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DESIGN FOR SAFETY

CONFERENCE 2016
Hamburg, 28-30 November

6th Conference on Design for Safety

2830 November 2016

Sponsored by:
MONDAY, 28 NOV 2016 Session 4: Design for Safety 1 Chair: Prof Dracos Vassalos 15:45 Enhancing SAR Communication and Decision Making
15:45 Design for Safety in a Changing Climate using Vessel TRIAGE: Concept and Developments
08:30 Registration desk opens Elzbieta BITNER-GREGERSEN, Erik VANEM, Odin GRAMSTAD Floris GOERLANDT, Jori NORDSTRM,
09:00 Welcome (DNV GL) Pekka RUPONEN (Aalto University)
Dr Bjrn-Olaf BORTH, Country Chair and Member of Executive 16:10 Naval Auxiliaries, Safe in Design - Safe through Life 16:10 SEAHORSE Procedure Improvement System
Board, (DNV GL) Loren ROBERTS, Andrew SMALLER (BMT Cadence) Rafet E. KURT, Volkan ARSLAN, Emma COMRIE,
Introduction 16:35 Equivalent Level of Safety Approach Fire Safety Hassan KHALID, Osman TURAN (University of Strathclyde)
Dr Pierre C SAMES, Group Technology and Research Director Daniel POVEL, Andres OTT (DNV GL)
(DNV GL) WEDNESDAY, 30 NOV 2016
Keynote 17:00 Data Analytics for Marine Operations*
Prof Dracos VASSALOS, Chairman of the DfS International Hao WANG, Girts STRAZDINS,Guoyuan LI (NTNU Aalesund) Session 9: Autonomous Systems Chair: Prof Volker Bertram
Standing Committee 10:00 Autonomous Shipping A Concept Design for an
TUESDAY, 29 NOV 2016 Autonomous Firefighting and Rescue Vessel
Session 1: Damage Stability Chair: Prof Apostolos Papanikolaou Simon PULLIN, Samantha HILL (QinetiQ)
09:35 Representing Military Behavior in Naval Ship Evacuation 09:30 eSAFE discussion 10:25 A New Concept for Avoiding Collision of Automatically
Simulations including Flooding Damage Scenarios Operating Ships and its Evaluation
David L.L. SICURO (Braz. Navy Research Inst.), Jos M. Session 5: Safe Operations Chair: Prof Yoshiho Ikeda Yoshiho IKEDA, Kana YOSHIDA, Nobuyuki SHIMIZU, Keiichi
VASCONCELLOS (UFRJ), Dracos VASSALOS (Univ Strathclyde) 10:00 Applied Bayesian Network Model for Risk Assessment for HIRAYAMA, Masakazu ARIMA (Osaka Pref Univ)
10:00 Design for safety in a competitiveness perspective Ship Collision 10:50 Safety Aspects of Autonomous Ships
Jose Jorge GARCIA AGIS, Ulrikke Brask BRANDT, Takeshi SHINODA (Kyushu Univ) Sauli ELORANTA, Andy WHITEHEAD (Rolls-Royce Marine)
Per Olaf BRETT (Ulstein) 10:25 Shopera Manoeuvrability in Seaway 11:15 Coffee break
10:25 Designing for Damage Stability beyond Design Level Vladimir SHIGUNOV (DNV GL)
Prof Dracos Vassalos, Evangelos BOULOUGOURIS, 10:50 Ship Optimization for Efficiency and Maneuverability in Adverse Session 10: Data Analytics Chair: Dr Pierre Sames
Donald PATTERSON (Univ Strathclyde), Markku KANERVA Sea Conditions 11:45 A Method for Describing Ocean Environments for Ship
10:50 On the Survivability of ROPAX and Cruise Ships: George ZARAPHONITIS, Aphrodite KANELLOPOULOU, Assessment
A New Approach to Differences in Design Apostolos PAPANIKOLAOU (NTUA), Vladimir SHIGUNOV (DNV GL) Eirik EISINGER, Jens Bloch HELMERS,
George DAFERMOS, Apostolos PAPANIKOLAOU (NTUA) 11:15 Coffee break Gaute STORHAUG (DNV GL)
11:15 Coffee break 12:10 Hull Monitoring Closing the Gap between Design and
Session 6: Safe Operations II Chair: Takeshi Shinoda Operation
Session 2: Intact Stability 1 Chair: Prof Naoya Umeda 11:45 Probabilistic Aspect on Minimum Propulsion Power Requirement Gaute STORHAUG, Adrian KAHL (DNV GL)
11:45 Performance based stability Issue under Adverse Weather Conditions 13:00 Lunch
Govinder Singh CHOPRA (SeaTech Solutions) Shusuke OHIWA, Naoya UMEDA (Osaka University)
12:10 Study on the Correction of Wave Surge Forces to Improve 12:10 CFD Based Simulation of LNG Release During Bunkering Workshop: Digital Safety Chair: Dr Pierre C Sames
Surf-riding/Broaching Vulnerability Criteria Check Accuracy and Cargo Loading/Unloading Simultaneous Operations 14:00 Setting the scene
Pei-Yuan FENG, She-Ming FAN (Maric), Liwei YU, of a Containership Dr Pierre C SAMES (DNV GL)
Ning MA (Shanghai JT Univ) Hongjun FAN, Kang CHENG, Shunping WU 14:15 PSC and survey data to understand ship condition
12:35 The Weather Criterion: Experimental Wind Tunnel Results (China Classification Society) Insight from combining data sources
Arman ARIFFIN, Shuhaimi MANSOR, 12:35 Subdivision Optimization of LNG Fueled RoPax Ship Andreas MELCHNER (DNV GL)
Jean-Marc LAURENS (ENSTA Bretagne) Teemu MANDERBACKA, Pekka RUPONEN, Daniel LINDROTH, 14:30 Mining casualty data to identify root causes
13:00 Lunch Markus TOMPURI (NAPA) Insight from recent FSA on container vessels
13:00 Group picture in DNV GL Atrium or outside Rainer HAMANN (DNV GL)
Session 3: Intact Stability 2 Chair: Prof Naoya Umeda Lunch 14:45 Fleet operation center how it works to improve safety
14:00 Safety Level Required by the IMO Second Generation Intact Keith DOWDS (Carnival)
Stability Criteria for Ships under Dead Ship Conditions and Session 7: Design for Safety 2 Chair: Prof Dracos Vassalos 15:15 Dynamic Barrier Management What we can learn
Parametric Roll Resonance Naho YAMASHITA, Naoya UMEDA, 14:00 Safety Culture - Beyond the Horizon but Still in View from offshore industry
Masahiro SAKAI (Osaka University) Martin TOLAND (QinetiQ) Frank B PEDERSEN (DNV GL)
14:25 Statistical Analysis on Parametric Roll Groups detected by 14:25 Challenges for Application of Risk Based Design Approaches 15:30 Panel discussion
IR-HHT Method in Irregular Head Seas for Arctic and Antarctic Operations All speakers
Liwei YU, Ning MA (Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ), Pentti KUJALA, Jorma KMRINEN, Mikko SUOMINEN (Aalto University) 16:00 Workshop Conclusions
Yoshiaki HIRAKAWA (YNU) 14:50 Coffee break Dr Pierre C SAMES (DNV GL)
14:50 A Meta-Model For Risk Assessment of RoPax Capsizing as
an Alternative Way of Ship Safety Evaluation Session 8: Man Machine Interfaces Chair: Prof Ning Ma Conference Dinner
Tomasz HINZ (Deltamarin), Przemysaw KRATA, 15:20 Accident Scenario-based Rapid and Interactive Damage Control 18:30
Jakub MONTEWKA (Gdynia Maritime University) System Using Coded Shortcut Keys
15:15 Coffee break Hee Jin KANG, Dongkon LEE, Jin CHOI (KRISO) * has been moved from session 10
Index of Papers

Hongjun Fan, Kang Cheng, Shunping Wu 5


CFD Based Simulation of LNG Release During Bunkering and Cargo Loading/Unloading Simultaneous
Operations of a Containership

Floris Goerlandt, Jori Nordstrm, Pekka Ruponen 11


Enhancing SAR Communication and Decision Making using Vessel TRIAGE: Concept and Developments

Pei-yuan Feng, She-ming Fan, Li-wei Yu, Ning Ma 17


Study on the Correction of Wave Surge Forces to Improve Surf-riding/Broaching Vulnerability Criteria
Check Accuracy

George Dafermos, Apostolos Papanikolaou 22


On the Survivability of ROPAX and Cruise Ships - A New Approach to Differences in Design

Eirik Eisinger, Jens Bloch Helmers, Gaute Storhaug 34


A Method for Describing Ocean Environments for Ship Assessment

Elena-Gratiela Robe-Voinea, Alexandru Pintilie, Raluca Vernic 40


A Short Ship Design Risk Analysis using the Monte Carlo Method

Arman Ariffin, Shuhaimi Mansor, Jean-Marc Laurens 46


The Weather Criterion: Experimental Wind Tunnel Results

Gaute Storhaug, Adrian Kahl 53


Hull Monitoring Closing the Gap between the Design and Operation

Hee Jin Kang, Dongkon Lee, Jin Choi 61


Accident Scenario-based Rapid and Interactive Damage Control System using Coded Shortcut Keys

Govinder Singh Chopra 68


Performance Based Stability

George Zaraphonitis, Aphrodite Kanellopoulou, Apostolos Papanikolaou,Vladimir Shigunov 75


Ship Optimization for Efficiency and Maneuverability in Adverse Sea Conditions

Liwei Yu, Ning Ma, Yoshiaki Hirakawa 85


Statistical Analysis on Parametric Roll Groups Detected by IR-HHT Method in Irregular Head Seas

Teemu Manderbacka, Pekka Ruponen, Daniel Lindroth, Markus Tompuri 90


Subdivision Optimization of LNG Fueled RoPax Ship

David L.L. Sicuro, Jos Marcio Vasconcellos, Dracos Vassalos 98


Representing Military Behavior in Naval Ship Evacuation Simulations including Flooding Damage
Scenarios

Loren Roberts, Andy Smaller 111


Naval Auxiliaries, Safe In Design - Safe Through Life

Shusuke Ohiwa, Naoya Umeda 127


Probabilistic Aspect on Minimum Propulsion Power Requirement Issue under Adverse Weather
Conditions

2
Tomasz Hinz, Przemysaw Krata, Jakub Montewka 132
A Meta-model for Risk Assessment of RoPax Capsizing as an Alternative Way of Ship Safety Evaluation

Yisi Liu, Xiyuan Hou, Olga Sourina, Dimitrios Konovessis, Nieves Endrina Snchez, Gopala Krishnan 141
Human Factors Evaluation in Maritime Simulator-based Assessment: A Case Study

Jose Jorge Garcia Agis, Ulrikke Brask Brandt, Per Olaf Brett 146
Design for Safety in a Competitiveness Perspective

Naho Yamashita, Naoya Umeda, Masahiro Sakai 153


Safety Level Required by the IMO Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria for Ships under Dead Ship
Conditions and Parametric Roll Resonance

Vladimir Shigunov 158


SHOPERA Manoeuvrability in Seaway

Sauli Eloranta, Andy Whitehead 168


Safety Aspects of Autonomous Ships

Daniel Povel, Andreas Ott 176


Equivalent Level of Safety Approach Fire Safety

Elzbieta Bitner-Gregersen, Erik Vanem, Odin Gramstad 183


Design for Safety in a Changing Climate

Pentti Kujala, Joma Kmrinen, Mikko Suominen 196


Challenges for Application of Risk Based Design Approaches for Arctic and Antarctic Operations

Rafet Emek Kurt, Volkan Arslan, Emma Comrie, Hassan Khalid, Osman Turan 204
SEAHORSE Procedure Improvement System

Martin Toland 214


Safety Culture - Beyond the Horizon but Still in View

Simon Pullin, Samantha Hill 219


Autonomous Shipping A Concept Design for an Autonomous Firefighting and Rescue Vessel

Dracos Vassalos, Evangelos Boulougouris, Donald Paterson, Markku Kanerva 225


Designing for Damage Stability beyond Design Level

Hao Wang, Girts Strazdins, Guoyuan Li 232


Data Analytics for Marine Operations

Yoshiho Ikeda, Kana Yoshida, Nobuyuki Shimizu, Keiichi Hirayama, Masakazu Arima 237
A New Concept for Avoiding Collision of Automatically Operating Ships and its Evaluation

Takeshi Shinoda, Ryoma, Nasu, Koji Uru 243


Applied Bayesian Network Model for Risk Assessment for Ship Collision

3
4
CFD Based Simulation of LNG Release During Bunkering
and Cargo Loading/Unloading Simultaneous Operations of
a Containership

FAN Hongjun, China Classification Society, hjfan@ccs.org.cn


CHENG Kang, China Classification Society, kcheng@ccs.org.cn
WU Shunping, China Classification Society, sp_wu@ccs.org.cn

ABSTRACT stations are under developing, and will be issued in 2016,


the complete regulatory systems will promote the formation
In order to reduce waiting time in port for large LNG of waterborne LNG supply chains.
fueled ships, it is suggested that LNG ship-to-ship (STS) However, due to the complexity of LNG bunkering, in
bunkering and cargo loading/unloading should be car- some cases there is a need to provide personalized solutions,
ried out simultaneously. This study investigated the such as relative motion limit between two ships, fender
safety zone of a LNG bunkering vessel with 10,000 cubic arrangement, allowed weather conditions, safety operations
meters capacity transferring LNG fuel to a LNG fueled zone, etc.
18000TEU containership. Four LNG leakage scenarios For large ships with large amount LNG fuel, simulta-
were identified based on failure frequencies analysis of neous operations (SIMOPS) of LNG ship to ship (STS)
piping systems and severity of consequence. The bunkering and cargo loading/unloading could reduce time
three-dimensional CFD software FLACS was adopted in port. If loading/unloading operations were in the flam-
to calculate flammable cloud dispersion after LNG mable cloud zone, there would be a risk of fire. In this study,
leakage. As a result, we obtained a rectangular danger the SIMOPS safety zone of a LNG bunkering vessel with
zone; the domain outside of this zone can be considered 10,000 cubic meters capacity transferring LNG fuel to a
as safe. The danger zone of LNG STS bunkering and LNG fueled 18000 TEU containership was addressed.
cargo loading/unloading simultaneous operations (SI-
MOPS) varies with different results for different designs THE ACCIDENTS OF LNG BUNKERING IN THE
and operation locations. Due to high frequencies and HISTORY AND ENLIGHTENMENT
severe consequences involved, two typical scenarios
cannot be ignored in similar studies: the leakage of an The accidents in the history are warning significances in
LNG hose and natural gas release from a bunkering LNG bunkering practice. There is a short history of only 15
tanks safety relief valve during bunkering. years after LNG bunkering appeared in marine sector, only
two accidents in Norway have been reported (IMO, 2015).
In Risavika Harbour, during bunkering of MS Ber-
INTRODUCTION gensfjord on 9 May 2014, there was a leak in the Quick
Release Coupling located in the bunkering station on board
LNG as marine fuel is a leading alternative for meeting the ship. The investigation concluded that approximately
current and future more stringent air emission requirements. 130 kg LNG were released. The incident did not result in
To date, there are more than 100 seagoing LNG fueled ves- personal injuries or damage to property.
sels operating mainly in the North Sea and Baltic Sea. In The other accident occurred in Moskenes. During bun-
China, there are more than 600 inland LNG fueled vessels kering of MF Landegode on 13 June 2014, the ships stern
are under building or on order (Xu, 2015). moved away from the quay. The hose was stretched, and a
The use of LNG requires the development of bunkering davit arm was damaged. The ferry managed to return to the
infrastructures and a complete regulatory framework. The quay, and there was no leak. The bunkering operation con-
feasible bunkering modes are as follows (China MSA, tinued. The davit arm broke later that day. The incident did
2013): 1) Truck to ship; 2) Onshore station to ship; 3) Pon- not result in any other damage to property, and no person
toon to ship; 4) Potable fuel tanks; 5) Ship to ship; 6) Off- was injured.
shore unit to ship. In terms of the regulatory framework, in The above two accidents shed some light on the safety
China, the Chinese government issued a regulation for LNG of LNG bunkering: a safety zone during bunkering should
bunkering pontoons in 2014, the regulation for LNG bun- be established; LNG drip trays should be installed; hoses
kering vessels and Design code for onshore LNG bunkering should not be restricted; bunkering station should be con-

5
tinuously monitored; ESD should be tested before every In the field of LNG risk assessment, defining LNG
bunkering operation; the breakaway couplings should be leakage positions and hole sizes based on failure frequen-
installed; mooring procedure should be focus on; Enhance cies analysis is becoming an international consensus. As an
personal training, etc. These safety measures have been example, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
considered in the project in this study. (FERC) issued guidance for the selection of leak sizes
based upon failure frequencies for piping systems; in par-
THE LNG FUELED SHIP AND THE BUNKERING ticular, scenarios with failure frequencies greater than
VESSEL 3E-05 per year must be considered (McInerney et al., 2013).
This criterion is used to define hazard scenarios in this
The LNG fueled ship is an 18000 TEU containership study.
(Fig. 1 and Table 1) under conceptual design according to
CCS (China Classification Society) Rules for natural gas Table 3: Nominal FERC failure frequencies per unit length
fueled ships. for piping
A 10,000 cubic meters LNG bunkering vessel (Table 2) Failure frequency (/yr/m)
with a new type bunkering arm (combination of davit, pipes Pipe Diame-
and hoses) was assumed to provide bunkering service for Catastrophic
ter Dhole=1/3dpipe Dhole=25mm
the containership in this study. Rupture
d pipe50mm 10E-07 - 50E-07
50mmd pipe
5E-07 - 20E-07
149mm
150mmd
2E-07 4E-07 7E-07
pipe299mm

Fig. 1: Basic arrangement of the LNG fueled containership Table 4: Failure frequencies and operation times of LNG
hose
Table 1: Basic parameters of the LNG fueled containership Failure frequen- 4.0E-7 hole diameter:10%D50mm ,
Length, over- ~ 403.40 m Depth, 30.20 m cy (/hour) D: hose diameter
all moulded (Refer to Wolting et al., 2013: Modified
Length be- ~ 384.00 m Design draft, 14.00 m failure frequency according to TNO
tween perpen- moulded purple book)
diculars Operation time 16 h (estimated)
Breadth, 58.50 m LNG storage 10,000 m3 every bunkering
moulded tank Bunkering times 20 times
Service speed 20 kn Main engine 56800 kW every year
power Total operation 320 h
time every year
Table 2: Basic parameters of the LNG bunkering vessel
Length, overall ~113.50 m Depth, 5.80 m Table 5: OGP manual valve failure frequencies (per valve
moulded year)
Length between ~106.00 m Designed 12.00 m DN50 DN150 DN300
perpendiculars draft, 13 2.0E-05 3.1E-05 4.3E-05
moulded 310 7.7E-06 1.2E-05 1.7E-05
Breadth, 20.30 m LNG storage 10,000 m3 Hole diameter 1050 4.9E-06 4.7E-06 6.5E-06
moulded capacity (mm) 50 -- 2.4E-06 1.2E-06
Max. bunkering 600 m3/h Type of Membrane 150
rate LNG tank
150 -- -- 1.7E-06
LNG LEAKAGE SCENARIOS DEFINITION BASED ON
Table 6: OGP actuated valve failure frequencies (per valve
FAILURE FREQUENCIES ANALYSIS
year)
In terms of LNG leakage during STS operations, the DN50 DN150 DN300
main focus is LNG bunkering system related receiving ship 13 2.4E-04 2.2E-04 2.1E-04
and bunkering vessel, besides the bunkering system itself, 310 7.3E-05 6.6E-05 6.3E-05
the valves for isolating other systems are involved as well. Hole diameter 1050 3.0E-05 1.9E-05 1.8E-05
As the safety zone assessment is the goal in this study, only (mm) 50 -- 8.6E-06 2.4E-06
LNG release sources located on open areas were considered. 150
Based on historical data, the flammable gas dispersion after
150 -- -- 6.0E-06
gaseous phase leakage will not influence the safety zone
significantly. Therefore, the liquid phase leakage is the only
situation considered.

6
Currently, there are some databases with failure fre- Table 8. Hazard scenarios of LNG leakage
quencies for piping systems, such as FERC (McInerney et Hazard Description Cumulative Cumulative
al., 2013), OGP (OGP, 2010), TNO (VROM, 2005), HSE scenarios time of LNG LNG
(HSE, 2012). Failure frequencies data suitable for this pro- leakage leakage
ject are shown in Tables 3, 5 and 6. Table 4 shows the mod- Scenario Hose in bunker- 90 s 1082.7 kg
ified failure frequency and operation times of LNG hose. 1 ing arm (liquid),
Table 7 shows the failure frequencies calculation of hole diameter is
bunkering piping systems which are located on open area. 50 mm
Due to lack of failure date of DN200 valve, the data of Scenario Actuated valve 90 s 91.3 kg
DN150 valve was used conservatively. The failure fre- 2 (liquid) in bun-
quency of the LNG hose is the highest, Table 7. kering station of
receiving ship,
Table 7: Failure frequencies of bunkering piping sys- hole diameter is
tems on open area 10 mm
N Type Length or Specification Failure frequencies Scenario Actuated valve 90 s 8.2 kg
o. amount 3 (liquid) or man-
1 Pipe 25m DN 200 Catastrophic Rupture ual valve (liquid)
(liquid) 5.0E-06 in bunkering
Hole diameter 67 mm: station of re-
1.0E-05 ceiving ship,
Hole diameter 25mm: hole diameter is
1.75E-05 3 mm
2 Pipe in 14m DN 200 Catastrophic Rup- Scenario LNG release 2.5 s (Acc. 15.0 kg
bunker- ture:2.8E-06 4 from safety relief to reseating
ing arm Hole diameter 67mm valve of bunker- pressure of
(liquid) 5.6E-06 ing tank safety valve,
Hole diameter 25mm: see 4.2.3)
9.8E-06
3 Hose in 20m DN 200 Hole diameter CFD ANALYSIS OF LNG FLAMMABLE CLOUD
bunker- 50mm:1.28E-04 DISPERSION
ing arm
(liquid) The 3D CFD software FLACS was used to simulate
4 Actuated 8 sets DN 200 Hole diameter flammable cloud dispersion after LNG leakage. The soft-
valve 1~3mm2.2E-04 ware is an authoritative gas dispersion tool worldwide. It
(liquid) Hole diameter has received approval from the US Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for LNG vapor
3~10mm6.6E-05
dispersion modeling scenarios according to federal regula-
Hole diameter
tions 49 CFR 193.2059(a). The environment conditions of
10~50mm1.9E-05 STS operations site are shown in Table 9, and these data are
Hole diameter the input of the CFD analysis.
50~150mm8.6E-06
5 Manual 1 set DN 200 Hole diameter Table 9: Environment conditions of STS operations site
valve 1~3mm3.1E-05 No. Type Parameter
(liquid) Hole diameter 1 Annual mean wind speed 3.15m/s
3~10mm1.2E-05 2 Annual mean temperature 16
Hole diameter 3 Atmospheric pressure 101325Pa
10~50mm4.7E-06 4 Relative humidity 75%
Hole diameter 5 Solar radiation intensity 583w/m2
50~150mm2.4E-06 6 Atmospheric stability D

Hazard scenario 1 ~ scenario 3 identified are listed in Establishment of 3D CFD calculating model
Table 8 according to the criteria (failure frequencies greater
than 3E-05 per year). In addition, two ships (receiving and Fig. 2 shows the calculating model. As the pipe outlet
supplying ship) are connected during LNG bunkering. Nat- type of the vent mast influence gas release and dispersion
ural gas release from the vent mast of the supplying ship significantly (Wu, 2016), the real pipe outlet was estab-
may disperse flammable gas to the receiving ship, bringing lished accurately in the 3D model, Fig. 3.
additional risk. Therefore, scenario 4 is identified, Table 8.
According to experience, ESD total time of 90 s is assumed
to consider LNG leakage continuously (60 s for detection
and initiation, 30 s for isolation).

7
unloading are carried out simultaneously, LNG
leakage occurs at the beginning of containers un-
loading. Fig. 5 shows gas dispersion after the LNG
was contained by the drip trays.

a) Top view

a) North wind

b) Perspective view
Fig. 2: 3D CFD calculating model

b) East wind

Fig. 3: Pipe outlet model of bunkering vessels vent mast

Calculations and analysis

Half of the lower flammability limit (LFL) (volume c) West wind


concentration value 2.5 percent) of natural gas was accept- Fig. 4: Flammable gas dispersion range for LNG leakage in
ed as the outermost boundary of the flammable zone. bunkering station (volume concentration: 2.5%~15%)

LNG leakage from hose in bunkering arm


LNG leakage from hose in bunkering arm corresponds
to Scenario 1 in Table 8. For this scenario, flammable gas
would disperse a large range because of a relative large
leakage volume, therefore, the dispersion would be sensi-
tive to obstacles surrounding. Accordingly, the two situa-
tions (unloaded and loaded) are analyzed to compare how
the containers (obstacles) influence the gas dispersion. Fig. 5: Flammable gas dispersion range when LNG leakage
When performing calculations, three wind directions, east, occurs in bunkering station (north wind, volume concentra-
west and north, are considered. (South wind is ignored be- tion: 2.5%~15%)
cause of the LNG fueled ship would shelter the gas from
wind, the wind directions are shown in Fig. 2.)

(1) Unloaded situation


In this situation, LNG bunkering and containers
loading are carried out simultaneously. LNG leak-
age occurs at the beginning of containers loading.
Fig.4 shows gas dispersion after the LNG was
contained by drip trays (1.2m1.2m0.2m). The a) East wind
results calculated show that in north wind, flam-
mable gas flowed over the gunwale and spread
27.5 m along the ship transverse direction, Fig.4;
in east and west winds, flammable gas was always
below the gunwale, therefore, there is no influence
on the safety of loading. When LNG leak into the
water rather than in the bunkering station, there is
no harm to the loading operations for flammable
b) West wind
gas was always below the gunwale.
Fig. 6: Flammable gas dispersion scope when LNG leak
(2) Loaded situation
into the water (volume concentration: 2.5%~15%)
In this situation, LNG bunkering and containers

8
The results calculated show that (Figs.5 and 6), in the
north wind situation, flammable gas flowed over the gun-
wale and spread 14.0 m along the ship transverse direction;
in the east and west wind situation, flammable gas was al-
ways below the gunwale, therefore, there is no influence on
the safety of loading.

LNG leakage from valves


Scenario 2 and scenario 3 are all regarding LNG leak-
age from valves in the bunkering station. LNG would be
contained by the drip trays.
Calculations are carried out only in north wind situation
(In east and west wind situations, the hazards are signifi- Fig. 8: Flammable gas dispersion range after safety valve
cantly less by trial calculation). The results (Fig.7) demon- takeoff (time: 2s, 3s, and 4.56s)
strate that the range of gas dispersion after valve leakage is
very narrow, which does not affect the loading and unload- Safety zone
ing operations. Based on the above calculations, initial rectangle dan-
gerous zone (27.5 m84.0 m) is obtained by dangerous dis-
tances envelopment, conservatively, the final dangerous
zone (Fig.9) is a new rectangle (41.3 m126.0 m) which is
obtained from every initial rectangle length is multiplied by
1.5. Outside the range of the final dangerous zone can be
defined as safety zone of simultaneous operations.

a) Actuated valve leak

Fig. 9: Dangerous zone


b) Manual valve leak
Fig. 7: Flammable gas dispersion range after LNG leak CONCLUSIONS
from valves (north wind, volume concentration: 2.5%
~15%) The main conclusions obtained in this study are summa-
rized below:
LNG release from safety relief valve of bunkering tank 1. Due to LNG leakage and gas dispersion are influenced
LNG bunkering tanks safety valve set and reseat pres- by ship design and environment conditions signifi-
sures are 0.25 bar and 0.23 bar respectively, and its effec- cantly, the safety zone of LNG ship to ship (STS)
tive flow area is 31400 mm2 in this study, the gas release bunkering and cargo loading/unloading simultaneous
rate from safety valve was compared by two ways. The operations (SIMOPS) cannot keep the same, there are
result is 6.76 kg/s by gas flow equation (VROM, 2015), and different results for different designs and operation
the result obtained from FLACS leak wizard tool is shown sites;
in Table 10, the total release time is 2.5 s, the total release 2. Because of the failure frequency of LNG hose is high
mass is 15 kg, therefore, it is reasonable to obtain natural and flammable gas dispersion range is large after nat-
gas release parameters based on FLACS software. ural gas released from safety relief valve, the scenarios
The distance from vent outlet to the farthest boundary of of LNG hose rupture and natural gas released from
flammable cloud is 10.1 m (Fig.8), however, the distance bunkering tanks safety relief valve cannot be ignored
from the bunkering vessels vent outlet to the container- in similar study.
ships deck edge is 12.7 m during bunkering operations,
therefore, ignition hazard due to natural gas release from
safety relief valve can be ignored. REFERENCES

Table 10: Natural gas release rates from safety valve China MSA Jiangsu Branch, China Classification Society.
Time(s) Release rates(kg/s) (2013), Research report of LNG bunkering modes and
0 6.7621 bunkering stations. (In Chinese)
0.5 6.5937
1 6.4242 HSE (2012), Failure Rate and Event Data for use within
1.5 6.3364 Risk Assessments.
2 6.0762

9
IMO MSC 95/INF.17 (2015), Information on incidents
during bunkering of LNG.

McInerney, E.H., Hart, R.J. and Kytmaa, H.K. (2013),


New Quantitative Risk Criteria for U.S. LNG Facilities,
9th Global Congress on Process Safety.

OGP (2010), Risk Assessment Data Directory Report No.


4341 Process release frequencies.

VROM (2005), Publication Series on Dangerous Sub-


stances (PGS 3) Guidelines for quantitative risk assess-
ment (Purple book).

VROM (2015), Publicatiereeks Gevaarlijke Stoffen 2


Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects, Due to
releases of hazardous materials (liquids and gases).

Wolting, A.G. and Vijgen, L.J. (2013), Development of a


QRA method to calculate the risks generated by Lique-
fied Natural Gas (LNG) filling stations for road trucks,
9th Global Congress on Process Safety.

Wu, S.P., Fan, H.J., Luo, X.F. et al. (2016), Evaluation


Study for Vent Mast Height of Inland LNG Fuelled
Ships, Ship Engineering, 2016(01), pp 59-63. (In Chi-
nese)

Xu, J.Y., Fan, H.J., Wu, S.P. et al. (2015), Research on


LNG Ship to Ship (STS) Bunkering Operations, Ship
Engineering, 2015(01), pp 7-10+82. (In Chinese)

10
Enhancing SAR Communication and Decision Making
using Vessel TRIAGE: Concept and Developments
Floris Goerlandt
Jori Nordstrm
Pekka Ruponen
Aalto University, Marine Technology, floris.goerlandt@aalto.fi
The Finnish Lifeboat Institution, jori.nordstrom@meripelastus.fi
NAPA Ltd, pekka.ruponen@napa.fi

ABSTRACT studies on RoPax vessels, there are significant limits re-


garding the extent to which the survivability of current ship
Efficient response to maritime incidents and accidents re- design concepts can be improved in relation to realistic
quires good communication processes and situation awareness impact conditions (Hogstrm, 2012).
by all involved parties, in particular between the Search and An important strategy to reduce the disaster potential of
Rescue (SAR) response operators and the crew of the dis- maritime accidents is to enhance post-accident situational
tressed vessel. This paper discusses the Vessel TRIAGE
awareness and related decision making. Several accident
method, a newly developed tool to assess the safety status of a
vessel involved in a maritime accident or incident. The focus of
investigations (MAIB, 2009; MIT, 2013) point to the
this the assessment of the vessels condition in terms of its ca- crews uncertainty about the damage extent, which hampers
pability to provide a safe environment for the people onboard, effective communication both onboard and towards Search
as well as for response crews potentially assigned to the scene. and Rescue (SAR) response operators. This easily leads to
The method uses a relatively simple categorization system loss of time, during which the event can further escalate,
based on a number of threat factors, and results in a categori- both in terms of accident progression itself (e.g. more ex-
zation in one of four safety levels. The levels can be easily tensive flooding, larger fires) but also in terms of increased
communicated by all involved parties to achieve a shared situ- human casualties. The importance of shared situational
ational awareness, enabling enhanced decision-making. This
awareness and the quality of information provided to the
paper furthermore gives a brief overview of industrial devel-
opments related to Vessel TRIAGE, showing the methods involved parties has been identified as a critical feature of
potential for innovative technical solutions supporting SAR successful emergency response Seppnen and Virrantaus
communication. Finally, further testing needs of the Vessel (2015).
TRIAGE method and stakeholder concerns about its imple- Improving current tools and practices for post-accident
mentation are outlined, based on discussions at IMOs vessel safety assessment and related SAR decision-making
Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communication and Search is an important aspect of improving maritime safety in
and Rescue. This provides a path for further envisaged work practice. The emergency phase classification, based on the
for implementing the method in practice. SAR Convention, describes the urgency of response and the
reliability of the information by dividing emergencies in
uncertainty, alert and distress phases. However, this method
INTRODUCTION does not assess the safety level of the ship itself, which
nonetheless is crucial information for onboard contingency
Maritime accidents, particularly those involving cruise and measures and for effective SAR response. In practice, this
RoPax vessels and tankers, can have serious consequences means for instance that a man-over-board situation and an
in terms of human casualties, economic losses, and envi- out-of-control fire onboard a vessel would both be classi-
ronmental damage. Whereas the overall safety performance fied as a distress phase, while it is clear that different re-
of the global maritime fleet has improved significantly over sponse actions would be needed and the situations differ
the last decades (Eliopoulou et al., 2016), its performance is substantially in terms of the safety of the persons onboard
still significantly lower than other transportation modes. the vessel.
While measures to prevent accidents are in principle most Recently, a new method has been developed to improve the
desirable, for low probability/high consequence events in current situation regarding the assessment of the vessels
complex socio-technical systems, it is essential to also fo- safety status in maritime accidents and incidents, to im-
cus on strategies to reduce the disaster potential. Technical prove communication between the involved stakeholders
design solutions providing inherently safe designs are one and to facilitate related SAR response decision making: the
feasible approach to achieve this, but may also lead to vessel TRIAGE method. This paper first provides an over-
higher economic costs (Klanac, 2011). Based on extensive view of this method and then outlines recent technical de-

11
velopments to support the method. Finally, further testing the vessels status in practice. These are briefly introduced
needs of the Vessel TRIAGE method and stakeholder con- below; for a more elaborate description of the method, its
cerns about its implementation are outlined, partly based on development process and preliminary evaluation, the reader
discussions at IMOs Sub-Committee on Navigation, is referred to RAJA et al. (2015) and Nordstrm et al.
Communication and Search and Rescue. (2016). A categorization of operational focuses for SAR
response organizations in line with the vessel safety catego-
VESSEL TRIAGE METHOD ries has also been developed, but is outside the scope of the
current paper.
The Vessel TRIAGE method is a new tool for assessing and
communicating the safety status of vessels in maritime ac- The Vessel TRIAGE categories
cidents and incidents, intended to be used both by the
onboard crew and by emergency responders. The focus is The vessel TRIAGE method applies four categories for the
on assessing whether, and to what extent, the subject vessel safety status of a vessel, each of which is given a color code.
can provide a safe environment for the people onboard, Black represents the most unsafe conditions, where the
which is linked to different operational focuses for SAR vessel no longer provides any safety for the people onboard.
response actions. Taking a broad view on SAR activities, Green represents situations in which the vessel safety is
the decision to leave persons onboard the vessel is also a least compromised (acknowledging that, in case no accident
viable option practical SAR operations, making the Vessel has occurred to the vessel, none of the categories should be
TRIAGE method not only a matter of post-accident risk applied). The yellow and red categories represent the most
assessment but one of SAR planning and operations. significant differences regarding the vessels safety status.
The method is inspired by similar categorization systems In the yellow category, there is a risk that the situation will
applied in medical emergencies, see e.g. (Azeredo et al., get worse, implying that it is still safe for the people to
2015). It aims to provide a fast but well-justified operation- remain onboard, but it considered possible that the situation
al safety status of the vessel, which is then used to com- may change. In the red category, the level of safety has
municate to the various stakeholders: the vessels onboard significantly worsened or will worsen, which implies that
crew, SAR responders, the vessels shipping company the safety of the persons onboard is severely threatened,
shore personnel, crew of other vessels and salvage compa- either immediately or in the near future. Figure 1 shows the
nies, and others. As such, the method can be used to proac- color codes and their basic definitions. A general descrip-
tively assess the situation and facilitate ensuing decision tion of the conditions onboard has also been made for better
making, limiting the further escalation potential of the delineating the types of situations covered by these catego-
event. ries; see RAJA et al. (2015) and Nordstrm et al. (2016).
The Vessel TRIAGE method consists of three main parts: The methods qualitative nature is intentional, as real-life
the definitions of the vessel safety categories, the corre- decision making requires tools, which are intuitively clear
sponding threat factor matrix and a practical form to assess to the users (Fuchs et al., 2015).

Fig. 1: Vessel TRIAGE categories, abridged from RAJA et al. (2015)

The Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix not by itself lead to the worst ship safety level (black cate-
gory). In contrast, stability can be decreased to such an ex-
The basis for the assessment of the vessel TRIAGE catego- tent that evacuation operations are no longer possible or
ry is a threat factor matrix. This matrix lists the possible that the ship has capsized or sunk.
threats to the vessels safety, including flooding, list- In the Vessel TRIAGE method, the categorization of the
ing/decrease of stability, decreased maneuverability, severity level for each threat factor is a judgment based on
blackout, fire / explosion and danger posed by hazardous the best available information at the time of the assessment.
substances. The matrix includes a general description for Information can be gathered from diverse systems and
each threat factor, which indicates to the assessor to which sources, and a list of questions has been proposed alongside
severity level the ongoing situation onboard the vessel cor- the general description of the severity level of the threat
responds, see Figure 2 where a part of the matrix is shown factors, Nordstrm et al. (2016). The focus is on observable
for the flooding, listing/loss of stability and black-out aspects of the situation, aiming to make the assessment as
threat factors. objective as possible.
Depending on the threat factor, there are either three or four
degrees of severity, linked to the general description of the
vessels safety status of Fig. 1. For instance, blackout can-

12
Fig. 2: Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix, abridged from RAJA et al. (2015)

Practical application: the Vessel TRIAGE assessment form method is to periodically repeat the assessment, to ensure
that appropriate SAR actions are taken.
The practical application of the vessel TRIAGE method is
supported by a specific, easy-to-use paper form, which RELATED TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
could be implemented e.g. in the onboard copy of the
IAMSAR manual and/or in onboard and shore-side safety While the Vessel TRIAGE method has only been recently
management systems. An example of such a form can be developed (RAJA et al., 2015), the method has already
found in RAJA et al. (2015). The method for assessing the been taken as a basis for representing information from
overall Vessel TRIAGE vessel safety category takes fol- onboard decision support systems, in particular for passen-
lowing steps. ger vessels and related to the threat factors flooding and
First, a number of basic information fields are filled out, listing/decrease of stability. Such technological develop-
containing basic facts such as the date and time of the acci- ments are considered a valuable contribution to the imple-
dent occurrence, the vessel type, number of crewmembers mentation and utility of the Vessel TRIAGE method in
and passengers. Second, it is assessed for each threat factor practical settings. While the overall method is qualitative
whether or not has materialized. Apart from the options and is intended to be flexible to account for various sources
yes or no, the option not known can be used in cases of information, it is beneficial to make use of technological
where it is too time consuming to get a status report on the support for classifying the vessels safety status. Arguably,
specific threat factor. Third, the severity of the materialized advanced progressive flooding software can provide better
threat factors is assessed, based on the information about information about the predicted survivability than crew
the situation onboard, using the questions appropriate to the members can obtain from checklists of static stability soft-
factors. The information is compared with the general de- ware, which is the current industry standard (MAIB, 2015;
scription of the severity level of the threat factors, such as MIT, 2013).
in Fig. 2. A judgment is made about the severity level, tak- Several decision support systems for flooding crisis man-
ing the stance that in case of doubt, the more severe option agement have been proposed, e.g. Jasionowski (2011),
is selected. Fourth, an assessment of the crew capabilities Ruponen et al. (2012) and Varela et al. (2014). An example
and the weather conditions is made, which could e.g. hinder of output of a system which assesses the survivability of a
the performance of measures which would, under more flooded vessel in real-time is shown in Fig. 3, based on
favorable conditions, stabilize the vessels safety status. work by Ruponen et al. (2015). This software uses data
These are treated separately from the treat factors as such, received from flood level sensors to detect breaches in the
because they affect the entire vessels safety status. Fifth hull. The real-time information about the water levels is
and finally, the overall Vessel TRIAGE category is deter- used in a time-domain progressive flooding simulation
mined. Here, the basic rule is applied that the overall vessel (Ruponen et al., 2007). Thus, the stability and survivability
safety status should be at least as high as the severity level of the vessel are predicted for a given period into the future,
of the highest realized threat factor. It may be judged higher, continuously updating the prediction based on the latest
when taking the crew capabilities and weather conditions available data.
into account. Ruponen et al. (2015) presented the vessel survivability as a
In typical maritime accident scenarios, the vessels safety value between 0 and 1. However, such values are not very
status typically changes over time, depending for instance intuitive for ship crew, who need readily understandable
on mitigating actions taken by the crewmembers. Hence, an information in a simple form on which they can act in an
integral part of the application of the Vessel TRIAGE accidental situation. The Vessel TRIAGE categories and
corresponding color codes present an easily interpretable

13
platform for communication. However, linking the calcu- Return to Port regulation, see also Vassalos (2007). The
lated survivability with these categories requires criteria for listing/decrease of stability criteria rely on the SOLAS reg-
delineating the categories. Pennanen et al. (2016) propose ulations, in particular the heel angle and the s-factor in
such criteria for passenger vessels. The flooding criteria SOLAS II-1 Part II-1 Reg. 7. For details, see Pennanen et al.
relate are based on the number of flooded compartments (2016), where a case study for a damaged passenger ship is
and a flooding extent coefficient, similarly as in the Safe shown as well.

Fig. 3: Survivability assessment for a flooded passenger ship:


Vessel TRIAGE category, time-domain heel angle prediction and flooding extent, (Pennanen et al., 2015)

CONCLUSION
DISCUSSION: FURTHER RESEARCH AND TESTING
This paper has presented an overview of the Vessel TRI-
While a preliminary evaluation of the theoretical construct AGE method, a recently developed tool for assessing and
of the Vessel TRIAGE system was overall very positive, communicating the safety status of a vessel in maritime
see Nordstrm et al. (2016), further testing has been rec- accident situations. Technical developments related to the
ommended both by the developers of the method (IMO, flooding and listing/decrease of stability threat factor
2015) and by IMOs Sub-Committee on Navigation, Com- were outlined, showing that Vessel TRIAGE is a simple yet
munication and Search and Rescue (IMO, 2016). Rigorous powerful method to act as a framework for integrating in-
testing has also been applied to triage systems for medical formation from technical decision support systems into an
emergencies, see e.g. Parenti et al. (2014). overall tool for emergency communication and decision
The method has a definite intuitive appeal, and offers a making.
simple way forward to improve communication and deci- The Vessel TRIAGE method has undergone preliminary
sion making in post-accidental situations. However, im- positive evaluation, showing good potential for enhancing
plementation of the method in international SAR regula- maritime safety in maritime distress situations. This paper
tions requires taking into account the concerns of various has outlined several possible further tests to show the effi-
stakeholders, and further justification that the method does cacy of the method to improve SAR decision making and
indeed serve its intended purpose to improve communica- maritime safety, and further developments to integrate the
tion and be useful for practical decision making, without method in SAR procedures. It is hoped that this can spur
putting unnecessary burdens on ship crew. It also requires additional research and testing activity, ultimately leading
that the method is aligned with current practices in SAR to broad acceptance among the different stakeholders and
communication, e.g. related to the already existing emer- on the appropriate regulatory levels of decision making.
gency phase classification included in the SAR Convention.
Nordstrm et al. (2016) stress the need for further testing,
but do not specify how this could be done in practice, and
provide no further discussion on the practical concerns
about its implementation.
Some concerns regarding the above issues briefly outlined
in Table 1, partly based also on the discussions of the
working group in the IMOs working group of the
Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communication and Search
and Rescue (IMO, 2016). A number of possible practical
actions are listed as well, providing a way forward to ad-
dress these concerns.

14
Table 1: Vessel TRIAGE: concerns and actions to address these
ID Concerns Action(s) to address the concern
1 Vessel TRIAGE should be valid for all acci- Additional theoretical assessments of the construct validity of
dental situations affecting the vessels status the method, through expert judgment and/or through assessing
as a means to provide safety to people the threat factors in light of accident reports.
onboard (crew, passengers, responders)
2 Vessel TRIAGE should not lead to additional Elaborate on crew communication procedures in
workload to the ship crew, which could hinder post-accidental situations, ensuring the Vessel TRIAGE clas-
successful shipboard response efforts sification contributes to the response effort rather than dis-
tracting resources.
Test the Vessel TRIAGE method in simulated accident sce-
narios, ensuring the crew communication procedures ensure a
successful outcome.
Test and provide guidance on how often the reassessment of
the Vessel TRIAGE category should be performed.
3 Vessel TRIAGE should give a discernible Accident reports can be studied to evaluate how much time
benefit to emergency communication and de- would be gained had Vessel TRIAGE be used.
cision making Test the Vessel TRIAGE method in simulated accident sce-
narios, to evaluate the benefits it brings to practice.
4 Vessel TRIAGE should not impose decisions Elaborate on communication and decision roles between ves-
on the SAR response resources on the ship sel crew, on-scene commanders and shore-based SAR re-
master sponders.
5 Vessel TRIAGE should not conflict with ex- Other international and national emergency assessment and
isting onboard and shore-based emergency communication methods and procedures should be identified,
assessment and communication methods and integrated into one unified procedure.
6 Vessel TRIAGE should be consistently ap- Test the Vessel TRIAGE method in simulated accident sce-
plied by different individuals in different situ- narios, to evaluate the inter-rater reliability of the tool.
ations
7 SAR communication procedures should not SAR emergency communication procedures should be har-
conflict when a vessel crosses multiple SAR monized across SAR regions.
regions be harmonized across SAR regions
8 Regulatory implications of implementing If and when it is decided to implement Vessel TRIAGE in
Vessel TRIAGE should be accounted for. international regulations, the effects on relevant IMO and
ICAO documents should be assessed and accounted for.

IMO (2015) Guidelines on harmonized aeronautical and


REFERENCES maritime Search and Rescue procedures, including SAR
training matters. Vessel TRIAGE - a method for as-
Azeredo, T.R.M., Guedes, H.M., Rebelo de Almeida, R.A., sessing and communicating the safety status of vessels in
Chianca, T.C.M., Martins, J.C.A. (2015). Efficacy of maritime accidents and incidents, NCSR 3/21/2
the Manchester Triage System: a systematic review. Int. Jasionowski, A. (2011) Decision support for ship flooding
Emerg. Nurs. 23, pp.4752. crisis management. Ocean Eng. 38, pp.15681581.
Eliopoulou, E., Papanikolaou, A., Voulgarellis, M. (2016) Klanac, A. (2011) Design method for safe ship structures
Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of PhD Thesis. Aalto University, Espoo, Finland.
safety level. Saf. Sci. 85, pp.282292. MAIB. (2015) Report on the investigation of the ground-
Fuchs, H.M., Steigenberger, N., Lbcke, T., (2015) Intui- ing and flooding of the ro-ro ferry Commodore Clipper
tion of deliberation - How do professionals make deci- in the approaches to St Peter Port, Guernsey on 14 July
sions in action?, in: Proc. ISCRAM, May 24-27. Kris- 2014, No. 18/2015 Marine Accident Investigation
tiansand, Norway. Branch, Southampton, UK.
Hogstrm, P., (2012). RoPax ship collision - a methodol- MAIB. (2009). Report on the investigation into the flood-
ogy for survivability analysis, PhD Dissertation. ing and foundering of the grab hopper dredger Abigail H
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Swe- in the Port of Heysham 2 November 2008, No. 15/2009.
den. Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Southampton,
IMO. (2016) Guidelines on harmonized aeronautical and UK.
maritime Search and Rescue procedures, including SAR MIT. (2013) Cruise Ship Costa Concordia Marine casualty
training matters. Amendments to the IAMSAR manual. on January 13, 2012 - Report on the safety technical in-
Revised guidelines for preparing plans for cooperation vestigation, Ministtry of infrastructures and transports.
between Search and Rescue services and passenger Nordstrm, J., Goerlandt, F., Sarsama, J., Leppnen, P.,
ships MSC/CIRC.1079 - Report of the working group. Nissil, M., Ruponen, P., Lbcke, T., Sonninen, S.,
(2016). Vessel TRIAGE: a method for assessing and

15
communicating the safety status of vessels in maritime
distress situations, Saf. Sci. 85, pp.117129.
Parenti, N., Reggiani, M.L.B., Iannone, P., Percudani, D.,
Dowding, D., (2014). A systematic review on the valid-
ity and reliability of an emergency department triage
scale, the Manchester Triage System, Int. J. Nurs. Stud.
51, pp.10621069.
Pennanen, P., Ruponen, P., Nordstrm, J., Goerlandt, F.,
(2016) Application of Vessel TRIAGE for a damaged
passenger ship in: Proc. 15th International Ship Stabil-
ity Workshop, ISSW, Stockholm, Sweden, pp.141146.
Pennanen, P., Ruponen, P., Ramm-Schmidt, H. (2015).
Integrated decision support system for increased pas-
senger ship safety. in: Damaged Ship III. Presented at
the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, UK.
RAJA, TraFi, LiVi, VTT. (2015). Vessel TRIAGE: A
method for assessing and communicating the safety sta-
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Ruponen, P., Larmela, M., Pennanen, P. (2012). Flooding
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Conf. Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles (STAB2012),
Athens, Greece, pp. 391400.
Ruponen, P., Lindroth, D., Pennanen, P. (2015). Prediction
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Ocean Vehicles, Glasgow, UK.
Ruponen, P., Sundell, T., Larmela, M. (2007). Validation
of a simulation method for progressive flooding. Int.
Shipb. Prog. 54, pp.305321.
Seppnen, H., Virrantaus, K. (2015). Shared situational
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Practical Design of Ships and Other Floating Structures.
Houston, Texas, USA.

16
Study on the Correction of Wave Surge Forces to Improve
Surf-riding/Broaching Vulnerability Criteria Check
Accuracy
Pei-yuan FENG1, She-ming FAN1, Li-wei YU2, Ning MA2
1. Science and Technology Laboratory of Water-jet Propulsion,
Marine Design & Research Institute of China, pyfeng23@163.com
2. State Key Laboratory of Ocean Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China

ABSTRACT tion for the development of broaching stability assessment


criteria. The latest proposal from U.S. and Japan (SDC
This study focuses on the influence of wave surge 2/INF.10 2014) follows a three-tiered framework: Level 1
force prediction accuracy on the surf-riding/broaching evaluation only needs the ship length and speed infor-
vulnerability criteria check. It is demonstrated through mation; Level 2 evaluation is based on a simplified
captive model test that the current wave surge force surf-riding model, the probability of surf-riding occurrence
prediction model adopted in the draft criteria is not ac- in irregular seaway is chosen as the criteria for assessment;
curate enough. To improve the vulnerability criteria Level 3 direct stability assessment procedures are still un-
check accuracy, the Green function based 3D panel der discussion, the draft guidelines can be found in
method and the empirical correction formula proposed SDC1/INF.8 (2013).
by Japan are adopted to calculate the wave surge forces
of five sample ships, respectively. It is shown that the This study focuses on the influence of wave surge force on
empirical correction formula can help improve the wave the Level 2 surf-riding/broaching check result. Experi-
surge force prediction result, despite some discrepancies. mental data based on captive model tests have shown that
Finally, the surf-riding/broaching vulnerability criteria the correctness of wave force estimation plays an important
check is performed to the sample ships and it is demon- role in the prediction model (Hashimoto et al 2004b, Horel
strated that neglecting diffraction effect in the predic- et al 2014). The current prediction model adopted in the
tion of wave surge forces may lead to wrong conclu- surf-riding/broaching vulnerability check procedure only
sions. takes into account the Froude-Krylov component of the
wave surge force. As pointed out in Annex 35 of the draft
INTRODUCTION criteria (SDC 2/INF.10, 2014): for calculating the ampli-
tude of the wave surge force, the Froude-Krylov component
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is currently on its own could often over-estimate it, in which case, em-
working on the Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria pirical diffraction effect correction should be considered.
to ensure ship safety in waves more effectively. Five new Therefore, it is meaningful to investigate more accurate
stability failure modes are to be included in the new genera- wave surge force prediction methods and find out a proper
tion stability criteria: pure loss of stability, parametric roll, correction model.
dead ship condition, surf-riding/broaching and excessive
acceleration (Umeda 2013). Among them, broaching is In this study, it is demonstrated through captive model test
considered to be the most complicated one due to its highly that the current wave surge force prediction model adopted
nonlinear nature (Umeda 1999, Hashimoto et al 2004a). in the draft criteria is not accurate enough. To improve the
Broaching occurs when a ship cannot keep a constant vulnerability criteria check accuracy, the Green function
course despite the maximum steering effort, typically in based 3D panel method and the empirical correction for-
following and quartering waves (Umeda and Renilson 1992, mula proposed by Japan (SDC 2/INF.10, 2014) are adopted
Spyrou 1995). Surf-riding is usually regarded as the pre- to calculate the wave surge forces of five sample ships,
requisite of broaching when a ship is captured by the wave respectively. It is shown that the empirical correction for-
approaching from the stern that accelerates the ship to the mula can help improve the wave surge force prediction
wave celerity (Motora et al 1982, Umeda and Vassalos result, despite some discrepancies. Finally, the surf-riding/
1996). Small-size high-speed ships are most vulnerable to broaching vulnerability criteria check is performed to the
this stability failure mode. sample ships and it is demonstrated that neglecting diffrac-
Significant theoretical and experimental efforts have been tion effect in the prediction of wave surge forces may lead
made by researchers in the recent decades (Hashimoto and to wrong conclusions.
Stern 2007, Maki et al 2010), which form a good founda-

17
SURF-RIDING/BROACHING CRITERIA N
K T ( J ) i J i = 0 + 1 J + 2 J 2 + L [7]
For the purpose of this study, Level 2 surf-riding/broaching i =0
vulnerability check procedures of Annex 32 and Annex 35 where, R(u) is the calm water resistance of the ship; Te(u; n)
in SDC 2/INF.10 (2014) are relevant. is propeller thrust in calm water; tP is thrust deduction fac-
tor; wP is wake fraction; DP is propeller diameter; J is ad-
For a ship to pass Level 2 vulnerability criteria assessment, vance coefficient; is water density.
it is required that:
C < RSR [1] ncr is the critical propeller revolution solved by Melnikovs
method (Maki et al 2010):
Te ( cw ; ncr ) R ( cw )
where, RSR is the standard value, which has recently been N i
2 = Cij ( 2 ) I j [8]
changed from 0.005 to 0.05. C represents the probability of j

surf-riding occurrence, which is estimated by: f i =1 j =1


N N a

( fk )
j 2
Wij C 2ij c i!
Cij = i j ci j [9]
C = W 2 ( H S , TZ ) N Na j !( i j ) ! ( m + mx )
i =1 j =1 j 2 w
[2] fk
H S TZ
Wij
(1 t P )(1 wP ) i
i
i =1 j =1
ci = +r [10]
ni 2 DPi 4
i
where, W2(HS,TZ) is the weighting factor of each sea state
according to long-term wave statistics; HS is the significant
j +1 j+2
wave height; TZ is the zero-crossing wave period; Wij is the I j = 2 [11]
statistical weight of a wave with steepness (H/) varying 2 2
from 0.03 to 0.15 and wave length to ship length ratio (/L) where, cw is wave celerity; k is wave number; m is ship
varying from 1 to 3. Details concerning the calculation of mass; mx is added mass in surge direction; () is the
these factors are specified in SDC 2/INF.10 (2014). Figure gamma function.
1 shows the occurrence percentage of the long-term wave
statistics. As can be seen, the sea state with the highest oc- f is the amplitude of wave surge force, which according to
currence frequency corresponds to HS=2m and TZ=8s. the draft criteria, is calculated by:
H
f = gk FC2 + FS2 [12]
2
NS
FC = S ( xi ) exp {0.5kd ( xi )} sin kxi xi [13]
i =1
NS
FS = S ( xi ) exp {0.5kd ( xi )} cos kxi xi [14]
i =1
where, Ns is the number of sections; d(xi) and S(xi) are the
draft and submerged area of section i in calm water.

This wave force prediction model is based on linear theory


and the effect of ship forward speed is neglected. Moreover,
this force model only accounts for the Froude-Krylov (FK)
component of the wave surge force, while the diffraction
Fig.1: Long-term wave statistics (occurrence percentage) effect is totally neglected. Japan proposed an empirical
correction formula to correct the diffraction effect in Annex
C2ij indicates whether surf-riding occurs for the designated 35 of SDC 2/INF.10, as shown in equation [16]. The block
wave case, which is defined as: coefficient CB and the mid-ship section coefficient CM are
1 if Fn > Fncri , j used as the featuring parameters for the correction. Detailed
C 2ij = [3] explanation of the reasoning behind this empirical formula
0 if Fn Fncri , j for diffraction effect correction can be found in (Ito et al
where, Fncr is the critical Froude number corresponding to 2014).
the threshold of surf-riding (surf-riding occurs under any H
initial condition); ucr is the critical speed determined by: f = x gk FC2 + FS2 [15]
Te ( ucr ; ncr ) R ( ucr ) = 0
2
[4]
1.46CB 0.05 CM < 0.86
N

R ( u ) ru
i = r1u + r2u + L
i 2
[5] x = ( 5.76 5CM ) CB 0.05 0.86 < CM < 0.94 [16]
i =1 1.06CB 0.05 CM 0.94

Te ( u; n ) = (1 t P ) n 2 DP4 KT ( J ) [6]

18
CAPTIVE MODEL TEST

To validate the wave surge force prediction model adopted


in the latest draft criteria, captive model test in regular fol-
lowing waves is performed to measure the wave surge force
for a purse seiner. The main particulars of the ship model
(scale ratio 17) are listed in Table 1. The experiment is
conducted in the towing tank of MARIC (Marine Design &
Research Institute of China). The basin is 280m long, 10m
wide and 5m deep. The ship model is towed at the service
speed. Several wave frequencies are tested with a constant
wave steepness of 0.02.

Table 1. Main particulars of the purse seiner


Item Symbol Full Scale Model
Length Perpendicular LPP (m) 42.5 2.5000 Fig.3: Comparison of wave surge force results

Breadth B (m) 7.80 0.4588 SAMPLE SHIP CALCULATIONS


Depth D (m) 4.05 0.2382
The 3D panel method and the empirical correction formula
Mean Draft d (m) 3.20 0.1882
proposed by Japan are adopted to calculate the wave surge
Block Coefficient CB 0.6721 0.6721 forces of five sample ships, respectively. Main dimensions
of the sample ships are listed in Table 2, which are mainly
Mid-section Coefficient CM 0.8808 0.8808
fishing vessels with length around 40m and Fn around 0.3.

The experimental model of the purse seiner is shown in Table 2. Main dimensions of sample ships
Fig.2. During the experiment, two poles are used to confine
NO. Ship Type LPP (m) Fn CB CM
the sway and yaw motions of the model. Two force trans-
ducers are installed correspondingly to measure the forces 1 purse seiner 42.5 0.320 0.6721 0.8808
in the surge direction. The summation of the forces from 2 purse seiner 43.0 0.340 0.8011 0.9309
the two sensors results in the measured wave surge force.
3 purse seiner 54.0 0.330 0.7396 0.9269
Besides, numerical result from a frequency domain Green 4 fishery vessel 29.5 0.364 0.4796 0.7416
Function based 3D panel method is also compared. The 3D 5 net fishing boat 41.0 0.318 0.5800 0.8730
panel method can calculate the diffraction component of the
wave surge force, and can reflect the influence of ship
speed. Detailed theoretical explanations and applications of According to the wave surge force prediction results shown
this method can be found in Chen (2004). in Figs.4-8, it can be seen that for No.1, 2 and 3 ships, the
correction formula over-estimates the wave surge force. For
The obtained wave surge force response amplitude opera- No.4 ship, the wave surge force is under-estimated. For
tors (RAOs) are illustrated in Fig.3, where the horizontal No.5 ship, the correction formula can give quite accurate
axis denotes the wave length to ship length ratio and the estimation. Generally speaking, the empirical correction
vertical axis denotes the non-dimensional wave surge force. formula can help improve the wave surge force prediction
result, despite some discrepancies.
From the results, it is clearly demonstrated that the ampli-
tudes of the wave surge force without diffraction correction Finally, both Level 1 and 2 surf-riding/broaching criterion
are over-estimated. Therefore, it is necessary to include the check is performed to the sample ships, with three strate-
diffraction effect in the wave surge force prediction model. gies of wave surge force prediction: (a) without diffraction
correction; (b) using empirical diffraction correction for-
The 3D panel method result agrees quite well with the ex- mula; (c) using 3D panel method.
perimental result, while the empirical formula can help im-
prove the prediction accuracy, but not as accurate. The results are shown in Table 3. As can be seen, although
the criterion check conclusion for all the sample ships are
consistent, the resulting C values are drastically different
whether the diffraction effect is considered or not, thus may
lead to wrong conclusions.

On the other hand, the check result using the empirical dif-
fraction correction formula is close to that using the 3D
panel method. Therefore, the empirical formula can im-
prove the check accuracy and the diffraction effect correc-
Fig.2: Experimental model of the purse seiner tion is recommended in the surf-riding/broaching vulnera-
bility assessment procedure.

19
Table 3. Surf-riding/broaching criterion check result
Level 2 Check
No. (a) (b) (c)
C Result C Result C Result
1 8.06E-03 Pass 1.74E-03 Pass 0.00E+00 Pass
2 1.12E-02 Pass 1.09E-03 Pass 0.00E+00 Pass
3 8.75E-03 Pass 0.00E+00 Pass 0.00E+00 Pass
4 3.01E-01 Pass 1.76E-01 Pass 2.10E-01 Pass
5 1.61E-02 Pass 1.51E-03 Pass 1.51E-03 Pass

Fig.7: Wave surge force prediction of No.4 ship

Fig.4: Wave surge force prediction of No.1 ship


Fig.8: Wave surge force prediction of No.5 ship

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, the influence of wave surge force prediction


on surf-riding/broaching vulnerability criteria check is in-
vestigated. The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. It is demonstrated that the wave surge force prediction


method adopted in the current vulnerability criteria
check procedure is not accurate and may lead to
wrong conclusions.
2. Comparison between experimental data from captive
model test and numerical results based on 3D panel
Fig.5: Wave surge force prediction of No.2 ship method shows that 3D panel method can give accurate
prediction of the wave surge forces of the ship in fol-
lowing waves under service speed.
3. The empirical correction formula proposed by Japan
can help improve surf-riding/broaching criterion check
accuracy. However, sample ship calculations show
that it may over-estimate or under-estimate the wave
surge forces.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present study is supported by the Ministry of Industry


and Information Technology of China and the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.
51579144).
Fig.6: Wave surge force prediction of No.3 ship

20
REFERENCES lowing Sea, Manoeuvring and Control of Marine Craft.
Computational Mechanics
Chen, X. B. (2004), Hydrodynamics in offshore and naval
applications, Proc. 6th Int. Conf. on Hydrodynamics Ito, Y., Umeda, N. and Kubo, H. (2014), Hydrodynamic
Aspects on Vulnerability Criteria for Surf-Riding of
Hashimoto, M., Umeda, N. and Matsuda, A. (2004a), Im- Ships, Jurnal Teknologi, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp 127-132
portance of Several Nonlinear Factors on Broaching Pre-
diction, J. Marine Science and Technology 9, pp.80-93

Hashimoto, M., Umeda, N. and Matsuda, A. (2004b),


Model experiment on heel-induced hydrodynamic forc-
es in waves for broaching prediction, Proc. 7th Int. Ship
Stability Workshop

Hashimoto, M. and Stern, F. (2007), An Application of


CFD for Advanced Broaching Prediction, J. Japan So-
ciety of Naval Architects and Ocean Engineers 5E,
pp.51-62

Horel, B., Guillerm, P. E., Rousset, J. M. and Alessandrini,


B. (2014), Experimental database for surf-riding and
broaching-to quantification based on captive model tests
in waves, Proc. 14th Int. Ship Stability Workshop

Maki, A., Umeda, N., Renilson, M. and Ueta, T. (2010),


Analytical Formulae for Predicting the Surf-Riding
Threshold for a Ship in Following Seas, Jour. of Marine
Science and Technology, No.15, pp 218-229

SDC 1/INF.8, (2013), Draft Guidelines of Direct Stability


Assessment Procedures as a Part of the Second Genera-
tion Intact Stability Criteria, International Maritime
Organization

SDC 2/INF.10, (2014), Proposed Amendments to Part B


of the 2008 IS Code to Assess the Vulnerability of Ships
to the Broaching Stability Failure Mode, International
Maritime Organization

Motora, S. (1982), On the Mechanism of Broaching-to


Phenomena, Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Stability of Ships and
Ocean Vehicles

Spyrou, K. (1995), Surf-riding, Yaw Instability and Large


Heeling of Ships in Following/Quartering Waves, Ship
Technology Research 42, pp.103-112

Umeda, N. (1999), Nonlinear Dynamics of Ship Capsizing


Due to Broaching in Following and Quartering Seas, J.
Marine Science and Technology 4, pp.16-26

Umeda, N. (2013), Current Status of Second Generation


Intact Stability Criteria Development and Some Recent
Efforts, Proc. 13th International Ship Stability Work-
shop

Umeda, N. and Vassalos, D. (1996), Non-linear Periodic


Motions of A Ship Running in Following and Quartering
Seas, J. Society of Naval Architects of Japan 179,
pp.89-101

Umeda, N. and Renilson, M. (1992), BroachingA Dy-


namic Analysis of Yaw Behaviour of a Vessel in a Fol-

21
On the Survivability of ROPAX and Cruise Ships
A New Approach to Differences in Design
George Dafermos
Ship Design Laboratory, NTUA, Greece, giorgosdafermos@gmail.com
Apostolos Papanikolaou
Ship Design Laboratory, NTUA, Greece, papa@deslab.ntua.gr

In the regulatory framework of SOLAS 2009, the s factor


ABSTRACT expresses the probability of survival of the ship and
accounts for any stage of flooding. The purpose of the
The present paper summarizes the main results of a intermediate s factor implementation is to identify whether
comparative study on the survivability after damage of the ship faces a higher risk of capsize in the intermediate
a ROPAX and a Pure Passenger ship (or cruise ship), of stages, under the effect of the above mentioned phenomena,
the same size. Systematic flooding simulations were than in the final stage of flooding.
carried out in order to investigate the damage stability
and identify notable differences in the survivability Since the inception of the probabilistic approach to ship's
behavior of the two vessels. In this respect, the present damage stability there were justified concerns regarding the
formulation of attained subdivision index A of SOLAS capability of the present s- factor formulation to properly
2009 is being examined in order to determine whether it account for the actual survivability of the ship under
can sufficiently account for the design differences of the consideration; this was particularly disputable for passenger
study vessels. On this background, we proceed with the ships of different designs and sizes and is still an
introduction of a new Survivability Performance Index unresolved issue in scientific and practical terms. There
(SPI), which better represents ship's behavior during were several attempts to reformulate the s factor for
flooding and properly accounts for notable differences passenger ships, e.g. by project GOALDS [10], and to
in the assessment of the damage stability of ROPAX and better account for the actual survivability of passenger ships,
cruise type ships of the same size and capacity. with the SLF55 formulation finally prevailing in the latest
amendment of SOLAS [5]. All above methods follow a
INTRODUCTION quasi-static approach to ship's survivability, where
intermediate stages of flooding are taken into consideration,
Flooding simulations of ships after the loss of their but not the time dependent progressive flooding process
watertight integrity are generally used for more refined itself.
investigations of ship's damage stability, as in cases where
the physics of flooding and its effects on the time to sink In recent years, the development and coding of
(TTS) need to be clarified in the frame of forensic studies. mathematical models for the dynamic flooding and ship
Previous studies of the authors laboratory (see, e.g., [1], motion simulation enabled the improved modeling and
[11], [14]) have indicated the occurrence of some typical recording of the behavior of the vessel throughout the
consequences of the flooding process, such as the transient evolution of the flooding process. When a time domain
heeling developed during the initial phases of flooding simulation of the flooding process is performed, which we
and/or cross flooding. Such phenomena, which are related like herein to interpret in the sense of the probabilistic
primarily to free surface effects, were thoroughly discussed SOLAS s- factor, we could use the same stability
during the adoption of the new probabilistic damage assessment criteria like in SOLAS, but accounting for the
stability regulations of SOLAS 2009. This is also reflected time evolution of the flooding process; this includes the
in the damage stability assessment of passenger ships by the assessment of ship's GZ curve momentarily, at every time
way of calculation of the survival factor; namely, the s instance, while determining the probability of survival as a
factor is calculated based on two different formulations, one certain event of survival or sink/capsize, depending on the
for the intermediate and one for the final equilibrium stage. simulated TTS predicted by the flooding simulation. This is
an important extension of present thinking regarding ship's
damage stability, namely by introducing a more refined

22
assessment of the individual flooding scenarios by a combinations of adjacent one-zone damages. For all
modified quasi dynamic s- factor, which also accounts for damage cases the corresponding probabilities of damage pi
simulated TTS. The ship motions following a breach of and vi are assigned. Also, the box-shaped breach SOLAS
ship's outer shell are being in parallel determined by concept is adopted and the dimensions of each breach are
dynamic simulation methods. determined based on the subdivision and the penetration
limits. For each damage case, the GZ curve is obtained for a
There are a variety of approaches and dynamic simulation number of intermediate phases and the final one; the s
models and computer solvers, in which the flooding process corresponding factor is calculated based entirely on the
and ship's motions are addressed by simplified and/or properties of the GZ curve. The s factor represents the
advanced modeling and numerical techniques ([3], [7]). In a probability of survival of corresponding stages of the
probabilistic approach to ship's damage stability, in which a flooding process. The cumulative probability of survival
large number of damage scenarios needs to be assessed, it is from each damage scenario is the product of the p, v and s

=
essential to dispose methods and simulation tools, which factors.
can be readily used in practice, without compromising on
the accuracy of the obtained results.
For each draft specified in the regulation the summation of
In this study, the ship is considered as a rigid body (at zero the above conditional probabilities, corresponding to each
forward speed) and her floating position is fully determined damage scenario, results to the attained subdivision factor
by three degrees of freedom, namely her heel, trim and at the considered draft. The attained subdivision indices are
mean draft1. We employ the well-established flooding and weighted by the w factors that represent the percentage of
motion simulation tool of NAPA and consider the time ships lifecycle associated to each condition. The final
dependent GZ-curve for the assessment of ship's stability; attained index is calculated on the basis of the following

= + +
through it, all main stability parameters, such as the formula:

= 0.2 + 0.4 + 0.4


maximum GZ value, the time varying metacentric height
and the s factor can be readily extracted and used for the
assessment of ship's survivability. The employed method
determines at each time step a new floating position, while For each damage case, the initial condition is known as well
the floodwater ingress and spreading is computed by a as the wi factor. As a result, the A index can be calculated
hydraulic model for the water fluxes; this is leading via the equivalent formulation:
eventually to a new floodwater distribution and a new
=
equilibrium position, based on the balance of the forces and
, ,
moments caused by the floodwater [2].

THE SOLAS 2009 ASSESSMENT


THE ASSESSMENT BASED ON NUMERICAL
The main scope of this assessment study is to determine the SIMULATIONS
survivability performance of the two passenger ships of
different design (a ROPAX and a cruise ship), but of the Flooding simulations may be used for the assessment of
same size and capacity (in terms of People On Board), with certain damage scenarios in a deterministic approach, e.g.
respect to their behavior in case of flooding; this is when doubts arise on whether the cross flooding completes
achieved by numerical flooding simulations, while within the specified time limit or when a specific damage
examining whether the current SOLAS regulation, which scenario is considered of particular importance (e.g.
specifies the same Required Subdivision Index for the two forensic studies), but rarely for the probabilistic assessment
study vessels, can effectively take into account the of ship's damage stability (e.g. [14], [15]). The assessment
difference of the inner subdivision of the vessels. is generally both qualitative and quantitative, elucidating
the physics and consequences of the flooding process on the
Initially, the two designs are being evaluated against the damaged vessel. However, complicated mathematical
requirements of the SOLAS 2009 criteria on damage models need to be developed to closely simulate the physics
stability. According to this framework, three loading of the problem and even more in order to enable the
conditions corresponding to the deepest subdivision draft possibility for comparison and optimization amongst
(ds), to the partial subdivision draft (dP) and the light service several design options.
condition draft (dl) need to be defined. Furthermore, the
subdivision of the vessel needs to be considered in order to In this study a new formulation for the survival s- factor of
properly apply the zonal approach prescribed in the SOLAS SOLAS is introduced. We replace the traditional s-factor by
regulations. For each zone determined via the vessels the new Survivability Performance Index (SPI), which
subdivision one or more damage cases are generated. takes better account of the actual survivability of the vessel
Multi-zone damages are also generated as all possible and is determined by the most important parameters of the
flooding process, namely
1 the estimated time to sink/capsize (TTS),
Herein, it is tacitly assumed that even though the ship
the time varying s factor at any moment of the
may be operating in a seaway, it will keep her mean
position while she is not drifting away and her wave simulation,
induced motions are small so that they can be practically the s factor at the 30th minute of the simulation
neglected. and

23
the maximum and/or final heeling angle. the s factor used in SOLAS and as such its maximum value
must be unity. The SPI represents the survivability
The time to sink TTS is probably the most important performance of a vessel as percentage of the best possible
parameter that is herein used. Even if the current SOLAS performance that is herein characterized by SPI equal to
assessment may lead to a survival s- factor of zero in case unity.
of sinking/ capsize, the time until the final loss of the vessel Both SPI formulations are herein used in parallel for the
is crucial and needs to be assessed; namely, a design that assessment of the vessels survivability performance, in
delays the time to sink/capsize is safer (and should score order to examine which one is more appropriate for use. In
better in the assessment of its survivability), even though the SPIfinal formulation, the finally attained heeling angle is
eventually the ship may be lost, but the potential loss of life used as criterion and the final equilibrium (if any) is the
is being mitigated. performance indicator, noting that a smaller final heeling
angle represents a more stable condition after flooding.
The specified s- factors used for the SPI formulation are the When the maximum attained heeling angle is used in
s factor at the 30th minute of the simulation and at the final SPImax, the transient flooding effects are more dominant and
moment, which is considered as either the moment when a the smoothness of the flooding process is favored.
steady state (equilibrium) is achieved, or when the
maximum simulation time (60 min) is reached. Both these When the SPI index is calculated, a new attained index can
factors may be calculated on the basis of the time varying be evaluated likewise to the A index obtained from the
GZ characteristics by the employed simulation method. The SOLAS assessment. In this case the Asim index is calculated
s factor at the 30th minute of the simulation is a according to the following formulation:

=
representative parameter indicating that the ship retains her
!>?
stability and an initiated evacuation of people onboard can
be completed, as specified in the regulations. The final , ,
equilibrium stability is also considered and expressed by
It is understood that the survivability performance of the
the final s- factor, so that a design associated to a higher s-
vessel is weighted based on the probabilities of the damage
factor should inherently have a higher survivability index,
breach position and dimensions, as well as the initial
since it is more stable.
loading conditions, similarly to the SOLAS s- factor
approach.
Furthermore, the floating position of the vessel needs also
to be taken into consideration. Heeling angles are
THE PROPOSED NEW ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
considered as adequately representative and the most
significant parameters characterizing ship's damage stability
The present study deals with the comparative assessment of
and eventually floatability. The heeling angles used herein
the survivability of the two selected passenger ship types of
are the maximum heeling angle developed during the
equal size and capacity according to both the current
flooding process and the finally attained heeling angle. The
SOLAS regulatory framework and by use of the herein
calculation of the index, based on the maximum heeling
proposed new SPI method on the basis of flooding
angle takes into account possible transient phenomena that
simulations. In this section the procedure followed for the
emerge during the initial ingress of floodwater or during
evaluation is outlined.
cross or down flooding periods. Ship's final floating
position is expressed through the final heeling angle.
The external hull surface and internal compartmentation of
the study vessels were developed by the Ship Design
The Survivability Performance Index (SPI) is calculated by
Laboratory of NTUA. The difference in the internal
use of the following formulations:
subdivision of the two vessels is that a new deck was
455 '()*+
= 11 ;
! '()*+
introduced in the RORO space of the ROPAX ship for the
/0
"#$% /0,-*. 455 6*78(9:
pure passenger ship (cruise ship), with cabins for passenger
'()*+,-*.
accommodation. The external openings, the under-deck

= 11 ;
! '()*+ /0 455 -*.
subdivision as well as the loading conditions were kept
< = 455 6*78(9:
"#$% '()*+,-*. /0,-*.
unchanged. The reason for not altering the loading sets was
to decouple the effect of the denser compartmentation
Where the TTS, sfinal, s30, heelfinal and heelmax were above the main deck from possible effects of differences in
discussed previously. The TRULE is the total simulation time the hydrostatic characteristics and the initial stability
and it is herein set equal to 60 minutes (default value). The parameters of the two vessel types. Furthermore, it was
sfinal-max and s30-max are the maximum values of the s factor at necessary to define a compartment connection table relating
the final stage and at the 30th minute, respectively, which to the flooding of the cruise ship spaces above the main
are unity. The capsize angle (heelcapsize) is herein set equal to deck, as in the case of the unobstructed garage space of the
45 (default value) and it corresponds to the angle that the ROPAX ship.
ship is considered as lost due to capsize. The above default
values may be adjusted on the basis of systematic studies. At first, the evaluation of both ship type according to
SOLAS 2009 is carried out. Calculations are made for
As observed, all parameters taken into account are damage cases involving alternatively up to five-zone
normalized by the maximum value they could attain. The damages and up to three-zone damages. The former
reason for this is to obtain an index which is comparable to assessment is made in order to fully explore the survival

24
capabilities of the vessel, attaining the highest possible A can be calculated, for each damage scenario. The
index and examining practically all possible damage cases. summation of the attained indices from all damage
The latter assessment, which involves fewer damage scenarios yields the final cumulative attained index, as
scenarios, is performed in order to generate a feasible set of given in the equations. It needs to be pointed out that the
damage scenarios that can all be examined in parallel by attained subdivision index A according to SOLAS is the
flooding simulations and the newly proposed method within probability that the ship survives a collision damage, while
reasonable computational times. the ASIM index is a survivability performance index
expressing more precisely the stability and floatability
For each SOLAS damage case and initial condition, a behavior of the vessel after flooding within a set time
damage scenario is defined and a flooding simulation is frame. The comparison of both above attained indices, for
performed by NAPA. After the completion of each flooding each studied vessel type (ROPAX and pure passenger ship),
simulation, the parameters needed to calculate the SPI should enable to detect the general trend of the actual
index are obtained. Both formulations of the SPI index are survivability performance of each ship against the estimated
calculated simultaneously. performance given through the current SOLAS framework.

Finally, after the s factors and the survivability performance


indices (SPI) are obtained, the attained indices A and Asim

Fig. 1: Flowchart of the new damage stability assessment procedure

hull geometry model extends till the upper limit of the


DESCRIPTION OF STUDY SHIP MODELS
RORO space, disregarding the superstructures above.
General
Starting from the above ROPAX parent model, a Pure
The initial ship study model is a ROPAX vessel of about Passenger vessel/ cruise type vessel has been generated,
117.00m in length and 19.50m in breadth. The depth to the while keeping the external hull and ship's capacity the same.
car deck is 6.70m from the baseline and the top of the A new deck was introduced at a height in between the
RORO space is at 12.25m from the baseline. The deepest original main deck (freeboard deck) and the original 2nd
subdivision draft is at 4.90m and the corresponding initial deck, which forms the uppermost limit of the modeled hull.
freeboard is 1.80m. The number of persons on board is The main deck (former car deck) and the new deck are
1560 persons, including the crew members. The ship is disposed for the accommodation of passengers and crew.
subdivided by 13 transverse bulkheads extending to the Two structural bulkheads are extended above the main deck,
main car deck and there is no lower hold. The employed forming the boundaries of the fire zones needed. A total of

25
38 large passenger cabins and 7 crew cabins are fitted. Also,
some additional public spaces are also provided in the same
region. The number of persons on board, the zone
definitions (subdivision) and the loading conditions are kept
exactly the same with those determined for the ROPAX;
this enables the identification of differences in the
calculated attained index purely due to differences in the
flooding of the above main deck spaces.

The main particulars of the vessel are given in the next


table:
SHIP PARTICULARS
Length Between
LBP [m] 117.18
Perpendiculars
Length Overall LOA [m] 124.20
Breadth B [m] 19.50
Design Draft T [m] 4.90
Car Deck Height D [m] 6.70
Displacement [t] 6400
Table 1: Ship principal particulars Plan 2: Pure Passenger vessel general arrangement plan

General Arrangement Openings

The ship is divided by thirteen transverse bulkheads below Regarding the definition of unprotected openings in NAPA,
the car deck. Also a ducktail is fitted on the aft end of the they were herein modeled as geometric objects. This
vessel. The general arrangement plans of the two vessel enables the software to automatically retrieve the necessary
types are given next. information concerning the lowest point of the opening and
the cross flow area, which is needed for the flooding
simulations. Fitted ventilators in the RORO space are
generally considered as unprotected external openings and
have an effect on the GZ curve determination. Internal
openings on the car deck were also taken into account and
this helped to define a compartment connection table that
allows the flooding of a dry compartment when the opening
is immersed. Even though these openings are not
necessarily watertight, they were herein considered as such,
so as to prohibit the change on the properties of the GZ
curve.

The same external openings were also used for the


assessment of the Pure Passenger vessel. The internal
openings were herein defined as open watertight doors and
stairs, connecting the adjacent compartments of the new
passenger decks.

The SOLAS assessment requires only the position of the


lowermost point of each opening and the opening type, in
order to determine the characteristics of the GZ curve, at
every flooding stage and calculate the survivability factor,
Plan 1: ROPAX general arrangement plan accordingly. For the flooding simulations, though, more
information is needed. Firstly, the area of the opening needs
to be defined, as well as the pressure loss on the opening.
The area of the opening is automatically calculated based
on its geometry. The pressure loss is expressed as a
discharge coefficient which reduces the water flow through
the opening. The discharge coefficients are set to 0.5 for
external openings, 0.75 for internal openings and 0.65 for
breach openings. The pressure of the water at the lowermost
point of the opening, the area and the discharge coefficients
allow the calculation of the water flow through the opening,
using a modified Bernoulli equation solution. The opening
type is indifferent for the flooding simulation, since the

26
progressive flooding is inherent to the flooding simulation floodwater volume is determined by the internal free water
concept. surface height and the compartment's geometry. In the final
stage, the internal and the external waterlines are in
Concerning a damage cases generation in the flooding equilibrium and the flooding process is assumed completed.
simulations, some remarks are due at this point. In the Contrary, in the time dependent flooding simulation
NAPA software environment the damage definition is not approach, the time dependent flow through the openings is
topological/geometrical, in the sense that there is not a determined. At each time step, a modified Bernoulli
geometric object representing the breach (damage). The equation is used to estimate the flow through every opening
definition can be made in NAPA by either automatically or and the corresponding water transfer is calculated. The
manually selecting the compartments that are affected in distribution of floodwater leads to a new floating position
each damage scenario or geometrically aided, using a for the vessel and to a new pressure head at the lower point
breach type or defining the extents of the damage breach of the opening and this iterative process continues until the
and allowing the software to decide on which external and internal pressure heads are balanced.
compartments are flooded, while the theoretical geometry
used is not defined as a real geometric object, in the NAPA Initial Loading Conditions
software. In both cases the damage definition results in a
group of compartments that are floodable, with reference to The same initial loading conditions were used for the
the level of the external waterline. This is the concept evaluation of the two vessel types, in order to make the
followed in the SOLAS assessment. However, when alteration in the survivability performance due to the
flooding simulations are performed, regardless of the change of part of compartmentation (above the main deck)
method employed, the definition of the initial condition of visible. The characteristics of the initial loading conditions
the vessel is crucial for the solution of the problem. The are given in the following table:
software allows the flooding to begin either from a NAPA Initial Condition DL DP DS
damage or an opening. In the first case, a new floating
T0 [M] 4.060 4.564 4.900
position after the flooding of the rooms defined in the
damage description is calculated, by the equalization TR0 [M] -0.798 0.000 0.000
between the internal and external water heights and the HEEL0 [DEG] 0.0 0.0 0.0
progressive flooding after the equalization is studied via the DISP0 [T] 5007.3 5790.9 6404.8
flooding simulation. When the flooding starts from an LCB [M] 51.913 53.199 52.827
immersed opening, the flooding simulation begins from the TCB [M] 0.000 0.000 0.000
initial floating position of the vessel. Therefore the breach VCB [M] 2.376 2.637 2.838
must be defined as a geometric object in order to allow the GM0 [M] 2.841 2.281 2.530
software to calculate the water flow through it. GM [M] 2.841 2.281 2.530
KG [M] 8.80 8.86 8.57
The previous discussion makes evident that a passage KMT [M] 11.641 11.141 11.100
from the traditional SOLAS damage definition to a Table 2: Initial conditions description
geometric breach definition is necessary to carry out the
required flooding simulations in NAPA. This is herein RESULTS
achieved by firstly registering the damaged compartments,
from each SOLAS damage definition. Secondly, the
SOLAS Assessment
registered compartments are separated into two categories,
namely the external compartments directly accessible by
In this section the SOLAS assessment results for the two
outside damages and which may be directly hit by the
vessel types are presented.
breach and those which may be within the damage extent,
but they are internal in the sense that they are protected by
Subdivision Length: 123.134 m
the external compartments. The compartments outside the
Breadth at the load line: 19.500 m
reach of damage extents, are interconnected as described in
Breadth at the bulkhead deck: 19.500 m
the compartment connection table, which remains active
Number of persons N1: 0
and their flooding will be taken into account during the
Number of persons N2: 1560
progressive flooding phase.
Required Subdivision Index: R=0.78400
The definition of the lowermost point and the area of the
Attained Subdivision Index- ROPAX: A=0.81850
damage opening can be automatically established, since
Attained Subdivision Index- Pure Passenger: A=0.81932
each opening refers a fully defined geometric NAPA object.
In that way, the theoretical damages prescribed in the
SOLAS evaluation are interpreted as geometric objects, SOLAS ASSESSMENT
representing the breach opening. W*P*V*S
Damages Difference
ROPAX Pure Passenger
One of the main differences between the SOLAS approach 1-Zone Damages 0.38808 0.38808 0.000%
and the herein advanced flooding simulations is the way of 2-Zone Damages 0.36477 0.36549 0.197%
determining the floodwater accumulation. The SOLAS 3-Zone Damages 0.05591 0.05599 0.143%
approach suggests multiple phases of floodwater 4-Zone Damages 0.00854 0.00856 0.234%
accumulation (intermediate stages), where at each phase the 5-Zone Damages 0.00120 0.00120 0.000%

27
A-Index Total 0.81850 0.81932 0.100%
Table 3: SOLAS assessment for both ship types
Pure Passenger Ship

The attained indices of both designs are by a good margin Similarly, the results obtained for the Pure Passenger vessel
higher than the required one, thus both vessel types comply are summarized in Table 5 and Fig. 3.
with regulations 6 and 7 of SOLAS 2009. The results also
show that the difference between the attained subdivision PURE PASSENGER SHIP RESULTS
index for the ROPAX and the Pure Passenger vessel is
SOLAS 0.80955 0.000%
practically zero or merely 0.1%, despite the differences in
ATTAINED INDEX SPIFINAL 0.87394 7.953%
their design above the main deck. Thus, this difference
should account for the existence of internal openings in the SPIMAX 0.86768 7.180%
above main deck spaces that can mitigate the spreading of Table 5: Pure Passenger ship SOLAS and simulations results
water, as well as the free surface effects on stability. It is
evident that this is not captured by the traditional SOLAS
approach and the two vessels demonstrate about the same
safety level against capsize, what is not reflecting reality2.
Flooding Simulation Assessment

The procedure followed for the assessment by use of the


flooding simulations was earlier described. For each
damage case and breach opening a flooding simulation is
performed by NAPA and the SPI index is calculated
according to both formulations. The new attained
simulation index is calculated as the product of w, p and v
factors and the SPI. The same methodology is repeated for
the Pure Passenger vessel.

For the flooding simulations, we assumed a realistic seaway


environment. For the latter, a regular wave pattern is
assumed. The incident, transversely propagating waves, is
assumed having a wave height of 2.00 m and a wave period
of 5.5 sec. By considering this seaway environment
scenario, we may expect a more pronounced flooding and
free surface effect on ship's main deck (Water On Deck
problem). The obtained results are presented below,
separately for the ROPAX and the Pure Passenger vessel
and then comparatively.

ROPAX

The results for the ROPAX vessel are given in the next
table and the following figures. The percentage difference
given in the fourth column is the difference between the
attained index via simulations and SOLAS A, normalized
by the SOLAS attained index.
ROPAX RESULTS
SOLAS 0.80876 0.000%
ATTAINED INDEX SPIFINAL 0.82541 2.059%
SPIMAX 0.81462 0.725%
Table 4: ROPAX SOLAS and simulations results

The attained index ASIM using the SPI index, following the
formulation with the final heeling angle is denoted as
SPIFINAL, while the attained index related to the SPI index
with the maximum heeling formulation is denoted as
SPIMAX. The correlation between the SPIMAX and SPIFINAL
against the SOLAS s factor are given in Fig. 2, for the case
of the ROPAX ship.

2
A difference could have been detected if the Stockholm
Agreement Water On Deck procedure would have been
implemented in the probabilistic SOLAS approach

28
ROPAX: SPI- SOLAS s factor
1

0,9

0,8

0,7
R = 0,8852
0,6 R = 0,9026
SPI

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
SOLAS s

SPIfinal-s SPImax-s Linear (SPIfinal-s) Linear (SPImax-s)

Fig. 2: SPI indices against SOLAS s factor for various damage cases of the ROPAX ship

Pure Passenger Vessel: SPI- SOLAS s factor


1

0,9

0,8

0,7 R = 0,6759
R = 0,6811
0,6
SPI

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
SOLAS s

SPIfinal-s SPImax-s Linear (SPIfinal-s) Linear (SPImax-s)

Fig. 3: SPI indices against SOLAS s factor for various damage cases of the Pure Passenger vessel

29
Comparative Results angle against the SOLAS s factor are given in Fig. 4 and Fig.
5, for both ship types.
In this section the results obtained for the ROPAX and the
Pure Passenger ship are compared. Initially, the SPI index
based on the final heeling angle and the maximum heeling

SPI final - s SOLAS


1

0,9

0,8
R = 0,6759
0,7

0,6
SPI final

0,5 R = 0,8852

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
SOLAS s

ROPAX PPF Linear (ROPAX) Linear (PPF)

Fig. 4: SPIfinal formulation against SOLAS s factor for ROPAX and Pure Passenger Ferry (PPF)

SPI max - s SOLAS


1

0,9

0,8

0,7

0,6 R = 0,6811
SPI max

0,5

0,4
R = 0,9026
0,3

0,2

0,1

0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
SOLAS s

ROPAX PPF Linear (ROPAX) Linear (PPF)

Fig. 5: SPImax formulation against SOLAS s factor for ROPAX and Pure Passenger Ferry (PPF)

30
The next table summarizes the results obtained from this
comprehensive study, along with the differences calculated
for each method and design alternative.

ATTAINED INDICES COMPARISON BY METHOD AND DESIGN ALTERNATIVE


METHOD/ DESIGN ROPAX PURE PASSENGER DIFFERENCE (ROPAX BASE)
SOLAS 0.80876 0.80955 0.099%
SPI (FINAL HEEL) 0.82541 0.87394 5.880%
DIFFERENCE (SOLAS BASE) 2.059% 7.953% -
SPI (MAX HEEL) 0.81462 0.86768 6.513%
DIFFERENCE (SOLAS BASE) 0.725% 7.180% -
Table 6: Attained indices comparison by method and design alternative

surface effects are herein slightly mitigated and thus


DISCUSSION
the transient heeling angles are limited.
4. In Fig. 3 the SPI indices, based on both formulations,
The most important results of this study are summarized in
are plotted against the SOLAS survivability index s.
Table 6. Following the traditional SOLAS approach a
The R2 values are less than 0.7, therefore the
negligibly higher attained subdivision index for the pure
correlation between the survivability performance
passenger vessel is recorded, when compared to the
indices and the survivability factor is herein very weak.
ROPAX of the same size and capacity, whereas the herein
The SPI formulations lead to higher attained indices
proposed new survivability performance index (SPI)
and consequently they account for a better survivability
approach yields a significantly higher index indicating an
of this vessel type.
enhanced survivability behavior for the pure passenger
5. In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 the SPI based on the final heeling
vessel.
angle and the SPI based on the maximum heeling angle
are depicted against the SOLAS s factor. Some
An elaboration of the obtained results is given in the
comments need to be made, so as to explain the
following.
difference between the two simulation indices and the s
factor. As easily observed, in the Pure Passenger vessel
1. The survivability of the ROPAX design is judged based
case, the SPI results are more scattered for zero s factor
on the results presented in Table 6 and Fig. 2. The
and s factor unity, comparing to the ROPAX case.
attained index based on the SPI, taking into account the
Starting from the s factor unity region, where in both
final heeling angle criterion, is the highest of the
cases the SPI indices give results different from unity.
attained indices for the ROPAX design. Comparing the
The reason for this is that in the SPI formulation the
two SPI indices, which are based on the simulations, it
heeling angle is directly implemented, while in the s
is obvious that the attained index based on the
factor it is indirectly accounted for, through the first
maximum heeling angle yields always a lower index.
stable equilibrium angle predicted in the GZ curve.
This is explained by the fact that the heeling angles for
Consequently, the development of any heeling angle
the intermediate stages of flooding can be quite
has a direct effect on the value of the SPI and leads to
excessive. These heeling angles are closely related to
values lower than unity. When the final heeling angle is
the free surface effects, which are more intensive
taken into account for the SPI calculation, the
during the initial and generally transient phases of the
scattering is less excessive both for the ROPAX and the
flooding process. The percentage difference between
Pure Passenger ferry. That is an indication of the
the two formulations of the SPI, based on the SOLAS
existence of excessive heeling angle during the
results, is about 1.3% which may be considered
intermediate flooding stages, with a consequent more
significant.
severe impact on the SPI. As for the region of zero s
2. Fig. 2 shows a good agreement between the SPI indices
factors, exaggerated differences are observed for the
and the SOLAS s factor, for the ROPAX case study.
case of the Pure Passenger vessel. This is actually what
The R2 values are about 0.9, with the highest value
is identified as the enhanced survivability of this type
corresponding to the SPI that takes into account the
of vessel, which retains its stability even though the
maximum heeling angle value. This suggests that the
properties of the GZ curve yield zero s factor. For the
SPImax approach differs from the SOLAS s-factor
ROPAX case, in most cases the SPI and the s factor are
approach only slightly, at least for the ROPAX case
nullified simultaneously. That is the explanation why
study.
the pure passenger vessel displays significant rise in
3. Considering the Pure Passenger vessel alternative, the
the attained index, compared to the SOLAS assessment
difference between the attained indices from the
results.
simulations and the SOLAS assessment is more
6. In Table 6 the differences between the two design
pronounced. This is an indication that while an
alternatives are recorded, by the evaluation method
enhanced survivability performance of this vessel type
used. As seen in the table, the difference between the
is present, the traditional SOLAS s factor approach
attained subdivision indices for ROPAX and pure
fails to account for it. Also, considering that the
passenger ferry, based on the SOLAS approach is about
difference between the attained indices from the
0.1%. When it comes to the attained indices from the
simulations is 0.8% leads to the conclusion that the free
flooding simulations, the results give a difference of

31
5.88% for the final heeling angle formulation of SPI 6. The new Survivability Performance Index approach
and 6.51% for the maximum heeling angle better accounts for differences in the design
formulation. This suggests that the traditional SOLAS arrangements, based on calculated parameters from
assessment method predicts comparable survivability numerical simulations conducted by a standard naval
capability for both ship types, while the SPI deriving architectural software package like NAPA; it
from flooding simulations of the real physical introduces aspects of the Time to Sink in the
phenomenon predicts an enhanced survivability for the assessment process, which are presently not considered
Pure Passenger vessel. Furthermore, the difference of in the s factor formulation and the SOLAS approach.
the attained indices from the simulations, for the two 7. Present Required Subdivision Indices of SOLAS for
ship types, is higher when the maximum heeling angle passenger ships do not consider basic differences in
is used for the SPI calculation. This is an indication of ship design, i.e. between ROPAX and Pure Passenger
the importance of the transient heeling angles, which ships of equal size and capacity, which is reasonable
are significant especially for the large unobstructed from the point of view of setting a safety level for the
RORO space. risk of People On Board. The present study suggests
that there are significant differences in the actual
CONCLUSIONS survivability performance of these two basic ship types
and this can be readily demonstrated by the new SPI
In this study a new index for the assessment of the approach elaborated in the present paper
survivability performance of a vessel, via flooding
simulations, is introduced. The SPI index approach takes REFERENCES
better into account the main ship design attributes that
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flooding process and assesses ships survivability within a of ROPAX and Pure Passenger Ferries and
set time frame, which may be defined by SOLAS. The Flooding Simulations," Diploma Thesis, School of
conducted comprehensive study on a ROPAX and a Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering,
modified Pure Passenger vessel of the same size and National Technical University of Athens, NTUA,
capacity suggests the following conclusions: Athens, 2015.
[2] Dankowski, H. and Krger, S., "Dynamic
1. While the present SOLAS probabilistic approach to the Extension of a Numerical Flooding Simulation in
attained subdivision index is practically insensitive Time-Domain," in 12th International Conference
with respect to the compartmentation of spaces above on the Stability of Ship and Ocean Vehicles,
the main deck, when using the new SPI approach for Glasgow, UK, 2015.
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for the Pure Passenger ship. This suggests that for the Passenger Ships, Guidelines On Safe Return To
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while for the Pure Passenger the SOLAS approach is Chapter II-1 And Associated Guidelines On
more conservative. Damage Control Drills For Passenger Ships,
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maximum heeling angle, the obtained attained index is [6] Kanellopoulou, A., "Study of damage stability
slightly lower than the index obtained when the final regulations and their impact on the design and
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the transient heeling angles developed, which are program," Diploma Thesis, School of Naval
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the maximum heeling angle formulation. This is the inflow momentum on the transient roll
understandable, considering that the denser response of a damaged ship," Ocean Engineering,
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limitation and slower compartments flooding. [8] NAPA. (2014). NAPA for Design Manuals for
Consequently, the transient heeling angles are reduced Release 2014.3.
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difference between the two arrangements. Sklavenitis, A., "Investigation into the Sinking of

32
the RO-RO Passenger Ferry S.S HERAKLION,"
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[12] Ruponen, P., "Progressive Flooding Of A Damaged
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33
A Method for Describing
Ocean Environments for Ship Assessment
Eirik Eisinger, Jens Bloch Helmers and Gaute Storhaug
DNV GL

ABSTRACT Table 1: Essential AIS fields


Field Description
Ship traffic data (AIS) and weather reanalysis data are
emerging technologies for the shipping industry. This paper MMSI Unique Identification number
examines a method for describing ocean environments for ship
assessment by combing AIS and reanalysis data. The quality
of AIS and reanalysis data is studied, and possible applications IMO Number International maritime organization
for the proposed method are analyzed and explained. number

The AIS data are found to contain some noise in terms of both Position Longitudinal and latitudinal position
wrong and lacking data entries and propose filters to deal with
this lack of quality. These filters seem to filter out enough of Speed Speed over ground in knots
these bad data points for the results to be credible. Reanalysis
data show a trend much similar to buoy measurements, but
seems to underestimate the occurrence of extreme values. True heading Relative to true north in degrees

The applications studied using this method are: making scat- Course over ground Relative to true north in degrees
ter diagrams based on trades and vessel type, weather routing
effects, and correlations between significant wave height, ves-
sel speed and heading. It is argued that these applications are
applicable in moderate ocean environments and trend studies.
Studies have been performed on both ERA-interim data and
The ERA-Interim model uses a sparse grid, if the proposed
method would be used with a reanalysis model of finer resolu- AIS data. The contribution to this field of study is the com-
tion there is reason to believe that the method may also work bination of the two datasets. The combination of these data
better for extreme values. Much longer observations are sources could give a good estimate of the environmental
needed for proper extreme value statistics. conditions experienced by operating vessels in their exact
position, and gives a range of new applications. This paper
INTRODUCTION is based on results from a thesis called a method for de-
scribing ocean environment for ship design (Eisinger, 2016).
Todays industry standard for environmental data for ship Before taking a closer look at applications, the method will
applications are taken from the BMT Atlas (BMT Atlas, be discussed and validated.
2011). The BMT atlas provides wave data based on visual
observations done from aboard vessels in the period METHOD
1949-1986. The data is statistically handled for improved
quality and is stored for different nautical zones (DNV GL, ERA-Interim is a global reanalysis model calculated on a
2007, appendix B) reduced Gaussian grid that has spacing of approximately
79km, and with calculation performed for every six hours.
Automatic Identification System (AIS) has been mandatory To reduce the complexity of the problem and to help with
for most commercial vessels since 2005. The system pro- calculation speed, an interpolated version of the model has
vides vessels that are within a range of 20-40km of each been used. The interpolated version has a uniform spacing
other with data. The most essential AIS data is found in of one degree for both longitude and latitude axis. The
Table 1. Satellite-based AIS receivers have been used to model provides environmental data like: significant wave
store data for all AIS equipped vessels, and provide AIS height Hs, average zero crossing period Tz, wave direction ,
data for more than 120 000 vessels. Environmental data is wind speed and temperature from 1979 up to today.
taken from ERA-Interim, a reanalysis model provided by ERA-Interim uses 30 wave frequencies and 24 wave direc-
the European Center for Midrange Weather Forecast tions, giving the model a total of 720 degrees of freedom.
(ECMWF). (ECMWF, 2014)

34
The AIS data have used is provided by vesseltracker. They
provide data every 10 minutes whenever data is available.
The coordinate system used for position is a geographic
coordinate system, and knots (arc minutes per hour) is used
for speed.

AIS data is used as a basis to combine these sources of


information. Interpolation is performed on the ERA-Interim
data to estimate the environment data to the time and posi-
tion of each vessel. Fig.1 illustrates this process where a
fleet and a time interval is chosen to get a position interval
for each vessel in the fleet. The reanalysis library is then
called to provide the environmental data for these positions
and times.

AIS data is used to find time and position for all vessels of
interest. These times and positions are then used to estimate Fig.2: Time interval between AIS loggings for four AIS
environment data. vessels.

Fig.2 shows the time interval between AIS loggings for four
vessels. The figure shows a time interval of up to 70 hours.
Within this interval there is no AIS data available. The figure
shows that interpolation on AIS data must be done with
caution since the uncertainty grows with the time interval.
Our greatest challenge related to AIS data is that the data
only goes back to 2012. At the time of writing this gives
roughly three years of data. In order to analyze unlikely
events a much larger time span is needed. Preferably 10
years or more.

Fig.1: Process of combining AIS data with environmental ERA-Interim Data


data. In order to validate the ERA-Interim data, moored buoys
have been logged since 3 march 2015. The buoy data is
taken from the national data buoy center (NOAA, 2016).

DATA VALIDATION

In this section the data quality of AIS and ERA-Interim data


is studied. It is also explained how to solve some of these
challenges.

AIS Data
The quality of AIS data can vary. The time interval between
neighboring entries can vary depending on if there is a
receiver in the area. Sometimes vessels report their position
with the wrong IMO number. Two equal data entries are
sometimes stored in the database, positions can be stored
with NaN, and sometimes important fields like speed are
missing.

These are all challenges that need to be considered and


addressed, and filters have been implemented which
cleanses the data for most of the addressed issues, but with Fig.3: Comparison between buoy data and ERA-Interim
120 000 vessels in the database there is bad quality data data for a buoy in the Bering Sea.
present that is not detected and filtered out. Because of the
vast amount of data used, this may not affect the result
significantly. In this section a buoy in the Bering Sea is used as an exam-
ple. The buoy is hereafter referred to by its ID, which is
46073. This is the buoy where the most severe wave heights
were detected among all the logged buoys. Fig.3 shows a
direct comparison between ERA-Interim data and buoy data

35
in the period 3 march 2015 to 26 may 2015. The figure Scatter Diagrams
shows a similar trend between the methods for both Hs and
Tz calculations. The absolute difference is included in light
grey, with the corresponding mean value and standard devi-
ation in the upper right corner of each plot. Notice that the
absolute difference of the wave direction has a mean value
of 23o and a standard deviation of 25o which gives this
value much uncertainty. This high uncertainty can partly be
explained by the interpolation performed for ERA-Interim
data. Buoys are logged every hour and hence ERA-Interim
data must be interpolated to fit all buoy time steps. Notice
also how buoys measure more extreme values than the
ERA-Interim model (see for example Hs for 9 April.

This can be seen more clearly in Fig.4, where all Hs values


are stored in a histogram for buoy 46073. The tail of the
distribution is zoomed into in order to show extreme values.
One can clearly see how ERA-Interim data measures lower
values than buoy measurements. This could be because
ERA-Interim uses a sparse grid and shows only the average
value within the grid. A finer grid can detect local varia-
tions which again could result in more accurate extreme
values (Bitner-Gregersen et al., 2016).
Fig.5: Scatter plot for Tz and Hs for all container vessels in
the AIS database sailing in the North Atlantic.

Scatter diagrams are widely used in ship design, as a meas-


ure of the weather conditions a vessel is likely to experi-
ence. The proposed method can potentially provide scatter
diagrams which are based on the weather actually experi-
enced by operating vessels. These scatter diagrams can be
made with arbitrary filters like: vessel type, vessel length,
age, etc. Container vessels and oil tankers in the North
Atlantic Ocean are used as examples. Fig.5 shows a scatter
plot for Tz and Hs for all container vessels in the North
Atlantic. The histograms show the distribution for Hs and
Tz. A scatter diagram could be extracted from this by
counting occurrences in every cell (cells are marked with
dotted lines).
Fig.4: Hs histograms for buoy data and ERA-Interim data.
The histograms included in Fig.5 can be fitted with three
parameter Weibull plots. The complementary cumulative
distribution function then gives the probability for exceed-
One can see how buoys measure higher waves than the ing a given value.
ERA-Interim model in extreme sea states from Fig.4. One
can also see that the number of occurrences for the lowest The scatter diagram used as industry standard today is
values is less for ERA-Interim than for Buoy data. The called Rec.34 and uses data from four zones in the BMT
reason for this could be that the grid of the ERA-Interim Atlas. Fig.6 compares this data with our method. The figure
model is too sparse. also includes data from all the ERA-Interim values in a
nautical sector going back to 1979. In Fig.6 this is shown as
APPLICATION reanalysis (RA) data. The black line at approximately 10-5
shows the 25 year value, meaning a vessel is likely to reach
A study of the challenges and limitations of the proposed this value during its life time. Note that our method shows a
method have been shown in previous sections. The follow- 25 year value up to 4 m lower than the industry standard.
ing section will focus on possible applications of the meth- Even the RA data gives lower Hs values than the Rec.34
od. All results presented in this section is using AIS data data. This is another indication that the ERA-Interim model
that are 150 nautical miles from shore and each vessel has a underestimates values. Notice also that oil tankers have a
time step of three hours. 25 year value which is one meter higher than for container
vessels. This indicates that container vessels are routing
more than oil tankers. Rec.34 data is based on visual wave
observations from 1949-1986, which would not include as
much routing as is common today, but even when Rec.34

36
data are a bit conservative our data is too low, as can be Fig.8 is showing the routing rate (routing distance dr divid-
seen in the RA data which does not take routing into ac- ed by shortest distance ds) for all crossings done by con-
count. tainer vessels. This figure varies with season, as winter
storms in the North Atlantic are most severe and gives good
Oil Tankers Container Vessels reason for routing.

Fig.6: Probability of exceeding for four zones for which


Rec.34 is defined. Rec.34 data is compared with our AIS-
RA method and all Reanalysis data found in each zone. Fig.8: Number of crossings versus routing rate (routing
Routing distance divided by shortest distance), for container vessels
on open sea.
Routing is the effect that a vessel does a maneuver to avoid
bad weather. This can be done with speed reduction, speed
increase, moving into sheltered areas, change of course, etc.
In order to measure to what degree vessels are routing on a Two scatter diagrams can be extracted based on the routing
big scale, an obstacle free area is chosen for the analysis. crossing Sr and the shortest distance crossing Ss. The rela-
This is done in order to know that when a vessel is moving tive difference between both scatters can be calculated
away from the shortest distance path it is most likely because using :
of weather conditions. Fig.7 is showing the boundaries for
such an area. The dashed line is showing the route taken by
an AIS vessel in this area, while the dotted line is showing The result is shown in Fig.9. The result illustrates at what
the shortest distance path between the end points. The figure conditions captains start routing. The transition where the
also shows the actual heading and the end point heading of relative difference goes from negative to positive gives an
the vessel in four points. The difference between the lengths idea of when captains typically start routing. The relation
of these routes gives an indication of how much the vessel can be written mathematically as:
was routing while crossing this area. The difference between . The line produced by the linear equation can
headings also gives such an indication, but does not take be seen in Fig.9
drifting into account. This method is therefore not consid-
ered as robust as the distance comparison.

Fig.9: Relative difference scatter between a routing scatter Sr


and the shortest distance scatter Ss.
Fig.7: Area with no obstacles. The shortest distance between
the end points can be compared with the route taken by the
vessel.

37
Hs Speed Relation icant wave height, vessel speed and heading. All applica-
The proposed method makes many new relations available, tions have given informative and reasonable results, some
like relative wave direction vs Hs, Tz vs ship length or Hs vs of which are confirmed by captains and vessel owners.
speed. Filters can be applied in order to look at these rela-
tions in specific areas, for specific ship types or size. This leads to the conclusion that although AIS data contain
errors, enough of these can be filtered out that in spite of
The Hs speed relation will now be studied as an example, the poor data quality in some of the cases, the vast amount
but other relations can also be extracted. of data makes the poor quality data statistically insignifi-
cant as there are many other data points of better quality.

The reanalysis model failing to reproduce extreme values


makes it difficult to use this method for extreme value sta-
tistics without handling extrapolation. Since this is an im-
portant application there is a need to improve the reanalysis
model. The grid was simplified, going from a reduced
Gaussian grid for which the reanalysis was originally done,
to a geographic coordinate system. This was to make the
interpolation scheme faster and less complex. It is recom-
mended to use data in the original grid and to do compari-
sons. This would be likely to improve the method, but the
result would still be based on the coarse grid used by
ERA-Interim. Comparing results with a fine resolution
Fig.10: Hs speed relation for following sea, beam sea and model like NORA10 would therefore also be necessary in
head sea. order to know what difference the grid resolution makes.

Another limitation to the method is the short time range for


which AIS data has been stored. The database will be ex-
One can see from Fig.10 that speed is reduced as Hs is in- tended with time, but it might also be possible to extend the
creased. The effect is most significant for head sea. This may data backwards in time.
differ from other sources like Barhoumi and Storhaug (2013)
suggesting that the speed may increase in stern seas at least Only vessel position data and time is needed in order to
for moderate wind speeds. estimate the weather environment, and values such as
heading and speed can be found based on the change in
CONCLUSIONS position. GPS systems get hold of vessel positions and
these systems became available to the public in the 1980s.
The study was set out to examine a method for describing The AIS database could therefore be extended for vessels
ocean environments for ship design, by combining ship where GPS data is made available.
traffic data (AIS data) with weather reanalysis data. As the
maritime industry is making a move towards data smart The proposed method can provide an important contribu-
solutions, AIS databases grow every day and reanalysis tion to the study of ocean environments for ship assessment,
models are becoming better, this is believed to be an im- but the method must still be improved to make it useful for
portant subject of study. The following questions have been the whole range of applications. Currently, the method must
sought to be answered: be limited to fatigue or trend studies, but the scientific
community is likely to develop better models and with
What is the data quality of AIS data, and how can more computer power reanalysis models will likely im-
the data be filtered to improve quality? prove. With better reanalysis models and more AIS data it
What is the data quality of reanalysis data, and is believed that these principles can solve a range of ques-
what limitations does this bring? tions that are difficult to solve with the current industry
What are possible applications for such a method? standards.
The data can also be used to study other assumptions which
It has been found that AIS data contain some noise in terms are important in the design of ships. For fatigue, for in-
of both wrong and lacking data entries, and it has been stance the time in port or sheltered water can be a factor to
found challenging to do comparison between different AIS limit the fatigue damage, requiring the scatter diagram to be
vessels as their data points are not given for the same time. based on the time at sea.
Reanalysis data have proven to have a trend much similar
to buoy measurements, but seem to underestimate extreme
values. This proves to be critical when comparing 25 year ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
values for reanalysis data, buoy data and data taken from
the industry standard Rec.34, as our method gets values The authors would like to thank DNVGL for support in this
much lower than the methods used to compare. study. Eisinger would also thank the supervisor at UiO and
at DNVGL, in particular Helmers for contributions towards
This paper has looked at three main applications: scatter the master thesis.
diagrams, weather routing and correlations between signif-

38
REFERENCES

Barhoumi, M. and Storhaug, G. (2013), PRADS

Bitner-Gregersen, E.M. et al. (2016) Sea state conditions


for marine structures analysis and model tests,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0029801
816300105

BMT Atlas (2011),


http://www.globalwavestatisticsonline.com/

DNV GL, Y. (2007), RP-C205, Environmental Conditions


and Environmental Loads ,
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNV/codes/docs/2007-10/
RP-C205.pdf

ECMWF IFS Documentation - Wave Model, Y. (2013),


http://www.ecmwf.int/sites/default/files/IFS_CY40R1_Part
7.pdf

Eisinger, E. (2016), A method for describing ocean envi-


ronment for ship design.

IMO (2016),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/
AIS.aspx

NOAA (2016),
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/

Vesseltracker (2016),
https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/static/Company.html

Wikipedia-AIS (2016),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_Identification_Sys
tem

39
Authors will not be present
at the conference

A Short Ship Design Risk Analysis using the Monte Carlo Method
Elena-Gratiela Robe-Voinea*, Alexandru Pintilie**, Raluca Vernic***
*PhD Student at Mathematical PhD School, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Bucharest and Project Planner at
SNC Ship Design-Constanta Shipyard, Email: elena_robe@yahoo.com

** PhD Assist. Prof. at Faculty of Maritime, Industrial and Mechanical Engineering,


Ovidius University of Constanta, Email: apintilie@yahoo.com

*** PhD Assoc. Prof. at Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Ovidius University of Constanta and Institute for Mathematical
Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Bucharest, Email: rvernic@univ-ovidius.ro

ABSTRACT
RISK ANALYSIS BASIS
The primary focus during the development of a ship
basic/detailed design is to pay attention to an important Designing a new ship involves the identification and
aspect called risk. Taking into consideration that build- assuming multiple risks, dependent on the environment, the
ing a ship implies a lot of risks, an important duty is to mobility of the production process, long execution terms,
prevent them by maximizing the probability and con- the large number of coordinated activities and the complex-
sequences of positive events and, in the same time, by ity of the entire process as well as contractual relations with
minimizing the probability and consequences of adverse third parties.
events related to the projects objectives. A well-known The risk is the possibility of an event occurring, usually
method such as Monte Carlo simulation is quite often an unfavorable one, bearing consequences on the cost per-
used to analyze the risks in a project development. This formances (it usually leads to further expense), on the qual-
paper aims to present the method using an ongoing ship ity (not rising up to the necessary quality specifications)
design project for a petroleum chemical tanker. and on time (not meeting deadlines). In other words, risk
can be defined as uncertainty associated with a desired re-
INTRODUCTION sult.
Risk can appear in three situations:
According to studies regarding the evolution of naval the event occurs, but the result is uncertain;
constructions, as evidenced in Market Research Reports, the effect of an event is known, but the result is un-
the industry of naval constructions has registered a series of certain;
major fluctuations lately. Ship orders have constantly risen the event is uncertain as well as the result.
during a four year period, from 2003 to 2007 and plum- Risk analysis uses the theory of probabilities and it con-
meted in 2008-2009, as a consequence of the global finan- sists of studying all variables of an objective which can
cial crisis. After a slight comeback in 2010, the naval in- contribute to the obtaining of acceptable performances,
dustry starts experiencing problems again in 2011. considering all the factors already discussed. This analysis
The slow evolution of ship building, worldwide speak- can be made quantitatively, through stochastic methods by
ing, reflects the weak economical foundations, the debt quantifying the possible value dispersion as previsions in
crisis within the euro zone and the lack of loans in maritime terms of cost and/or time, and from a qualitative point of
transport. The ship building industry is faced with a dark view, through a formal investigation, based on judgments,
perspective due to the constant growth of naval shipyards experience and diagnostic methods using checklists.
efficiency, modest investments in the field and also the The risk element in a project is represented by any ele-
market saturation. ment which possesses a measurable probability to deviate
Building new ships means substantial costs, a great from a well-defined plan. Any element of such a structure
consumption of raw matter and materials, significant hu- can be used as a potential risk element. The more repre-
man resources as well as launching new dedicated tech- sentative a structure is, the more significant the risk ele-
niques and technologies. Consequently, to start a new pro- ments will be taken into consideration.
ject, a risk analysis is required to reflect as accurate as pos-
sible the implications and consequences of all the factors Thus, to achieve a goal, a series of activities must be run.
which are about to participate in the task achievement. An activity, (a), can be considered a risk element if two

40
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simultaneous conditions are met: RISK ANALYSIS METHODS

Qualitative methods
(1)
Here, P(a) represents the probability that the event (a) The qualitative method of risk analysis implies using
will occur; E(a) represents the effect of event (a) on the qualitative criteria, using various categories for separating
project; L(a) represents the financial evaluation of E(a). parameters, with definitions establishing the range for every
Generally, evaluating risks means covering the follow- category. Qualitative analysis is based on expert opinions, it
ing stages (see Roman and Andreica 2012 ): doesnt require specialized instruments and it is easily ap-
sensitivity analysis; plied. Interpreting results is clear to most people, not re-
critical variables probability distribution; quiring special knowledge, and the conclusions are suffi-
risk assessment; cient. Qualitative risk analysis elements consist of risk
probability, risk impact and risk assessment matrix (see
evaluating acceptable levels of risk;
Ionescu 2010).
risk prevention. The risk probability is defined as the probability of that
risk occurring. According to the probabilities theory, the
RISK MANAGEMENT ASPECTS probability of the event (a) is defined as the ratio of the
number of favorable results (m) of the event (a) and the
Risk management is a cyclic process which unfolds total number of the event results (n), considered equally
throughout the entire project and it consists of covering at possible, that is
least three distinct stages, as it can be observed in Table 1.
(2)
Table 1 Risk management stages
Nr. Risk management
Activities Risk impact points to the effect that risk has upon the
Crt. stages
RISK - identify the risk project objectives, if it occurs.
1.
IDENTIFICATION - identify significant risks The risk probability and impact, I(a), are seen as very
- eliminate incongruous risks high, high, medium, low or very low.
- in-depth analysis of significant Risk score, S(a) is determined using the formula
2. RISK ANALYSIS risks
- result assessment (3)
-probability assessment
-expected value determination
To determine the actual scores of every risk, one must
REACTION TO - risk reduction
3. draw up the risk score matrix, as can be seen in table 2.
RISK - risk elimination
- risk distribution
Table 2 Risk score matrix
Risk impact
In the risk identifying stage one must evaluate potentials Probability
perils, as well as effects and apparition probabilities in or- 0,05 0,10 0,20 0,40 0,80
der to decide which specific risks need prevention. Actually, 0,90 0,05 0,09 0,18 0,36 0,72
at this stage, one must identify all the elements which meet
the criteria (1). At the same time, one must eliminate in- 0,70 0,04 0,07 0,14 0,28 0,56
congruous risks that are those elements with low probabil- 0,50 0,03 0,05 0,10 0,20 0,40
ity of occurrence or with insignificant consequences. This
means that we shall not take into consideration those ele- 0,30 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,12 0,24
ments whose P(a) or L(a) value tend to zero. 0,10 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04 0,08
In the risk analysis stage one must take into considera-
tion the risks primarily identified and another in-depth
analysis must be drawn up. To perform a risk analysis, one The significance of the data in Table 2 is as follows:
must use various mathematical instruments, ranging from S(a) < 0,05 = low impact (green);
probability analysis to Monte Carlo analysis. 0,05 S(a) < 0,15 = medium impact (yellow);
In the reaction to risk stage one takes action to eliminate, S(a) > 0,15 = high impact (red).
to reduce or to distribute risks. These actions are carried out The qualitative approach is subjective but it allows a
according to a risk management plan which includes the higher generalization degree, being less restrictive.
procedures to be used in risk management, designating in-
dividuals responsible for certain actions in risk domains, Quantitative methods
resources assigned to this purpose, as well as assessing re-
sults obtained in risk management. The quantitative risk analysis implies the evaluation of
the risk value through numerical methods. Through quanti-
tative risk analysis one takes into consideration the numer-
ical evaluation of probability and impact of each risk upon
the entire project. To this end, several quantitative methods
are employed, such as decision trees analysis or the Monte
Carlo simulation.

41
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The quantitative analysis cannot be made without the MONTE CARLO SIMULATION FOR A 41000 TDW
qualitative analysis to determine the initiating events. The SHIP DESIGN CHEMICAL TANKER PROJECT
method requires a high volume of data, very well prepared
professionals and expensive software. In this study case we consider a short part of a ship de-
Decision trees method represents decisions and random sign project which was planned to start on January 4, 2016
events, in the way they are viewed by the decision makers. and scheduled to be completed on July 18, 2017 at a cost of
As represented in Fig. 1 (Ionescu 2010), each probable fu- $120.000.
ture event (represented by a circle) is matched with an ac-
tion (a square) which can be taken by the decision maker, Preliminary
resulting in a tree-like graph. The actual occurrence of a
future event may mean that one of more actions needs to be The planning of the project was developed in the pro-
taken, and the sum of all probabilities equal to unity. gram software Primavera P6, having initially a level 3 work
breakdown structure (WBS) as in figure 2.

Fig. 2 Basic design project schedule in Primavera P6

After the planning was made and the Baseline was as-
signed, the next step was to export our project into a soft-
ware able to help us to make a risk analysis. In consequence,
we imported it in Primavera Risk Analysis (Fig. 3).

Fig. 1 Decision tree

The significance of notations in Fig. 1 is as follows: D


decision point; E probable event; U profit according to
various uncertainty degrees.
The Monte Carlo analysis, elaborated in 1940, uses re-
peated random sampling to generate simulated data to use Fig. 3 Basic Design project schedule imported to Primavera
with a mathematical model (see Roman and Andreica 2012, Risk Analysis
Kroese et al. 2013). In this context, the simulation is repre-
sented by the approximation process of a result through the In order to start an analysis we must assure that aspects
random and repetitive use of the algorithm. such as: finish date, duration and cost are well completed
Monte Carlo simulation allows project managers to in- and imported from P6.
corporate uncertainty and risk in project planning unlike First of all we will we evaluate the risk only under the
other risk analysis methods which cannot quantify these effect of duration uncertainty using two distribution types:
aspects equally well. triangle and uniform.
The Monte Carlo simulation is frequently applied, due The triangular distributions is commonly used to model
to its acknowledged advantages, both by the practitioners the duration of a task. Its simple set of parameters make it
(Hulett and Avalon 2015) and by the academic community easy to relate to real life. Requires minimum, maximum and
(Vose 2008). most likely duration, having the following density
The quantitative approach is much more objective and
accurate, but one must mention the fact that results can be
affected by the precision and the validity of input parame-
ters. Due to this fact, the quantitative results mustnt be (4)
considered exact numbers, but estimative ones, with a var-
iable scale depending on the quality of the data used in the
analysis.

This distribution is often skewed to the left. This is be-


cause a lot of tasks cannot physically be completed in less
than a certain duration, but all tasks can generally be delayed

42
Authors will not be present
at the conference
for any number of reasons. This leads to the minimum du-
ration being closer to the most likely than the maximum
duration. A long thin long tail on the triangular distribution
models a range of things that could go wrong but are un-
likely.

The Uniform distribution is used when only the extremes


of uncertainty can be specified and where intermediate val-
ues have equal probability of occurrence (or where no in-
ference can be made as to the likely shape of the distribu-
tion). Its density is given by

(5)
Fig. 5 Uniform distribution finish date
The software allows us to simulate all mentioned above From Fig. 5, we can observe that if we chose a uniform
using also others distribution types such as: Normal, Beta distribution the probability to finish in time is more opti-
Pert, Lognormal, Discrete, Trigged, cumulative, etc. mistic, 98%. This is due to the shape of the Uniform distri-
bution, but we would expect a Triangular distribution to be
In the second part of the simulation the project will be more realistic for such a study.
constrained in addition and by a risk register. All these is-
sues will be detailed forwards.

Simulation 1

Table 3 Set uncertainties to activities


Distribution
WBS Name Min. Likely Max.
type
Structural design doc-
Triangle 25% 75% 100%
uments
Ships equipment, out-
Triangle 70% 105% 120%
fitting
Accommodation
Triangle 85% 110% 130%

The percentage assigned to the minimum, likely and Fig. 6 Triangle distribution cost
maximum are applied to the total duration/ activity.

Fig. 7 Uniform distribution cost

The costs for Simulation 2 are almost similarly in both


Fig. 4 Triangle distribution finish date cases: even though we use a Uniform or a Triangle distribu-
tion (Fig.6 and Fig.7), there are 94% chances for the Uni-
After running the Monte Carlo simulation, we can ob- form distribution and 96% chances in case we chose a Tri-
serve (Fig. 4) that the possibility of finishing on time is angle distribution to maintain the initial budget.
90%. Also, we can observe that the P-80 date is now July Simulation 2
04, 2017 for a Triangle distribution, compared with May 30,
2017 for the Uniform distribution. In this part, as we mentioned before, we use a Risk

43
Authors will not be present
at the conference
Register (Fig. 9). Every risk is defined by four attributes
such as: probability, schedule, cost, performance and score.
Every attributes has assigned a factor scale (low, medium,
high) in accordance with its project impact factor.

Fig. 9 Risk Register

The Matrix Risk Register (Fig. 10) shows the before


Pre-Mitigation period

We assume risks such as:


Changing the input data Fig. 12 Cost - with the default Risk Register
Leaving employees
Class certification Risk Register - Cost and Duration sensitivity
Logistic database
We can also make a classification regarding the Cost
(Fig.13) and Duration (Fig.14) sensitivity.

Fig. 10 Matrix Risk Register

Fig. 13 Cost

Fig. 11 Risk result for Finish date Monte Carlo simulation

We can easily observe that in this case, the P-80 date is


now August 18, 2017 or almost more than one month from
the scheduled date of July 18, 2017, and that the possibility
of finishing on time is in this scenario only 39% (Fig. 11).
Regarding the costs, there are only 19% chances to fin-
ish the project with the initial budget ($120.000), and a
P-80 posibility to have a cost of $282.448, which means a
$ 162.488 amount difference (Fig. 12).
Fig. 14 Duration

It results that the Leaving employees risk is the most

44
Authors will not be present
at the conference
sensitive with a 85% possibility to happen if we take into Schedule Risk Analysis, Long International Inc.
consideration the cost, while Class certification is the
most dangerous risk if we look at the duration issue. Kroese, D.P., Taimre, T. and Botev, Z.I. (2013), Handbook
of Monte Carlo methods (Vol. 706). John Wiley & Sons
CONCLUSIONS
Vose, D. (2008), Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide, 2nd
By adding default risk to the task activities, the follow- Edition, John Wiley & Sons
ing aspects changed (see Table 4):
Ionescu (Mndru), L. (2010), Theoretical research and
Table 4 Result of analysis case studies on risk assessment in an integrated manage-
Item Initial Pre-mitigation ment system for quality-risk industrial companies, PhD
Duration 562 d 586 d Thesis Summary, Transilvania University of Brasov
Cost $120.000 $383.283
Start Date 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 Dorp, J.R.v. and Duffey, M.R. (1997), Statistical depend-
Finish Date 18/07/2017 11/08/2017 ence in risk analysis for project networks using Monte
Carlo methods, Elsevier
After a Pre-Mitigation process, it should follow a
Post-Mitigated process. Roman, M. and Andreica, M. (2012), Paper no. 10- De-
Furthermore, in order to improve the possibility to have veloping risk analysis into the cost-benefit analysis of pro-
a project success, it is indicated - and the experience has jects financed by the ERDF and CF, Bucharest, University
shown this- that it must exist a risk analysis periodically of Economics Studies
throughout all stages of a project, namely: project plan-
ning, engineering, procurement, execution and commis-
sioning.
Finally, in order to improve the perspective of a success,
Hulett and Avalon (2015) recommended a plan which im-
plies the following stages:
Create a summary schedule at Level 2 or Level 3
that is integrated, logically-linked, and complies
with scheduling best practices. The budget or cost
estimate is incorporated into the schedule with
summary time-dependent and time-independent
resources assigned to activities.
Gather data about uncertainty and risk. Experience
has shown that individual confidential interviews
of subject matter experts in the project teams and
management, contractors, and other knowledgea-
ble personnel in the organization, can uncover
risks that are either new or unpopular to discuss
risk workshops.
Use a modern Monte Carlo simulation software
package to model both uncertainties to activity
duration and to time-dependent resources burn
rates or time-dependent resources total material
costs.
Prioritize the Risk Drivers to schedule and to cost
(only schedule was illustrated above)
Prepare a pre-mitigated risk result presentation
Conduct a risk mitigation workshop using the priori-
tized risk contained in the pre-mitigation presenta-
tion as a guide to the most important risks
Gain organizational commitment to those mitigation
actions to be adopted, scheduled, budgeted, staffed,
and monitored.
Prepare a post-mitigation model and simulate it.
Prepare a post-mitigation report.

REFERENCES

Hulett, D.T. and Avalon, A. (2015), Integrated Cost and

45
The Weather Criterion: Experimental Wind Tunnel Results
Arman Ariffin1, Shuhaimi Mansor2, Jean-Marc Laurens1
1
ENSTA Bretagne, IRDL, Brest, France
2
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia

ABSTRACT
In the MSC 81st, the guidelines for alternative
The intact stability code, 2008 IS Code, includes a assessment of the weather criterion were approved by IMO.
weather criterion. The vessel is subject to a lateral This guideline are aiming to provide the industry with
strong wind and a roll motion. The wind force on the alternative means (in particular, model experiments) for the
sail, the roll amplitude and the bilge keel effect are assessment of severe wind and rolling criterion (weather
computed according to a set of empirical formulae given criterion) (IMO MSC.1/Circ.1200, 2006). It consists of the
in the 2008 IS Code. The maximum resulting list angle is guidelines for experimental determination of the wind
then computed using the righting arm curve only, heeling lever and angle of roll to windward due to wave
neglecting any damping. To verify how conservative, the action. Wind test and drift test were explained in these
regulation is, experimental trials have been conducted guidelines.
in the Low Speed Wind Tunnel of the Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia for two models: a simple academic In the MSC 82nd session, IMO approved the explanatory
shape and the DTMB 5415. The experimental setup is notes to the interim guidelines for an alternative assessment
described in the paper. Results have been obtained for of the weather criterion (IMO MSC.1/Cir.1227, 2007). This
several wind velocities, initial heel angles, yaw angles explanatory notes provide an example of the alternative
and with and without the bilge keel. The maximum assessment of severe wind and rolling criterion (weather
angles of list obtained are compared with results given criterion) based on a series of model tests following the
by the code as implemented within the stability code Interim Guidelines for the alternative assessment of the
GHS. As expected, the code is sometimes barely weather criterion for better understanding of the alternative
conservative and sometimes, very conservative. procedures.

When evaluating the stability of a ship in beam seas and


INTRODUCTION winds, consideration must be given to the modelling of
wind and wave forces. While much research has been
The International Code of Intact Stability 2008 (2008 IS devoted to the hydrodynamics of ship rolling motions,
Code) is based on the best state-of-the-art concepts relatively little work has been devoted to wind heeling
available at the time the Code was developed. Since the loads on ships. This situation is particularly surprising when
design technology for modern ships is rapidly evolving, considering that current intact stability criteria are based
2008 IS Code should be revise continuously and largely upon the heeling of ships under wind forces
reevaluated as necessary. Generally, 2008 IS Code consists (McTaggart, 1992).
of two main criteria. First is the criteria regarding righting
lever curve properties as stated in (IMO, 2009) Ch 2 Naval Engineering Division conducted a wind tunnel
Paragraph 2.2 and second is the severe wind and rolling test for naval ship 378-WHEC US Navy ship. The test
criterion (also known as weather criterion) as stated in was measuring 4 heeling position (upright) 25, 50 and 75
(IMO, 2009) Ch 2 Paragraph 2.3. and 4 wind velocities (6, 12, 18 and 24 m/s). This
experiment concluded that wind heeling moment is about
In 1939, Rohala (Rohala, 1939) wrote a doctoral thesis 16% less than calculated value (Paul, 1994).
which evoked widespread interest throughout the world at
that time because it was the first comprehensive study and An experimental wind tunnel to obtain the experiment
proposed method to evaluate the intact stability which did results of wind forces and moment acting on ship models at
not require complex calculation (Ariffin, Mansor, & various angle, with beam wind was conducted in 2003
Laurens, 2015). The weather criterion adopted as (Bertaglia, Serra, Francescutto, & Bulian, 2003). The
Resolution A.562 by IMOs Assembly in 1985 was a leap models used were scale down to 1/125th and wedges have
beyond the statistical approach of the earlier Rohala-type been applied to the model to simulate the correct heeled
general intact ship stability criteria. position. The measurement has been performed with an

46
undistributed wind velocity of 13m/s with Reynolds =displacement (t) and g = gravitational acceleration).
number of 2x106 (length reference) and 2.3x105 (breadth Direct Assessment (DA) can be used to verify the weather
reference). This paper concluded that the real centre of criterion for unconventional ships. The DA can be
underwater forces was assumed at half draught; and seems experimental. The present study shows how such an
to be a safe assumption, but further test could be made in experimental DA can be conducted for two models, a
order to verify this assumption. civilian ship and a military ship.

The draft amendment of the IS Code regarding In the weather criterion, two main rules are commonly
vulnerability criteria and the standards (levels 1 and 2) used. For commercial ship, it uses the IMO weather
related to dead ship condition and excessive acceleration criterion and for naval ship, it uses the Naval Rules. The
are contained in SDC 3/INF.10 Annex 1 and 2. The level IMO Weather criterion is shown in Fig. 1 and the weather
1 check for dead ship condition is basically the same criterion for naval ship is shown in Fig. 2. The significant
method used for current IS Code 2.3 which is weather different between IMO an Naval Rules are presented in the
criteria. If it failed, the design should process to level 2 Table 1.
check and the direct assessment. Direct assessment
procedures for stability failure are intended to employ the
most advanced state-of-the art technology available either
by numerical analysis or experimental work for quantitative
validation as stated in SDC 1/INF.8 Annex 27 (IMO, 2013).

THE WEATHER CRITERION


Fig. 2 Weather criterion for naval ship
The IS Code 2008 Part A 2.3 contains the weather
Table 1: Comparison IMO and naval rules for weather
criterion. The ship must be able to withstand the combined
criterion
effects of beam wind and rolling. The conditions are:
a. the ship is subjected to a steady wind pressure Criterion IMO Naval Rules
acting perpendicular to the ship's centre line Wind velocity 26 m/s 100 knots
which results in a steady wind heeling lever (lw1). Roll back angle various* 25
b. from the resultant angle of equilibrium (0), the WHA constant cos2
ship is assumed to present an angle of roll (1) to Ratio A2/A1 1 1.4
windward due to wave action. The angle of heel Gust Yes No
under action of steady wind (0) should not exceed * roll back angle (phi1) calculated based on IS Code 2008
16or 80% of the angle of deck edge immersion, # WHA wind heeling arm, A2 - restoring energy, A1 capsizing energy
whichever is less.
c. the ship is then subjected to a gust wind pressure GHS CODE
which results in a gust wind heeling lever (lw2);
and under these circumstances, area b shall be In this paper, a software code, General Hydro Static
equal to or greater than area a, as indicated in Fig. (GHS) is used. This code is for designing and to
1. evaluate all types of ships and floating structures. It
addresses flotation, trim, stability and strength by
calculating the force involved using
mathematical/geometrical model of the vessels. In GHS,
the weather criterion can be evaluated with the presetting of
the wind condition. There are two methods to set up the
wind in GHS. The first one specifies the wind speed and
the second is using the wind pressure. The main difference
between both function is that using the wind pressure
function, the wind speed is constant at all height. It means
that there is no boundary layer for this setting. For wind
speed (knots) function, the specified wind speed in knots is
given at 10 meters above water plane, assuming a standard
boundary layer above the sea level. This is a standard
coming from maritime weather forecast (B. Chelton &
Fig. 1 Severe wind and rolling
H.Freilich, 2006).
The heeling lever shall be calculated using formula:
lw1 =(P*A*Z)/(1000*g*) (1) Since this paper presents a comparison result with
lw2 = 1.5 lw1 (2) experimental work, the function of wind pressure was used.
It is because of the boundary layer in the wind tunnel used
where lw1 = steady wind heeling angle, lw2 = gust wind in this experiment is about 30mm. This boundary layer
heeling lever, P = wind pressure of 504 Pa, A = projected can be neglected because the value is relatively small
lateral area (m2), Z = vertical distance from the centre of A compare to the model size in wind tunnel test section.
to the centre of the underwater lateral area or approximately
to a point at one half of the mean draught (m),

47
SHIP MODEL Both models were constructed at ENSTA Bretagne,
France using the Computer Numerical Control (CNC)
Two models were used for the experimental work. The machine. The material used was polystyrene. Both models
first model is an academic container ship geometry referred were designed in 3D drawing and imported to CNC machine
as ASL shape in the rest of the paper. The second program for fabrication process. The hulls were divided into
model is a research ship model, the well know DTMB 5415 six parts for the cutting process. Then, all parts were glued
(Molgaard, 2000). The 5415 DTMB model is widely used and laminated with a fiberglass. The superstructure used the
for the research study in seakeeping (Begovic, Day, & synthetic glass. The completed ship models are shown in
Incecik, 2011; Jones & Clarke, 2010; Yoon et al., 2015). Fig. 5.
MODEL VERIFICATION
The main particulars of ASL shape are given in Table 2
and for the 5415 DTMB shape in Table 3. The body plan and To determine the correct centre of gravity, inclining
perspective view for ASL shape is shown in Fig. 3. The tests were performed. The inclining test is a procedure
body plan and perspective view for 5415 shape is shown in which involves moving a series of known weights,
Fig. 4.Fig. 4 Body plan (left) and perspective view (right) of normally in transverse direction (Fig. 6), and measuring the
the 5415 shape resulting change in the equilibrium heel angle of the ship.
By using this information and applying basic naval
architecture principles, the ships vertical centre of gravity
Table 2 Main particulars of ASL shape is determined from the GM. We also verified that the
natural roll period is as expected. Two devices were used
Ship model Ship Model for the data recording, first is the Ardu Flyer device and
LOA, (m) 140 1.400 smartphone (Djebli, Hamoudi, Imine, & Adjlout, 2016).
BOA, (m) 20 0.200
Draft, (m) 12 0.120
Displacement, (tonnes) 26,994 0.027
VCG, (m) 10 0.10
LCG, (m) 70.037 0.70
KM, (m) 10.206 0.10
GM, (m) 0.206 0.002

Table 3 Main particulars of 5415 shape


Ship model Ship Model
LOA, (m) 153.3 1.533 (a)
BOA, (m) 20.54 0.205
Draft, (m) 6.15 0.061
Displacement, (tonnes) 8,635 0.0086
VCG, (m) 7.555 0.076
LCG, (m) 70.137 0.70
KM, (m) 9.493 0.09
(b)
GM, (m) 1.938 0.014
Fig. 5 Complete build ship models (a) ASL shape (b) 5415
DTMB shape

Fig. 3 Body plan (left) and perspective view (right) of the


ASL shape

Fig. 4 Body plan (left) and perspective view (right) of the Fig. 6 Moving weight and transverse distance for inclining
5415 shape test

48
The experiment started with the model placed in the
water tank with the correct draft (Fig. 9). A laser light is
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP used to ensure the vessel is upright. The test started with
measurement of the stable heel. The wind tunnel velocity
A wind tunnel test was conducted at the low speed wind was increased slowly while the heel angle was recorded
tunnel facility at Univerisiti Teknologi Malaysia. This using the Ardu Flyer device. The Ardu Flyer is a
wind tunnel has a test section of 2m (width) x 1.5m (height) complete open source autopilot system designed for 3D
x 5.8m (length). The maximum test velocity is 80m/s robotics. This experiment involved three models
(160 knots). The wind tunnel has a flow uniformity of configuration as stated below:
less than 0.15%, a temperature uniformity of less than a. ASL shape.
0.2C, a flow angularity uniformity of less than 0.15 and a b. 5415 shape.
turbulence level of less than 0.06% (Ariffin et al., 2015). c. ASL with bilge keel shape.

Wind tunnel setup A roll back angle (2*) measure was performed for all the
models. The definitions of (1) and (2*) are shown in Fig.
The models were allowed to heave and roll freely. It 11. The test steps are as follow:
was not allowed to yaw because the model must be hold at a. Model placed in water tank.
the longitudinal axis to avoid the model bump to water tank b. Wind applied and the wind velocity and heel angle
side. The models were fixed with a rod both at bow and recorded.
stern (Fig. 7). It is passing through the point of c. Roll back angle (1) applied at the model. (using rod
longitudinal centre of buoyancy. Both rods at bow and in Fig. 10)
stern were aligned using laser light to confirm the shafts d. Then model is suddenly released.
positioned at same axis. The arrangement of rod used in e. The maximum counter roll back angle (2*)
this experiment is frictionless therefore, minimum recorded. The is (2*) is measure from the angle of
interaction between the rod and rod stand can be obtained. stable heel. With referring to the value used in IS
Code 2008, the (2*) can be calculate as (2) - (0).
To allow the model to float in the wind tunnel, a water
tank fabricated with glass of 8mm thickness was installed.
The water tank size is 1600mm x 400mm x 240mm (length
x width x depth). Since the wind tunnel is not water tight, to
avoid any leak of water during the experiment, a dummy
pool was placed underneath the platform. The dummy
pool is capable to cope the total volume of water if the glass
water tank gets damaged. The arrangement in the test
section is shown in Fig. 8.

(a)

Fig. 7 Rods fixed at ship models

(b)
Fig. 9 Ship models ready to be tested in wind tunnel test
section (a) ASL shape (b) 5415 shape

Fig. 8 Arrangement in the test section

49
Fig. 12 The velocity profile curve
Fig. 10 Rod used to force the model to heel at roll back angle
(1)

Fig. 13 Comparison of velocity profile and ship models

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Fig. 11 Definition used in this experiment Angle of stable heel (0) vs wind velocity

Scaling criteria Fig. 14 shows the graph for angle of stable heel, 0
versus wind velocity for the two models and two methods;
The models used in the experiment were scaled down to IMO and experimental. The 5415 curves are following a
1:100. It is the same scale used by (Begovic et al., 2011) parabolic shape since as we can see in Fig. 15, the GZ
for the ship motion experiment using DTMB 5415 model. curve of 5415 shape follows a linear curve up to 30 degrees.
For the GZ curve, the model and full scale ship has a same Furthermore, the experimental curve is below the IMO
curve shape but values for the model are divided by 102. curve which indicates that the drag coefficient CD, of the
For weight calculation, values used for the model are ship silhouette is smaller than 1, the value assumed in the
divided by 106. For the wind velocity, the value used for IMO formula (Fig. 14). The ASL curves present different
the model is divided by 10. shapes and behaviour. At first, they do not present the
parabolic shape because as we can see in Fig. 15, the GZ
Boundary layer curve is only linear up to 5. Furthermore, the experimental
curve for this case is above the IMO curve (Fig. 14). That
When the air flow over the ocean surface from any is explained by the fact that the drag coefficient CD, for the
direction, a natural boundary layer is formed. This means box shape of the ASL is bigger than 1. This can be
that the wind velocity at the surface is zero and increase confirmed by the many references that exist giving the drag
with higher altitude. The boundary layer thickness in the coefficients of basic shapes, see for example (Sadraey,
test section for this experiment is about 35mm and the 2009).
velocity profile is shown in Fig. 12. The comparison of
boundary layer thickness and the ship models is shown in
Fig. 13. The two lines in this figure shows the water line
and boundary layer thickness.

Fig. 14 Graph of wind velocity and angle of stable heel for


ASL shape and 5415 shape on the experimental results and

50
GHS calculation 0.55 and for the ASL with bilge keel, the average ratio is
0.43. As expected, the configuration with bilge keel
contributes to more roll damping than configuration without
bilge keel.

Fig. 15 The GZ curves for ASL shape and 5415 shape

Roll back angle (2*) versus roll to windward (1) Fig. 18 Roll back angle (2*) vs roll to windward (1) for
ASL shape, 5415 shape and ASL with bilge keel
Fig. 16 shows the roll back angle (2*) versus roll to configuration
windward (1) for ASL shape for wind velocity range of 2
m/s to 4 m/s. Fig. 17 shows the roll back angle (2*) Yaw angle effect on stable heel
versus roll to windward (1) for 5415 shape. In the absence
of damping the results should be like a swing where 2* Fig. 19 shows the angle of stable heel for the ASL and
follows 1. The results suggest a far more complex the 5415 both with the wind direction from star board 75
behaviour where the hydrostatic force shape is playing an and port 105. For the ASL, the values of 0 are smaller for
important role. the beam wind than those obtained with the yaw angles. In
other words the assumption of the beam wind in the IMO
code is not necessarily conservative. This phenomenon
also appears for the 5415.

Fig. 16 Roll back angle (2*) vs roll to windward (1)


for ASL shape Fig. 19 Angle of stable heel for wind from starboard 75 and
port 105
Effect of roll to windward (1) and roll back angle (2*)
with yaw angle

Fig. 20 shows the result for 1 and 2* for the ASL and the
5415 with beam wind and wind from starboard 75. For
the ASL, the beam wind has higher 2* than wind from
starboard 75 and for the 5415, the beam wind has smaller
2* than wind from starboard 75. The two models have a
different response to the yaw angle. The behaviour is a
combination of the superstructure geometry, the GZ curve
and the damping.
Fig. 17: Roll back angle (2*) vs roll to windward (1) for
5415 shape
Ratio 2* and 1 with bilge keel

Fig. 18 shows the ratio (2*/1) for the ASL shape and
the ASL with a bilge keel. Both models were tested at
wind velocity 2m/s. For the bare ASL, the average ratio is

51
REFERENCES

Ariffin, A., Mansor, S., & Laurens, J.-M. (2015). A


Numerical Study for Level 1 Second Generation
Intact Stability Criteria. In International Conference
on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles (pp. 183
193). Glasgow, UK.
B. Chelton, D., & H.Freilich, M. (2006). Comments on
Scatterometer-Based Assessment of 10-m Wind
Analyses from the Operational ECMWF and NCEP
Numerical Weather Prediction Models. Monthly
Fig. 20 Roll back angle (2*) vs roll to windward (1) for Weather Review, 134(2), 737742.
5415 shape with wind from port 105 Begovic, E., Day, a. H., & Incecik, A. (2011).
Comparison IMO GHS and experimental result Experimental Ship Motion and Load Measurements
in Head and Beam Seas. In Proceeding of The 9th
Symposium on High Speed Marine Vehicles (pp. 18).
Fig. 21 shows the comparison results between IMO and Naples, Italy.
experimental results. For the ASL, the counter roll back Bertaglia, G., Serra, A., Francescutto, A., & Bulian, G.
angle (2*) obtained from experimental results is 24.07, (2003). Experimental Evaluation of the Parameters
lower than IMO which is 29.638. Therefore, IMO result for the Weather Criterion. In International
is more conservative. For the 5415, the counter roll back Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles
angle (2*) obtains from experimental results is 16.31, (pp. 253264). Madrid, Spain.
lower than Naval Rules which is 33.82 for ratio capsizing Djebli, M. A., Hamoudi, B., Imine, O., & Adjlout, L. (2016).
and restoring energy 1.0 and 39.45 for ratio capsizing and The application of smartphone in ship stability
restoring energy 1.4. Therefore, the IMO and Naval rules experiment The Application of Smartphone in Ship
are always more conservative. Stability Experiment. Journal of Marine Science and
Application.
IMO. (2009). International Code of Intact Stability, 2008.
London.
IMO. (2013). SDC 1/INF.8 - Development of Second
Generation Intact Stability Criteria.
IMO MSC.1/Cir.1227. (2007). Explanatory Notes to the
Interim Guidelines for Alternative Assessment of the
Weather Criterion.
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1200. (2006). Interim Guidelines for
Alternative Assessment of the Weather Criterion.
Fig. 21 Comparison result for IMO rules and Naval Rules Jones, D. a., & Clarke, D. B. (2010). Fluent Code
Simulation of Flow around a Naval Hull: the DTMB
5415. Victoria, Australia.
CONCLUSIONS
McTaggart, K. a. (1992). Wind effects on intact ship
stability in beam seas. Journal of Wind Engineering
In this paper the authors presented an experimental
and Industrial Aerodynamics, 44(1-3), 24872498.
Direct Assessments (DA) of the weather criterion for two
Molgaard, A. (2000). PMM-test with a model of a frigate
different models; a civilian ship with a simple geometry and
class DDG-51. Lyngby, Denmark.
a military ship, the well-known DTMB 5415. To conduct
Paul, H. (1994). 378-WHEC Wind Tunnel Tests by Paul
the experiments, the low speed wind tunnel of UTM was
Hirsimaki Naval Engineering Division (G-ENE-5B).
used. Both models were placed in a water tank in the
CG Engineers Digest, 2737.
wind tunnel. Both models were free to roll so the heel
Rohala, J. (1939). The Judging of the Stability of Ships and
angle could be measured and compared with the IMO and
the Determination of the Minimum Amount of
Navy Rules.
Stability. Doctoral Thesis, Technical University of
Finland.
Although the assumptions taken by the rules are not always
Sadraey, M. (2009). Aircraft Performance Analysis. VDM
conservative, the final results always show that the
Verlag Dr Muller.
experimental values are lower than the values given by the
Yoon, H., Simonsen, C. D., Benedetti, L., Longo, J., Toda,
rules.
Y., & Stern, F. (2015). Benchmark CFD validation
data for surface combatant 5415 in PMM maneuvers
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Part I: Force/moment/motion measurements. Ocean
Engineering, 109, 705734.
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of
the Government of Malaysia, the Government of the French
Republic and the Direction des Constructions Navales
(DCNS).

52
Hull Monitoring Closing the Gap between the Design and Operation
Gaute Storhaug & Adrian Kahl
DNVGL, Maritime advisory

ABSTRACT also the change of the response due to human interaction,


i.e. seamanship. This can be crucial as the captains gut
Sensor technology used for measuring hull girder feeling and experience may not be reliable, e.g. for new
loading is becoming more popular. The leading class ship designs, new ship trades, new loading condition or rare
societies have already hull monitoring rules, but the extreme conditions. Key elements are well calibrated
requirements differ. Many hull monitoring suppliers sensors and intuitive display for decision support on board.
exist, but not all systems are approved before installed. This is illustrated.
While the main objective of hull monitoring is to ensure
safety and reduce maintenance costs, the specific system Related to maintenance, the display on board will show
with its software configuration, functionality and fatigue rates. Generally, fatigue may not be well understood
installation may not be optimal for the above objective. by the crew, so the fatigue rate is given a clear definition in
It can therefore be difficult for the owner and yard to order to build awareness also to the effect of wave induced
choose the right supplier and right rule sets. This paper vibrations.
will highlight some of the important aspects and
opportunities with examples. It will also outline a few Data may be transferred to shore for further big data
development needs. analysis. Ship owners may share data with class in relation
to class related services, e.g. risk based inspection, life time
INTRODUCTION extension, hull integrity management and condition
assessment program. The objective is to ensure safety and
Sensor technology is widely used, but the potential may reduce and optimize the inspection efforts and plan
be far from fully utilized. Today, only a small fraction of maintenance. Data can also be used to improve assumptions
ships and offshore structures are equipped with hull in ship design rules and class guidelines. Further, the
monitoring systems. The number of installed systems is, owner/manager may use the data to improve their company
however, increasing fast as owners/managers realize the practice and gain full control, and even as part of
benefits. documentation in sale.

Many class societies have already hull monitoring rules. Hull monitoring is becoming a standard element in
These give requirements to hull monitoring systems, which bridge/control systems on ships and offshore structures and
typically need to be approved before installed on board. part of the daily operation for the crew on board and ship
The installation of a hull monitoring system is usually manager onshore. It can provide input to class to ensure
associated with a class notation. DNV GLs class notation safety and optimize inspection and maintenance costs.
is called HMON (DNVGL, 2016), which is applicable for
both ships and offshore structures. It is more general than RULE REQUIREMENTS
other similar class notations, and HMON can in principle
include any sensor for any purpose. The main objective is, The hull monitoring rule requirements are found in
however, to include strain sensors to measure hull girder DNVGL (2016), Pt.6, Ch.9. Sec.3. These hull monitoring
loading for the purpose of giving onboard decision support rules are close to identical with the previous hull
related to safety (extreme loading) and maintenance monitoring rules from DNV and GL Legacy before the
(fatigue loading), including the effect of wave induced merger of the two companies. The first hull monitoring
vibrations. Another important application can be the rules were developed early 1990ies, and in 2005
monitoring of accelerations with regard to cargo securing, requirements to identification of the importance of wave
e.g. on container and multi-purpose ships. An overview of induced vibrations for fatigue and extreme loading were
rule requirements is given with examples of recent and included. This is one item which separates this rule set from
expected development. many others.

Regarding safety, the system reveals the status of the The rules text is divided into the following main elements:
response versus design criteria (including warnings), but

53
1. General: This includes scope, application and
definitions. More importantly it includes qualifiers that
needs to be specified by ship operator (owner or
management company) and documentation
requirements to the yard, or supplier, whoever submits
this to class for approval
2. Component requirements: This is referring to general
requirements for any electrical and connected system,
but also to sensors with amplitude ranges, accuracy,
filter frequencies and sampling frequencies
3. System design: This refers to system requirements, e.g.
that un-interruptible power supply should be included in
case of power shut down, but also approximately where
sensors should be located and how data should be
processed with different types of statistics, how the
display should work and how data should be stored. A
Fig. 1 Illustrations of main sensors on an oil tanker
guide to the extent of monitoring depending on ship
type is also provided, but this should also be discussed
For a container ship, there may be additional concerns
with class for the specific ship type.
related to hatch corner fatigue and lashing loads for
4. Installation and testing: Fabrication acceptance testing
container stacks. This can then be covered by additional
should be carried out, and installation and test reports
local strain sensors, L and a motion reference unit, M.
should be delivered. Proper calibration of strain sensors
Engine related sensors, E may also be added, e.g. for
is also an important aspect, which should be witnessed
monitoring fuel consumption. Some of these sensors may
by a surveyor from the Class Society.
already be onboard. The notation may then look like
HMON(A1, C1, E3, G4, L2, M1, O1, W1). There could be
Each qualifier is represented by a letter which refers to a
additional sensors for other purposes related to e.g. engines
specific type or group of sensors. E.g. G refers to global
(systems), propeller-shaft, temperature (fire fighting
strain sensors for hull girder loading. The available number
vessels), and wave conditions, with reference to DNVGL
of qualifies are the largest number of qualifiers given by
(2016).
any rule set. It is thereby considered to be the most flexible
rule set, in principle covering any need.
RECENT AND EXPECTED DEVELOPMENT
The associated class notation is referred to as HMON()
Four elements will be discussed in this section:
where refers to the list of qualifiers and each qualifier
has a number, referring to the number of that type of Monitoring display
sensors. E.g., G4 refers to four global strain sensors. Calibration
Fatigue rate
There are many different combinations of hull monitoring Damping of hull girder vibrations
systems, but a typical minimum sensor set up can be
characterized by HMON(A1, C1, G4, O1, W1) which Recent ship accidents such as of MSC Napoli and MOL
means: Comfort have shaken the container ships industry, and the
A1: One vertical accelerometer close to bow focus on certain load components like whipping has
C1: Connection to loading computer for vertical increased. IACS (2015) have responded by introducing a
bending moment at measurement positions, GM and new longitudinal strength standard UR S11A where
draught whipping is required to be addressed for Post Panamax
G4: Four global deck sensors; two at midship on port container ships according to the individual class society
and starboard side, one at aft quarter length on starboard requirements. The approach is not specified by IACS, but
side and one at forward quarter length on starboard side. already covered by DNVGL rules (DNVGL, 2016b). The
accident report after MSC Napoli also recommended
O1: One navigation sensor such as GPS for position,
research into hull monitoring to handle whipping (MAIB,
speed over ground and course over ground
2008). However, the DNVGLs HMON notation already
W1: One wind sensor for wind speed and heading.
covers whipping, and have done so for more than a decade.
Whipping is basically handled as part of vertical wave
This can be quite useful for an oil tanker, and an illustration
bending. It is included when warning is given at 80% and
of the locations of some of the main sensors are given in
100% of the total moment the vessel is designed against, i.e.
Fig. 1.
the sum of permissible still water and rule wave bending
moments. If whipping is contributing, it eats of the
allowable wave bending moment. There will, however, also
be additional safety margin in the design, so 100% is not
referring to the collapse strength, but to the total design
moment.

54
There are additional aspects that have been recently looked sensors. A quick solution was to use the latest known
into. One of them considers the human factor and is related loading condition, but that is not reliable. Thus, proper
to the monitoring display on the bridge. It should be calibration of the strain sensors is needed. However, the
intuitive and easy to understand, focusing first of all on the loading computer neglects physical effects, and calibration
main safety aspects. The technology may be new for many against the loading computer then needs to be handled with
captains, so when coming onboard a new ship the captain or care. Other physical effects need to be accounted for during
officer on watch should immediately be able to understand calibration such as:
what the system is doing by looking at the display. An 1. Temperature effects (sun expanding steel)
example of a new display developed in cooperation with 2. Forward speed (steady wave in bow and stern)
DNVGL is illustrated in Fig. 2. This display has received 3. Uncertainties in cargo and ballast
much positive feedback from captains. It should be 4. Sea pressure on the ships end
expected that requirements to the content of the main view 5. Cargo fluid pressure on bulkheads
of hull monitoring displays are given in the next rule 6. Hydroelastic effects
revision based on the principles indicated above. For 7. Heel (distance from neutral axis to sensor)
example, even how the arrow in the display in Fig. 2 moves,
will be an important element, since it cannot follow the Most of these effects can be handled relatively easily so
instantaneous loading which varies too fast; whipping that it can be neglected. For instance the forward speed
vibrations have a period in the order of 2 seconds. In Fig. 2 setting up a sagging moment can be avoided by performing
the display is relevant for a container ship or a high speed the calibration at zero speed. However, the calibration
vessel because of the range from 0 to 100%. For a container procedure needs to account for sea pressure at the ships
ship hogging is the main concern, while for the high speed ends and static hydroelasticity, both which may be
vessel sagging may be the main concern. For an oil tanker significant according to Storhaug et al. (2016). An
the speedometer will go from -100% to 100%, because illustration of the static hydroelastic effect, reducing the
both hogging and sagging are important. still water hogging moment of container ships, is given in
Fig. 3. The static hydroelastic effect comes from changed
buoyancy distribution due to the deflecting hull. It increases
with ship length, and it is in the order of 5%, e.g. for large
container ships.

Fig. 2 Mainview display showing hull girder loading Fig. 3 Reduction of hogging moment, dM, in percentage of
the hogging moment, M, as a function of ship length
Another aspect is still water bending moment. This was a
topic for both MSC Napoli and MOL Comfort. The Based on proper calibrated strain sensors, there should be a
reporting from MOL Comfort was not very clear on this deviation between the bending moment from the loading
point, but it was indicated that the ships permissible still computer and the measured bending moment. For a
water bending moment was exceeded, but also that the container ship, it is also important that the measured
uncertainty could be 10% (NK, 2014), i.e. possibly even bending moment is represented by the average of sensor
more overloaded. The uncertainty is an important aspect, readings from both port and starboard side, to eliminate
which has been addressed recently by DNVGL in a couple contribution from axial warping stress from the static
of projects. One of the elements is related to the loading torsion moment distribution. If the deviation between the
computer (qualifier C1), which is often providing the hull loading computer and the hull monitoring is large this
monitoring system with the still water bending moment as should be provided as input information to the captain. That
basis for the warning in combination with wave bending is done by the vertical columns on the left hand side in Fig.
moment. However, in practice on certain ship types it has 2, showing both the situation in case the vessel is in harbour
been observed that the loading computer can be in or at sea. In harbour a higher still water bending moment is
working mode frequently. This may also be related to a allowed and the utilization becomes lower. An explanation
specific type of loading computer. In the worst case on a for high deviation could be that the loading computer does
container vessel the loading computer did not provide the not have automatic reading of ballast tanks and that wrong
hull monitoring system with still water bending moments filling of ballast tanks have been given as input. For
for up to 50% of the time. This is not acceptable, and in container ships, the other possibility is that the uncertainties
such cases the hull monitoring must rely solely on the strain in the declared container weights affect the actual still water

55
bending moment. It should be expected that the next
revision of the DNVGL rules includes stricter requirements
to calibration of the sensors and how they should be
combined in order to make the comparison with the loading
computer more consistent.

Fatigue damage is a nonlinear process and the crew and


captain onboard may have had little training in
understanding of fatigue loading. They may however have
experience with cracks of the hull structure and the
associated inconvenient repairs. Fatigue damage is caused
by cyclic loading, e.g. induced by waves. By doubling the
loading, fatigue damage becomes at least eight times as
large (power of three). During the last decade also the wave Fig. 4 Five-minute fatigue rates with and without wave
induced vibrations, i.e. whipping and springing, have been induced vibrations in deck on a Post Panamax container
recognized to contribute to fatigue damage, and the amount vessel with a target life of 40
of contribution has been quantified by measurements for
several ship types and sizes and different operational Due to the merger of DNV and GL, and since the topic of
conditions. This effect can more than double the fatigue wave induced vibrations have been high on the agenda
damage in deck of ships, e.g. see Storhaug and Kahl (2015). lately, the two class guidelines dealing with how to account
The main contribution comes from vibrations increasing the for whipping and springing in design of container ships
peaks of the wave induced load cycles (Storhaug et al., have also been merged into a new document (DNVGL,
2007). For the purpose of building awareness for the crew 2015b). In this document also numerical calculations of
onboard a parameter called fatigue rate is required to be wave induced vibration and model tests are allowed for. An
calculated by the hull monitoring system. This is defined as important input parameter, affecting both the contribution
the fatigue damage for a specific time period, like 5 minutes of whipping for extreme bending moment and whipping
or 30 minutes, divided by the average fatigue damage and springing for fatigue damage, is damping. The damping
during this period which gives a damage ratio (Miner sum) affects the resonance level in springing, which may occur
of 1.0 after the target design life, normally being 25 years. more or less all the time, but also the decay of the whipping
A Miner sum of 1.0 corresponds to a through-thickness cycles occurring now and then. An illustration of a
crack after the target life (associated with 2-3% probability). whipping event is given in Fig. 5.
The fatigue rate is then typically below 1.0, but in storms it
can reach 50 to 100. This is displayed on board and the
understanding is that staying at 100 for one day 100 days of
fatigue budget is spent. One should then not encounter
more than three days with such storms during a year. This
will soon build awareness for the officers on watch. An
example of the fatigue rates (each dot) from a container
vessel is illustrated in Fig. 4. In this case fatigue rates of
more than 360 have been reached within a 5 minute interval
based on a target life of 40 years. With a target life of 20
years it would be 180, but is still very large. With duration
of 30 minutes, the fatigue rate will be less affected by
Fig. 5 Illustration of a whipping event
extreme whipping events, but still more than 100 in this
case, which has about 80% contribution from whipping and
It is important to have a damping value as a target value to
springing. One ship operator was interested in keeping the
the numerical analysis or model tests, and this value should
value below 50 based on half hours and 20 years target life.
be based on real life experience. Damping values for
This could be a guide for a captain, because the fatigue rate
container ships or any other ship type are not well covered
may be reduced significantly by avoiding storms or reduce
in the literature, and this represents an uncertainty. A recent
the speed in a storm. The definition of fatigue rate has been
study carried out in cooperation with DNVGL assessing
implemented in the hull monitoring rules (DNVGL, 2016).
more than ten container ship designs, but also other ship
The calculation of fatigue damage is covered by a class
types, confirm that the damping is higher on container ships
guideline DNVGL CG 0129 (DNVGL, 2015).
than other ship types (Edin and Laanemets, 2016). Further,
the sampling rate (min. 20 Hz) and length of the time series
(30 minutes) required by DNVGL (2016) are suitable for
reliable estimates of damping. However, the available
methods for the evaluation of damping are not considered
equally good. The half-band width method should be
abandoned, but spectral method where the spectrum has
been smoothened is regarded reliable but tends to
overestimate the damping slightly. Other more complicated
methods may be more accurate, but difficult to implement,

56
e.g. stochastic subspace identification. This is not very systems
helpful for operation today, but in order to collect damping SST; Naviscan 99 systems; one
http://www.sst21c.com/Eng_Goods_MainFr system approved by
data more quickly and efficiently, the suppliers of hull ame.htm DNVGL
monitoring systems may be required to include methods to BMT Scientific Marine Services; Integrated <10
estimate damping of main hull girder vibrations, including Marine Monitoring System
torsional vibrations for container ships. Two convenient http://www.scimar.com/
Weir-Jones Group; HMONTM <10
methods are then the spectral method or the random http://www.weir-jones.com/products.php?pi
decrement technique. An example of the spectral method d=125&cat=Marine
applied to torsional vibration on a container ship is given in Rouvari Oy; Hullmos <10
Fig. 6. The torsional vibration occurs at 0.28Hz (1.76 rad/s) http://www.rouvari.fi/
in this case and with a damping ratio which from the Totemplus; Hull stress monitoring <10
http://www.totemplus.com/hsm.html
spectrum fit in Fig. 6 was estimated to 5.3%. 2-node HMC; Hull monitoring system 4 systems + several
vertical vibration at about 2.5 rad/s is however more http://www.hmc.nl/mba/hullmosys/ motion systems
important. CPE Systems; Hull stress monitoring system <10
http://www.cpesys.co.nz/
MCA Consultants; Hull monitoring system 8 in service + some
http://www.mcaco.com/products/index.html gone out of service
Miros <10 research systems;
http://www.miros.no/ first of all wave radar
supplier
Marin http://www.marin.nl/web/show <10 research systems
Micron Optics, Hull stress monitoring <10 research systems
system http://www.micronoptics.ru/
Cetena; Sh.A.M.An <10 research systems
http://www.cetena.it/
Automasjon og Data a.s.; HUMS <10 systems
http://automasjon.no/
Fig. 6 Illustration of spectral method by a fit (solid) to the EnduranceConsulting; HSMS <10 systems; navy
measured stress spectrum (dots); fit made to the torsional http://www.endcon.com.au/
vibration mode for a ULCS DNV <10 research systems
GL; GL SeaScout <10 systems

OVERVIEW OF SUPPLIERS AND CLASS NOTATIONS Table 2 Class societies and associated class notations
Class society Class notation
There are many suppliers of hull monitoring, e.g. those ABS HM2
listed in Table 1. The suppliers are given an approximate BV MON-HULL
number of systems delivered. For the suppliers with a low DNVGL HMON()
number of delivered systems < 10 is provided. Additional KR HMS
comments are also included occasionally. As seen from LR SEA(HSS-n)
Table 1, there are few leading suppliers, and the rest of the NK HMS
suppliers have not delivered many standard systems. Even RINA MON-HULL
the class societies like previous DNV and GL have
developed their own systems, which have been used in EXAMPLE RESULTS
research but also partly commercially, e.g. some GL
SeaScout systems are still in operation. Some other class On a 4600TEU Panamax container vessel a GL SeaScout
societies may have done the same. Not all suppliers have system together with a measurement system for research
delivered systems, approved by a class society, despite that was installed and Fig. 7 shows the load history (stress range
many class societies have hull monitoring rules with an spectrum) with and without wave induced vibrations. The
associated class notation. Table 2 lists class notations from stress is taken from a sensor located slightly aft of midship
various class societies. The hull monitoring rules vary in upper deck.
significantly which is a challenge for the suppliers but also
ship operators and yards, and a secondary problem is that
the name of the class notations varies. However, a future
harmonized class notation could earliest be expected in
2019, since there is no ongoing activity in this respect yet.

Table 1 List of suppliers


Supplier; Name of system Number of
systems delivered
Light Structures AS; Sensefib 172; approved systems
http://www.lightstructures.no/
Strainstall UK; StressAlert 300+; approved
http://www.strainstall.com/systems/vessel-m systems
onitoring/stressalert/
BMT Seatech; SmartStress 100+; approved
systems, but stopped
delivering new

57
Fig. 7 Cumulative spectrum of nominal stress ranges in
upper deck amidships with and without wave induced
vibration

From Fig. 7 it is observed that the stresses are amplified


relatively more due to wave induced vibrations at high
stress levels. Combined with a S-N curve, the damage from
the different cumulative frequency levels can be estimated
as shown in Fig. 8. It is seen that the fatigue damage is
related to lower stress levels occuring frequently. The wave
induced vibrations do not affect significantly the probability
level dominating the fatigue damage. More details are given
in Kahl et al. (2016). The measured effect of wave induced
vibrations on fatigue damage can be used to correct
numerical calculations for all relevant structural details,
such as longitudinal end connections at transverse Fig. 9 Fatigue damage from wave frequencies and vibration
bulkheads as well as deck outfitting details. frequencies for a gas carrier as a function of significant
wave height for stress taken from a sensor amidships just
below upper deck

In Fig. 10 the fatigue damage is displayed versus heading


for these deck details and for only cargo condition. It is
clear that most of the fatigue damage comes from head seas
(sector 1), while not so much from stern (sector 6) and
beam seas (sectors 3 and 4). It is also observed that all
headings have contribution from wave induced vibration,
but that the contribution is most significant from head and
bow quartering seas. More details are included in Storhaug
et al. (2013).

Fig. 8 Importance of fatigue damage at different probability


levels with and without wave induced vibrations

Desipite that Fig. 8 shows that the governing fatigue


damage comes from loads associated with high cumulative
frequencies, it is a common misunderstanding that this
always refers to daily or hourly levels of fatigue loading (it
would also imply that the peaks in Fig. 4 would not matter
which is certainly not the case). In a statistical smeared out
situation in may appear so, but if the damage is shown
differently, e.g. as in Figure 4 or versus the significant wave
height, the understanding is increased. An example taken
Fig. 10 Fatigue damage for the gas carrier in cargo
from a gas carrier is shown in Fig. 9, for which it is
condition as a function of heading from head to stern sea
observed that 5 meter significant wave height is most
important. The wave induced vibrations are contributing at
Previous examples included fatigue loading, but also
all wave heights. The results are not differing between
extreme loading is of importance. An example of the
loading conditions or headings.
extreme dynamic loading measured amidships and at aft
and forward quarter length from a large container ship with
extreme bow flare angle is shown in Fig. 11. The
measurements are normalized with respect to the
longitudinal strength standard IACS UR S11. It should be
noted that this has just been replaced by UR S11A (IACS,
2015) which is slightly stricter and requires whipping to be
addressed for such vessels. It is clear that especially in the
aft part this vessel has encountered high wave loading with
strong contribution from whipping, while the forward part
has good margins. In all cases the wave frequency loading
has been below the design loading. This is because the ship
has not really encountered real severe storms, but it has
been operating at high speed in moderate to small storms.

58
Whipping is quite sensitive to the speed. More details are CONCLUSIONS
given in Barhoumi and Storhaug (2013).
The number of hull stress monitoring system increases
fast. There are however few standard suppliers with mature
systems approved to the latest hull monitoring rules from
class societies. As the associated class notations also vary,
it is not only important to choose the right supplier, but also
to choose the right class notation. Recent developments
have also been made with focus on good intuitive displays
on the bridge and proper calibration of the strain sensors in
deck including hydroelastic effect and end pressure effects.
Other physical effects must also be handled during
calibration. The hull monitoring systems is also
recommended to also include the determination of fatigue
rates.
Fig. 11 Deck stress for a large container ship at aft, midship
A typical minimum installation is illustrated with examples
and foreward quarter length with and without whipping and
from such systems. The governing fatigue damage is caused
normalised with stress based on loads from IACS UR S11
by loads associated with high cumulative frequencies, but
(replaced by UR S11A)
this does not necessarily imply low associated sea states.
Head and bow quartering seas are most important, but wave
The main point of Fig. 11 is that the design wave load may
induced vibration contributes to fatigue damage at all sea
be exceeded, i.e. it is important for the officer on watch to
states and for all headings. Here the fatigue rates may be
have a functional warning system to stay below the design
helpful in operation as the crew immediately can relate the
loads, although, there are margins against ultimate hull
wave loading including wave induced vibrations to budget
girder collapse. Further, if the wave loading with whipping
fatigue damage.
exceeds the design wave load, the total loading may still not
exceed the total design load, when at the same time the still
The extreme loading has relatively higher contribution from
water bending moment is below the permissible still water
whipping, and occasionally it can exceed design limitations
load. It is therefore also important to know the actual still
even though the wave frequency loading stays well below.
water bending moment of the ship versus the design
It may be difficult to understand when this can happen, and
limitation. An illustration is shown in Fig. 12 taken from a
the seamanship experience may be unreliable in this respect.
measurement on a large container ships. It demonstrates
A hull stress monitoring system can then be useful to close
that the ship stays below the maximum permissible bending
the gap between design and operation, both, with respect to
moment at sea all the time, but that frequently it may be
the wave loading including whipping and to verify the
rather close to it. The time it is above the limitation (100%)
loading computer. The loading computer may indicate
refers to a harbour condition and is not relevant here. The
frequent still water loading close to the maximum still
still water bending moment distribution taken from the
water bending moment without accounting for uncertainties
stress rather than the loading computer will also display a
in the cargo or false input to the loading computer. Hull
slightly different and more smooth distribution.
monitoring should therefore be used to provide the crew
with decision support on the deviation from the loading
computer.

It should be expected that the hull monitoring rules in IACS


are harmonized within a decade, but with the recent
development, the DNV GL HMON() class notation is
already ensuring safety and building awareness in order to
reduce repair and maintenance costs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank DNV GL for the support


of this paper and previous full scale measurements and hull
monitoring projects.

REFERENCES

Fig. 12 Still water bending moment distribution of a large Barhoumi, M. and Storhaug, G., Assessment of whipping
container ship versus maximum permissible still water and springing on a large container vessel, Proceedings
bending moment midships; taken from the loading of the PRADS2013, 20-25 October 2013, CECO,
computer Chanwon City, Korea
DNVGL (2015), Fatigue assessment of ship structures,
DNVGL-CG-0129, October 2015,

59
http://rules.dnvgl.com/ServiceDocuments/dnvgl/#!/indus Storhaug. G., Oma, N., Blomberg. B, and Hirota, K., (2013),
try/1/Maritime/1/DNV%20GL%20rules%20for%20class The effect of measured whipping and springing on LNG
ification:%20Ships%20(RU-SHIP) vessels, Proceedings of the ASME 2013 32nd
DNVGL, (2015b), Fatigue and ultimate strength international conference on ocean, offshore and arctic
assessment of container ships including whipping and engineering, OMAE2013-10775, June 9-14, Nantes,
springing, DNVGL-CG-0153, October 2015, France
http://rules.dnvgl.com/ServiceDocuments/dnvgl/#!/indus
try/1/Maritime/1/DNV%20GL%20rules%20for%20class
ification:%20Ships%20(RU-SHIP)
DNVGL, (2016), DNV GL rules for classification: Ships
(RU-SHIP), Part 6 Additional class notations, Ch.9
Survey arrangements, Sec. 9 Hull monitoring systems
HMON, January 2016,
http://rules.dnvgl.com/ServiceDocuments/dnvgl/#!/indus
try/1/Maritime/1/DNV%20GL%20rules%20for%20class
ification:%20Ships%20(RU-SHIP)
DNVGL, (2016b), DNV GL rules for classification: Ships
(RU-SHIP), Part 5, Ch.2, June 2016,
http://rules.dnvgl.com/ServiceDocuments/dnvgl/#!/indus
try/1/Maritime/1/DNV%20GL%20rules%20for%20class
ification:%20Ships%20(RU-SHIP)
Edin, I. and Laanemets, K., (2016), Damping estimation of
wave induced vibrations, evaluation process of damping
estimation methods, Master thesis, Department of
shipping and marine technology, division of marine
technology, Chalmers University of Technology,
2016:X-16/343.
IACS, (2015), S11A, Longitudinal strength standard for
container ships, June 2015, International association of
classification societies, Unified Requirements (UR),
Requirements concerning Strength of ships (S),
http://www.iacs.org.uk/publications/default.aspx
Kahl, A., von Selle, H. and Storhaug, G., (2016), Full
scale measurements and hull monitoring on ships,
Proceedings International institute of welding (IIW),
V1675-15 (XV-1494-15)
MAIB, (2008), Report on the investigation of the
structural failure of MSC Napoli, English Channel on 18
January 2007, Marine Accident Investigation Branch,
Report No. 9, April 2008.
https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports
NK, (2015), Investigation Report on Structural Safety of
Large Container Ships, The investigative panel on large
container ship safety, ClassNK, September 2014,
http://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/news/Investigation_Rep
ort_on_Structural_Safety_of_Large_Container_Ships_E
N_ClassNK.pdf
Storhaug, G., Aagaard, O. and Fredriksen, ., (2016),
Calibration of hull monitoring strain sensors in deck
including the effect of hydroelasticity, ISOPE2016
TPC-0160, The twenty-sixth International Ocean and
Polar Engineering Conference, Rhodes, Greece, June
26-July 2, 2016
Storhaug, G. and Kahl, A., (2015), Full scale
measurements of torsional vibrations on Post-Panamax
container ships, 7th International conference on
Hydroelasticity in marine tehnology, pp. 293-310, Split,
Croatia September 16-19 2015.
Storhaug, G., Moe, E. and Holtsmark, G., (2007),
Measurements of wave induced hull girder vibrations of
an ore carrier in different trades, Journal of offshore
mechanics and arctic engineering, Volume 129, issue 4,
pp. 279-289, doi:10.1115/1.2746398

60
Accident Scenario-based Rapid and Interactive Damage
Control System using Coded Shortcut Keys
Hee Jin Kang, Dongkon Lee, Jin Choi
Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean engineering (KRISO), Republic of Korea

ABSTRACT the perspective of operators. The table 1 shows a plan for


using a DCS according to five Ws and one H.
When an accident happens on a ship, effective dam-
age control activities are required. Many large ships, Table 1 Required action items for damage control system
especially naval vessels, are equipped with damage con-
trol systems to mitigate damage to life, environment, Necessary measure
and property. In spite of the damage control systems, Immediately upon Check, spread damage condition
When
most onboard recovery activities are still carried out by accident Composition of damage control crew
the crews. In any case, the final decision-maker is Where Accident scene
Input damage control crew
someone on the ship. Therefore, the key to damage con- Conduct damage control
trol rests with well-trained crews on the ship during the Who Crew Damage control
early phase of an accident. For effective use of damage Composition of damage control man-
control systems, each system has its own symbols and ual
static and dynamic kill cards, including many that pre- Establishment of ground cooperation
What Damage control
system for rescue
dict calculation functions for ship performance. How- Record, analyze, and improve
ever, too much information on a graphic user interface, onboard training results
and too many complex tasks that must be done in a very Severe life, envi-
short time for damage control, lower the usability of a ronment, and asset Predict accident influence according
damage control system. For this reason, this paper uses Why damage occurs to time flow
when initial re- Decision-making for damage control
a systems engineering approach to guide the develop- sponse fails
ment of a design alternative for existing damage control Create damage control system based
systems. To guarantee the success of damage control on operator requirements
activities in the early phase of an accident, coded Through system Gain certification to operate ship load
shortcut keys are considered for effective communica- that reflects vari- Establish organic cooperation system
How ous accident sce- of command crew, scene response
tion between members of the damage control team. A narios and onboard team, and ground team
suggested damage control system based on coded training results Establish database for preliminary
shortcut keys is developed using the results of a re- analysis and decision-making with
quirement analysis. The proposed design concept makes regard to flooding and fire accidents
effective damage control possible with rapid and inter-
active kill cards. Therefore, current DCSs were improved based on survey
results of stakeholders related to ship sailing and by ana-
INTRODUCTION lyzing cases of existing accidents. This direction was im-
plemented within regulations and laws related to ship dam-
Damage control systems (DCSs) that minimize life, en- age control.
vironment, and asset damages in naval vessels or large pas-
senger ships are in operation. However, cases that prove the ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM BEING
utility of DCS have not yet been reported for severe acci- OPERATED
dent cases such as the rubber boat bomb on the destroyer
USS Cole or the grounding accident of the Italian Costa Most DCSs on large passenger ships and naval vessels
Concordia. Quick external support is difficult in marine are being operated as subsystems to engineering control
accidents, and onboard accident situations must be immedi- systems (ECS). DCSs are linked with onboard fire and
ately controlled. Life, environment, and asset damage can flooding sensors, doors, hatch openings, closing infor-
spread quickly and severely if accident information is not mation, remotely controlled valves, and kill cards that pre-
quickly grasped and responded to. Therefore, it is necessary sent sequential damage control procedures to respond to
to analyze the functions of currently operated systems and various accident situations. A DCS linked with ECS checks
determine how to improve damage control systems from mission operability restrictions according to the damage,

61
and includes functions for responding to attack situations Check ventilation closing of main compartments, and
on vessels and evaluating basic operations on ships such as extinguish areas when fire spreads
destination sailing during accident situations.
Interviews and a survey were conducted for 20 items
Stage 3: Mustering and preparation
dealing with each function of a damage control system.
These included onboard utility, correspondence for safety Check duty contents of scene damage control crew
management duty procedures, regulations related to func- according to procedure and remote support
tional improvements, possibilities for reflective systems, Simplification or automation of personnel check and
and factors that should be considered during ship design by report procedure
assuming fire and flooding accidents on a ship with 310
sailors (crewmen), safety management, a regulation system, Stage 4: Strengthen entry into the fire zone, and fire-
and design field experts. Based on the results, requirements fighting
for improvement, and design plans for the effective use of a
Accurate and quick recording and coordination of ac-
DCS, were presented.
cident situation and response situation
ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE-FIGHTING Inspect main extinguishers, emergency extinguishing
pumps, and fuel oil and electrical blocking with re-
Regulations and guidelines for damage control are pre- mote support when needed
pared and used for each shipping company, ship classifica- Provide decision-making support information for set-
tion (IMO 1997; KRS 2004; IMO 2007; Bgh et al. 2009). ting and resetting fire location and extinguishing area,
The Fig.1 shows an example of the procedures for fire- extinguishing team entrance and exit routes, timing
fighting and abandon-ship drills, and basic factors to con-
sider in configuring a DCS. Stage 5: Rescue operation
Support confirmation of casualty location, suffer in-
formation, and injury information
Support quick transportation of the wounded, and
share information with nearby ships and rescue ships
for treatment

Stage 6: Use of a fixed fire-extinguishing system


Use fixed fire-extinguishing system, check remaining
personnel, and support evacuation when required
Check for blocking of ventilation in areas and remote
support

ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR FLOODING


DAMAGE CONTROL
Fig.1 Firefighting and abandon-ship drill (KRS 2009)
Regarding damage control for flooding, situations where
The requirements and required information for damage DCS can be used to prevent the spread of accident damage
control, by each stage related to fire damage control, are were analyzed by investigating the results for the Italian
summarized from IMO (1997) and KRS (2004) as below: Cost Concordia. The requirements for an effective damage
control are listed in Table 2.
Stage 1: Reporting bridge of initial fire
Register fire accident information, and call and check Table 2 Required actions for flooding damage of a ground-
nearby crew ing damage case (IMIT 2012)
Announce fire alarm considering scene-reported con-
tents, fire class, and size according to location; and Fields that can be improved when
Time Event Heeling
confirmation of scene through other identification applying DCS
tools such as CCTV and reports by crewmen
Monitor site situation and check smoke and heat Check previously defined
accident scenario simulation
spreading route by considering how the fire spreads 09:45
Collision
database
Monitor site situation and check kill card for fire- with Scole
p.m.
reefs Respond according to Kill
spreading situation Cards(damage control guide-
lines)

Stage 2: Initial actions to be taken by an initial caller DCS is used in damage control
Respond according to kill card (decision making of 09:50 Blackout regardless of blackouts (owing
p.m. onboard to separate emergency power
response team in onboard accident scenes, record of
and independent operability)
damage control procedures prioritizing fire- extin-
guishing activity, guidance for decision-maker)

62
Check ship behavior and risk
functions were selected by considering the results of a pri-
of capsize by flooding steps ority analysis of requirements, technical implementation
and considering progress of difficulties, and the effects of damage control. The func-
flooding tions present a direction for improving existing DCSs.
Set waterproof area to prevent
risk of capsize
Recommend evacuation of
Table 3. Selected TPMs for effective use of DCS
passengers to shelter deck TPMs
when risk of ship capsize is
judged to be high, and call Support shortcut key input to activate main
TPM 1
crewmen in each area to sup- functions
10:36 Ship drift-
05 port evacuation User inter- Provide wireless communication system
p.m. ing TPM 2
Perform rescue signaling ac- face (WICS)-linked usage onboard
cording to defined damage
control procedures Provide information to predict accident influence,
TPM 3
Order mustering on shelter such as fire and flooding, based on database
deck, and transfer information Smoke, heat spreading route, and tendencies
on accident situation to nearby TPM 4
during fire can be predicted
ships and ground units (marine
police, VTS automatically) Provide operation guidelines for HVAC in main
TPM 5
compartments and extinguishing areas
Call crewmen in each area,
and check remaining personnel Provide number of casualties and location
TPM 6
and the wounded information for passengers and crewmen

Record damage control infor- Check damage control procedures in real time,
mation (including information Strengthen TPM 7 and provide dynamic response guidelines that can
Ship touch- decision be managed
10:44 on casualties that occurred
es the sea 12 making
p.m. during accident and abandon-
bottom support Provide response guidelines that can be updated at
ing procedures), and share with TPM 8
any time
rescue support team

10:48 General Provide static and dynamic restoration predicting


TPM 9
p.m. emergency functions during flooding

First life- Provide ship behavior properties and


10:55 boat flooding-progress predicting information
TPM 10
p.m. launched at according to time flow, assuming flooding
sea situation by accident scenarios

10:58 Ship
p.m. grounding
15 It was found from the results of TPM selection that acci-
dent information for responses must be provided to roughly
440 persons predict the influence of an initial accident on user interfaces.
11:37
still to 20 It was found that a shortcut-key-based operational proce-
p.m.
evacuate
dure (that can omit complicated and diversified procedures
Ship master for menus such as difficult calculations or data input by
00:34 leaves the Analyze accident and damage
7075 keyboard and trackball) was required to secure an addition-
a.m. ship by control results. Improve
lifeboat onboard DCS and training
al communication network based on wireless communica-
process tion. This allows damage control teams or decision-makers
Helicopter who are distant from each other on the ship to effectively
ITCG in-
00:41
tervention 80
share situational recognition and effectively control acci-
a.m. dent situations that spread quickly (Calabrese et al. 2012).
to recover
50 persons To strengthen decision- making support, it was found that
the function of presenting measurements for each step
50 persons
03:44
still to (from the start of the accident to the endpoint of damage
a.m. control) must be strengthened by considering the develop-
evacuate
ment of the damage and aspects of damage control. These
30 persons
04:22
still to
issues include changes in ship behavior considering the
a.m. state of the sea based on the progress of flooding, sugges-
evacuate
tions for operability evaluations and plans for main equip-
06:14 Evacuation ment, area lockout considering smoke and the spread of
a.m. completed
heat onboard, and configurations for effective kill cards to
use in a fixed firefighting system.
Table 3 shows the results of an analysis on the require-
ments for effective use of a DCS. Damage control systems OPERATION CONCEPT OF IMPROVED DCS
in operation must adhere to laws, regulations, and guide-
lines. To select technical performance measures (TPMs) to The concept of using an improved DCS, which assumes
evaluate the utility of a DCS, 10 items in two fields were that TPMs in existing DCSs are applied, is shown in Fig. 2.
selected for improvement. Table 3 also shows functions that
are required for the efficient use of a DCS on a ship. These

63
Fig. 2 Example of operational concept of DCS including improvements
(Some images of the figure are derived from google.com and edited for noncommercial use)

TPM 1, TPM 7, and TPM 8 are related to the use of kill The DCS works with information such as the initial re-
cards to respond to accident alarms. These alarms are trig- sponse plan for initial crewmen who find the fire, the tim-
gered by flooding and fire information gathered from sen- ing of the fire-extinguishing team entering the fire scene,
sors, damage control personnel on the ship, location infor- the temperature of the exiting point, smoke height standards,
mation of weak traffic, and coordination of various accident area lockout timing, and points where a fixed fire extin-
situations in the DCS operations console. guishing system is used.
TPM 2 and TPM 6 provide locations of onboard person- According to preliminary training results, the initial step
nel and open-and-shut information for watertight doors, to minimize accident damage during fire or flooding acci-
airtight doors, and hatches. These data are linked through a dents is taken by the initial accident finder or crewmen near
signal interface that can be checked in the DCS. the accident scene (Peters et al. 2004). Reports are given
Information on the operability or disabling information of after measurements in minor accidents, but the DCS auto-
equipment that is essential for ship operation of generators matically intervenes when decision making by the captain
and distributing boards according to flooding and fire is required because the size of the accident spreads over a
spreading during accidents is used by linking it with ECS certain area.
information. The level of linkage may vary by the type of The accident situation is determined through sensors in-
ship within the range of laws, regulations, and guidelines stalled onboard. The DCS operator reports to the com-
related to the operators requirements. mander and refers to accident scene reports and kill cards
There is a difference in the number of compartments in from the DCS. During emergencies, or when the ship is not
ships or the size of ships for TPM 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10. This large, one person must perform the role of the DCS opera-
relates to the kill card configuration used to predict damage tor and decision-maker. When reporting site information
development, predict the damage scale, or respond to each during emergency damage control, it is difficult to effec-
accident situation according to the time flow in accidents. tively record data using diversified menus with existing
This uses the simulation results from various damage sce- keyboards or trackballs. Therefore, it is necessary to con-
narios (Kang et al. 2013). However, flooding analysis is sider operating the DCS by using shortcut keys, along with
configured by simulating more than 5,0008,000 cases of voice recording and recording events on the DCS operation
damage scenarios that consider the sea state and the inci- screen. Fig. 3 shows a shortcut key configuration using
dent angles of waves. For fire accidents, simulation results NSTM 079 and DCAMS 5.02 casualty icon.
from a smoke and heat-spreading analysis of main areas
and passages with risks of A-, B-, C-, and D-class fires are
used.

64
Table 4 Example of Use of Fire Damage Control with Coded Shortcut Keys

65
fire-extinguishing crews, exit routes, and the tendency of a
fire to spread.

CONCLUSIONS

In spite of the DCS, most onboard recovery activities are


still carried out by the crews. And DCS is not preferable
system for crews since its difficult and not familiar features.
For this reason, in this proceeding, specifications of DCSs
on large passenger ships and naval vessels are studied. And
requirements of stakeholders are investigated. From this
following conclusions are obtained.
Fig. 3 Concept of NSTM 079 and DCAMS 5.02 casualty 1. Existing DCSs can be improved with coded shortcut
icon-based shortcut key configuration (US navy 2001) keys and well predefined kill cards.
2. The shortcut keys are configured based on situations
The shortcut keys were configured based on primary in- that require decision making according to existing
formation that must be recorded by the DCS operator. The regulations and guidelines for damage control proce-
shortcut keys are configured based on situations that require dures, and for events that require confirmation.
decision making according to existing regulations and 3. The shortcut keys can be used to analyze damage con-
guidelines for damage control procedures, and for events trol results or evaluate onboard accident response
that require confirmation. They are used to analyze damage training results. They are also used to improve Kill
control results or evaluate onboard accident response train- Cards during a ships life cycle.
ing results. They are also used to improve accident response 4. Further study required to prove effectiveness of sug-
scenarios during the ships life cycle. The table 4 shows the gested concept of coded shortcut keys in near future.
concept of operating the coded shortcut keys.
The user interface of a DCS that uses coded shortcut
keys can be roughly configured as shown in Fig. 4. This ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
configuration of the user interface can minimize the devel-
opment costs of completely new DCSs, and can easily dis- This research was supported by the research projects of
play the management mode and required database in the KRISO, PNS2500 and PES2350.
existing DCS for linkage.

REFERENCES

Bgh, S.A., and Severinsen, T. (2009), Damage manage-


ment control system on the Danish navy ships, In Proc.
14th Int. Ship Control Systems Symp. (SCSS). Ottawa,
Canada.

Calabrese, F., Corallo, A., Margherita, A., and Zizzari, A. A.


(2012), A knowledge-based decision support system for
shipboard damage control, Expert systems with Applica-
tions, Vol. 39, No.9, pp.8204-8211.

Fig. 4 Example of modified GUI for DCS Henley, G., Haupt, T., Parihar, B., and Williams, F. W.
(2008), Fire GUI: A Software Tool for Predicting Fire
FUTHER CONSIDERATIONS and Smoke Spread on Ships, In ASNE Symp.: Ship-
building in Support of the Global War on Terrorism
The management of a DCS using shortcut keys is a con-
cept used with existing system management methods, and IMIT (2012), Marine Accident Investigation C/S Costa
can be selectively used by considering the skill of the sys- Concordia, Italian Maritime Investigative Body on Ma-
tem operator. rine Accidents
Accident-scenario-based simulation databases are limited
because they cannot completely reproduce actual accident IMO, MSC/Circ.919 (1999), Guidelines for Damage Con-
situations. Considering the difficulty of calculating damage trol Plans
restoration or securing reliable calculation results during
flooding accidents on deck, the database can be used to IMO, MSC.1-Circ.1245 (2007), Guidelines for Damage
roughly check changes in ship behavior or safety during Control Plans and Information to The Master (Secretari-
restoration over time after flooding accidents. For fires, it is at)
impossible to make an accurate quantitative prediction of
the amount of smoke or spreading time of a fire (Henley et Kang, H. J., Yang, Y. S., Choi, J., Lee, J. K., Lee, D. (2013),
al. 2008). The database can be used for damage control Time basis ship safety assessment model for a novel
based on kill cards by checking the entrances for ship design, Ocean Engineering, Vol.59, No.C,

66
pp.179-89

Korea Register of Shipping (2009), "Fire Fighting/Abandon


Ship Drill Checklist

Korea Register of Shipping (2004), "Technical Information


- Onboard Fixed Fire Extinguishing System

Peters, S., Bratt, E.O., Clark, B., Pon-Barry, H., and Schultz,
K. (2004), Intelligent systems for training damage con-
trol assistants, Proc. of ITSE.

US Navy (2001), Damage Controlman-NAVEDTRA


14057, Naval Education and Training Professional De-
velopment and Technology Center

67
Raising the Bar for Tug Stability
Govinder Singh Chopra
Director, SeaTech Solutions International (S) Pte Ltd, Singapore

ABSTRACT another. This brings in the human factor to the safety equa-
tion. Safety can be considered a function of these 3 inter-
One of the crucial components of safety in the ship de- dependent elements as shown in Fig. 1, and within the lim-
sign spiral is ship stability. The ship must remain stable its specified by the Regulations.
when loaded under different conditions under various
operations performed by its operator in the various sea
conditions. Traditionally stability under different load-
ing conditions has been evaluated and checked for com-
pliance with the IMO stability criteria. However, espe-
cially for workboats which have completely different
operating profiles as compared to commercial ships,
such stability criteria alone may not be adequate. For
the ship to remain stable, in addition to the loading con-
dition, the other variables such as vessel operations, op-
erators competency, and sea condition must also be
considered. In this paper, we identify the limitations of
the present IMO stability criteria, both the first and
second generation, and with some case studies, suggest
more meaningful performance based criteria to be in-
cluded in the design for safety.

Fig. 1. Safety as a function of Human Factor, Operations


INTRODUCTION and Design within the limits of Regulations
Oceans can support the ship, and they can also cap- The vessel must be designed for the intended opera-
size it This is a well-known ancient Chinese saying that tions, operated as intended and have onboard a safety man-
presents the stark reality that every vessel is vulnerable to agement system for the human operators taking into con-
capsize. Under extreme operations and or environmental sideration not only their human skills and experience but
conditions that exceed acceptable limits, the vessel will turn also their attitudes and behaviors for a more proactive re-
over, heel and capsize. sponse to safety.
For ship designers, one of the crucial components of The present stability criteria do not adequately con-
safety has been the vessels stability. Standards for safety sider the intended operations of the vessel. This deficiency
are set by Regulations, and for stability the standard to be becomes more exposed in the case of workboats which are
complied is the Intact Stability Code 2008, which applies to in fact intended to operate in diverse roles and in harsh
all vessels greater than 24m length. weather conditions.
Unfortunately, the drivers for better regulations is ac-
cidents, and after some serious accidents involving headsea PRESENT IMO STABILITY CRITERIA
parametric roll resonance the IMO decided in 2012 to de-
velop the second generation stability criteria which is pres- The conventional fundamental principles for stability eval-
ently under discussions. uation remain valid but we need to adapt and adjust these
Guaranteeing a sufficient level of safety to comply criteria to the actual operations. The goal is to ensure ade-
with the Regulations has typically been considered to be a quate reserve buoyancy, positive GM, and ensure there is
matter of design. However, it is impossible to ensure safety always sufficient righting energy along with watertight in-
only by design as it also depends on how the vessel is oper- tegrity, in all conditions of operations.
ated and under what operating conditions.
Further, safety itself is a personal perception and
non-absolute. What may be safe to one could be unsafe to

68
The four (4) pillars of stability against capsize are: SHP : Shaft Horsepower per shaft
1. GM Statical / Initial stability regulations : displacement, long tones
2. Righting Energy Dynamic Stability Regulations f : minimum freeboard along the length
3. Freeboard Load line Regulations B : molded beam
4. Watertight Integrity Load Line Regulations h : vertical distance from propeller shaft centreline
to towing bitt
The vessel geometry and hull form decides the vessels
stability characteristics, such as KM, KN etc. Each hull
Murphy further modified the basic formula as follows:
form being unique, the stability form characteristics may be
different, however for a given set of vessel dimensions,
there is little room for designers to drastically change these
stability form characteristics. The vessel arrangement,
depth and weight distribution fixes the vertical centre of
GM = (ft.)
gravity. Together, this decides the vessels stability at the
design.
N : number of screws
GM Statical / Initial Stability Regulations
D : propeller diameter
S : fraction of propeller circle cylinder intercepted
The origin of the first-generation intact stability regu- by rudder turned to 45
lations can be traced to the pioneering works of Rahola in
1939. It is based on purely empirical and statistical ap-
proach. Stability of the ships that capsized was compared The US Coast Guard used the Murphy Criterion until
with those with a long accident-free history. The stability 1971, when the factor of 76 in the denominator was
parameters were calculated in calm and still waters as it changed to 38, resulting in a twofold increase in the re-
was not possible to compute and evaluate ship motions in a quired GM. Another criterion is the standard proposed for
seaway. Norway which was experimentally derived by towing a
GM is the most basic and elementary stability criteri- model with a block coefficient of 0.5 sideways at a speed of
on to quantify the ships stability. Specification of a mini- 4 knots. The standard requires:
mum value of initial GM and freeboard sufficed as the sole
numerical stability criterion in use until 1940s. The value of
GM is easy to calculate, its meaning is relatively simple to
understand, and the effect of its magnitude on the heel re-
sponse is readily predictable. However, GM is only a valid GM = (m)
measure within small angles of heel, less than 5 degrees.
For workboats, the required GM in the IMO criteria is only h1 : height of towing bitt above waterline
0.15m. This is extremely inadequate for powerful tugs of d : draught
the present and the required value must be increased sub- f : minimum freeboard along length
stantially and also related to the bollard pull to be realistic.
The major limitation of the GM criteria is that it is
valid only at angles of heel less than about 5 degrees. These
expressions are unable to predict the response of the work-
boat at heel angle near capsize. A more sound approach for
large angles of heel is based on GZ and balancing the heel-
ing or overturning moment induced with the available
righting moment below a critical angle, such as either the
angle of downflooding or the threshold of capsize.

Righting Energy Dynamic Stability Regulation

The concept of energy balance is that the righting en-


ergy must be more than the capsizing or overturning energy.
IMO GENERAL CRITERIA
However, the present IMO criteria do not cater for work-
GM = KM - KG 0.15 m.
boat operations and operating conditions, which experience
Fig. 2. Statical/Initial Regulations under the
a different set of forces and overturning moments.
IMO General Criteria In the absence of suitable criteria from IMO, Classifi-
cation Societies developed and laid down criteria for
In the absence of a valid IMO criterion, designers
workboats energy balance, considering certain operations
have been guided by the Argyriadis formula:
such as towing, firefighting and crane operations. Finally in
May 2016, at the 96th session of The Maritime Safety
Committee, IMO has approved the amendments in the IS
code with respect to Stability information for vessels en-
GM = (ft.) gaged in towing. It includes design criteria and operational
criteria for harbor towing, coastal or ocean towing and Es-

69
cort operations. This is a good starting point, however, 1) 0 < de
these criteria need to be further developed to properly rep-
Fig. 4. Classification society criteria/IMO weather criteria
resent both the operation mode and the weather conditions
under which these operations are carried out. IMO CRITERIA (TOWING)
DYNAMIC

1) G > H
2) 0 < 3
Fig. 5. IMO Towing Criteria
IMO CRITERIA (ESCORT)
IMO - GENERAL CRITERIA
1) 'A' - Area under GZ curve up to 30 0.055 m.-rad
2) 'B' - Area under GZ curve up to 2 0.09 m.-rad
3) 'C' - Area under GZ curve bet. 30 and 2 0.03 m.-rad
4) 'E' - Max. GZ to occur at angle 25
5) 'F' - Max. GZ 0.2 m
Fig. 3. IMO General Criteria for Dynamic Stability

HEEL & RIGHTING

1) Area I 1.25 * Area J


2) Area K 1.40 * Area L; and
3) 0 15 degrees.
Fig. 6. IMO Escort Criteria
The IMO criteria were developed using empirical values
derived from statistics of commercial vessels. Workboats
IMO - WEATHER CRITERIA have different proportions and hull forms and perform dif-
ferent operations. This renders the criteria not suitable and
1) 0 0.8 x de or 16 whichever is less in some cases inadequate. There is an urgent need to in-
2) S2 S1 clude all other operations that the workboat may be re-
quired to perform, and make the criteria more performance
ABS TOWING CRITERION based.
1) S2 > 0.09 m.-rad
ABS FIRE FIGHTING CRITERA Freeboard Load Line Regulation

1) S2 > 0.09 m.-rad The loadline concept was developed for commercial
2) f > dy shipping to prevent overloading vessels and jeopardizing
their safety. Samuel Plimsoll was instrumental in drafting
ABS ESCORT CRITERIA the Merchant Shipping Act and convincing the British Par-
liament to finally enact this in 1890.

70
The loadline convention followed in 1930: openings into the buoyant envelope removes them from
Freeboard and the minimum bow height has an effect on consideration as downflooding points because they are as-
various vessel characteristic sumed to be effective in preventing the ingress of water
1. Shipping green water during intermittent immersion. Such openings need a min-
2. Deck immersion imum height (sill height) above deck so that when open,
3. Reserve buoyancy water ingress is minimized. However, for small workboats
4. Righting energy which have also a lower freeboard, this sill height may not
5. KG Values be adequate. There is a need for adopting the loadline regu-
The concept of freeboard is still valid. However, the lations to workboats and basing the requirements with
value in the present regulations is obtained arbitrarily and greater emphases on physics and operational requirements.
empirically without scientific basis. For some workboat
operations, a lower freeboard at the stern may be necessary.
SECOND GENERATION STABILITY CRITERIA
This conflicts with the stipulated freeboard and may result
in a design which is not suitable or unsafe for certain opera-
The development of the second-generation intact stabil-
tions.
ity criteria has focused on five dynamical stability capsize
On the other hand, workboats with the minimum statu-
modes during operations:
tory freeboard may not prove to be very suitable for opera-
- Excessive acceleration
tions in harsh sea conditions.
- Deadship
- Parametric roll
Watertight Integrity Load Line Regulation - Broaching
- Pure loss of stability
One of the crucial means of ensuring adequate stability
involves providing external watertight integrity so that the
hull boundary remains effective in providing buoyant force
and righting energy.
Downflooding point is the point at which water could
enter the hull boundary which provides buoyancy when the
vessel heels due to an external overturning moment.

Fig. 7. Downflooding Points


Fig. 8. Structure of Second Generation Intact Stability Cri-
teria IMO (2008)
The requirements for watertight integrity are contained The second generation criteria are ship specific and
in the load line regulations, and this is directly related to the consider the stability during certain operations. Further it
downflooding point which is a very critical factor in the provides guidance to the operator on limitations for opera-
IMO stability criteria. tions. Vulnerability has now been defined it is the possi-
There are basically two types of downflooding points bility that the ship may capsize.
assumed in the calculation of stability: The aim of level 1 vulnerability criteria is to check the
1. Weathertight openings susceptibility of a ship to a specific failure mode, whereas
2. Unprotected openings. the aim of level 2 vulnerability criteria is to indicate the
The most common unprotected opening is the engine degree of ship susceptibility to a particular failure mode.
room ventilator, since provision of air to combustion ma- These criteria again are developed for commercial ship-
chinery is necessary for operations. The possibility exists ping and do not consider the operations of workboats.
that in certain conditions, however, some of the unprotected
openings may also need to be closed such as during the Limitations of present IMO Stability Criteria
preparation for severe storm or for the duration of the tow
and when the hull is unmanned and not in an operational From the previous section, it is clear that the present
condition. IMO stability criteria is totally inadequate as they do not
Weathertight openings are those openings which are consider the different operations of workboats which may
provided with weathertight closing appliances that can be take place with simultaneous wind, waves and currents to
closed in bad weather. Providing weathertight closures on be superimposed. The reaction or forces from the thrusters

71
to counter the environmental forces/moments resulting in raised and additional decision assist guidance must be pro-
additional heeling moments need to be added in the vided to the operators to ensure safer tug operations.
weather criteria, along with crane, towing, or maneuver-
ing operations, which are undertaken by the workboat.

Fig. 11. High Speed Operations - Escort

OPERABILITY ENVELOPE

For safe operations, a limiting or operability envelope


could be provided for operators guidance for each mode of
Fig. 9. External Forces & Heeling Moment during tug op-
operation. Such an envelope will provide the following
erations
limits which the operators may monitor closely and have
built-in alarms to forewarn the operators as well as provide
In addition to the operations which are usually at low
enough guidance to the operator for decision making.
speeds, on some occasions, the workboat may also perform
operations at higher speeds.
Limiting KG
Report from a recent tragedy concluded that the major
cause of the accident was apparently due to suddenly turn-
The limiting KG is the maximum KG complying with
ing both the thrusters to maximum hard over position
prescribed and applicable set of criteria at a given draft and
while the tug was moving at its maximum full speed ahead
given sea conditions.
during sea trials for a steering test.
Another high speed operation is escorting in both direct
Limiting Heel
and indirect modes. There is adequate awareness of this
operation within the industry and the Classification Socie-
ties have laid good and adequate stability guidelines and This is another useful guidance for operators. For tow-
criteria for escort tugs. This criterion has now been in the ing operation, the heel must be less than the angle of which
IMO stability. water may flood the vessel through openings left without
weathertight closures. For turning operation, the heel needs
to be less than Deck Immersion or say 10 degree, whichev-
er is less. The 10 degree heel has been suggested based on
feedback from operators on a reasonable value.

Limiting Speed

For higher speed operations, it is essential to advise the


operator on the limit speed for safe operations.

Limiting Sea Conditions during Different Modes of


Fig. 10. High Speed Operations Turning Operations

Perhaps, this is the most critical guidance for the opera-


Further, during operations, the watertight integrity may tor - limiting sea conditions i.e. the wind, wave, and current
differ from the as-designed or as-regulated conditions. limitations where the different operations may be carried
For actual realistic operating conditions, a more worst out.
downflooding point for those weathertight openings which
remain open, may need to be considered, and higher sill
heights made mandatory in the regulations. The bar must be

72
CASE STUDIES
Limiting KG curves were then plotted (Figs. 12 and 14)
Investigations were carried out on existing designs of for the following cases:
tugs, in order to develop an operability envelope taking 1. Without wind
account of the actual operating conditions. The parameters 2. With steady wind (35 knots)
of the 3 tugs are shown in Table 1. 3. With steady wind (50 knots)
4. With wind and worst downflooding (DF) point
Table 1. Principal Dimensions of Tug Boats (See Figs. 14 & 15)
5. With wind, worst downflooding (DF) point and
Beam Depth Design Bollard aft trim 1% of LBP (See Figs. 14 & 15)
LOA LBP Limiting heeling angle curves were plotted as follow.
Tug (mld) (mld) Draft Pull
1. For Turning Operation, the heel angle limit was
(m) (m) (m) (m) (m) MT defined as Deck Immersion Angle or Absolute
1 25.80 21.910 9.50 5.00 4.00 40 10 deg whichever is less. (See Fig. 13)
2. For Towing Operation, the Equilibrium Heel An-
2 32.50 24.830 10.50 4.90 3.90 45 gle Limit for each case was plotted. (See Fig. 15)
3 33.00 27.640 11.60 5.60 4.40 65

Dominant Criteria

Limiting KG values were calculated under 4 different


draft conditions for all the criteria as defined in Figs 3-4.
1. General stability criteria
2. Weather criteria
3. Towing & Fire fighting operations
4. Towing Operations with steady wind of 35 knots
and 50 knots Fig. 12. Limiting KG - Dominant Criteria Turning
Criteria for turning operations as follows: Equilibrium
heel on turn <10 or deck immersion.
Investigations revealed a certain pattern in the criteria
which was most dominating at different draft loading con-
ditions (see Table 2).

Table 2. Dominant criteria of tugs under four different


loading conditions

Fig. 13. Heeling Angle Limit for Turning

Limiting KG Curves

As seen in Table 2, the following two criteria are domi-


nant.
1. Towing + Steady Wind
2. Turning + Steady Wind

For Turning Criteria, Tug 1 was selected as it has this as


the dominant criterion for all the 4 draft conditions.
For Towing Criteria, Tug 2 was selected as it has this as
the dominant criterion for all the 4 drafts conditions. Fig. 14. Limiting KG - Dominant Criteria Towing

73
- Wind, wave and current forces superimposed on the
existing criteria for towing, firefighting operations etc.
- More fail safe means to ensure external watertight in-
tegrity
- Definition of downflooding points to be changed to
include access openings on main deck
- The effect of aft trim to be considered
- Effect of thruster forces leading to additional heeling
moments during turning with wind effect to be includ-
ed.
- Training procedures and standards need to be made
uniform for the industry to ensure the operator is com-
petent and his knowledge is constantly updated.
For operators guidance in decision making, the next
step is to develop easy to use stability advisory tools (soft-
ware) with built-in limits from the limiting envelope. The
operator will be provided with clear instructions on limiting
operating parameters, by the on-board stability alarm and
monitoring system.
Fig. 15. Heeling Angle Limit for Towing Further detailed research would be required and collab-
oration with other stakeholders to analyse a larger sample
Table 3: Limiting KG Values of existing designs with inputs from operators on their op-
erational requirements and finally provide a basis to devel-
op a modified stability criterion relevant for workboats.
Limit-
Reduction Finally, it would be more effective if ship designers
Description ing KG
(%) were to have more direct access to the relevant IMO Com-
(m)
mittees along with other stakeholders to provide the de-
signers perspectives and ensure that the safety and stability
Turning Criteria requirements regulated are realistic and suitable for intend-
Without Wind 4.123 - ed operations. We must not wait for another tragedy to raise
With Wind Speed (35 knots) 4.030 2.3% the safety standards!
With Wind Speed (50 knots) 3.925 4.8%
Towing Criteria
Without Wind (ABS Criteria) 4.612 -
2.9% REFERENCES
With Wind Speed (35 knots) 4.476
With Wind Speed (50 knots) 4.389 4.8%
IMO, 2009, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on
With Wind Speed (50 knots) its eighty-sixth session.
4.147 10.1%
+ (Worst Downflooding)
Rohr, J., 2003, Stability Management for DP Platform
With Wind Speed (50 knots) Supply Vessels, Dynamic Positioning Committee, Dy-
+ (Worst Downflooding) 4.091 11.3% namic Positioning Conf., Houston, Texas.
+ Trim by aft (1% of LBP)
Marine Technology, April 1980, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.
During turning, if the wind speed is superimposed, the cor- 163-173
responding impact on the Limiting KG is shown in table 3.
Turning with wind speed (50 knots) reduces the values of William A. Henrickson (n.d.), Assessing Intact Stability,
Limiting KG by 4.8%. University of Michigan. Available online:
http://www.sname.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocume
ntFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=5980d5a0-e50a-4448-8ca8-2bd
During towing, if the worst downflooding point and 1%
39d7aa1bc (Accessed on: 5 July 2016)
aft trim is superimposed, it has a significant impact on the
reduction in the Limiting KG of up to 11.3%.
Martin, L.L. (1980), Ship Manoeuvring and Control in
Wind. SNAME Trans. 88. [Available online:
As expected, the worst downflooding point at the deep-
http://www.sname.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocume
est drafts and with 1% aft trim has the most significant im- ntFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=c0c558bf-fff8-4890-ac5c-9242
pact on the reduction in the Limiting KG. 8c56f3c4] (Accessed on: 5 July 2016)

CONCLUSIONS

There appears a strong case for modifying the existing


IMO criteria to include the following:

74
Ship Optimization for Efficiency and Maneuverability in
Adverse Sea Conditions
George Zaraphonitis1), Aphrodite Kanellopoulou1),
Apostolos Papanikolaou1),Vladimir Shigunov2)
1)
National Technical University of Athens, 2)DNV GL Maritime, Hamburg

ABSTRACT global greenhouse gas emissions (3rd IMO GHG study,


2014). The increase of emissions from shipping up to year
Aiming to improve energy efficiency and to reduce 2050 is estimated from 50% to 250%, depending on
greenhouse gas emissions from shipping, IMO worldwide economic development. Acknowledging the
introduced the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), paramount importance of averting the catastrophic
MEPC.212(63). In order to meet the gradually consequences of climate changes due to global warming,
increasing requirements of the new regulation, coming the control of greenhouse emissions from shipping was
into force in successive five-year phases, new ships brought before the Marine Environment Protection
should be designed with reduced propulsion power. As a Committee and after lengthy debates IMO adopted in 2011
result, questions have been raised regarding the ability the
of these designs to operate safely in adverse weather Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and
conditions. Within the EU-funded research project Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).
SHOPERA, alternative methods of variable complexity Based on statistics from the existing fleet, relevant formulae
and accuracy have been developed for the assessment of for the calculation of the Energy Efficiency Design Index
the manoeuvrability of ships under the action of heavy have been developed for each ship type, depending on the
wind and waves. The present paper focuses on the transport capacity, service speed and installed power, and
development of an optimization procedure for the trend lines were drawn depicting the current status of the
design of RoPax ships, which applies the world fleet. Then, requirements for new trend lines in
above-mentioned assessment procedures to identify five-year intervals (phases) have been adopted to ensure the
designs with adequate powering to ensure safe operation substantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from
in adverse weather conditions while keeping the right ships up to year 2025. Roughly speaking, a ships EEDI is
balance between economy, efficiency and safety of the proportional to its fuel consumption (therefore to the
ship and the environment. installed power) divided by its transport capacity and speed.
For the same transport capacity and speed, a reduction of
EEDI might be achieved by either reducing specific oil
INTRODUCTION consumption or the required installed power. Although
some improvements of specific oil consumption of modern
Shipping is by far the most efficient and environmentally diesel engines might be achieved in the near future, it is
friendly means of transportation of significant quantities of reasonable to expect that these would be rather small, since
cargo around the world. As a result, even nowadays, despite it seems that the design of these engines is nowadays
all the technological developments of land and air reaching its optimum. Hopefully, technological
transportation, more than 80% of the worlds merchandise developments will enable the design of more efficient ships
trade is transported by sea. According to the United Nations in terms of energy consumption, either by developing more
Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD 2015) the efficient hullforms and propulsion systems, streamlined and
international seaborne trade (millions of tons loaded all optimized appendages, installation of energy saving devices
cargoes) increased from 5,984 in year 2000 to 9,842 in year and waste heat recovery systems, improvements in hull
2014, with an average annual growth rate of 3.62%. During coatings, or by the combination of the above solutions1. If
the same period, the ton-miles of transported cargo however the benefits from technological advances are not
increased from 30,823 (billions of ton-miles all cargoes) enough to enable compliance with the increasingly
to 52,572 with an average annual growth rate of 3.89%. demanding EEDI requirements coming into force in
Despite the proven efficiency of maritime transportations,
due to the huge volume of transported cargo, the impact of 1 Improvements in operational procedures (e.g. trim optimization
greenhouse emissions from shipping is inevitably quite or improved weather routing) can also help in the reduction of
significant. Maritime transport emits around 1000 million ship emissions, but these are not accounted for in the calculation
tonnes of CO2 annually and is responsible for about 2.5% of of EEDI.

75
January 1 2020 (Phase 2) and 2025 (Phase 3), then an have been often criticized for not addressing ship
obvious design solution would be to reduce the propulsion manoeuvring characteristics at limited speed, in restricted
power by an adequate reduction of the ships design speed. areas and in adverse weather conditions. The latter has been
In either case, it is expected that future ships will be addressed in the project SHOPERA, Papanikolaou et al.
designed with significantly reduced propulsion power in (2015).
comparison with those before the introduction of the Based on the analysis of accident statistics, accident reports,
Energy Efficiency Design Index. There are, however, interviews of ship masters and existing proposals for
serious concerns regarding the safety of under-powered manoeuvrability criteria in adverse conditions, Shigunov
ships, related to the sufficiency of the installed propulsion and Papanikolaou (2014) proposed to address three
power and steering devices to maintain their scenarios of adverse conditions and defined the
manoeuvrability in adverse weather conditions. This gave corresponding functional requirements:
reason for additional considerations and studies at IMO (1) In the open sea, it is sufficient for the ship to be able to
(MEPC 64/4/13 and MEPC 64/INF7). As a result, weather-vane, i.e. change the heading to a favourable
guidelines for the evaluation of minimum propulsion power with respect to seaway and keep this heading; even
were proposed (IMO MEPC 62/5/19 and MEPC 62/INF.21), uncontrolled drifting with seaway can be acceptable for
which later resulted in the 2012 Interim Guidelines (IMO a limited time.
MEPC 64/4/13 and MEPC 64/INF.7), updated in 2013 in (2) In coastal areas, the requirements to manoeuvrability are
Res. MEPC.232 (65). These guidelines for the minimum more stringent: first, the ship should be able to perform,
powering evaluation should be considered as a provisional in principle, any manoeuvre, in seaway from any
remedy rather than a permanent solution, since it was direction and, second, the ship should be able to leave
acknowledged that at the time of their adoption, there was a the dangerous area before the storm escalates.
significant lack of understanding of the impact of the (3) Manoeuvring at limited speed in restricted areas is
various underlying parameters affecting the dynamic relevant in situations where forward speed is limited
behaviour and hence the manoeuvrability of ships in because of navigational restrictions; the ship should be
adverse weather conditions. To address the above able to manoeuvre at reduced speed in the presence of
challenges by in-depth research, the EU funded project strong wind and obstacles.
SHOPERA (Energy Efficient Safe SHip OPERAtion) Based on these functional requirements, Shigunov and
(2013-2016) was launched in October 2013. The ultimate Papanikolaou (2014) proposed equivalent, but simple to
goal of the SHOPERA project is to develop criteria and evaluate in design and approval practical criteria:
corresponding environmental conditions, along with the In the open sea, Weather-Vaning criterion: the ship
required assessment methods of varying complexity and should be able to keep heading in head to
accuracy, which can be applied in order to assess bow-quartering seaway up to 60 off-bow.
sufficiency of propulsion and steering systems of ships for In coastal areas: Steering Ability criterion: the ship
manoeuvrability in adverse conditions, including open sea, should be able to keep any prescribed course in waves
coastal waters and restricted areas. The impact of the and wind from any direction, and Propulsion Ability
proposed new guidelines for the minimum propulsion and criterion: the ship should be able to keep a prescribed
steering efficiency on the design and operational advance speed in waves and wind from any direction.
characteristics of various ship types and sizes is In restricted areas at limited speed, course-keeping at a
investigated, among other measures, by specified low speed in strong wind was proposed in
a. Conducting a large number of case studies by design shallow water, shallow water near a bank and shallow
teams comprising designers, shipyards, shipowners, water during overtaking by a quicker ship.
classification societies, research institutes and Whereas IMO Manoeuvrability Standards IMO (2002) are
universities. evaluated in full-scale trials, this is impossible for the
b. Developing and applying optimization procedures, proposed criteria in adverse weather conditions. An
targeting sufficient propulsion and steering alternative, model tests with self-propelled ship models in
requirements for safe ship operation in adverse weather simulated irregular waves and wind, for all required
conditions, while keeping the right balance between combinations of wave direction and wave period, is
ship economy, efficiency and safety of ship and the impracticable at the present state of technology, whereas
environment. direct numerical simulations of transient manoeuvres in
The development of such an optimization procedure for the irregular waves are not mature enough yet for routine
design of RoPax ships is presented in the following. The design and approval. The project SHOPERA proposed an
adopted procedures for the assessment of a ships alternative procedure, referred to as Comprehensive
propulsion and manoeuvrability in adverse weather Assessment, which is based on free choice of separate
conditions are outlined, and the obtained results are simple model tests, numerical simulations or empirical
presented and discussed. formulae to define wave, wind and rudder forces and
manoeuvrability coefficients, which are combined in a
simple numerical model to model ship motions, Shigunov
MANOEUVRABILITY IN ADVERSE CONDITIONS and Papanikolaou (2014). This procedure is not expensive
if empirical formulae are used for all force contributions;
Manoeuvrability of ships is presently addressed by IMO however, it still requires the solution of a nonlinear system
Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability, IMO (2002), which of 3 motion equations for many combinations of forward
norm turning, initial turning, yaw-checking, course-keeping speeds and seaway headings. Therefore, an even simpler
and emergence stopping abilities of ships. These Standards alternative assessment, the Simplified Assessment

76
procedure, was proposed by Shigunov et al. (2016), which evaluated using the bollard pull assumption instead of
has the complexity of a spreadsheet calculation. This full open-water propeller characteristics.
procedure is especially suitable for multi-objective design Calm-water resistance X s at 6.0 knots speed can be
optimization and was used here. For convenience, it is defined using the ITTC regression line.
briefly described below.
Wind resistance X w = 0.5 X w a (vs + vw ) AF is
' 2
The Simplified Assessment procedure is based on a reduced
number of assessment cases and reduced complexity of the defined by the air density a , wind speed vw , frontal
motion equations, but still takes into account all relevant
windage area AF and head wind resistance coefficient
physics of propulsion and steering, and addresses the same
manoeuvrability criteria as the Comprehensive Assessment. X w' , which can be assumed conservatively as 0.9.
In this paper, two criteria were considered: Propulsion For the maximum added resistance in short-crested
Ability and Steering Ability. irregular waves X d over the wave directions 0 to 60
The Simplified Propulsion Ability assessment is based on
the observation that bow seaways are most critical for off bow, an empirical formula is proposed and validated
required power at a given speed (Fig. 1, middle plot), (only for container and general cargo ships, bulkers and
therefore it is enough to consider only seaway directions tankers) in Shigunov et al. (2016):
from 0 to about 60 off-bow in the assessment, and, further, ( )
X d = 83 Lpp C B1.5 1 + Fr hs2 , where Lpp is the
that the influence of drift on the required thrust and
required power can be neglected, thus the system of motion length between perpendiculars, CB is the block
1/ 2
equations reduces to one surge equation (1). coefficient, Fr = vs ( gLpp ) is the Froude number
and hs is the significant wave height.
The resulting assessment procedure is implemented as an
MS Excel worksheet and covers diesel and diesel-electric
engines working on fixed- and controlled-pitch propellers.
The evaluation of the Steering Ability criterion is more
complex, because for the steering ability, both the steering
system and propulsion (which influences steering ability)
should be taken into account in the assessment: e.g. ships
with powerful propulsion may have a smaller rudder,
whereas ships with weaker propulsion may compensate this
with larger or more effective steering devices. The
Fig. 1. Examples of Comprehensive Assessment results in Simplified Steering Ability assessment is based on the
polar coordinates ship speed (radial coordinate) seaway observation that the steering ability is challenged to the
direction (circumferential coordinate, head waves and wind largest degree in seaway directions close to beam (Fig. 1,
come from the top): lines required power equal to right), i.e. the point where both the ratio of the required to
available power (A), advance speed 4.0 knots (B) and available delivered power and the rudder angle are
rudder angle 25 (C) simultaneously maximized (further referred to as critical
conditions for steering for brevity) is close to beam
X s + X w + X d + X R + T (1 tH ) = 0 seaway. Therefore, evaluation of the time-average wave
(1)
and wind forces can be reduced to beam seaways. Further,
analysis of the terms of the motion equations at the critical
where indices s, w, d and R denote calm-water resistance, conditions for steering shows that for conventional vessels,
wind resistance added wave resistance and rudder certain terms can be omitted, and the resulting Simplified
resistance respectively, T is the propeller thrust and tH Steering Ability assessment reduces to one equation:
is the thrust deduction. It is important to keep in mind that
the added resistance X d in eq. (1) is taken as maximum X s + X w90 + X d90 + X R + T (1 tH ) = 0 (2)
over wave directions between 0 and 60 off-bow. Whereas
forces X s , X w , X d , X R and thrust T in eq. (1) can and one check:
be found using any method (empirical, numerical or
experimental), it seems logical to allow using even simpler YR b (Yw90 + Yd90 ) (3)
approximations for these terms in the Simplified
Assessment. In particular (see Shigunov et al. (2016) for 90
details and validation of the assumptions), In eq. (2), X s denotes calm-water resistance, X w and
Rudder resistance X R , which may be substantial in 90
X added resistance due to beam wind and beam waves,
d
bow-quartering waves, is calculated as a fraction of respectively, X R the rudder resistance, T the propeller
propeller thrust X R = tR T , where tR is an
thrust and tH the thrust deduction on the hull. The
empirical constant.
As the required advance speed, 6.0 knots was used; at solution of eq. (2) defines the maximum attainable speed,
such a low speed, the propeller characteristics may be the corresponding propulsion point and the propeller thrust,
and thus defines the maximum available lateral steering

77
force on the rudder YR ; this force should be not less than DEVELOPMENT OF PARAMETRIC MODEL
the lateral steering force required by eq. (3),
b (Yw90 + Yd90 ) , where Yw90 and Yd90 are lateral forces
During the preliminary ship design stage, the designer, in
search of the optimal vessel for a specified operation
due to beam wind and waves, respectively, and scenario, is faced with a series of important decisions, all of
b = N s /( N s + 0.5Ys Lpp ) is a coefficient depending on the them having crucial impact on the vessels performance. It
is the nature of the designers work that requires many of
ratio between calm-water yaw moment Ns and these decisions to be made during the early stages, usually
calm-water lateral force Ys at the critical conditions for based on limited, vague or in some extent unreliable
steering. To provide a conservative recommendation for the information. In such cases, the designer needs to rely on his
value of b , it was evaluated in critical conditions for experience, intuition and engineering judgment,
steering using the Comprehensive Assessment for 11 ships occasionally supported by the exploitation of relevant data
(bulk carriers, container ships and tankers), leading to available from past designs. Advanced design tools, making
b = 0.5 as a default conservative value. For the other terms use of modern CASD technology to facilitate the
in equations (2) and (3), in addition to any methods from elaboration of a vessels preliminary design in limited time
the Comprehensive Assessment (empirical, numerical and and with limited human effort, yet at the same time with
experimental), simplified approximations are proposed by reasonable detail and accuracy, would be undoubtedly of
Shigunov et al. (2016), consistent with the complexity of great assistance.
the Simplified Assessment: A systemic approach to ship design needs to consider the
The increase in rudder resistance X R , significant in ship as a complex system, integrating a variety of
subsystems and their components, all serving well-defined
critical conditions for steering, is taken into account ship functions (Papanikolaou, 2010). Employing the
using a simple assumption X R = tR T , where parametric design, or parametric modelling procedure, the
tR = 0.24 is an empirical constant. design of a certain object, component or system may be
automatically elaborated, using specifically developed
To calculate the available lateral force on rudder YR ,
software tools for each particular set of values of the design
rudder model by Sding from Brix (1993) was used variables defined by the designer. A parametric design
with a specified maximum lift coefficient equal to 1.2. procedure may be relatively easily implemented in the case
The lateral force due to beam wind is calculated as of simple objects or components. In the case of integrated
Yw90 = 0.5Yw'90 a AL vw2 ; where Yw'90 = 0.9 is used as a systems, however, such as an industrial plant or a large
conservative assumption for the lateral wind force commercial ship, the implementation of a parametric model
coefficient. is no more a simple task, if possible at all, as the level of
Approximation of the calm-water resistance in eq. (2) is complexity increases exponentially. In such cases, the
more difficult than in eq. (1): the ITTC regression line design of the parametric model requires particular attention,
cannot be used, because it would under-estimate in order to ensure its integrity, accuracy, robustness and
resistance at the (rather high) forward speeds relevant in functionality. The parametric model should be flexible and
critical conditions for steering. If the resistance curve generic, so that it can be applicable to as many design
is available e.g. from model tests, it can be directly alternatives as possible, detailed enough to depict all the
used; alternatively, resistance curve is calibrated to essential characteristics of the design, and at the same time
match exactly the propulsion point, ship speed and as simple as possible, to avoid any unnecessary
propeller rotation speed at full MCR. complexities and implications during the development of
For the added resistance in irregular short-crested beam the corresponding software tools. Such tools, if available,
would enable the application, testing and verification of
waves X d90 , a simple empirical formula crucial assumptions and decisions regarding the ships main
X d90 = 380 Lpp C B1.5 ( 0.1 + Fr ) hs2 is proposed by technical characteristics on a large number of design
alternatives, in order to identify the most suitable design
Shigunov et al. (2016).
according to a set of selected criteria, to serve as the basis
Similarly, a simple empirical formula for the
for the subsequent detailed design stages. Going one step
time-average lateral wave force Yd90 in irregular further, once developed, these tools could be used as the
short-crested beam seaway is proposed (maximum over core of a formal optimization procedure, facilitating the
relevant wave periods): rational exploration of the design space and the
identification of a series of optimal, or near-optimal
600 Lpp hs2 design solutions, according to a predetermined set of design
Yd90 = criteria (objective functions or merit functions), while at the
1 + 45000 ( CB L0.5
pp )
4.6 (4)
same time fulfilling a set of design constraints. Inherent to
ship design optimization are the conflicting requirements,
resulting from the design constraints and optimization
This procedure was implemented in a MS Excel for
criteria, reflecting the interests of the various stakeholders:
practical use and extended to cover diesel and
ship owners and operators, ship builders, classification
diesel-electric engines working on fixed- and
societies, administrations, regulators, insurers, cargo
controlled-pitch propellers, as well as propellers in pod
owners/forwarders, port operators etc. A ship needs to be
drives.
optimized for cost effectiveness, operational efficiency,
improved safety and comfort of passengers and crew, and,

78
last but not least, for minimum environmental impact development of the corresponding NAPA macros, to ensure
(minimization of risk of accidental oil outflow, engine that the resulting hullforms are of adequately high quality,
emissions etc.). Many of these requirements are clearly to serve as the basis of the subsequent tasks, particularly the
conflicting and a decision regarding the optimal ship design hydrodynamic and the intact and damage stability
needs to be rationally made. In the course of the SHOPERA calculations. The hull is divided in three parts: entrance, run
project, a series of parametric models have been developed and parallel mid-body, with the length of the mid-body
for various types and sizes of ships, including RoPax and being very small, as usual for fast displacement-type RoPax
cruise ships, tankers, bulk carriers, containerships and vessels. The development of each part of the hull is based
general cargo carriers. Some of them were developed using on the corresponding set of design parameters. Apart from
the NAPA software by NAPA Oy, others using the the main particulars, specific parameters are introduced to
CAESES software by Friendship Framework. In the present control local hullform details, such as the size and shape of
paper, the parametric model for the global optimization of the bulbous bow (either conventional or goose-neck type),
RoPax ships will be outlined, and the results obtained from the shape of the flat of side and of the flat of bottom, the
its application to the design and optimization of a small immersion of the transom, or the existence of a propeller
RoPax will be presented. tunnel, a duck tail or a stern wedge. Based on these
The parametric model for the RoPax ships was developed parameters, three grids of definition curves are created
in NAPA. The main advantage of this software tool, apart defining the vessels entrance, mid-body and run. The
from the availability of a large suite of modules and tasks, resulting hullforms are typical of modern twin-screw RoPax
suitable for the detailed 3d modelling and analysis of ship vessels with fine fore-bodies and buttock-flow sterns. The
designs, is the availability of NAPA Basic, an embedded definition grid of representative hullform of a small RoPax
programming language that facilitates the development of a ship, developed by the parametric model, is shown in Fig.
parametric model with the level of detail needed for the 2.
work at hand. Using the functionality provided by the
NAPA Basic programming language, it is possible to fully
automate the development and evaluation of a 3d model,
without the need for any user intervention.
The development of each design variant is based on a large
set of design parameters, the most important of which are
listed in the following:
Main particulars (Length BP, Beam, Draught, Depth)
Length of entrance, mid-body and run
Variables controlling local hullform details (e.g. shape
and size of the bulbous bow, the transom and duck tail)
Length and position of engine room(s) (optional)
Number of bulkheads aft and forward of the engine
room(s)
Number of vehicle decks and deck heights below and
above the bulkhead deck
Number of passengers (berthed and total)
Service speed, range Fig.2: Typical hullform (fore and aft parts), developed by
The parametric model is quite generic and can be used for the parametric model
the design of RoPax ships of small, medium or large size.
Once NAPA is called by the optimization software, the The development of the vessels internal layout starts with
parametric design methodology is automatically executed the definition of the watertight subdivision below the main
and the following basic tasks are elaborated: car deck. A horizontal bulkhead deck and a piecewise
1. Hullform development horizontal double bottom deck are created according to
2. Resistance and propulsion estimations user-defined parameters. The vessel is subsequently divided
3. Development of internal layout in zones, aft and forward of the main engine room. The size
4. Weights estimation - Definition of Loading Conditions and position of the main engine room are determined first.
5. Evaluation of transport capacity (lanes length, number The length of the engine room is derived from the size of
of cars/trucks, payload) the main engines, based on empirical formulae derived
6. Evaluation of Stability Criteria and other Regulatory from the statistical analysis of data from existing vessels. In
Requirements order to minimize the shaft length, the aft bulkhead of the
7. Assessment of Building and Operational Cost, Annual engine room is positioned as far aft as possible, based on
Income and Selected Economic Indices the shape of the hullform. Alternatively, the size and
8. Evaluation of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) position of the engine room may be defined by the user.
9. Evaluation of hydrodynamic/manoeuvring performance The main transverse bulkheads aft and forward of the
in adverse seaway/weather conditions engine room are subsequently positioned, and the
The first step of the parametric design procedure is the corresponding watertight compartments are created. The
development of the hullform. A set of NAPA macros have number of car decks and the type of vehicles carried on
been developed, facilitating the fully automatic hullform each of them (mix of private cars and trucks) are specified
definition. Considerable attention has been given to the by a series of user-defined parameters, in accordance with
the size of the vessel. Smaller vessels have usually only one

79
deck for the carriage of trucks and private cars. For the and air conditioning, accommodation and miscellaneous.
larger vessels, an additional upper deck for trucks and/or The steel weight is estimated based on enclosed volumes of
private cars and/or one or two lower holds for private cars, the main hull and superstructure using appropriate weight
located forward of the engine room, may be created, coefficients. For the main engines, the actual weight
according to the users specifications. Alternative layouts provided by the engine manufacturer is used. The
with central or side casings may be modelled, as specified calculation of the remaining weight groups is based on
by the user. A number of upper decks are then generated, empirical formulae and appropriate weight coefficients. The
providing the necessary area for the accommodation of vessels maximum payload is determined by subtracting the
passengers and crew, according to the passengers transport light ship weight and the various DWT items (consumables,
capacity specified by the user and the required crew number. provisions, stores etc.) from the total displacement. A series
The model of the internal arrangement of accommodation of typical loading conditions are then created, for which the
spaces is rather coarse; however, it is ensured that ample intact stability assessment is performed based on the
room for public spaces and cabins for passengers and crew requirements of IMO Resolution A.749. Suitable NAPA
and for the required service spaces is provided. The upper macros for the assessment of damage stability are also
decks layout considers also the accommodation of the implemented, but they were not applied during the
vessels lifesaving equipment required for the particular optimization studies presented below, in order to keep the
service (i.e. life boats and/or life rafts). The internal layout calculation time in reasonable limits. The assessment of
of a small RoPax is presented in Fig. 3. manoeuvring performance of the ship in adverse weather
The prediction of the vessels resistance and calm water conditions is performed by series of NAPA macros,
propulsion power are performed by applying the Holtrop applying the assessment procedure presented in the
1984 procedure. These predictions may be corrected using previous section, developed by the SHOPERA project.
appropriate calibration factors provided by the user. Then, The building cost is divided in labour cost and cost of
suitable diesel engine models are selected from a data base. material. The latter is decomposed in the cost of steel,
outfitting, main and auxiliary engines, technical and other.
The cost of each of these items is calculated using
appropriate unit cost coefficients. For the calculation of
labour cost, an estimation of the required man-hours is
needed. The latter may be calculated by a similar
decomposition, assuming appropriate man-hour rates per
ton of steel, area of accommodation spaces, kW of installed
power etc. An alternative approach for the estimation of
man-hours is based on the compensated gross tons (cgt)
concept (OECD 2007), jointly developed by the
Community of European Shipyards Associations (CESA),
the Shipbuilders Association of Japan (SAJ) and the
Korean Shipbuilders Association (KSA). The compensated
gross tons is a function of the actual gross tons and may be
calculated by the following formula:

cgt = A gt B (5)

where A represents mainly the influence of the ship type, B


is the influence of the ship size and gt is the gross tonnage
of the vessel. Appropriate values for the above coefficients
are available for various ship types. For Ferries, A is set
equal to 20 and B equal to 0.71. Using an average of 30
effective hours per cgt, an estimation of the required
man-hours for the construction of a RoPax ship may be
readily obtained. Both methods may be used for the
estimation of a ships building cost, according to the users
selection. It is also possible to use the reference (known)
cost of an existing ship (used as the starting point of the
optimization) and to calculate the cost difference of each
design alternative applying either one of the above
procedures.
The financial evaluation of the shipbuilding investment is
Fig.3: Internal arrangement of a small RoPax, developed by based on the calculation of the Net Present Value. To this
the parametric model end, suitable macros have been developed, based on two
scenarios defined by the user: the investment scenario and
The ships light weight is decomposed in the following the operating scenario. The investment scenario is defined
main weight categories: structural, propulsion, auxiliary, by the building instalments, the years to delivery of the ship,
deck machinery and outfitting, electrical, piping, heating the loan factor (loan as percent of ship price), the loan years,
the interest rate and the discount rate. The operation

80
scenario is used for the calculation of the annual income requirements and the SHOPERA criteria for
and operating cost and then the assessment of cash flow, tax manoeuvrability in adverse weather conditions presented
allowances, taxable profits and taxes in order to calculate above, as well as various operational constraints such as
the annual discounted cash flow throughout the lifetime of draught and trim constraints for the various loading
the ship and the selling price after the end of service. The conditions, upper limit on building cost, lower limits on
operating scenario is defined on an annual basis and is DWT and lanes length requirements, constraints on the
assumed to remain unchanged throughout the economic life average truck weight etc. A scatter diagram of the Net
cycle of the ship. In the course of one year, three periods of Present Value as a function of Length BP is presented in
economic exploitation (i.e. low, intermediate and high Fig. 4 (only feasible designs are included). The starting
season) are taken into account. For each of these periods, point of this optimization (the original design) in this and
the duration in months, the details of the route, including the following diagrams is marked by a cross. As shown in
distance between the ports and operating speed, passenger Fig. 4, the maximum NPV is obtained with the length at the
and vehicle occupancy rates and the corresponding fares upper limit of the design space. The impact of the other
and port charges are defined by the user. The annual income main dimensions on NPV was relatively less significant.
is calculated consisting of earnings from passenger and This fact is mainly attributed to the impact of the length on
vehicle fares and from services to passengers on-board the the required propulsion power (see Fig. 5). Scatter diagrams
ship, and any state subsidies per trip, if applicable. The of NPV vs. the building cost, DWT, Propulsion Power and
operating costs consist of the annual port, fuel, crew, Lanes Length are shown in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9,
upkeeping (maintenance) and other costs. An inflation rate respectively. A negative relationship between NPV and
and a fuel price escalation pattern, both defined by the user DWT is shown in Fig. 7. This is because the freight rate of
are taken into consideration. trucks was assumed to be constant, irrespectively of their
weight. This way, ships capable of carrying the same
number of trucks, but of increased mean weight, are
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES penalised because of their increased propulsion power
requirements, whereas at the same time they are not
As already mentioned, the developed parametric model is receiving any credit for their increased DWT capacity. A
quite generic, and has been applied for the design and scatter diagram of building cost vs. DWT is presented in
optimization of RoPax ships of various sizes. In the Fig. 10.
following, results obtained from the optimization of a The obtained results indicate that compliance with the
relatively small vessel will be presented. The ship is EEDI Phase II requirement was quite demanding for this
designed for operation between Piraeus and the island of study, as most of the unfeasible designs failed to satisfy this
Crete, with a roundtrip length of 320 sm, a transport criterion. At the same time, only two designs were
capacity of 1200 passengers, 200 private cars and 21 trucks identified, marginally fulfilling the EEDI Phase III
and a service speed of 23.8 kn. The ship will be operated requirement. Scatter diagrams of the calculated margins
year-round, considering a high season during summer of with respect to the EEDI Phase II and Phase III are plotted
1.5 months with 7 roundtrips per week, a medium season of in Fig. 11. The EEDI margin is herein defined as the
5.5 months with 5 roundtrips per week, and a low season of required EEDI, according to the regulations, minus the
5 months with 3 roundtrips per week. The corresponding value attained. Therefore, a positive margin indicates a
occupancy rates for the passengers, cars and trucks that design complying with the corresponding phase, while
have been assumed for the calculation of annual revenues designs with negative margin are failing to comply with the
are 70%, 65% and 52%, respectively, for the high season, requirement. A scatter diagram of the calculated EEDI
50%, 30% and 75% for the medium season and 30%, 20% margin with respect to the Phase III requirement versus
and 75% for the low season. The ships earnings per trip are NPV is plotted in Fig.12. The results shown in this plot
calculated assuming an income of 39 per passenger (ticket indicate that increased NPV is associated with improved
price plus earnings from services to passengers on-board), performance with respect to EEDI. The Net Present Value
50 per car and 557 per truck. The assumed oil prices are of the two designs capable of complying with Phase III is
220 for FO, 420 for DO and 950 for LO. A lifetime of equal to m14.35 and m14.37. It is anticipated that
25 years has been used. Over this lifetime, an average systematic hullform and propeller optimizations,
inflation rate of 2% has been assumed, while for the oil installation of energy saving devices and waste heat
prices in particular, an annual escalation rate of 4% has recovery systems, or other technological advances might
been applied. For the above operational scenario, several help the designers to improve the performance of future
studies have been performed with the optimization tool ships, without the need of significant) compromises with
available in NAPA (i.e. the Optimization Manager), using respect to service speed. However, with the current
Genetic Algorithms. The results presented in the following parametric model, it was found that, in order to obtain a
were obtained by varying the main dimensions as follows: significant number of designs in compliance with EEDI
Min. value Max. value Phase III requirement, the design speed should be reduced
Length BP, m 105.0 115.0 down to 21.6 kn, a reduction that would have a significant
Beam, m 18.0 20.0 impact on the specified operational scenario. For the design
Design Draught, m 5.0 5.4 speed of 23.8 kn four Wrtsil 9V32 engines were selected
for all ships presented herein. These engines were replaced
The objective of the study was to maximise the Net Present by four Wrtsil 9L26 engines for the reduced speed of
Value of the owners investment, while ensuring 21.6 kn. As a result, compliance with EEDI Phase III
compliance with safety regulations, EEDI Phase II requirement was achieved (see Fig. 13).

81
14.6 14.60

14.4 14.40

14.2 14.20
NPV [mEuro]

NPV [mEuro]
14.0 14.00

13.8 13.80

13.6 13.60

13.4 13.40

13.2 13.20
111.5 112 112.5 113 113.5 114 114.5 115 15500 15600 15700 15800 15900 16000 16100 16200 16300
LBP [m] Propulsion Power [kW]

Fig.4: NPV vs. Length BP feasible designs Fig.8: NPV vs. Propulsion Power

16,300 14.6

16,200 14.4

16,100
14.2
Prop. Power [kW]

16,000

NPV [mEuro]
14.0
15,900
13.8
15,800
13.6
15,700

15,600 13.4

15,500 13.2
111.5 112 112.5 113 113.5 114 114.5 115 590 595 600 605 610 615 620 625 630
LBP [m] Lanes Length [m]

Fig.5: Propulsion Power vs. Length BP feasible designs Fig.9: NPV vs. Lanes Length

14.6 65.75

14.4

65.50
14.2
Building Cost [mEuro]
NPV [mEuro]

14.0
65.25
13.8

13.6
65.00

13.4

13.2 64.75
64.9 65 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.4 65.5 65.6 65.7 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300
Building Cost [mEuro] DWT [t]

Fig.6: NPV vs. Building cost Fig.10: Building cost vs. DWT

14.6 5

14.4 4

3
14.2

2
NPV [mEuro]

EEDI Phase 2 Margin


EEDI Margin

14.0
EEDI Phase 3 Margin
1
13.8 Initial Design - Phase II
0 Initial Design - Phase III

13.6
-1

13.4
-2

13.2 -3
1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300
DWT [t] DWT [t]

Fig.7: NPV vs. DWT Fig.11: EEDI Phase II and III Margin vs. DWT

82
0.2 0.97
0.0
0.96
-0.2
-0.4
0.95

Propulsion Criterion
-0.6
EEDI Ph.3 Margin

-0.8 0.94
-1.0
-1.2 0.93
-1.4
-1.6 0.92

-1.8
0.91
-2.0
-2.2
0.90
13.2 13.4 13.6 13.8 14 14.2 14.4 14.6
1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300
NPV [mEuros]
DWT [t]
Fig.12: EEDI Phase III Margin vs. NPV
Fig.14: Propulsion Criterion vs. DWT
7
EEDI Phase 2 Margin 6.9
EEDI Phase 3 Margin
6

6.8
5

Hs_steer_max [m]
EEDI Margin

4 6.7

3
6.6
2

1 6.5

0
1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 6.4
DWT [t] 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300
DWT [t]
Fig.13: EEDI Phase II and III Margin vs. DWT for vessels
Fig.15: Steering Criterion: max wave height vs. DWT
with smaller engine, selected for a service speed of 21.6kn

On the other hand, and in contrast to what was observed for CONCLUSIONS
other ship types, compliance with the SHOPERA criteria
for manoeuvrability in adverse weather conditions was A parametric model for the design of RoPax ships has been
easily achieved. The same conclusion was derived by all developed, to be used for the investigation of the impact of
optimization studies for RoPax ships that were carried out, EEDI and of the ability of ships designed to meet Phase II
regardless of their size. This of course was not an and III requirements to operate safely in adverse conditions.
unexpected result, since RoPax ships are highly powered in This parametric model has been used to perform a series of
comparison with other types of ships of equal displacement. formal optimization studies of RoPax ships of various sizes.
Even the designs with reduced service speed of 21.6 kn, Results from the optimization study of a small RoPax ship
complying with EEDI Phase III, had enough power to indicated that compliance with EEDI Phase II requirement
ensure manoeuvrability in adverse weather conditions. was quite demanding, as most of the unfeasible designs
Calculations performed with only one propeller in operation, failed to satisfy this criterion. In order to comply with EEDI
in order to verify redundancy of the propulsion system, and Phase III requirement, the design speed should be reduced
assuming a 30% reduction of the propeller thrust to account by more than 2 kn, a reduction that would have a significant
for ship motions, unsteady conditions and propeller racing, impact on the selected operational scenario, unless
indicated that all feasible designs were able to achieve 12 systematic hullform and propeller optimization, energy
kn at bow waves with a significant wave height of 4.0 m saving devices and waste heat recovery systems, alternative
(see Fig. 14). The propulsion criterion plotted in this figure fuels or other technological advances might help to achieve
corresponds to the ratio of the required to the available Phase III requirements without the need of significant
propulsion power; therefore, values less than 1.0 indicate compromises with respect to service speed.
compliance with the criterion. With both propellers in On the other hand, and in contrast to what was observed for
operation, even with a 50% reduction of thrust, all feasible other ship types (especially bulkers and tankers), systematic
designs could still achieve 12 kn at a significant wave calculations for RoPax ships regardless of size indicated
height of 5.5 m. The maximum wave height for which that compliance with the SHOPERA criteria for
compliance with the steering criterion was obtained is manoeuvrability in adverse weather conditions was easily
shown in Fig. 15. Once again, the presented results are achieved. This was not an unexpected result, since RoPax
obtained with one propeller in operation, and assuming a ships are highly powered in comparison with other types of
30% reduction of the propeller thrust. ships of equal displacement.

83
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS UNCTAD (2015) Review of Maritime Transport 2015,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
The authors acknowledge the contributions of all http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2015_en.pdf
SHOPERA partners and of numerous researchers who
contributed to the work presented herein. The work NAPA Software, NAPA Oy, https://www.napa.fi/
presented in this paper is partly supported by the
Collaborative Project SHOPERA (Energy Efficient Safe CAESES Software, FRIENDSHIP SYSTEMS,
SHip OPERAtion), Grant Agreement number 605221, https://www.caeses.com/
co-funded by the Research DG of the European
Commission within the RTD activities of the FP7 Thematic
Priority Transport, FP7-SST-2013-RTD-1, Activity 7.2.4
Improving Safety and Security, SST.2013.4-1: Ships in
Operation. The European Community and the authors
shall not in any way be liable or responsible for the use of
any knowledge, information or data of the present paper, or
of the consequences thereof. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessary reflect
the views and policies of the European Community.

REFERENCES

Brix, J. (1993), Manoeuvring Technical Manual,


Seehafen Verlag

Holtrop, J. (1984), A statistical re-analysis of resistance


and propulsion data, Int. Shipbuilding Progress, vol. 31,
No 363, p. 272-276

Papanikolaou, A. (2010), Holistic ship design


optimization, Journal of Computer-Aided Design, vol.
42 pp 1028-1044

Papanikolaou, A., Zaraphonitis, G., Bitner-Gregersen, E.,


Shigunov, V., El Moctar, O., Guedes Soares, C.,
Devalapalli, R., Sprenger, F. (2015), Energy Efficient
Safe Ship Operation (SHOPERA), Proc. 4th World
Maritime Technology Conference

Shigunov, V. and Papanikolaou, A. (2014), Criteria for


minimum powering and maneuverability in adverse
weather conditions, 14th Int. Ship Stability Workshop
(ISSW 2014), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Shigunov, V., Papanikolaou, A. and Chroni, D. (2016),


Maneuverability in Adverse Conditions: Assessment
Framework and Examples, Proc. 15th Int. Ship Stability
Workshop, Stockholm, Sweden

IMO (2002) Standards for ship manoeuvrability, Res.


MSC.137(76)

OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry


(STI), Council Working Party on Shipbuilding,
Compensated Gross ton (CGT) System,
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydoc
umentpdf/?cote=C/WP6(2006)7&docLanguage=En

Third IMO GHG Study (2014),


http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pollution
Prevention/AirPollution/Pages/Greenhouse-Gas-Studies-
2014.aspx

84
Statistical Analysis on Parametric Roll Groups Detected by
IR-HHT Method in Irregular Head Seas
Liwei Yu1,2, Ning Ma 1,2,3, Yoshiaki Hirakawa3,4
1. State Key Laboratory of Ocean Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
2. Collaborative Innovation Center for Advanced Ship and Deep-Sea Exploration (CISSE),
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
3 Institute of Advanced Sciences, Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan
4 Systems Design for Ocean-Space, Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan

ABSTRACT practical non-ergodicity of parametric roll is one of the


governing factors in statistical post-processing of paramet-
Sufficient test time or enough repeated tests are ric roll based the numerical simulation results. It was also
needed for statistical post-processing of parametric roll suggested that 1220 repeated tests are needed for detailed
which has practical non-ergodicity. However, long test analysis of parametric roll in random seas. Bulian et al.
time or many repeated tests are time-consuming espe- (2006) also confirmed by a comprehensive theoretical, nu-
cially for model experiments. A new technique is de- merical and experimental study that the parametric roll
veloped to reveal more efficiently the statistical process is practically non-ergodic and long test time is
properties of parametric roll in irregular waves. needed to achieve the convergence on temporal average
which is probably impracticable. Furthermore Bulian et
The time frequency analysis method, Hilbert
al.(2008) investigated the influence of the initial conditions,
Huang Transform (HHT), is applied on the simu- the problem of the length of the initial stochastic transient,
lated parametric roll records to obtain the the dispersion in the estimated statistical characteristic of
time-dependent instantaneous frequency. Based on measured processes based on the experimental results.
the time-dependent instantaneous frequency, the Large uncertainty was observed from time histories for roll,
roll motion groups where parametric roll occurs in especially when the environmental conditions are close to
the records are picked up. Then the statistical the parametric roll stability boundaries. Umeda et al. (2012)
analysis is conducted on these groups which con- conducted model experiments of a car carrier with many
tain most of the roll energy. Results show that the realizations for longtime duration to establish guideline
new technique can obtain a faster convergence on the specifications for model experiment and numerical simula-
running standard deviation of different roll realizations tion of parametric rolling in irregular waves. It was sug-
comparing to the original one. gested that around 12-realizations and more than 360 en-
counter wave cycles should be used in model experiments.
For cases close to the threshold for parametric rolling, ac-
INTRODUCTION curate estimation is difficult. Kim et al. (2011) conducted a
systematic study on the sensitivity of simulation results to
Parametric roll is a self-resonant roll motion phenome- some parameters of parametric roll in irregular waves. It
non with strong nonlinearity. The large roll angle in para- was found that the statistical properties of parametric roll in
metric roll can cause huge cargo damages and losses. Its irregular waves are highly sensitive on simulation time
mechanism in regular waves has been well addressed by window, the discretization of wave spectrum in irregular
both numerical simulations (Umeda et al. 2004; Bulian wave and motion simulation.
2005; Neves et al. 1999; Spanos & Papanikolaou 2007; Past researches conclude that large number of repeated
Hashimoto & Umeda 2010) and model experiments tests are needed for the statistical analysis of parametric roll
(Spanos & Papanikolaou 2009; Hashimoto et al. 2006; in random seas. Parametric roll in irregular waves comes
Hashimoto et al. 2007). and goes and has a so-called grouping phenomenon
However, parametric roll in the random seas is a phe- (Belenky et al. 2003; Bulian et al. 2006). In irregular waves,
nomenon with unique statistical properties. It has been con- parametric roll will happen under a certain wave group and
firmed by researchers through numerical simulations and then disappear. It is anticipated that the statistical properties
model experiments that parametric rolling in irregular are easier to converge for the roll motion groups where
waves has practical non-ergodicity, due to the nonlinearity parametric roll occurs and most of the roll energy is con-
on roll motion, the multi-direction and groupness property ceived. Thus by analyzing solely on the roll motion groups
of irregular waves. Belenky et al (2003) pointed out that

85
where parametric roll occurs, the number of the repeated In the statistical analysis, the running standard devia-
tests may be reduced and the statistical properties of para- tion(STD) of the ith record is calculated as:

( X (t ) X (t ) )
metric roll can be obtained more efficiently. n 2

( tn ) j =1
In this paper, the parametric roll records in irregular i j i n
2
= (1)
heading waves are obtained by numerical simulations on a n 1
3100TEU containership using a 6-DOF weakly nonlinear where n is the number of record points up to the time, tn.
unified model accounting for non-linear restoring and X i (tn ) is the mean of the ith record up to tn. The ensemble
Froude-Krylov forces, maneuvering motion, rudder and
averages of the running standard deviations of all the 20
propeller hydrodynamics (Yu et al. 2012). Based on the
records are calculated to check for the convergence.
parametric roll detection approach proposed by Yu et al.
(2016), the groups where parametric roll occurs in the rec-
ord are picked out. Then the statistical analysis is conducted
on these groups which contain most of the roll energy.
Through this new technique, the statistical properties of
parametric roll are expected to be revealed more efficiently
comparing to the conventional one.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BY CONVENTIONAL


TECHNIQUE

The statistical analysis of parametric roll simulation records


by the conventional technique is carried out firstly. The
simulation cases and statistical analysis methodology are
described.

Simulation Cases
Fig.1 Samples of simulation records with a duration of
The 6-DOF unified model coupling both sea-keeping and 1800s
maneuvering motion proposed by Yu et al. (2012) are used
to obtain the parametric roll simulation records of a
3100TEU containership in irregular heading waves. The
model was validated by model experiments to simulate
parametric roll in head sea. Main particulars of the contain-
ership are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Main particulars of 3100TEU containership


3100 TEU Containership
Length between per-pendiculars, Lpp(m) 214.2
Breadth, B(m) 32.2
Depth, D(m) 18.8
Fore draft, df(m) 11.49
Aft draft, da(m) 12.31
Displacement(t) 55633
Metacentric height, GM(m) 0.85
Block coefficient, CB 0.668
Radius of gyration, roll, kxx(m) 7.09
Radius of gyration, pitch(yaw), kyy(kzz)(m) 53.6 Fig.2 Running STD (colored thin solid line) of the roll (up)
Roll natural period, Troll (s) 18.85 and pitch (down) motion of the 20 records
Service Speed, V (kn) 22.5
The irregular heading waves are obtained using the
JONSWAP spectrum with significant wave height Hs=5m
and Tp=15.3s. Totally 20 simulation records each with a
duration of 1800s are obtained from numerical simulations
under the same condition with different random seeds. The
time duration of 1800s i.e. 0.5 hour is normally enough for
the conventional seakeeping statistical analysis and longer
than the time duration that model experiments can achieve
without wave reflection.

Statistical Analysis Methodology

86
Fig.3 Probability plot for the normal distribution (solid line)
of the roll (left) and pitch (right) motion of the 20 records
The running STDs and their ensemble average of roll and
pitch motions for all the 20 records are plotted in Fig.2 with
colored thin solid line. As shown in the figure, the running
STDs of pitch motion converge to the ensemble average.
Thus the pitch motion in irregular wave is ergodic process
with practical accuracy. However, the running STDs of roll
motion do not converge to the ensemble average with sig-
nificant dispersion. Moreover, the probability plots for
normal distribution of roll motion in Fig.3 also show large
dispersion among different records. These results indicate
that the temporal average obtained from a limited time rec- Fig.6 Running STD of merged records with eight records of
ord cannot converge to the ensemble average. Thus it is the roll motions
concluded (as expected) that parametric roll in irregular
waves is a practically non-ergodic process. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BY THE NEW TECHNIQUE
In order to find out the numbers of repeated records
needed for the convergence of roll motion STD, the running Given that large number of repeated tests are still diffi-
STD of the merged records are calculated and presented in cult sometimes especially for model experiments, the new
Fig.4,5 and 6. The merged record is defined as the combi- technique is developed to reduce the number of tests re-
nation of records randomly selected from the total 20 rec- quired. In this new technique, The parametric roll detection
ords. From the figures, it is found that the convergence of approach based on the incremental real-time Hilbert-Huang
running STD is improved as the number of merged records transform (IR-HHT) method proposed by Yu et al. (2016)
increasing. When 8 records or more are merged, the disper- are used to pick out the groups where parametric roll occurs.
sion becomes steady and can still be as large as 20% as The IR-HHT method can obtain the time-dependent instan-
shown in Fig.6. taneous frequency. In the instantaneous frequency as shown
in Fig.7, there is a frequency shift before and after the onset
of parametric roll. Based on this frequency shift, the
groups where parametric roll occurs in the record can be
detected. The detection results of record #1 and #6 are
demonstrated in Fig.7 and 8.

Fig.4 Running STD of merged records with four records of


the roll motions

Fig.7 Groups where parametric roll occurs for simulation


record #1 (up: roll motion, down: instantaneous frequency)

Fig.5 Running STD of merged records with six records of


the roll motions

Fig.8 Groups where parametric roll occurs for simulation


record #6 (up: roll motion, down: instantaneous frequency)

87
During the statistical analysis, the groups where para-
metric roll occurs within one record are combined together
to the new record. Thus 20 new records are formed. The
time durations of the 20 new records are not the same. The
running STDs of roll motion for all the 20 new records are
shown in Fig.9. In records #3, #5 and #7 shown as thick
solid black line in Fig.9, because parametric roll happens
for very short time, the dispersion of these three records is
larger than that of the other records. Except for records #3,
#5 and #7 as shown in Fig.9, the dispersion on the running
STDs of roll motion of the new records is much smaller
than that of the original records in Fig.2. This is further
confirmed by the probability plot presented in Fig.10. Other
than records #3, #5 and #7 which are of very short time
duration, the probability plots of all the other records con-
verge very well with the normal distribution.
Moreover, the ensemble average of the original records
in Fig.2 is plotted in Fig.9. It shows that the running STDs
of the new records is larger than that of the original records.
Because in the new records, the parts where roll angle is
small are eliminated.
Furthermore, the running STD of the merged records are
calculated and presented in Fig.11, 12 and 13. From the Fig.10 Probability plot (solid line) for the normal distribu-
figures, it is found that the convergence of running STD is tion of the new records
improved as the number of merged records increasing.
However, the dispersion can be about 12% when 8 records
are combined as shown in Fig.13. Comparing to the results
in Fig.4,5 and 6 of the original records, the records obtained
based on the new approach converge faster as the number
of merged records increasing, and the dispersion on roll
running STD for the new records are smaller.
Therefore, it is concluded that the new statistical analysis
approach which deals only with the groups where paramet-
ric roll occurs can obtain a faster convergence and smaller
dispersion among the roll running STDs of all the records.
Hence, the number of repeated tests needed for the statisti-
cal analysis of parametric roll can be reduced.
Fig.11 Running STD (colored thin solid line) of merged
records with four records of the roll motions

Fig.9 Running STD (colored thin solid line) of the roll mo-
tion of the 20 records

Fig.12 Running STD (colored thin solid line) of merged


records with six records of the roll motions

88
application to parametric roll in longitudinal long
crested irregular sea". Ocean Engineering, 33(8),
pp.10071043.
Bulian, G. et al., 2008. "Qualitative and quantitative
characteristics of parametric ship rolling in random
waves in the light of physical model experiments".
Ocean Engineering, 35(17), pp.16611675.
Hashimoto, H. et al., 2006. "Experimental and numerical
studies on parametric roll of a post-panamax container
ship in irregular waves". In 9th Int. Conf. on the
Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. pp. 181190.
Hashimoto, H., Umeda, N. and Sakamoto, G., 2007.
"Head-sea parametric rolling of a car carrier". In 9th
Fig.13 Running STD (colored thin solid line) of merged Int. Ship Stability Workshop, Hamburg, Germany. pp.
records with eight records of the roll motions 3031.
Hashimoto, H. and Umeda, N., 2010. "A study on
CONCLUSIONS quantitative prediction of parametric roll in regular
waves". In 11th Int. Ship Stability Workshop.
In order to reveal the statistical properties of parametric Wageningen, Nether- lands, pp. 295301.
roll more efficiently, a new approach for the statistical Kim, Y. et al., 2011. "On Uncertainty in numerical analysis
analysis of parametric roll in irregular waves is proposed. of parametric roll" . In 12th Int. Ship Stability
The new approach deals only with the groups where para- Workshop. Washington DC, USA.
metric roll occurs. These groups are picked out using the Neves, M.A.S., Prez, N.A. and Valerio, L., 1999. "Stability
parametric roll detection scheme based on IR-HHT. of small fishing vessels in longitudinal waves". Ocean
Through the comparison on the roll running STDs and Engineering, 26(12), pp.13891419.
probability plots between the conventional technique and Spanos, D. and Papanikolaou, A., 2007. "Numerical
the newly proposed one, it is concluded that the new tech- simulation of parametric roll in head seas". Int.
nique can obtain a faster convergence and smaller disper- Shipbuilding Progress, 54(4), pp.249267.
sion among the roll running STDs of all the records, despite Spanos, D. and Papanikolaou, A., 2009. "SAFEDOR
some records with small duration of time for parametric roll. international benchmark study on numerical
The number of repeated tests needed for the statistical simulation methods for the prediction of parametric
analysis of parametric roll can be reduced by this new tech- rolling of ships in wave". NTUA-SDL Report, Rev, 4.
nique. Umeda, N. et al., 2004. "Nonlinear dynamics on parametric
However, the new technique shows its advantage in this roll resonance with realistic numerical modeling". Int.
specific numerical simulation condition of the 3100TEU Shipbuilding Progress, 51(2), pp.205220.
containership. Its effectiveness on other numerical simula- Umeda, N. et al., 2012. "Estimation of parametric roll in
tion conditions as well as model experiment results of par- random seaways". In Parametric Resonance in
ametric roll is still needed to be confirmed in the future Dynamical Systems. pp. 4559.
work. Yu, L., Ma, N. and Gu, X., 2012. "Study on parametric roll
and its rudder stabilization based on unified
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS seakeeping and maneuvering model". In 11th Int. Conf.
on the Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles. Greece.
The present study is supported by the National Natural Yu, L., Ma, N. and Gu, X., 2016. "Early detection of
Science Foundation of China (NSFC) research project: No. parametric roll by application of the incremental
51579144 and the Institute of Advanced Sciences in Yoko- real-time Hilbert Huang Transform". Ocean
hama National University Engineering, pp.224236.

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Belenky, V., Weems, K.M. and Pauling, J.R., 2003.


"Probabilistic analysis of roll parametric resonance in
head seas". In 8th Int. Conf. on the Stability of Ships
and Ocean Vehicles. pp. 325349.
Bulian, G., 2005. "Nonlinear parametric rolling in regular
wavesa general procedure for the analytical
approximation of the GZ curve and its use in time
domain simulations". Ocean Engineering, 32(34),
pp.309330.
Bulian, G., Francescutto, A. and Lugni, C., 2006.
"Theoretical, numerical and experimental study on the
problem of ergodicity and 'practical ergodicity' with an

89
Subdivision Optimization of LNG Fueled RoPax Ship
Teemu Manderbacka, Pekka Ruponen, Daniel Lindroth, Markus Tompuri
NAPA, Finland, teemu.manderbacka@napa.fi, pekka.ruponen@napa.fi, daniel.lindroth@napa.fi, markus.tompuri@napa.fi

ABSTRACT LNG into use (Acciaro et al. 2013). Regulation and cost are
also perceived as barriers.
Stricter requirements imposed on ships through The number of LNG fueled RoPax vessels is still rela-
emission control areas (ECA) can be fulfilled by using tively low, only a couple are currently in operation. How-
LNG as fuel. Low flashpoint fluids onboard have raised ever, several RoPax newbuilding projects are LNG fueled
some concerns with respect to the safety level, especially or LNG-ready vessels. Altogether, the number of LNG
on passenger vessels. In addition, recently revised SO- fueled vessels worldwide is rising, there are 162 confirmed
LAS regulations pose more stringent requirements to LNG ship fuel projects worldwide (DNVGL 2016). Special
the survivability of ships in case of damages involving attention in the design of an LNG fueled ship must be paid.
flooding of a ro-ro space. The number of LNG fueled The new mandatory code for ships fueled by gases or other
ships is increasing and new projects are initiated. Due to low-flashpoint fuels was adopted by IMO in June 2015
fairly new development towards LNG fueled ships, de- (IMO, 2015). The International Code of Safety for Ships
signers are still lacking extensive experience and using Gases or other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code) will
knowledge on the restrictions and possibilities for LNG enter into force on 1 January 2017. The IGF Code contains
fueled ship. The designer is also faced with an additional mandatory provisions for the arrangement, installation,
challenge of safe positioning of the LNG tanks. An op- control and monitoring of machinery, equipment and sys-
timal subdivision of an LNG fueled ship is studied by tems using low-flashpoint fuels. LNG bunker tanks are
applying a multi-objective genetic algorithm. The study spherical and insulated, and they occupy roughly twice the
concentrates on feasible design alternatives of an LNG space occupied by fuel oil, when the regulatory constraints
RoPax in order to obtain a design with a good safety are taken into account (Eide DNVreport 2010).
level in case of damage. Calculations are performed ac- Large void spaces would be required between the LNG
cording to the SOLAS2009 and accounting for the Wa- tanks and the ship side shell. Asymmetric flooding in case of
ter-on-Deck effects (Stockholm Agreement). side breaches can be avoided by equalization of floodwater be-
tween void spaces through a cross-flooding duct. Several new
cruise ships have been built with void spaces or double skin
INTRODUCTION around the engine room compartments, after the Costa
Concordia accident. Because of this recent trend, it was
Ship designers are facing stricter requirements with re- decided to study also if a similar design would improve the
spect to the environmental impact and safety. Emissions of safety level of the RoPax ship. Besides the void spaces
exhaust gases are limited in the densely operated special around the LNG tanks and the engine rooms, damage sta-
Emission Control Areas (ECA). Moreover, the require- bility is also dependent on the subdivision i.e. the locations
ments for Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) must be of the longitudinal or transversal bulkheads, and the vertical
taken into account. In addition, recently revised SOLAS position of the decks.
regulations pose more stringent requirements to the surviv- Optimization studies can be performed to increase the
ability of ships in case of damages involving flooding of a general safety level without compromising the operational
ro-ro space. requirements of the ship design. Lyu et al. (2015) studied
Significant reductions in the emissions of NOx, SOx subdivision of a damaged military ship by applying genetic
and CO2 can be reached by using LNG (Burel et al. 2013). algorithm to optimize transversal bulkheads positions. Ge-
Requirements imposed on ships in the emission control netic algorithms have been applied in several studies aim-
areas can be fulfilled by using LNG as fuel. With respect to ing to optimize ship design (Turkmen and Turan 2007, Pa-
the energy efficiency, an LNG fueled RoPax can achieve a panikolaou et al. 2010, Boulougouris et al. 2011, Kout-
significant advantage of ~ 26 % better EEDI than the one roukis et al. 2014). In the present study the starting point is
powered by fuel oil (GasPax 2013). However, low flash- an initial design with a suitable hull form and cargo capaci-
point fluids onboard have raised some concerns with re- ty. The target is to optimize the watertight subdivision in
spect to the safety level, especially on passenger vessels. order to maximize the attained subdivision index of SOLAS.
The shipping companies still perceive the possible impacts Parametric ship model created with NAPA software has
on safety as one of the important barriers impeding to take been applied in previous studies combined together with an
external optimization tools (Boulougouris et al. 2004, Pa-

90
panikolaou et al. 2010, Puisa et al. 2010, Zaraphonitis et al. The following geometrical constraints are applied:
2012, 2013). In this study optimization is performed apply- hull form and displacement are kept constant
ing genetic algorithm combined with a parametric model of The total volume of LNG tanks must be at least
the ship, both, the genetic algorithm, and the parametric 600 m3
model are implemented and run in the NAPA software. The total volume of MDO tanks must be at least
600 m3
PARAMETRIC MODEL OF A ROPAX SHIP There must be two engine room compartments
with a minimum length of 13.9 m, in order to ac-
The case study ship is a large RoPax ship for short in- commodate the main engines
ternational routes, e.g. in the Baltic Sea, Fig. 1. The ship If these criteria are not met, the design is considered to
has two vehicle decks for trucks and trailers. The main di- be unfeasible.
mensions are listed in Table 1. The ship has dual fuel en-
gines, and in addition to LNG the ship is equipped with
MDO (Marine Diesel Oil) tanks.

Fig.1. LNG fueled RoPax

Table 1. Main dimensions


Gross tonnage (approx.) 45 000
Length over all 215 m
Breadth 30.0 m
Design draft 6.5 m
Service speed 22 kn
Passengers 2000
Crew 250
Fig. 2. Original subdivision and the design variables
Lifeboat capacity (N1) 1000
No. of persons in addition (N2) 1250 IGF CODE
Lane meters (approx.) 2 300
The allowed location of the LNG tanks is limited by the
A parametric 3D model of the ship was created with the IGF Code (IMO, 2015). This restricts both the double bot-
NAPA software. The following design variables were used: tom height and the width of the U-voids around the tanks.
transverse bulkheads (13 bulkheads) The tanks should be located at a minimum distance of B/5
longitudinal bulkheads around the LNG tanks or 11.5 m, whichever is less inboard from the ship side,
double bottom height where B is breadth. The distance of the fuel tanks from the
main deck height (freeboard) bottom should be at least B/15 or 2.0 m. The size of the
double skin around the engine room compartments tanks and the required protective distances from the side
(yes/no) and bottom bring additional requirements for the designer
to take into account with respect to the subdivision and
Altogether the design variables result in 18 parameters. damage stability of the ship.
Table 2 gives initial values, variation range, and variation
steps of the parameters. The parameters are illustrated in DAMAGE STABILITY CALCULATIONS
Fig. 2 along with the subdivision of the initial design.
The damage stability is calculated according to SOLAS
Table 2. Design variables II-1 Part II-1 Reg. 7. There is lifeboat capacity to all per-
variable initial variation variation sons onboard, and thus the required subdivision index is R
value range (m) step (m) = 0.793302.
(m) The damages up to 6 zones are calculated since longer
transverse bulkheads -2.4 2.4 0.8 damages would likely not contribute to the attained subdi-
LNG U-void width 6.6 6.6 8.0 0.2 vision index.
double bottom height 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.1 The proposed changes regarding flooding of ro-ro spac-
(positive upwards) es are applied, so that the s-factor, representing the surviva-
main deck height i.e. 9.7 -0.2 0.4 0.1 bility of a damage case, is calculated as:
freeboard (positive 1

upwards) GZ max range 4


s final = K (1)
ER double skin 2.4 1.0 4.5 0.7 TGZ max Trange
width

91
where GZmax is limited to TGZmax and range is limited Effect of air compression in a large void space can be
to Trange. If the damage case involves a ro-ro space significant, Ruponen et al. (2013). In this study the cross-
TGZmax = 0.20 m and Trange = 20, otherwise TGZmax = flooding calculations are done according to IMO Resolution
0.12 m and Trange = 16. MSC.362(92), IMO (2013), specifying that air compression
The effect of the heel angle is accounted with the co- effects must be accounted if the air pipe area is less than
efficient: 10% of the cross-flooding device area. However, excessive
air pipes are not feasible since they would take too much
space from the vehicle decks. The pressure losses in the
15
K= (2) cross-flooding duct are accounted for with the so-called
15 7 k-sum parameter in the simplified method in MSC.362(92).
The paragraph 3.2 of the Resolution provides a very simple
when the heeling angle is between 7 and 15. With method for estimation of the restrictive effect of air pres-
smaller heel angles K = 1 and if the heeling exceeds 15 sure on the cross-flooding. This approach is fast to evaluate
then K = 0. and thus suitable for an optimization study. In practice the
The attained subdivision index for the initial design is effective total k-value for the cross-flooding device is:
0.830993, which is larger than R-index, thus making the 2
S
original design feasible. k e = k w + k a a w (3)
There are also special requirements concerning passen- w Sa
ger ship stability, namely Reg. 8.1 for damage in the for-
ward part and Reg. 8.2 for minor side damages. In addition, where kw is the k-sum for the cross-flooding device
there are requirements for bottom damages, Reg. 9. For the (water) and ka is the effective k-sum for the air pipe. The
studied ship design this is fulfilled by ensuring a minimum applied water density w = 1025 kg/m3 and air density a =
double bottom height of 1.5 m throughout the length of the 1.225 kg/m3. Sw and Sa are the effective area of the
ship. cross-flooding device and air pipe.
The studied ship is intended to operate in Europe, and Time-domain simulation would provide more realistic
thus the so-called Stockholm Agreement, EC (2003), for results, Ruponen et al. (2012), but the simplified method in
accumulation of water on the main vehicle deck needs to be MSC.362(92) is considered to be more suitable for optimi-
fulfilled. This study concentrates on the subdivision opti- zation calculations.
mization during the initial design, and therefore the three The effective total area of a cross-flooding device is ap-
initial conditions of SOLAS are used instead of the real proximately:
loading conditions. Unrestricted operational area is as- S w = 0.35L zone H db (4)
sumed and the applied significant wave height is 4 m.
where Lzone is the length of the zone and Hdb is the
CROSS-FLOODING height of double bottom from the baseline.
The k-sum for water flow in the cross-flooding devices
The LNG tanks need to be protected by large voids, and is estimated based on the length of the duct:
the IGF Code (IMO, 2015) requires a distance of at least k w = N 1.778 (5)
B/5 to hull surface. The side effect of large voids is the risk where N is the number of longitudinal girders in the
of asymmetric flooding and large transient heeling that duct:
must be equalized rapidly with the use of effective L
cross-flooding devices. This needs to be included in the N = int duct + 1 (6)
3Llfr
optimization process since the designs with slow
cross-flooding are not feasible. For the cross-flooding cal- where Llrf = 0.7 m is the longitudinal frame spacing.
culations the U-voids are divided into two parts at center- For the effect of air pipes a constant value ka = 3.0 is as-
line, the cross-flooding duct is modelled as shown in Fig. 3. sumed as an initial assumption, based on the CFD analyses
for a typical air pipe configuration with free discharge,
Ruponen et al. (2012).
The maximum feasible total air pipe size for each side
of one void is considered to be Sa = 0.4 m2, which corre-
sponds to 2 pieces of circular pipes with inner diameter of
about 500 mm.

A-CLASS BULKHEADS

The A-class fireproof bulkheads can seriously restrict


the flooding, and thus they must be accounted for in the
damage stability calculations. Alternative approaches for
this have been studied and compared by Ruponen and
Lindroth (2016).
In this study the A-class structures are accounted for by
Fig. 3. Modelling of cross-flooding ducts in the U-void calculating all possible combinations of intermediate
around the LNG tanks flooding stages, by considering the A-class bulkheads either
to collapse immediately or to remain practically watertight.

92
With this approach the number of alternative intermediate damages, and therefore it is checked first. The whole opti-
stages of flooding increases enormously as the function of mization procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5.
the number of modelled A-class bulkheads. Therefore, in
the subdivision optimization it is reasonable to keep the
model as simplified as possible, Fig. 4. The final compli- Design variation
ance of the regulations can be done with the selected opti-
mal subdivision, using time-domain simulation in order to
ensure realistic treatment of various non-watertight struc- Check geometry failed
constraints
tures inside the watertight compartments. ok

Multi Obejctive Genetic Algorithm Optimization


failed
Check IGF code

ok

Update CoG and


initial conditions

failed
Check Reg. 8.1

Fig. 4. Modelled A-class bulkheads (marked with red) ok


failed
Check Reg. 8.2
WEIGHT AND CENTER OF GRAVITY
ok
The above mentioned damage stability calculations re- Check Stockholm failed
quire the definition of initial conditions for the deepest sub- Agreement
ok
division draught DS, lightest service draft DL, and a partial
subdivision draught DP. Since the hull form, lightship and SOLAS 2009
index calculation
the total deadweight are kept constant, the draughts of the
initial conditions are also constant. However, the location
of the bulkheads, the tank top and the bulkhead deck are Fig. 5. Optimization process
varied in the optimization process. Naturally this affects
also the center of gravity of the ship, which must be ac- RESULTS
counted for in the damage stability calculations.
A simplified approach is adopted, and it is assumed that Altogether 2673 number of designs were generated by
the changes in the subdivision affect only the vertical center the optimization algorithm of which 226 were considered
of gravity. When the height of the bulkhead deck (main feasible. 115 without double skin and 111 with double skin.
vehicle deck) is changed, also the upper vehicle deck needs Majority of non-feasible designs were ruled out by the ge-
to be correspondingly changed, and this must be included in ometry or IGF-Code checks. The total computation time for
the estimation of the changed vertical center of gravity. For the optimization process was about two days on a single
the other decks in the superstructure it is assumed that the computer.
changes are minimal and can be arranged by changing the There are two groups of designs, namely the ones with-
free height of the passenger areas. out side voids and the ones with side voids around the en-
For the initial conditions DS and DP also the change in gine rooms. Higher A-indices are obtained for designs
the vertical center of gravity for the deadweight must be without the side voids than for the designs with side voids.
accounted when the main deck location is changed. Moreover there is less scatter in A-index for the designs
without the side void. Some of the generated designs with
OPTIMIZATION PROCESS side void reach nearly as high A-indices as the ones without
the voids, however in general the designs with the side void
The number of design variables is large, and there is no have poorer A-indices. Fig. 6.
direct information about the mathematical behavior of the Increasing the height of the bulkhead deck i.e. the
objective space of the watertight subdivision of a ship re- freeboard height improves A-index. On the other hand,
garding the attained subdivision index. There are conflict- increasing the tanktop height has the opposite effect on the
ing objectives and constraints, and therefore, adoption of A-index. Increasing the vertical positions of the decks in-
Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) appears to be creases KG, this seems to have negative effect with respect
the only solution to the set optimization problem, Sen and to the tanktop position, however for the bulkhead deck the
Yang (1998). positive effect of increased freeboard height results in total
The optimization objectives are to maximize attained for improved A-index. Looking at the combined effect
subdivision index A and to minimize the required GMmin namely the distance between the bulkhead deck and the
according to the Stockholm Agreement. The order of com- tanktop improves A-index, see Fig. 6.
pliance checks is based on the required computational time. Location of the longitudinal bulkheads around LNG
The fastest checks to calculate are performed first, so that tanks was varied, its effect does not seem to play an im-
non-feasible designs are ruled out quickly, in this way ex- portant role for the values of A-index, see Fig. 7.
tensive calculations are not performed for non-feasible de-
signs. For example, the Reg. 8.1 requirement for bow dam-
age is much faster to calculate than the Reg. 8.2 minor

93
8.2 are mainly correlated by the height of the main deck,
no double skin
this is more pronounced for the designs without the side
double skin voids.
optimum design without double skin Two different optimal designs were selected, one with
optimum design with double skin double skin in the engine room compartments and one
initial design without. The selection was based on A-index, but in addi-
0.87
tion it was required that the minimum GM due to Stock-
holm Agreement and Reg. 8.2 had to be less than 2.0 m.
0.86
A-index for the optimal design without double skin is
0.864946 and with double skin 0.866617, i.e. only a mar-
ginal difference. There is a notable improvement in the
0.85
A-index of the optimal designs when compared to the initial
design.
0.84
A-index

0.83 0.87

0.82 0.86

0.81 0.85

0.8
0.84

A-index
7.8 8 8.2 8.4 8.6
distance between maindeck and tanktop (m)
0.83

Fig. 6. A-index versus change of the distance between the


main deck and the tanktop. 0.82
no double skin
double skin
0.81 optimal design without double skin
no double skin
optimal design with double skin
double skin intial design
0.8
optimum design without double skin
1.6 1.8 2 2.2
optimum design with double skin
WOD min GM(m)
initial design
0.87 Fig. 8. Minimum required GM for Water on Deck (Stock-
holm agreement) versus obtained A-index for designs with
0.86 and without side void.

0.85 no double skin


double skin
optimal design without double skin
0.84
A-index

optimal design with double skin


initial design
0.83 0.87

0.82 0.86

0.81 0.85

0.8 0.84
A-index

6.5 7 7.5 8
LNG U-void width (m) 0.83

Fig. 7. A-index vs. U-void width around the LNG tanks. 0.82

With respect to minimum required GM in case of Water 0.81


on Deck (Stockholm agreement) the presence of the side
skin gives slightly smaller limitations than the design with- 0.8
out the double skin, Fig. 8. Designs with double skin are 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
less limited by the deterministic regulation 8.2., for which Reg. 8.2. min GM(m)
smaller minimum GM is allowed than for the designs
without the side skin, see Fig. 9. The requirement of the Fig. 9. Minimum required GM for Reg 8.2 versus obtained
minimum GM set by the Stockholm agreement and the Reg A-index for designs with and without side void.

94
Both optimal designs are compared to the initial design height has a significant effect on damage stability of a
in Figs. 10 and 11. Interestingly, the length and location of RoPax ship.
the main engine rooms is not changed. In the case with the In both optimal designs the LNG tank compartment was
double skin, the width of the void space around the engine shifted one frame (0.8 m) forward and the width of the
room was very small, only 1.0 m. voids around the tanks was increased by 1.0 m. interesting-
The A-index calculation is limited to collision damages, ly, the transverse division of the U-void was in both cases
and thus the double bottom height has no significant effect. shifted from the center of the void to forward.
Including a probabilistic model for grounding damages In addition, in both aft and fore ship several bulkheads
might have led to different results in this respect. In both were shifted, up to 3 frames (2.4 m). Especially in the for-
optimal designs the main deck height has been increased by ward part of the ship the optimal subdivision is notably
0.4 m, i.e. the maximum allowed distance in the optimiza- changed from the initial design.
tion process. This is an expected result since the freeboard

Fig. 10. Comparison of the optimum design without double skin and the initial subdivisions.

Fig. 11. Comparison of the optimum design with double skin and the initial subdivisions.

95
CONCLUSIONS
Burel, F., Taccani, R., Zuliani, N. (2013), Improving sus-
LNG as fuel is a viable option for the fuel of RoPax tainability of maritime transport through utilization of
ships, especially when operating in the emission control Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for propulsion, Energy,
areas. However, the LNG tanks need to protected against Vol. 57, pp.412-420.
both collision and grounding damages. This makes the wa-
tertight subdivision more complex than with the tradition- DNVGL (2016) Full list of LNG vessels in operation and
ally fueled ships. In this study the subdivision of an LNG on order (as of March 2016)
fueled RoPax ship was optimized in order to improve the https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/lngi-business-intelligen
safety of the ship. The A-index of SOLAS2009 was used ce-portal-for-lng-industry.html?utm_source=dnvgl.com
as a measure of the safety level against collision damages. &utm_medium=maritime-hero-area&utm_campaign=lng
In addition, other relevant stability regulations need to be i [Accessed 31 May 2016]
used as constraints. Based on the results, two alternative
optimal subdivision arrangements were selected; one with EC (2003) Directive 2003/25/EC of the European Parlia-
double skin around the engine room compartments and one ment and of the Council of 14 April 2003 on specific
without. stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships
The strict deterministic requirements of the minimum
distance to the hull surface in the IGF Code leave a little Eide, M.S. (2010), Assessment of measures to reduce fu-
room for improved safety level within the probabilistic ture CO2 emissions from shipping, DNV Report,
framework of SOLAS2009. The optimization resulted in www.dnv.com
significantly larger A-index, but most of this improvement
was obtained by increasing the freeboard height and by GasPax (2013) note LNG-fuelled ships - Research find-
finding more optimal locations for the transverse bulkheads. ings: GasPax - LNG for passenger ships, Naval Archi-
The size of the U-void around the LNG tanks had only a tect, (SEP), pp.S24-S25
small effect of the A-index. However, in both of the select-
ed optimal designs the width of the void was increased. IMO (2013), Resolution MSC.362(92): Revised Recom-
Although large voids may cause problems in ensuring fast mendation on a Standard Method for Evaluating
enough cross-flooding, it seems that in the presented case Cross-Flooding Arrangements. Int. Maritime Org., Lon-
asymmetric transient flooding was not a major factor, af- don
fecting the optimal design of the subdivision. However, this
should not be generalized and further research on the topic IMO (2015) Resolution MSC.391(95): International Code
is still needed. of Safety for Ships Using Gases or Other
The double skin around the engine room compartments Low-Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code), Int. Maritime Org.,
did not in general improve the A-index since it increased London.
the asymmetry of flooding. However, for large raking side
damages this kind of arrangement can improve the surviva- Lyu, Z., Ma, K., Liu, F. (2015), Military ships subdivision
bility. However, it is considered to be extremely important optimization for reinforcement of anti-wind capacity af-
to correctly account for cross-flooding devices, including ter damage, J. Marine Science and Technology, Vol.
air pipes, in damage stability calculations already in the 20(3), pp.579-589
initial design phase.
The presented approach for optimizing the subdivision Koutroukis, G., Papanikolaou, A., Nikolopoulos, L., Sames,
of a RoPax ship is a fast and efficient way to improve the P., Kpke, M. (2014), Multi-objective optimization of
safety of the ship in the event of a collision damage. Use of container ship design Proc. IMAM Conf., 1, pp.477-489.
LNG as a fuel introduces new constraints to the optimiza-
tion process, and especially the large voids around the LNG Papanikolaou, A. (2010), Holistic Ship Design Optimiza-
tanks need to be properly accounted for the damage stabil- tion, CAD Computer Aided Design, Vol. 42,
ity calculations. pp.1028-1044. doi:10.1016/j.cad.2009.07.002

REFERENCES Papanikolaou, A., Zaraphonitis, G., Skoupas, S., Boulou-


gouris, E. (2010), An Integrated Methodology for the
Acciario, M., Hoffmann, P.N., Eide M. S. (2013), The Design of Ro-Ro Passenger Ships, Ship Technology
Energy Efficiency Gap in Maritime Transport, J. Ship- Research Vol. 57, pp.24-37.
ping and Ocean Engineering Vol 3, pp 1-10.
Puisa, R., Tsakalakis, N., Vassalos, D. (2010), Reducing
Boulougouris, E., Papanikolaou, A., Pavlou, A. (2011), uncertainty in subdivision optimization, Proc. 4th De-
Energy efficiency parametric design tool in the frame- sign for Safety Conference, Trieste, Italy
work of holistic ship design optimization, J. Engineer-
ing for the Maritime Environment, 225 (3), pp.242-260. Ruponen, P., Queutey, P., Kraskowski, M., Jalonen, R.,
Guilmineau, E. (2012), On the Calculation of
Boulougouris, E.K., Papanikolaou, A.D., Zaraphonitis, G. Cross-Flooding Time, Ocean Engineering Vol. 40,
(2004), Optimization of Arrangements of Ro-Ro Pas- pp.27-39. doi:10.1016/j.oceaneng.2011.12.008
senger Ships with Genetic Algorithms, Ship Technology
Research Vol. 51, pp.99-105.

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Ruponen, P., Kurvinen, P., Saisto, I., Harras, J. (2013), Air
Compression in a Flooded Tank of a Damaged Ship,
Ocean Eng. Vol. 57, pp.64-71.
doi:10.1016/j.oceaneng.2012.09.014

Ruponen, P., Lindroth, D. (2016), Time-Domain Simula-


tion for Regulatory Flooding Analysis, PRADS2016,
Copenhagen, Denmark.

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ti-objective optimisation algorithm and its application to
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pp.21-37

Zaraphonitis, G., Skoupas, S., Papanikolaou, A., Cardinale,


M. (2012), Multi-objective Optimization of ROPAX
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Zaraphonitis, G., Boulougouris, E., Papanikolaou, A.


(2013), Multi-objective Optimization of Cruise ships
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China, pp.89-97.

97
Representing Military Behavior in Naval Ship Evacuation
Simulations including Flooding Damage Scenarios

David L. L. Sicuro1
Jos Marcio Vasconcellos2
Dracos Vassalos3
1
Brazilian Navy Research Institute (IPqM), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil david@ipqm.mar.mil.br
2
Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil jmarcio@ufrj.br
3
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK d.vassalos@strath.ac.uk

ABSTRACT objective is to achieve consistent results in personnel evac-


uation drills in military vessels through an evacuation sim-
The application of simulators, able to represent dif- ulator typically built for passenger ships adapted for this
ferent scenarios, environments and individual charac- different application. This option originated in the absence
teristics of each occupant enable consideration even of of an evacuation simulator developed specifically for mili-
extreme situations involving breach of the vessel exter- tary ships and crew. The steps to achieve this goal are de-
nal boundary, as a result of an accident or indeed war- scribed below and detailed in the body of this paper.
fare. The simulation process is an important decision
support tool to improve the existing evacuation proce- First, the focus is on the understanding of the problem. This
dures in a number of ways. Re-configuration of com- entails characterizing a warship by describing its peculiari-
partments and gateways are examples of design ties and differences in relation to passenger ships in the
measures that could be taken and implemented by using physical, operational and behavioral aspects of her crew.
simulation. Rules and safety guidelines can similarly be Next, we will briefly outline the modeling techniques cur-
developed by a better understanding of the evacuation rently employed for simulators in order to investigate what
process. happens during the evacuation simulation. Subsequently,
we will explain the reasons for the choice of evacuation
This paper addresses the adequacy of a passenger ship simulator to be adapted to contemplate military ships and
simulation system for evacuation of personnel in war- how it was made. Finally, a case study will be presented
ships considering all the specifics of this type of vessel as which will simulate the evacuation of the crew of a Brazil-
well as the individual characteristics of naval crew. The ian Navy Frigate, followed by discussion of the results.
evacuation simulation system that is the object of this
study is Evi, developed at the Department of Naval Ar- UNDERSTANDING MILITARY SHIPS
chitecture and Ocean and Marine Engineering, Univer-
sity of Strathclyde. This examination of suitability in- A warship has several characteristics that differentiate it
volves modeling adjustments to fit the behavior of a from a passenger ship. Below the most important specifics
military crew, changes in the way of modeling the phys- considered for the simulation system adaptation process
ical arrangements and inclusion of new functionalities. will be described.
The results of this process are presented in this paper,
considering a case study including flooding damage
scenarios. Physical Arrangement

A warship has a very characteristic physical arrangement.


INTRODUCTION There is a huge concern for the water tightness of the com-
partments due to the high probability of damage and the
This paper is related to decision support systems using sim- need for keeping survival and functionality intact. The
ulations. This area of research, within the marine engineer- compartments are usually small whilst the corridors are
ing, aims to provide reliable information to assist decision narrow and have well-defined directions of traffic. The type
on the physical configuration of a naval plan and proce- of the passages between compartments is different from a
dures to be adopted by the crew in certain situations. The passenger ship due to concern about the water tightness and

98
the deck change is usually via stairs with high inclination, ment of fires and explosions on offshore oil production fa-
including passage through watertight hatches. cilities. According to this standard, the escape stage is asso-
ciated with the act of the people turn away from an immi-
The physical plant also assumes different configurations nent danger area (fire, smoke, explosion, etc.), heading to a
according to the mode in which the ship is operating. That place where the effects of these hazards are reduced or
is, because of the mandatory closing of doors and hatches in eliminated, but still within the accident scene. The aban-
each mode of operation, ranging from a more relaxed clos- donment stage suggests a change of scenery: to a secure
ing condition "X", inside a harbor in peace time, through situation or even to a secondary risk scenario, for example,
the closing conditions "Y", "Z" to a very restrictive condi- survival at sea, since this second scenario is outside of the
tion known as "Z-NBC" in which the ship is in a scenario of influence of the original accident scenario that caused the
nuclear, biological or chemical warfare. evacuation.

Operational Modes Within a naval context, the situations that lead to the evacu-
ation of the crew of a ship usually result from damage im-
There are numerous modes of operation in a warship. Each posed by the enemy or major incidents such as a fire out of
specific situation represents a different mode of operation. control, a collision or raking/grounding. Searching the ex-
Operations in the port, charge transfer between ships, refu- isting Brazilian Navy's standards and procedures related to
eling maneuvers, a helicopter landing on a flight deck, etc., evacuation, we try to separate this information into the two
will determine a different operating mode. All of this, still phases, escape and abandonment, as the current approach.
under the main condition that defines whether the ship is in
a war or peace scenario. The procedures specifically related to the escape phase are
based on a document called Master Table (CAAML, 2005).
Crew Features The Master Table states that each crew member has its spe-
cific muster station, that is, the nearest possible survival raft
The crew of a warship presents a demographic homogeneity. from the battle station of that person. The Brazilian Navy
In the Brazilian Navy it is always composed of men only, has a policy coming from the US Navy for training its mili-
all of them well trained and knowledgeable of their tasks in tary regarding this escape phase. "Exercise Abandonment
each mode in which the ship is operating. The reaction time Stations" were adapted from US Navy Fleet Exercise Pub-
is very short and age differences usually do not affect the lication 4 (Rev. A) in MOG-S-7-SF section - Preparation
moving speed, which differs drastically from the occupants for Abandon Ship (US Navy, 1993), with the aim of as-
of a passenger ship. In a passenger ship we have from chil- sessing the training of the military at this stage of the vessel
dren to elderly, men and women with different abilities, low evacuation.
ship plant knowledge, and the number of people is general-
ly much larger than a warship. Another unclassified document from Brazilian Navy, "Sur-
vival Guide at Sea" (CAAML, 2007), describes procedures
This demographic homogeneity, however, presents other of the escape and abandonment phases related to three situ-
forms of variation according to the operating mode in ations directly related to the ship buoyancy's reserve and the
which the ship is placed. The positioning on board, the ac- extent of damage: possible, probable and imminent capsize
tivity performed and the level of stress experienced vary or sinking.
greatly depending on the current operating mode. For ex-
ample, the same man who works relaxed in an office com- In the possible capsize/sinking situation, there is no imme-
partment in peace time, in battle stations, will be in charge diate danger of sinking or capsize. In this case, where there
of a 40mm cannon, positioned in the compartment ammu- is the possibility of keeping the ship afloat or save it from
nition under very high stress. the enemy without great risk of loss of life, the Commander
will give the order "Prepare to Abandon ship", "Go to Mus-
Another peculiar feature of a warship is the existence of a ter Stations" and to the GSD, "Take Ship's Control", which
group of highly trained military experts with a great diver- will be disseminated by the media available. The following
sity of skills, known as Group of Salvation and Destruction should be noted: 1) the crew, except the GSD, meets at the
of the ship (GSD). This group represents about 1/3 of the muster stations. The crew with the highest rank in each
ship crew (captain included). It is responsible for trying to group checks for presence and sends the absence list to the
save the ship in extreme situations of damage, when the rest Chief Officer who transfers the list to the Commander. If
of the crew already headed for their abandonment stations, possible, the GSD will attempt the rescue of the absent
or even destroy the ship to make it unusable to the enemy, ones; 2) the crew members who stand in the stations to be
in case of capture, if there is no possibility of salvation. relieved by GSD members should only leave their stations
after the relief. If not relieved, they must remain there and
Evacuation Process incorporate the GSD team; 3) the highest ranked member of
each group chooses 2 men as raft launchers. The specific
The literature related to people evacuation from different procedures for each type of raft are then started; 4) the
types of plants, buildings or ships, uses the word evacuation Chief Officer makes sure that radio equipment and GPS are
as a general term that includes the proceedings of escape placed in each raft; 5) the Navigation Officer spreads by
and abandonment from such facilities. A document that any means available, again and again, the magnetic mark-
distinguishes well these two steps is the ISO 13702 (ISO, ing, the distance from the nearest land, whether friend or
1999), which discusses about the control and extinguish- not, the direction and the wind speed, the direction and the

99
speed of the current, the seawater temperature and the esti- (Xiaoping et al., 2009).
mated survival time in the water, the local depth and the
destruction procedure to be adopted (shallow or deep wa- For example, if the goal is to simulate the physical interac-
ters). The charts and navigation instruments that may be tion between individuals and the physical structure of the
useful must be prepared and shipped to the GSD raft ; 6) environment (for example, a crowd in a stadium forcing a
The GSD continues their effort in an attempt to rescue the fence) the most appropriate technique would be the Social
ship, constantly informing the Commander of the situation ; Forces Models. In this technique, at each time t, the move-
7) if the situation is critical, the Commander will give the ment of each pedestrian is determined by a sum of forces of
order to "Abandon Ship" and to the GSD, "Destroy the attraction and repulsion to other pedestrians and environ-
Ship". Only after the order of "Abandon Ship" is given, that mental elements. This type of modeling is translated by a
survival rafts are launched overboard and personnel embark continuous dynamic system for homogeneous groups on a
them . Rafts intended for the GSD remain tied to the ship microscopic scale (Helbing et al. 1995).
and the others clear away, remaining as close as possible to
each other; 8) the GSD executes the planned actions to de- Cellular Automata Models are discrete dynamical systems
stroy the ship, and each of the members reports "done" to in time and space where the three-dimensional environment
the Commander, then go to the muster stations. After the is represented by a regular grid of cells that can be occupied
destruction of ship by the GSD, the Commander will give by a single individual. Cells may be free (capable of being
the order "GSD - Abandon Ship"; and 9) if the GSD can occupied by someone) or fixedly engaged representing ob-
save the ship after the abandonment of the crew, the captain stacles, walls, etc. The individual walks (or not) from one
will give the order "Re-embark the Crew." The action is grid cell to another, every predetermined time interval, in
coordinated quickly by the staff of the GSD, in order to accordance with the values of variables that are assigned to
restore the priority of the command as soon as possible. each cell and its neighbors, fulfilling predetermined move-
Survival rafts should remain attached to the ship to allow ment rules. The modeling using this technique works on a
their subsequent gathering. microscopic scale of interaction. It can consider both ho-
mogeneous groups of individuals and heterogeneous groups
In the probable capsize/sinking situation, there is no imme- and are used to simulate evacuation in normal situations
diate danger of sinking or capsize, but there is a high prob- and in emergencies (Yang et al., 2005).
ability of the ship sinking or being captured by the enemy,
leaving only the alternative of destroying it. In this case, the Techniques based on fluid dynamics (Fluid-dynamics Mod-
Commander will give the order "Prepare to Abandon Ship", els) describe how the density and velocity of a fluid vary in
"Go to Muster Stations", and "GSD - Destroy the ship", time by partial differential equations. They are continuous
which will be disseminated by the media available. Proce- dynamic systems for homogeneous groups in macroscopic
dures 1 to 5 are the same as described in the situation of scale applied to moving crowds. This type of modeling has
possible sinking. Then, 6 upon receipt of the ready of man- the following assumptions: the movement of pedestrians in
ning the GSD in the muster stations, the Commander will very dense concentrations has characteristics similar to flu-
give the order to "Abandon Ship"; and 7) only after the or- ids in motion and can be described by nonlinear partial dif-
der "Abandon Ship" survival rafts are launched overboard, ferential equations; and, panicked crowds have similar be-
and personnel embark them. Rafts intended for the GSD havior to the turbulence of a fluid on an obstacle or a nar-
remain tied to the ship and the others clear away, remaining row passage (Henderson, 1971).
as close as possible to each other. The action ends with the
same procedure (number 8) of the possible sinking case. There are also techniques such as Lattice Gas Modeling
where each pedestrian is considered an active gas particle
Finally, the imminent sinking situation that is, when there is and the crowd behaves like a gas network in a regular grid
immediate danger of sinking or capsize, the Commander (Fredkin et al., 1982); the Game Theoretical Modeling pro-
will give the order "Abandon Ship" by the media available vides that each member of the game evaluates all available
and all pass the order on. The crew evacuates the ship, and options to achieve a goal and rationally chooses to maxim-
if possible, attends to the procedures used in case of proba- ize success in reaching it (Lo et al., 2006); modeling based
ble sinking. on Behaviors of Animals (like ants), etc. Therefore, each
application will determine which modeling technique
As can be seen from the above description, the procedures should be used.
of escape and abandonment in a military ship has specific
characteristics. The main differences are the action of the The technique that has proven most suitable for evacuation
GSD, the relief of crew members by GSD during the escape drills on board passenger ships is the Agent-Based Models
phase and the organized way in which the movement of the (ABM) (Bonabeau, 2002). They are computer models able
military crew happens. to build complex social structures from the multiplicity of
relatively simple interactions between individuals repre-
MODELING TECHNIQUES sented by virtual agents. In other words, ABM is a compu-
tational model class for the simulation of actions and inter-
Several modeling techniques have been studied in order to actions of autonomous agents in order to evaluate their ef-
represent the pedestrian evacuation of a certain physical fects on the system as a whole, i.e., ABM is a "bottom-up"
space. Depending on the purpose of the study a different process that goes from the simple to the complex. Further,
technique is chosen. Below, we briefly describe the main to approximate the simulation of a real case, the Mon-
characteristics of the most used modeling techniques te-Carlo method is often used to introduce randomness to

100
the process. From this point of view somewhat chaotic, this microscopic and macroscopic, are required for a more real-
type of modeling shows to be extremely suitable for simu- istic representation of the movement of agents in an evacu-
lations of confusion and panic situations precisely because ation simulation (Vassalos et al., 2001). An interesting ap-
of the possibility of the lack of coordination of actions of proach was used by modelling the time discretely and the
agents. ABM is the dynamic interaction of agents with "de- space continuously for the movement of agents, avoiding
cision-making power". It is like having a system based on the usual representation of the environment through a grid.
rules and facts, that is, an expert system "running" in each This approach allows more flexibility in the physical repre-
agent in which we can configure features that can make this sentation of the environment and is particularly suitable for
agent more or less able to deal with a given situation. This environments with small and irregular compartments. An-
interaction can create a complexity that makes the simula- other great feature is the capability of integration of damage
tion system much like reality. Agents, acting as expert sys- scenarios as fire, smoke and flooding.
tems, gain intelligence and purpose in their actions. The
location of each agent, its responsive behavior and purposes Also in 2001, the Korea Research Institute of Ships and
are encoded in the form of non-procedural algorithms in Ocean Engineering (KRISO) and Seoul National University
computer programs. Interestingly, the algorithms that reside (SNU) developed an evacuation model called MonteDEM
on each agent can be different from each other (not only the using the Monte-Carlo method in a probabilistic approach.
parameter settings), turning the agents in real individuals: MonteDEM uses the Fire Safety Evaluation Module
some smarter than others, some more responsive than oth- (FSEM) assessing the safety of fire on ships, calculating the
ers, and so on. probability of having casualties, which was used as a safety
index. Based on Cellular Automata Models, this mesoscop-
CHOOSING THE SIMULATION SYSTEM ic model considered the effect of vessel motion forces in six
degrees of freedom acting on the movement of passengers
The first attempts to develop evacuation systems applied to (Lee et al., 2003). In 2004 the same institutions developed a
marine facilities began with a European community project model called Intelligent Simulation Model for Extrication
called Mustering and Evacuation of Passengers: Scientific (IMEX) for large ships based on ABM, considering the
Basis for Design (MEPdesign) between 1997 and 1999 attributes of individuals and evaluating the evacuation time
(Lee et al., 2003). The EVAC simulation program was de- and the procedures being executed. There were no more
veloped from the knowledge generated in MEPdesign. It recent references related to this work.
had microscopic interaction approach and the initial distri-
bution of the passengers was defined by the user. Using Focusing on three main evacuation systems, which remain
Cellular Automata Models, the movement and the interac- in development until the present day, AENEAS, Evi and
tion between the passengers were simulated without, how- maritimeEXODUS, we can point the main technological
ever, considering the movement of the ship. trends of this research area: use of agent-based modeling
(ABM) to consider the heterogeneity of individuals; devel-
At the same time, the Gerhard-Mercator-University in opment of systems that consider the inherent uncertainty of
Germany in 1999 began the BYPASS project with the ob- human behavior with statistical analysis; use of systems
jective of evaluating the evacuation time on passenger ships that enable the integration of damage models such as fire,
using a simple Cellular Automata Model. The BYPASS was smoke, flooding and the effects on individuals; and the de-
the basis for the company TraffGo HT to develop the pe- velopment of systems that include psychological factors in
destrian evacuation simulation system PedGo, which has a the characterization of simulated individuals.
version that incorporates maritime features named AENE-
AS (Klupfel, 2000) using Agent-based Models (ABM). The Among the main systems studied, none was entirely appro-
AENEAS remains in the market today with several inter- priate to the needs of a warship under damage. Undoubtedly,
esting features, but the interaction with hazard models like the greatest demand is for passenger ships. As previously
flooding models were not implemented. mentioned, the main points that distinguish a warship from
other ship types are: the various operating modes and ship
Already in 2000, the Fire Safety Engineering Group plant configurations during a mission; the high level of risk
(FSEG) at the University of Greenwich, England, devel- exposure leading to high probability of damage, especially
oped an evacuation system called EXODUS. In 2003, in in combat situations; the procedures of the crew during the
collaboration with the Canadian company BMT FLEET evacuation, especially GSD; and the behavioral profile of
TECHNOLOGY, FSEG created a version of the evacuation its military crew.
system for ships called maritimeEXODUS also based on
the ABM with interesting studies about the displacement of The main requirements of an evacuation simulation system
agents under the effects of ship movement (Galea, for a warship would be: great flexibility in the configuration
2001).This system continues to evolve today. of environments; ability to simulate the movement of the
ship and its effects on crew moving; capacity to support the
From 2001, also based on the knowledge generated by integration of models of the main types of damage, such as
MEPdesign and EVAC, The Ship Stability Research Center fire and smoke spreading and flooding, and its effects on
at the University of Strathclyde and Safety at Sea Ltd., the crew; ability to simulate the GSD's members behavior
Glasgow, Scotland, in collaboration with Deltamarin, de- during evacuation; and ability to represent the profile of the
veloped a so-called evacuation simulation model Evi naval military in each participating agent.
(Evacuability Index). Based on ABM, they introduced the
mesoscopic approach, emphasizing that both approaches, Potentially all three major evacuation simulation systems

101
studied were able to incorporate adaptations for use in mil- (McGrattan et al., 2013). The results of flooding caused
itary plants. However, Evi was chosen because it was the by hull openings obtained by Proteus 3.1 (Jasionowski
simulation system that met two features considered very et al., 2001) system produced by the Ship Stability Re-
important to achieve the objective of this and future works search Center (SSRC) of the University of Strathclyde
in naval area: and Safety at Sea Ltd, Glasgow, UK, are quite unique.
The movements of the vessel during the evacuation in-
Unlike other simulators that model the physical space in fluence the speed of the crew, making the simulation
a discrete way through a grid, Evi considers it in a more realistic (Tsychkova, 2000). Of all the systems
semi-continuous way. This was considered an important considered only Evi is capable of dealing with flooding
factor in the modeling of a plant with small, irregular scenarios.
compartments and narrow passages, characteristic of a
warship, where it would be harder to fit a grid exactly. The originality of this paper resides in applying the concept
The combination of Social Forces (SF) e Cellular Au- of evacuability of Evi for the first time in naval vessels that
tomata (CA) techniques determined an unique approach it is unique in this respect.
to the agents dynamics. VASSALOS et al., (2001) in-
troduced the mesoscopic modeling, merging the macro- SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
scopic and microscopic approaches, as explained by
Guarin et al. (2014): The work of adequacy of Evi to meet simulations in mili-
tary vessels was performed in a joint effort directly with the
The macroscopic behavior defines the way an agent simulator development team at the University of Strath-
will travel from one location to another on board the clyde and Safety at Sea Ltd in Glasgow, UK. After a de-
ship layout. Building on the graph structure defined tailed study of the characteristics and features of Evi, the
within the model, the process of identifying the main points identified for this adaptation were: 1) the
shortest route to a destination is achieved using change in the form of demographics defining the ship's
Dijkstra's classic shortest path algorithm (Dijkstra, crew; 2) the inclusion of a function that could implement an
1959) with the weighting taken as the distance be- objective exclusively found in a military ship; 3) a change
tween doors. Once route information has been gen- in the way of crossing a passage (door or hatch) according
erated for each node, the process of travelling from to the ship's closing condition at a given operating mode;
one point in the environment to another is just a case and 4) change of the form of movement of the crew in order
of following the sequence of information laid down to better represent the behavior of a group of trained mili-
by the search; this is referred to as the path plan. tary.

The microscopic model covers the behavior of Setting the Crew


movement of agents within spaces. It dictates the
way agents avoid boundaries of spaces and how it The simulation of an evacuation in Evi uses a script written
should avoid other agents. Given these constraints, in a programming language based on TCL (Tool Command
the objective is to steer the agent towards a local Language). This script defines what will happen during the
destination (waypoint) in an optimal manner without simulation: the crew is characterized and positioned, goals
being un-cooperative towards the other agents in the are set for each member and events can be triggered at spe-
space. In order to simplify calculation, a range of cific points in time.
discrete decisions are established around the agent
with the objective of identifying the one which will Regarding the demographic definition of the crew, this task
allow the agent to travel the greatest distance toward is performed in quite different ways on a passenger ship and
the local target. In addition, a continuous local (so- a warship. Usually in a passenger ship, passengers and crew
cial/personal) space is established around each agent, are treated in an impersonal way, being able to make use of
which other agents will aim to avoid. This space is a random distribution of simulation agents in the ship envi-
used to prevent a deadlock situation when the num- ronment. In a warship, each military has a specific posi-
ber of agents in an area becomes high. The agent tioning for each vessel operation mode according to the
makes a decision of the best use of its personal space current condition being war or peace. Certain military per-
to resolve any conflicts that may arise. As a result, sonnel, especially members of the GSD, have specific tasks
this approach allows the evacuation process to be during the escape phase leading to the need of a personal
modeled in sufficient detail and still run in real time identification of each crew member. This need was solved
or faster. by the creation of new commands for the definition of sim-
ulation agents where we could assign a unique and individ-
Ease of integration with the models for simulation of ual name to the agent, in addition to the usual demographic
fire, smoke and flooding was considered an essential definitions that characterize and place the agents in a pas-
feature, aiming future works in naval evacuation analy- senger ship. Thus, at any time of the simulation, we know
sis under damage. Evi is designed to read and interpret exactly where a particular agent is and if he is managing to
the data generated by the renowned software Fire Dy- meet a set goal at that moment.
namics Simulator (FDS) for fire and smoke spreading,
produced by the National Institute of Standards and Taking advantage of an Evi feature to differentiate func-
Technology (NIST) of the US Department of Commerce, tionally and visually crew members and passengers, we use
and the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland this to differentiate members of the GSD from other crew

102
members in order to facilitate visually the identification of and survival sectors for a possible recovery and
these agents during the simulation. Therefore, the new re-occupation of the vessel.
commands created, AddNameCrew and AddNamePax,
identify and place in the ship's plant the GSD's members As explained above, depending on the ship's closing condi-
and the normal crew, respectively. New commands in TCL tion (X, Y, Z, ...), as a function of the mode in which the
language were also to simplify the arduous task of defining ship is operating, several passages must remain closed
one by one each member of the crew (name, personal char- while others may remain open. Therefore, a procedure was
acteristics, initial positioning, and basic objective) reducing developed in Evi which adds a time to open a passage
the size of the script and making it more readable, facilitat- which is defined as closed. At the present stage of devel-
ing the development and maintenance. Below is an example opment of this feature, it is assumed that the door closes
of a procedure called DefAgEx created to define a GSD automatically after the passage of the agent. In case of a
agent in an exercise situation of probable sinking: the agent group of agents wanting to go through this passage, the
is the captain of the ship, male M, log-normal distribution system has enough intelligence to allow the passage of the
function for awareness time with offset AT1m, initially entire group before closing the passage again. As can be
placed at the d-1-CrewService12 compartment with the seen, the agent does not remain next to the passage in order
basic objective of reaching the muster station known as to close it, what usually needs to occur in most doors and
MS3_Deck01_Starboard. hatches of a conventional naval ship. Despite this, the new
implementation does quite accurately represent what occurs
DefAgEx Crew M GSD:CAPTAIN d-1-CrewService12 in the vessels of the Brazilian Navy, naturally causing a
$AT1m MS3_Deck01_Starboard delay in the movement of agents, turning the simulation
very close to the operation of a military ship.
The reaction time and speed are defined automatically in-
side the procedure by probabilistic log-normal and normal This version of Evi does not include hatches modeling. This
distributions respectively, thus ensuring the differentiation restriction was solved as follows: where there was a small
of agents within a simulation run and the difference be- isolation lobby to access the hatch, it was simply consid-
tween each simulation iteration when running in batch, for ered the duplication of the times for opening and closing of
statistical analysis. the lobby door, considering the door + hatch system as a
single entity, taking advantage of the physical proximity of
Creating a new objective in simulation them; and, in cases where there were no isolation lobby, a
virtual one was introduced in the model. Its virtual door,
As described above in the explanation of the procedures in then, assumes the properties of real hatch. The simulator
cases of possible and probable sinking, item (2), there is a development team already includes hatch modeling for fu-
situation where a military should be relieved by a member ture versions.
of the GSD before heading to muster station. If this member
of the GSD, for any reason (death, for example), did not Representing the movement of a group of well trained
come to that place, the crew member who would be re- military
lieved assumes the function and will integrate the GSD.
This is really a situation that does not exist in a passenger The biggest challenge in the process of adaptation of an
ship. So it was necessary to create a new objective called evacuation simulator for passenger ships to military ships is
relieve to implement this. The syntax of this command is the representation of the crew behavior during the evacua-
shown below: tion. The simulators generally develop their behavioral
models in order to reproduce the passengers in panic situa-
Objectives GSD:1103 {{relieve d-1-CrewService58 {evac tions, which renders the movement disorderly. In these cas-
MS1_Deck02_Starboard} 1301} {wait 60} {...}} es, it is common "to fight" for a better position during the
evacuation. The lack of knowledge about the ship is also
In this example, the member of GSD identified as explored leading to the simulation of the behavior known as
GSD:1103 must relieve the crew member 1301 which is "herding" where there is a tendency to go where everyone
waiting in the compartment d-1-CrewService58, which then, else is going, avoiding to try an alternative path, among
must proceed to MS1_Deck02_Starboard abandonment other aspects.
area. The member of the GSD should wait 60s in this place
before fulfilling his next goals. However, in a warship the picture is totally the opposite.
All crew members have similar skills and level of fitness,
Changing the way of crossing a passage all are trained and prepared to face extreme situations of
danger and all know deeply the ship where they serve.
The version of Evi used for this work would assume a pas- These reasons would be enough for the development of a
sage as open by default,. If the passage was initially defined new behavioral model quite different from that used in
as blocked, it would not be part of a route until its condition passenger ships. However, it was out of the scope of this
would change to open. In a passenger ship there is no need work to undertake such big changes in the behavioral mod-
to close a door after the passage of people during an evacu- el's paradigms of the current simulator. Therefore, some
ation of the ship. In contrast for a warship, in a possible or attempts have been made in order to achieve a more orga-
probable sinking situation, where there is still the possibil- nized behavior. Three lines of action were assumed as fol-
ity of the ship to be saved by the staff of GSD, there is the lows:
need to preserve the water tightness of the compartments

103
Regarding the heterogeneity of the group: set the be- define the best route option in case of blockage. In the sec-
havioral parameters of the agents in order to make the ond case, without totally blocking the usual route, conges-
group most homogeneous. tion not explicitly brings a new attitude to staff members
who are approaching the congested region to seek alterna-
For disorganized behavior: change the physical model- tives. To bring about this attitude it has created a model that
ing of the plant to create pseudo-corridors in more spa- measures the density of agents on that critical region, and
cious areas of the ship to induce agents to adopt a be- so a new route choice is activated or not. We called this
havior as if they were walking in a "queue". technique as "ship knowledge".

Concerning the knowledge of the ship in order to To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy to
choose other paths: use of special features of the simu- represent the organized behavior of a military crew, a small
lator to "induce" agents to choose another path in order plant tests will be used. For ease of presentation, the test
to avoid congestion on the usual route, despite the dis- plant is contained in only one deck. This test plant will be
tance being longer in this alternative route. modeled using the conventional technique used in passen-
ger ships and also with the changes proposed to represent
To make the group the most homogeneous, the age range the military's behavior. The objective is to evaluate the dif-
was considered narrow and the distribution of reaction time ferences in the behavior of agents and changes in time of
had its standard deviation reduced. The configuration of completion of the programmed movement.
speeds was made based on specific test described by Glen
et al. (2003). In this research, velocity measurements in the The plant of test, shown in Fig. 1, includes: the STARTING
plane and on stairs with 10 degrees of inclination, used in ROOM, where the agents are placed at the beginning of the
accessing hatches in naval vessels were made, having as simulations; the ACCESS CORRIDOR, which leads the
target population men and women with and without expe- agents to the KEY ROOM, where the proposed adaptations
rience with this type of equipment. Former military men will take place; and two ways to reach the DESTINATION
and women belonging to the Royal Navy and the Coast ROOM: the MAIN CORRIDOR (shortest route) and the
Guard have volunteered and joined the group with experi- ALTERNATIVE CORRIDOR (longer route).
ence. Among all results, the chosen were related to the male
group with experience, shown in Table 1:
Table 1 - Speed definition
Horizontal speed (m/s) Vertical speed (m/s)
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.90 2.00 2.10 0.40 0.50 0.60
Fig. 1 - Test Plant
Speeds were assessed according to a uniform probability
distribution with the minimum, average and maximum
Three test situations were simulated: 1) conventional mod-
listed above. The small variation characterizes the group as
eling; 2) adapted modeling with "forced queue" implemen-
homogeneous as expected for a military operative crew.
tation; and 3) adapted modeling with "forced queue" and
"ship's knowledge" implementations. All simulations have
The reduction of disorganized behavior of the agents was
the same number of agents, with the same demographic
implemented, when possible, by reconfiguring the internal
characteristics and the same goals. The dynamic to be ob-
representation of the compartment. A compartment is nor-
served is the movement of 80 agents that are within the
mally represented by geometric elements (rectangles and/or
STARTING ROOM and start moving simultaneously to-
polygons) which, when grouped, make up the area of the
wards the DESTINATION ROOM. The congestion gener-
entire compartment. A geometric element is connected to its
ated at the output of the STARTING ROOM to access the
neighbor through a pseudo-passage known as union, occu-
ACCESS CORRIDOR is not taken into account in the
pying the entire length of contact between the two elements.
analysis. The focus of the analysis is what happens in the
The choice of geometric forms of the elements and the
KEY ROOM.
quantity of them is not restricted, allowing for a simplified
representation. Given this flexibility, it was possible, in
Test 1:
some cases, to create sets of elements favoring the for-
In this simulation, the plant is modeled in the conventional
mation of a row of agents making the evacuation more or-
way. The KEY ROOM is represented by only a Basic Ge-
ganized. We called this technique as "forced queue".
ometric Element (BGE), in this case, a rectangle. The Pri-
mary Route is defined including ACCESS CORRIDOR, the
Regarding the ability to knowing the layout of the ship to
KEY ROOM and the MAIN CORRIDOR. Fig. 2 shows the
choose other paths, there are two distinct situations: the
test plant with conventional modeling and the indication of
usual route is blocked; and the usual route is just congested.
the Primary Route.
In the first case, the strategy was to combine a feature of the
simulator for setting primary routes (Primary Route) along
with another feature that allows one to generate alternative
output signals (Primary Exit) in a particular passage during
the modeling phase of plant. This feature was designed to

104
Fig. 2 - Conventional Modeling (Primary Route) Fig. 5 - Adapted Modeling (Primaries Route and Exit)

In this type of modeling, Evi simulator tries to represent the The result of this simulation shows a much more organized
situation observed in a passenger ship. The dimension of behavior of agents. The dimension of the door that sepa-
the door that separates the KEY ROOM to the MAIN rates the KEY ROOM to the MAIN CORRIDOR remains
CORRIDOR is far from ideal for the expected flow, caus- less than the ideal for the expected flow, however, the for-
ing a major congestion. The simulation agents representing mation of the queue favors the flow of the agents. As long
passengers, unaware of the existence of an alternative route as there is not a blockage in the main route, the alternate
and, therefore, they clog, seeking access to the only route route is not used. This model does not include yet the "ship
that is being used by all, in a typical situation of herding. knowledge" modeled in the script. Agents remain in the
This causes a significant delay in arrival at the destination "forced queue" until the end of the flow to the DESTINA-
and definitely is not a trained military behavior. Fig. 3 TION ROOM. A large reduction was observed in the total
shows congestion obtained in the test with conventional moving time, just because now the movement is more or-
modeling. ganized. Fig. 6 shows the queuing of agents obtained in the
test with adapted modeling.

Fig. 3 - Congestion in the Conventional Modeling


Fig. 6 - Queuing in the Adapted Modeling
Test 2:
In this simulation, the plant is modeled in the adapted way. Test 3:
The KEY ROOM is represented by several Basic Geomet- In this simulation, the plant is modeled as in Test 2. The
ric Elements, with the clear intention of inducing the for- KEY ROOM is represented in the same way and the alter-
mation of a queue. The Primary Route is defined including native exit as well. The Primary Route is also defined in the
ACCESS CORRIDOR, some Basic Geometric Elements of same manner as in the previous test. Fig. 7 shows the test
the KEY ROOM and the MAIN CORRIDOR. The alterna- plant with the adapted modeling, the definition of the Pri-
tive output is also defined, in the event of blockage of the mary Route, the alternative output (Primary Exit) and the
Primary Route. Fig. 4 shows the new subdivision made in Basic Geometric Element chosen as "conditional BGE".
the KEY ROOM and Fig. 5 shows the test plant with the
adapted modeling, the definition of the Primary Route (now In this modeling is included a decision-making mechanism
including the Basic Geometric Elements BGE1, BGE4 and that evaluates the agents density in the "conditional BGE"
BGE6) and the alternative output signage. (BGE4), to represent the "ship knowledge". This modeling
is performed in the simulation script using the commands:

AtSpaceOccupancyCount BGE4 N {Se-


lectAgentsInSpaces {PreviousRoute}}

AtSpaceOccupancyCount BGE4 N {Objective select


{goto NewRoute}}

The command AtSpaceOccupancyCount assesses the num-


Fig. 4 - Adapted Modeling of the Key Room ber of agents in the "conditional BGE" BGE4. At the mo-
ment that the number of agents N is reached, the agents
which are moving in the PreviousRoute are selected and a
new objective is given to them. In this situation, they must
pass thru the NewRoute location. In this example, the Pre-
viousRoute could include the BGE6 and the ACCESS
CORRIDOR, and the NewRoute location could be the AL-

105
TERNATIVE CORRIDOR. The choice of these parameters
will depend on the analysis of each region in which one CASE STUDY
wishes to model this behavior. Visually, the simulation rep-
resents better the situation of people arriving where a row is The warship chosen for this case study was a "Niteri"
becoming dense and then, they choose another way know- Class Frigate, English design, built in Brazil between 1965
ing that it will lead to the same destination, keeping the and 1970, with an average crew of 209 men. Ships at that
organization of the moving. Decreasing the density in time were not as focused on the safety of the crew as today.
BGE4, the normal path becomes the one chosen again. If The focus was concentrated on the functional operative
congestion evolve into a blockage, all agents, both those efficiency, leaving security in the background. Actually, the
already in line at KEY ROOM as those approaching it, they main reason probably was because it was very difficult to
would automatically be redirected to the passage defined as predict certain problems associated with a possible evacua-
Primary Exit. tion of the ship without the availability of a simulator.

The result of this simulation demonstrates a more organized Nowadays, especially in Navies with more resources and
behavior by the agents, adding the aspects of knowledge of ability to design their own ships, the design for safety of the
an alternative path. The dimension of the door that sepa- crew, of course, is a reality. This is a trend that will include
rates the KEY ROOM to the MAIN CORRIDOR remains not only large passenger ships, but the merchant ships and
less than ideal for the expected flow and the formation of oil platforms, because of the ease of use of the simulators.
the queue continues to favor the development of the move- Talking about design for safety in navies with few resources
ment. Although there was not a blockage in the main route, could be a theme somewhat inapplicable because not much
this time the alternative route is used. However, in a differ- is done in this area since most of their ships with large ca-
ent way. As the main route is not blocked, there is not a pacity are old and purchased from other navies. However,
total redirection of agents for the alternative route. Some the update needs of these ships are frequent. Many sectors
agents remain in the queue on the main route and some of the ship could pass through a redesign phase to receive a
agents "evaluate" that the queue is large and "choose" the new weapon or a new sensor. At this point, we can use the
alternative route. As a consequence, a reduction in total simulation capabilities to assess the impact that a change in
drive time is observed, featuring aspects of an organized the ship's plant could have on the safety of the crew in a
behavior, showing the knowledge about the paths in the possible evacuation situation.
ship on which they serve. The time reduction was small
because the alternative pathway used by some agents is The simulations were executed considering two scenarios,
longer than the main path, demonstrating that the results both in a probable sinking situation. The first one repro-
obtained from this modeling are consistent. Fig. 8 shows duced the current doctrine used on board in evacuation ex-
agents in a queue in the main route and agents which are ercises (drill case). This case was used to validate the simu-
choosing another route. lation model (adapted modeling) by comparing the real
time spent by all normal crew members (non GSD) to reach
their muster stations to the correspondent simulated time.
This time (Escape Time) was measured from the moment of
the Commander's orders (to the normal crew: "Prepare to
Abandon ship", "Go to Muster Stations" and to the GSD
members, "Take Ship's Control") to the moment when the
last member of the normal crew reached his muster station.
The time spent by the GSD members complete all their
duty and go to their muster stations was not used for this
Fig. 8 - Queuing and "Ship Knowledge" represented validation purpose.
The average times of 50 simulations for each of the three Some situations to use the command "relieve" have been
cases tested are shown in Table 2. A progressive time re- created following suggestions of the operating sector of the
duction is observed from the case of conventional modeling ship. These situations are internally defined for each ship of
(Test 1) to the case with full adapted modeling (Test 3). the class, with minor variations in procedures from one ship
The simulations carried out have shown that it is possible to to another. The procedures related to the application of the
satisfactorily represent the behavior of a military crew by a command "relieve" were simulated correctly, following the
specifically adapted modeling, using a simulator developed sequence of pre-determined actions. There were no prob-
for passenger ships. In the next section, a case study will be lems for the agents of the GSD when they were going to-
presented in which all the adaptations suggested in this wards the compartments where they were expected by
work will be applied. members of the normal crew. There were no critical situa-
tions of movement in counter-flow.
Table 2 - Simulation times
Times to accomplish the moving (sec) By military secrecy issues, the results presented are related
Test to reference values, privileging a qualitative analysis of the
Mean Standard Deviation
adapted simulator under evaluation. The difference between
Test 1 421.6 49.8 the real mean time obtained in the drill case, used as refer-
Test 2 219.0 26.1
ence, and the mean simulated time after 50 runs was less
Test 3 201.5 17.2
than 5%. This result validated the adapted model.

106
Flight Deck (Muster Station), in order to avoid conges-
The Fig. 9 is related to the first scenario (drill case - current tion in the stern region;
doctrine), showing the congested regions. It represents a
snapshot of the moment of maximum congestion shown in 3. Traffic direction reversal of the outer starboard corridor
the graph of Fig. 10. of the deck 01 only during the evacuation procedures.
The goal is to avoid going up to deck 02 and then going
down again to the deck 01 to use the port corridor.

The Fig. 11 shows just one congested region in the second


scenario. It represents a snapshot of the moment of maxi-
mum congestion shown in the graph of Fig. 12. In relation
to Scenario 1, one can see in Fig. 11 the elimination of
congestion in the regions 2 and 3 and a significant im-
provement in the region 1.

Fig. 9 - Congested Regions in the Scenario 1

According to the graph of Fig. 10, the maximum value of


congested agents in this case is 60 and the average was
calculated at 32.8 agents throughout the moving time T1.
The vertical axis (No. of Agents) is the number of congested
agents at each simulation time instant.

Fig. 11 - Congested Regions in the Scenario 2

According to the graph of Fig. 12, the maximum value of


congested agents in this case is 30 and the average was
calculated at 16.3 agents throughout the moving time T2.
The vertical axis (No. of Agents) is the number of congested
agents at each simulation time instant.

Fig. 10 - Congested Agents Time History in the Current


Doctrine (Scenario 1)

Once the adapted model has been validated, the simulation


results could be used to improve the evacuation procedures.
The second scenario includes some changes in the evacua-
tion procedures and in the physical plant of the ship in order
to improve the simulation results. The following three sug-
gestions aim to reduce the number of congested regions and
the Escape Time of the previous scenario:
Fig. 12 - Congested Agents Time History in the new pro-
1. Changing of routes for the personnel assigned to the posal (Scenario 2)
main deck (Deck 1) and the lower decks (Decks 2, 3 and The escape time in scenario 2 (T2) fell by 55% compared to
4). In this case all these people would have to go to the the reference time (T1) of scenario 1. However, this solu-
stern of the ship using internal routes on decks 1 and 2. tion is only indicated if a paradigm change in the movement
Then they would access the external area of the aft main of the crew is accepted, allowing violation of the traffic
deck, going up to the Flight Deck by an external stair- rules.
case. The goal is to reduce the flow of people in the ex-
isting bottlenecks in regions 1 and 2; FLOODING SCENARIOS
2. Changing the ship's physical plant with enlargement or Evis integration with hydrodinamic simulations
duplication of external staircase used to access the

107
The hydrodynamic simulation to be integrated with the
evacuation drill is achieved through the system Proteus 3.1
(Jasionowski et al., 2001) developed at Ship Stability Re-
search Centre (SSRC), University of Strathclyde, Glasgow,
UK.

The Evi simulator system uses the MEPdesign project re-


sults (Tsychkova, 2000) to reduce the speed of the agents
according to the ship's movements

Building the hydrodinamic model


Fig. 13 MONOLAX image for flooding damage
The Protheus System 3.1 requires input files that define the
hydrodynamic model of the ship to be studied: Damage simulations

The file extension ".g" ou ".geo", which contains the Three flooding damage cases will be presented: bow,
geometrical description of the hull for simulations of the amidships and aft of the ship. The same initial conditions of
intact case; and the crew with positioning in "Battle Stations" used in Sce-
nario 1 will also be used in these simulations.
The file extensions ".sus" e ".dam" which contain the
geometrical description of the hull, the internal com- The simulations integrated into the simulator Evi have a
partments that could be object of damage study and the visual representation. In the case of simulations integrated
damage characteristics itself, to the damage case. with hydrodynamic simulations of Proteus 3.1, Evi features
a blue plane representing the sea. The 3D model of the ship
These files are usually generated by specific computer pro- moves according to the movements of the sea and in the
grams for marine engineering like NAPA and PolyCAD, for event of a flooding damage, of course, also represents blue
example. in the flooded compartments. Also on the visual aspect, the
agents who die due to the action of flooding have its color
The System Proteus 3.1 provides the results of hydrody- changed to red and leave the simulation. The Fig. 14 shows,
namic simulations through the output files with extension as an example, the visual representation of an integrated
".mot" to the intact case and the files with the extension simulation with flooding damage amidships.
".mot" and ".wat1 the .watn" to the damage case. In the file
".mot" we have, in a timescale, the ship's position relative
to the its center of gravity according to the number of de-
grees of freedom (DOF) defined for the analysis. In files
with the extension ".wat1" to ".watn", also in the same time
scale, the data are consistent with the sea water accumula-
tion in n internal compartments defined in geometric mod-
eling of the vessel under study. All these files are in text
format and will be used by Evi simulator for interaction
between simulations. Fig. 14 Evi in a flooding simulation

The SSRC also developed an extremely useful tool for the Two types of damage were simulated according to their
evaluation of the results generated by the simulator Proteus extension:
3.1, called MONOLAX (MONOLAX, 2013). Through this
application we can see all the movement of the ship in the Damages of small proportions whose time for a
virtual ocean set for simulation within the timescale estab- commitment of compartments involved were great.
lished for that experiment. It is also possible to visualize Thus, it was defined as small proportion's damage, sizes
and quantify, in real time, the flow direction and quantity of less than 1m, where the compartment's drain capacity is
sea water that enters and leaves the vessel during a hull not sufficient to solve the problem; and
damage simulation, and the free surface effects within the
flooded compartments. The visualization of the simulation Damages of major proportions whose time for react is
is quite interesting and it allows feeling the continuity of very short. Thus, it was defined as major proportion's
the movement of the ship, discarding the presence of coarse damage, sizes up to 15m, in the form of tear, reaching
numerical errors generated in the simulation. more than one compartment in longitudinal direction.

Fig. 13 illustrates MONOLAX image generated by the ap- The design of military ships give too much emphasis to the
plication to the simulated event of damage aft. issue of sealing, especially in decks below the waterline. In
the case of vessels in this class, the simulations allowed to
note that this project priority was very well implemented,
basically because of the following reasons:

108
Most compartments below the waterline have a small tions in warships. The adaptation of Evi simulator allows
longitudinal dimension; and different possibilities to better assess the movement of per-
sonnel in a military ship. Following will be presented the
In decks below the waterline does not exist longitudinal evaluation of each part of the adaptation process and some
communication between compartments. considerations about the flooding cases:

These two factors make this vessel fairly safe regarding to 1. The adjustments made to nominally set the simulation
the spread of a flooding. There is no possibility of forget- agents allowed the identification of them in possible
ting an open door cause the spread of a flooding as there are functional analyzes in specific shipboard operations;
no doors in the bulkheads of the ship below the waterline.
The entire moving is in the vertical direction, being neces- 2. The creation of auxiliary procedures in TCL language
sary moving up to achieve higher decks and then moving targeting a code compaction contributed to the clarity
down, to progress in the longitudinal direction. and maintenance of simulation scripts;

The reference time for this analysis will be the total time to 3. The adaptations for the representation of hatches com-
reach the abandonment stations in Scenario 1 (TSC1). The pensated the absence of this feature in the original sim-
simulations were carried out in the sea state 5 (coarse sea). ulator;
Batch of 50 rounds was run with all damages localized be-
low the waterline. The results obtained are shown in Table 4. The adjustments made to pass through a passage (open-
3. ing and closing doors) did not reproduce exactly the
procedures required for manually operated doors used in
Table 3 - Simulation times this ship. However, the objective of causing a delay in
Times to reach the
the agent's passage was achieved, offsetting this defi-
Damage Situation ciency;
Casualties

abandonment stations

Rooms 5. The new command to relief a member of the regular


Location Extention Mean SD crew by a member of the GSD has been met partially.
affected
The situation in which the member of the GSD does not
short 1 0 TSC1+17.9% 4.1% appear to assume the station was not implemented and
Bow
long 3 4 TSC1+17.6% 4.7%
is also expected for the next versions of the simulator;
short 1 0 TSC1+18.1% 5.2%
Midship
long 2 4 TSC1+18.5% 5.0%
short 1 0 TSC1+19.3% 4.4%
6. The Primary Exit feature was a good modeling tool to
Stern represent the "ship knowledge" during the evacuation of
long 2 2 TSC1+18.2% 4.6%
the ship;
It was observed that, regardless of the scale and location of
the damage (bow, midship or stern), there was no occur- 7. The attempts to change the disorganized behavior of the
rence of blocking of escape routes, even considering that passengers of a cruise ship into the behavior of trained
nothing was done to mitigate the problem. The difference military achieve its goal. The test cases using a small
observed according to the extent of damage was the number hypothetical plant demonstrate that the techniques of
of casualties among agents. In damages of small propor- "forced queue" and "ship knowledge" were able to
tions, there was enough time for agents to get access to the model the military organization, even without any
higher decks, containing the flooding only in the affected change in the core of the behavioral modeling program
compartments. In damages of larger proportions, there was of the simulator Evi. The definition of the demographic
no time for agents to evade, causing the death of these parameters contributed to tune some aspects of the mil-
agents. itary behavior of the agents.

Thus, the escape times showed no significant difference 8. In the simulations with flooding damage scenarios was
compared to those obtained in the case of reference, but due found that Evi simulation system uses a powerful hy-
to the movements of the sea, which naturally causes a re- drodynamic simulator with great possibilities for inte-
duction in travel speed. The damage simulations were gen- gration between programs. This ease of integration be-
erated considering a drifting ship in Sea State 5, in order to tween the two simulators, by sure, lies in the fact that
cause a worsening of the vessel's stability. As the ship was they were developed in the same department at the
in the closing condition "Z", in which the hatches to lower University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, UK. At the cur-
decks must remain closed, the vessel remained stable even rent stage of development of this integration, the affect-
in damages of greater extent. In consequence, it was not ed compartments are blocked and can no longer be part
verified any ship capsizing situation in 30 minutes of simu- of possible escape routes. Agents are affected gradually
lation time, in any of the 50 simulation rounds. in accordance with the progression of the flood level.
An agent is considered dead and excluded from the
simulation if the flooding level exceeds its height. This
CONCLUSIONS condition does not accurately reflect the real case for an
analysis of casualties during a damage of flooding.
In this article, we analyze the possibility of adapting an
originally designed simulator for passenger ships to simula- Resuming, the purpose of obtaining results for decision

109
support and changes through computer simulations was
reached. The results obtained in hypothetical proposals Jasionowski, A., and Dodworth, K., PROTEUS 3.1 User
suggested in the case study proved to be sufficiently con- Manual, 1 ed. Glasgow, UK, The Ship Stability Re-
sistent and reliable for use in decision support in the areas search Centre (SSRC), 2001.
of planning and training involving the movement of the
crew on board with or without damage situations. Klupfel, H., Meyer-Knig, M., Wahle, J., Schreckenberg,
M., "Microscopic Simulation of Evacuation Processes
Some results obtained within the scope of the simulations on Passenger Ships", In: Proceedings of the Fourth In-
were not presented in this paper for confidentiality reasons. ternational Conference on Cellular Automata for Re-
search and Industry: Theoretical and Practical Issues
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS on Cellular Automata, pp. 63-71, Oct. 2000.

To all team of the Safety at Sea Ltd., Glasgow, UK, for Lee, D., Kim, H., Park, J.H., and Park B.J., "The Current
their support in the simulator adaptation phase, especially to Status and Future Issues in Human Evacuation from
my instructor Yasmine Hifi for the attention and dedication Ships", Safety Science, v. 41, n. 10, pp. 861-876, Dec.
in teaching on the use of simulation software. 2003.

Lo, S.M., Huang, H.C., Wang, P., and Yuen, K.K., "A Game
Theory Based Exit Selection Model for Evacuation",
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trol and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore
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Geneva, Switzerland, 1999.

110
Naval Auxiliaries, Safe In Design - Safe Through Life
Loren Roberts, Andy Smaller
BMT Cadence Ltd

ABSTRACT management of ships in the commercial world.

The increase in the number of Naval Auxiliaries


currently being purchased is requiring a change in INTRODUCTION
approach to safety in design from the commercial
shipyards being contracted to build these ships.
Modern Naval practice requires a more detailed Naval Auxiliaries vary in type and size but the main
approach to proving the safe design and subsequent purpose of each Naval Auxiliary is to provide support to
operation of the ship. The concept of a Wholeship naval shipping, within their fleet. They may also be
Safety Case is being more widely utilised throughout required to support any North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
modern navies and where a prescriptive approach does (NATO) ship during joint operations.
not exist there is a requirement to conduct a risk-based
approach and to meet Naval Regulations. A Naval Auxiliary may have to meet a low capability
requirement (e.g. solely to transport fuel), or alternatively
This paper aims to introduce the concept of Safe in could be a complex ship with:
Design through the approach taken in the design of
Naval Auxiliaries and how this fulfils the start of the liquid and solid cargo capacity;
Safe Through Life concept. The paper will discuss how a hospital;
a risk based approach can be utilised where, due to the ability to deploy an organic helicopter;
unique nature of the ship, current Classification Society ability to deploy as a Mothership;
Rules do not apply for all areas of the design. The ability to carry deck cargo whether this is in
paper will cover all of the significant hazardous areas: containers or in the form of vehicles or boats.
Stability, Structures, Escape, Evacuation and Rescue,
Propulsion and Manoeuvring Systems, Fire, Aviation Whatever the capability or cargo, one key role of any Naval
and Explosives, it will also consider how risks to the Auxiliary is to be able to transfer its cargo to another ship.
platform and environment can be taken into account, Although this transfer can take place alongside or whilst
and the benefits of understanding and managing these rafted together at anchor or alongside, it is normal practice
areas. to undertake the transfers whilst underway at sea, in an
activity known as Replenishment At Sea (RAS).
The other key area to ensure a ship is Safe in Design and Therefore even a relatively simple tanker has many
Safe Through Life is to consider the interfaces within complex interfaces.
the design of the ship. The interfaces between systems
or capabilities of the ship are often not covered by the A naval ship, be it a warship or an auxiliary, is required to
prescriptive approach defined by Classification Societies follow command decisions to meet a military operational
to the level of detail required by Naval Regulators. A imperative, even though this may involve deliberately
discussion will be presented as to how interfaces can be putting the ship and her crew at increased risk. This
identified and how a risk-based approach can be utilised military operational imperative does not apply to
to ensure that the interfaces are considered throughout commercial shipping, and this difference can influence the
the design of the ship. decision as to what is considered acceptably safe. This
paper will provide a summary of how the As Low As
The paper will conclude with a discussion on how the Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle is used in the
safe design of the ship can be used to continually context of military operations.
demonstrate that the ship remains Safe Through Life
utilising ongoing management and review. This paper uses examples of complex interfaces to
Acknowledging that this ongoing management is an demonstrate why a Wholeship Safety Case is essential to
overhead on the through life costs of running the ship is ensuring the ship remains safe throughout its lifecycle. A
important, given the existing statutory regulation, IMO Naval Auxiliary that cannot undertake a safe RAS whilst
and SOLAS, however an argument will be made for the maintaining a steady course and speed has failed in its key
benefits of adopting this type of approach to the design requirement. Even a Naval Auxiliary whose sole

111
role is a hospital ship will be required to transfer casualties. Safety Case and that there was a need to maintain this
Although this may not normally be through a ship-to-ship Safety Case through life.
transfer, this method of casualty receipt often needs to be a
capability. Safety Cases were introduced in a naval context for the first
time through a Defence Council Instruction in 1993 [6] and
This paper will demonstrate how, through the combination implemented via regulations detailed in Joint Services
of prescriptive and risk-based assessment, the development Publication (JSP) 430 Issue 1 [18] in 1996.
of a Wholeship Safety Case can provide assurance to the
operator that the ship is safe for all its intended purposes. In 2006 the UK lost a Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in
Where a risk cannot be reduced through design, mitigations Afghanistan. The loss of this aircraft resulted in an
can be implemented through life to manage the risk to a inquiry, which was conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC.
level that is tolerable or ALARP. BMT Cadence has The Nimrod Review [7] highlighted that, although a Safety
demonstrated how this enhances the safety performance and Case existed for the aircraft, it was not sufficiently robust
provides protection to both the ship owner and operator and had failed to identify significant design flaws that, if
based on their experience of developing safety cases, rectified, could have potentially avoided the accident. The
primarily for the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of recommendations from this review identify the need for a
Defence (MoD). The experience gained in the Safety Case that is succinct, driven by the owner, accessible,
development of safety cases for the UK Tide Class Tankers proportionate and easy to understand. The Nimrod
and the Norwegian Logistics Support Vessel HNoMS Maud Review has had a significant influence on the development
will be used throughout this paper. Both of these vessels are of both safety regulation and through-life Safety Cases
based on the BMT Aegir Design produced by BMT throughout the UK MoD for all operational platforms.
Defence Services Ltd and constructed by Daewoo
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). The safety case for the Nimrod MR2 aircraft was not
developed during the design phase, due to the age of the
Although not a new concept, the safety case is not a widely platform. This meant that during the development of the
used construct in the marine industry, whether at Wholeship Safety Case, opportunities were not available to influence
or Equipment level. Considering the operating the design, and the design information available was legacy
requirements and the level of input into both the design and information.
through-life management of commercial shipping from
Classification Societies, International and National What Is A Safety Case?
legislative bodies, e.g. the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO), the UK Maritime and Coastguard Issue 5 of JSP 430 [19] defines a safety case as:
Agency (MCA) or the United States Coast Guard (USCG),
this lack of a safety case for the majority of commercial a set of structured arguments, supported by a body of
shipping is understandable. A Wholeship Safety Case evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and
however, becomes essential when a ship becomes more valid case that a system is safe to operate and is operated
complex through a military capability and requires a safely and environmentally soundly for a given application
risk-based approach. in a given operating environment.

THE CONCEPT OF THE WHOLESHIP SAFETY CASE The body of evidence supporting the Safety Case compiles
all of the evidence that the ship has been designed to
The History of Safety Cases in the United Kingdom appropriate standards, constructed in accordance with the
design and is maintained and managed safely through life.
The concept of a safety case was introduced in the nuclear Examples of this evidence would be Classification Society
power industry as far back as 1965 [1], but it wasnt until approval for the design, supported by surveys undertaken
the introduction of the Control of Industrial Major during construction and prior to the ship being handed over,
Accidents Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations [22] (the and continuous survey through life with a clearly defined
implementation of the 1982 EC Directive 82/501/EEC [8]) and implemented maintenance regime.
that the concept of hazard identification and management
began to be used more widely [5]. CIMAH, later In this context the concept of safe is subjective and
superseded by the Control Of Major Accident Hazards means freedom from unacceptable or intolerable levels of
(COMAH) Regulations 1999 [23], was developed in harm [19]. It is clear that absolute safety is impossible to
response to the Flixborough disaster of 1974 [11]. attain and as such UK Case Law employs the ALARP
principle when assessing risk reduction measures
The CIMAH regulations implemented a safety assessment undertaken by Duty Holders or employers. Risks are said
regime mainly within the chemical industry to ensure the to be ALARP if it can be shown that the cost of reducing
safety of their on-shore activities. Following the Piper the risk further is grossly disproportionate to the benefit
Alpha disaster in 1988, in which 167 workers lost their gained [4]. It should be noted that UK Health and Safety
lives, a public inquiry led by Lord Cullen was undertaken. at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) [2] imposes a duty on
Lord Cullens report [5] concluded that the formal safety employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable
assessments conducted for on-shore facilities should be (SFAIRP), the health, safety and welfare at work of all their
developed to cover off-shore installations. He also noted employees. These two concepts are considered to be
that these safety assessments were often recorded within a equivalent.

112
This gap can be filled by using a risk-based approach to the
As part of a Wholeship Safety Case it is also necessary to assessment. A risk-based assessment can take many forms
consider equipment and system level safety. From the from a simple desktop hazard identification to a more
design and system architecture there is a logical hierarchy complex Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). The
to the safety documentation as shown in Fig 1. An approach taken will depend on the complexity of the area
Equipment Safety Case provides the body of evidence for being considered and some examples of different methods
the equipment, this then forms part of the body of evidence are shown in this paper.
for the System Safety Case, which in turn forms part of the
body of evidence for the Wholeship Safety Case. It is Identifying Hazards and Assessing Risks
accepted that not all equipment requires a safety case: for
example, some simple Commercial Off the Shelf There are a range of regulations that are used to ensure the
Equipment (COTS) or a simple equipment such as a small management of safety within the maritime industry, for
valve. However, safety information would be expected in example compliance with Flag State Rules, The ISM
a form such as a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), CE Code [15] and Standards of Training, Certification and
marking or other equivalent marking. Watchkeeping (STCW) for Seafarers [14]. These policies
cover international navies (depending on manning
arrangements), the offshore oil sector and commercial ship
Wholeship operation. The areas covered by these regulations provide
Safety Case
methods for the assessment of safety for example:
goal-based regulation, formal safety assessment, functional
System 1 System 2 System X safety, health and safety management systems and ship
Safety Case Safety Case Safety Case certification. The aim of these documents is to ensure
hazards are identified and risks are managed for the ship in
Equipment Equipment Equipment Equipment Equipment all of its operating contexts.
1 Safety 2 Safety 1 Safety 2 Safety X Safety
Case Case case Case Case These regulations, as a general rule, consider those areas
Equipment that could be classed as the significant hazards or those
3 Safety hazards that apply to all floating vessels, for example
Information
stability or escape and evacuation. In the maritime
Fig. 1: Hierarchy of Safety Cases industry, safety is inherently considered during the design
of the ship, for example, by designing a hull that is stable
At various points of the ships lifecycle, a Safety Case and will withstand the environmental operating envelope
Report is produced which provides a summary of the Safety the personnel working onboard are naturally protected.
Case. These reports usually coincide with milestones in These significant hazards, in the main, fall into the category
the ships life, for example at the end of detailed design to of basic design requirements and tend to be driven by
provide assurance that the design is safe; at the start of the prescriptive goal-based requirements. Significant hazards
ships in-service phase of the life-cycle to document that and the approach to them are covered in more detail later in
the ship is safe to go to sea; or after a major refit period to this paper.
reflect the changes in the ship.
Hazardous areas or activities that are not covered by these
Developing the Body of Evidence policies will require a different approach to the
identification of hazards. The risk-based approach
There are several types of evidence that are used to provide considers how all aspects of a design or operation of a ship
the majority of the body of evidence: Classification Society could be hazardous and often interfaces with a significant
Rules, Statutory Regulations such as Safety Of Life At Sea hazard. For example, when considering movement around
(SOLAS) and Maritime Pollution (MARPOL), Naval the ship a fall from height may be identified, the
Authority Certification and, evidence provided by consequence of which is determined by the surface on
risk-based hazard identification and risk assessment. which the falling person lands e.g. a deck, equipment or
overboard into the sea. This has the potential to have a
Lloyds Register has defined a specific set of Naval direct influence on the design in that area. Mitigations
Rules [13] against which an increasing number of Naval then need to be identified that will help reduce either the
Auxiliaries and Ships are being designed, constructed and likelihood of occurrence or the consequence of the accident.
maintained. These rules provide standards for the design To continue with the fall from height example, if this
of naval systems that may not exist on commercial ships, activity is a frequent event then the designer may consider
for example RAS, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical the addition of guardrails or safety nets, or it may be more
Defence (NBCD), or that may be used in a different way, appropriate to provide fall arrest equipment and connection
for example the propulsion system. However these rules points in order to limit the consequence.
only consider the design of the equipment. Within the
Wholeship Safety Case the design of the system would fall When hazards are identified, the risk to personnel needs to
within the certification body of evidence whilst its be considered, what level of injury they are likely to suffer
operation would remain a gap. and the frequency of occurrence of this injury. These
assessments can be undertaken using either quantitative or
qualitative methods.

113
any additional Naval Authority requirements have been
Reporting The Findings complied with. This task is often delegated to a
Recognised Organisation such as a Classification Society.
In order to provide a body of evidence the design,
construction and through-life management activities A Risk-based Approach
undertaken must be documented. For the design, this
evidence is in the form of approved drawings and Other Naval Authority areas also demand compliance with
supporting documentation, approval and certification. Classification, Statutory and Flag State rules. However,
Any hazards identified as part of the design also need to be these rules are generally based around a commercial ship
documented. These are recorded in a hazard log. This such as a tanker or ferry, and are not necessarily sufficient
records a description of the hazard, the risk assessment, the for a military application.
mitigations identified to reduce the hazard to a level that is
ALARP, and the person(s) responsible for managing the For example, in the case of bad weather a cargo ship might
hazard and implementing the mitigations. A Safety Case navigate around the storm, or seek shelter in port, whereas a
Report is used to provide a summary of the body of military ship is required to continue to carry out its duty.
evidence. Furthermore, a military ship is expected to be able to
sustain a certain amount of damage without significant
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDOUS AREAS degradation of its key capabilities - for example, by
providing higher levels of redundancy.
What Might Be Considered A Significant Hazardous Area?
As such, the Naval Authority applies a risk-based approach
Significant hazard areas are those areas of ship design or to meet a wider range of capabilities than is expected for
operation that are assessed as presenting the greatest risk to commercially-operated ships. In order to take account of
operators, maintainers or others. the military operational imperative, it expects to see a
Safety Case arguing that the risks have been managed to a
The UK MoD Naval Authority Regulations (JSP 430 Part level that is ALARP.
3) [19] define a significant failure as a defect of a system
that can cause, or has the potential to cause, an adverse Some Classification Societies have begun to develop
effect on a particular defined capability of a ship. Hazards specific rules for military applications, for example Lloyds
that could lead to a significant failure must be examined by Register Naval Ship Rules [13]. These rules are
the Naval Authority, through a submission prepared by the harmonised across a number of Classification Societies
MoD Platform Team. Following their audit, the Naval through the Naval Ship Code [21].
Authority will issue a Certificate of Safety.
HOW CAN INTERFACES BE MANAGED SAFELY
JSP 430 Part 3 defines the following hazardous areas, each
covered by their own Certificate of Safety: Methods for Identifying Interfaces
Structure, Buoyancy and Stability;
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue; Any Naval Auxiliary design begins with a set of User
Propulsion, Manoeuvring & Navigation Systems; Requirements. This is essentially a list of ideal
Fire Detection & Fighting; capabilities the ship would have. These User
Aviation Requirements are usually produced once a capability gap
Explosives has been identified. Simplistically the User Requirement
for a Naval Auxiliary might be to support other naval
These areas are also broadly reflected in the structure of vessels, over time, in both national and international waters.
ANEP-77, the NATO Naval Ship Code [21].
This User Requirement would then be developed into a set
How Are Significant Hazards Designed Out? of System Requirements that would be refined to ensure
that they can be achieved within the budget and would form
A Prescriptive Approach the basis of a contract specification. An article written for
the Canadian American Strategic Review [3] describes how
Some significant hazardous areas are addressed through the Norwegian Forsvaret Logistikkorganisasjon, Norways
prescriptive means for both commercial and naval shipping. Defence Logistics Organisation, requested tenders for a
Structural strength, buoyancy and stability requirements are support vessel for the Sjforsvaret, the Norwegian Navy.
well established rules with which the ship designer must The original System Requirement included a
comply. Similarly for escape and evacuation, SOLAS Roll-On/Roll-Off capacity, at sea replenishment, cargo
provides prescriptive rules about the quantity and nature of handling and modular accommodation, but no design could
escape routes and the provision of life saving equipment, achieve all of these capabilities for an affordable budget.
based on the role and crew size of the ship. After reviewing these requirements, the Defence Logistics
Organisation were able to identify a set of System
Where a naval ship is designed, built and maintained Requirements that were developed into Design
through life to applicable Class, Statutory and Flag State Requirements and have resulted in a contract being placed
rules, the Naval Authority seeks evidence that these and between Forsvaret, the Ministry of National Defence in the
Government of Norway, and DSME for the design and

114
production of the first purpose built Logistics Support ship falls within the Safety Case for the receiving ship.
Vessel (LSV) for the Norwegian Navy. Ensuring the ships maintain an appropriate steady course
speed, and separation is part of the Navy-wide operating
Once a set of System Requirements have been identified, procedures.
these are developed into Design Requirements. Design
Requirements are then used to formulate a design solution. If this identification of interfaces is undertaken for each
Once the Design Requirements have been identified it design requirement, a complex network of interfaces is
becomes possible to begin to identify interfaces that require quickly developed representing the Design Requirements.
safe management. It we once again take the example of Although the outcome of the review of the Design
RAS we can begin to identify where interfaces may occur. Requirements appears complicated, the identification
For example, to conduct a RAS safely, a steady speed is process is a relatively simple exercise. However, this
required. The production of a steady speed is through the approach is not without risk. A simple review of the
Propulsion System resulting in a direct interface between Design Requirements will not identify the interfaces within
these two systems. Examination of the Propulsion System the design solution, but only those between the
reveals that it is supported by a number of auxiliary systems, requirements. A full review of the design should be
resulting in another interface. undertaken to identify the interfaces, but this would require
a certain level of maturity of the design. Beginning the
Therefore, if we are to consider the movement of liquid safety review when the design is at this maturity level
cargo from one ship to another whilst underway there are a would make it difficult to influence the design from a safety
number of interfaces with other systems in the ship. Fig 2 perspective so it is essential to identify the interfaces as
shows an example of the various interfaces within the ship. early as possible in the design phase. This can be
achieved by developing the interfaces within the design
requirements and then conducting a validation exercise.
Platform
Cargo Pump
Management
System
System
This validation exercise should involve the design team as
they will be able to provide appropriate evidence for the use
Electrical System
of interfaces and identify the detailed and specific
interfaces associated with the design solution. This will
Other Machinery
Systems
also help to identify any areas where design requirements
RAS RIG
Other Mechanical
Systems
have been changed or are being met through alternative
design options. The output of this validation process
should not only confirm the interfaces to be considered but
any items excluded from the design, for example the
PROPULSION RAS
Receiving Ships RAS equipment.
Hydraulic System
SYSTEM OPERATION

Once the interfaces have been identified, these can then be


used as part of the through-life safety management. If a
change is made to a system during the life of the ship, for
NAVIGATION
SYSTEM RECEIVING example a new propulsion system, the interfaces can be
SHIP
reviewed to ensure that all aspects of the ship are
considered.

Documenting the Interfaces


Electrical System COMMUNICATION
SYSTEM
Once the interfaces have been identified these should be
documented. It is essential to have this documentation to
ensure that the interfaces are not forgotten or lost during the
Fig. 2: Example of Interfaces That May Be Associated design phase. It is also necessary to provide an auditable
With RAS Operations document trail for the decision process used as these
interfaces will form the basis of the safety assessment
As is demonstrated by developing the interfaces for RAS process. This document trail will also form part of the
operations, it can quickly become a complex network of body of evidence for the safety case.
interfaces. There are also opportunities for some systems
to interface with more than one system. For example, the The documentation should identify the interfaces, the
electrical system is required in order to operate the RAS rig, boundary of the safety case activities and any assumptions
the propulsion system, the navigation systems and that have been made. The boundaries of the safety case
communications. As Fig 2 illustrates there are also will identify any areas excluded from the safety assessment,
interfaces external to the ship and its systems, in this such as the Receiving Ship RAS equipment in our example.
example the Receiving Ship. These interfaces also need to Any assumptions that have been identified must also be
be considered to establish if they fall within the remit of the recorded for the body of evidence of the safety case. These
design or are excluded. For example in a RAS operation assumptions may impose requirements on obtaining further
the delivering ship is responsible for the RAS rig and hoses, information, for example that all equipment will be
but the responsibility for connecting this to the receiving

115
delivered with a safety case, or assumptions about the
operation of the ship, e.g. that RAS will occur at set speeds.

There are many ways in which the interfaces can be


recorded and the chosen method may be strongly
influenced by the complexity of the design and the number
of interfaces. BMT Cadence has developed an approach
to the recording of interfaces and boundaries. An example
of this is shown diagrammatically in Appendix 1.

The boundaries and assumptions diagram was initially


developed for the safety assessment developed as part of
the basic design of the LSV for the Norwegian Navy. The
diagram was used to define the LSV, its capability and
interfaces, as well as exclusions not covered by the hazard
identification up to the preliminary design review at the end
of basic design. The boundaries and assumptions
associated with the safety (including fire safety) and
environmental aspects of the LSV design were defined
during a meeting held with the BMT Defence Services
Design Area Leaders (DAL).

The elements captured define the attributes of the basic


design that were covered under the safety and
environmental management remits. The definitions of the
components in the diagram are as follows:

Platform - the requirements and specifications for


the LSV to fulfil the basic capability of a ship i.e. Fig 3a: Example of Interconnecting Nodes
to accommodate the crew, float and move;
Inter-operability - the requirements and Fixed Line
specifications of the LSV to perform the tasks that
are of value to the Norwegian Defence Logistics
Organisation (the reasons that the ship is being Ship to Air
built); Military
Interfaces - the parts of the design that have
important interactions, in terms of safety and
environmental risks, that need to be considered; (a) COMMS
Exclusions - or boundaries are areas not covered
by the safety and environmental management remit
as they are either:
Civil Ship to Ship
outside of the designer's control at basic
design;
not relevant at this stage of the design
process; or Electrical
are operational aspects of the LSV. (b)

The boundaries diagram visually presents the links and Fig 3b: Example of Interconnected Node
interfaces between systems. However, for a whole ship
this is a complex diagram with many links between systems. Appendix 1 shows examples of those areas of the design
It can be seen that a number of nodes require linking, but that are covered by classification or statutory certification.
the complexity of the diagram produced cross-connections This colour-coding demonstrates how much of the ship
that would cut through other nodes, making the diagram design falls within the requirements of certification and
hard to interpret on paper. To avoid this confusion, links clearly demonstrates that the majority of risk-based
have been made using nodules labelled with the system activities are required for the operability of the ship.
name and a unique identifier as shown in Fig 3a and 3b.
These diagrams are a subset of the Wholeship nodes Each node on the diagram was identified as a principal
presented in Appendix 1. hazard area. These principal hazards formed the basis for
the hazard identification process and were key to
identifying where an interface crossed a system design
boundary. When hazards or accidents were identified that
had a direct influence on another principal hazard area,

116
these were reviewed in tandem. By doing this, we could year, or per ship lifetime, or across the fleet. Likelihood
ensure that the mitigating actions could be implemented may be quantified using a Fault Tree or Event Tree or
effectively and proportionally to reduce the risks associated similar technique, or may be estimated by review of failure
with both principal hazard areas. rates or historical evidence, or based on the experience of
those in the room.
DEVELOPING HAZARDS
Director Ships within MoD Defence Equipment and
Methods for Identifying Hazards Support has established a common Risk Classification
Matrix [17] against which all MoD shipping risks are
A hazard is defined in JSP 430 [19] as potential to cause assessed. This allows comparisons and aggregations of
harm e.g. a physical situation or state of a system, often risk to be measured across the fleet and this matrix was
following from some initiating event, that may lead to an used on the UK MoD Tide Class design.
accident.
Following risk assessment, the matrix is used to combine
In contrast, an accident is defined as an event, or sequence the likelihood and impact to produce a Risk Classification
of events, that causes unintended harm. of A, B, C or D.

There are many techniques to identify hazards, of varying The four Risk Classifications are defined as shown in Table
degrees of rigour. A formal HAZOP is an example of a 1 below. The military are prepared to accept risks at a
rigorous technique. Developed for the chemical process higher level than would be deemed appropriate for a
industry, it follows a methodical sequence to examine every commercial ship due to the military operational imperative,
node of an operation in turn, and consider all the ways in but it is still necessary to demonstrate that all reasonably
which the process could operate abnormally at that node. practicable measures have been taken.
It uses guide words such as More of, Less of, None
of, Reverse and others to comprehensively analyse how For example, on the Tide Class tankers, the risk of collision
a system could fail and what the consequences would be. during an abeam RAS is a Class B risk which has been
endorsed as ALARP. This reflects the inherent residual
Ships do not lend themselves to such a rigorous technique. danger in such an operation, despite the fact that all
The number of interacting systems to take into account, reasonable safety measures have been identified and put in
along with external factors (e.g. weather, other ships and place. The military imperative means that the ship must
human operators) would be unmanageable. An alternative deliberately put itself in harms way to meet its mission.
is to use Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT) - a
systematic team-oriented technique for hazard identification. Class Description
It considers deviations from normal operations identified by A Unacceptable. Risk cannot be justified
brainstorming, with questions beginning What if? or except in exceptional circumstances.
How could?. The brainstorming may be supported by B Tolerable only if further risk reduction is
checklists to help avoid overlooking hazards. SWIFT is impracticable and if the penalties are grossly
dependent upon the team of Suitably Qualified and disproportionate to the improvement gained
Experienced Personnel (SQEP) to bring to the table their (ALARP).
experience of the system under examination, or similar C Tolerable if the penalties are grossly
systems. The meeting facilitator is responsible for disproportionate to the improvements gained
ensuring that everyone has an opportunity to contribute. (ALARP)
D Broadly Acceptable. Must still be ALARP,
Conducting Risk Assessments but no need for detailed assessment.
Necessary to ensure the risk remains at this
Having identified hazards it is then necessary to assess the level.
associated risk. This provides a means to rank and Table 1: Risk Classifications
prioritise the hazards. This is done by assessing against
two criteria. Developing Mitigations

The first is severity: supposing that an accident occurs as Of course, the purpose of identifying hazards is not simply
a result of the hazard, what is the impact? As well as the to produce a list of them. The aim is to manage the risk
obvious human impact (injury or death), this may be an posed by the hazard to acceptable levels.
impact on the environment (e.g. leakage) or damage to the
ship or platform itself. By considering the platform and In general, it is not possible to eliminate all risk associated
environment at this point in the assessment, changes can be with a particular equipment, system or operation. All
made to the design and operation of the platform that have activities inherently carry risk. However, UK Law states
the benefit of reducing these risks thereby improving the that we have a duty to ensure that the level of risk posed
service life and the environmental impact of the ship. ALARP. Risk can be minimised by:

The second is likelihood: What are the chances, given that Reduce the Likelihood: Even though the
the hazard exists, that it will lead to the identified accident consequences may remain severe, you reduce the
occurring? This may be measured in terms of likelihood per chance of the accident occurring.

117
Reduce the Impact: This focusses on the outcome Reducing Risk
and tries to make it less severe.
Whether action is taken to reduce the likelihood or the
Mitigations can be grouped into various types, as shown in impact, this will reduce the overall level of risk. The
Table 2 below. Those near the top of the list are harder, reduction is generally a qualitative assessment of the
and so typically more costly, to achieve, but are more change to likelihood or impact, with the new risk
effective at reducing the risk. classification derived from the matrix.

Mitigation Description In reality though, the level of risk is a continuum, not


Elimination Redesign the equipment/system or simply one of the four discrete levels, as shown in Fig 3
change the task such that the below. Action that reduces the risk from a High C to a
hazardous circumstance does not arise. Low C may still be desirable - even if it does not appear
Engineering Provide additional physical measures to affect the Risk Class, the risk has still been reduced.
Control to reduce the risk - e.g. guard rails, fall
arrestors, ventilation
Procedural Provide instructions/procedures to Intolerable
Control carry out the task safely. E.g. Job Region
Instruction Cards (JICs), Standard Class A
Operating Procedures (SOPs),
operator/maintainer manuals, safety
signage Tolerable and
Personal If the risk cannot be reduced by any ALARP
Protective other method, ensure the person at risk Region
Equipment (PPE) is suitably protected - e.g. hard hats, Class B or C
goggles, boots, etc.
Table 2: Hierarchy of Mitigation

For real-world examples of these mitigations, consider the


hazard of working at height on a ship - perhaps on a mast or Broadly
funnel. Clearly, the associated accident would be a fall Acceptable
from height onto the deck below. Examples of the four Class D
types of mitigations are as shown in Table 3 below:

Mitigation Description
Elimination Design the ship such that there is no
reason to go aloft in the first place - Fig 4: The HSE Framework for the Tolerability of Risk
e.g. no equipment requiring
maintenance in that location. Reasonably Practicable is generally a subjective
Engineering Provide a guard rail and working judgement. JSP 430 [19] defines ALARP as being the
Control platform where the work is to be state where the cost of any further risk reduction (in terms
undertaken, provide clip point for of money, time or trouble including the loss of defence
harness; design the equipment such capability), is grossly disproportionate to the benefit
that minimal or infrequent obtained from that risk reduction which involves weighing
maintenance is required. a risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control
Procedural Procedure for the task setting out it.
Control method of work and stressing the risk;
Working at Height to be risk-assessed In order to determine more objectively what constitutes
and a Permit-To-Work granted by a grossly disproportionate, it can be useful to assign a
responsible person, taking into account monetary value to achieving a reduction in the risk of death.
sea conditions and other such factors. The Health & Safety Executive [9] provides guidance to
Personal Harness, Hard Hat industry sectors (including the MoD) in setting a
Protective benchmark Value to Prevent a Fatality (VPF). This is of
Equipment (PPE) particular use in calculating the safety benefit gained from
implementing a mitigating action if a Cost Benefit Analysis
Table 3: Example of hierarchy of mitigation
is the method employed to justify that risk is ALARP. The
cost of implementing engineering solutions can be justified
It is clear from this that the first two are relatively easy and
by calculating the incremental reduction in risk achieved
cost effective to achieve during the design phase, though
per fatality avoided per single installation where the system
they might be difficult or prohibitively expensive to
is installed and used over many years. This can help in
retro-fit at a later date. Note that these mitigations are
making and justifying a decision as to gross disproportion.
often interlinked - for instance there is no benefit in
Note that VPF is not the value that society, or the courts,
providing a harness with nowhere to clip it onto.

118
might put on the life of a real person or the compensation The Body of Evidence
appropriate to its loss.
The body of evidence that forms the basis of any safety
As it is subjective, an ALARP justification is required that case should encompass all relevant evidence that supports
sets out why those responsible for the hazard consider its the argument that the ship is safe in design and safe to
risks to be ALARP, and that justification is to be endorsed operate. This section aims to describe some of the
by a properly-constituted Safety Committee. evidence that is expected, but this list is not exhaustive and
the evidence should be identified for each individual safety
Reviewing Risks case. The body of evidence should be maintained through
the life of the ship as information changes.
There is a requirement, periodically through the life of the
ship, to review the hazards and risks identified. The Design Information
review should consider whether the hazard or risk has
changed. A change may occur for many reasons, for When considering whether a design is safe, the design
example: a change in the lifecycle phase, a change to the information is an essential piece of evidence. This
operating envelope, or a change of role. information would include all drawings, calculations and
reports that provide the details of the design. It should
The hazards should be reviewed to ensure that no changes also include all design approval whether this is internal to
have occurred to any of the hazard information, including the design, for example checking of calculations, or
the risk assessment, and that the risk remains ALARP. external from a Classification Society or other approval
body. The design of naval ships to Classification Society
DEVELOPING A SAFETY CASE rules provides a cost-effective solution to meet capability
requirements.
The Purpose Of The Safety Case
The intent of providing this evidence is twofold: to
As stated previously the purpose of a safety case is to demonstrate the underlying integrity of the design; and, by
provide: proving the design meets the design criteria and design
requirements, demonstrating that the ship has been safely
a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, designed.
that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case
that a system is safe for a given application in a given Certification - Classification and Statutory
environment.
Classification and Statutory certification provides a key
By fulfilling this purpose a Wholeship Safety Case provides aspect of assuring safety both in design and through life.
assurance to stakeholders that the ship is safe for all its If we take the new UK Tide Class Tankers currently under
intended operations. The stakeholders for a ship would construction for the UK MoD as an example they have
include Ships Staff, Regulators whether in the form of three different types of certification. The ships are being
Classification Societies or other certification bodies, and built to Lloyds Rules as defined in the Technical
owners. For the UK MoD, the ownership is managed by Specification [20] and will be delivered with Lloyds
two separate entities or duty holders. Certification covering areas of Stability, Structures, and
propulsion systems. This certification will be maintained
The Platform Duty Holder (PDH) is responsible for the through life. The ships are also required to meet Statutory
design and upkeep of the ship whilst the Operating Duty Certification including SOLAS and MARPOL. The ships
Holder (ODH) is responsible for the safe operation of the also comply with aspects of the Naval Ship Code [21], as
ship in accordance with its defined operating envelope. In tailored by the Technical Specification [20]. Finally the UK
the commercial industry this ownership regime might be MoD have their own certification body called the Naval
seen as the equivalent of a ship leasing arrangement Authority Group (NAG). This body is independent of
whereby the ship lease company is responsible for a ship both the Duty Holder and the operator and provides
that is of a safe design and construction (the PDH role) certification that the ship meets the requirements laid down
whilst the lessee is responsible for the safe operation of the in JSP 430 [19]. This MoD certification body was
ship (the ODH role). developed to provide assurance that MoD shipping is
designed and maintained safely and is therefore safe to
However, the purpose of a safety case is not only an operate.
assurance role. A comprehensive safety case can also
provide a legal defence that best efforts have been made to Certification may be granted to a ship from any of these
reduce the risk to personnel associated with the operation of certification bodies with caveats or limitations. These,
the equipment or ship. It can be seen from the Nimrod along with the proposed solutions and timeframes should be
Review [7] that a safety case that is not comprehensive is recorded as part of the body of evidence. Such evidence
not capable of supporting a legal defence and can leave should be referenced in the Safety Case Report.
governments, companies and individuals open to blame.
All of this certification is required to be maintained through
life. Classification Society and Statutory certification
have clearly defined survey and certification regimes and

119
the MoD Naval Authority certification has similar It should be noted that a comprehensive hazard log will
stipulations. For example, if a ship is docked, the Naval record closed or non-credible hazards along with
Authority certification is suspended and evidence has to be justification for the decision that these hazards are not
re-submitted to provide assurance that either the changes pertinent to the design.
made to the ship have no impact on the scope of
certification, or that changes meet the appropriate The hazard log is a live document that is used, maintained
requirements prior to certification being re-instated. and reviewed throughout the life of the ship.
Classification Societies maintain certification through a
regime of surveys, the Lloyds Register surveys for Naval Training Records
ships are summarised in their document Naval Ship Safety
Assurance Guidance for Navies and Shipbuilders [10]. The competence and currency of competence of individuals
is a significant mitigation to the majority of hazards that
The intent of certification as part of the body of evidence is cannot be designed out. For example, if a fire occurs
to demonstrate that the design and through-life management onboard a naval ship, the competence of the compartment
of the ship is independently reviewed and certified. re-entry team is as important as the firefighting equipment.
If a re-entry team is not appropriately trained then
Technical Studies additional lives may be put at risk whilst attempting to fight
the fire in a compartment.
Technical studies can provide essential evidence to the
safety case. These studies may concentrate on a specific Therefore, a significant part of the body of evidence is
design solution, such as a study detailing the benefits of demonstrated through the provision of relevant training and
new or novel equipment and the reasons for selecting it as the training records of the ships crew. Competence of the
part of the design. Alternatively, they might contain crew in terms of their RFA Seamanship training,
details of how and why technical details have been tailored,. STCW [14] and specific role/equipment training is critical,
For instance, a naval auxiliary may tailor the SOLAS Safe both in the safe operation and maintenance of the ship and
Return To Port requirements to ensure the ship could its systems, and in an effective response to emergency
undertake a safe return to port, whilst remaining within the situations. These training records will demonstrate the
physical and budgetary restrictions placed on the design. qualification, experience and therefore competence of the
A technical study may also be used to provide evidence of a crew and should be maintained throughout the life of the
mitigation against a hazard, whether this is a design ship.
justification or the results of a Cost Benefit Analysis.
The approval of a design by a Classification Society
This type of document is essential to a safety case body of provides evidence that the design team is SQEP to produce
evidence as it often provides information on the design or the design. The competence of the ship builder is assessed
decision making process that would otherwise be a through the Classification Societys survey and approval of
potential gap in evidence. the build process and as-built ship. UK MoD also
undertake shipyard audits and inspections to provide
Hazard Log assurance that the yard is capable of delivering the ship
safely.
The hazard log is a vital part of the body of evidence. The
hazard log records the hazards that have been identified and The competence of the designers and builders is also a key
their associated risk assessment. It also contains details of part of the argument. The Safety Case must demonstrate
the mitigations that have been identified which, during the that those involved in the design and construction of the
design process, should signpost design changes. ship are competent to do so.

As well as the hazard log recording the hazard and its Maintenance Procedures
associated risk assessment it also records the person
responsible for managing the hazard. Once a hazard has A significant aspect of maintaining the safety of the ship
been detailed it is then possible to start identifying actions and its equipment is to ensure that maintenance is
to mitigate the hazard. These actions should mitigate or conducted in accordance with the maintenance regime
reduce one or both of the likelihood or consequence of the required by the equipment manufacturer, Classification
risk and will also need to be allocated to the individual who Society and/or ship owner. It is therefore essential that the
has the budget to complete the action. As discussed required maintenance is documented through appropriate
previously it is possible at the design stage for a mitigating procedures and that a schedule has been developed for the
action to design out (eliminate) the hazard. maintenance. The body of evidence for the safety case
should consequently include details of the maintenance
The hazard log provides the currently recorded status of procedures
each hazard, the history of the hazard and any future actions
that are required to be completed at a later date, for Maintenance support may be required from Original
example, outfitting the ship under construction with Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) or other shore-based
lifesaving appliances. The hazard log is also the format facilities. Although these maintenance items will be
for recording the ALARP statement for each hazard. identified as part of the ships maintenance schedule, the
responsibility for the activities being conducted safely falls

120
outside the boundary of the ships Safety Case, and rests
with the organisation in question. Functional
Claim Area Claim
Operating Procedures

The defined operation of the ship is fundamental to the


safety case as this operational envelope defines the basis of
the boundaries of the safety assessment. To ensure that
the ship is operated within this envelope, operating Arguments are
procedures must be defined. Argument made to justify the
claim
The operating procedures form a key part of the body of
evidence as they detail how the ship should be operated to
remain within the operational envelope. Evidence is provided
to support claims
For a new-build ship, the development of operating Evidence and arguments
procedures significantly influences the competency of the
crew, and may identify specific training requirements. For
example, the Bosch Rexroth abeam RAS stations installed
on the Tide Class Tankers have not been used within the
Fig 4: An Example CAE Diagram.
UK MoD before. This has resulted in the development of
new operating procedures and training courses to support
Identifying Forward Actions
the safe operation of the equipment.
A key role of the SCR is to provide details of the forward
The Safety Case Report
actions that are outstanding. These forward actions may
be mitigating actions that have not been completed or other
The Safety Case Report (SCR) provides a snapshot in time
outstanding activities that may be required depending on
of the status of the safety case and its body of evidence.
where the ship is in its lifecycle.
The SCR records the status of the safety case at a particular
time within the ships lifecycle and is only valid and current
Forward actions should identify what ongoing management
until changes occur to the body of evidence.
is required to complete the action, the owner or person
responsible for completing the action and the due date by
The Safety Argument
which the action is required to be competed.
The body of evidence that supports the safety case is
Independent Review
reported within the SCR as the safety argument. The
safety argument aims to provide a clear and structured
There are two types of independent review - those
argument that the ship is safe for its intended operation.
conducted by Classification Societies, and for the UK MoD
those conducted by an Independent Safety Auditor (ISA).
There are several ways of structuring the safety argument
The role of the Classification Societies in providing
and the structure is often defined by the complexity of the
independent technical assurance is well understood, so this
system. The safety argument for a simple system may be
section considers the benefit of an ISA review of the
addressed entirely through compliance with standards,
risk-based aspects of the Safety Case.
regulations and rules, whereas a complex system such as a
whole ship may require a more structured approach for
The production of a SCR is an opportunity for an
example through the use of Goal Structuring Notation
independent audit of the whole safety assessment process.
(GSN) or Claims Argument Evidence (CAE).
The UK MoD requires all SCRs to go through an
independent review to ensure that the process as described
BMT Cadence has used a CAE approach for the
in JSP 430 [19] has been appropriately followed.
newly-designed Naval Auxiliaries with which it has been
involved. This approach uses a set of claims and
The Nimrod Review [7] details the independent review
sub-claims against which arguments are developed that the
process that was followed and the inadequacies of the
available evidence supports the claim. Fig 4 provides an
process used. This report highlighted that part of the
example of how a CAE diagram is constructed. During
problem was a lack of distinction between the roles of
the design phase a traffic light system was used to
technical assurance and independent audit. It is crucial to
colour-code the CAE diagrams. This traffic light system
understand these differences when contracting for either
is a simple method of identifying where arguments are not
role as part of a ship build project. The Nimrod Review
fully defined or evidence has not been completed.
identified that there is a need for independent review to
Appendix 2 shows how the CAE diagram can be developed
consider both the process and the process output for legacy
and the traffic light system utilised.
equipment.

121
To maintain appropriate independence, an ISA should not operator (Operating Duty Holder). The safety case should
have detailed experience of the ship or system under review, be maintained and updated to take into account any changes
and therefore audit of the process output will include to the ships operational profile or material state over its
validation that evidence exists to support the completed service life.
mitigations identified for each action.
At Disposal, the safety case serves to provide assurance of
Independent Technical Assurance as undertaken by a safety, and awareness of the locations of any hazardous
Classification Society, however, will require experience of materials, to a new purchaser, dismantler or recycler.
similar ship or system design.
For the Tide Class Tanker, the first ship has been accepted
References to the independent audit are a significant part of off contract, and is undergoing customization for the full
the body of evidence, since they provide assurance that, military capability prior to entry into service. As such,
through following the published process, all aspects of ship responsibility for the safety case has transferred from the
safety have been appropriately considered. shipbuilder to the customisation contractor, who will update
the hazard log and safety case to reflect the changed
Managing the Safety Case With A Safety Management material state of the ship.
System
In order to ensure this process is followed, and that there
The MOD uses a six-phase acquisition cycle knows as are no gaps, a Safety Management System (SMS) is
CADMID to manage the acquisition of defence required. This is usually documented within a Safety and
equipment [16]. The six stages are: Environmental Management Plan (SEMP), which
developed in the early stages of the project. It sets out:
Concept
Assessment An outline of the equipment/system/ship;
Demonstration Agreed safety requirements, targets;
Manufacture Organisation & responsibilities - MOD is a
In-Service complex chain of authorities, with different
Disposal customers and users depending upon the phase
in the CADMID cycle;
The focus of the safety management activity is different at Structure of the Safety Case;
each phase of the CADMID cycle. During the Concept Timescales for production of documentation;
and Assessment phase, the focus is on using high-level Approval arrangements;
hazard identification to derive safety requirements that will Forward actions
result in a tolerably safe design from the outset. This is a
critical part of design for safety - a safety programme The Safety Case Report Timeline
initiated later in the cycle will have less opportunity to
influence the design. The SCR is only valid at the time of production and
therefore, over the life of the ship, an SCR should be
In the Demonstration phase (for a ship, essentially the Basic produced at key milestones in the ships life, for example:
and Detailed Design stages), the hazards may be refined, as
the design emerges further hazards will arise, and again
At the end of the design phase to demonstrate that the
there is an opportunity to design out (eliminate) hazards
design is safe;
whilst the ship exists only on paper.
At the end of construction to demonstrate that the ship
has been constructed in accordance with the design and
For example, during the design of the Tide Class tankers, a
to ensure it is safe to operate;
hazard was identified related to the Flight Deck Officers
visibility of the flight deck. At the design stage, it was At appropriate times through the in-service phase of
reasonably straightforward to include a build-out in the the lifecycle, for example after a change in role or
FDOs compartment to enable 180 visibility of the flight major refit;
deck. As a later modification, this would have been At the disposal point of the ship to provide assurance
expensive and time-consuming to implement. that the ship is safe to dispose of whether through sale
or dismantling.
A key focus of the Tide Class Safety Case has been to
ensure that such opportunities are identified, recorded and MANAGING SAFETY THROUGH LIFE
implemented.
The safety case is developed during the design phase of the
During Manufacture, the focus is on ensuring that the ships lifecycle and is developed through the construction
safety-related design features identified have been reflected phase providing assurance that the design and construction
into the as-built product. of the ship is safe. The point at which the ship enters
service is a significant milestone as this is when the
Once the ship is accepted into service, responsibility for assumptions and hazards are tested, and is the point at
safety transfers from the ship designer and builder and which operational hazards may manifest themselves.
acquisition Project Team (Platform Duty Holder) to the

122
Ongoing management of the safety case becomes an the ship owner or operator that the ship is tolerably safe.
important aspect of the through-life management of the ship. As detailed in the Naval Ship Safety Assurance
The SMS will identify the through-life milestones at which Guidance [12] the use of Classification Society Rules has
the safety case requires updating to ensure the SCR remains been widespread within the commercial industry for over a
live and relevant to the ship. century and building naval ships to these commercial
standards is becoming more common. The development
When the ship enters service the focus of the safety case of Classification Society Rules for naval ships, for example
changes from the design and construction aspects to the Lloyds Register Rules and Regulations for the
operational aspects of the ship. Hazards will still be Classification of Naval Ships [13] has eased the transition
identified either through the ongoing hazard identification from regulations developed specifically by navies to
process or due to an incident, accident or near miss Classification Society Regulation.
occurring. These details will need to be recorded and
reported in the SCR at the next update of the document. The use of a commercial design for naval auxiliaries, such
as BMTs Aegir, allows governments to purchase their
During the design and construction phase of the ship, ships through commercial shipyards which are experienced
consideration should be given to whether there is any future in delivering such ships quickly and efficiently.
legislation that may impact the ship. For example, the
Marine Pollution (MARPOL) Regulations [10] requiring all There are differences between Naval Auxiliaries and
tankers came into force via a phase-in schedule whilst the commercial shipping that can be easily defined, for
regulation was defined in 1993. Therefore any tanker example, both the Tide Class and the Norwegian LSV have
designed after this regulation came into force should have a number of roles that would not be combined in the
considered the impact of meeting this regulation and commercial world. Where the LSV is one ship that
equally the impact of not meeting this regulation. provides a replenishment capability, a container carrying
role, a solid cargo role, an aviation capability, a hospital
Therefore, when the safety case is reviewed through life, and mothership role, these would likely all be separate
consideration should be given to the impact of current and ships in the commercial industry and some of these roles
future legislation whether this is national or international. may not even be required in industry. These combinations
of roles are one of the key reasons that naval auxiliaries
For example, the Tide Class tankers have been designed require well defined and maintained safety cases to ensure
such that they are compliant with MARPOL Tier 2 Nitrous that areas and interfaces not covered by existing
Oxide (NOx) emissions upon entry into service, but also commercial standards are fully addressed.
such that they may be modified to comply with Tier 3 in the
future with minimal additional work. For specific significant hazardous areas, the Safety Case is
examined by the relevant Naval Authority to support the
When the UK MoD first implemented safety cases, these issue of a Certificate of Safety for the ship. This ensures
were produced for legacy ships and equipment. This that the most significant hazards are subject to rigorous
required significant effort to be made to identify the review.
baseline status for documenting in the SCR. However,
more recently designed and built ships have had safety In order to ensure that all areas of the ship design and
cases produced at the design stage resulting in significant operation are assessed for potential hazards it is essential to
through-life cost savings for the management and update of identify the boundaries of the ship operation and the
this information. interfaces between the systems onboard. This activity
allows those areas of the design that are not covered by
It is acknowledged that during normal operation of a ship, prescriptive regulation to be identified as principal hazard
whether it be military or commercial, there is no direct areas and managed through a risk-based process.
financial benefit to producing the body of evidence required
to support a Safety Case. However, in the event of an This paper has detailed the significant level of additional
incident or accident, the burden of proof that all hazards information that is required to produce and manage a safety
were considered remains with the owner of the ship. In case through life, and the cost benefit may only be seen in
this instance, the benefit of this already-prepared body of the event of an accident. However, with the growth of a
evidence becomes apparent. It can also be used to analyse litigious society the need for a cost effective and
the impact of any change, and to make sure that safety demonstrable baseline providing evidence that all potential
margins are not eroded. hazards and risks have been considered by a ship owner or
operator may increase and the production of a safety case,
CONCLUSIONS summarized in an SCR, would help provide this evidence.

This paper has focused on the development of a safety case The operating ethos is different for naval auxiliaries than
in line with current best practice for Naval Auxiliaries, and commercial shipping, because of the military operational
has, where possible, drawn comparisons with the imperative which means that naval auxiliaries must often
commercial shipping industry. It is accepted by the put themselves in harms way. For example, a
authors that the majority of commercial shipping is not commercial ship will plot a course around a severe storm,
complex, unique or novel in its design and so meeting or seek shelter in a port, whereas the naval auxiliary may be
statutory regulations is sufficient to provide assurance to

123
commanded to a certain location regardless of the weather amendments);
conditions. [16] MoD Defence Equipment & Support - Acquisition System
Guidance (ASG), June 2016;
The military operational imperative also affects the [17] MoD Implementation of Director Ships Common Risk
Classification Matrix, Version 1, June 2009;
response to emergency situations. It is important for naval [18] MoD Joint Services Publication (JSP) 430, Ship Safety
shipping to recover from an incident and continue their Management System Handbook, Volume 1, Issue 1,
mission, part of the Float, Fight, Move philosophy. January 1996 (not publicly available);
However, despite all of these differences there are [19] MoD Joint Services Publication (JSP) 430, Management of
justifications for the development of a safety case in Ship Safety and Environmental Protection;
commercial shipping. There are vessels or platforms in [20] MoD MARS Tanker Schedule 3 Technical Specification
the commercial industry that are complex in design and (redacted version from
operation as they have specific roles or alternatively they https://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-finder-archive/contract/4
have a significant role with passengers. 65670);
[21] NATO Naval Ship Code ANEP-77, Edition F Version 1,
August 2014;
Some areas of the commercial world such as cruise ships or [22] SI1984:1902, Control of Industrial Major Accidents
LNG carriers are already utilizing a risk-based approach to Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations, 1984;
safety management. In this case the body of evidence for [23] SI1999:743, Control of Major Accidents Hazards
the safety case already exists and it would only be a small (COMAH) Regulations, 1999;
step to document this process. [24] SI2013:1471, Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful to UK MoD Commercially


Supported Shipping for their permission to use the Tide
Class Tankers as an illustration in this paper.

REFERENCES

[1] Act of Parliament: 1965 C. 57, Nuclear Installations Act


1965;
[2] Act of Parliament: 1974 C. 37, Health and Safety at Work
etc. Act, 1974;
[3] CASR, A Joint Support Ship Comparison - An AOR
Norwegian Style, Joint Support Ship (JSS) Project News
Release July 2013,
http://www.casr.ca/doc-news-aor-norwegian-style.htm;
[4] Court of Appeal Judgment in Edwards v. National Coal
Board, [1949] 1 All ER 743;
[5] Cullen, The Honorable Lord, The Public Enquiry into the
Piper Alpha Disaster, HM Stationery Office, 1990;
[6] DCI GEN 270/93, Arrangements for the Management of
Safety for MoD Ships (not publicly available);
[7] Haddon-Cave, Charles QC, The Nimrod Review, An
Independent Review Into The Broader Issues Surrounding
he Loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in
Afghanistan in 2006, October 2009;
[8] European Commission Directive 82/501/EEC issued in
1982 (known as the Seveso Directive);
[9] Health & Safety Executive: Reducing Risks, Protecting
People: HSEs decision making process, 2001, ISBN 0
7176 2151 0;
[10] IMO International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 1973, as amended;
[11] Kelly, Timothy, Arguing Safety - A systematic Approach
To Managing Safety Cases, 1998;
[12] Lloyds Register Marine, Naval Ship Safety Assurance
Guidance for Navies and Shipbuilders, 2014;
[13] Lloyds Register Rules and Regulations for the
Classification of Naval Ships, January 2015;
[14] MSC.1/Circ.1164/Rev.15, International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, 1978, As Amended, 17 June 2015 (and all
previous amendments);
[15] MSC.353(92), Amendments to the International
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and
Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management
(ISM) Code), adopted 21/06/2013 (and all previous

124
Appendix 1 - Interface and Boundary Diagram

125
Appendix 2 - Claims Arguments Evidence diagram

03 - The ship can


conduct RAS, Lift-On,
Lift-Off, and other
defined stores evolutions
safely

02 - The risk of 03 - Stores can be


05 - VERTREP
01 - RAS can be causing environmental moved and secured
operations can be
conducted safely. pollution during RAS appropriately on the
conducted safely.
is reduced to ALARP. ship.

The RAS equipment


and RAS design has The ship has been
Stores can be moved Stores can be safely Control of the ship
been designed to designed to allow
safely around the secured on the ship can be maintained
reduce the risk of VERTREP operations
ship whilst at sea. whilst at sea. during RAS.
environmental to be undertaken.
pollution.

Appropriate wheeled The flight deck has Interactions between


Appropriate wheeled Seakeeping and mechanical handling Seakeeping and been arranged to the ship and
The RAS equipment The safe use of the
mechanical handling manoeuvring trials equipment will be manoeuvring trials allow for VERTREP helicopter have been
to be used has been RAS equipment is
equipment will be are being conducted provided with are being conducted operations. considered.
clearly stated. defined.
provided. for the ship. defined storage for the ship.
positions.

The basic design of The basic design of The Power and


The RAS deck has Appropriate deck Visibility of VERTREP Internal and external
the ship has the ship has Propulsion operating
been designed to coatings will be used The ship has defined operations can be communications are
identified stowage identified stowage scenarios have been
contain spillages in way of the stores stores routes. maintained during all defined for RAS
areas for all defined areas for all defined defined for RAS
from equipment. routes. operating conditions. operations.
cargo requirements. cargo requirements. scenarios.

The RAS deck has


The operating been designed for
RAS equipment has Control of the ship 04 - Lifting operations
conditions suitable RAS operations in all
been designed to can be maintained can be conducted
for RAS are clearly defined
operate safely. during RAS. safely on the ship.
defined. environmental
operating conditions.

Cranes suitable for


The Power and the operating The risk of human
Seakeeping and Appropriate weather Visibility of the RAS Internal and external
Propulsion operating environment and error associated with
manoeuvring trials deck coatings will be deck can be communications are
scenarios have been with appropriate safe crane operations has
are being conducted used on the RAS maintained in all defined for RAS
defined for RAS working loads have been considered
for the ship. deck. operating conditions. operations.
scenarios. been selected for the during basic design.
ship.

RAS deck equipment


The RAS deck officer The communications The RAS and
has been designed to The selected crane
and RAS deck crew Crane Operators will The selected crane required for container deck have
The RAS machinery RAS equipment is operate in the will have the safety
The ship has defined have safe havens to be trained in will meet Class operation of the been designed to
space is unmanned guarded as defined features defined in
stores routes. reduce the number accordance with Society crane have been ensure safe crane
during operation. appropriate. environmental Class Society
of personnel on MOD procedures. requirements. identified during operations can be
operating requirements.
deck. basic design. conducted
temperatures.

126
Probabilistic Aspect on Minimum Propulsion Power
Requirement Issue under Adverse Weather Conditions
Shusuke Ohiwa, Osaka University, Shusuke_ooiwa@naoe.eng.osaka-u.ac.jp
Naoya Umeda, Osaka University, umeda@naoe.eng.osaka-u.ac.jp

However, simple decrease of engine power could result


ABSTRACT in operational danger under adverse weather. Typical ex-
At the IMO (International Maritime Organization), amples, include grounding accidents of a Panamax bulk
minimum propulsion power guidelines are now under carrier named Pasha Bulker and a Capesize bulk carrier
discussion. The provisional guidelines require the min- named Ocean Victory, although they were built before the
imum propulsion power for the specified Beaufort EEDI requirement, off New Castle port in Australia and
number. The authors numerically estimated the mini- Kashima port in Japan, respectively. In both cases, the ships
mum power for guaranteeing safety against grounding failed to go ahead because severe head wind and waves,
accidents under sea states specified by the significant and then lost their manoeuvrability and finally grounded.
wave height, peak wave period and mean wind velocity Thus, the Annex IV also requires that installed propul-
by using a surge-sway-yaw-roll model and its local sta- sion power shall not be less than the power needed to
bility analysis. The used method was compared with maintain the manoeuvrability of the ship under adverse
model experiments using a handy-max bulk carrier and conditions as defined in the guideline to be developed by
and the agreement between the two is satisfactory at the IMO. Therefore, developing the guideline is urgent
least for head wind and waves. As a next step, the au- issue. While the EEDI regulation requires the maximum
thors attempt to establish the relationship between the allowable propulsion power, this guideline requires the
estimated results for several different states and the minimum one. As a result it is essential for the minimum
mariners experience based on the Beaufort scale by propulsion power guideline should have reasonably small
calculating danger probability under the different safety margin for realizing possible design range in propul-
Beaufort scales. The used ship is the handy-max bulk sion power.
carrier having MCR of 7930 KW. The added resistance For this purpose, the authors attempted to examine op-
due to waves and the wind forces were predicted by a erability of a handymax bulk carrier under severe wind and
potential flow theory and an empirical formula, respec- waves by identifying equilibrium points of a
tively. All the propulsive and manoeuvring forces are surge-sway-yaw-roll manoeuvring model with a PD auto-
estimated with the conventional model experiments for pilot and examining their local stability. This procedure was
the ship. In conclusion, it was conformed that the tested well established in nonlinear dynamics and was already
ship in head wind and waves can avoid grounding up to applied to ship manoeuvrability in wind and waves by Asai
the Beaufort scale of 8. (1980), Kadomatsu (1990) and others. In this work, for
guaranteeing accurate prediction, more accurate modelling
of hydrodynamic elements and experimental validation in
INTRODUCTION wind and waves were executed. Furthermore, final judge-
For reducing greenhouse gas from ships, Annex IV of ment of the installed propulsion power was made using
the MARPOL Convention (International Convention for the probability for allowing actual environmental data of rele-
Prevention of Pollution from Ships) requires us to reduce vant water areas. For the same purpose, Shigunov et al.
the energy efficiency index (EEDI) by 30 % for a ship after (2016) applied a similar procedure but with neither experi-
2015. This is because an energy efficient ship shall emit mental validation in wind and waves nor probabilistic
smaller amount of greenhouse gas such as CO2. The EEDI assessment. Thus this work could supplement their work
defined here is proportional to a ratio of the engine power with these elements.
and the ship speed. Since the engine power is roughly pro-
portional to the cube of the ship speed, reducing the ship
speed by only 20 % results in reduction of engine power by EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
50 % so that the EEDI decreases more than 30 % (Takasaki, The model experiments were conducted using a
2014). Thus simple reduction of the design ship speed and handy-max bulk carrier, which has superstructures, at a
engine power is easiest response to the EEDI requirement. seakeeping and manoeuvring basin of the National Re-
search Institute of Fisheries Engineering of Japan. Table 1

127
shows principal particulars of the bulk carrier. Irregular
wind and long crested irregular waves were generated at the X
Wind
same time by three sets of blowers and 80 segmented wave U

maker. The propeller rotation speeds at which the forward x

speed of the model is almost zero, due to winds and
waves, were determined as a function of the significant O Wave
wave heights. The spectrum of irregular waves is JON-
y
SWAP spectrum. Mean wave period is the period at which
the added resistance becomes maximum value. The rela- Y
O
tionship between the mean wind speed and the significant
wave height is based on Table 2. The details of this exper- Fig.1 Coordinates system
iment will be published later.

Table 1 Principal particulars of the bulk carrier


(m + mx )u& (m + my )vr = X H + X P + X R + X A + XW (1)
(m + my )v& + (m + mx )ur myl y = YH + YR + YA + YW (2)
&&
Ship Model
( I z + J z )&& = N H + N R + N A + NW (3)
Lpp(m) 178.0 2.9091
( I x + J x )&& m y l y v& mx l x ur + 2& + & & + mgGM =
B (m) 32.26 0.5273 (4)
K H + K P + K A + KW
D (m) 21.14 0.3455
TE& + = K p ( c ) K pTD& (5)
d (m) 11.57 0.1891
DWT (ton) 47500 0.207 where and are the ship speeds in the and direc-
tions. is the metacentric height. and are the
MCR (kW) 7930
added mass in the and directions. and are the
Dp (m) 5.51 0.09 moment of inertia around the and axes. and
are added moment of inertia around the and axes.
and are linear and quadratic roll damping coefficients.
Table 2 relationship between the mean wind speed and the and are hydrodynamic forces in the and direc-
significant wave height tions. and are hydrodynamic moments around the
Beaufort NO. 6 7 8 9 10 and axes. The subscripts, , , , and , mean
hull, propeller, rudder, wind and wave, respectively. is
H1/3 (m) 3 4 5.5 7 9
the rudder angle. ! is the time constant of the steering
Wind speed (m/s) 12.35 15.55 19 22.65 26.5 gear. " is the specified ship heading angle for the auto
pilot. # and $ are the proportional gain and the time
constant for differential control.
NUMERICAL METHOD The added resistance due to waves, Xw, are estimated by
Maruos theory (Maruo, 1963) with the Kochin function
For predicting required propulsion power under wind and calculated by Ogilvie-Tucks slender body theory. The
waves, a surge-sway-yaw-roll coupled simulation model is wave-induced steady sway force, Yw, and yaw moment, NW,
used with a PD autopilot. This models low-frequency mo- are calculated by a linear 3D panel method using the Green
tion only and ignores high-frequency motions such as function for zero forward speed. These wave-induced
harmonic motions due to incident waves or fluctuating steady forces and moment in irregular waves are calculated
wind. The coordinate systems describing the model are with the wave spectrum by assuming they are proportional
defined as shown in Fig.1. The coordinate system O-XYZ to the square of wave height. The wind forces and moments
represents a space-fixed, while the coordinate system O-xyz are estimated with Fujiwaras empirical formula (Fujiwara
does a body-fixed. Wind is assumed to blow in the negative et al., 1998). All the propulsive and manoeuvring forces,
direction of -axis. Here the ship heading measured except for the added masses and moments of inertia, are
from the -axis is indicated by and the angle be- obtained from the conventional model experiments for the
tween wind and wave directions is represented by . The ship such as circular motion tests using a X-Y towing car-
ship is assumed to run with its forward speed of with the riage. The added masses and moments of inertia are
drift angle of . The heel angle is against -axis. estimated by Motoras empirical charts.
Based on the above simulation model with the system pa-
Then equations of surge-sway-yaw-roll motion and a re- rameters, equilibrium points are determined by the Newton
sponse equation of the steering gear are represented as method. Then we locally linearized the mathematical model
follows. in the vicinity of the equilibrium and calculated the eigen-
values of the Jacobi matrix. If all the real part of the
eigenvalues is negative, the equilibrium is stable so that the
equilibrium point indicates a possible steady running condi-
tion.

128
NUMERICAL PREDICTION OF THE MINIMUM 12000
POWER IN HEAD WINDS AND WAVES Experiment

10000 Experiment(Steady wind)


For validating the above calculation procedure, model ex- Estimation(U=0kt)
periments using wind and waves are required. However, the 8000 Estimation(U=4kt)
scale effects of ship frictional resistance and propeller wake,

BHP (kW)
Plimit(U=4kt)
which depends on the Reynolds number, exist and accurate 6000
measurements of means of time-varying elements requires
longer measurements regardless shorter model basin. To 4000
resolve these difficulties, the authors executed model ex-
periments for a ship losing her forward speed due to severe 2000
head or bow-quartering wind and waves. As a result, the
scale effect due to hull boundary layer and statistical inac- 0
curacy due to the limited size of model basin can be 2 4 6 8 10
avoided. Significant wave height (m)
Fig.2 shows the comparison in the propeller revolution for Fig.3 Comparison of calculated value and required value
zero forward speed between the experimental results and
calculations. Good agreement between the experiment and NUMERICAL PREDICTION OF THE MINIMUM
the calculation for the Beaufort scales 6-10 are found. Fig.3 POWER IN OBLIQUE WINDS AND WAVES
shows the comparison in the brake horsepower. The calcu-
lated results well agree with the experimental ones. These Operability in head wind and waves itself cannot guaran-
good agreements demonstrate that the used calculation tee safety in oblique wind and waves. Thus, we extended
procedure is capable for explaining the required propulsion our calculation to the 4kts runs in bow quartering seas un-
power within practical accuracy. Similar comparison in der the Beaufort scale No. 8. As shown in Fig. 4, the
bow quartering waves using a different model can be found required engine power further increases from that in head
in Umeda et al. (2016). seas and has a peak at the specified heading of 60 degrees
from the wind direction. Even so, the required engine pow-
er is smaller than the engine limit. Fig. 5 shows the required
120
rudder angle for keeping the ship course. The required rud-
Rotational speed of the propeller (rpm)

Resting
der angle is smaller than its limit, i.e. 35 degrees, and the
100 Resting(Steady wind) real parts of eigenvalues for these ranges are negative. Thus,
Estimation the present calculation suggests that the ship can run with 4
80 kts even in bow quartering waves under the Beaufort scale
No. 8.
60
6000
40
5000

20
BHP (kW)

4000
2 4 6 8 10
Significant wave height (m)
3000

Fig.2 Measured propeller revolution at which ship rests


2000 Plimit
in head winds and waves and its estimation
1000 Estimation

As a next step, we apply the same calculation procedure to 0


the case that the ship runs with 4kts in the opposite direc- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
tion of wind and waves. If a ship can run with 4kts in Course specified for auto pilot (degrees)
severe head wind and waves, she is able to leave lee shore Fig.4 Required engine power and its limit in bow quartering
even slowly for avoiding grounding. Fig.3 includes the waves under the Beaufort scale 8.
predicted engine power with the forward speed of 4 kts in
head wind and waves. The maximum allowable engine In stern quartering waves, the situation to be investigated
power is also shown based on the engine dynamics model- could be different. Since the added resistance due to waves
ling. An intersection between the two can be found at the could be negative in stern quartering waves, there is no
significant wave height of 7.5 metres, in other words, the difficulty to increase the propeller revolution. On the other
Beaufort scale No. 9 or over. Thus, it can be concluded that hand, for keeping the forward speed of 4 kts could require
the ship cannot run with 4kts towards wind and waves un- even negative propeller revolution so that the hydrodynam-
der the Beaufort scale No.10 because the required engine ic situation becomes unnecessarily complicated.
torque exceeds its limit.

129
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE DUE TO THE LACK OF
PROPULSION POWER
The environmental conditions discussed so far are defined
by the Beaufort scale. However, the Beaufort scale is not
suitable for probabilistic safety assessment because sea
state data for certain water area are usually available as
wave scattering diagram and rigorous relationship between
such sea state data and the Beaufort scale cannot be found.
Thus, we attempt to calculate the probability that a ship
meet dangerous sea states for failure due to the lack of
propulsion power. This probability could be more informa-
tive index than the binomial judgement using the Beaufort
scale.
Fig.5 Required rudder angle and its limit in bow quarter- Firstly, we utilise the wave scattering table for the North
ing waves under the Beaufort scale 8. Atlantic as shown in Table 3 as one of the worst situation.
The relationship between the mean wind velocity and the
Thus, we examine operability of the ship in stern quarter- significant wave height is assumed to be given by the fol-
ing seas with the maximum allowable propeller revolution lowing formula.
number which can be obtained from the engine dynamics. ++.4
)* +, 0.067173
%&'(
(6)
The results are shown in Figs. 6-7. In case of stern quarter-
ing seas ranging from 90 to 180 degrees from the wave
This could represent the situation that a ship is departing
direction, both the engine power and rudder angle are be-
from a port facing the North Atlantic without any obstacles.
low their limits. Thus, the ship is able to select any course
in stern quartering waves under the Beaufort scale 8. Table 3 Wave scattering diagram of the North Atlantic
H/Tz 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5 10.5 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 15.5 16.5 17.5 18.5
9000 0.5 0 0 1.3 134 866 1186 634 186 36.9 5.6 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0

8000 1.5 0 0 0 29.3 986 4976 7738 5570 2376 704 161 30.5 5.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 2.2 198 2159 6230 7450 4860 2066 645 160 33.7 6.3 1.1 0.2 0 0
7000 3.5 0 0 0 0.2 34.9 696 3227 5675 5099 2838 1114 338 84.3 18.2 3.5 0.6 0.1 0
6000 4.5 0 0 0 0 6 196 1354 3289 3858 2686 1275 455 131 31.9 6.9 1.3 0.2 0
BHP (kW)

5.5 0 0 0 0 1 51 498 1603 2373 2008 1126 464 151 41 9.7 2.1 0.4 0.1
5000 6.5 0 0 0 0 0.2 12.6 167 690 1258 1269 826 387 141 42.2 10.9 2.5 0.5 0.1
4000 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 3 52.1 270 594 703 525 277 112 36.7 10.2 2.5 0.6 0.1
Plimit 8.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 15.4 97.9 256 351 297 175 77.6 27.7 8.4 2.2 0.5 0.1
3000 9.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 4.3 33.2 102 160 152 99.2 48.3 18.7 6.1 1.7 0.4 0.1
2000 Estimation 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 10.7 37.9 67.5 71.7 51.5 27.3 11.4 4 1.2 0.3 0.1
11.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 3.3 13.3 26.6 31.4 24.7 14.2 6.4 2.4 0.7 0.2 0.1
1000 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 1 4.4 9.9 12.8 11 6.8 3.3 1.3 0.4 0.1 0
0 13.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 1.4 3.5 5 4.6 3.1 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 14.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0 0
Course specified for auto pilot (degrees) 15.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0
16.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0
Fig.6 Required engine power and its limit in stern quarter-
ing waves under the Beaufort scale 8 with the maximum
propeller revolution.

Fig.7 Required rudder angle and its limit in stern quartering


waves under the Beaufort scale 8 with the maximum pro- Fig.8 Ratio of required engine power to its limit for the
peller revolution. ship with 4kts in head seas under various sea states.

130
Secondly, for each sea state defined by the significant sented. It suggests that the bulk carrier should leave a port
wave height, the mean zerocrossing wave period and the sufficiently before the significant wave height exceeds
JONSWAP spectrum, the required engine power in head 7.5m. Further probabilistic analysis using the estimation of
seas is calculated using the present calculation procedure. consequence and uncertainty of loading could be future
The ratio of required engine power to its limit is shown in tasks.
Fig. 8. It is noteworthy here that the required engine power
drastically depends on the mean wave period. Thus, the ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
assessment using the worst mean wave period could be very This research was supported by ClassNK and JSPS KA-
conservative. If this ratio for a certain sea state is larger KENHI Grant Number (15H02327). It was executed under
than 1, the sea state can be judged as dangerous for opera- the umbrella of the strategic research committee of the Ja-
tion of the ship. Table 4 indicates results of such judgement. pan Society of Naval Architects and Ocean Engineers
The danger due to the lack of propulsion power for the (JASNAOE) chaired by Prof. Yasukawa. For the calcula-
given ship appears when the significant wave height is tion of wave-induced steady forces and manoeuvring forces,
larger than 7.5 m. Profs. Yasukawa and Yoshimura kindly provided their data.
Thirdly, we calculated the failure probability by integrat- For the experiment, Mr. Matsuda and Dr. Terada from Na-
ing the probability density of sea states. The obtained tional Research Institute of Fisheries Engineering provided
results for the North Atlantic is 2.56 % because occur- effective advices and assistance. We thank Prof. Papaniko-
rence probability of the significant wave height larger than laou and Dr. Shigunov from EU Project (SHOPERA) for
7.5m is not so small in the North Atlantic. Of course, if the their valuable discussion as well as Dr. Miyake from
ship leaves the port sufficiently before the significant wave ClassNK and Dr. Tsujimoto from NMRI.
height exceeds 7.5m, the failure probability could be almost
zero.
REFERENCES
Table 4 Binomial judgements of operability for the ship
with 4kts in head seas under various sea states. Asai, S.: A Study on Check Helms for Course Keeping of a
Ship under Steady External Forces, Journal of Society of
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1.5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Fujiwara. T. et al.: Estimation of Wind Forces and Mo-
2.5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P ments acting on Ships, J. Society of Naval Architects of
3.5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P Japan, Vol. 183, 1998, pp. 77-90 (in Japanese).
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9.5 F F F F F F F F F F F P P P P P P P (in Japanese).
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Maruo, H.: Resistance in Waves, 60th anniversary Series,
12.5 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F P P P vol. 8, The Society of Naval Architects of Japan, 1963,
13.5 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F P pp.67-102.
14.5 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F P Nagai, T.: Long Term Statistics Report on Nationwide
15.5 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F
16.5 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F
Ocean Wave information network for Ports and Harbours
(NOWPHAS 1970-1999), Technical Note of the Port and
Furthermore, we use a wave scattering diagram off Airport Research Institute, no. 1035, 2002, pp.276-280,
(in Japanese).
Kashima port, which faces the North Pacific and in which a
Shigunov, V., Papanikolaou, A. and Chroni, D.: Manoeu-
grounding accident was reported, in place of that for the
vrability in adverse conditions: assessment framework
North Atlantic. This data is based on measurements in the
and examples, Proc. 15th Int. Ship Stability Workshop,
period between 1972 and 1999 with ultrasonic wave probes
(Nagai, 2002). The obtained probability is 0 % because the Stockholm, 2016.
maximum significant wave height in Kashima port was 7.5 Takasaki, K.: Reduction of CO2 Emission from Main En-
gine, Bulletin of the Japan Society of Naval Architects
m but the mean wave period is outside the dangerous sea
and Ocean Engineers, Vol. 56, 2014, pp. 23-26 (in Japa-
states for the ship. This means that the ship can leave
nese).
Kashima port anytime, if the present calculation and as-
Umeda, N., S. Koga, et al.: Methodology for Calculating
sumed loading and environmental conditions are correct.
Capsizing Probability for a Ship under Dead Ship Condi-
tion, Proc. 9th Int. Ship Stability Workshop, Hamburg,
CONCULUSIONS
2007, pp. 1.2.1-1.2.19.
A procedure to estimate required propulsion power and
Umeda, N. et al.: Tank Test Results and Simulation under
manoeuvrability under severe wind and waves is presented
Adverse Weather, Proc. Minimum Ship Propulsion Power
and is partly validated with model experiments in wind and
Symposium, Tokyo, 2016 (in Japanese).
waves. The procedure indicates that a handy-max bulk car-
rier can run with 4 kts or over in any direction under the
Beaufort No. 8.
As a more rigorous approach, a calculation procedure of
probability that a ship meets dangerous sea states is pre-

131
A Meta-model for Risk Assessment of RoPax Capsizing as
an Alternative Way of Ship Safety Evaluation
Tomasz Hinz1,2, Przemysaw Krata2,3, Jakub Montewka3,4,5
1) Deltamarin sp.z o.o, Gdansk, Poland, tomasz.hinz@deltamarin.com
2) Waterborne Transport Innovation Foundation, apino, Poland
3) Gdynia Maritime University, Faculty of Navigation, Poland, p.krata@wn.am.gdynia.pl
4) Aalto University, Research Group on Maritime Risk and Safety, Espoo, Finland,
jakub.montewka@aalto.fi
5) Finnish Geospatial Research Institute, Masala, Finland

ABSTRACT recommendations, (IMO 1999). However, two main disad-


vantages of this approach can be noticed. One objection is a
This article presents the application of risk assess- very simplified nature of these criteria, which are of statis-
ment of an intact ship stability failure, called ship cap- tical nature. Only the weather criterion is based on the
sizing in dead ship conditions. The analysis is based on mathematical model of ship capsizing even if this model is
the results of simulations of ship motions in regular only coarse approximation of the capsizing phenomenon.
waves performed with the use of six degree of freedom Second reproach is a binary outcome of the stability as-
code called LaiDyn. Subsequently the results are orga- sessment procedure, where a ship either complies with the
nized into a probabilistic meta-model with the use of requirement or not and there is no information provided
Bayesian learning algorithms. Obtained results in a about the level of risk related to the considered loading
form of F-N curve are plotted on top of IMO risk ac- condition.
ceptance criteria. Finally they are compared with the Under the pressure of wide criticism of the contempo-
actual stability criteria. Good agreement is found for rary stability standards the attempts were started in the mid
those cases, where a ship fulfills the IMO stability crite- of 90ties to develop more rational stability criteria cover-
ria by large margin. However, for the cases where the ing some typical dynamical phenomena inflicting hazards
prescriptive IMO criteria are barely met, the results of to ship sailing in rough sea, (Francescutto 2004). As a re-
risk assessment clearly indicate that the risk level is not sponse to such demand the second-generation ship stability
acceptable for the analyzed ship. criteria are being developed. An expected implementation
The approach could be found suitable for safety evalua- of the second-generation stability criteria shall notably
tion of a ship during design stage and operation. improve the known shortages of the present standards in
terms of relevant modeling of the dynamical phenomena.
INTRODUCTION Moreover, numerous postulates were submitted in the
marine society forum to make another step forward towards
One of the safety features of seagoing ships is ships the development of s called risk-based stability criteria,
stability, that influences ships overall sea-keeping perfor- (Kobylinski 2007). To address the risk estimation problem
mance. The stability related issues are covered by the prop- the second-generation criteria and any other methods for
er design and the appropriate operation. The loading condi- ship stability performance evaluation can be employed.
tion of a ship causing the insufficient stability may lead her Within this approach, focusing on the evaluation of the risk
to capsizing or generally the stability accident. The latter is level, the modeling of ship stability characteristics is con-
defined as exceeding the amplitude of rolling or an angle of sidered as means to an end, not an end itself.
heel at which operating or handling of a ship is risky or Therefore, this paper presents the results of attempt
impossible. Generally, such an approach focusing on the taken to develop a risk assessment of a particular stability
excessive heel avoidance is valid both in a port during car- failure, i.e. the dead ship conditions (DSC) for a given
go operations and in rough sea when underway, (Krata and Ro-Ro/passenger ship (RoPax). The outcome of this as-
Szapczyska 2012; Krata, Szpytko, and Weintrit 2013). sessment shall provide information about the level of risk
The design aspect is at least same vital in terms of related to the operation, which is appreciable in the ship
providing ships relevant stability as the operational one. design process. The obtained risk can be compared to the
The contemporary approach towards ship stability assess- commonly recognized risk acceptance margins, however it
ment is rooted in prescriptive criteria based on the IMO can be utilized in much wider way. The outcome variable

132
enables not only a statement whether the ship complies with The works of Bouguer from 1746, Euler from 1749,
any criteria but rather it provides an extended information Bernoulli from 1757 and Attwood from 1796 are recog-
how far from the accepted safety margins the obtained risk nized as the foundations of a scientific approach towards
level remains. To achieve this a probabilistic meta-model is ship stability. The first introduced the metacentric height
developed and tested. The idea of probabilistic meta-model notion remaining the only measure utilized to assess ship
has been successfully implemented earlier for the assess- stability till the end of the XIX century, (Kobylinski and
ment of damage ship safety in waves, see for example Kastner 2003). In the mid-nineteenth century the righting
(Papanikolaou et al. 2010; Schreuder et al. 2011). arm curve was already know and thanks to Moseleys pub-
The process adopted here for the development of me- lication from 1850 also the notion of dynamical stability
ta-model is two-stage, (Montewka, Goerlandt, and Zheng was introduced. Although, those theoretical achievements
2015). First, numerous simulations are run for a chosen were not fully applied in practice and none stability stand-
RoPax for a number of anticipated operational conditions. ards were elaborated, (Kobylinski and Kastner 2003).
For that purpose we use a state-of-the-art numerical model A significant breakthrough in the field of ship stability
of ship dynamics called LaiDyn. This allows overcoming of standardization was Raholas doctoral dissertation from
the limitations of commonly used static methods. Second, 1939, (Rahola 1939). He statistically obtained the margins
the obtained results are organized in a probabilistic me- between sufficient and insufficient stability characteristics
ta-model with the use of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). analyzing the initial metacentric height and the shape of the
Subsequently the meta-model is used as a tool for opera- righting arm curve including some areas under this curve,
tional risk assessment of a ship with respect to her capsiz- (Womack 2003). In the 1960s under the auspices of the
ing in DSC, where a ship is exposed to adverse action of IMO the contemporary ship stability standards were devel-
wave and wind. To measure the risk we adopt the probabil- oped, mainly covering Raholas results. In the 80s they
ity of a given number of fatalities resulting from the were supplemented by the weather criterion inspired by the
above-mentioned accident. The results are presented in a Japanese proposal and researches.
form of F-N curve plotted on top of the risk acceptance However, during some previous IMO - SLF sessions
criteria. To inform the end-users about the quality of the (from 47th onwards) discussions have taken place concern-
meta-model and its validity, two analyses are carried out. ing the new generation of regulations, so called sec-
These are cross-validation and sensitivity-uncertainty-bias ond-generation stability criteria, (Umeda 2013). Four defi-
assessment. The first determines the accuracy of the me- nitions of criteria are given, which deal with the assessment
ta-model compared to the results of numerical simulation, of the intact stability failure in different ways (Szozda
the second helps to determine the most relevant variables 2014):
for the model in order to point to the direction of the future A probabilistic performance-based criterion is a crite-
research. Such approach may help to develop trust in the rion based on a physical model of a stability failure
meta-model among the end-users. considering this phenomenon as a random event, see
Finally the results of the risk assessment for a set of for example, (IMO 2006a, 2006c)
case studies are compared with the existing prescriptive A deterministic performance-based criterion is a crite-
stability criteria. Rather good agreement is found for those rion based on a physical model of a stability failure
cases, where ship fulfills the IMO stability criteria by large considering this phenomenon in a deterministic manner,
margin. However, for the cases where the prescriptive IMO see for example, (IMO 2006b).
criteria are barely met, the results of risk assessment clearly A probabilistic parametric criterion is a criterion based
indicate that the risk level is not acceptable for a ship. on a measure of a quantity related to a phenomenon,
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: sec- but does not contain a physical model of the phenom-
tion II elaborates on the stability requirements. Section III enon, and includes one or more stochastic values for
presents methods and materials used to develop the me- this criterion (for example, the new probabilistic dam-
ta-model assessing the risk of capsizing in DSC. The ob- age stability criterion contained in resolution (IMO
tained results are shown in Section IV and discussed in 2005).
Section V. The concluding remarks are provided in Section A deterministic parametric criterion is a criterion based
VI. on a measure of a quantity related to a phenomenon,
but does not contain a physical model of the phenom-
AN OVERVIEW OF SHIP STABILITY REQUIRE- enon, while all the input values are deterministic (for
MENTS example, the GZ curve criterion contained in section
2.2 of the draft revised Intact Stability Code).
The history of shipping reaching at least a couple of Intact stability failure is defined as a state of inability of
thousands years dispensed with a deeper understanding and a ship to remain within design limits of roll angle and com-
any standardizing of ship stability for majority of time. bination of rigid body accelerations, (IMO 2008). The sec-
However, in recent decades the subjective value of human ond-generation regulation are developed based on the fol-
life steady increases resulting in endeavor to improve the lowing four scenarios of intact stability failure, however
safety of navigation. Historically, the first approach towards some authors enumerate more, (Kobylinski 2003, 2008): 1)
ship stability evaluation was based on an experiment only. Dead Ship Condition, i.e. ship without forward speed, ex-
Till the time of boat launching one could not be sure the posed to action of waves and wind; 2) Pure-loss of stability;
design correctness so the design process had to be based on 3) Parametric roll; 4) Surf-riding and broaching; 5) Exces-
architects and seamens experience and on earlier projects sive accelerations.
similitude. The results provided by the second-generation ship sta-
bility criteria are of binary nature, likewise the

133
first-generation criteria. The ship either passes the criteria approach. Relatively high number or simulations that are
or not, without specifying the safety margin for various run for a number of anticipated operational conditions with
loading conditions. The stability criteria are still based on the use of the LaiDyn code overcomes the shortcomings of
the comparison of a specific computation result and a lim- the existing static methods that are used for safety assess-
iting value established on the basis of statistics. The limit- ment of a ship. The simulations method allow the analysis
ing values are worked out for contemporary typical conven- of numerous scenarios, where a ship is exposed to varying
tional ships, which make the approach, suspect to be less environmental loads, delivering a wide set of ship responses
effective in case of non-conventional hulls. Moreover, the in terms of roll angle and time to reach the maximum roll
discussed criteria can be used only at the design stage of a angle, given hydro-meteorological conditions. The proba-
ship and they are not relevant to ship operation, (Szozda bilistic approach taken to develop the meta-model recog-
2014). Despite being a significant step forward in stability nizes the inherent uncertainties in the explanatory variables.
assessment development, the second-generation stability Thus it overcomes some of the issues of static, determinis-
criteria however say nothing about the consequences of a tic methods adopted nowadays for safety evaluation of a
stability failure. The latter is a substantial element of risk ship in operation. A concept of the meta-model is depicted
assessment, which can be seen as a holistic approach to in Fig. 1.
safety evaluation of a ship. Moreover, the application of the Bayesian network, al-
To address the above shortcomings, while utilizing to a lows the end-user not only to predict the level of risk given
large extend the achievements of the second-generation set of inputs (predictive reasoning) but also the backward
criteria, we propose a meta-model that quantifies the risk of reasoning can be made, from the effect to the causes. The
ship capsizing in DSC allowing for displaying the associ- latter helps to determine the required value for input pa-
ated risk level on top of risk criteria thus showing the dis- rameters in order to obtain the desired value of the output.
tance of the risk level from the delimiting criteria lines. The Finally, the BNs allow for quick assessment of model sen-
meta-model encompasses the probability of an event along sitivity and uncertainty, determining the paths of uncertain-
with its adverse consequences. ty propagation. This is very useful in risk analysis, where
uncertainty is an inherent, though often neglected, feature
METHODS AND MATERIALS of risk, see for example (Aven 2008; Goerlandt, Montewka,
and Kujala 2014; Goerlandt and Reniers 2016).
Ship motion simulations
Weather Repair 5me
The crucial element of any risk models related to ship
stability is prediction of ship motion when in the rough sea. Response of Time to
Evacua5on 5me
ship in DSC capsize
Numerous variables characterizing intensity of rolling,
pitching and other motions are introduced into such models Ship stability Fatality rate
likewise in the case described here. Capsizing

In recent years majority of significant research centers


makes many attempts to develop accurate and effective Probability of Number of
F-N curve
mathematical models of ship motions to solve the complex DSC people on board

problem of ship motions prediction (Hinz 2007; ITTC Fig. 1. A concept of meta-models estimating risk of ship
2014; Spanos and Papanikolaou 2009). The meta-model capsizing as a result of DSC, (Hinz, Montewka, and Krata
proposed here for risk of ship capsizing in DSC utilizes 2016)
LaiDyn code, (Matusiak 2002), to evaluate motions of a
given RoPax when adrift in DSC. Risk model parameters
Since the linear theory of ship motion is well acknowl- There is a wide number of interpretation and measures
edged and the linear computation of ship response are for risk, see for example (Aven 2010). However the me-
commonly known, the LaiDyn code is based on the as- ta-model presented here expresses risk in its most frequently
sumption that the complete response of a ship to external met manner, namely the probability of the consequences.
excitation equals the sum of linear and non-linear parts The latter is expressed as an expected number of fatalities,
(Matusiak 2007). The radiation and diffraction forces are resulting from the stability accident. Mathematically, the
presented by linear equations. The main part of the first adopted notion of risk can be formulated as follows, (Hinz
order load is calculated with the linear approximation, 2015):
based on the current heading and location in relation to a
wave. Defining the non-linear part, such elements as ~
non-linearity due to ship shape, hydrostatics and wave force = | _ | ,
were taken into consideration (Matusiak 2011). The results (1)
given by the code has been validated with the use of model
scale tests, see (Acanfora and Matusiak 2014; Matusiak and where P(DSC) is the probability of a ship being in DSC
Stigler 2012). Moreover it took part in several benchmarks, when at sea, P(caps|DSC) is the probability for a ship to
see for example (Potthoff and Papanikolaou 2016; Spanos capsize when in DSC, P(N_fat|caps,DSC) is the probability
and Papanikolaou 2009). of certain number of fatalities when capsized in DSC.
Meta-model development The probability for a RoPax being in DSC while in op-
erations at sea is taken as 0.14 per year per ship. This number
The meta-model for risk assessment of a ship in DSC is derived from the experts judgment on the reliability of
presented here combines deterministic and probabilistic machinery and electrical systems of a ship in operation,

134
(Brandowski 2009). However this number is most likely Bad Above 7.34
debatable, since it depends on numerous factors, like the
engine type and configuration, mode of ship operation, Evaluation of meta-model suitability for a purpose or risk
moreover the number is subject to a spread, as reported in the assessment
available body of literature, (Antao and Guedes Soares
2006). In the classical view on quantitative risk assessment
Another major parameter of the risk model is (QRA) in many technical disciplines, the aim of a QRA is
P(caps|DSC), which is determined by ship behavior in considered to be an accurate estimate of an underlying true
waves. This is governed by inter alia ships loading probability. This true probability is unknown, and uncer-
condition, which defines stability condition of a ship. For the tainty is expressed about the accuracy of this supposedly
purpose of this paper we anticipate four different loading true probability. When probabilities are derived through
conditions for the same ship draft, as presented in Table 1. engineering models, e.g. through the exceedance of a limit
For each loading conditions a set of simulations with the use state in terms of ship capsizing, these engineering models
of LaiDyn is conducted. From the time series of a simulation typically involve a number of simplifications. These can
the relevant information about the maximum roll angle and lead to evidential uncertainty, but the type of simplification
the time of reaching it are obtained. may also involve value-laden choices of a modeler
The ship is considered capsizing if the time of reaching (Diekmann and Peterson 2013). In particular, certain choic-
the critical angle is shorter than the anticipated time of repair es may lead to more conservative or optimistic model re-
time of recovering from the DSC. Otherwise, the ship is sults compared to how the modeled system works in reality.
considered safe. Time to repair is modeled with the use of This can be considered evidential bias and can also be qual-
Weibull distribution with alpha=0.5 and beta=23, (Leva et itatively assessed, as originally proposed in (Rosqvist and
al. 2006). In a similar manner the life loss is determined, if Tuominen 2004).
the time to capsize is shorter than the evacuation time, we The importance of evidential uncertainty and bias de-
assume that the life is perished. Then, the number of fatali- pends on the overall importance of the BN node to which
ties (N) is estimated based on a concept of fatality rate - the evidential uncertainty and/or bias applies. In this respect,
(Jasionowski, Vassalos, and Scott 2007) - calculated as the sensitivity analysis of the BN provides useful insights:
follows, (Montewka et al. 2014): evidential uncertainty and/or bias of highly sensitive nodes
= (2) is more important than for nodes which imply low overall
sensitivity, for more in-depth elaboration of that issue the
where haz is the exposure time to a hazard (time for the reader is referred to our earlier study presented in
ship to capsize), resp is the response time, in this case the (Goerlandt et al. 2014).
evacuation time, Npax is the number of people on board the
ship. The latter is obtained from the available data published Cross validation of the meta-model
by ship operators in the Baltic Sea regarding the total K-fold Cross-Validation (CV) is performed to check the
monthly volume of passengers transported with the use of predictive power of the probabilistic meta-model by com-
similar RoPax ships as the one considered here. Assuming paring the response of the meta-model with the data rec-
an ordered evacuation of a ship in danger, the time to evac- orded in the course of simulation (training dataset).
uate the ship is modelled with the use of triangular distribu- Within the K-fold CV part of the data is used to develop
tions following the IMO recommendations, and a distinction the model, and the other part is used to check the predictive
is made between day and night, for more details see (IMO power of the model. The K-fold algorithm works as fol-
2007; Montewka et al. 2014). lows:
Wave and wind parameters are taken from the available 1. randomly divide the training dataset into K sub-
statistics as presented in IMO documents - (IMO 2013a) - sets;
and combined into a three-state variable called weather, as 2. for each subset S:
presented in Table 2. The adopted distribution of this varia- train on the data but not on the subset S;
ble reflects the prevailing wave conditions for the Northern test model on the subset S;
Atlantic Ocean, however it can be easily updated to reflect 3. return the average error over the K subsets.
any sea area. The direction of the encountering waves with
respect to a ship heading is modeled with the uniform dis- The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 with
tribution, where the variable is discretized in four states respect to a variable called Number of fatalities (N), which
(180-270, 270-360, 360-90, 90-180), covering all pos- is discretized into five states. Very good prediction power
sible directions of wave. for the meta-model is noted for all the states of this variable
but one. Prediction power is understood as a level of
Table 1 Loading condition agreement between the results obtained from the me-
Loading condition Draft [m] GM [m] ta-model and the results from the simulation. The lowest
LC01 6.10 0.30 prediction power holds for the state of N covering the high-
LC02 6.10 0.98 est number of fatalities (2500-3000).
LC03 6.10 1.11 Among all conditions leading to that specific number of
LC04 6.10 2.29 fatalities (2500-3000) that are recorded in training dataset,
Table 2 Weather condition the obtained meta-model associates properly only 20% of
Weather Significant wave height [m] them. In the remaining 80% of the cases that ended up with
Good Below 3.33 N=(2500-3000) the meta-model delivers the following
Moderate Between 3.33 and 7.34 results: N=(1500-2500) in 72% - and N=0 in 8%. For

135
other states of variable N the probability of delivering the of the model correspond with the data-set obtained from
correct answer by the meta-model falls between 0.82 and over 17300 simulations of a ship in DSC (C-V analysis).
0.99. This means that the translation of data obtained from nu-
merical simulation is sound.
Sensitivity, uncertainty, bias assessment Subsequently qualitative assessment of the meta-model
Both the uncertainty (U) and the bias (B) of the model regarding its evidential uncertainty, bias and sensitivity is
elements can be systematically assessed and put in relation carried out, and the abridged results are presented in Figure
to the sensitivity of the model outcome to changes in the 3. The results of it show that the meta-model is moderately
individual nodes of the BN (S). Such an assessment is qual- sensitive to majority of variables, and highly sensitive to
itative, but it provides an overall picture of how uncertain two variables (Evacuation time and Probability of DSC).
the resulting probability assignment in terms of the F-N However these variables are also characterised with low to
curve is expected to be, see (Goerlandt et al. 2014). More- medium uncertainty, with a tendency to overestimate the
over, it provides some insight as to whether the F-N curve modelled parameters. Overestimation of the parameters
is expected to be optimistic or conservative, namely the means here the overestimation of the probability of fatali-
model underestimate or overestimate the risk level. Such an ties, thus risk. The majority of variables stay within low to
integration of sensitivity, uncertainty and bias in one medium level of both sensitivity and uncertainty moreover
framework can be beneficial to support decision-making. they tend to take the middle ground in the bias assessment.
The classification for the level of U, B and S shown in All that mean that the results obtained form the model are
Table 4, is based on (Flage and Aven 2009). expected to slightly overestimate the risk of ship capsizing
in DSC.
The value-of-information analysis Finally, when we look at the results of the value of in-
This analysis identifies the most informative variables, formation analysis, it is evident that there is significant
with respect to the output variable. It determines the varia- influence of Time of day on the Time for evacuation, which
bles among which the probability mass of the output is is a sensitive node. Obviously there is also a significant
scattered. This analysis can be seen as a tool for analyzing influence of Capsizing on Time to capsize and Probability
the potential usefulness of additional information, before of fatalities. This means that the most of the uncertainty
the information source is consulted, i.e., what the effect of associated with the outcome node is passed along those
observing one node would have on the other. To visualize paths, which are marked in bold arrows in Figure 2.
the potential influence that two directly connected nodes
9 ELEMENTS OF META-MODEL
have on each other the thickness of the arcs connecting H A - Wave direction
them is varied, (Koiter 2006). The thicker arc the stronger 7 B - Weather
influence, the results of this analysis are shown in Figure 2. B I
C - Loading conditions
BIAS

5 A,C G D - Roll angle


D
Table 3 The results of CV of the meta-model E - Time to max roll angle
E F
Results obtained from the probabilistic meta-model 3 F - Repair time

Number of 0 0- 750- 1500- 2500- G - Evacuation time


1 H - Probability of DSC
fatalities 750 1500 2500 3000
L M H I - Number of people on board
Training dataset

N
UNCERTAINTY
0 0.9999 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
0-750 0.0510 0.8163 0.1122 0.0204 0.0000
750-1500 0.0000 0.0000 0.9611 0.0389 0.0000 H G,H H G H
1500-2500 0.0101 0.0050 0.0000 0.9246 0.0603
SENSITIVITY

SENSITIVITY

>2500 0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 0.7200 0.2000 F


M C B,E D,F I M E C,D B, I

RESULTS L
L A A

To measure the risk associated with the stability acci- L M H 1 3 5 7 9


dent of DSC of a ship in operation we adopt a cumulative UNCERTAINTY BIAS
probability of fatalities that results from the Parameter
above-mentioned accident. The results are presented in a underestimated overestimated

form of F-N curve plotted on top of the risk acceptance Fig. 3. Qualitative SUB-assessment of the meta-model of
criteria. However the meta-model presented in Figure 2 the risk of RoPax capsizing in DSC.
determines the probability of a given interval of fatalities (f),
once the accident happens. To get the cumulative frequency Subsequently the safety of a ship is evaluated, by plot-
per year (F), the results needs to be multiplied with the ting the results of risk analysis on top of the risk accepted
probability of DSC and the frequency of an interval (f) criteria given by the IMO. Finally the results are compared
needs to be transformed into the cumulative frequency (F). with the standard stability criteria, as currently in force, for
Social risk acceptance criteria are adopted here, as proposed four loading conditions as anticipated by the risk model, as
by IMO for RoPax and passengers ships, (IMO 2013b). depicted in Figure 4. The ship is considered safe, when the
To inform the end-users about the quality of the me- risk falls within the acceptable region. On the lower part of
ta-model and its validity, a set of analyses is performed. Figure 4, the actual stability parameters in each considered
Their results indicate that the structure and the parameters loading condition of the ship are plotted in color dots and

136
limiting curves reflect individual stability criteria. If a dot is an important factor influencing the meta-model outcome
above the corresponding line the ship is considered safe, while this time may be predicted only roughly. There is a
otherwise she is not. lack of evacuation models predicting the time required to
Comparing the risk picture with the classical stability abandon a ship with regard to actual motion amplitudes that
criteria picture, it is evident, that good agreement is found seems to be important. On the other hand, the ship in DSC
for those cases, where ship fulfils the IMO stability criteria capsizes rather rapidly, which does not leave much time for
by large amount (LC4). This is the case for LC4 (however an ordered evacuation. Moreover, the prevailing weather
the curve goes beyond the limiting lines for some numbers conditions at the time of capsizing may be very challenging
of fatalities). However, for the cases where the prescriptive for successful evacuation. For that reason, a straightforward
IMO criteria are barely met (LC1-3), the risk level is not assumption of all hands lost in case of DSC accident could
acceptable for that ship, since the risk measure falls beyond be made instead. However, we decided to follow the same
the limiting lines of ALARP. logic as in case of damage ship capsizing, where we quan-
tify the share of passengers that are likely to perish, once
the time to capsize is shorter that evacuation time see Eq.
2.
Another challenge influencing the final outcome of the
meta-model is ships motion modeling. LaiDyn software
was utilized as well-benchmarked simulation tool, (Spanos
and Papanikolaou 2009;Potthoff and Papanikolaou 2016),
although it contains numerous simplifications. Due to the
complexity of ship 6DOF motion it is difficult to assess to
what degree the probability of breaching the predefined
marginal angle of heel corresponds with the actual ship
behavior in rough sea. The time spent to reach this critical
angle of heel is one of the key variables in the model (Roll
angle, Time to capsize). Reducing uncertainty about varia-
ble Weather, Number of people on board and Loading con-
ditions will also reduce the overall uncertainty of the me-
ta-model. However, the uncertainty associated with the first
and second variables is of aleatory nature, thus can be
deemed unresolvable, (Der Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009).
The knowledge about Loading conditions is not available to
us at the moment, but in principle could be gained. The
uncertainty of Repair time depend on design and operation-
al factors, which are not considered here, however the
model is not very sensitive to that node.
The influence of the uncertainty associated with the es-
timates of the probability of a ship being in DSC while in
operation seems to be rather significant. This parameter is
obtained based on the experts judgment, which accounts
for various aspects of ship operational conditions. On one
hand such assessment can be considered less uncertain than
if based on reliability data given by the manufacturer. On
the other the value for that parameter holds for medium size
Fig. 4. The results of risk assessment for ship capsizing in
DSC plotted on top of risk acceptance criteria for ships container ship with one engine, thus for a double-engine
carrying passenger above; graphical representation of four RoPax this value can be lower, pulling down the risk values.
loading conditions plotted on top of present stability criteria Definitely this parameter needs more detailed investigation.
- below. It is also important how the nodes are discretized, how
many states do they have, and what are the bases for se-
DISCUSSION lecting those. This affects the results of cross-validation,
and the overall performance of the meta-model, (Montewka
The meta-model presented here can be utilized for in- et al. 2015; Pitchforth and Mengersen 2013).
novative ships and their unusual loading conditions. The Last but not least, the time required for the meta-model
range of effects taken into account and the relation between preparation can be seemed as a drawback compared to
them are exceptional. Not only is the dynamical behavior of classical stability criteria. The process of meta-model de-
the ship considered but also other time-depended phenom- velopment is at the moment time-consuming since there is a
ena producing the whole scenario of the studied incident. need for performing a huge number of numerical simula-
Despite the unquestionable advantages the presented tions to obtain the probability distributions for the essential
approach face some difficulties as well. First of all the BNs variables. However, the preparation of the data-set is an
require the quantitative adjustment in terms of probability exercise that needs to be performed only once in ships life,
distributions of the applied variables which may be prob- for a wide range of operational conditions.
lematic since there is a shortage of well-established reliable Notwithstanding the mentioned difficulties the perfor-
models in the literature. The considered evacuation time is mance of the meta-model is decent and the application of

137
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CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA,
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environment developed at the Decision Systems Laboratory, IMO. 2006b. SLF 49/5/6 REVISION OF THE INTACT STABILITY
University of Pittsburgh available from CODE A Methodology of Direct Assessment for Capsizing
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The Merenkulun sti the Maritime Foundation - IMO. 2006c. SLF 49/INF.7 REVISION OF THE INTACT
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from Helsinki is appreciated for the travel grant provided.
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