G.R. No.

L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as

Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant. Manuel O. Chan
for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal
Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax
collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo
the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to
October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December
31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly
submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive
and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro
and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here.
In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the
case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines
is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a
discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly
section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the
Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case
that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection
thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office,
a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General,
because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated
Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize
the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section
9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries,
because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received
by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his
compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of
income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to
the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make
and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of
said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department.
And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only
of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the
power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the
duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating
their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state
is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course
would

lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a
judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might
be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to
the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of
whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of
a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act
of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to
prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the
constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power
to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature
may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the
courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would
surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution
by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of
the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the
collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where
the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so
apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do,
was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary
fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may
not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the
present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax
corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the
number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every
payday, that is to say,

twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his
salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday,
fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue
on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And
further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the
collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt
from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving
P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not
therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased
by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic
Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling
among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as
citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be
stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but
also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The
exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor
General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals,
commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant.
There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of
Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace.
The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme
Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As
said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S.,
245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause
in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of
action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading
principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal
concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as
a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the
principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially
when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and
considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married
person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But
even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that
prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the
Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the
judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax
on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental
law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of
judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them
is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to
the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes
to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire
at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to
receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give
more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can
less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be
real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on
public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason,
felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the
Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or
written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions
are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively
for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b)
[4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received
by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United
States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by
officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States,
allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive,
are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers
and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may
justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on
his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers
of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their
salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that
the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G.
R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that
I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it
provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of
the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of
the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers.

PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide
that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that
he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The
warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded
on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner
believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-
year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona
Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse.
He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70
million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then
Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.[2]

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then
headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other
hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to
impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued
a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to
step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.[3] Two days later or on October
13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.[4]
Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner
take the supreme self-sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus.
Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation.[7]However, petitioner strenuously held on to his
office and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar
Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II
also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses
of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors
led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were

former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P.
Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza,
Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV
and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating.Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one
foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a
P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled
against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered
against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line of
people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in
Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in demanding petitioners resignation.
Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in
the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more
people.[21]

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services
went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service
commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries,

undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.[25] Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito
Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the presidential Management
Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato
de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.[27]
Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which
resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the
EDSA Shrine.

At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the
following press statement:[30]

20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]

Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20.[32] Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00
p.m.[33]

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which
request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at
noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper
party.

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.[34]
Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in
a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio
Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US
President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US
recognition of her government.[36]

On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.[39]

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.[40] A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.[42] the
next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with
reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44]
The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45]
Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.[46]

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio
and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted
against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run
for another elective post.[48]

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up from
16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-
CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President
Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by
60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao.
Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:

58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor
class.[50]

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on

November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.,
(5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder,
indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758
filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-
15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of
GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief
Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of
petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that
they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file
their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement
for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court
resolved:

(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in

public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.

The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:

I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.

IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

I Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence,
are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at
bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that

respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as
the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political
thicket which the Court cannot enter.

We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud
on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the
20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on
prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United States, the
most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice
Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political
questions, not of political cases.

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
notlegality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.[60]With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync
and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in

limpid language to x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas
corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases
at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question.
A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held
that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign
people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent
Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the
1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA
II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused
and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of
EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of
the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for
the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the reforms sine quibus
non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally
or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes
of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the
authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved when the United
States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission
of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution.
These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident.
The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third,
it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a
method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and
of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can
take place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,[71]
this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights
Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all
and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly
stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people
assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who
count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article
II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11[76] of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of
political is but a foray in the dark.

II Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question.
Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case
and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as president.

The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:

Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a
high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives.Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary
of Trade and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call
reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the
second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the
EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in morning
of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they
decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito.
Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.At 3:00 p.m., General
Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he
asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81]
Petitioner did nor disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30
p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He
gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to
support him and his family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion
for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.[84] At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a
week in the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It
was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed.
Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period
of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family,
and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87]Again, we
note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three
points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

xxx

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when
he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:

Oppositions deal

7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:

1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.

2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
president and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:

1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).

3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.

4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition
Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice
President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be
noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by
the parties during and after the transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General
Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the
party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the fateful
events, viz:[90]

xxx

11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.

Agreement

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.

xxx

The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.

4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.

5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore
attached to this agreement.

xxx

11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the
agreement)? I asked.

Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).

I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?

And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already
moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which
have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provision on security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The president is too stunned for words.

Final meal

12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.

1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal
possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence
due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner
sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the
cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation.Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final
press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was
temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the
time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of
the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation
from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the
press release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency
cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is
the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal
significance to petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not
resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No.
3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate,
did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship
speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any
act of graft or corruption, or is under

administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period of
amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph
of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section
15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly
focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There
was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with
pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to
be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official
as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against
him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the
Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a
violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or
resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records
show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to
act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of
cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity
from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section
12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There
was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

III Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is
contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress
has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[95] This contention is the
centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an
Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now the operative facts:

(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;

(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;

(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;[96]

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which states:

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE

ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING
ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS
GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition
to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to
the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation,
to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nations goals under the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which
states:

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF

SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
- qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and overcome the nations
challenges.[99]

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the land -
which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:

RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio
and has been terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be transferred
to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate President.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously
with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners
claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court
cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been
delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103]
there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass
upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910
case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued
petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages
for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Johnson, held:

The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch
the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply,
that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This
remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property
rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not
do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official
duty, any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to
act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide
wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably
qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so
plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as
Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive
spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the State
and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the
integrity of government itself.[105]

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity.
Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive
immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The Kings
Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former
Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute
immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from
criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome).

The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now
Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to
President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a
return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive
immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas,
viz:[108]

Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that
the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind
of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he
cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is
now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than
a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object
of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal
and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]

xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts.

This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are
inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.Petitioner cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President Richard Nixon, a sitting
President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with
aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to
obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon
himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim
was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts. Recently, the
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it
held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is
inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity
in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public
trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[120] It
set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman
was also given fiscal autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed
during his incumbency.

V .Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits
that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of
his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.[125] The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.[126] The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the
case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at

bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the
minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We
have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records
do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130]
and its companion cases. viz.:

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

xxx

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers
have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:

xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or
partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history,
supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine
v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of

everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to
receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press,
standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to
the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise
of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom
is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present,
and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right
to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer
more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty social
science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because
of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs.[132] News reports
have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by
this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of
the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith
and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor
can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words,
investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper
court.

VI. Epilogue

A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized
as the most fundamental of all freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and
less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have
a circus-

free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient vehemence of
the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not
by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism
of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the
best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that
it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans
progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples
prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., no part in view of expression given in the open court and in the extended explanation.

Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.

Kapunan, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.

Panganiban, J., no part per letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2000 mention in footnote 51 of ponencia.

Pardo, J., in the result; believes that petitioner was constrained to resign and reserve his vote in immunity
from suit

Buena, J., in the result.

Ynares-Santiago, J., concur in the result and reserve the filing of a separate opinion.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.

[11] The complaint for impeachement was based on the following grounds: bribery, graft and corruption,
betrayal of public trust, and culpable violation of the Cnstitution.

[17] Those who voted yes to open the envelop were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano,
Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon, Osmea III. Those who vote no were Senators Ople, Defensor-
Santiago, John Osmea, Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revilla, Sotto III and Tatad.

[50] Acceptance of Gloria is Nationwide, Mahar Mangahas, Manila Standard, February 16, 2001, p. 14.

[60] Note that the early treatises on Constitutional Law are discourses on limitations of power typical of
which is, Cooleys Constitutional Limitations.

[61] Joint Resolution, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. Pres. Corazon C.
Aquino, et al., GR No. 73748; Peoples Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino,
et al., GR No. 73972; and Councilor Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., GR No. 73990, May 22,
1986.

[64] It states: I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vice President of the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I will
faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the nation.

So help me God. (Annex I, Comment of the Ombudsman; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15 Vol. II, p. 332)

[66] The guaranty was taken from Amendment I of the US Constitution which provides: Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof of abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievance.

[91] In the Angara Diary which appeared in the PDI issue of February 5, 2001, Secretary Angara stated that
the letter came from Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla; that he and Political Adviser Banayo opposed it; and
that PMS head Macel Fernandez believed that the petitioner would not sign the letter.

[[94] Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: No involuntary servitude in any form shall
exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

[96] House Resolution No. 175, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001), reads:RESOLUTION EXPRESSING
THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF HER
EXCELLENCY, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, on January 20, 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the 14th
President of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, her ascension to the highest office of the land under the dictum, the voice of the people is the
voice of God establishes the basis of her mandate on integrity and morality in government;

WHEREAS, the House of Representatives joins the church, youth, labor and business sectors in fully
supporting the Presidents strong determination to succeed;

WHEREAS, the House of representative is likewise one with the people in supporting President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyos call to start the healing and cleansing process for a divided nation in order to build an
edifice of peace, progress and economic stability for the country: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the
House of Representatives, To express its full support to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, 14th President of the Philippines.

Adopted, (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. ,Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) Roberto P. Nazareno ,Secretary General

[105] The logical basis for executive immunity from suit was originally founded upon the idea that the King
can do no wrong. [R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV.. 303 (1959)]. The
concept thrived at the time of absolute monarchies in medieval England when it was generally accepted that
the seat of sovereignty and governmental power resides in the throne. During that historical juncture, it was
believed that allowing the King to be sued in his court was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King.

With the development of democratic thoughts and institutions, this kind of rationalization eventually lost its
moral force. In the United States, for example, the common law maxim regarding the Kings infallibility had
limited reception among the framers of the Constitution. [J. Long, How to Sue the President: A Proposal for
Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 283 (1995)]. Still, the
doctrine of presidential immunity found its way of surviving in modern political times, retaining both its
relevance and vitality. The privilege, however, is now justified for different reasons. First, the doctrine is
rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by history. [Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
451 U.S. 731 (1982)]. The separation of powers principle is viewed as demanding the executives
independence from the judiciary, so that the President should not be subject to the judiciarys whim. Second,
by reason of public convenience, the grant is to assure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. [Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)].
Otherwise, the time and substance of the chief executive will be spent on wrangling litigation, disrespect
upon his person will be generated, and distrust in the government will soon follow.[Forbes v. Chouco Tiaco,
16 Phil. 534 (1910)]. Third, on grounds of public policy, it was recognized that the gains from discouraging

official excesses might be more than offset by the losses from diminished zeal [Agabin, op. cit., at 121.].
Without immunity, the president would de disinclined to exercise decision-making functions in a manner that
might detrimentally affect an individual or group of individuals. [See H. Schnechter, Immunity of Presidential
Aides from Criminal Prosecution, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 779 (1989)].1

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of
the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws
a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end
of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system
of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became
tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us
that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of

constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form
of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or

criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
(underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3,
par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give
the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for

Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for
resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts
invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional
attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes
its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties
and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort.
In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for the
decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be
decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and
palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of
the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner
has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is

sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes
the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the
illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide
the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-
gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together
with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES
& Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused
CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself

and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec.
1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render
the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6]
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition
of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the
Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION
OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when
we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number
one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot
be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of
overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of
necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when
we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended
a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined
in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern
of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the

"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to

justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15]
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court
review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary.The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine,"
to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil
at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize
the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect
and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it
does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in

the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not
all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason
(Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make
unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a
public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate
reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten

wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our
free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30]
The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the
other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if
the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed
is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the
information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3
pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the
amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance,
in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able
to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through
the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime,
there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,

but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum
of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute
a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at
least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.[31]

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).
Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason
and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious
effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a
very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without
applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of
the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable
doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged
for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x
xx

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it
contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section
4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of
plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is
crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be
severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the
existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for
a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the
nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions
thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives
of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he
claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the
deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each
and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of
Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution
need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime
must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing

to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the
capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for
more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made
or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to
be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that

their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.
For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they
are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect thislong
dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places
which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the
highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has
driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst
of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.

Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.

Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.

Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries
of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's
directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous
and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from
the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it
best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the
clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from
payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three
branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was
further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted
amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would
be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured

by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized
the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme
Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record
that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the
salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment
as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the
salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income
earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis
supplied).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior
courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis
ours).

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall
be exempt from payment of income tax. 3

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
4(Emphasis supplied).

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution,
for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-
diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such
contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges
of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief
Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)

During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their
objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate the
principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied
not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is
comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special
privileges to the salary of justices?

MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their
salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of
the judges.

MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on
taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection
clause. 6
xxxxxxxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for
whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with
the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so
doing, some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying
to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality
under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the
Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of course,
denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos
proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to
income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.

Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original
draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of
far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos
then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an
amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows:

FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not enough to
drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then
he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and
Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the
statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE

SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to
be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the
income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right
now, for instance, there are many people who have accepted employment in the government involving a
reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income
is reduced by accepting service in government.

Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de
los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas
announced:

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that
his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to
Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall
be exempt from payment of income tax.

So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax.

When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of
public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate,
when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision
under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the
salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax?
The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax"
is deleted.9

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that
the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.121avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
(Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in
the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as
affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the
alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section
10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Yap, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG,

defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor
General Florencio Villamor for appellee.

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion of
fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester,
12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs having obtained in proper license or permit
therefore from competent authority.
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in question,
invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as
secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina
Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order
campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession
one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the
successful execution of his hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and whereabouts
of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all matters
affecting tranquility therein existing.lawphi1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or
permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter
therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him

within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-
appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal
Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2)
years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction
based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep
in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live
ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the
same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was
accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in
the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially
with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position.
As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month.
It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground
for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will
have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of
office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) FELICI
ANO LEVISTE Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as
Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose
firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver,
Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he
was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.

Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of
record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry
the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27,
1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v.
Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused
because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without
license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said
firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue
any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms;
and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary
means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In
Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained
the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ...
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879,
Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa
reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of
the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first
view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this
Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may
not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de
oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-

appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney
Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the
costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as
"Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum
Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with
one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the
accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt
was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and
possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29,
1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds
of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a
corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused
was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US
and the accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not
the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and
posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense
charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction
"in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a
fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is punishable
by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year

and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two
hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But
considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is
penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5)
years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than
five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction
over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret
agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the
performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was
informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said
firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in
appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the
latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."

At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs.
Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the
maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category
of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879."
The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967.
Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he
incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed from
is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his
provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

4 Exhibit 1 reads: You are hereby accredited as Special Agent without regular compensation. This
designation does not confer upon you police powers and authority to make investigations provided by
Section 848 of the Revised Administrative Code nor does it entitled you to (possess and carry firearms or)
take free rides in any public conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are ours and the words within were crossed
out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela, Chief, CIS, who signed appellant's appointment.)

5 Exhibit 2 reads: I akcnowledged to have received from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas, Inf (PC) ASO, CIS,
HPC, the following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provisions of the Accounting Law, and
will be used in the office of CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag & stock Total value
P40.00 Note: For the use of Agt. Jesus E. Santayana while in the performance of his official duties.
Approved: t/s/ Jose C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC) Chief, CIS, HPC. ...

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VENANCIO CONCEPCION,

defendant-appellant.

Recaredo Ma. Calvo for appellant. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National
Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7,
1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of
P300,000. This special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum order of President
Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to
grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to
P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm of "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required consisting of six demand notes. The notes, together with
the interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.

"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto Concepcion

contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente Puno,
P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S.
Concepcion was the administrator of the company.

On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and as member
of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation
of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First
Instance, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.

Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which reference must
hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant
loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."
Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts
took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.

Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. These errors they
have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in oral argument. Attorney-General
Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and comprehensive brief, answers the proposition of appellant one
by one.

The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which follows:

I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No.
2747?

Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only
show the concession of a credit. In this statement of fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits in question
speak of a "credito" (credit) and not of a " prestamo" (loan).

The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed
by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of
money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. (Payne
vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of
"loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"

II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount"?

Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a "loan," it does not prohibit
what is commonly known as a "discount."

In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank, inquired of the Insular
Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to discounts as well as to loans. The
ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11, 1916, was to the effect that said section referred to
loans alone, and placed no restriction upon discount transactions. It becomes material, therefore, to
discover the distinction between a "loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes
under the first or the latter denomination.

Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an actual, live,
transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money, with, however,
these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the
expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name
paper.

Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and not discounts,
yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."
were not discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted
from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not
double-name paper.

The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not essentially different from
the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was declared that the operations constituted a loan
and not a discount, so should we here lay down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of
section 35 of Act No. 2747?

Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an "indirect loan." In
this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held one-half of the capital of this
partnership.

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety
against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the
familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to
duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the
success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a
member, falls within the prohibition.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal partnership.
(Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan, therefore, to a
partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the
acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs
with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and
without asking for collateral security.

In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the Supreme Court
of Maryland said:

What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should borrow of the bank,
and "if any director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be
punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the
bank, against the temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as
such they must necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature
unwilling to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire any
interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty, declared in express terms that
they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.

In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate decision, it
was said:

We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself directly. The
loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.

IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a violation of
section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when these portions of Act No. 2747
were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the finding of the information and the rendition of the judgment?

As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation to section 35 of
the same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any of the provisions of

the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act
No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution.

This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to such contention
in the cases of United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs. Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653);
and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other
words, it has been the holding, and it must again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which
penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not
have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentenced offenders
charged with violations of the old law.
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747,
penalized by this law?

Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the bank, and since
section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates any provisions of the law, but
on a person violating any provisions of the same, and imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the
prohibition contained in said section 35 is without penal sanction.lawph!l.net

The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board
of directors, and to each director separately and individually. (People vs. Concepcion, supra.)

VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in
extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal
defense?

Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was because he was
misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated that since the loans made to the
copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been paid, no loss has been suffered by the Philippine
National Bank.

Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the defendant has
violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the inhibited act, inhibited on account of
public policy and public interest, constitutes the crime. And, in this instance, as previously demonstrated, the
acts of the President of the Philippine National Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the
Insular Auditor, even conceding that such rulings have controlling effect.

Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:

It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, and advantage not common to the other
stockholders. The law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will not listen to any proof of honest intent.

JUDGMENT

On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and the errors
assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court on the same subject, we
are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this case, and that
the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime

charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within the limits of the punitive
provisions of the law.

Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue,

defendant-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor and
appellant. Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted
this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not
being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant
appealed.

The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim of a
colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is
not without its vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not legally
disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals to this Court, and
there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in the United States
have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question touches all the members of the
judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose
compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and
the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the subject has been thoroughly discussed in many
American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to
compare their conclusions to local conditions. There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions,
for the situation is not unprecedented.

Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges
of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos". When in
1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a different
salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen
thousand pesos a year.

Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?.

A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the
affirmative. It says:

Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed
during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the
compensation paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of
Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902)
131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the
contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v. Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.)
73]*

A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the contrary
view is Missouri.

The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of
the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax law. Does it
embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should consider four periods:

First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.

Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil officers of the
United States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as including the
compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the
Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things:

The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it can
be diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at
the pleasure of the legislature.

The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and established by the
Constitution. Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a character that requires it to be
perfectly independent of the two other departments, and in order to place it beyond the reach and above
even the suspicion of any such influence, the power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from
Congress, and excepted from their powers of legislation.
Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most
important and essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of the legislative and executive
branches of the government, and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his
person and property, would be of little value without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free
from every influence, direct and indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement warp their
judgments.

Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of
the judges, as unconstitutional and void2.

The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court, that
ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary
of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection of the tax was
consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half a century
thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3

Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided that taxable
income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United
States". Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid income tax on his salary; and
maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to recover the money he had delivered
under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making decision.*, explaining the
purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and
the effect of an income tax upon the salary of a judge.

With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges "shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to promote the
public weal by giving them that independence which makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of
the judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the
compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet
effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that
the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for
his support during his continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this
regard may be changed to his disadvantage?

The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be
assured by vesting the three powers the legislative, the executive, and the judicial in separate
departments, each relatively independent of the others and it was recognized that without this
independence if it was not made both real and enduring the separation would fail of its purpose. all
agreed that restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; for
otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate
the others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by
the legislative.

The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by Alexander Hamilton
in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following:

xxxxxxxxx

At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him to
speak as no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are
the balance wheel of our whole constitutional system; and our is the only constitutional system so balanced
and controlled. Other constitutional systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they
lack the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of
exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional understandings it is indispensable, alike for the
preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the powers of the
government, that there should be some nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be impartially
debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the
government must accept definition of its authority. There the individual may challenge the legality of
governmental action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the
government must abide; there the government can check the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual
and establish its power upon lines which all can comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of the
courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in
this sense that

our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between
individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty. Constitutional government in
the United States, pp. 17, 142.

Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts, recognizing that they
would be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important than any ever before confide to judicial
tribunals, and appreciating that they were to be, in the words of George Washington, "the keystone of our
political fabric", the convention with unusual accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the
judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Can there be any doubt that
the two things thus coupled in place the clause in respect of tenure during good behaviour and that in
respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their
purposes was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of
their task, and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance? Mr. Hamilton said in
explanation and support of the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general
course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.

xxxxxxxxx

These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench, and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential
to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the
admiration of justice without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.

xxxxxxxxx

But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted
of others engaged in private employment.

If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the taxation of other
income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no
license to do what it prohibits.

The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution,
whether for one purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and
commonly accepted ever since, make with impelling force for the conclusion that the fathers of the
Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs. Gore, supra.)

In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of claims. His
salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a
statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the same theory on which
Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision.
It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that

Judge Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified before),
and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply to the salaries of Federal judges
appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made no distinction as to judges
appointed before or after its passage)

Fourth period. 1939 Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in
inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that "gross income" on which
taxes were payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the United States taking office after
June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as
judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the United States the issue of decrease of remuneration
again came up. That court, however, ruled against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to
adopt the law. It said:

The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that
United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence
of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course,
Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is
not, when applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article 3,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took
office after the Congress has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them
bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic
experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax
is merely to recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in government does not
generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose
Constitution and laws they are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R.
1379.)

Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this decision
(Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income taxes without violating
the constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during their continuance in office", and
that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs. Gore". To grasp the full import of the
O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:

1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent
with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter announced.

2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that the
Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of that case.

Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the logical
conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges
appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those
judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their salaries
(Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize the
allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.

By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with disfavor
from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore
(Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such school

publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the
grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on
the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on incomes from whatever
source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal:

In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided that by taxing the
salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect reducing his salary and thus
violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax really is a
reduction of salary, even so it would seem that the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes,
from whatever source derived', are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1.
But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the amendment in no way extended the subjects
open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes from the
amendment the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p. 70)

The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be attributed to the above detraction which, without
appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being also citizens liable to
income tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor the 16th Amendment has no
counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as the underlying
influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much of its
force.

Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries
of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been approved.

Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative declaration
taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court probably had in mind
what in other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary in effect decreased the
emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced emoluments.6

The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay tax by
executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is controlled by the
administrative and judicial standards herein-before described in the "second period" of the Federal
Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant
practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it does not
include salaries of judges protected from diminution.

In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932, upheld in the
O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to judges who took office
before 1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the O'Malley ruling to permit
legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or after. The answer to this is
that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the O'Malley case. Which
is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.

Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly
taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United
States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income"
taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally

be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable
"income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the
prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here;7 and
second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution
off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really
impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is
not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution
intended to preclude taxation of the same.8

It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax on salaries
of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance dated March 4,
1940, which says in part:

xxxxxxxxx

The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in computing additional
residence taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever
resolution is adopted with respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the
attention of this department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine regarding the
liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that the question is of great
significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice
was requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the said decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present
ruling to the effect that judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion of the court
in the said case, the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States is not binding in the Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the
issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President
decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and additional residence taxes from the
President of the Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General, and the undersigned
was authorized to act accordingly.

In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the salaries received by
the President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General during the calendar year
1939 and thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of
taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by Congressional
enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes
thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is
charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the
taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial

salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon
legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)

Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. Let
the highest court of Maryland speak:

The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity, privilege or
exemption. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant
on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed
as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent,
knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured
salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their
position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and
dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is
irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption
from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for
a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full
consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of
Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the independence of
the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of
judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the
income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of government officials on the level of
judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because
the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative
branches in equal measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of
salaries of the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems,
quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges
compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law. Consequence:
Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority
will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing
their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their
pressure?

Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his salary to the
income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of the President, his
salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this
executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume that, in the matter of
compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such
assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.

The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA., J., dissenting:

It is indeed embarrassing that this case was initiated by a member of this Court upon which devolves the
duty to decide it finally. The question of whether the salaries of the judges, the members of the Commission
on Elections, the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are immune from taxation, might
have been raised by any interested party other than a justice of the Supreme Court with less
embarrassment to the latter.

The question is simple and not difficult of solution. We shall state our opinion as concisely as possible.

The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833, which was approved on March 7, 1919, to take
effect on January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) of said Act provided:

There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income received in the
preceding calendar year from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the Philippine Islands, a
tax of two per centum upon such income. . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Section 2 (a) of said Act provided:

Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the taxable net income of a
person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal
service of whatever kind and is whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade,
commerce, sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of
or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of
any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever.

That income tax law has been amended several times, specially as to the rates of the tax, but the above-
quoted provisions (except as to the rate) have been preserved intact in the subsequent Acts. The present
income tax law is Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466, sections 21,
28 and 29 of which incorporate the texts of the above-quoted provisions of the original Act in exactly the
same language. There can be no dispute whatsoever that judges (who are individuals) and their salaries
(which are income) are as clearly comprehended within the above-quoted provisions of the law as if they
were specifically mentioned therein; and in fact all judges had been and were paying income tax on their
salaries when the Constitution of the Philippines was discussed and approved by the Constitutional
Convention and when it was submitted to the people for confirmation in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.

Now, the Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts
"shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." (Section 9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)a

The simple question is: In approving the provisions against the diminution of the compensation of judges
and other specified officers during their continuance in office, did the framers of the

Constitution intend to nullify the then existing income tax law insofar as it imposed a tax on the salaries of
said officers ? If they did not, then the income tax law, which has been incorporated in the present National
Internal Revenue Code, remains in force in its entirety and said officers cannot claim exemption therefrom
on their salaries.

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified. or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines.
In resolving the question at bar, we must take into consideration the following well-settled rules:

"A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in reference to existing statutory laws, upon the
provisions of which in detail it must depend to be set in practical operation" (People vs. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375;
People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y. 537; Cass vs. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; People vs. N. Y., 25 Wend. (N. Y. 22).
(Barry vs. Traux, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas 191, 193.).

Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and
existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment
and opinion in its adoption (Baltimore vs. State, 15 Md. 376, 480; 74 Am. Dec. 572; State vs. Mace, 5 Md.
337; Bandel vs. Isaac, 13 Md. 202; Manly vs. State, 7 Md. 135; Hamilton vs. St. Louis County Ct., 15 Mo. 5;
People vs. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Servis vs. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Pope vs. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 686; People
vs. Harding, 53 Mich. 48, 51 Am. Rep. 95; Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co. vs. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S. W.
Rep. 791). (Idem.)

A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, like statutes, are properly
to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption, the general spirit of the
times, and the prevailing sentiments among the people. Reference may be made to the historical facts
relating to the original or political institutions of the community or to prior well-known practices and usages.
(11 Am. Ju., Constitutional Law, 676-678.)

The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each associate Justice, respectively, of
the Supreme Court were the same salaries ]which they were receiving at the time the Constitution was
framed and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under the existing income tax law. It seems
clear to us that for them to receive the same salaries, subject to the same tax, after the adoption of the
Constitution as before does not involve any diminution at all. The fact that the plaintiff was not a member of
the Court when the Constitution took effect, makes no difference. The salaries of justices and judges were
subject to income tax when he was appointed in the early part of 1945. In fact he must have declared and
paid income tax on his salary for 19454 he claimed exemption only beginning 1946. It seems likewise
clear that when the framers of the Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into consideration
that the recipients were paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to provide expressly that said
salaries shall be subject to income tax because they knew that already so provided. On the other hand, if
exemption from any tax on said salaries had been intended, it would have been specifically to so provide,
instead of merely saying that the compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office."

In the light of the antecedents, the prohibition against diminution cannot be interpreted to include or refer to
general taxation but to a law by which said salaries may be fixed. The sentence in question reads: "They
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished

during their continuance in office." The next sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide otherwise,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of P16,000, and each
associate Justice, P15,000." It is plain that the Constitution authorizes the Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation, but that such rate must be higher than that which the justices receive at he
time of its enactment or, if lower, it must not affect those justice already in office. In other words, Congress
may approve a law increasing the salaries of the justices at any time, but it cannot approve a law
decreasing their salaries unless such law is made effective only as to justices appointed after its approval.

It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the prohibition against diminution to read into it an
exemption from taxation. There is no justification for the belief or assumption that the framers of the
Constitution intended to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They knew that it was and is the
unavoidable duty of every citizen to bear his aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government; that
taxes are the very blood that sustains the life of the Government. To make all citizens share the burden of
taxation equitably, the Constitution expressly provides that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform." (Section
22 [1], Article VI.) We think it would be a contravention of this provision to read into the prohibition against
diminution of the salaries of the judges and other specified officers an exemption from taxes on their
salaries. How could the rule of income taxation be uniform if it should not be applied to a group of citizens in
the same situation as other income earners ? It is to us inconceivable that the framers ever intended to
relieve certain officers of the Government from sharing with their fellows citizens the material burden of the
Government to exempt their salaries from taxes. Moreover, the Constitution itself specifies what
properties are exempt from taxes, namely: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes." (Sec. 22 [3], Article VI.) The omission of the salaries in question from this
enumeration is in itself an eloquent manifestation of intention to continue the imposition of taxes thereon as
provided in the existing law. Inclusio est exclusio alterius.

We have thus far read and construed the pertinent portions of our own Constitution and income tax law in
the light of the antecedent circumstances and of the operative factors which prevailed at the time our
Constitution was framed, independently of the construction now prevailing in the United States of similar
provisions of the federal Constitution in relation to the present federal income tax law, under which the
justices of the Supreme Court, and the federal judges are now, and since the case of O'Malley vs.
Woodrough was decided on May 22, 1939, have been, paying income tax on their salaries. Were this a
majority opinion, we could end here with the consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from. But ours
is a voice in the wilderness, and we may permit ourselves to utter it with more vehemence and emphasis so
that future players on this stage perchance may hear and heed it. Who knows? The Gospel itself was a
voice in the wilderness at the time it was uttered.

We have to comment on Anglo-American precedents since the majority decision from which we dissent is
based on some of them. Indeed, the majority say they "hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and
to compare their conclusions to local conditions." which we shall presently show did not obtain in the United
States at the time the federal and state Constitutions were adopted. We shall further show that in any event
what they now borrow is not usable because it has long been withdrawn from circulation.

When the American Constitution was framed and adopted, there was no income tax law in the United
States. To this circumstance may be attributed the claim made by some federal judges headed by Chief
Justice Taney, when under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, their salaries were subjected to an income
tax, that such tax was a diminution of their salaries and therefore prohibited by the Constitution. Chief
Justice Taney's claim and his protest against the tax were not heeded, but no federal judge deemed it
proper to sue the Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the taxes they continued to pay under protest for
several years. In 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury referred the

question to Atty. General Hoar, and that officer rendered an opinion in substantial accord with Chief Justice
Taney's protest, and also advised that the tax on the President's compensation was likewise invalid. No
judicial pronouncement, however, was made of such invalidity until June 1, 1920, when the case of Evans
vs. Gore (253 U.S. 245, 64 L. ed. 887) was decided upon the constitutionality of section 213 of the Act of
February 24, 1919, which required the computation of incomes for the purpose of taxation to embrace all
gains, profits, income and the like, "including in the case of the President of the United States, the judges of
the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States, [and others] . . . the compensation received as such."
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, sustained the suit
with the dissent of Justice Holmes and Brandeis. The doctrine of Evans vs. Gore holding in effect that an
income tax on a judge's salary is a diminution thereof prohibited by the Constitution, was reaffirmed in 1925
in Miles vs. Graham, 69 L. ed 1067.

In 1939, however, the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough (59 S. Ct. 838, 122 A. L. R. 1379) was brought up to
the test the validity of section 22 of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, which included in the "gross income,"
on the basis of which taxes were to be paid, the compensation of "judges of courts of the United States
taking office after June 6, 1932." And in that case the Supreme Court of the United States, with only one
dissent (that of Justice Butler), abandoned the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham by holding:

To subject them [the judges] to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that
their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens
the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.

The decision also says:

To suggest that it [the law in question] makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office
after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their
aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on
which the framers based the safeguard of Article 3, section 1.

Commenting on the above-quoted portions of the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
on the subject, Prof. William Bennett, Munro, in his book, The Government of the United States, which is
used as a text in various universities, says: ". . .

All of which seems to be common sense, for surely the framers of the Constitution from ever cutting a
judge's salary, did not intend to relieve all federal judges from the general obligations of citizenship. As for
the President, he has never raised the issue; every occupant of the White House since 1913 has paid his
income tax without protest. (Pages 371-372.)

We emphasize that the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham is no longer operative, and that all
United States judges, including those who took office before June 6, 1932, are subject to and pay income
tax on their salaries; for after the submission of O'Malley vs. Woodrough for decision the Congress of the
United States, by section 3 of the Public Salary Act of 1939, amended section 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of
June 6, 1932, so as to make it applicable to "judges of courts of the United States who took office on or
before June 6, 1932." And the validity of that Act, in force for more than a decade, has not been challenged.

Our colleagues import and transplant here the dead limbs of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham and
attempt to revive and nurture them with painstaking analyses and diagnoses that they

had not suffered a fatal blow from O'Malley vs. Woodrough. We refuse to join this heroic attempt because
we believe it is futile.

They disregard the actual damage and minimize it by trying to discover the process by which it was inflicted
and he motivations that led to the infliction. They say that the chief axe-wielder, Justice Frankfurter, was a
Harvard graduate and professor and that the Harvard Law Journal had criticized Evans vs. Gore; that the
dissenters in said case (Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men like Frankfurter; and that they believe this
to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the case [O'Malley vs.
Woodrough] went off." This argument is not valid, in our humble belief. It was not only the Harvard Law
Journal that had criticized Evans vs. Gore. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues said that the decision in
that case "met with wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and professional opinion," and
they cited the following: Clark, Furthermore Limitations Upon Federal Income Taxation, 30 Yale L. J. 75;
Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 15 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 635, 641-644; Fellman, Diminution of
Judicial Salaries, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 89; Lowndes, Taxing Income of Federal Judiciary, 19 Va. L. Rev. 153;
Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 117, 118; Powell, The Sixteenth Amendment and
Income from State Securities, National Income Tax Magazine (July, 1923), 5, 6; 20 Columbia L. Rev. 794;
43 Harvard L. Rev. 318; 20 Ill. L. Rev. 376; 45 Law Quarterly Rev. 291; 7 Va. L. Rev. 69; 3 University of
Chicago L. Rev. 141. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues also said that "Evans vs. Gore itself was
rejected by most of the courts before whom the matter came after that decision." Is not the intention to throw
Evans vs. Gore into the graveyard of abandoned cases manifest from all this and from the holding that
judges are also citizens, liable to income tax on their salaries?

The majority say that "unless and until our legislature approves an amendment to the income tax law
expressly taxing 'the salaries of judges thereafter appointed,' the O'Malley case is not relevant." We have
shown that our income tax law taxes the salaries of judges as clearly as if they are specifically mentioned
therein, and that said law took effect long before the adoption of the Constitution and long before the plaintiff
was appointed.

We agree that the purpose of the constitutional provision against diminution of the salaries of judges during
their continuance in office is to safeguard the independence of the Judicial Department. But we disagree
that to subject the salaries of judges to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners would in
any way affect their independence. Our own experience since the income tax law went effect in 1920 is the
best refutation of such assumption.

The majority give an example by which the independence of judges may be imperiled thru the imposition of
a tax on their salaries. They say: Suppose there is power to tax the salaries of judges and the judiciary
incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so
as to levy a 30 per cent tax on all salaries of government officials on the level of judges, and by means of
another law the salaries of the executive and the legislative branches are increased to compensate for the
30 per cent reduction of their salaries. To this we reply that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to
(which we cannot imagine), we shall be the first ones to vote to strike it down as a palpable violation of the
Constitution. There is no parity between such hypothetical law and the general income tax law invoked by
the defendant in this case. We believe that an income tax law applicable only against the salaries of judges
and not against those or all other income earners may be successfully assailed as being in contravention
not only of the provision against diminution of the salaries of judges but also of the uniformity of the rule of
taxation as well as of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. So the danger apprehended by the
majority is not real but surely imaginary.

We vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Paras J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C.
Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold
that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of
August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or
permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not
question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver
with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13,
1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the
corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor."
Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao
also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on
a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11,
1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated
that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from
the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time
to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime
of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to
two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of
the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task
is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The
conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on
the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such
reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.