7/6/2016 G.R.No.

93252

TodayisWednesday,July06,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.93252August5,1991

RODOLFOT.GANZON,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSandLUIST.SANTOS,respondents.

G.R.No.93746August5,1991

MARYANNRIVERAARTIEDA,petitioner,
vs.
HON.LUISSANTOS,inhiscapacityasSecretaryoftheDepartmentofLocalGovernment,NICANORM.
PATRICIO,inhiscapacityasChief,LegalServiceoftheDepartmentofLocalGovernmentandSALVADOR
CABALUNAJR.,respondents.

G.R.No.95245August5,1991

RODOLFOT.GANZON,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSandLUIST.SANTOS,inhiscapacityastheSecretaryofthe
DepartmentofLocalGovernment,respondents.

NicolasP.Sonalanforpetitionerin93252.

RomeoA.Gerochiforpetitionerin93746.

EugenioOriginalforpetitionerin95245.

SARMIENTO,J.:p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government),tosuspendand/orremovelocalofficials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsodthereof(G.R.No.93746),respectively.

ThepetitionsofMayorGanzonoriginatedfromaseriesofadministrativecomplaints,teninnumber,filedagainst
himbyvariouscityofficialssometimein1988,onvariouscharges,amongthem,abuseofauthority,oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office Salvador
Cabaluna, her husband Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer Mansueto Malabor, ViceMayor Rolando
Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
andPanchoErbite,abarangaytanod.ThecomplaintsagainsttheMayoraresetforthintheopinionoftherespondentCourt
ofAppeals.2Wequote:

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Inherverifiedcomplaint(AnnexA),Mrs.Cabaluna,aclerkassignedtotheCityHealth,OfficeofIloilo
Citychargedthatduetopoliticalreasons,havingsupportedtherivalcandidate,Mrs.Rosa0.Caram,
the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the
public,pulledheroutfromrightfulofficewhereherqualificationsarebestsuitedandassignedherto
aworkthatshouldbethefunctionofanoncareerserviceemployee.Tomakemattersworse,autility
worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and
functions, has been detailed to take her place.The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at
luringherawayfromherpermanentpositionorforcehertoresign.

InthecaseofDra.FelicidadOrtigoza,sheclaimsthatthepetitionerhandpickedhertoperformtask
notbefittingherpositionasAssistantCityHealthOfficerofIloiloCitythatherofficewaspadlocked
withoutanyexplanationorjustificationthathersalarywaswithheldwithoutcausesinceApril1,1988

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thatwhenshefiledhervacationleave,shewasgiventherunaroundtreatmentintheapprovalofher
leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a wellengineered
trumpedupchargeinanadministrativecomplaintfiledbyDr.RodolfoVillegas(AnnexB).

Ontheotherhand,MansueloMalaboristhedulyelectedViceMayorofIloiloCityandcomplainants
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are
members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the
casewhereCouncilorLarryOng,whosekeytohisofficewasunceremoniouslyandwithoutprevious
notice,takenbypetitioner.Withoutanoffice,CouncilorOnghadtoholdofficeatPlazaLibertad,The
ViceMayorandtheothercomplainantssympathizedwithhimanddecidedtodothesame.However,
the petitioner, together with its fullyarmed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza
Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station
anddecidedtoholdofficeattheFreedomGrandstandatIloiloCityandthereweresomanypeople
whogatheredtowitnesstheincident.However,beforethegroupcouldreachthearea,thepetitioner,
togetherwithhissecuritymen,ledthefiremenusingafiretruckindozingwatertothepeopleandthe
bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former
mayorRosaO.Caram.OnMarch13,1988,withoutthebenefitofchargesfiledagainsthimandno
warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon
ordersofpetitioner.Injail,hewasallegedlymauledbyotherdetaineestherebycausinginjuriesHe
wasreleasedonlythefollowingday.3

TheMayorthereafteranswered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing.The opinion of the Court ofAppeals also
setforththesucceedingevents:

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TheinitialhearingintheCabalunaandOrtigozacasesweresetforhearingonJune2021,1988at
theRegionalOfficeoftheDepartmentofLocalGovernmentinIloiloCity.Notices,throughtelegrams,
were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The
petitioneraskedforapostponementbeforethescheduleddateofhearingandwasrepresentedby
counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino
BermudezhadtocomeallthewayfromManilaforthetwodayhearingsbutwasactuallyheldonly
onJune20,1988inviewoftheinabilityandunpreparednessofpetitioner'scounsel.

The next hearings were reset to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venueIloilo City. Again, the
petitionerattemptedtodelaytheproceedingsandmovedforapostponementundertheexcusethat
he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in
viewofthefactthatthepartieswerenotifiedbytelegramsofthescheduledhearings(AnnexM).

Inthesaidhearings,petitioner'scounselcrossexaminedthecomplainantsandtheirwitnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
August11,1988tolastuntilOctober11,1988foraperiodofsixty(60)days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a
postponementtoSeptember26,1988.OnSeptember26,1988,thecomplainantsandpetitionerwere
present,togetherwiththeirrespectivecounsel.Thepetitionersoughtforapostponementwhichwas
denied.InthesehearingswhichwereheldinMalathepetitionertestifiedinAdm.CaseNo.C10298
and10299.

TheinvestigationwascontinuedregardingtheMalaborcaseandthecomplainantstestifiedincluding
theirwitnesses.

OnOctober10,1988,petitioner'scounsel,Atty.OriginalmovedforapostponementoftheOctober
24,1988hearingtoNovember7to11,1988whichwasgranted.However,themotionforchangeof
venueasdeniedduetolackoffunds.AtthehearingonNovember7,1988,thepartiesandcounsel
werepresent.Petitionerreiteratedhismotiontochangevenueandmovedforpostponementanew.
ThecounseldiscussedaproposaltotakethedepositionofwitnessesinIloiloCitysothehearingwas
indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were
notifiedofthehearing,theinvestigationwassettoDecember13to15,1988.

Thepetitionersoughtforanotherpostponementonthegroundthathiswitnessesweresickorcannot
attendtheinvestigationduetolackoftransportation.Themotionwasdeniedandthepetitionerwas
givenuptoDecember14,1988topresenthisevidence.

OnDecember14,1988,petitioner'scounselinsistedonhismotionforpostponementandthehearing
officersgavepetitioneruptoDecember15,1988topresenthisevidence.OnDecember15,1988,
thepetitionerfailedtopresentevidenceandthecaseswereconsideredsubmittedforresolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by
Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated
October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order
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and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.The second
preventivesuspensionwasnotenforced.5

Amidstthetwosuccessivesuspensions,MayorGanzoninstitutedanactionforprohibitionagainsttherespondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtainingawritofpreliminaryinjunction.Presently,heinstitutedCAG.R.SPNo.16417,anactionforprohibition,
intherespondentCourtofAppeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor
Ganzonforanothersixtydays,thethirdtimeintwentymonths,anddesignatingmeantimeViceMayorMansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CAG.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of
Appeals,apetitionforprohibition, 6(Malaboritistobenoted,isoneofthecomplainants,andhence,heisinterestedin
seeingMayorGanzonousted.)

OnSeptember7,1989,theCourtofAppealsrenderedjudgment,dismissingCAG.R.SPNo.16417.OnJuly5,
1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CAG.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24,
1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of MaryAnnArtieda, who had been similary charged by the
respondentSecretary,tothisCourt.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementingthesuspensionorders,andrestrainingtheenforcementoftheCourtofAppeals'twodecisions.

InourResolutionofNovember29,1990,weconsolidatedallthreecases.InourResolutionsofJanuary15,1991,
wegaveduecoursethereto.

MayorGanzonclaimsasapreliminary(GRNo.93252),thattheDepartmentofLocalGovernmentinhearingthe
tencasesagainsthim,haddeniedhimdueprocessoflawandthattherespondentSecretaryhadbeen"biased,
prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
DemokratikongPilipinoparty 8andtherunningpoliticalrivalrytheymaintainedinthelastcongressionalandlocalelections
9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his
suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the
aforementionedcases.12HelikewisecontendsthathesoughttobringthecasestoIloiloCity(theywereheldinManila)in
order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for
postponementon"validandjustifiable" 14grounds,amongthem,thathewassufferingfromaheartailmentwhichrequired
confinementthathis"vital"15witnesswasalsohospitalized16butthatthelatterundulydeniedhisrequest.17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is
devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the
petitionerMaryAnnRiveraArtieda(G.R.No.93746).

AstoMayorGanzon'schargesofdenialofdueprocess,therecordsdonotshowveryclearlyinwhatmannerthe
MayormighthavebeendeprivedofhisrightsbytherespondentSecretary.HisclaimsthatheandSecretaryLuis
Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and
althoughthelatterdoesnotappeartohavedeniedthesecontentions(ashe,MayorGanzon,claims),wecannot
take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that
"politicalfeud"hasoftenbeenagoodexcuseincontestingcomplaints.

TheMayorhasfailedfurthermoretosubstantiatehissayso'sthatSecretarySantoshadattemptedtoseducehim
tojointheadministrationpartyandtooperatealotteryinIloiloCity.Again,althoughtheSecretaryfailedtorebut
hisallegations,wecannotacceptthem,atfacevalue,muchmore,asjudicialadmissionsashewouldhaveus
accept them 18 for the same reasons abovestated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by
independenttestimonies.Asaresponsiblepublicofficial,SecretarySantos,inpursuinganofficialfunction,ispresumedto
beperforminghisdutiesregularlyandintheabsenceofcontraryevidence,noillmotivecanbeascribedtohim.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on
accountoftheninetydaybanprescribedbySection62ofBatasBlg.337,theCourtfindsthequestiontobemoot
and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the
petitioners.19

Astohisrequest,finally,forpostponements,theCourtisafraidthathehasnotgivenanycompellingreasonwhy
we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in
denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and
basedonMayorGanzon'sabovestory,wearenotconvincedthattheSecretaryhasbeenguiltyofagraveabuse
ofdiscretion.

TheCourtcannotsay,underthesecircumstances,thatSecretarySantos'actuationsdeprivedMayorGanzonof
dueprocessoflaw.

Wecometothecorequestion:WhetherornottheSecretaryofLocalGovernment,asthePresident'salterego,
cansuspendand/orremovelocalofficials.

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It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionsdid,toexercisethepowerofsuspensionand/orremovaloverlocalofficials.Accordingtobothpetitioners,the
Constitutionismeant,first,tostrengthenselfrulebylocalgovernmentunitsandsecond,bydeletingthephrase 21as may
beprovidedbylawtostripthePresidentofthepowerofcontroloverlocalgovernments.Itisaview,sotheycontend,that
findssupportinthedebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission.Theprovisioninquestionreadsasfollows:

Sec. 4.The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.22

Itmodifiesacounterpartprovisionappearinginthe1935Constitution,whichwequote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercisegeneralsupervisionoverallLocalgovernmentsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,andtakecare
thatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes,
since:(1)thepowerofthePresidentis"providedbylaw"and(2)hence,nolawmayprovideforitanylonger.

Itistobenotedthatinmetingoutthesuspensionsunderquestion,theSecretaryofLocalGovernmentactedin
consonancewiththespecificlegalprovisionsofBatasBlg.337,theLocalGovernmentCode,wequote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local
Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to
submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the
hearingandinvestigationofthecasewithintendaysafterreceiptofsuchansweroftherespondent.
Noinvestigationshallbeheldwithinninetydaysimmediatelypriortoanelection,andnopreventive
suspensionshallbeimposedwiththesaidperiod.Ifpreventivesuspensionhasbeenimposedprior
totheaforesaidperiod,thepreventivesuspensionshallbelifted.24

Sec. 63. PreventiveSuspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the
respondentisanelectivemunicipalofficial,orbythecityormunicipalmayoriftherespondentisan
electivebarangayofficial.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonablegroundtobelievethattherespondenthascommittedtheactoractscomplainedof,when
the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the
continuanceinofficeoftherespondentcouldinfluencethewitnessesorposeathreattothesafety
andintegrityoftherecordsandotherevidence.Inallcases,preventivesuspensionshallnotextend
beyondsixtydaysafterthestartofsaidsuspension.

(3)Attheexpirationofsixtydays,thesuspendedofficialshallbedeemedreinstatedinofficewithout
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the
delayintheproceedingsofthecaseisduetohisfault,neglectorrequest,thetimeofthedelayshall
notbecountedincomputingthetimeofsuspension.25

Theissue,astheCourtunderstandsit,consistsofthreequestions:(1)Didthe1987Constitution,indeletingthe
phrase"asmaybeprovidedbylaw"intendtodivestthePresidentofthepowertoinvestigate,suspend,discipline,
and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government
Code?(3)Whatisthesignificanceofthechangeintheconstitutionallanguage?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the
charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existinglegislationtoprovideadministrativesanctionsagainstlocalofficials.Itisouropinionthattheomission(of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however,
intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular,concerningdiscipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making ministates out of local government units, as in the federal
governmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(orBrazilorGermany),althoughJeffersonissaidtohavecompared
municipalcorporationseuphemisticallyto"smallrepublics." 26Autonomy,intheconstitutionalsense,issubjecttothe
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the
"supervisionclause"itselfsuggestistoweanlocalgovernmentunitsfromoverdependenceonthecentralgovernment.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly selfexecuting, but subject to, among
otherthings,thepassageofalocalgovernmentcode, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a
nationalrepresentationlaw,30andmeasures31designedtorealizeautonomyatthelocallevel.Itisalsonoteworthythatin
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthyfinally,thattheCharterallowsCongresstoincludeinthelocalgovernmentcodeprovisionsforremovaloflocal
officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has
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done,delegateitsexercisetothePresident.Thus:

Sec.3.TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshallprovideforamoreresponsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,
andallothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the
objectiveoftheframerstostrengthenlocalautonomybyseveringcongressionalcontrolofitsaffairs,asobserved
bytheCourtofAppeals,likethepoweroflocallegislation. 33TheConstitutiondidnothingmore,however,andinsofar
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
officialsadministratively,theConstitutioncontainsnoprohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinaryauthority.Itisamistakenimpressionbecauselegally,"supervision"isnotincompatiblewithdisciplinary
authorityasthisCourthasheld,34thus:

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ItistruethatinthecaseofMondanovs.Silvosa,51Off.Gaz.,No.6p.2884,thisCourthadoccasion
todiscussthescopeandextentofthepowerofsupervisionbythePresidentoverlocalgovernment
officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
whereinitwasemphasizedthatthetwoterms,controlandsupervision,aretwodifferentthingswhich
differonefromtheotherinmeaningandextent.ThusinthatcasetheCourthasmadethefollowing
digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officertoseethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthemthe
formermaytakesuchactionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheirduties.Control,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentofthe
formerforthatofthelatter."Butfromthispronouncementitcannotbereasonablyinferredthatthe
powerofsupervisionofthePresidentoverlocalgovernmentofficialsdoesnotincludethepowerof
investigationwheninhisopinionthegoodofthepublicservicesorequires,aspostulatedinSection
64(c)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode....35

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"Control"hasbeendefinedas"thepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter."36"Supervision"ontheotherhandmeans"overseeingorthepowerorauthorityofanofficertoseethatsubordinate
officersperformtheirduties. 37Asweheld, 38however,"investigating"isnotinconsistentwith"overseeing",althoughitis
a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three
cases,Lacsonv.Roque,39Hebronv.Reyes,40andMondanov.Silvosa,41andpossibly,afourthone,Pelaezv.Auditor
General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be
provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . .
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decisionofthecorrespondingprovincialboard." 44However,neitherLacsonnorHebron nor Mondano categorically banned
theChiefExecutivefromexercisingactsofdisciplinaryauthoritybecauseshedidnotexercisecontrolpowers,butbecause
nolawallowedhertoexercisedisciplinaryauthority.Thus,accordingtoLacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is
withoutdoubtnotwelltaken.Removalandsuspensionofpublicofficersarealwayscontrolledbythe
particularlawapplicableanditsproperconstructionsubjecttoconstitutionallimitations.45

InHebronwestated:

Accordingly,whentheprocedureforthesuspensionofanofficerisspecifiedbylaw,thesamemust
be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the
contrarywhichdoesnotetwithrespecttomunicipalofficers...46

InMondano,theCourtheld:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministrationofoffice,andconvictionbyfinaljudgmentofanycrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude."
Andifthechargesareserious,"heshallsubmitwrittenchargestouchingthemattertotheprovincial
board,furnishingacopyofsuchchargestotheaccusedeitherpersonallyorbyregisteredmail,and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question."

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Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercisedbytheDepartmentHeadovertheadministrationof...municipalities....Ifitbeconstrued
thatitdoesandsuchadditionalpoweristhesameauthorityasthatvestedintheDepartmentHead
bysection79(c)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode,thensuchadditionalpowermustbedeemedto
havebeenabrogatedbySection110(l),ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.47

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InPelaez,westatedthatthePresidentcannotimposedisciplinarymeasuresonlocalofficialsexceptonappeal
fromtheprovincialboardpursuanttotheAdministrativeCode.48

Thus,inthosecasethatthisCourtdeniedthePresidentthepower(tosuspend/remove)itwasnotbecausewe
didnotthinkthatthePresidentcannotexerciseitonaccountofhislimitedpower,butbecausethelawlodgedthe
powerelsewhere.Butinthosecasesiiwhichthelawgavehimthepower,theCourt,asinGanzonv.Kayanan,
foundlittledifficultyinsustaininghim.49

TheCourtdoesnotbelievethatthepetitionerscanrightfullypointtothedebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission
to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive,
because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50
CommissionerBlasOplewouldnot.51

TheCourtisconsequentlyreluctanttosaythatthenewConstitutionhasrepealedtheLocalGovernmentCode,
Batas Blg. 37.As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the
other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held
thatinspiteoftheapprovaloftheCharter,BatasBlg.337isstillinforceandeffect.52

AstheConstitutionitselfdeclares,localautonomymeans"amoreresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernment
structureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization."53TheConstitutionasweobserved,doesnothingmorethan
tobreakupthemonopolyofthenationalgovernmentovertheaffairsoflocalgovernmentsandasputbypoliticaladherents,
to"liberatethelocalgovernmentsfromtheimperialismofManila."Autonomy,however,isnotmeanttoendtherelationof
partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a
regimeoffederalism.TheCharterhasnottakensucharadicalstep.Localgovernments,undertheConstitution,aresubject
toregulation,howeverlimited,andfornootherpurposethanprecisely,albeitparadoxically,toenhanceselfgovernment.

Asweobservedinonecase, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local
levels.Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
politicalsubdivisionsinordertobroadenthebaseofgovernmentpowerandintheprocesstomake
localgovernments"moreresponsiveandaccountable,"and"ensuretheirfullestdevelopmentasself
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
andsocialprogress."Atthesametime,itrelievesthecentralgovernmentoftheburdenofmanaging
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision"overthem,butonlyto"ensurethatlocalaffairsareadministeredaccordingtolaw."He
hasnocontrolovertheiractsinthesensethathecansubstitutetheirjudgmentswithhisown.

Decentralizationofpower,ontheotherhand,involvesanabdicationofpoliticalpowerinthefavorof
local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is
freetochartitsowndestinyandshapeitsfuturewithminimuminterventionfromcentralauthorities.
Accordingtoaconstitutionalauthor,decentralizationofpoweramountsto"selfimmolation,"sincein
thatevent,theautonomousgovernmentbecomesaccountablenottothecentralauthoritiesbuttoits
constituency.55

ThesuccessivesixtydaysuspensionsimposedonMayorRodolfoGanzonisalbeitanothermatter.Whatbothers
theCourt,andwhatindeedloomsverylarge,isthefactthatsincetheMayorisfacingtenadministrativecharges,
the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
faciefindings.TheCourtisnotofcoursetoleratingmisfeasanceinpublicoffice(assumingthatMayorGanzonis
guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is
effectively,tosuspendhimoutofoffice.Asweheld:56

2.PetitionerisadulyelectedmunicipalmayorofLianga,SurigaodelSur.Histermofofficedoesnot
expireuntil1986.WereitnotforthisinformationandthesuspensiondecreedbytheSandiganbayan
according to theAntiGraft and Corrupt PracticesAct, he would have been all this while in the full
dischargeofhisfunctionsassuchmunicipalmayor.Hewaselectedpreciselytodoso.AsofOctober
26,1983,hehasbeenunableto.itisabasicassumptionoftheelectoralprocessimplicitintheright
of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasanceormalfeasance,anyofthemcould,ofcourse,beproceededagainstadministrativelyor,
asinthisinstance,criminally.Ineithercase,Msculpabilitymustbeestablished.Moreover,iftherebe
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a
due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold

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officehadbeennullified.Clearly,therewouldbeinsuchacaseaninjusticesufferedbyhim.Norishe
theonlyvictim.ThereisinjusticeinflictedlikewiseonthepeopleofLiangaTheyweredeprivedofthe
services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice
Cardozo,theprotractedcontinuanceofthispreventivesuspensionhadoutruntheboundsofreason
andresultedinsheeroppression.Adenialofdueprocessisthusquitemanifest.Itistoavoidsuch
anunconstitutionalapplicationthattheorderofsuspensionshouldbelifted.57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also,
because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government.The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authorityoverpossiblewitnesses"60ortokeephimoff"therecordsandotherevidence.61

Itisameans,andnomore,toassistprosecutorsinfirmingupacase,ifany,againstanerringlocalofficial.Under
theLocalGovernmentCode,itcannotexceedsixtydays, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days
longifashorterperiodisotherwisesufficient,andwhichisalsotosaythatitoughttobeliftedifprosecutorshaveachieved
theirpurposeinashorterspan.

Suspensionisnotapenaltyandisnotunlikepreventiveimprisonmentinwhichtheaccusedisheldtoinsurehis
presenceatthetrial.Inbothcases,theaccused(therespondent)enjoysapresumptionofinnocenceunlessand
untilfoundguilty.

SuspensionfinallyistemporaryandastheLocalGovernmentCodeprovides,itmaybeimposedfornomorethan
sixtydays.Asweheld,63alongersuspensionisunjustandunreasonable,andwemightadd,nothinglessthantyranny.

Asweobservedearlier,imposing600daysofsuspensionwhichisnotaremotepossibilityMayorGanzonistoall
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes,hissuspensionpermanent.

Itisalso,infact,tometeoutpunishmentinspiteofthefactthattheMayor'sguilthasnotbeenproven.Worse,
anyabsolutionwillbefornaughtbecauseneedlesstosay,thelengthofhissuspensionwouldhave,bythetime
heisreinstated,wipedouthistenureconsiderably.

TheCourtisnottobemistakenforobstructingtheeffortsoftherespondentSecretarytoseethatjusticeisdone
inIloiloCity,yetitishardlyanyargumenttoinflictonMayorGanzonsuccessivesuspensionswhenapparently,the
respondentSecretaryhashadsufficienttimetogatherthenecessaryevidencetobuildacaseagainsttheMayor
withoutsuspendinghimadaylonger.WhatisintriguingisthattherespondentSecretaryhasbeencrackingdown,
so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary,couldhavepursuedaconsolidatedeffort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power,yetweareoftheopinionthattheSecretaryofInteriorisexercisingthatpoweroppressively,andneedless
tosay,withagraveabuseofdiscretion.

TheCourtisawarethatonlythethirdsuspensionisunderquestions,andthatanytalkoffuturesuspensionsisin
fact premature.The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspensionandthepossibilityofsixtydaysmoreisarguablyaroundthecorner(whichamountstoaviolationof
the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the
restofhisnaturaltenure.TheCourtissimplyforeclosingwhatappearstousasaconcertedeffortoftheStateto
perpetuateanarbitraryact.

Aswesaid,wecannottoleratesuchastateofaffairs.

WearethereforeallowingMayorRodolfoGanzontosufferthedurationofhisthirdsuspensionandlifting,forthe
purpose,theTemporaryRestrainingOrderearlierissued.Insofarasthesevenremainingchargesareconcerned,
we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to
expeditethesame,subjecttoMayorGanzon'susualremediesofappeal,judicialoradministrative,orcertiorari,if
warranted,andmeanwhile,weareprecludingtheSecretaryfrommetingoutfurthersuspensionsbasedonthose
remainingcomplaints,notwithstandingfindingsofprimafacieevidence.

InresumetheCourtislayingdownthefollowingrules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in
whichlocalofficialsremainaccountabletothecentralgovernmentinthemannerthelawmayprovide

2.ThenewConstitutiondoesnotprescribefederalism

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny
legislative control over local governments it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided
regulationisconsistentwiththefundamentalpremiseofautonomy

4.Sincelocalgovernmentsremainaccountabletothenationalauthority,thelattermay,bylaw,andinthemanner
setforththerein,imposedisciplinaryactionagainstlocalofficials

5."Supervision"and"investigation"arenotinconsistentterms"investigation"doesnotsignify"control"(whichthe
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Presidentdoesnothave)

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspendedfortheoffenseshewaschargedoriginallyprovided:

a)thatdelaysintheinvestigationofthosecharges"duetohisfault,neglectorrequest,
(thetimeofthedelay)shallnotbecountedincomputingthetimeofsuspension.[Supra,
sec.63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner
commitsanotherorothercrimesandabusesforwhichproperchargesarefiledagainst
himbytheaggrievedpartyorparties,hisprevioussuspensionshallnotbeabartohis
being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the
LocalGovernmentCode.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED.TheTemporary Restraining Order issued is
LIFTED.ThesuspensionsofthepetitionersareAFFIRMED,providedthatthepetitioner,MayorRodolfoGanzon,
maynotbemadetoservefuturesuspensionsonaccountofanyoftheremainingadministrativechargespending
againsthimforactscommittedpriortoAugust11,1988.TheSecretaryofInteriorisORDEREDtoconsolidateall
suchadministrativecasespendingagainstMayorGanzon.

Thesixtydaysuspensionagainstthepetitioner,MaryAnnRiveraArtieda,isAFFIRMED.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

Fernan,C.J.,Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Gutierrez,Jr.,Cruz,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,Grio
Aquino,Medialdea,RegaladoandDavide,Jr.,JJconcur.

Footnotes

1Rollo,G.R.No.93252,7677.

2Hon.BonifacioCacdac,Jr.,J.

3Rollo,Id.,7677.

4Id.,77.

5Id.,7778.

6Id.,78.ThefirstsuspensionwasontheCabalunaandOrtigozacomplaints.CAG.R.No.16417
wasontheErbitecomplaint.CAG.R.No.20736wasachallengeonthedesignationofViceMayor
Malabor.

7Id.,21

8Id.

9Id.,27.

10Id.,28.

11Id.,30.

12Id3132.

13Id.,3435.

14Id.,36.

15Id.

16Id

17Id.,38.

18Id.

19ByvirtueoftheTemporaryRestrainingOrdertheCourtissuedonJune26,1990.

20CONST.,art.X,sec.4.

21CONST.(1935),art,X,sec.10(l).The1973Constitutioncontainednosimilarprovision,butsee
art.VII,sec.18.

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22CONST.(1987),supra.

23CONST.(1935),supra.

24BatasBlg.337,sec.62.

25Supra,sec.63.

26CRUZ,PHILIPPINEPOLITICALLAW64(1987ed.)

27CONST.,supra,art.X,sec.3.

28Supra,secs.5,6.

29Supra,sec.7.

30Supra,sec.9.

31Seesupra,sec.14,providingforregionaldevelopmentcouncilstobeorganizedbythePresident.

32Supra,sec.3.

33G.R.No.95245,Id.,53seeMendoza,J.,Concurring.

34Ganzonv.Kayanan,104Phil.484(1985).Inthisconcurrence(Id.,4861),JusticeMendozacited
thiscase.

35Supra,489490.

36Mondanov.Silvosa,97Phil.143,148(1955).

37Supra,147.

38Ganzonv.Kayanan,supra.

3992Phil.456(1953).

40104Phil.175(1958).

41Supra.

42No.L23825,December24,1965,15SCRA569.

43Lacsonv.Roque,supra,463.

44Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral,supra,583.

45Lacsonv.Roque,supra,462.

46Hebronv.Reyes,supra,185.

47Mondanov.Silvosa,supra,148.

48Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral,supra,583.

49G.R.No.95245,Id.,5051seeMendoza,J.,Concurring.

50Id.,23.

51Id.,53.

52Bagabuyov.Davide,G.R.No.87233,September21,1989.

53CONST.,supra,art.X,see.3.

54Limbonav.MangelinG.R.No.80391,February28,1989,170SCRA786.

55Supra,794795.

56Layno,Sr.v.Sandiganbayan,No.65848,May24,1985,136SCRA536,

57Supra,541.

58Seesupra.

59Lacsonv.Roque,supra.

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60Supra,469.

61BatasBlg.337,sec.63.

62Supra.

63Layno,Sr.v.Sandiganbayan,supra.

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