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respectfully submits this brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial.
I. INTRODUCTION
This court has invested a substantial amount of time and resources hearing and
evaluating the facts and arguments in support of Plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims
against the District. The Court first evaluated Plaintiffs’ claims when it reviewed full
briefing by both parties on the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On February
25, 2010, the Court issued a detailed, 25-page decision denying the Motion, reasoning
that trial was necessary to flesh out the facts, and noting that it was particularly reluctant
to grant summary judgment and to deny Plaintiffs the right to trial in this case, which
involves issues of public policy and great concern to the community. The Court reached
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a case proffered by Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 53, at 24-25.
The Court next held a 9-day bench trial in which both sides were permitted
opening statements. The Court heard evidence from 25 witnesses called by Plaintiffs.
The Court then heard testimony from two additional witnesses proffered by the District,
and, at the conclusion of the evidence, permitted both parties to make lengthy closing
arguments. Finally, after issuing lengthy factual findings on May 13, 2010, the Court
entertained post-trial briefing by both sides on the legal issues and subsequently held oral
argument on those very same issues on June 4, 2010. After oral argument, the Court
allowed the parties an additional opportunity to submit a letter to the Court concerning
additional points raised during oral argument, which Plaintiffs did on June 11, 2010.
After considering all of the above evidence and arguments, on June 24, 2010, the Court
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Plaintiffs have not provided any compelling reason why the Court should now
question its sound discretion and undo its well-reasoned decision. For these reasons and
those set forth more fully below, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New
II. ARGUMENT
A. Legal Standard
heavy burden. It must demonstrate that a new trial is “required to prevent injustice or to
correct a verdict that was against the weight of the evidence.” American Bearing Co. v.
Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 948 (3d cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984);
Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 736 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Anderson v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-6043, 2001 WL 177068, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
2001). In a non-jury case, as here, a motion for a new trial must be based “upon manifest
error of law or mistake of fact, and a judgment should not be set aside except for
substantial reason.” WRIGHT & MILLER, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. 2d § 2804 (2005)
(emphasis added); see also Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 59.13[3][a] (same).
The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial “is confided almost entirely to the
exercise of [its] discretion.” American Bearing Co., 729 F.2d at 948. When determining
whether to grant a motion for a new trial, a “court should be most reluctant to set aside
that which it has previously decided.” Libatti v. United States, 178 F.3d 114, 118 (2d
Cir. 1999) (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983)), and “must ‘view
all the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party with the verdict.’” Ferguson v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 95-938,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10910, at *10 (emphasis added) (quoting Marino v. Ballestas, 749
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F.2d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 1984)). These “rigorous restrictions imposed on the granting of a
new trial” are critical to uphold the “important policies of conserving ever-dwindling
judicial resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” Burzynski v. Travers, 111 F.R.D.
15, 18 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d without op., 833 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1986).
Notably, a motion for new trial is not meant to be an avenue to rehash or relitigate
legal principles and arguments already presented to and rejected by the court. “The
authorities generally recognize that a new trial should not be granted where it is obvious
that it would serve no purpose except to relitigate issues which have been correctly and
finally determined. In considering a motion for a new trial the court must determine
whether or not the reasons advanced indicate that a substantial injustice has been done by
improper action on the part of the court or jury, and also indicates that a new trial will
amount to more than a mere relitigation of the issues.” Wilson v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc.,
158 F. Supp. 127, 129-30 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (quoting Miller v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 17 F.R.D. 121, 124 (W.D. Mich. 1954)). As one court has succinctly observed,
“[d]istrict court opinion[s] are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to reconsideration
at a litigant’s pleasure.” Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D.
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are entitled to a new trial under these
stringent standards. Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New
Trial.
B. The Court Did Not Find that Strict Scrutiny Was Mandated
As a preliminary matter, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Court did not find
that application of strict scrutiny was “mandated” in this case. Indeed, the Court
distinguished the Supreme Court cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their
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argument for strict scrutiny, i.e., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (“Seattle”), Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499 (2005), recognizing, as it had done previously, that these cases are distinguishable
from the case at hand, as they involved actions that expressly employed individual racial
classifications, whereas this case involves a facially neutral redistricting plan and facially
neutral redistricting guidelines and no individual racial classifications. Dkt. No. 121 at 9,
11, 14. The Court further distinguished these cases on the grounds that they allocated
benefits and burdens based on individual racial classifications, see Dkt. No. 121 at 11,
Indeed, the Court stated that “the Supreme Court cases relied upon by Plaintiffs
are distinguishable, indicating that strict scrutiny may not be the operative standard to
evaluate the constitutionality of the District’s January 2009 redistricting.” Dkt. No. 121,
at 6-7 (emphasis added). See also Dkt. No. 121 at 5 (“If strict scrutiny applies to this
case, the Court must determine whether the inclusion of a particular geographic area due
to its racial makeup violates the Equal protection Clause, or whether the District has
shown that the same redistricting plan would have been adopted absent such a
Moreover, even though the Court ultimately applied strict scrutiny in light of the
Third Circuit’s decision in Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548 (3d
Cir. 2002), it noted that language in Adarand “indicates that the Supreme Court did not
intend for strict scrutiny to be applied to cases such as Arlington Heights, Pryor, or this
case, in which the challenged policies do not expressly employ ‘individual racial
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classifications.’” Dkt. No. 121 at 16, n.7. The Court similarly questioned whether
application of strict scrutiny under Pryor was valid in light of Seattle. Id. at 15, n.6
programs only involving individual racial classifications calls into question whether
in part on race, applies to student assignment plans that do not involve individual racial
classifications.”).
considered evidence that race was a motivating factor during redistricting,” the Court
applied strict scrutiny. Dkt. No. 121 at 17 (emphasis added). At the same time, however,
the Court expressly recognized that “no congressional statute or Supreme Court
After giving Plaintiffs every benefit of the doubt and applying strict scrutiny
(although not mandated), the Court found, based on the record evidence and testimony
elicited after nine days of trial, that the redistricting in question survived such review, as
the District had demonstrated that Plan 3R was the only redistricting plan that
District: (1) equalizing the populations at the two high schools; (b) minimizing travel
time and transportation costs; (3) fostering educational continuity; and (4) fostering
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walkability, as defined by reference to living within the official, historic Lower Merion
High School walk zone. Dkt. No. 121 at 21.1 The Court also found that other legitimate
factors motivated the Administration to act as it did, including the goals of helping
students achieve educational excellence, . . . and also closing the achievement gap that
Dkt. No. 114 at 51 (emphasis added). See also Dkt. No. 121 at 29-30.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the interests identified by the District (a) do not fall
within the categories of compelling state interests recognized by the Supreme Court in
situations where student school assignments are based upon race, and (b) cannot be
Supreme Court, should be rejected. As an initial matter, and as the Court found, this case
does not involve individual student assignments based upon race. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s recognition of certain interests as “compelling” does not preclude the
existence of other compelling interests, and Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority that would
indicate otherwise. Seattle did not rule out diversity as a compelling government interest
outside the higher education context, and, indeed, five Justices in Seattle agreed that
diversity and reducing racial isolation in the secondary education context are compelling
1 In a footnote, Plaintiffs cite Seattle, 551 U.S. at 720, for the proposition that “the stated goal has to
bear a relationship to a race based policy in order to survive a strict scrutiny challenge” and
concludes that none of the goals identified by the Court, i.e., equalizing the populations at the two
high schools, minimizing travel time and transportation costs, fostering educational continuity,
and fostering walkability, bear such a relationship. Dkt No. 127-2 at 7, n.3. Notably, however,
the language relied upon by Plaintiffs reads as follows: “[T]he school districts must demonstrate
that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under review is
‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.” 551 U.S. at 720. As
previously stated and repeatedly recognized by this Court, the instant matter did not involve a
student assignment plan and did not involve individual racial classifications; consequently, it does
not fit the mold of Seattle or the other Supreme Court precedents relied upon by Plaintiffs.
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D. The District Was Not Precluded From Arguing Both That Race Was
Not a Factor in Redistricting and that, To the Extent that It Did
Consider Race, It Did So to Achieve a Compelling State Interest
The District has maintained throughout this case that race was not a factor in
determining which of the District’s two high schools students would attend, but that to
the extent that it did consider race in the redistricting process, it did so in an appropriate
and legally permissible manner. This position does not preclude it from arguing, and is
entirely consistent with its position, that Plan 3R and any consideration of race in
interests. Notably, Plaintiffs fail to proffer any applicable case law holding otherwise.
The one case they do cite in purported support of their argument that these defenses are
mutually exclusive, G-1 Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 586 F.3d 247 (3d Cir.
2009), is inapposite, as it did not involve an equal protection analysis, or any claim of
discrimination, for that matter. Instead, in G-1 Holdings the defendant first claimed that
a particular policy did not apply to the matter at issue but later attempted to invoke a
provision of the same policy. The court ultimately found that judicial estoppel did not
apply, and noted that in the Third Circuit, judicial estoppel is generally not appropriate
where the defending party did not convince the District Court to accept its earlier
position. 568 F.3d at 262. Here, Judge Baylson found that race was one of several
plans; therefore, judicial estoppel does not operate to preclude the District from arguing
that Plan 3R and any consideration of race in redistricting were narrowly tailored to
2
Plaintiffs boldly assert that “[i]t would appear as a matter of law that in those instances when a
court has found that a defendant used race as a factor in decision-making after an Arlington
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which the Court could conclude that to the extent the District took race into account in
the redistricting process, it did so to address the empirically measured “achievement gap”
between African-American students and their peers of other racial and ethnic
the Court noted in its Factual Findings, “legitimate factors motivated the Administration
to act as it did, including the goals of helping students achieve educational excellence,
attaining equal student populations at the two high schools, minimizing travel time,
developing the 3–1–1 feeder pattern, and also closing the achievement gap that the
Moreover, at trial Dr. McGinley testified at length as to the reasons why he, as an
educator, would look at race in connection with providing educational opportunities to all
students, and testified concerning a number of programs and initiatives that he and the
District had implemented to specifically combat the achievement gap and ameliorate
racial isolation. See April 14, 2010 Trial Testimony of Dr. McGinley. Plaintiffs
themselves introduced into evidence documents demonstrating that, to the extent race
was taken into account during redistricting, it was done to address these issues. See P-
166 and P-167, video clips of portions of the November 17, 2009 Board meeting, during
Heights/Pryor review, as in this case, then said defendant will always lose a strict scrutiny
challenge.” Dkt. No. 127-2 at 6-7. Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of this statement,
and the Supreme Court’s precedents contradict it. Even under Arlington Heights/Pryor, a
defendant can prevail even after race has been found to have been a factor by showing that
its action was narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 562.
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which Dr. McGinley stated that he would want to make sure the District did not have any
racially isolated students if they were to adopt a 3-1-1 plan drawn on a north-south bias,
and that he thought about equalization of student populations, such as students with IEPs
and students on free or reduced price lunch, as a reality check after each plan. In sum,
the record speaks for itself, and there is sufficient evidence for the Court to have
concluded that the District considered the racial demographics of the Affected Area
during redistricting in connection with its desire to address the achievement gap and
The Court’s finding that the redistricting process embraced “racial parity” does
not alter this conclusion. Plaintiffs incorrectly assume that “racial parity,” as referenced
by the Court in its Factual Findings, equals the “racial balancing” found impermissible by
the Seattle Court. There is no support for this assumption. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reliance
misplaced here. The full context of this statement in both Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003), and Seattle indicates that racial balancing is never permitted solely for the
purpose of achieving a particular racial balance – in other words, racial balance is not to
be achieved for its own sake. Such racial balancing is not at issue here.
F. The Court Properly Found that the District’s Actions Were Narrowly
Tailored to Achieve Compelling State Interests
contend that there is no evidence in the trial record regarding how many African-
American students needed to be redistricted or whether this number were in fact moved
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McGinley, Dr. Jarvis, and Dr. Lyles that because racial isolation is not formulaic, any
effective method of combating racial isolation similarly must not be formulaic or “by the
numbers.”
wrong. Plaintiffs ignore the undisputed testimony of Dr. McGinley and Board Members
that magnet programs were, in fact, considered, but because additional magnet programs
at Harriton would interfere with the legitimate educational goal of having equal curricular
opportunities at both high schools, and because the use of magnet programs in the past
Lower Merion High School, the District determined, in its discretion, that the
achieve its redistricting goals. Moreover, as the Court noted, “narrow tailoring does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative.” Dkt. No. 121 at 30
Third, Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence that once the African-American
student population at both high schools “becomes equal,” there will be more African-
American children taking classes with their non-African-American peers. The Court,
however, never found that the African-American student populations would at some point
be equal at both high schools. The Court instead relied on evidence that the District
implemented initiatives such as clustering to address racial isolation and achievement gap
courses and not select courses below their individual abilities. On that basis, the Court
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found legitimate educational reasons for having African-American students at both high
schools. Plan 3R, in addition to fulfilling the District’s goals of equalizing the overall
student populations at the two high schools, minimizing travel time and transportation
costs, fostering educational continuity K-12, and fostering walkability, achieved that.
Finally, Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that there is no express limit on
Plan 3R’s duration. The mere fact, however, that Plan 3R may not have a definitive end
point does not render it insufficiently narrowly tailored. First, the language of Grutter
mere dicta. Second, Justice O’Connor went on to state that “[e]nshrining a permanent
justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection
principle.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-42. These concerns simply do not exist here, where
The Court properly found that the District established that Plan 3R still would
have been adopted even had racial demographics not been considered. Plaintiffs have
that the District failed to allege and therefore waived. This argument is misplaced and
should be rejected. First, Plaintiffs fail to cite any case law in support of their position.
They do, however, cite authority stating that an affirmative defense is an assertion by the
defendant of new facts or arguments that, if true, would defeat plaintiff’s claim, even if
all of plaintiff’s allegations were presumed correct. See Dkt. 127-2 at 12. The facts and
arguments relied upon by the Court to conclude that Plan 3R would have been adopted
even had racial demographics not been considered are not new. The District has asserted
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from the very beginning and throughout this case that the Affected Area was districted to
Harriton because of geography and existing feeder patterns. Students living in the
Affected Area attend Penn Valley Elementary School and Welsh Valley Middle School
and reside outside the official Lower Merion High School walk zone; consequently,
under Plan 3R, which utilized a 3-1-1 feeder pattern, they were districted to Harriton
High School, along with all other students, regardless of race, who similarly attend Penn
Valley and Welsh Valley and live outside the official Lower Merion High School walk
zone. Consequently, Plaintiffs clearly were on notice of the District’s position that even
apart from any consideration of race, the Affected Area would attend Harriton under Plan
3R.
Plaintiffs also were on notice that the Administration developed and presented,
and the Board ultimately adopted, Plan 3R because it fulfilled the K-12 continuity goal
walkability for those students living within the official Lower Merion High School walk
zone, another priority set by the Board. Once the Board decided to utilize a 3-1-1 plan,
and to maintain the option for those living within the official Lower Merion High School
walk zone, it was inevitable that they would choose Plan 3R, because Plan 3R was the
only plan that would fulfill those goals. It was similarly inevitable that all students in the
Affected Area would have to attend Harriton under Plan 3R, apart from any consideration
of race, because they attended an elementary and middle school that fed into Harriton
High School under the 3-1-1 feeder pattern, and because they resided outside the official
Lower Merion High School walk zone. The mere fact that the District did not label these
facts and arguments as an “affirmative defense” does not alter the fact that they were
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defense, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any prejudice to them resulting from the District’s
failure to assert this as an affirmative defense in its answer or other pleading. Indeed, the
Third Circuit has held “that the failure to assert an affirmative defense in an answer will
not result in waiver if the opposing party has notice of the defense sufficient to avoid
prejudice.” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1991) (“It has been held that a
defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if he raised the issue at a pragmatically
sufficient time, and [the plaintiff] was not prejudiced in its ability to respond.”).
Plaintiffs’ contention that the District has not proved “inevitability” in light of the
Court’s finding that the Affected Area had been targeted due to its racial composition and
the District’s admission that the walk zone does not extend one mile into Plaintiffs’
neighborhood is incorrect. The Court already has found that there is no evidence in the
record to support Plaintiffs’ conclusion that not expanding the walk zone to include the
Affected Area, even though part of the Affected Area is within one mile of Lower Merion
High School, was a subterfuge. See Dkt. No. 114 at 43-44. Moreover, the Court’s
finding that the District “targeted” the Plaintiffs’ neighborhood for redistricting to
Harriton High School in part because of its racial demographics does not negate the fact
that the District would have chosen Plan 3R, and the Affected Area would have been
districted to attend Harriton High School under Plan 3R, even in the absence of such
“targeting.”
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because of racial considerations fails to show that Plan 3R was not inevitable. What
matters is what plan was adopted by the Board, not what scenarios or plans were
discarded. Consequently, the argument that Dr. Haber unilaterally discarded potential
information was withheld from the public is likewise immaterial. What is material is that
once the Board decided that K-12 educational continuity, which required a 3-1-1 feeder
pattern, was its primary goal, and that it should maintain walkability (as defined in
relation to those students residing within the official Lower Merion High School walk
zone), Plan 3R was the only plan that could meet these requirements.
In sum, the irony is that if the District had never looked at any race data during
the redistricting process, it still would have ended up with Plan 3R, knowing full well that
found, both North Ardmore and the Affected Area were “natural candidates for
redistricting” because they were the two areas closest to Harriton that were not already
districted to attend Harriton prior to the adoption of Plan 3R. Dkt. 121 at 25. Of these
two areas, the Affected Area ultimately was chosen for redistricting to Harriton High
School, because redistricting students in that area fostered K-12 educational continuity,
whereas redistricting students in North Ardmore would not have done so. Dkt. 121 at 27.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision was based on solid reasoning and evidence – much of which
was undisputed – presented during a 9-day bench trial, and Plaintiffs have not provided
any compelling reason why the Court should now question its sound discretion. The
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bottom line is that, as this Court found, neither the Supreme Court, nor the Third Circuit
has ever prohibited a school district from taking into account the demographics of a
neighborhood as one of many factors in assigning students to schools. Indeed, the only
discussion of this issue in any Supreme Court case is that of Justice Kennedy, who
See Seattle, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, there is no error of law to
be corrected. As to the facts, Plaintiffs have not pointed to any mistakes. Having
performed the Arlington Heights factual examination, the Court has reached a decision
that Plaintiffs simply do not like. Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision,
however, is not a legal basis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to relitigate these facts. The
District respectfully submits that the Court should therefore deny their Motion for a New
Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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