CAROLINA G.

LIM REMREV II
SECTION JDA

1. G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Senator Juan Ponce Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement
in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF). On June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motion on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same
day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. This was again denied by
the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sen. Enrile is entitled to the right to bail.

HELD:
Yes, Sen. Enrile has the right to bail. Firstly, bail protects the right of the accused to due
process and to be presumed innocent. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
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is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
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regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
2. G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Roloto Go was accused of frustrated homicide for the gun shot suffered by Eldon Maguan
(Maguan). After seven (7) days, before the information was filed in Court, Maguan died.
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. Also, at the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of the
same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of
the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty
on a cash bond of P100,000.00. The petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special
raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was
raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash
bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Go was released that same day. The
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigationand prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He
stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been
granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991. The trial court issued an Ordergranting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. However, the next day, respondent
Judgemotu proprioissued an Orderembodying the recall of the grant of bail, the surrender of
Go in 48 hours from the receipt of the order and for the preliminary investigation order to be
recalled and cancelled.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Go was lawfully arrested.
2. Whether Go effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

HELD:
1. No, Go was not lawfully arrested because his arrest was not the lawful warrantless arrest
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

When Go walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact
placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was
"surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had
slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for
charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded
him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without
a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.

2. No, Go did not waive his right to preliminary investigation. In fact, Go demanded
preliminary investigation at the very beginning. While that right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, isnota mere formal or technical right; it
is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid
a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure
of his right to due process. The Supreme Court considers that petitioner Go remains entitled
to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the
merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
should be accorded to petitioner.
3. A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817. June 8, 2005
P/SR. SUPT. ORLANDO M. MABUTAS vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820. June 8, 2005
CITY PROSECUTOR EDWARD M. TOGONONON vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO

FACTS:
Two (2) complaints were filed against Judge Norma Perello accusing respondent Judge of
partiality, serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law, concerning the her
grant of bail in criminal cases for Violations of R.A. No. 9165 pending before her. Said judge
was under contention that shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a precursor or essential
chemical and should not warrant the accused life imprisonment or death as penalty. In the
earlier cases, she granted the bail with appropriate hearing as to its grant. However in the last
cases, no such hearing was conducted. R.A. No. 9165 provides in Section 11 that shabu is
classified as a dangerous drug. It further provides that regardless of quantity, the sale, trade,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu is punishable
by life imprisonment to death. Therefore, the grant of bail in this cases must be preceded by
hearing.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Perello should be sanctioned administratively for granting bail on
capital offenses without hearing.

HELD: Yes, Judge Perello should be sanctioned administratively for granting bail on capital
offenses without hearing. This constitutes gross ignorance of the law. R.A. 9165 clearly
enumerates and specifies the classification of shabu as a dangerous drug.It does not even
take an interpretation of the law but a plain and simple reading thereof. Furthermore, had
respondent judge kept herself abreast of jurisprudence and decisions of the Court, she would
have been apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of casesdecided by the Court that
methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabuhad always been considered as a dangerous drug.
It is clearly stated that the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation ofshabuis punishable by life imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it
is incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the petitions/motions for bail filed
by the accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong. To grant an
application for bail and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence.
4. G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.

FACTS:
Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo C. Mendoza (Alfredo). Juno Cars alleged that on
June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its
Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered
that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance
managers permission. The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made
payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further
alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for.
Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai
Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted
amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of
P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage. On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an
information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. While the case was pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and
estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March
31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause12 before the trial court.
On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment. On March 3, 2009, the trial
court dismissed the complaint after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence
on record and holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause
for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration but
was subsequently denied. Upon petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the case. Aggrieved Alfredo brought the
matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

HELD: Yes, the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor. While it is within
the trial courts discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is
only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutors determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of
probable cause independent of the prosecutors finding. There are two kinds of determination
of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is
one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function
has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable
cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced
to issue the arrest warrant. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three
options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
5. G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa. Dy alleged that he was a long-time
client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the manager. Because of their good
business relationship, Dy took Ngos advice to deposit his money in an investment house that
will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also
known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies
and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. Relying on Ngo and
Gracias assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests, leading
Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the
name of State Resources. In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his
earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred
Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen
Centavos (P114,286,086.14). However, all these checks were subsequently dishonored when
Dy deposited them. Judge Placido Marquez of RTC Manila issued warrants of arrest against
the petitioners and the other accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to
defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the
absence of probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ). These motions were denied by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether probable cause exists against the accused.

HELD: Yes, there is probable cause as found by the RTC Judge of Manila, Judge Placido
Marquez. Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutors resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.
These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the
prosecutors findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances
presented by both parties. Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon
the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He/She may: a) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it
finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause. The records showed
that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause to
support the issuance of the warrants. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested.
This must be distinguished from the prosecutors finding of probable cause which is for the
filing of the proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to
address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.
6. G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and
RONALD MUNOZ vs. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso reside. Atty. Generoso called for the police and upon response, they saw him badly
beaten. When askekd who mauled Atty. Generoso, the latter pointed the petitioners who were
invited by the police. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police
Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived
the attack. Two days after, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. The petitioners
filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding
was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the petitioners motion.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was again denied. The petitioners
brought the matter to the Court of Appeals but again was dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

HELD:
Yes, the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Warrantless arrest are provieded
in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. In determining
probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the
requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere
general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as
personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness
or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such
information. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for trial. The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest
ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion,
based on actual facts. In the case at bar, Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
those responsible for his mauling and the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the
same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired. With these facts and circumstances that the
police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the
time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, the Supreme Court deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests.
These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers'
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
7. G.R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012
MARGARITA AMBRE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Margarita Ambre (Ambre), Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee Mendoza (Mendoza) were
charged with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia and illegal use of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as shabu. Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty and were convicted.
On the other hand, Ambre pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations. She contended that
her arrest was not valid and the items seized from them were inadmissible in evidence. PO3
Moran, PO1 Mateo, PO1 Masi, PO2 Hipolito and P/Insp dela Rosa testified that the Caloocan
Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation
pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife
Ina Aderp (Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound
in Caloocan City. Aderp was arrested but Sultan ran away causing the police to pursue the
the latter, leading them to his house. Inside the said house the police operatives found Ambre,
Castro and Mendoza having a pot session. Ambre, in particular, was caught sniffing what was
suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while
PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu. The
items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory
examination. Urine samples taken from Ambre and her co- accused and were found to be
positive for the presence of shabu.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and
2. Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
1. YES, the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid. One of the
recognized exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.In this
exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides three (3)
instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had
just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the case at
bar, Ambre was caught sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza. Considering that the
warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her
person was likewise lawful.

2. NO, the items seized are NOT inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had
not been compromised. They had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in
the chain of custody of the seized items. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned
over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the
former. All the pieces of evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as
SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05. With the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2
Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory and delivered them to P/
Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who found all the items, except the disposable lighters,
positive for traces of shabu.