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
13. Finally, after the construction is completed 17. Implementation of KC-1 was initiated in phases.
and subprojects are about to become operational, The first phase, which started in 2003, involved 11
communities undergo a transition stage before municipalities, one each in 11 regions. The second
proceeding to a new CEAC. The transition involves phase targeted 56 municipalities. The third phase was
a community-based evaluation to identify changes split into two, with phase 3A covering 34 municipali-
resulting from the residents experience with the ties and phase 3B working in 28 municipalities. The
subprojects, accountability reporting, and review to last phase, which was implemented in 2006, involved
determine the performance of different stakehold- 54 municipalities. Phased implementation enabled
ers (village residents, KALAHI-CIDSS staff, local gov- each succeeding phase to benefit from the lessons
ernment officials and staff, and other donors) in the learned in the previous phase.
delivery of subproject commitments.
21. As a consequence of the pilot, DSWD shifted (v) A corollary to this institutionalization is the
from being the lead implementing agent to a sup- designation of municipal department heads
porting role that involved the continued provision or members of technical working groups as
of block grant support for community subprojects focal persons to provide advice and technical
and the recruitment and deployment of munici- support to barangays and sectors. Visits from
pal monitors to provide technical assistance to the members of the technical working groups
municipalities. to barangays have also facilitated other LGU
tasks, such as the registration of children and
22. In 2009, DSWD commissioned a study to the payment of taxes. Experiences with CDD
review the selection guidelines and processes of have brought the LGU functionaries closer
the Makamasang Tugon pilot and to assess the con- to the people and led to new practices in
ditions that would enable LGUs to adapt the CDD sharing information and technical expertise.
approach to local development processes (Canlas (vi) Local initiatives to improve interdepartmental
2009). The study examined how the Makamasang coordination have extended to the legislative
Tugon pilot supports and strengthens LGU-led councils that are responsible for policy making
efforts to institutionalize participation, account- and budget allocation, thereby assuring
ability, and transparency into local governance support for the integration of bottom-up
systems. planning and budgeting measures into local
government processes.
23. The study identified several positive effects of (vii) Local finance committees budget and allocate
the pilot on the participating municipalities: funding to support village development
and annual investment plans. In pilot
(i) Several municipalities have legislated LGU municipalities, village subprojects with high
policies, provided guidelines for poverty rates of community participation are given
reduction programs or mechanisms for pro- priority in terms of counterpart funding from
poor programs, and adopted the processes municipal local government units (MLGUs).
and procedures of CDD. In Balangiga, Samar, (viii) A few municipalities have overcome internal
for example, a local policy framework for funding constraints by increasing local
good governance has been legislated. The taxes. In one municipality, higher taxes
framework institutionalizes indicators for good have increased municipal revenues more
governance and processes in development than 400 times their former level. Resource
planning and budgeting. mobilization for counterpart funding has also
(ii) Pilot LGUs have taken the lead in coordinating optimized political ties and relations with the
and supporting the conduct of village provincial governor, the district congressional
planning processes, thus promoting representative and, in one case, the President
achievement of the KALAHI-CIDSS of the Philippines.
requirement that at least 80% of a villages (ix) Village assemblies continue to be conducted
households attend the meetings that discuss and serve as important mechanisms for social
proposed subprojects. accountability. It is at these assemblies that
(iii) The participatory situation analysis is community members and barangay officials
integrated into village planning to ensure are able to articulate, negotiate, and vote
responsiveness to community needs as for their preference for subprojects. The
opposed to the traditional desk approach of assemblies also provide an important means
the past in which barangay officials prepared to assess performance and provide feedback
village plans with little or no input from the to village and municipal governments.
residents. (x) The functioning of local special bodies at
(iv) The municipal interagency committee (MIAC), the village level has been enhanced due to
the coordinating mechanism of the different the increased representation of civil society
units of municipal governments, has been organizations in these bodies. Functionality
institutionalized as the technical working has also improved due to the bodies
group of the municipal development councils. integration with project-initiated structures,
6 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
such as O&M committees and committees for (iii) While there is increased space for citizen
bids and awards. representation in the municipal development
(xi) KALAHI-CIDSS processes have also energized councils and other local bodies, expansion
participation of vulnerable and indigenous of civil society membership is limited. In
groups and remote barangays. Harmonization many instances, there are few civil society
of participatory approaches and subproject organizations operating in the pilot
management systems with local government municipalities and they usually represent
processes has also renewed indigenous membership-based organizations, such as
governance practices, such as the key roles those for farmers, women, and senior citizens,
performed by elders in the provision of advice or church-based groups.
or in the mediation of conflicts. (iv) Basic data are inadequate to support
participatory planning. While several LGUs
24. The DSWD study also identified the following have developed community-based monitoring
key challenges facing future efforts to scale up the systems in compliance with the requirements
pilot model: of DILG and the National Economic and
Development Authority, formidable problems
(i) The selection process suffered because there related to financial requirements and the staff
was not enough time during prequalification capacities of LGUs remain.
workshops to provide sufficient orientation (v) Several municipalities continue to experience
for the candidate municipalities to prepare difficulty in meeting their commitments for
their proposals. In the effort to avoid counterpart contributions. KALAHI-CIDSS
raising expectations, DSWD did not provide requires each municipality to contribute the
sufficient details about the pilot to the equivalent of 30% of the total amount of the
municipal representatives. At the same grant allocated to a municipality. Counterpart
time, DSWDs regional offices were strict contributions can be in cash and in-kind
about requiring candidate LGUs to submit services and can come from municipal and
a resolution of their legislative councils barangay LGUs as well as from the villagers
formalizing the commitment of the municipal themselves.3 Some people cited the lack of a
government to harmonize CDD operations clear delineation between cash and in-kind
with the local governments implementation contributions. Others cited problems in
processes and guarantee LGU counterpart opening accounts with the Land Bank of the
funding and support. Moreover, involvement Philippines, the governments depository
of DILGs local offices was uneven across the bank, because of a minimum deposit
regions. This occurred because of the delayed requirement, which was increased from
arrival of directives from DILGs national P10,000 to P30,000.
office, a lack of familiarity of regional DILG (vi) The limited tenure of municipal officials (a
staff with CDD approaches, and inadequate 3-year term and a maximum of three terms) is
coordination between the departments a major constraint to the sustainability of CDD-
regional offices. based governance reforms.
(ii) Project time lines at the national level did not (vii) National programs remain top-down in terms
fully consider the budget calendar of village of approach and are often disconnected from
and municipal governments. This made it the development plans and programs of local
difficult to synchronize the requirements governments.
for policy and budget support effectively,
particularly local counterpart commitments 25. The Makamasang Tugon pilot generated
and the participatory processes that were important lessons in the design of the KALAHI-
required for planning and budgeting. CIDSS: KKB-1/Extension (KC-1/Ext), which features
3
As noted above, each participating municipality receives the equivalent of approximately $14,000 for each of its villages. If there are
10 villages, the municipality would receive the equivalent of $140,000 and be required to provide 30% of this amount, or $42,000, in
counterpart funding, either in cash or in-kind services.
Context of the KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Project 7
an LGU-led modality of KALAHI-CIDSS implemen- in the LGU development planning and implementa-
tation in municipalities assisted previously in KC-1. tion processes at the barangay and municipal levels.
To participate in the KC-1/Ext phase, previously
assisted municipalities were required to demon- 28. These village and municipal governmental
strate effective performance in sustaining KALAHI- units also constitute the key arenas for engagement
CIDSS development processes and in enhancing when the institutionalization agenda is advanced.
local governance systems. The institutionalization agendas, which are advo-
cated by local communities with the support of the
area coordinating teams, include the following:
The KALAHI-CIDSS
Institutionalization Framework (i) Policy development:
(a) issuance of local ordinances adopting
26. Institutionalization of CDD is reflected in how KALAHI-CIDSS as a local poverty-
local governments undertake participatory, inclu- reduction strategy at the village and
sive development planning; allocate resources for municipal levels;
development as well as the parameters and criteria (b) issuance of priority targets, programs,
used in allocating resources; and implement devel- and resources based on experiences or
opment programs in a participatory, transparent, lessons learned from KALAHI-CIDSS;
and inclusive manner. (c) issuance of local ordinances responsive to
communities priority needs;
27. The KALAHI-CIDSS Institutionalization Frame- (d) issuance of ordinances to adopt the MIAC
work (Figure 2) seeks to mainstream KALAHI-CIDSS as a regular structure of the municipal
principles and processes and sustain their application government; and
lop R Barangay-based
e SB
mechanisms to address
es
Dev
1. Mainstreaming BA s
s BAP priorities.
ou r c e
BAs = barangay (village) assemblies, BAP = barangay action plan, BDC = barangay development council, B/MLGU = barangay and
municipal local government unit, CDD = community-driven development, KC = KALAHI-CIDSS, LGU = local government unit, LSB =
local special body, MDC = municipal development council, MIAC = municipal interagency committee, O&M = operations and main-
tenance, OLCE = office of the local chief executive, PO = peoples organizations, SB = sangguniang bayan/barangay (local legislative
council)
Source: KALAHI-CIDSS National Project Management Office. Field Guide for KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Area Coordinating TeamsCEAC
Operations Manual. Unpublished. 5 February 2007.
8 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
29. In sum, institutionalization of KALAHI-CIDSS 32. Municipalities previously assisted in KC-1 that
involves incorporation of the following practices and qualify for participation in KC-1/Ext are given the
mechanisms into the operations of the local govern- opportunity to manage directly the social mobi-
ment unit: lization activities previously undertaken by area
Context of the KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Project 9
coordinating teams. For these municipalities, DSWD coordination to communities and LGUs in the newly
provides support for (i) training of municipal coordi- included municipalities. New team members receive
nating teams and the local poverty reduction action training in CDD, development planning and man-
team on CDD facilitation; and (ii) salary, incidental agement, conflict resolution, intra- and intervillage
costs, and training of project-hired municipal moni- mediation, quality reviews, poverty assessments,
tors who provide management support and techni- and other relevant topics.
cal assistance to local governments.
34. As in KALAHI-CIDSS-1, DSWD provides grants
33. Activities in the new or additional munici- to participating villages. Two types of grants are
palities follow the operational model used in KC-1. provided. Planning grants support participatory
Area coordinating teams lead implementation and planning processes and activities of local communi-
are recruited and supervised by DSWD, which also ties as well as technical assistance to ensure proper
provides their training, salary, and incidental costs. implementation. Investment grants support village
These teams provide facilitation support, techni- proposals to implement subprojects that respond to
cal assistance, subproject oversight, and local-level needs that communities have identified.
The ADB Assessment of
KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB
Assessment Objective and Research are relevant to local needs and expressed
demand. The assessment also examined
Framework beneficiary perceptions about the quality
of construction of subproject infrastructure,
35. The assessments objective is to examine the
services delivered, and the factors that have
extent to which KALAHI-CIDSS has contributed to ser-
affected the subprojects. The study assessed
vice delivery and governance in the beneficiary com-
institutional arrangements for O&M and the
munities. Specifically, the assessment focuses on two
extent that the roles and responsibilities of
key issues. First, the assessment analyzes the appropri-
key actors, such as communities and local
ateness and relevance of the bottom-up participatory
governments, were enforced effectively.
approach to deliver services that are of good quality
(iii) Accountability and transparency. CDD
and that reflect local needs. Second, the assessment
assumes that a bottom-up method
examines the positive long-term institutional impacts
empowers community members to exercise
of the CDD approach in strengthening local capacity,
voice, influence their leaders, demand
participatory decision making, and transparency and
accountability, and prevent any perceived
accountability in local service delivery.
rent-seeking and mismanagement of
36. To address these objectives, the assessment resources. To determine whether this is a
focused on four major study areas: (i) community par- valid assumption, the assessment sought
ticipation, (ii) utility and sustainability of community the perceptions of beneficiaries about
subprojects, (iii) transparency and accountability, and the existence and extent of corruption
(iv) institutional impacts on participating village and within subprojects, the experience of local
municipal governments. communities in dealing with attempts to
misappropriate KALAHI-CIDSS funds, and
(i) Community participation. CDD assumes the extent of disclosure of financial and
that participation in the subproject cycle subproject information by local officials to
enables residents and special groups within their constituents.
the community, such as women, ethnic (iv) Institutional impacts. CDD assumes that the
minorities, and the poorest, to express participation of local governments in the
their preferences and influence investment CEAC can lead to the institutionalization of
decisions. The assessment sought to a participatory model of service delivery
establish whether community residents have in LGUs and enhance transparency
opportunities to engage in participatory and accountability in the use of public
processes to express their preferences and resources. To ascertain progress toward
whether their priorities were eventually institutionalization, the assessment appraised
reflected in the choice of the subprojects the Makamasang Tugon pilot to determine
(rather than on the dictates of elites). The whether implementation was transferred to
assessment also sought to identify the groups municipal governments.
and individuals with the most influence on
selection of subprojects. 37. Table 3, which summarizes the framework for
(ii) Utility and sustainability of subprojects. The the assessment of KALAHI-CIDSS, shows the proj-
assessment examined the extent to which ects theory of change, the key assumptions of the
investment decisions about subprojects theory, and the indicators of these assumptions.
11
12 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
Table 3 (continued)
Assessment Sites did not receive any funding for their proposed sub-
projects. Was this due to inherent weaknesses of
38. The ADB assessment was conducted in three the villages or flaws in the systems and procedures
KALAHI-CIDSS municipalities, one each in Luzon, of KALAHI-CIDSS? Second, do nonprioritized vil-
Mindanao, and Visayas, the three major island groups lages receive benefits from KALAHI-CIDSS apart
of the Philippines. Three villages were selected in from funding, possibly in terms of capacity building?
each of the three assessment municipalities (Table4). Third, what measures can or should be incorporated
Two of these were prioritized villages that had into the design of KALAHI-CIDSS to address the
received at least one round of funding for a commu- needs of nonprioritized villages?
nity subproject during KC-1 and additional funding
during the Makamasang Tugon pilot. The third village 40. In addition to geographic spread, the munici-
was intended to be a nonprioritized village that had palities were also included in the assessment on the
not received subproject funding during KC-1 or the basis of their strong performance during the initial
Makamasang Tugon pilot.4 engagement with KC-1 and, as a result, their subse-
quent participation in the Makamasang Tugon pilot.
39. Obtaining the views of residents from non- The decision to limit the assessment to well-per-
prioritized villages is important for several reasons. forming municipalities was deliberate and intended
First, it is important to understand why some villages to test the limits and potentials of KALAHI-CIDSS to
4
The KALAHI-CIDSS National Monitoring Unit reports that about 500 villages (10% of the total) did not receive funding for any
subprojects during KC-1.
14 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
Note: There was little difficulty in the choice of prioritized villages. Selection of nonprioritized villages was problematic because there
were none in Mulanay or Talaingod and only one village in Barotac Viejo. As a result, the assessment team had to modify the defini-
tion of nonprioritized villages as those that had received the fewest funded subprojects in their municipalities.
encourage local governments to adopt and insti- 43. Due to its excellent performance during KC-1,
tutionalize CDD principles and practices into their Mulanay was selected to be one of the municipalities
planning and implementation processes. After all, to participate in the Makamasang Tugon pilot in 2008.
the design and objective of KALAHI-CIDSS is to The pilot enabled Mulanay to mainstream the CEAC
transfer implementation responsibility to all assisted into local planning processes, thereby operational-
municipalities. In fact, 80% of the 200 municipalities izing participation, transparency, and accountability.
assisted under KC-1 are expected to lead local imple-
mentation under a Makamasang Tugon approach in 44. The assessment in Mulanay focused on two
the ongoing extension of KALAHI-CIDSS (KC-1/Ext). prioritized villages, Latangan and Ibabang Yuni, and
one nonprioritized village, Amuguis.
41. The opportunity to capture the dynamics
of implementation within diverse social, politi- 45. Latangan, which is about 2 kilometers from
cal, and institutional contexts was also considered. Mulanays town center, received funding for three
Specifically, the assessment communities permit- subprojects: two farm-to-market roads and one for
ted the examination of beneficiary perceptions rural electrification. Ibabang Yuni, in the uplands
about the existence and extent of corruption within of Mulanay, received funding from KALAHI-CIDSS
KALAHI-CIDSS and the experience of local commu- for three subprojects: a farm-to-market road, a vil-
nities in dealing with attempts to misappropriate lage health center, and one for rural electrification.
project funds.5 Amuguis received a grant for a day care center in 2011.
42. Mulanay, Quezon, is on the Bondoc Peninsula 46. Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, is in the northern part of
about 279 kilometers southeast of Manila and Iloilo province. The municipalitys engagement with
142 kilometers from Lucena City, the provincial KALAHI-CIDSS started in 2003. Thirty-nine subproj-
capital. KC-1 came to Mulanay in 2003. Over the ects were completed in the municipality during the
next 3 years, KALAHI-CIDSS invested P25.2 million three cycles of KC-1.
in the municipality. The municipal government
augmented these funds with a counterpart contri- 47. Barotac Viejo was one of the star performers of
bution of P7.2 million. The municipality estimates KC-1, winning many citations for its early performance.
that investment in CDD-related activities reached In its third cycle of KC-1, however, the municipal gov-
P49million over the 3-year period. ernment delayed the delivery of a chlorinator for a
5
In relation to this third criterion, Mulanay and Talaingod performed well during the Makamasang Tugon pilot. In contrast, Barotac
Viejo had a subpar and controversial performance, as described below.
The ADB Assessment of KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB 15
multivillage water system. Given the previous record of higher office. He was thus distracted and often away
the municipal government and its promise to improve from the municipality.
its attention to its obligations to KALAHI-CIDSS, the
municipality was selected as one of the participants in 50. The experience of Barotac Viejo with the pilot
the Makamasang Tugon pilot. is not a positive one. Precisely for this reason, how-
ever, documentation of the experience is important
48. Unfortunately, Barotac Viejo did poorly in for DSWD as KALAHI-CIDSS moves toward the LGU-
Makamasang Tugon; there were delays in the comple- led implementation and the institutionalization of
tion of village subprojects and persistent rumors of CDD into local governance.
procurement anomalies and financial mismanage-
ment. Many of the implementation problems can 51. Due to its poor performance in the pilot, the
be traced to the poor performance of its municipal KALAHI-CIDSS regional office did not initially rec-
coordinating team, the unit that the municipal gov- ommend inclusion of Barotac Viejo in KC-1/Ext. The
ernment had organized to lead the pilots implemen- municipality was eventually permitted to join the
tation. The coordinating team also avoided responsi- extension only after the new mayor, a first-termer
bility when villages encountered problems with their and younger brother of the previous mayor, commit-
suppliers during subproject construction. This avoid- ted to overhauling the coordinating team by remov-
ance was ironic because the team had recommended ing the erring officials from further participation in
that only those contractors that had been prequali- KALAHI-CIDSS and to completing implementation
fied by the municipality should be eligible to bid for of the two unfinished subprojects from the pilot.
the provision of goods and services for village sub-
projects, ostensibly to protect the communities from 52. The CDD assessment in Barotac Viejo focused
fly-by-night service providers. When the contractors on the prioritized villages of Sto. Domingo and Nueva
failed to deliver on their commitments and communi- Sevilla and the nonprioritized village of San Juan. Sto.
ties sought the municipal coordinating teams (MCTs) Domingo received funding for three subprojects: a
intercession, the latter chose not to pressure the sup- health center and two farm-to-market roads. Nueva
pliers. Instead, more often than not, the MCT opted Sevilla also received funding for three subprojects: a
to support the contractors, thereby undermining the potable water system, upgrading of an existing farm-
bargaining position of the communities. For this rea- to-market road, and an artificial reef-cum-fish sanctu-
son, community residents considered the coordinat- ary. San Juan, in contrast, has not received any fund-
ing team to be an ally of underperforming contractors ing from KALAHI-CIDSS despite four attempts.
rather than as a guardian of community interests.6
53. Talaingod is in Davao del Norte, about 100 kilo-
49. The coordinating teams poor performance meters from Davao City. More than 70% of the popu-
was blamed on the absence of local government lation is indigenous and belongs to the Ata-Manobo
leadership. At the time of the pilot, the incumbent tribe. The rest are settlers from Bohol, Cebu, and Leyte.
mayor, under whose leadership the municipality The Ata-Manobo tribe has three major subgroups:
had successfully implemented three cycles of KC-1 the Langilan (warriors), the Kaylawan (wanderers or
funding, was in his last term and preparing to run for nomads), and the Talaingod (mountain people).
6
The assessment team learned that, in Barotac Viejo, one barangay had to stop work on its subproject (road concreting) because of the
late delivery of materials and pending resolution of a problem with the supplier, which claimed it had over-delivered sand by 30cubic
meters. The villagers did not agree with the claim of over-delivery; instead, they claimed that the supplier had under-delivered. The
Barangay Sub-Project Management Committee (BSPMC) said that if the supplier had indeed over-delivered, why did the village
still have cement, while running out of sand and gravel? Unfortunately, the supplier was in a strong position because the BSPMC
representative had signed the delivery receipt (which showed that the supplier had indeed over-delivered) without a thorough
physical check of the quantity of the delivery. Despite a number of follow-ups, the BSPMC was unable to contact the supplier. It then
turned to the MCT, only to be told to follow up with the contractor. When the MCT representative finally went to the village at the insistence
of the BSPMC, he merely said that the record showed an over-delivery of sand. After many other meetings between the BSPMC, MCT,
and the contractor, a solution was found. The savings or excess funds from the KC grant were used to purchase the needed materials.
While the village did not like the proposal, it accepted the solution so that the subproject would be completed by the August 31, 2009
deadline for subproject implementation of the Makamasang Tugon pilot. This incident, which also demonstrates how communities can be
disadvantaged by inflexible implementation deadlines, was documented in the process documentation report of the Makamasang Tugon
experience of Barotac Viejo, which was prepared by the KC-recruited municipal monitor.
16 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
54. Talaingod was one of the 11 municipalities two in tribal housing and one in rubber production.
included in the first phase of KC-1. Upon entry, the Lumabag had two subprojects, tribal housing and
immediate problem the area coordinating team rubber production.
faced was how to ensure that KALAHI-CIDSS would
be responsive to the Ata-Manobo residents who con-
stituted the majority of the municipalitys population. Assessment Methodologies and
Talaingod has three villages (Sto. Nino, Dagohoy, and Respondents
Palma Gil), but the neighborhoods (puroks) of these
villages, especially the upland areas where the Ata- 59. In addition to the desk appraisal of project doc-
Manobos live, are scattered over more than 45,000 uments, two other methods were employed: focus
hectares. Not surprisingly, the centers of government group discussions (FGD) and a survey of residents in
of these three villages and the concentration of gov- the six prioritized villages. The views of KALAHI-CIDSS
ernment services are all found in the lowland areas of staff were also obtained through a survey.
the municipality, thus resulting in the neglect of the
upland areas that are home to the different clans of 60. FGDs were held with municipal officials in
the Ata-Manobo tribe. each of the three assessment municipalities as well
as with village officials and community volunteers in
55. To give due recognition to the needs and aspi- the priority and nonprioritized villages. The FGD with
rations of the Ata-Manobo, KC-1 and the municipal villagers of nonprioritized communities focused on
government organized the upland communities into the dynamics of the municipal inter-barangay forum
tribal clusters. Each tribal cluster was then recognized (MIBF). In particular, the FGD sought participants
as a separate quasi-village, thus increasing the num- views about the MIBFs fairness, transparency, and
ber of villages in Talaingod from three to 15 (three for- overall effectiveness.
mal villages and 12 quasi-villages/tribal communities).
61. Thirteen FGDs were conductedfour munici-
56. This arrangement enabled the KALAHI-CIDSS pal FGDs and nine village FGDs.8 On average, 7 to 10
allocation of funds for Talaingod to be increased participants were in each of the municipal FGDs while
from P900,000 (P300,000 x 3 villages) to P4.5 million the village FGDs had about 20 participants each.
(P300,000 x 15 villages), a 500% increase.7
62. Guides for the municipal and village FGDs
57. During implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS were prepared, translated into Cebuano, Ilonggo
from 20032006, 24 subprojects were completed, and Tagalog, and distributed to the participants.
operated, and managed by their respective O&M
committees. Over the 3-year period, the KC-1 invest- 63. The FGDs were complemented with a small
ment in the municipality amounted to P22.5 million, quantitative survey of 30 residents in each of the 6 pri-
P13.5 million from KALAHI-CIDSS and P9 million in oritized villages. A total of 180 residents (30 residents
local counterpart contributions (in cash and in kind). x 2 prioritized villages x 3 assessment municipalities)
Due to Talaingods good performance during KC-1, participated in the survey. The survey provided a gen-
it was chosen as one of the municipalities for the eral sense of peoples perceptions about their leaders,
Makamasang Tugon pilot in 2008. KALAHI-CIDSS, and subproject benefits. Respondents
were selected through purposive sampling. Local
58. The CDD assessment focused on two pri- KALAHI-CIDSS staff, village officials, neighborhood
oritized tribal cluster communities (Tibi-tibi and leaders, and community volunteers assisted the
Barobo) and one nonprioritized cluster (Lumabag). assessment team in the selection of survey respon-
The Tibi-tibi cluster community received funding dents. The respondents were chosen using three cri-
for two subprojects, banana production and rubber teria: sex (equal representation of men and women),
production, Barobo implemented three subprojects, socioeconomic status (better-off, middle class, and
7
At the start of KALAHI-CIDSS in 2003, the municipal allocation was computed at P300,000 x the number of villages. The base figure is
currently P500,000 per village.
8
In Mulanay and Talaingod, separate FGDs were held with the mayors and other municipal officials. In Barotac Viejo, only one FGD was
held with municipal officials and MIAC members in attendance.
The ADB Assessment of KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB 17
The family can eat three The family has alternate meals of The family eats once a day
times a day rice and sweet potatoes
One to two children per Three to five children per family Six or more children per family
family
Barotac Viejo Concrete house Semiconcrete house Wood and nipa house
At least one family At least one family Daily income is sufficient only
member is a professional member is a professional for subsistence
At least one family Has a small business Can be considered a fish ven-
member is an overseas (e.g., tricycle, vending with dor but only of the
worker or seaman own capital) familys own fish catch
poorest) and historical exclusion from decision mak- (v) Work or livelihood (top five only): farmer, 43%;
ing in community affairs (e.g., indigenous peoples, housewife, 22%; businessperson, 8%; fisher,
new settlers, etc.).9 8%; tricycle/pedicab driver, 4%
(vi) Number of years in village: 120 years, 29%;
64. Selection of respondents according to socio- 2140 years, 36%; 4160 years, 30%; 61 years
economic status was based on data on poverty for and over, 5%
Mulanay and the results of wealth-ranking exercises (vii) Accessibility of residence to village center:
in Barotac Viejo and Talaingod. Wealth rankings are accessible, 53%; relatively inaccessible, 47%10
not comparable because different villages use dif-
ferent criteria. Table 5 identifies the wealth-ranking 66. The questionnaire was translated into Tagalog,
criteria used in Talaingod and Barotac Viejo. Ilonggo, and Cebuano and administered by locally
recruited interviewers under the supervision of the
65. The profile of the 180 survey respondents is ADB assessment team.
reflected in the following information:
67. Survey of KALAHI-CIDSS staff. The assess-
(i) Sex: male, 51%; female, 49% ment team had originally planned to hold an FGD of
(ii) Age: 2040 years, 38%; 4160 years, 47%; and KALAHI-CIDSS staff. Due to the difficulty of finding a
61 years and above, 15% convenient time for the FGD, an internet survey was
(iii) Civil status: married, 88%; single, 2%; others used instead. The KALAHI-CIDSS staff questionnaire
(separated, lost, live-in, etc.), 10% was emailed to selected staff of the projects national
(iv) Socioeconomic status: better-off, 21%; middle, project management office and three regional
49%; poorest, 30% offices. Thirteen questionnaires were completed.
9
The term better-off should not be interpreted as describing a household that would be considered wealthy in a conventional sense
but simply a family that is better-off in relation to other households in the municipality.
10
Accessibility is relative. In Barotac Viejo, inaccessibility is defined as a 1520 minute walk from the respondents residence to the
village center. In Talaingod, it is a walk of 12 hours over mountain trails.
Findings and Assessment:
Community Participation
The Barangay Assembly Village councilors needed to go house-to-house to
inform residents about the assemblies and convince
68. Barangay assemblies or meetings are an essen- them to attend. Village officials also needed to pro-
tial feature of the CEAC. During the subproject prepa- vide snacks for attendees. Later, however, people
ration stage, these village assemblies orient residents would come to the meeting on their own volition
on the objectives and processes of KALAHI-CIDSS after realizing that KALAHI-CIDSS can be of real help
and validate the priority problems and proposed to them. Attendance rates vary across the assessment
subprojects identified during the participatory situ- sites, ranging from 50%80% of village households.
ation analysis (PSA). The assemblies also approve the The Philippine Local Government Code requires a
various aspects of the chosen subprojects. 50%+1 attendance rate in a village assembly before a
proposal can be approved.
69. During subproject construction, barangay
assemblies enable the village subproject manage- 72. Despite this situation, FGD participants raised
ment committees to report on the progress of several concerns about village assemblies:
implementation. And during subproject operations,
village assemblies enable O&M committees and resi- (i) Attendance at village assemblies takes
dents to discuss the status of subprojects, problems away time that residents can devote to their
encountered, and plans for the future. economic activities.
(ii) It is not easy to achieve a 50% attendance rate
70. FGD participants, village and municipal, were for big villages, especially in municipalities
unanimous in their assessment of village assemblies whose residents tend to be heterogeneous.
as an important and transparent exercise of citizen (iii) Until recently, the costs of village assemblies
participation in development planning and budget- could not be charged to a village budget;
ing. According to the participants, village assem- hence, village officials were often expected
blies enable an entire community to be involved to subsidize meeting costs through their
in identifying priority problems and projects. The personal contributions.
assemblies also (iv) At times, the behavior of village officials
does not promote a productive meeting.
(i) clarify any misconceptions about KALAHI- They sometimes become defensive when
CIDSS implementation; asked about their performance. They do
(ii) facilitate agreement on the details of not respond to residents questions about
subprojects, especially, the nature and their performance and the use of village
magnitude of community counterpart funds, and they monopolize the discussion,
contributions; thus forcing residents to become passive
(iii) allow reports on the progress of subproject listeners.
implementation;
(iv) create a means to discipline negligent 73. The frequency of barangay assemblies has
members; and been a persistent issue in KALAHI-CIDSS. The
(v) renew friendships and build solidarity. Philippine Local Government Code requires the
holding of only two village assemblies per year,
71. FGD participants recalled that in the begin- while the CEAC requires a minimum of eight meet-
ning of KALAHI-CIDSS, it was difficult to get people to ings annually. Given the important objective of
attend barangay assemblies related to KALAHI-CIDSS. information sharing, two village assemblies per year
18
Findings and Assessment: Community Participation 19
are clearly insufficient. Given the time constraints of (i) Persistent rumors about collusion abound
rural poor households, eight assemblies annually are among friendly villages, sometimes with the
likely to be too many. blessing of municipal or village officials who
champion their own proposals but assign low
74. A final point involves the use of attendance scores for the proposed subprojects of other
rates at barangay assemblies as a criterion in sub- villages.
project selection at the MIBF. Attendance rates were (ii) Even if collusion does not occur, the use of
used as a criterion in the early days of KALAHI-CIDSS voting to rank subprojects creates divisiveness
but the criterion was later dropped due to abuse. For due to the intense campaigning by the
some reason, this criterion was resurrected during villages. This leads to a politicized selection
the Makamasang Tugon pilot. An FGD participant process.
from a nonprioritized village complained that some (iii) MIBF participants often do not have a
villages pad attendance lists to show a higher par- common understanding of the qualitative
ticipation rate and, consequently, a better score for criteria because these are stated too broadly.
their subprojects at the MIBF. Thus, the votes on qualitative criteria are
predisposed to collusion and, consequently,
raising or lowering of the rankings of
The Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum individual proposals.
(iv) The use of quantitative criteria is predisposed
75. The MIBF is the mechanism for subproject toward certain types of subprojects. An
selection within KALAHI-CIDSS. Each village is given example is the criterion on number of
a few minutes to present its proposal to the MIBF, beneficiaries. A road will always have more
followed by an open forum where representatives beneficiaries than almost any other type of
of other villages are given an opportunity to raise subproject eligible for funding.
questions about the proposal. After the subproject (v) The skills of the presenters can make a
presentations are completed, proposals are graded difference in the ranking of a proposed
using the criteria agreed upon earlier. The scores of subproject.
the proposals are consolidated to arrive at the sub- (vi) Proposed subprojects that are less expensive
projects overall ranking. The ranking of the subproj- are likely to be ranked higher than more
ects is then used for allocation of the KALAHI-CIDSS expensive subprojects.
municipal grant, as explained above. (vii) The MIBF generates many negative feelings
among the losers, even if they accept the
76. FGD participants identified these major results.
strengths of the MIBF:
78. In response to such concerns, especially
(i) Community representatives establish the those related to collusion and politicking, Mulanay
criteria for subproject selection and determine and Barotac Viejo introduced changes to the MIBF
the community subprojects to be funded, process and criteria during the Makamasang Tugon
unlike in the past when selection was the pilot. Changes in Mulanay included the following:
prerogative of the local government.
(ii) The element of competition motivates villages (i) Instead of representatives from the villages
to give their best efforts to obtain a high ranking proposed subprojects, that task is now
ranking for their proposed subprojects. assigned to a project review committee (PRC)
(iii) The transparency of the MIBF enables both whose members are selected by the village
winners and losers to accept the results. representatives at a criteria-setting workshop.
(iv) There is bonding among village PRC members include department heads of
representatives as they become aware of each the municipal LGU and representatives of
others situations. academe, nongovernment organizations, and
sector groups. To facilitate the ranking process,
77. In contrast, FGD participants also noted the PRC reviews proposed subprojects before
weaknesses: the municipal development forum (MDF).
20 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
(ii) At the MDF, the PRC raises questions as 81. Local government officials and FGD partici-
each village team presents its proposed pants in Mulanay appear to be satisfied with these
subprojects. changes. The new arrangements seem to retain
(iii) After a question-and-answer period, PRC the positive dimensions of competition without its
members complete an individual tally sheet destructive aspects. Nonetheless, the participation
that indicates their ranking of the subproject of village representatives is limited to voting for the
proposals. The individual tally sheets are given jury panel that will select the subprojects, which
to a technical working group for consolidation. is analogous to a shift from direct democracy to
Once the individual rankings have been representative democracy.
consolidated and all presentations completed,
the composite rankings of all the subproject 82. In Barotac Viejo, the major change was the
proposals are displayed. removal of all qualitative subproject selection cri-
(iv) The rankings are presented to the municipal teria. Only quantitative criteria are now used during
development council for final decision. The MIBF deliberations, including the
municipal development council also serves
as the forum where individual villages can (i) ratio of local community counterpart
question the subproject rankings. If a vote is contribution to total subproject cost;
taken on an issue, each village has only one vote. (ii) subproject household beneficiaries as a
percentage of total households in the village;
79. One advantage of the new system is that no (iii) household attendees at village assemblies as a
one (not even individual PRC members) knows the percentage of total households in the village;
final results until they are displayed after the rank- (iv) sustainability of previous subprojects;
ings have been consolidated. Village representatives (v) poverty incidencepercentage of population
also feel that the revised process is more objec- below the poverty line (based on 2007 data);
tive because the PRC is composed of disinterested and
individuals with no personal interest in any of the (vi) household attendees at KALAHI-CIDSS
subprojects. activities as a percentage of total households
in the village.
80. Mulanay continues to employ both qualita-
tive and quantitative criteria in subproject selection, 83. The exclusive use of quantitative criteria elim-
but the following changes in the criteria have been inated the need for subjective judgments by the
introduced: MIBF and, for that matter, the underlying rationale
for the MIBF. Individual subproject scores based on
(i) The link between a subproject and municipal the application of the quantitative criteria can be
goals has been added as a criterion. computed from the subproject proposals and other
(ii) Subproject sustainability is defined to include relevant documents and the subprojects ranked
a good O&M plan, engagement of CBOs, accordingly.
and participation of the people in bayanihan
(voluntary labor or in-kind contributions). 84. While the strengths of the MIBF as a mecha-
(iii) There has been minimal negative impact nism for subproject selection and resource alloca-
on the environment as evidenced by good tion outweigh its weaknesses, its processes and
and credible environmental management dynamics need to be managed carefully. The MIBF
plan and clearances from the Department of is a negotiated process for the allocation of scarce
Environment and Natural Resources and other development resources. By its nature, the MIBF
concerned agencies. has subjective and objective dimensions; these are
(iv) Counterpart contributions and attendance reflected in the quantitative (objective) and quali-
rates at village assemblies are now considered tative (subjective) criteria used in the selection of
as tie-breaker criteria. subprojects. Despite inherent difficulties in the use
(v) In the event of a tie between two villages, the of qualitative criteria, discarding them altogether
village with less funding from KALAHI-CIDSS is would eliminate citizen participation in decision
given priority. making, which is the rationale for the MIBF.
Findings and Assessment: Community Participation 21
85. There is a need for continuing refinement 90. Community residents. Survey results indi-
and re-articulation of the quantitative and qualita- cate strong community participation in the selection
tive criteria to ensure that they are responsive to the of subprojects. Eighty-eight percent of respondents
development aspirations of local stakeholders. For said they participated in the selection of their vil-
example, the criterion on the number of beneficiaries lages subproject and more than 62% said that they
(subproject reach) should be balanced with another had expressed their views at a barangay assembly
criterion on the significance of subproject impact on where the proposed subprojects had been discussed.
beneficiaries (subproject depth). Otherwise, roads Among the respondents, 96% also felt that their per-
will always be preferred over schools. sonal views and those of the community had been
considered at the assemblies.
86. The element of competition is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, it is effective in mobilizing 91. Women. Survey results indicate strong par-
the energies of community residents and village ticipation of women in subproject selection. All but
governments in the CDD process. Indeed, competi- 4% of the respondents believed that women partici-
tion is the main energizing element that accounts pated in subproject selection, 91% said that women
for the high degree of participation in KALAHI- spoke at the village assembly when the subproject
CIDSS. On the other hand, competition gives rise to was selected, and 94% said that the views of women
traditional politicking and collusion, practices that had been considered at the assembly.11
run counter to the principles of CDD. The continuing
challenge is to maximize the benefits of competition 92. Participants of municipal and village FGDs
while mitigating its negative effects. confirmed the strong involvement of women in sub-
project selection through their attendance and par-
87. The element of competition is not limited to ticipation in social preparation activities, such as the
the MIBF process alone. With the inclusion of quan- participatory situation analysis (PSA) workshop, vil-
titative criteria related to community participation lage assemblies, subproject planning sessions, and
in subproject development and community perfor- deliberations of the MIBF. In Mulanay and Barotac
mance in the O&M of previous village subprojects, Viejo, FGD participants claimed that there were
the spirit of competition now pervades the entire more women than men in village assemblies.
CEAC.
93. Women were also involved in subproject
88. Given all of the above, the modifications intro- implementation, serving as community volunteers
duced by local stakeholders in Mulanay on the MIBF on the various KALAHI-CIDSS teams and commit-
(renamed the municipal development forum or tees. Women are considered to be better than men
MDF) deserve further study. The Mulanay model can in paperwork and in monitoring the volume and
be a compromise between the competing expecta- quality of construction materials from suppliers.
tions of local government officials, community resi- Women also provide construction labor (although
dents, and KALAHI-CIDSS. male laborers do the heavy work) and prepare food
for construction workers. During the operations of
the subproject, women often serve as secretary,
Participation of Community bookkeeper, or treasurer of O&M committees.
Residents and Special Groups in
Subproject Selection 94. FGD participants claimed that women are
more active in KALAHI-CIDSS because their husbands
89. Survey and FGD results indicate that there is often leave the village for outside work. While no
significant participation of community residents, detailed statistics were presented, FGD participants in
including women, ethnic minorities, and the poor- Mulanay and Barotac Viejo noted that there are more
est, in preparation, selection, and implementation of women than men among community volunteers.
subprojects. In Talaingod, where the majority of the population
11
A village official at one FGD said that the subproject advocated by the women is usually the one adopted by the village assembly. At
one village meeting, he recalled challenging the women who were pushing for a particular subproject to ensure that their husbands
would contribute the needed labor.
22 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
is lumads or indigenous peoples, FGD participants 97. Third, participation in subproject activities is
said that women have become more vocal at assem- an added burden to womens workload. The solu-
blies, and many have become community volunteers, tion is not to ban women from participating in these
although men still outnumber the women. KALAHI- activities. Instead, support mechanisms can be con-
CIDSS has contributed significantly to building the sidered to reduce womens responsibilities in house-
confidence of women, enabling them to play an hold management and child care.
important role in decision making about community
development. This is true even in communities of 98. Finally, domestic tension between husbands
indigenous peoples where women have been tradi- and wives has occurred as a result of womens
tionally regarded as having a secondary role. increasing engagement in KALAHI-CIDSS. At the
same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that some
95. While the participation of women in KALAHI- men are proud of their wives accomplishments and
CIDSS is significant, several unresolved gender issues even support them by assuming responsibility for
remain. Some of the issues are due to the significant some of the housework. Unfortunately, the assess-
participation of women in KALAHI-CIDSS. First, while ment team is not aware whether the laudable actions
women and men are almost equally represented in of these men represent a common occurrence.
the membership of KALAHI-CIDSS committees, men
still outnumber women as chairs or leaders of the 99. The poorest in the community. Survey results
committees. As members of KALAHI-CIDSS commit- indicate the strong participation of the poorest in the
tees, women tend to perform traditional support community in the selection of subprojects.12 Among
positions, such as bookkeeper, treasurer, in charge of all the respondents, 96% said that the poorest
paperwork, or food preparation, that can be con- participated in subproject selection, 85% said
sidered as extensions of their responsibility as oper- that the poorest spoke at the barangay assembly
ations and finance managers of their households. when a subproject was selected, and 95% said that
the views of the poorest had been considered at the
96. Second, recognition of womens contributions assembly.
and the proper valuation of their efforts remain con-
tinuing challenges. The work of women as commu- 100. Participants of municipal and village FGDs
nity volunteers is usually not documented and thus confirmed the strong involvement of the poorest
their contribution is not recognized (this omission in subproject selection through their attendance
also affects male community volunteers). When a at village assemblies, the participatory situation
womans work is monetized for purposes of deter- analysis, and other project workshops. In Mulanay,
mining counterpart contributions, the monetary FGD participants said that the poorest are the most
value of her work is sometimes less than that of her articulate group in expressing their problems at vil-
male counterpart. Interestingly, women at an FGD in lage assemblies. FGD participants in Barotac Viejo
Barotac Viejo rationalized this discrepancy by saying claimed that subprojects proposed by the poorest
that their work was lighter than that of men. The are usually selected because these are also sup-
assessment team has no way of knowing whether ported by middle-class residents.13
this practice is widespread. In any event, KALAHI-
CIDSS prides itself on promoting gender equity, so it 101. The poorest are likewise involved in sub-
would be desirable to determine whether womens project implementation as community volunteers.
contributions are being properly valuated in the In fact, the assessment team was surprised by one
majority of municipalities assisted by the project. FGD participants comment that the majority of
12
Wealth-ranking exercises conducted by KALAHI-CIDSS staff facilitate identification of the poorest in the community. It should be
noted, however, that KALAHI-CIDSS villages are relatively homogeneous in that almost all residents can be considered poor. In
Mulanay, for example, 17 of the towns 28 villages have poverty incidences of 60% or higher, with one village having a poverty
incidence of 87%. The same is true of project beneficiaries in Talaingod since the wealth-ranking exercise involved only the lumad
residents of the upland tribal cluster communities (who are generally of the same socioeconomic standing) and did not include the
better-off and middle-class households residing in the lowland areas of the villages.
13
In one village in Barotac Viejo, three subprojects had been advocated by the poorest: a health center and village drugstore, which
caters mainly to the poorest who cannot afford commercial health care; a water system, which also serves the poorer families; and a
village access road, which facilitates the fish-vending activities of the wives of fishers.
Findings and Assessment: Community Participation 23
community volunteers are from the middle and ethnic minorities, particularly in village assemblies,
poorest socioeconomic classes.14 The FGD partici- village development planning and membership in
pant, a councilor in one of the villages of Mulanay organizations.
who considers his family as belonging to the poorest
in the community, told the assessment team how he 106. The assessment sought to identify the fac-
had worked on a road subproject for 8 months with- tors that have led to the increased participation by
out pay. He and his wife had agreed that she would indigenous groups. FGD participants identified the
be the family breadwinner during this period. following modifications to the KALAHI-CIDSS pro-
cess that increased the participation of indigenous
102. The poorest also work as laborers during groups:
subproject construction. In all three assessment
municipalities, the poorest get priority in subproject (i) Recruit members of the Ata-Manobo tribe as
construction work, sometimes through a 50 (coun- community facilitators.16
terpart)50 (payment) wage scheme, which allows (ii) To the extent possible, deal with ethnic groups
them to earn some money for the daily needs of on the basis of their traditional geographic
their families.15 boundaries or ancestral domain and
leadership structure rather than mainstream
103. The assessment team was surprised by the geographic and political boundaries.
strong participation of the poorest in the commu- (iii) Use color-coded materials (e.g., during the PSA
nity in the selection of subprojects and as commu- and in voting) to facilitate understanding by
nity volunteers. This finding, which runs counter to illiterate tribal members.
the conventional wisdom that the poor are too busy (iv) Translate KALAHI-CIDSS training materials and
in their survival activities to participate in commu- forms into the Ata-Manobo dialect.
nity affairs, should be studied further. It is important (v) To the extent possible, incorporate indigenous
to identify the features of the KALAHI-CIDSS system customs into subproject implementation
that encourage the participation of the poorest in (e.g., the use of knots to schedule dates of
the community. meetings).
(vi) Hold briefings in the local dialect with
104. Indigenous peoples. Of the three assess- community members before the conduct of
ment municipalities, it is only in Talaingod that an key activities, such as the PSA workshop.
ethnic group, the Ata-Manobo tribe, comprises the (vii) Provide meals and snacks to encourage
majority of the population. The KALAHI-CIDSS field attendance of indigenous peoples at
office considers Talaingod a major success, espe- assemblies; the latter have to walk great
cially because it had been a conflict-affected area distances to come to the meeting venue and
for many years. Notable achievements of KALAHI- they are understandably tired and hungry
CIDSS include the empowerment of volunteers, upon arrival.
some of whom have entered the political arena; the
improved status of Ata-Manobo women; and the
establishment of permanent housing for tribal fami- Contributions of Community
lies, which has facilitated improvements in agricul- Volunteers
tural productivity.
107. Community volunteers lead the village-level
105. This appraisal is consistent with a midterm implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS during the four
evaluation of KALAHI-CIDSS completed by the stages of the CEAC. During subproject preparation,
Asia-Pacific Policy Center (Edillon et al. 2007). That community volunteers are chosen as members
evaluation reported increased participation of of the project preparation team (responsible for
14
Does this mean that the better-off residents of the community are not interested in participating in KALAHI-CIDSS? This seems to be
an area for future study.
15
If the wage for unskilled labor is P200, 50% of the amount is considered as a counterpart contribution for labor while the other 50%
represents the laborers take-home pay.
16
Both the MCT coordinator and incumbent mayor were members of the Ata-Manobo tribe.
24 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
development of subproject proposals) and the vil- having honesty and good moral values, and being
lage representation team (to represent the village a good facilitator. Only 1 of 180 respondents gave
in intervillage meetings, such as the criteria-set- financial capability, an important criterion for the
ting workshop). In subproject approval, the three- selection of a village head, as a consideration in the
member village representation team speaks for the selection of community volunteers.
village at the MIBF where subprojects are ranked
and a municipal grant is allocated to approved 112. Due to the roles that community volunteers
proposals. are expected to perform, they are often seen by
residents as a new type of community leader from
108. When communities with approved propos- whom they have different expectations compared
als move to subproject implementation, their vil- with the traditional leaders of the mainstream sys-
lage assemblies select community volunteers to tem of political patronage.
form a village subproject management committee.
That committee implements subprojects through 113. Unfortunately, volunteer service can have an
subcommittees. Finally, after construction is com- adverse effect on family income, especially when
pleted, an O&M committee manages subproject volunteers serve on a full-time basis, such as chair-
operations. persons of committees. In some instances, commu-
nity volunteers have to use their own funds to cover
109. Survey and FGD results indicate recognition meeting costs. When women serve as community
of the important contributions of community vol- volunteers, this adds to their work burden and can
unteers. More than 98% of survey respondents were create tension with their husbands. In some circum-
aware of community volunteers in implementa- stances, a final difficulty is that community volun-
tion and 99% considered their contributions to be teers are perceived as threats to the power of village
significant.17 officials, which can create conflict.
17
Among the respondents, 70% believe that the contribution of community volunteers is very significant, 28% feel it is significant, and
1% consider it somewhat significant.
Findings and Assessment: Community Participation 25
Group or Individual %
Mayor 23.9%
N=180
18
Efforts to avoid elite influence and control altogether may be unrealistic and counterproductive in many Philippine villages.
Maintaining relations with village officials is a form of informal insurance for poor residents when the resources of extended family
and friends are inadequate to meet major emergencies.
26 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
119. At the FGDs of all three villages, partici- 123. San Juans experience underscores the
pants expressed their frustration at losing. They absence of effective mechanisms to address the
claimed to be so discouraged that their first impulse negative feelings and, more important, the out-
was to discontinue participation in future cycles. standing needs of villages who have not received
Community volunteers related that the hardest funding for their subproject proposals. With regard
thing they had to do was to return to the village after to these nonprioritized villages, it is important to
the MIBF and face their neighbors and friends. emphasize that community residents consider the
two primary interventions of KALAHI-CIDSS, capac-
120. Subsequent reflection sessions with their com- ity-building and provision of grants for community
munity facilitator and some encouragement from the subprojects, as one integrated package. It is unlikely
municipal government reversed the initial impulse to that communities will value the social preparation
disengage. Eventually, the three villages did partici- inputs when these are not accompanied by subproj-
pate in the remainder of KC-1. Amuguis and Lumabag ect funds from KALAHI-CIDSS.
finally received KALAHI-CIDSS funds, so they have pos-
itive feelings about the project and are satisfied with 124. Village and municipal governments receive
its overall design and implementation procedures. an internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the national
The residents of Amuguis and Lumabag feel that their government to supplement locally generated rev-
earlier failures were simply the luck of the draw and enues.The amounts available to villages from IRAs
not due to some inherent flaw in the projects design. cannot substitute for subproject funding; currently,
IRA funds are insufficient to support the invest-
121. Not surprisingly, residents of San Juan are less ments needed to achieve significant improvements
optimistic. Its representatives believe that their fail- in the provision of basic services.
ure is not merely the luck of the draw but due to a
conspiracy of the other villages. Due to this belief, 125. This is particularly true for KALAHI-CIDSS
they would prefer to do away with the competi- municipalities and villages, which are among the
tive MIBF mechanism for subproject selection. In its poorest in the country. Unfortunately, these areas
place, DSWD should simply give each village a grant were heavily dependent on IRAs to fund their oper-
entitlement and decide whether each village has ating costs and planned development projects prior
complied with all necessary requirements for release to their entry into KALAHI-CIDSS.
of the funds. Under these revised conditions, the
village is prepared to participate again in KALAHI- 126. Village budgets, which are overwhelmingly
CIDSS. Otherwise, KALAHI-CIDSS will remain a bitter dependent on the IRA, ranged from $17,440 to
experience that the village would like to erase from $23,225 in the assessment areas during KC-1. Funds
its collective memory and the sooner the better. from a villages IRA are usually budgeted as follows:
55% for personnel services, 20% as a development
122. Collusion is a possible factor in the selection of fund for village projects, 10% for youth, 10% for
certain village subprojects, whether this is in Barotac maintenance and other operating expenses, and
Viejo or other municipalities. In San Juan, however, it 5% for a calamity fund. The 20% development fund
is difficult to believe that conspiracy was the reason ranged from $3,490 to $4,650 per year. In contrast,
why the village failed to receive funding. Community allocations from KALAHI-CIDSS for subprojects, if
volunteers of San Juan themselves admitted that their divided equally among all villages, would be about
proposed subprojects did not receive a high ranking $14,000 per village annually. This amount under-
on two occasions because they failed to produce a scores the importance of a KALAHI-CIDSS grant for
certified deed of donation for the land on which their a villages development. Moreover, because the
proposed subproject would be constructed. On two KALAHI-CIDSS allocation is apportioned through
other occasions, the village failed to follow up on cer- a competitive process, some villages can receive a
tain issues, which excluded them from the MIBF. grant as large as $23,000.
Findings and Assessment: Utility
and Sustainability of Subprojects
Usefulness of Subprojects subprojects generate job opportunities for commu-
nity residents, including employment for the poorest
127. Survey respondents were asked to name residents during the construction of subprojects.
one subproject with which they were familiar. The
top five answers were roads (31% of respondents), 131. These perceptions are consistent with the find-
water systems (17%), banana plantations (17%), ings of Edillon et al. (2011). They found that the increase
health centers (12%), and housing (11%).19 According in per capita consumption of households in ben-
to the respondents, all of the abovementioned sub- eficiary communities was about 6% higher than the
projects were operational at the time of the survey. increases of households in villages that did not bene-
Among respondents, 92% have used the facilities of fit from KALAHI-CIDSS. Households in beneficiary vil-
a subproject. Likewise, 90% found their community lages with larger numbers of subprojects enjoy even
subprojects to be useful (23%) or very useful (67%). higher increases in consumption, as much as 14%
more than those in nonbeneficiary communities. The
128. Among the top six needs, three were related authors also reported that the share of nonfood items
to difficulties in transport and access: (i) vehicles are in the household budget has increased over time. The
unable to pass; road muddy and gets flooded; difficulty increase among beneficiary households was signifi-
in traveling especially at night (24%, 44 respondents); cantly higher at 44% than the increase among non-
(ii) difficult to go to doctor because of distance; hospital beneficiary households. Households in beneficiary
far; hard to go to other villages (7.2%, 13); or (iii) hard to barangays with more subprojects were reported to
bring products to the marketplace (6.7%, 12). have experienced even higher increases. Finally, the
study reported significant improvement in employ-
129. The fourth need involved inadequate income ment rates, particularly among females, and more
from corn and banana production, resulting in lack of diversified employment with household members
funds for hospitalization, schooling, food, and appli- now employed in more than one sector.
ances (18%, 32). The fifth need involved difficulties in
access to potable water (17%, 30). Difficulties included 132. Participants in the FGDs gave the follow-
hard-to-fetch water for daily needs (taking a bath, ing reasons for how types of subprojects increase
washing, cooking) and water sources that are far and household incomes:
expensive. The sixth need was the lack of permanent
housing (11%, 19), which resulted in the need to reside (i) Water system:
in the forest, inability to focus on livelihoods, and fre- (a) reduces residents time fetching water
quent purchases of materials for housing repair. and allows the savings to be used for
other economic activities;
Effects on Household Incomes (b) reduces expenses for buying water;
(c) increases opportunities for income-
130. The purpose of subprojects is the delivery of generating activities among women, such
social services, but they also have positive effects on as the making and selling of ice candy
household income. Nearly 9 of 10 survey respondents and other water-related products; and
believe that KALAHI-CIDSS subprojects can increase (d) reduces the cost of health care due to
household income, while 92% also believe that improved access to clean water.
19
These responses are consistent with programwide data on KC-supported subprojects. In KC-1, five types of subprojectswater
systems, access roads, schools, health stations, and day care centersaccounted for 80% of all community grants.
27
28 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
(v) supportive legislation to minimize damage to 143. At the village FGDs in Mulanay, participants
the subproject (for example, for subprojects confirmed the regular and timely provision of
involving roads, ordinances are needed municipal funds for the O&M of their subprojects.
to prohibit practices that damage roads, They also stated that there is a regular funding allo-
including the passage of vehicles when it cation for subprojects O&M in their villages annual
is raining, the passage of carabao-pulled budgets. The annual village government support for
nonwheeled carts that create ruts in the road, O&M is modest (e.g., P35,000 for roads and P20,000
and the use of the road by heavy vehicles); and for health centers) but these have been adequate so
(vi) regular monitoring by citizens, local officials far because the subprojects have not yet required
(including the members of the MIAC), and major repair work.
KALAHI-CIDSS field staff of the operations of
the subproject and the performance of O&M 144. At the FGDs with tribal communities in
committees. Talaingod, participants mentioned that contribu-
tions from the village government for subproject
139. The last point is important. More than 40% O&M is provided on an as-needed basis, requires
of survey respondents said that they have reported a resolution from the cluster community, and has
problems related to subproject operations, an indi- been sporadic. FGD participants were generally not
cation of their commitment to the subproject. aware of assistance from the municipal government,
although a few mentioned receiving one-time assis-
tance from the municipal agriculture office in the
Contributions of Local Governments form of fertilizers and chemicals, vegetable seed-
for Subprojects Operation and lings, and seeds for upland rice and corn.20
Maintenance
145. Participants of the village FGDs in Barotac
140. Municipal and village FGDs confirmed that Viejo stated that their annual budgets contained a
local governments provide contributions for the regular allocation for the O&M of existing subproj-
O&M of village subprojects. The municipal alloca- ects. They were not aware of regular municipal gov-
tion for O&M is usually charged against the munici- ernment support for subprojects O&M, although
palitys development fund. The manner in which they recalled that the municipal government had
these contributions are disbursed and the degree once provided sand and gravel and lent equipment
of transparency surrounding the transactions vary for the maintenance of roads.
across the three municipalities.
20
Several subprojects in Talaingod involve agricultural production.
30 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
Item %
reasons are valid and consistent with the KALAHI- 149. Participants at municipal and village FGDs
CIDSS requirement of community support for O&M. confirmed the significant contributions of residents
In principle, all beneficiary households are required toward the upkeep of subprojects, including
to contribute to O&M, but contributions can be in
cash (whether as regular donations or user fees) or (i) provision of unpaid or voluntary labor for
in kind (labor, provision of food, etc.). When asked regular maintenance activities (e.g., provision
whether they make contributions, respondents usu- of security, repair work, hauling of materials,
ally assume that the question is related to a cash food and food preparation, etc.) and during
contribution. Since most respondents make in-kind crisis situations (e.g., clearing of spillways
contributions, they provided negative answers during periods of heavy rains);
when asked whether they make a contribution. (ii) cash contributions, including (a) user fees for
the use of roads and common service facilities,
147. The apparent discrepancy in respondents (b) payments of tariffs for water systems,
answers can be interpreted as a deficiency in com- (c)monthly dues, (d) voluntary donations for
munications regarding the O&M arrangements of the use of health facilities, and (e) allocation of
the subprojects. Even if these arrangements had a small portion of the net profit of community
been discussed at a village assembly, people tend to enterprises;
forget or are not fully convinced. Accordingly, there (iii) strong patronage of the common service
is need to remind residents of their roles in and facilities, thus ensuring their commercial viability;
responsibilities for the subproject. Open communi- (iv) compliance with local ordinances and policies
cations and transparency have been the foundation of the subproject; and
of the success of KALAHI-CIDSS; these should be (v) provision of in-kind contributions from
continued beyond subproject planning and imple- organized users of roads (e.g., truckers and
mentation into subproject O&M. tricycle drivers contributing gravel and sand as
well as hauling services).
148. While a third of respondents believe that they
are not required to contribute to O&M, they are nev- 150. A final gauge of the residents commitment
ertheless prepared to provide support as necessary. is the extent to which they monitor their subproj-
Table 7 lists the types of contributions that residents ects. More than 40% of respondents have actu-
say they are prepared to provide for the mainte- ally reported on problems related to subproject
nance of subprojects. Almost 96% of respondents operations to an O&M committee or to their village
are willing to contribute unpaid labor for O&M. officials.
Findings and Assessment:
Accountability and Transparency
Corruption in KALAHI-CIDSS assemblies) and indirectly (through their represen-
tatives on the subproject management committee)
151. Survey residents generally perceive KALAHI- in the management of KALAHI-CIDSS funds. They
CIDSS to be corruption-free: 87% of respondents are kept informed and become aware of problems
believe that there is no corruption and 6% consider through observation of the work being done, public
corruption in KALAHI-CIDSS to be less than that billboards listing work accomplishments, and village
found in other programs in the village. Only 4% of assemblies.
respondents believe that corruption is on the same
level as other programs. 154. Second, many individuals have been desig-
nated to manage funds from KALAHI-CIDSS, includ-
152. FGD participants were unanimous in say- ing the village treasurer and a DSWD representative.
ing there is no corruption in KALAHI- CIDSS.21 They These officers are required to report on the status of
based their position on the following: the village account, including incomes and expenses,
at the village assemblies and make financial docu-
(i) Many external audits have indicated that there ments and other records available to the public.
is no corruption in KALAHI-CIDSS. There is also a roving bookkeeper who monitors
(ii) Corruption is difficult to commit in KALAHI- the finances of subprojects. If community members
CIDSS because ordinary citizens are watching have suspicions about financial transactions, they can
the subprojects closely, in part because of report these to the KALAHI-CIDSS community facilita-
their counterpart contributions. tor. FGD participants recognize that DSWD is the final
(iii) Government projects follow a process arbiter regarding cases of alleged corruption.
to prevent corruption but the KALAHI-
CIDSS system is much better. Not only are 155. Third, there are procedures to remove offi-
transactions well documented, the decision- cers of KALAHI-CIDSS subprojects and charge them
making process goes through a series of with corruption. For example, one officer of an O&M
workshops and exercises. committee in a Talaingod village was charged with
(iv) There is close supervision through the misappropriation of funds. Some members of sub-
KALAHI-CIDSS team and local officials. project associations have also been charged for non-
payment of dues and fines.
Mechanisms within KALAHI-CIDSS 156. Fourth, grant funds are sent directly to the vil-
that Prevent Corruption lage account from DSWD without passing through
any intermediaries. Also, KALAHI-CIDSS adheres to the
153. More than 93% of survey respondents believe one-fund concept, which requires that all funds for a
that community members can prevent the misuse of community project (or KALAHI-CIDSS subproject) be
subproject funds. FGD participants share this view. deposited and disbursed from a single account using
According to these participants, internal mecha- uniform procedures. Finally, village residents validate
nisms in the KALAHI-CIDSS enable community resi- all completed subprojects using three monitoring
dents to prevent the misuse of funds. First, village exercises: community-based evaluation, accountabil-
residents are involved both directly (through village ity reporting, and sustainability evaluation.
21
One village official commented that if all village programs were handled the KALAHI way, they would be able to say proudly, at the
end of their term, that there has been no corruption during their administration.
31
32 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
157. In Mulanay, as an illustration, community-based to assess the physical condition of subproject infra-
evaluation and accountability reporting are conducted structure and a meeting with the O&M committee
after completion of subproject implementation. The to rate performance and discuss the findings of the
outputs of these exercises are considered in planning joint inspectorate team.
for the next cycle of implementation. Community
evaluation is a reflection process in which the people
involved in the various phases of the CEAC, particularly The Grievance Redress System
subproject implementation, articulate the changes
that KALAHI-CIDSS has brought about in terms of 161. During the Makamasang Tugon pilot in
empowerment, good governance, and poverty reduc- Barotac Viejo, municipal officials opted not to install
tion. The 2- to 3-day reflection exercise uses different the projects grievance redress system (GRS), claim-
tools to facilitate the full participation of community ing that any problems could be resolved through
volunteers and other residents of the villages. existing mechanisms. In the other two municipali-
ties, the grievance system was installed as designed;
158. Accountability reporting, in contrast, is an end- Talaingod even designated a municipal coordinat-
of-cycle activity in which representatives of prioritized ing team staff person to follow up and ensure that
and nonprioritized villages convene to discuss the every grievance is addressed.
highlights of their performances in the just-concluded
cycle. The main audience is the municipal interagency 162. Despite these actions, FGD participants in the
forum and the municipal development council. tribal communities of Talaingod claimed to have lit-
Discussions focus on tle knowledge of the grievance system or had never
used it. Talaingods municipal officials, conversely,
(i) subproject implementation, claimed that grievances are usually related to minor
(ii) compliance with counterpart commitments at issues in implementation, such as the delivery of
the village and municipal levels, materials or the subpar performance of local staff.
(iii) compliance with social and environmental Both village and municipal FGD participants main-
safeguards, tain that there has never been a grievance complaint
(iv) lessons learned about CDD processes, filed because of allegations of corruption.
(v) plans for enhanced participation and
implementation of the CEAC, and 163. In Mulanay, grievances that have been raised
(vi) setting directions for community development are of a similar nature. In one village, for example, a
and municipal engagement in succeeding complaint was filed against the previous village
cycles. head for allowing a vehicle that he was riding to use
the project-funded road during the rain. This was in
159. Twice a year, all completed subprojects are violation of a village policy that vehicles would not
evaluated using a sustainability evaluation tool be allowed on the road when it is raining because
(SET). Evaluation focuses on subprojects benefits, rainwater collects in the low portions of the road
organizational development, and financial and tech- and the passage of vehicles can cause potholes.
nical aspects. The O&M committees are graded on
individual parameters and their mean rating of per- 164. No formal complaints about corruption have
formance for the previous 6-month period is deter- been raised to the GRS in the three assessment
mined. Organizational aspects receive a weight of municipalities, even though the assessment team
60%. The remaining 40% is intended for the techni- was told of attempts to misuse funds. These were
cal and financial aspects. not formally reported through the GRS but resolved
at the local level. In one municipality, a village head
160. In Mulanay, the entity responsible for the SET attempted to limit the issuance of canvass forms for
is the municipal joint inspectorate team, which was construction materials to his preferred suppliers,
organized through a local executive order. The SET a move that was probably intended to obtain per-
is conducted with community volunteers, mem- sonal commissions. The issue was resolved when the
bers and officers of the O&M committee, and the mayor stepped in and, together with the commu-
members of the village council. SET has two main nity volunteers in the village, voided the contract.
activities: the conduct of subproject walk-through The issue was settled internally because the local
Findings and Assessment: Accountability and Transparency 33
stakeholders wanted to maintain their good reputa- violations in contract conditions and suppliers,
tion with DSWD and thereby ensure the continued and 36 were violations in procurement guidelines.
flow of funds from the project. Examples of type C complaints include the following:
165. The foregoing suggests that, whenever pos- (i) Bribery and kickbacks by stakeholders.
sible, local leaders prefer to resolve corruption com- There were several cases when subproject
plaints locally. Elevating them to the regional level implementers were reported to have received
might invite the imposition of sanctions, including bribes from contractors.
the cutoff of funds from KALAHI-CIDSS. Given this, (ii) Misuse of subproject funds involved the
the assessment team hypothesizes that the overall utilization of funds for personal or use for
effectiveness of the GRS is due, at least in part, to other than their intended purposes.
local stakeholders fear of diminished reputations (iii) Missing or unaccounted supplies and materials
and DSWD sanctions. involved cases of missing materials that were
reported as stolen from a storage warehouse
166. Notwithstanding these findings, the GRS or subproject site.
appears to be functioning satisfactorily. According (iv) Delayed or nondelivery of materials by the
to the GRS Unit of the KALAHI-CIDSS National suppliers, which included the delivery of
Project Management Office (2011), it has resolved substandard materials by the suppliers.
99% of the 1,950 queries and grievances reported (v) Uncompleted or unfinished contracts involved
from 2003 to 2009. situations in which contractors failed to
complete all of the specifications of their
167. These queries and grievances were classified contracts, thus resulting in the noncompletion
as follows: or delayed completion of subprojects.
(vi) Noncompliance with the procurement process
(i) Type A are simple queries and comments and involved the nonutilization of the appropriate
concerns about KALAHI-CIDSS; mode of procurement or lack of transparency
(ii) Type B involve violations of rights and during the bidding process.
procedures that affect or hinder KALAHI-CIDSS
activities and subproject completion; 171. These examples are typical of the complaints
(iii) Type C include allegations of corruption and that one would expect. That they have been raised
misuse of funds as well as procurement-related and captured by the GRS indicates that stakehold-
violations; and ers are aware of and trust the system, and that it is
(iv) Type D concern complaints against project operating effectively.
implementers.
172. The only concern is the small number of com-
168. Type A complaints were the most numerous plaints. If the 1,950 complaints received in KC-1 are
at 71.6% (1,396) of all cases filed, followed by type D divided among the 4,583 barangays in KC-1, this
cases at 14.9% (291), type C cases at 7.9% (154), and would mean only 1 complaint per 2.4 barangays. If
type B cases at 5.6% (109). only the 154 type C complaints are considered, this
would be even lower, at 1 complaint per 30 baran-
169. Actions taken by the GRS to address com- gays. Of course, this does not include the grievances
plaints include immediate feedback or clarification to that were not reported to the GRS or those settled
the complainant; holding special village or municipal informally at the local level.
assemblies to resolve the issue in a transparent man-
ner; referral of the complaint to the appropriate deci-
sion-making bodies; and imposing sanctions, such as Handling of Village Funds
the nonrenewal of staff employment or blacklisting
of contractors, when the acts committed are found to 173. A high 95% of survey respondents believe
be true, malicious, and intentional. that village officials are honest in handling the finan-
cial resources of the village, a belief that village FGD
170. Of the 154 type C cases, 70 involved allega- respondents shared. This finding is contrary to the
tions of corruption and misuse of funds, 48 involved conventional view that village officials cannot be
34 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
trusted in proper use of village funds. It is important example, are as follows: (i) do village officials involve
to remember, however, that the assessment villages community residents in decision making (88% yes);
(and their officials) have had extensive experience in (ii) do village officials disclose financial information
the practice of financial transparency and account- to residents (93% yes); and (iii) do the decisions of vil-
ability through their experience with KALAHI-CIDSS. lage officials reflect community priorities (98% yes).
In fact, several village officials had been community The percentages of affirmative answers from the sur-
volunteers. An optimistic explanation is that a new vey respondents of Talaingod and Barotac Viejo are
culture of honesty has developed in these villages as similar to those in Mulanay.
a result of KALAHI-CIDSS.
176. The survey had several follow-up questions
174. Due to positive experiences with KALAHI- comparing the behavior of village officials in involv-
CIDSS, the majority of FGD participants and 94% of ing citizens in governance in the past (i.e., prior
the survey respondents in the prioritized villages to the entry of KALAHI-CIDSS) with their current
believe that they have the ability to prevent misuse behavior.22 Between 72% and 78% of respondents
of village funds, either directly at village assemblies from the three assessment municipalities answered
where citizens raise questions about the planned affirmatively to these follow-up questions.
allocation and actual utilization of village funds, or
indirectly through the barangay development coun- 177. Among respondents from villages in Barotac
cils, whose memberships have been expanded to Viejo and Talaingod, the assessment team found that
include representatives from the business sector, the percentage of affirmative answers for the follow-
civil society, and peoples organizations. up questions were generally the same (at an aver-
age of 90%). The percentage of affirmative answers
in Mulanay was markedly lower, with an average of
Involvement of Residents in Village 37% for the three follow-up questions.
Decision Making
178. A possible explanation for these findings is
175. The survey asked respondents whether village that village officials in Mulanay were already recep-
officials involve community residents in decision tive to citizens involvement in village governance
making, whether village officials disclose financial prior to KALAHI-CIDSS. This receptiveness was likely
information to residents, and whether the decisions due to the influence of a previous mayor who had
of village officials reflected community priorities. A instituted participatory and transparent governance
large majority of respondents answered affirmatively processes before the entry of KALAHI-CIDSS into
to all three issues. Survey responses from Mulanay, for Mulanay in 2003.
22
The follow-up questions are as follows: (i) If you compare the behavior of your barangay officials before the entry of KALAHI-CIDSS
with the behavior of current officials, do they involve communities more in their decisions today? (ii) If you compare the behavior of
your barangay LGU officials before the entry of KALAHI-CIDSS with the behavior of current officials, are they disclosing and sharing
financial information more with their constituents today? (iii) If you compare the decisions of your municipal LGU officials before the
entry of KALAHI-CIDSS with the decisions of current officials, are these currently more reflective of community priorities?
Findings and Assessment:
Institutional Impacts
179. Institutionalization impacts refer to the extent of their local development plans. Over time, the
that local governments have incorporated CDD prin- project-related technical assistance of area coor-
ciples and practices of participation, transparency, dinating teams has resulted in better-quality plans
and accountability into their governance processes. that outline a villages strategic directions; support
the villages with well-researched community data;
and provide detailed descriptions of programs and
Institutional Impacts at the projects with clear implementation schedules, a
Village Level monitoring plan, and a resource mobilization plan.
Most important, community members know and
180. Expanded membership of barangay devel- understand the projects and activities contained in
opment councils. The barangay development the plans.
council prepares village development plans. Due
to KALAHI-CIDSS, membership in the barangay 183. In Mulanay, participatory planning has been
development councils in Mulanay and Barotac Viejo institutionalized through the barangay develop-
has expanded to include informal groups, sector ment councils. The first step involves the conduct of
representatives (e.g., senior citizens, women, dis- consultative meetings with residents of the different
abled, and major occupational groups), and other neighborhoods to identify and discuss priority prob-
membership-based organizations within the village. lems and potential subprojects. These subvillage
Many of these citizen representatives served previ- meetings are a prerequisite activity to a PSA work-
ously as community volunteers. shop, an annual 3-day meeting. PSA participants
consult with residents of the different neighbor-
181. Participatory planning. 23 Prior to the entry hood clusters in the village prior to the workshop.
of KALAHI-CIDSS, the majority of villages in the The PSA agenda includes
three assessment municipalities did not have vil-
lage plans. When a village did have a development (i) reporting on the income and expenditures of
plan, it typically had been developed by village the village,
officials who wanted to justify utilization of the (ii) reporting on identified household priority
village IRA, or more precisely, the portion of the problems that have been consolidated at the
village IRA known as the 20% development fund, neighborhood level,
which is intended for village development projects. (iii) reporting of neighborhoods proposed
Hence, funding requirements of the proposed proj- projects,
ects contained in village development plans were (iv) consolidation of priority problems and
usually equivalent to the amount of the 20% devel- proposed projects at the village level, and
opment fund. (v) ranking of priority problems and projects and
scheduling of priority projects over a 5-year
182. One of the major interventions of KALAHI- period (the maximum planning horizon of the
CIDSS is assistance to communities in the preparation village development plan).
23
The Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 requires village governments to prepare 3-year village development plans and an
annual investment plan. The mandated planning process assumes consultative meetings between officials and residents, initially at
the neighborhood level to identify problems and priority projects, and later at the village level for purposes of consolidation. The
results of the consultations are submitted to the barangay development council, which prepares the draft development plans and
submits them to the village council for approval. Approved village development plans are submitted to the municipal government
for incorporation into municipal plans.
35
36 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
184. Once the implementation of priority projects 188. Unlike in Mulanay, there are fewer oppor-
has been scheduled over a multiyear time frame of tunities for residents of Talaingods villages to be
the village development plan, the villages IRA is involved in the implementation of projects funded
budgeted for projects to be undertaken in the cur- by the villages budgets. Village officials manage the
rent year. Projects requiring funds in excess of the funds, and village captains, treasurers, and, in some
village IRA are included in the village development cases, the chairs of the village appropriation com-
plan on the assumption that the village will identify mittees approve disbursements. Periodic reports on
other sources of financing. Draft village plans are project expenditures are made to the the barangay
presented at a village assembly for validation and development council.
approval before being forwarded to the municipal
legislature for promulgation. 189. Talaingods village officials are also reluctant
to use the community force account and prefer to
185. The planning process in Talaingods villages rely on outside contractors, with residents tapped
is similar to Mulanays. One difference is that, in to provide additional labor. According to the vil-
Talaingod, village leaders get to decide the neigh- lage officials, their preference for outside contrac-
borhood projects to be implemented in the cur- tors is based on the provisions of the Philippine
rent year and those that will be deferred to later Procurement Law, which does not allow the use of a
years. The prioritization of neighborhood projects community force account when the labor costs of a
is made known to residents through their lead- village subproject are above $1,200.
ers or by village officials during their visits to the
neighborhood. 190. The use of the community force account
under the procurement law is a gray area. The reluc-
186. Use of KALAHI-CIDSS procedures in sub- tance of village officials to use KALAHI-CIDSS proce-
project implementation. In Mulanay, the village dures may be due to other reasons. FGD discussions
IRA is allocated on the basis of the priorities iden- revealed that village officials do not have adequate
tified in the participatory situation analysis (PSA) knowledge and understanding of KALAHI-CIDSS
exercise. Village assemblies validate and approve procedures in subproject implementation. In part,
all plans before they are submitted to the baran- this is because some village officials are newly
gay development council for approval. The villages elected first-termers. In addition, village officials
IRA often provides counterpart funding for grants may not be convinced of the value of KALAHI-CIDSS
from KALAHI-CIDSS, so there are almost no village procedures because they do not have sufficient
subprojects funded solely by the 20% development experience in their use.
fund. Due to the use of the one-fund concept, the
village IRA is controlled in the same way as KALAHI- 191. When the 12 tribal clusters in Talaingod were
CIDSS funds. Thus, village projects, regardless of the recognized as villages, and therefore implementing
source of funding, are usually implemented using units of subprojects, the tribal chiefs, neighborhood
KALAHI-CIDSS procedures. leaders, and community volunteers became the
main actors in implementation within the tribal clus-
187. Procurement for materials is subject to pub- ters. The involvement of most village officials was
lic bidding, as is the procurement of external con- minimized and was probably limited to receiving
tractors for services involving heavy or specialized reports on subproject implementation at meetings
equipment. The use of a community force account is of the barangay development council.
the preferred mode of labor procurement.24 Village
residents are given priority in employment and usu- 192. If this assessment is correct, the top (municipal
ally work on a 5050 basis (50% unpaid or bayani- government) and bottom (tribal chiefs and neigh-
han labor and 50% paid). Finally, there is regular borhood leaders) layers of leadership in Talaingod,
reporting on implementation progress and financial who have become advocates of CDD, need to con-
expenditures at village assemblies. vince the middle leadership layer (village officials) to
24
When a community force account is used, a beneficiary community manages the labor component of a subproject, hires the workers,
and pays their salaries. In CDD subprojects, community force accounts are typically preferred over the hiring of external contractors
because the former reinforces a communitys sense of ownership.
Findings and Assessment: Institutional Impacts 37
become similarly committed to CDD. This is impor- members include village captains and heads of
tant if further institutionalization of CDD is to be departments of municipal local government units
achieved in Talaingod. (MLGU). While community residents are not mem-
bers of this committee, they respond to its surveys
193. In Barotac Viejo, no new projects have been on the performance of subprojects.
undertaken because officials in the assessment vil-
lages are newly elected. In the past, however, pro- 198. In Talaingod, local governments constitute a
curement processes for projects funded through the multisector monitoring team for village subprojects.
village IRA followed the provisions of the Philippine In some villages, team members were involved pre-
Procurement Law. Procurement of materials is sub- viously in KALAHI-CIDSS. In other villages, village
ject to canvass or public bidding. Interestingly, councilors constitute the membership of the moni-
procurement of labor is done through the admin- toring teams.
istration method, which is similar to a community
force account. Residents are also given priority for 199. Constraints in village government adop-
employment in construction work. tion of community-driven development princi-
ples and practices. FGD participants had differing
194. Community involvement in subproject views about the constraints that village governments
monitoring and evaluation. The implementation face in the adoption of CDD principles and practices.
of village subprojects in Mulanay follows KALAHI- In Mulanay, FGD participants felt that there are no
CIDSS procedures, so residents are involved in moni- constraints to the adoption of CDD practices as long
toring through their membership as community vol- as village officials do not mind sharing power.
unteers in various committees. Residents also often
go to construction sites to get a first-hand view of 200. FGD participants in the other two municipali-
progress; formal reporting on implementation is ties were not so optimistic. Apart from inadequate
reserved for village assemblies. funds, they identified other constraints: (i) continued
infighting, from one election to the next, between
195. Before the end of subproject implementation rival political factions; (ii) legal impediments, includ-
and before villages proceed to the next cycle, two ing provisions of the Philippine Procurement Law;
transition activities are conducted: a community- and (iii) the accountability of village officials if
based evaluation, which enables residents to assess residents are allowed to manage a subproject and
their participation in subproject implementation funds are misused or implementation encounters
and the changes brought about by their participa- problems.25
tion, and accountability review and reporting, which
facilitates the collective review of stakeholder com- 201. Resource mobilization efforts of barangay
mitments during subproject implementation. local government units. According to FGD partici-
pants, villages are almost wholly dependent on the
196. During subproject operations, communities IRA for their activities. Villages in the assessment
are involved in monitoring through attendance sites are trying to raise revenues by increasing taxes,
and participation in village assemblies where offi- licenses, and other fees (village clearances, parking
cials of the O&M committee report on the status of fees, etc.) or tapping nontraditional sources (e.g.,
subproject operations and the regular conduct of overseas Filipino workers), but it is doubtful that
sustainability evaluations of subproject operations. these revenue-raising measures will yield substantial
Sustainability evaluations examine a subprojects revenues in the short term. In the meantime, villages
organization and management, technical and finan- seek to mobilize funds for development projects in
cial aspects, and services provided. traditional ways, that is, by sending resolutions of
request to municipal and provincial governments,
197. In Barotac Viejo, the LGU created a munici- their local legislators, and national government
pal monitoring and evaluation committee whose agencies.
25
This concern can be partly addressed if officials in barangay LGUs adopt a merit-based system that allows neighborhood clusters
that have performed well on their KALAHI subprojects to manage the implementation of other initiatives that are supported with a
barangays resources.
38 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
202. Improvements in poverty monitoring. In (v) MDPs are reviewed and approved by the
general, village governments do not have their own municipal development council (MDC), at
systems for monitoring the incidence of poverty, public hearings, and by provincial committees
relying instead on municipal initiatives. In the three on housing and land use.
assessment municipalities, the most reliable initiative
in the monitoring of poverty is the regular survey that 205. In Mulanay, citizen representation has been
village health workers conduct. These workers, who increased in local special bodiessuch as the peace
are each assigned a catchment area of 2550 fami- and order council, the MDC, the development coun-
lies, compile a database on the health of their clients. cil, and school and health boardsthat serve as ven-
Health workers also conduct a poverty survey twice a ues for dialogue among citizens and the municipal
year. The results are reported regularly to the MLGU government on proposed sector measures. In addi-
and village officials. Village officials claim to utilize the tion, citizens are consulted, mainly through public
monitoring results in their planning processes. hearings, before MLGU proposals with wide-ranging
effects are finalized.
26
In Mulanay, the MIBF has been renamed the municipal development forum.
Findings and Assessment: Institutional Impacts 39
to village residents through its Caravan of Municipal occurs for all municipal projects because they are
Front-Line Services to the Villages. To prepare for the all funded collaboratively by the municipal gov-
caravan, residents of each neighborhood in the three ernment and other donors. Community monitor-
villages of Talaingod identify problems and propose ing takes place at village assemblies and through
priority projects. Village officials consolidate neigh- periodic evaluations of sustainability. In Barotac
borhood proposals into a village action plan that is Viejo, the MIAC handles the monitoring and evalua-
presented to the municipal government. The village tion of all projects in the municipality, regardless of
projects are reviewed and prioritized for implemen- the source of funds. While village residents are not
tation during the Caravan of Services in the villages. members of the monitoring committee, they serve
as the respondents of MIAC surveys and focus group
210. The caravan calls for the mayor and key service discussions during project monitoring. The MIAC
departments to hold office for 1 month in each vil- uses a monitoring instrument similar to the SET.
lage of the municipality. During this 1-month period,
municipal frontline service departments implement 214. In Talaingod, neighborhood residents do not
priority projects that were identified previously in have a clearly articulated role in monitoring munici-
community consultations. pal projects, although the Caravan of Services is
guided explicitly by the principles of participation
211. When the assessment team visited Talaingod, and accountability. All neighborhood and village
the caravan was in the village of Sto. Nino and projects must be completed within the 1-month
involved in period of the caravan and citizens are encouraged to
report perceived grievances or complaints related to
(i) rehabilitation of village roads, installation of shortcomings in the construction of neighborhood
culverts, and construction of drainage canals; projects.
(ii) construction of multipurpose and tribal
transient buildings; 215. Passage of supportive legislation. Of the
(iii) rehabilitation of water systems; three assessment municipalities, Talaingod has
(iv) registration of births, tribal marriages, and crafted the most progressive legislation to institu-
senior citizens; tionalize CDD. The municipal government approved
(v) assessment of real properties and collection of an ordinance that articulates guidelines on partici-
taxes; patory planning and budgeting at the municipal
(vi) mass vaccination; and village levels, including the establishment of the
(vii) distribution of seedlings and farm inputs; and municipal coordinating team. The ordinance is cur-
(viii) goodwill basketball games.27 rently being discussed by the provincial legislature
and is expected to be approved. Once approved, the
212. The municipal allocation for the caravan was final step prior to implementation will be the formu-
$70,000 in 2011. Funds are drawn from the municipal lation of the implementing rules and regulations of
governments development fund and its allocation the ordinance.
for capital outlays. Projects that are scheduled for
the current year become the focus of implementa- 216. Poverty monitoring. Of the three munici-
tion during the caravan. Residents are encouraged palities, Mulanay has the most advanced monitoring
to monitor implementation of the priority projects system, a community-based monitoring system cre-
that the MLGU departments implement during the ated in 2009. The 2009 data serve as the baseline for
caravan. Priority projects that cannot be accommo- the municipality.
dated during the caravan are assigned to the regular
implementation program of the municipal govern- 217. Subsequent collection of data by village
ment during the remaining months of the year. health workers indicates a decline in maternal deaths
and malnutrition, but additional data collection will
213. Community involvement in monitoring be required to determine whether these reductions
and evaluation. In Mulanay, community monitoring are sustainable.
27
Tribal transient buildings are housing units in lowland areas where tribe members who live in the uplands can stay temporarily when
they are in the lowlands.
40 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
218. In Barotac Viejo, the MLGU conducted a pov- (v) Quezon Electric Cooperative (P1.1 million for
erty survey in 2007. The survey was based on 14 two village electrification projects).
poverty indicators. The results of the 2007 survey (as
well as an earlier 2003 survey by the National Anti- 223. Community-driven development cham-
Poverty Commission) provide complete baseline pions within the local government structure. In
data for the municipality. A second survey was con- large part, the significant progress achieved in the
ducted in 2010. institutionalization of CDD in Mulanay and Talaingod
was achieved because of the presence of champions
219. Talaingod conducts a survey of basic mini- within the local governments of the two municipali-
mum needs every 2 years. The survey covers 36 ties. This is true in most of the assessment villages.
poverty indicators. The municipal government is Local officials, many of whom had previously served
considering adoption of a poverty monitoring sys- as KALAHI-CIDSS community volunteers, are now
tem developed in another province or DILGs com- strong advocates of the KALAHI way. By far, they
munity-based monitoring system. represent the largest number of KALAHI champions
and the backbone of the projects supporters.
220. Resource mobilization efforts of municipal
local government units. The resource mobilization 224. Much has already been said about the crucial
efforts of Barotac Viejo and Talaingod are focused support of a local chief executive who is committed
on increasing their tax revenues. The new mayor of to CDD. Equally important is the presence of com-
Barotac Viejo is actively seeking funds from national mitted individuals who are in strategic positions
agencies and legislators for municipal projects.28 within the municipal bureaucracy. In Mulanay and
The mayor of Talaingod is also seeking to improve Talaingod, for example, the individuals responsible
the commercial viability of existing municipal enter- for CDD under the Makamasang Tugon pilot were
prises to generate additional revenues.29 members of the original KALAHI-CIDSS area coor-
dinating team who had been absorbed into the
221. Apart from intensifying tax collections, municipal government.
Mulanays municipal government has not adopted
any resource mobilization strategies. The MLGU 225. In Mulanay, both the municipal coordinating
believes that the best strategy to attract develop- team (MCT) coordinator and the municipal planning
ment funds is to maintain good performance and and development coordinator were formerly the
utilize its existing resources as counterpart equity to coordinators of the KALAHI-CIDSS area coordinat-
the funds of interested external donors. ing team in the municipality. The MCT is housed in
the municipal planning office and its operations are
222. To date, Mulanay has been able to attract funded by the municipal budget.
funds from
226. In Talaingod, the municipal government
(i) the International Red Cross (P25 million for 500 has also institutionalized the MCT, which has a full
houses for calamity victims), complement of staff and a regular allocation in the
(ii) Department of Agrarian Reform (P40 million municipal budget. Since the end of KALAHI-CIDSS
for two circumferential roads), engagement in 2006, the municipal government has
(iii) Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace provided about P500,000 annually to support the
Process (facilitated the approval of P120 million operating costs of the MCT. The MCT coordinator,
for the construction of the municipal port), a member of the Ata-Manobo tribe, was part of the
(iv) International Labour Organization and Food original area coordinating team during implementa-
and Agriculture Organization, and tion in the municipality.
28
The new mayor of Barotac Viejo has supposedly already raised about P30 million since he assumed office. His target is to raise external
funds of about P156 million to be invested in municipal projects.
29
These municipal enterprises include (i) rental of municipal equipment (grader, pay loader, dump truck); (ii) hollow block and culvert
making, mainly for the residents of the municipality; and (iii) a one-hectare fishpond for breeding tilapia.
Findings and Assessment: Institutional Impacts 41
229. KALAHI-CIDSS has been especially effective in 232. Third, community participation lowers costs
and improves construction quality of subproject
(i) facilitating broad-based participation of investments. Community oversight helps to ensure
village residents, including special groups, smooth and rapid implementation of subprojects,
by establishing or reinvigorating grassroots while cash and in-kind community contributions, in
institutions that promote inclusive decision terms of foregone wages and local materials, lower
making and effective action; overall subproject costs and promote a sense of
(iI) enabling communities to implement quality ownership.
subprojects that address local priority needs
and sustain subproject delivery of basic 233. Fourth, sustainability is enhanced by promot-
services to their intended beneficiaries; ing shared responsibility between communities and
(iii) providing village residents with valuable local governments for the O&M of local investments.
experience in subproject management that Village and municipal governments augment
enables them to exercise voice, hold their funds raised through cost-recovery measures, thus
leaders accountable, and deal effectively with enhancing the sustainability of community social
attempts to misappropriate CDD funds; and infrastructure.
(iv) creating space for the collaboration of LGU
officials with village residents in subproject 234. The importance of the community facilita-
management, which is facilitating the process tor in mobilization cannot be overemphasized.
of institutionalizing participatory, transparent, Community facilitators are the frontline staff work-
accountable, and responsive principles and ing directly with KALAHI-CIDSS communities. They
practices into LGU planning and budgeting are expected to mobilize their assigned communi-
processes. ties, build the latters capacity for collective action,
ensure adequate representation and participation,
and, where necessary, break through elite domina-
Lessons Learned tion. To do this effectively, they must be culturally
and politically sensitive, charismatic leaders, train-
230. What are the major lessons learned from the ers, anthropologists, engineers, economists, and
analysis of the experience of KALAHI-CIDSS imple- accountants. Amid such high expectations, com-
mentation over the past 8 years? munity facilitators also work under tremendous
constraints. There is the temptation to gloss over
231. CDD provides an effective platform for local power relations in the rush to show results.
integrating and coordinating the key elements There are the ever-present attempts at manipula-
of an effective local poverty reduction strategy. tion and control by locally powerful individuals and
First, the participatory planning process of KALAHI- groups. There is also the understandable tendency
CIDSS ensures that all community members, espe- to present an impression of successful implemen-
cially the poor, are involved in the situational tation to their superiors and outsiders. For these
42
Lessons Learned and Implications for Policy and Practice 43
reasons, careful and adequate attention should be tensions that can arise between husbands and wives
paid to the training and development of commu- as a result of womens increasing engagement with
nity facilitators. Training must not be done in haste KALAHI-CIDSS. Ironically, the community nature of
but rather as part of an incremental learning-by- CDD can sometimes force field staff to accept exist-
doing process that gives inexperienced facilitators ing gender relations in the community and hinder
the chance to learn and grow under the tutelage efforts to promote gender equity.
of more experienced supervisors (Mansuri and
Rao2004). 239. Time frames for CDD implementation pro-
cesses need to be flexible. Community-driven
235. Despite some weaknesses, the MIBF is development involves disruption of an existing
an effective mechanism for the selection of vil- equilibrium where the prevailing social system allo-
lage subprojects and allocation of development cates resources to serve the interests of entrenched
resources. A number of modifications have been elites. By necessity, breaking down these social sys-
introduced into the MIBF to prevent collusion, con- tems will be a slow and gradual process that must be
sidered to be one of its principal weaknesses. One done with care and full knowledge of both benefi-
of the more promising experiments is found in cial and adverse consequences. As Mansuri and Rao
Mulanay where the task of subproject ranking has (2004) reported in their study for the World Bank, an
been transferred to an impartial panel, whose mem- effective CDD strategy has to involve slow, gradual,
bers are selected by village representatives. persistent learning-by-doing where project design
gradually adapts to local conditions by learning
236. Another approach is the removal of qualita- from the false starts and mistakes that are endemic
tive criteria, which has been the major area of abuse to all complex interventions.
in the past. While the exclusion of qualitative criteria
does eliminate the subjective element of the MIBF, it 240. In particular, time periods and deadlines for
also removes village representatives from the deci- the completion of subprojects should be flexible.
sion-making process in subproject selection, which Deadlines are important, but when they are consid-
is the underlying rationale for the MIBF. ered inflexible, communities can be disadvantaged.
For example, communities may be persuaded to
237. Finally, the element of competition in the forego or disregard unresolved issues with suppli-
MIBF is a double-edged sword that must be handled ers to complete their subprojects within prescribed
carefully. On the one hand, it is the main energiz- deadlines.
ing element that accounts for the high degree of
participation of communities in KALAHI-CIDSS. On 241. Corruption or misuse of development
the other hand, competition gives rise to traditional resources can be reduced through strong com-
politicking and collusion, practices that run counter munity participation in CDD that promotes
to the principles of CDD. transparency and accountability. Above all else,
communities value the transparency that pervades
238. Womens significant involvement in KALAHI- KALAHI-CIDSS. Transparency, which is practiced dur-
CIDSS has increased their self-confidence and ing all steps in the CEAC, reduces leakage of pub-
enhanced their analytical, management, and lead- lic funds. All procurement activities are conducted
ership skills. The strong participation of women by community members with public opening and
notwithstanding, several gender equity issues awarding of bids. The release of funds is documented,
remain unresolved. First, men still outrank women and reports are made at village assemblies and allow
in leadership positions of the various KALAHI-CIDSS scrutiny by community members.
volunteer committees. In many instances, women
are assigned as documenter, treasurer, cook, record 242. Effective supervision of CDD implementation,
keeper, and other traditional roles that are, in effect, and of funds use in particular, is achieved through
extensions of their responsibilities as household a combination of community-based assessments,
managers. Second, recognition of womens con- internal monitoring by project staff, and oversight by
tributions and the proper valuation of their work local governments. When conducted as a learning
remain continuing challenges. Third, there is no tool, project supervision and monitoring generates
formal mechanism for the resolution of domestic effective insights to address problems, particularly
44 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
those related to the misuse of funds. Finally, the 247. These positive experiences notwithstand-
projects GRS gives communities and members of ing, more support is needed to institutionalize
the public an effective venue to resolve claims of CDD approaches, especially given the capacity and
wrongdoing. funding constraints of poor MLGUs. The institution-
alization of CDD requires that local governments
243. National government funding for KALAHI- acquire new CDD-oriented values, renew their
CIDSS and CDD can leverage other local resources orientation toward public service, and make insti-
for investments in service delivery. KALAHI-CIDSS tutional adjustments in their operating processes.
has provided incentives for enhancing local resource This is not an easy task for local chief executives
mobilization efforts and improved coordination of of powerful political families who are accustomed
local resources. In seeking support to meet targets to highly centralized governance styles and mak-
for local counterpart funding, many communities ing major budget and development decisions by
and their local governments have secured supple- themselves.
mental contributions from both public and private
sources, including district congresspersons, provin- 248. In the KC-1/Ext phase of KALAHI-CIDSS, DSWD
cial governments, nongovernment organizations, has introduced the Makamasang Tugon modality in
and other development partners. which municipal governments assume lead respon-
sibility for local CDD implementation, with DSWD
244. Even villages that were not successful in secur- performing support and oversight. The modality
ing funding from KALAHI-CIDSS have had some suc- is expected to improve overall cost-effectiveness
cess in identifying alternative funding providers. while ensuring that local leadership and communi-
Their success is not only important for the additional ties assume responsibility for implementing CDD
resources that were leveraged; the experience has activities.
also promoted greater awareness among poor com-
munities and LGUs of the availability of resources 249. Introduction of the LGU-led modality is an
other than those from the internal revenue allot- ambitious proposition. While some municipalities
ment provided to municipal governments. (Mulanay and Talaingod are clear examples) may be
in a position to assume this lead role, others may not
245. The efficiency of KALAHI-CIDSS and other be up to the task.
CDD programs can be enhanced by devolving
local implementation to responsive LGUs. In 250. With the introduction of the Makamasang
the early days of KALAHI-CIDSS, fears of elite cap- Tugon pilot there are now two implementation
ture motivated implementers to marginalize village modalities in KALAHI-CIDSS. The first is regu-
and municipal LGUs. Over time, however, the role lar implementation, where DSWD takes the lead
of LGUs in implementation has grown substan- role; the second is LGU-led, where the munici-
tially to address the sustainability requirements of pal government assumes leadership. Perhaps a
KALAHI-CIDSS. third option can be formulated, a middle ground
between these two modalities, for LGUs that are
246. After 8 years of KC-1 implementation, a num- not yet prepared to assume lead responsibility for
ber of municipal governments have exceeded CDD implementation.
expectations in their buy-in and support for KALAHI-
CIDSS, which include the passage of municipal reso- 251. There are clear benefits and challenges in
lutions in support of the CDD approaches, hiring of the management of a CDD program by a national
previous KALAHI-CIDSS staff as municipal employ- government agency. In the Philippines, manage-
ees, and innovative funding mechanisms to sup- ment and direct implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS
port community subprojects. The majority of other is the responsibility of the DSWD. The advantages
participating MLGUs have also responded posi- of this implementation arrangement include the
tively to the CDD goals of enhanced governance following:
and improved service delivery while continuing
to struggle with the adoption of new values, roles, (i) scale (KALAHI-CIDSS covers more than 50% of
and relationships. the country);
Lessons Learned and Implications for Policy and Practice 45
(ii) strong prospects for long-term sustainability, Implications for Policy and Practice:
as the project can receive continued funding Scaling Up Community-Driven
from the national government budget; and
(iii) possible ripple effects on the entire Development as a National Strategy
government bureaucracy. Other national
257. The 8-year experience of KALAHI-CIDSS has
government agencies in the Philippines can
sufficiently demonstrated its viability and cost-
replicate the CDD approach of KALAHI-CIDSS
effectiveness as a mechanism to fund priority com-
in the delivery of their own programs.
munity investments identified by residents. Given
252. The major disadvantage is the threat of bureau- this demonstrated effectiveness, what will it take to
cratic capture, which can manifest itself through (i) cen- scale up CDD as an overall national development
trally determined deadlines to force synchronized field strategy to address poverty and improve gover-
implementation across multiple locations with diverse nance? The adoption of CDD as a national strat-
conditions, (ii) bureaucratic procedures and financial egy in the current Philippine Development Plan
regulations that drain the initiative and energies of (20112016) is a welcome development and an
local implementers, (iii) turf issues with other govern- important first step.
ment agencies, and (iv) difficulties in retaining staff.
258. Eventually, an enabling law or executive order
253. Clearly, the continuing challenge is how to will be required to translate the CDD strategy into a
insulate the CDD program and partner communities national program. The enabling instrument will need
from having to deal with and work through what are to address several challenges and constraints to the
perceived to be the debilitating policies and proce- institutionalization of CDD: the absence of stable
dures of a government bureaucracy. long-term funding for CDD activities; existing laws
that inhibit community participation in subproject
254. Social preparation, an intrinsic feature of implementation and monitoring; lack of bottom-up
CDD programs, should not be seen as a cost but planning and budgeting processes within national
rather as an investment in human capital forma- government agency systems; and top-down deliv-
tion. KALAHI-CIDSS is considered by some to be ery of community subprojects, which runs contrary
expensive, and therefore unsustainable in the long to CDD principles and practices.
term, because of its emphasis on social preparation
and community capacity building. For this reason, 259. To be effective, the envisioned national CDD
the continued provision of capacity building and program would need to rely on existing national
grants for subprojects, the two main program com- systems and procedures. Sector departments for
ponents, has become the major concern of DSWD agriculture, education, and health will be active
and its other stakeholders. Long-term sustainabil- participants as they collaborate to ensure that
ity is a major rationale for the introduction of the existing resources are allocated as efficiently as
Makamasang Tugon modality. possible, new investments are responsive to local
development plans, technical specifications are
255. The root of the problem lies in the short- maintained, and relevant facility staffing and sup-
sighted view that social preparation is merely a cost or port are ensured.
project expenditure. Instead of this view, the amount
spent for social preparation should be recognized 260. Interdepartmental convergence will be
as an investment in human capital formation. Unlike encouraged to rationalize the various efforts to
analogous investments in education and health that improve service delivery and streamline efforts to
have long-term effects, investment in social prepara- combat poverty. Convergence should be experi-
tion bears immediate fruit as enhanced community ence-based and build on successful collaboration
capacity results in well-managed village subprojects efforts between and among sector departments
with strong prospects for long-term sustainability. and local government units. Best practices in conver-
gence, whether in terms of thematic concerns, coor-
256. In the medium and long term, this invest- dination mechanisms, or resource sharing, should be
ment will yield even more dividends in terms of an documented and reviewed for possible replication at
empowered and productive citizenry. higher levels.
46 The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
261. Fortunately, DSWD and other national agen- could be contributed by Philippine legislators from
cies have positive experiences in convergence. their countryside development fund, which is used
Internally, DSWD is facilitating the convergence of to support projects in their respective congressio-
KALAHI-CIDSS, the 4Ps conditional cash transfer, nal districts. The amounts contributed will not be
and the Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran deducted from the legislators individual allocations;
(Micro-Credit) Program, its three main interven- in fact, individual legislators will be able to select
tions to address the needs of the poorest. Externally, the communities to whom their contributions will
KALAHI-CIDSS is collaborating with the Department be assigned. Once the communities are identified,
of Education and other agencies to refocus resources CDD implementing agencies will assist communities
on poor communities. Meanwhile, the National to manage and utilize the funds according to CDD
Convergence Initiative of the departments of agrar- principles and practices.
ian reform, agriculture, and environment and natu-
ral resources is demonstrating the ability of the 265. In like manner, national government agencies
departments to undertake CDD and how resources can disburse a portion of their program budgets
can be converged for complementary programs and (e.g., 5%) to existing KALAHI-CIDSS communities
services to targeted communities. to be managed according to KALAHI-CIDSS pro-
cedures. The Philippine Congress could enact an
262. Apart from technical assistance, monitoring, enabling law that permits projects worth $250,000
and oversight of local government units, DILG is and below from various national government agen-
expected to take the lead for the installation of an cies and departments (public works and highways,
incentive system to encourage local governments agriculture, agrarian reform, education, health, etc.)
to move progressively toward good governance to be implemented through the KALAHI-CIDSS com-
practices. The National Anti-Poverty Commission munities after the competence of these communi-
and National Economic and Development Authority ties has been established.
should assume responsibility in the evaluation of the
programs ultimate antipoverty impacts. The depart- 266. Finally, the design process to scale up CDD
ments of finance and budget and management can into a national strategy for Philippine development
be tasked to facilitate fiscal transfers and undertake will benefit from a review of Indonesias National
overall financial management. Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM-
Mandiri). The experience of the program offers
263. Some national agencies will be interested in many lessons for the national expansion of CDD in
pursuing an active role, taking responsibility for local the Philippines. Particularly relevant will be lessons
CDD implementation within certain geographic related to financial arrangements and the difficulty
areas. These agencies will receive assistance in set- of consolidating the many department-specific ver-
ting up CDD units within their respective depart- sions of CDD activities that different national agen-
ments. A CDD training institute will be established cies implement.
for agency implementers and field staff. The CDD
institute will perform a key role in building the staff 267. PNPM-Mandiri was formulated with the assis-
capacity of CDD units and of provincial and munici- tance of Indonesias major development partners
pal LGUs engaged in local CDD implementation. and incorporates lessons from CDD projects and
programs in the country, including the two impor-
264. Other national agencies may be inclined to tant CDD elements of community control of deci-
take a less active, funding-oriented role by allo- sion making over investment choices and the direct
cating a portion of their departmental budgets, flow of funds to community groups.
whether from their national government allocation
or official development assistance from donors, 268. PNPM-Mandiri seeks to consolidate the unco-
to support CDD projects. Their funding role would ordinated and sometimes overlapping programs of
approximate the proposal of the former mayor of the different sector ministries by using a single frame-
Mulanay, the man largely responsible for the excel- work that institutionalizes bottom-up planning and
lent implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS in the munici- decision making. The PNPM-Mandiri Oversight Body,
pality, who has suggested the establishment of a a coordinating committee of ministries implement-
national CDD fund. Part of the national CDD fund ing community-based and CDD poverty-reduction
Lessons Learned and Implications for Policy and Practice 47
programs, provides policy directives, guidance, and 269. Consistent with the thrust of Indonesias gov-
managerial oversight to the program. It is chaired ernment to have a single strategy for community
by the coordinating minister for social welfare, and empowerment and poverty reduction, it has har-
its members include the state ministers of national monized its approaches, guidelines and procedures.
development planning and less developed regions PNPM-Mandiri is supported by a monitoring and
and the ministers of finance, home affairs, public evaluation framework, a grievance redress system,
works, and social development. The composition of a common management information system, and
this body is mirrored in provincial and district coor- common training packages. All of these have been
dination teams, which are chaired by provincial gov- jointly prepared by the government and its develop-
ernors and district heads. These regional bodies also ment partners under the leadership of the PNPM-
have coordinating and monitoring functions. Mandiri Oversight Body.
References
Canlas, Corinne. 2009. Makamasang Tugon KALAHI-CIDSS National Project Management Office.
Community Driven Development: From Practice to 2007. Field Guide for KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Area Coordinating
Prospects. Unpublished study for KALAHI-CIDSS. TeamsCEAC Operations Manual. Unpublished. 5
February 2007.
Edillon, Rosemarie et al. 2007. Mid-Term Survey for the
Impact Evaluation of the KALAHI-CIDSS: Final Report. Mansuri, Ghazala and Rao, Vijayendra. 2004.
Quezon City: Asia-Pacific Policy Center. Community Based (and Driven) Development: A Critical
Review. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Edillon, Rosemarie G. et al. 2011. Impact Evaluation of No. 3209. Washington, DC: World Bank.
the KALAHI-CIDSSFinal Survey. Quezon City: Asia-
Pacific Policy Center.
48
The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines
Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development
ADBs vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing
member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite
the regions many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of the worlds poor: 1.8 billion
people who live on less than $2 a day, with 903 million struggling on less than $1.25 a day.
ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, environmentally
sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity
investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.