VS CA 153 SCRA 451

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina
Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto.
Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on
November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the
late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana.
Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
While Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed.
The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties.

Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document
or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of
the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked.
The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had,
nevertheless, been sufficiently proven.
The appellate court based its finding on the facts that:
The document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence,
By the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and,
Her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up

Held:

There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. The heart
of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.

The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself,
or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by
some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate
distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction,
cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (Emphasis Supplied.)

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute
an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator.
It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator.
Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will
and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to
have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where
the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a purported
win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...."

a. Doctrine of dependent relative revocation

GAGO VS MAMUYAC 49 PHIL 902
 The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac.
It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a
last will and testament.
Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probation of that will.
The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac.
After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied upon the ground that the
deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.

On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced to secure the probation of the said will
of the 16th day of April, 1919.
To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their
oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said
Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel
Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error:

in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities
required by the law;
that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death;
that the said will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging
that fact.

Held:

With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law
does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing
that after due search the original will cannot be found.
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when
last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will
has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the
presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish
not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or
destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perish with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by
proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the
formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is
made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

VS MOLO 90 PHIL 37

FACTS:
Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending
line.
His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and by his nieces and nephew Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo (oppositors-appellants).
Oppositors appellants were the legitimate children of a deceased brother of the testator.
Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939,
In both the 1918 and 1939 wills Juana was instituted as his universal heir.
The latter will contains a clause, which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918.
Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the probate of the will executed in 1939.
The court rendered a decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove
that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by
the deceased on August 18, 1918.
 The oppositors filed an opposition to the petition contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939
will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918.
Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the
presumption that the testator himself deliberately revoked it.
The will of 1918 was admitted to probate.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Was the admittance into probate proper?

What is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation?

HELD:

A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys
a will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made,
fails to effect for same reason.

The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will does not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a
new will.

Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of
the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918
because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
executed and would be given due effect.

The theory on which the principle of dependent relative revocation is predicated on that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on different occasions and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

Doctrine of dependent relative revocation the revocation by destruction or overt act was good only if this
condition is fulfilled, namely, that the revoking will was valid. The conditioned was not fulfilled; therefore, the
revocation by overt act did not really materialize.

Diaz v. De Leon Digest

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately
returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the
testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the
incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his
own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was
subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed
destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.

Guevara v Guevara Digest

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural
daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which
he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to
invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated.
She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court
for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

Facts:
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they
gave two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.

2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed
in 1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed
in 1954.
3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law.
While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued
by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence
this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of
probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final
decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of
Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals
but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its
final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include
the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not
within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be
on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his
will, Florentino bequeathed his share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his share would be assigned to
spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Teclas son by her first marriage who grew up
under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protg
Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition
wasregistered by Florentinos brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted
the will to probate.

The testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of
partition and distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging
that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that they be
declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res
judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the
will, the legal heirs filed a case for annulment of the will alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the annulment of the will
ofFlorentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to
the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case
which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res
judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the
will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not

even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in
rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case,
which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It
constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of
the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action
or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot
apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for annulment of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the

period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

Nepomuceno v. CA Digests
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as
the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez
with whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children
opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that
there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of
cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and
held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in
violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general
rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator
and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a
practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only
since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of
its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons
guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also
prohibited.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012

(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will
be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

NUGUID VS NUGUID
GRN L-2344 17 SCRA 449

JUNE 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her parents and
siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on
November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the
ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited
and as a consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.

Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:

The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes
petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that
the nullity is complete.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law.

On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of
the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we
might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
Octavio Maloles II vs Pacita De
Los Reyes Phillips
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that he
has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The
petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court
determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his
last will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February
16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for
the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion
but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61
claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be
appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to
Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch
61, then it should be the same court which should hear Pacitas motion. Branch 61 however
refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently
consolidated the case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion
for intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate
proceeding.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has
already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with
Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now
concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back
the case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided
that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir.
Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case,
Arturo left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of
his estate.

Maloles II v. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 (2000)

Facts:
 - On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he had no
compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less
than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
- On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely
executed said will.
- Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died
- Petitioner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceaseds sister Alicia de
santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the
deceased.
- Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then
withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65.
- Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full
blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61.
- Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61.
- Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion to intervene, and denied
taking cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved
the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos
Himself when he was alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed
the will.
- Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again took cognizance of
the case to expedite proceedings.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon
its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2. Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

Held:
Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contention that that the proceedings must continue until the
estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73,
1 of the Rules of Court is without merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. This was already done in the ante-mortem probate
of Dr. De Santos will during his lifetime.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules
of Court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of
over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial
courts. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the
will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death.

Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos.
Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent,
he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has
already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the
said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim
to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to
the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

Thus, the Petition was denied.

Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR, petitioners,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:

Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor
Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS.
Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or
not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an
action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which
were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by
inheritance. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on
petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying
reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained
unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection
of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate
court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in
another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of
the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said
order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which
Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately
executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due
Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion,
Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was
denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING:

In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the
question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a
declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.

The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory,
considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still
pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged
with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
 Pascual COSO, vs.
Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her
for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to
the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario
Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is
alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence
alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that
Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that
effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative,
with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of
testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testators free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of
its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does
not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be
practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in
favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made.