1 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

RIGHT OF ACCESSION

(a) With respect to real property

Article 440 (1) accession industrial

The ownership of property give the right Example:

by accessions to everything which is produced Building

thereby, or which is incorporated or attached Planting

thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Sowing

Accession Defined (2) accession natural

Is the right of the owner of a thing, real or Example:

personal, to become the owner of everything Alluvion

which is produced thereby, or which is Avulsion

incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally Change of river course

or artificially.
formation of islands

Accession vs. Accessory (b) With respect to personal property

(1) Conjunction or adjunction

(2) Commixtion or confusion

Accession Accessory
(3) Specification

Are the fruits of, or Are things joined to,

a d d i t i o n s t o , o r or included with, the
improvements upon principal thing for the Article 441
the principal. latters embellishment,
better use or (1) The natural fruits; (2) The industrial fruits; (3)
completion The Civil fruits.

Not necessary to the Accessory and the

Right of owner to the fruits
principal thing principal thing must go
together

Kinds of Accession General Rule

(1) Accession discreta The general rules is that all fruits belong
to the owner of a thing.

Is the extension of the right to ownership

of a person to the products of a thing which Exceptions
belongs to such person.

In the following cases, a person, other

(a) Natural Fruits
than the owner of a property, owns the fruits
(b) Industrial Fruits
thereof:

(c) Civil Fruits

(a) Possession in good faith by another

(2) Accession continua

The possessor in good faith is entitled to

Is the extension of the right of ownership the fruits received before the possession is legally
of a person to that which is incorporated or interrupted.

attached to a thing which belongs to such person

(b) Usufruct

2 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

The usufructuary is entitled to all the (1) Grass, as the vacate for horse, is ordinarily
fruits of the property.
natural fruits but is considered an industrial
(c) Lease of rural lands
fruits when it is cultivated as food for horses

(2) Wild mushrooms are natural fruits but

The lessee is likewise entitled to the fruits cultivated fruits but mushrooms are industrial
of the land with the owner.
fruits.

(d) Pledge
Civil Fruits

The pledgee is entitled to receive the (1) Rents of buildings

fruits, income, dividends, or interests which

pledge earns or produces but with the obligation
Article 443
to compensate or set-o what he receives with
those with are owing him

(2) Prices of leases of lands and other property

(e) Antichresis
(3) The amount of perpetual or life annuities or
other similar income

The creditor acquires the right to receive He who receives the fruits has the
the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, but with obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and
preservation.

Article 442
Application:
the obligation to apply them, first, to the interest if
owing, and then to the principal.
(1) Where the owner of the property recovers the
Natural fruits are the spontaneous same from a possessor and the possessor
products of the soil, and the young and other has not yet received the fruits although they
products of animals.
may have already gathered or harvested

(2) The possessor has already received the fruits

Industrial fruits are those produced by but is ordered to return the same to the owner

lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.

Obligation of the owner:

Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the
price of leases of lands and other property and To reimburse the previous possessor for
the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other the expenses incurred by the latter for their
similar income.
production, gathering, and preservation.

KINDS OF FRUITS Eect of bad faith:

Natural Fruits A possessor in bad faith ordered to return

the fruits he had gathered, has a right to deduct
Two kinds of Natural Fruits the expenses of planting and harvesting.

(a) the spontaneous products of the soil

When good or bad faith of the possessor is
(b) the young and other products of animals
material:

Industrial Fruits Where the fruits are still ungathered at

the time he gave up his possession.

Those produced by the lands of any kind through

human cultivation or labor
Where expenses exceed fruits

Examples:
Only expenses incurred by the possessor
for the production, gathering and preservation
(not improvement) of the fruits are reimbursable.

3 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO

Even where such expenses exceed the IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

value of the fruits, the owner must pay the Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or
expenses just the same because the law makes sown on the land of another and the
no distinction.
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to
the owner of the land, subject tot he provisions of
The owner, however, may free himself of the following articles.

Principles:
Article 444
(1) Accession follows the principal

the expenses by permitting the possessor to

complete the harvesting and gathering of the Means that the owner of the latter
fruits for himself.
acquires the ownership of the former.

Only such as are manifest or born are

considered as natural or industrial fruits.
(2) Incorporation or union must be intimate

With respect to animals, it is sucient Means that it must be such that removal
that they are in the womb of the mother, although or separation cannot be eected without
unborn. (Exception to the first paragraph)
substantial injury to either or both.

When natural fruits and industrial fruits deemed to (3) Eect of good faith and bad faith

exist:
Good faith exonerates a person from punitive
Natural and industrial fruits while still liability;

pending are real property. Their special nature Bad faith gives rise to dire consequences;

requires rules so that the time when they are

deemed to exist must be definitely fixed.
GR: a person who acts in bad faith has no rights.

Products of the soil - only when manifest or He may also be maid liable for damages.

visible;

Animals - only if existing in the womb of the HOWEVER, a person, whether in good or bad
mother, though unborn.
faith, is entitled to reimbursement for necessary
expenses of preservation as well as expenses for
Guide:
cultivation, gathering and preservation.

Plants which produce only one crop and then (4) Eect where both parties in bad faith

perish are deemed manifest or existing from the

time the seedling appear from the ground;
The bad faith of one para neutralizes the
Fruits of plants and trees which live for years bad faith of the other;

and give periodic fruits are deemed manifest or

existing when they actually appear on the They shall both be considered as being in
plants or trees;
good faith.

Animals are deemed existing at the beginning

of the maximum ordinary period of gestation;
(5) Principle against unjust enrichment

In the case of fowls, the fact of appearance of

the chicks should retroact to the beginning of No one should unjustly enrich himself at
incubation.
the expense of another.

Article 445 & 446 General rule on accession industrial

The accessory follows the principal; the

land is the principal and what is built, the
accessory.

4 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

Exception:

Rights where land and materials belong to

Article 120 of the Family code with dierent owners
respect to improvements made on the separate
property of the spouses.
Article 447 presupposes that the owner
of the materials is in good faith. Good faith is
TN: NOWHERE in these articles (445 & 447) on always presumed and he is deemed a possessor
industrial accession is there any mention of the in good faith who is not aware that there exists in
case of a landowner building on his own land his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
with materials owned by himself.
invalidates it.

Ratio:
Applies when both landowner and the owner of
the materials are in good faith; and

Recourse to the rules of accession are

totally unnecessary and inappropriate where the when landowner is in bad faith and the owner
ownership of land and of the materials used to of the materials is in good faith.

build thereon are concentrated on one and the

same person.
(1) Rights and liabilities of the owner of land who
used materials of another:

Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting are If in good faith - he becomes the owner of the
presumed made by the owner and at his materials but he shall pay their value.

expense, unless the contrary is provided.

HOWEVER, the owner of the materials

Presumption as to improvements
can remove them if the removal can be done
without injury to the plantings, etc. for in such
(1) The works, etc. were made by the owner
case there is really no accession.

A land naturally has an owner and the law If in bad faith - he becomes the owner of the
accordingly presumes that he made the works, materials but he is obliged:

sowing, or planting;

to pay their value; and

(2) They were made at the owners expenses

to pay damages.

GR: It cannot be said that one who builds, plants (2) Rights and liabilities of the owner of materials
who acted in good faith:

Article 447 if the landowner acted in good faith, the owner

of the materials are entitled;

or sows on anothers land will do so at his

expense for the benefit of the owner.
1. To reimbursement for the value of the
The owner of the land who makes materials;

thereon, personally or through another, plantings, 2. To removal of the materials if the same
constructions or works with the materials of can be done without injury to the
another, shall pay their value; and if he acted in plantings, etc.

bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the

reparation of damages. The owner of the If the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner
materials shall have the right to remove them only of the materials is entitled:

in case he can do so without injury to the work

constructed, or without the plantings, 1. To indemnification for damages; and

constructions or works being destroyed. 2. To absolute right of removal whether or

However, if the landowners acted in bad faith, the not injury would be caused.

owner of the materials may remove them in any

event, with a right to be indemnified for damages.

5 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

(3) Rights and liabilities of owner of materials who Requirement of good faith
acted in bad faith:

(1) Existence of good faith

Landowner is in good faith and the owner of

the materials is in bad faith:

Article applies only where the builder,
planter, or sower honestly believed himself to be
1. Owner of the materials is liable for any the owner of the land or, at least, to have a claim
consequential damages;
of title; or he proceeded with the knowledge,
2. No right of removal whether or not injury tolerance, consent, or permission of the owner.

would be caused.

(2) Where interest in land merely that of holder

Where both parties are in bad faith:

Does not apply where ones interest in

1. They shall both be treated as being in the land is merely that of a holder such as a mere
good faith
tenant or lessee under a rental contract, an
agent, or a usufructuary because they have no
adverse claim or title to the land or pretension to
Article 448
be the owner thereof.

The owner of the land on which anything (3) Special cases where the SC recognized the
has been built, sown or planted in good faith, existence of good faith beyond the limited
shall have the right tot appropriate as his own the definition:

works, sowing or planting, after payment of the

indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or One whose house, despite having been built at
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the the time he was still co-owner, overlapped with
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the the land of another

proper rent. However, the builder or planter Builder had constructed improvements with the
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is consent of the owner

considerably more than that of the building or Builders in good faith who relied on the consent
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, of another whom they have mistakenly believed
if the owner of the land does not choose to to be the owner of the land

appropriate the building or trees after proper Son who built his house on a land with the
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms knowledge and consent of his father to whom
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the belonged the land

court shall fix the terms thereof.

Children who built structures on the lots owned
by their parents who invited their children to
Good faith under this article consists in the occupy and use the lots and fully consented to
hones belief of the builder, sower, or planter, the improvements introduced by them.

that the land he is building, sowing, or planting

on, is his or that by some title he has a right to (4) Presumption of good faith

build, etc. thereon, and his ignorance of any

defect or flaw in his title.
Good faith is presumed, he who alleges
bad faith on the part of the builder, etc. has the
Application: burden of proof.

When a person builds in good faith on Presence of negligence

the land of another, on which he believes to have

a claim of title.
The good faith of the builder, etc. does
not necessarily preclude negligence which gives
Contemplates of a land whose ownership right to damages under Article 2176.

is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom

has built some works or sown or planted
something.

6 of 28
Case No 74: Rosales vs. Castelltort
GR 157044, Oct. 5, 2005
DOCTRINE: Where the builder, planter or sower
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners, and it becomes necessary
to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view
of the impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution
by giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower the
proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either
option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily
Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot 17,
Block 1 of Subdivision Plan situated in Los Baos,
Laguna.
Petitioners discovered that a house was being
constructed on their lot, without their knowledge
and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort
(Castelltort). It turned out that respondents
Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a
lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from
respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her
son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but
that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer
Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot
16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus
began, with Villegas offering a larger lot near
petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a
replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas
proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners
lot with legal interest. Both proposals were,
however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel
directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and
demolish his house and any other structure he
may have built thereon, and desist from entering
the lot. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against spouses-
respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before
the RTC of Calamba, Laguna
Edu Notes: Property
ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD:
Under Article 448, the landowner can choose
between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the
price of the land, unless its value is considerably
more than that of the structures, in which case the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If
the parties cannot come to terms over the
conditions of the lease, the court must fix the
terms thereof.The choice belongs to the owner of
the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e.,that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as
the option lies with the landowner, the grant to
him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner
cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.The raison detre for this
provision has been enunciated thus: Where the
builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of
creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law
has provided a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to
exercise either option. It is the owner of the land
who is authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.
Case No. 75: JM Tuazon Co., Inc. vs. Via de
Lumanlan, GR. No. L-23497, April 26, 1968
FACTS:
J.M. Tuason & Co Inc (Tuason) filed a case
against Lumanlan after the latter unlawfully
entered into its property known as Santa Mesa
Heights Subdivision (situated at Barrio North
Tatalon, Quezon City). Lumanlan took possession
of 800 sq m land and constructed her house on
the said land. Tuason prays for ejectment and
damages for occupancy.
Lumanlan argues that she had brought the
property from one Pedro Deudor and that there is
a Compromise Agreement between Deudor and
Tuason stating that she was one of the buyers
recognized therein.
7 of 28
CFI: Lower Court ruled in favor of Tuason, holding
that it is the registered owner and the question
being purely one of possession. Lumanlans
evi dence (C ompromi se Agreement) was
completely immaterial.
Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lumanlan,
holding that the Compromise Agreement was a
valid defense against the possessory action filed
by Tuason. Under paragraph 7 of the said
agreement, Tuason bound and committed itself to
sell to Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at a
reasonable price. Lumanlan has the right to
compel Tuason to accept payment for the lot in
question and that the agreement legalized the
possession of Lumanlan.
ISSUE
Whether or not J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc is the
rightful owner of the said land? YES
HELD
1. A careful analysis of the compromise
agreement will show that in no way did it obligate
Tuason to sell to those buyers the lots occupied
by them at the price stipulated by the Deudors,
but at the current prices and terms specified by
the OWNERS (Tuason) in their sales of lots. (See
notes for paragraph 7 of compromise agreement)
2. Paragraph 7 also imports that these buyers of
the Deudors must (1) recognize the title of the
OWNERS (Tuason) over the property purportedly
bought by them and from the Deudors, and (2)
sign, whenever possible, new contracts of
purchase for said property. The agreement also
states that the sums paid by them to the
Deudors...shall be credited to the buyers.
3. All that Tuason agreed to was to grant the
Deudor buyers preferential right to purchase at
current prices and terms upon recognizing the
title of Tuason and signing new contracts and to
credit to them for the amounts they had paid to
the Deudors.
4. Lumanlan never claimed that she had signed a
new contract with Tuason for the puchase of the
lot occupied. Instead of recognizing the title of
Tuason as required by the agreement, she used
paragraph 6 of the agreement for her special
defense, arguing that Deudor and Tuason entered
into the compromise agreement where Deudor
and his co-owners renouced, ceded, waived, and
quitclaimed all their rights in the property in favor
of Tuason without her knowledge and consent.
Now she does not rely on the compromise
agreement but she assails it. -_-
Edu Notes: Property
5. Without the compromise agreement, Lumanlan
must justify her possession on the basis of a
pretended superiority of the Deudors old Spanish
nformacion posesoria over Tuasons Certificate of
Title No. 1267. But the Court has already ruled in
previous cases that Lumanlan is barred from
assailing the decree of registration in favor of
Tuasons predecessors 20 years after its
issuance.
6. The agreement provides that the Deudor
buyers should sign new contracts with it at current
prices specified for the sales of lots. Article 1474
of the Civil Code does not apply in this case
because Lumanlan is not a buyer from Tuason
since there is no contract between the two.
7. Lumanlans argument that she should be
deemed a builder in good faith does not hold
water. In a related case (Tuason v Macalindong),
the Court ruled that there being a presumptive
knowledge of the Torrents titles issued to Tuason,
the buyer from the Deudors cannot say now that
she believes her vendor had rights of ownership
over the lot purchased. She had chose to ignore
the Torrens title of Tuason and relied instead upon
the Deudors claim of ownership, perhaps
because such course appeared to her as more
advantageous; hence, she has only herself to
blame for the consequences now that the
Deudors' claim has been abandoned by the
Deudors themselves, and can not pretend good
faith.
8. Lumanlan could have asked that she recover or
be credited with the amounts paid by her to the
Deudors. Equity demands, however, that her right
to claim such return, or to have the amount offset
against the sums she was sentenced to pay
should be reserved.
Case No. 76: Quevada vs. Court of Appeals, GR.
No. 140789. Sept. 19, 2006
FACTS:
Before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the
plainti/respondent said that he is the lessor of a
parcel of land with a residential house in
Sampaloc, Manila.
Sometime in 1994, he and defendant/petitioner
entered into a Contract of Lease for the period
from August 15, 1994 to August 15, 1995, at a
monthly rental of 2,500.00. After expiration of the
lease, they entered into another Contract of
Lease, commencing from August 15, 1995 to
8 of 28
April 15, 1996. After the expiration of the
extended Lease, the petitioner continued
possessing the premises, but without payment of
any reasonable compensation. Because of the
petitioners refusal to vacate the premises, private
respondent referred the matter to the barangay
court for conciliation.
1. The action for ejectment or, more specifically,
On January 20, 1998, private respondent served
upon the petitioner a notice to vacate the leased
property within a period of fifteen (15) days, to
pay 5,000 rental starting May, 1996, and every
month thereafter until the premises shall have
been vacated. On the other hand, petitioner
answered that as early as November 1985, he
built a house on the lot which was finished in
1986 and occupied the house as his residence. A
Lease of Contract was executed for him to pay
the rentals at 2,500.00 a month, but only with
respect to the land and as an assurance that as
soon as petitioner would be in financial position
to do payment, the former will transfer the title to
the latter.
for its object the recovery of the physical
The private respondent did not give him a chance
to pay the purchase price and refused to accept
the monthly rental of the lot. Because of his
refusal, petitioner opened an account in trust
for the private respondent where the monthly
rentals could be deposited.
3. Petitioner should be paid for the value of the
Petitioner added that there was an implied trust
by virtue of the true agreement whereby the
purchase price of the lot would be paid by the
private respondent and for the latter, later on, to
transfer the title after he shall have paid the
purchase price. The MeTC of Manila, Branch 30,
ruled in favor private respondent. Petitioner
appealed, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch VII, armed the decision of
MeTCs Decision. Petitioner then went on appeal
again asking for reversal of the RTC Decision.
The CA rendered its assailed Decision arming
the appealed decision. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition
for review by Marcelito D. Quevada, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
REMANDED to the court a qou.
ISSUES:
Case No. 77: Macasaet vs. Macasaet, GR.
1. Whether the action for ejectment is proper
154391-92. Sept. 30, 2004
2. Whether such action can be brought by private
respondent who is not the titled owner of the
property
Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are
Edu Notes: Property
3. Whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the
value of the house on the property
4. Whether there is an implied trust
HELD:
unlawful detainer or desahucio is under the
proper jurisdiction of the MeTC. The Lease
Contract was not extended again after its
expiration on April 15, 1996. Petitioners
continued use and occupancy of the premises
without any contract between him and private
respondent was by mere tolerance or permission
of the latter. Possession by tolerance is lawful,
but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner.
2. Private respondent may bring the action for
unlawful detainer, even though he is not the titled
owner of the leased property. Such action has
possession or determination of who is entitled
to possession de facto of the leased premises,
not the ownership of the lot and not its legal
possession, in the sense contemplated in civil
law.
portion of the house covered by the lease, to be
oset against rentals due. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
4. There is no implied trust. Petitioner fails to
support his assertion that such has been created
in his favor and that the purchase of the land by
private respondent is for and in his behalf.
DECISION: The petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 53209, dated September 16, 1999
and November 11, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED
BUT WITH THE MODIFICATION that the case is
Facts:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and
9 of 28
first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of
respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
under Article 1678 of the same Code, the children
The parents alleged that they were the owners of
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and
T-103141, situated in Banay-banay, Lipa City;
that by way of a verbal lease agreement, their
son and his wife occupied these lots in March
1992 and used them as their residence and the
situs of their construction business.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any
verbal lease agreement. They claimed that their
parents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots. They
added that it was the policy of their parents to
allot the the land owned as an advance grant of
inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the lot covered by TCT no.
T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by
TCT-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as
payment for construction materials used in the
renovation of their parents house.
purpose of the agreement ceased. The children
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with
the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against
their children for failure to pay the agreed rental
despite repeated demands.
And because they refused to heed the demand,
The MTCC ruled in favor of the parents and
ordered the children to vacate the premises. It
opined that the children had occupied the lots,
not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by
tolerance of the parents. As their stay was by
mere tolerance, the children were necessarily
bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots
upon demand. The MTCC dismissed their
contention that one lot had been allotted as an
advance inheritance, on the ground that
succcesional rights were inchoate. It disbelieved
that the other parcel had been given as payment
for construction material.
no sucient proof of a settlement or contract of
On appeal, the RTC upheld the findings of the
MTCC. RTC allowed the parents to appropriate
the building and other improvements introduced
by the children, after payment by indemnity
provided for bt Article 448 in relation to Article
546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
On an appeal by both parties to the CA which
were consolidated, the CA sustained the finding
of the lower courts that the children had been
occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance
of their parent. Thus, possession of the subject
lots by the children became illegal upon their
receipt of letter to vacate it. The CA modified the
RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the
Edu Notes: Property
Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that
had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the
value of the improvements made.
Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, the children
brought the case to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
WON the children can be ejected
Based on the parents love reasons for
gratuitously allowing the children to use the lots,
it can be safely concluded that the agreement
subsisted as long as the parents and the children
benefitted from the arrangement. Eectively,
there is a resolutory condition existing between
the parties occurs like a change of ownership,
necessity, death of either party or unresolved
conflict or animosity the agreement maybe
deemed terminated. When persistent conflict and
animosity overtook the love and solidarity
between the parents and the children, the
had any cause for continued possession of the
lots. Their right to use became untenable. It
ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate.
ejectment was the proper remedy against them.
The children had no right to retain possession.
The right of the children to inherit from their
parents is merely inchoate and is vested only
upon the latters demise. Rights of succession
are transmitted only from the moment of death of
the decedent. Assuming that there was an
allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless
remained with the parents.
The childrens allegation that the indebtness of
their parent to them has been paid through
dation cannot be given credence as there were
dation to settle the alleged debt, and is
inconsistent of the separate action by the
children to recover the same debt.
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the
right of possession.
Rights of a Builder in Good faith
As applied to the present case, accession refers
to the right of owner to everything that is
incorporated or attached to the property.
Accession industrial building, planting and
sowing on an immovable is governed by
Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.

10 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

As the court found that the children possession covered veranda and a concrete hollow block
of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, the fence, at their own expense, and with appellants
applicable rule would be Article 448. This article consent, which renovation was made without
has been applied to cases wherein a builder had altering the form and substance of the subject
constructed improvements with the consent of property. Also, appellees argued that what they
the owner.
removed was merely the improvements made on

the subject property, which removal had not
Case No. 78: Mores vs. Yu-Go. GR No. 172292. caused any substantial damage thereto as, in
July 23, 2010
fact, it remained intact. By way of counterclaims,
they demanded payment of actual damages,
Principle:
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Indeed, full reimbursement of useful

improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
prove by preponderance of evidence that they
It does not apply where ones only interest is that
of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.
appellate court disagreed that spouses Mores
FACTS:
between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores
This case stemmed from an injunction suit filed
by plainti-appellants Yu-go et.al, alleging that,
sometime in March 1983, appellees Mores,
pleaded to appellants that they be allowed to
stay in the subject property in the meantime that
they did not own a house yet. Said property was
co-owned by plainti-appellants. They readily
agreed without asking for any rental but subject
only to the condition that the said stay would last
until anyone of appellants would need the subject
property. Forthwith, appellees and their children
occupied the same as agreed upon.
merit.
The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor
of the spouses Mores ruling that Defendants,
who are possessors in good faith, were able to
removed only the improvements they introduced
without destroying the principal building, after the
plaintis refused to pay them the reasonable
value of the improvements. x x x However, the
were in good faith, believing that the relationship
is one between a lessor and a lessee, making
Article 1678 of the Civil Code applicable to the
present case. The options given by Article 1678,
the right of appropriating the useful
improvements after reimbursing 50% of its value
or the right of removal of the useful
improvements, are given by law to the lessor -
the Yu siblings. Hence the appellate court
ordered the spouses Mores to pay the Yu siblings
moral damages worthP100,000 and denied
Mores Motion for Reconsideration for want of

In November 1997, appellants made known to ISSUE:

appellees that they were already in need of the
subject property. However, appellees begged that
they be given more time. Extensions of time were
repeatedly given to appellee but, instead of
heeding such demand, appellees hired some
Whether or not the appellate court awarding the
Yu siblings moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 is rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and is not in accord with the decisions
of this Court.

laborers and started demolishing the

improvements on the subject property on RULING:

January 20, 1999.

The petition has merit.

Consequently, appellants instituted the said The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was
action for injunction where they also prayed for about the building of the improvements on the
the reimbursement of the value of the residential leased subject property. However, tenants like the

building illegally demolished. Appellees filed their
Answer where they denied the material
averments of the complaint. They claimed that
appellees were the ones who caused its
renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a
spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in
good faith as they have no pretension to be
o w n e r s o f t h e p r o p e r t y. I n d e e d , f u l l
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
11 of 28
made applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. It does not apply where
ones only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in
the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord
out of his property.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article
1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the
present case. Article 1678 reads: If the lessee
makes, in good faith, useful improvements which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance
of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-
half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing
may suer damage thereby. He shall not,
however, cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary.
an area of 15 square meters for Obesia.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the
lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement,
but he may remove the ornamental objects,
provided no damage is caused to the principal
thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain
them by paying their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.
the 5 square meters of the land in question.
There is thus no reason for the appellate courts
award of moral damages to the Yu siblings. We
agree with the trial courts finding that the
spouses Mores "removed only the improvements
they introduced without destroying the principal
building, after the [Yu siblings] refused to pay
them the reasonable value of the improvements."
When the spouses Mores demanded
reimbursement, the Yu siblings should have
oered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the
value of the improvements. Since the Yu siblings
failed to make such oer, the spouses Mores had
the right to remove the improvements.
Code should apply.
Petition is Granted with Modification as to
damages awarded to the Yu siblings
the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate
Case No. 79: Del Campo vs. Abesia GR. No.
L-49219. April 15, 1988
provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE: When the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that
Edu Notes: Property
the house of the defendants occupies a
portion of 5 square meters of the land
pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendant
obviously built in good faith, the provisions of
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should
apply.
FACTS:
An action for partition of a parcel of land was
filed by the spouses Del Campo in the CFI of
Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-
owners pro indiviso of this lot in the
proportion of and 1/3 share each,
respectively. The trial court appointed a
commissioner in accordance with the
agreement of the parties. The commissioner
conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan
and submitted a report to the trial court on
May 29, 1976, recommending that the
property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A
with an area of 30 square meters for the
spouses Del Campo and Lot No. 1161-B with
Upon surveying, it was shown that the house
of Obesia occupied the portion with an area
of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of the
spouses Del Campo. The parties manifested
their conformity to the report and asked the
trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who
among the parties should take possession of
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code
is applicable to a builder in good faith when
the property involved is owned in common.
HELD:
When the co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of
Obesia occupies a portion of 5 square meters
of the land pertaining to spouses Del Campo
which Obesia obviously built in good faith,
the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil
In applying Article 448 of the New Civil Code,
said portion of the house of defendants upon
payment of indemnity to defendants as
Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the
defendants to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house. But if the price
12 of 28
asked for is considerably much more than the
value of the portion of the house of
defendants built thereon, then the latter
cannot be obliged to buy the land. The
defendants shall then pay the reasonable
rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and
conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. The defendants may opt to
demolish or remove the said portion of their
house, at their own expense, if they so
decide.
Case No. 80: Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals,
GR. No. 100866. July 14, 1992
recreation hall was converted into a residential
FACTS:
occupied the same together with his family
Plainti, Heirs of Eugenia V Roxas, Incorporated,
was incorporated on December 4, 1962 (Exh.
"C") with the primary purpose of engaging in
agriculture to develop the properties inherited
from Eugenia V. Roxas and that of y Eufrocino
Roxas; that the Articles of Incorporation of the
plainti, in 1971, was amended to allow it to
engage in the resort business (Exh."C-1"); that
the incorporators as original members of the
board of directors of the plainti were all
members of the same family, with Eufrocino
Roxas having the biggest share; that accordingly,
the plainti put up a resort known as Hidden
Valley Springs Resort on a portion of its land
located at Bo. Limao, Calauan, Laguna, and
covered by TCT No. 32639 (Exhs. "A" and "A-l");
that improvements were introduced in the resort
by the plainti and among them were cottages,
houses or buildings, swimming pools, tennis
court, restaurant and open pavilions; that the
house near the Balugbugan Pool (Exh. "B-l")
being occupied by Rebecca B. Roxas was
originally intended as sta house but later used
as the residence of Eriberto Roxas, deceased
husband of the defendant Rebecca Boyer-Roxas
and father of Guillermo Roxas; that this house
presently being occupied by Rebecca B. Roxas
was built from corporate funds; that the
construction of the unfinished house (Exh. "B-2")
was started by the defendant Rebecca Boyer-
Roxas and her husband Eriberto Roxas; that the
third building (Exh. "B-3") presently being
occupied by Guillermo Roxas was originally
intended as a recreation hall but later converted
as a residential house; that this house was built
also from corporate funds; that the said house
occupied by Guillermo Roxas when it was being
Edu Notes: Property
built had nipa roofing but was later changed to
galvanized iron sheets; that at the beginning, it
had no partition downstairs and the second floor
was an open space; that the conversion from a
recreation hall to a residential house was with the
knowledge of Eufrocino Roxas and was not
objected to by any of the Board of Directors of
the plainti; that most of the materials used in
converting the building into a residential house
came from the materials left by Coppola, a film
producer, who filmed the movie "Apocalypse
Now"; that Coppola left the materials as part of
his payment for rents of the rooms that he
occupied in the resort; that after the said
house, defendant Guillermo Roxas moved in and
sometime in 1977 or 1978; that during the time
Eufrocino Roxas was still alive, Eriberto Roxas
was the general manager of the corporation and
there was seldom any board meeting; that
Eufrocino Roxas together with Eriberto Roxas
were (sic) the ones who were running the
corporation; that during this time, Eriberto Roxas
was the restaurant and wine concessionaire of
the resort; that after the death of Eufrocino
Roxas, Eriberto Roxas continued as the general
manager until his death in 1980; that after the
death of Eriberto Roxas in 1980, the defendants
Rebecca B. Roxas and Guillermo Roxas,
committed acts that impeded the plainti's
expansion and normal operation of the resort;
that the plainti could not even use its own
pavilions, kitchen and other facilities because of
the acts of the defendants which led to the filing
of criminal cases in court; that on August 27,
1983, because of the acts of the defendants, the
Board of Directors of the plainti adopted
Resolution No. 83-12 series of 1983 (Exh. "F")
authorizing the ejectment of the defendants from
the premises occupied by them; that on
September 1, 1983, demand letters were sent to
Rebecca Boyer-Roxas and Guillermo Roxas
(Exhs. "D" and "D-1") demanding that they
vacate the respective premises they occupy; and
that the dispute between the plainti and the
defendants was brought before the barangay
level and the same was not settled
The petitioners point out that their occupancy of
the sta house which was later used as the
residence of Eriberto Roxas, husband of
petitioner Rebecca Boyer-Roxas and the
recreation hall which was converted into a
residential house were with the blessings of
13 of 28
Eufrocino Roxas, the deceased husband of
Eugenia V. Roxas, who was the majority and
controlling stockholder of the corporation. In his
lifetime, Eufrocino Roxas together with Eriberto
Roxas, the husband of petitioner Rebecca Boyer-
Roxas, and the father of petitioner Guillermo
Roxas managed the corporation. The Board of
Directors did not object to such an arrangement.
to stay within the company premises forever. We
ISSUE:
between the petitioners and the respondent
WON, the authority thus given by Eufrocino
Roxas for the conversion of the recreation hall
into a residential house can no longer be
questioned by the stockholders of the private
respondent and/or its board of directors for they
impliedly but no leas explicitly delegated such
authority to said Eufrocino Roxas.
No. 57288. April 30, 1984
HELD:
FACTS:
NO. Again, we must emphasize that the
respondent corporation has a distinct personality
separate from its members. The corporation
transacts its business only through its ocers or
agents. (Western Agro Industrial Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, supra). Whatever authority
these ocers or agents may have is derived from
the board of directors or other governing body
unless conferred by the charter of the
corporation. An ocer's power as an agent of the
corporation must be sought from the statute,
charter, the by-laws or in a delegation of authority
to such ocer, from the acts of the board of
directors, formally expressed or implied from a
habit or custom of doing business. (Vicente v.
Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210 [1973])
questioned.
In the present case, the record shows that
Eufrocino V. Roxas who then controlled the
management of the corporation, being the
m a j o r i t y s t o c k h o l d e r, c o n s e n t e d t o t h e
petitioners' stay within the questioned properties.
Specifically, Eufrocino Roxas gave his consent to
the conversion of the recreation hall to a
residential house, now occupied by petitioner
Guillermo Roxas. The Board of Directors did not
object to the actions of Eufrocino Roxas. The
petitioners were allowed to stay within the
questioned properties until August 27, 1983,
when the Board of Directors approved a
Resolution ejecting the petitioners,
faith. -- YES
We find nothing irregular in the adoption of the
Resolution by the Board of Directors. The
petitioners' stay within the questioned properties
was merely by tolerance of the respondent
corporation in deference to the wishes of
Edu Notes: Property
Eufrocino Roxas, who during his lifetime,
controlled and managed the corporation.
Eufrocino Roxas' actions could not have bound
the corporation forever. The petitioners have not
cited any provision of the corporation by-laws or
any resolution or act of the Board of Directors
which authorized Eufrocino Roxas to allow them
rule that in the absence of any existing contract
corporation, the corporation may elect to eject
the petitioners at any time it wishes for the
b e n e fi t a n d i n t e re s t o f t h e re s p o n d e n t
corporation.
Case No. 81: Sarmiento vs. Agana, GR
While one Ernesto was still courting his wife, the
latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a residential house on a certain lot. They
constructed a residential house.
Subsequently, the land was sold to petitioner
Sarmiento, who asked Ernesto and his wife to
vacate. Sarmiento filed an Ejectment suit against
them.
In the evidentiary hearing, Sarmiento submitted
the deed of sale of the land which showed the
price to be PHP15,000. On the otherhand,
Ernesto testified that the residential house then
cost PHP30,000-40,000, which was not
The MTC found that Ernesto was a builder in
good faith and the house had a value of
PHP20,000. When the case was elevated, the CFI
of Pasay ordered Sarmiento to exercise his
option, to reimburse Ernesto for the sum of the
house or allow them to purchase the land, within
sixty days. Upon expiration of the period, Ernesto
was allowed to deposit the sum of PHP25,000
with the Court as the purchase price for the land.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are builders in good
HELD:
Ernesto and his wife were builders in good faith in
view of the peculiar circumstance under which
they had constructed the residential house. As far
14 of 28
as they knew, the land was owned by Ernesto's
mother-in-law, and could reasonably be expected
to later on give them the land.
The owner of the building erected in good faith
on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the
value of his building. The owner of the land, has
the option either to pay for the building or to sell
his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as Sarmiento did, refuse both to pay for
the building and to sell the land and compel the
owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected.
landowner can avail of his remedies under the
Option Given to Landowner
Option alternative or preclusive
Generally, the landowner can exercise a
remedy of his own liking. He is given the option,
either:
of the lease, the courts could fix them; or
(a) To appropriate the improvement upon
payment of the required indemnity based on
its present or concurrent value, pursuant to
Article 546 and 548; or
Should no other arrangement be agreed upon,
Liability of builder, etc. to account for fruits
received
Whatever fruits (rents) he receives during the
period of retention must be deducted from
whatever indemnity is due to him; and in case it
exceeds the value of the indemnity, the excess
shall be returned to the owner of the land.
However, If the building is occupied by the
builder himself who acted in good faith, the
landowner has no right to collect rents for the
occupants of the land while the latter retains
the building.
option or choice to acquire the improvements
(b) To oblige the builder or planter to pay the
price of the land, and the sower, to pay the
proper rent.
When this right cannot be exercised
(1) When other provisions of law govern
the accessory thing because the accessory
(2) Improvement constructed on ones own land
subsequently sold
around.
(3) Builder, a belligerent occupant
Edu Notes: Property
Remedies of Landowner if Builder/Planter
Refuses to pay
(1) Option of owner to sell land or aected
portion thereof
Where a person built a portion of his
house on anothers land, it would be unfair or
impractical for the latter to pay for said portion of
the house which is not only prejudicial but is
certainly a nuisance to his property.
If the builder fails to pay for the land the
law.
(2) Remedies where builder or planter refuses to
pay
They may assume the relation of lessor-lessee,
and should there be disagreement on the terms
They may sell the property at public auction
and apply the proceeds of the sale, first, to the
value of the land and the excess to the
improvements.
the owner of the land does not automatically
become the owner of the improvement.
(c) Reason for the Option
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the
land of another, the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land.
(1) Just and equitable solution to conflict of
rights
The law provided a just and equitable
solution by giving the owner of the land the
after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige
the builder or planter pay for the land and the
sower to pay the proper rent.
(2) Principle of Accession
The owner is entitled to the ownership of
follows the principal and not the other way

15 of 28
(3) Benefit to builder
ISSUE:
Instead of being outrightly ejected from
the land, he can compel the landowner to make a
choice between the two options, either to pay the
improvement or to sell the land.
HELD:
Case No. 82: Ochoa vs. Apeta., GR No. Sept. 13,
2007
FACTS:
honest belief, the absence of malice and the
Since 1910, the above-named petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying Lot No. 1580 consisting of 886 square
meters situated in Malaban, Bian, Laguna. The
lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T40624 of the Registry of Deeds of that
province. They built their houses and apartment
building thereon.
possession, one is considered in good faith if he
Sometime in May 10, 1982, Mauro Apeta and
Apolonia Almazan, respondents, found that they
are the true owners of Lot No. 1580 being
occupied by petitioners.
that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
On January 22, 1988, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Bian,
Laguna a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. B-2777. Respondents alleged in
the main that they are the lawful owners of Lot
No. 1580 covered by Certificate of Title No.
RT-599 (10731) issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Laguna.
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
In their answer to the complaint, petitioners
specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint, contending that they are the owners of
Lot No. 1580 as shown by TCT No. T-40624
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
During the proceedings before the RTC, upon
agreement of the parties, the trial judge
commissioned Engr. Romulo Unciano of the
Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a
resurvey of the disputed property. The result of
the resurvey (approved by the Bureau of Lands)
shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by
petitioners, was registered in the name of
Margarita Almada, respondents predecessor-in-
interest; and that the lot covered by TCT No.
T-40624 is not Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. 1581
registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa,
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. This lot has
been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.
Edu Notes: Property
WON the petitioners are in good faith
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition,
and it encompasses, among other things, an
absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry.8 The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of ones right,
ignorance of a superior claim and absence of
intention to overreach another.9 Applied to
is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.10
Using the above parameters, we are convinced
were in good faith when they built their houses
and apartment building on Lot No. 1580 since
they were convinced it was covered by their TCT
No. T-40624.
Under the foregoing provisions, the landowner
can make a choiceeither by appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a
rule that accords with the principle of accession
that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. He must choose only one.
Following the above provisions, respondents, as
owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between
appropriating as their own the houses and
apartment building constructed thereon by
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest by
paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging
petitioners to pay the price of Lot No. 1580 which
is not more than that of the improvements
Right of the landowner to Remove or Demolish
Improvment
(1) Obligation of owner to exercise option
Since the option is given to the
landowner and it is limited the choices provided
16 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

by law , he cannot refuse to exercise his right of were, however, rejected by petitioners whose
choice and compel the builder to remove or counsel directed Castelltort to stop the
demolish the improvement.
construction of and demolish his house and any
other structure he may have built thereon, and
(2) Where owner has no option
desist from entering the lot. Petitioners
subsequently filed a complaint for recovery of
When the owner has not been active in possession and damages with prayer for the
exercising his right, the owner is deemed to have issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
waived his right to recover possession of his injunction against spouses-respondents Miguel
property and the construction thereon. His only and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of
remedy would be to recover damages for the Calamba, Laguna

value of the property taken.

ISSUE:

(3) When owner entitled to remove

Under Art 448, who has the right of option?

When after having chosen to sell his land, HELD:

the other party fails to pay for the same.

Under Article 448, the landowner can choose
between appropriating the building by paying the
(4) Character of Improvement
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land, unless its value is
Must be of a permanent character, considerably more than that of the structures, in
attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity, but which case the builder in good faith shall pay
if it is of a transitory character or is transferable, reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to
there is no accession and, therefore, the terms over the conditions of the lease, the court
landowner has every rich to have the same must fix the terms thereof.The choice belongs to
removed from his property.
the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e.,that the accessory
Case No. 83: Rosales vs. Castelltort, Supra. follows the principal and not the other way
around. Even as the option lies with the
FACTS:
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to
Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered exercise either option and compel instead the
owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot 17, owner of the building to remove it from the
Block 1 of Subdivision Plan situated in Los land.The raison detre for this provision has been
Baos, Laguna.
enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
Petitioners discovered that a house was being arises between the owners, and it becomes
constructed on their lot, without their knowledge necessary to protect the owner of the
and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort improvements without causing injustice to the
(Castelltort). It turned out that respondents owner of the land. In view of the impracticability
Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the
lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from law has provided a just solution by giving the
respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her owner of the land the option to acquire the
son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but improvements after payment of the proper
that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to
Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot pay for the land and the sower the proper rent.
16 the Castelltorts purchased.
He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is
the owner of the land who is authorized to
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus exercise the option, because his right is older,
began, with Villegas oering a larger lot near and because, by the principle of accession, he is
petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas

proposed to pay the purchase price of
petitioners lot with legal interest. Both proposals
17 of 28
Case No. 84: Depra vs. Dumlao., GR No.
L-57348. May 16, 1985
DOCTRINE: The owner of land on which
improvement was built by another in good faith is
entitled to removal of improvement only after land
owner has opted to sell the land and the builder
refused to pay for the same. where the lands
value is considerably more than the improvement,
the landowner cannot compel the builder to buy
the land. In such event, a forced lease is
created and the court shall fix the terms thereof in
case the parties disagree thereon.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
FACTS:
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land
registered, situated in the municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-
appellant, owns an adjoining lot. When Dumlao
constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen
thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four
(34) square meters of Depras property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation
survey of Depras lot made on November 2, 1972,
his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand
letter asking Dumlao to move back from his
encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful
Detainer. Said complaint was later amended to
include Depra as a party plainti. After trial, the
Municipal Court found that Dumlao was a builder
in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil
Code. Depra did not accept payment of rentals
so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the
Municipal Court. In this case, the Municipal
Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was
null and void and cannot operate as res judicata
to the subject complaint for Quieting of Title. The
court conceded in the MCs decision that Dumlao
is a builder in good faith.
two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay
ISSUE:
t h e C i t y Tr e a s u r e r o f Q u e z o n C i t y t o
Whether or not the factual situations of Dumlao
and Depra conform to the juridical positions
respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good
faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good
faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good
faith' under Article 448?
the RTC upheld the spouses title but declared
HELD:
was not included in the auction sale. This was
Owner of the land on which improvement was
built by another in good faith is entitled to
removal of improvement only after landowner has
opted to sell the land and the builder refused to
pay for the same. Res judicata doesnt apply
Edu Notes: Property
wherein the first case was for ejectment and the
other was for quieting of title.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
to buy the land if its value is considerably more
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
Builders/Sowers/Planters Right to Retain
Improvement
Until indemnity which includes necessary
and useful expenses has been paid in full by the
landowner who was elected to appropriate the
improvements, the builder, etc., may retain both
the land and the improvements even against the
real owner.
Case No. 85: Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals GR.
No. 151815. February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located
at Quezon City, on which he built a four-door
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to
the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale
before the RTC of Quezon City. In its Decision,
that the four-door two-storey apartment building
armed in toto by the Court of Appeals and
thereafter by this Court, in its Decision dated May
25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360 entitled Pecson v.
Court of Appeals.
18 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of Whether or not the petitioners should reimburse
possession of the lot and the apartment building.
the respondent for the improvements of the
building -- YES

In its Order of November 15, 1993, the trial court,

relying upon Article 546 of the Civil Code, ruled HELD:

that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse It is not disputed that the construction of the four-
Pecson for his construction cost of P53,000, door two-storey apartment, subject of this
following which, the spouses Nuguid were dispute, was undertaken at the time when
entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
possession over the lot and improvements. In Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the
the same order the RTC also directed Pecson to lot on June 23, 1993, by virtue of entry of
pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the judgment of the Courts decision, dated May 25,
Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the 1993, in G.R. No. 105360, the apartment building
apartment units or P21,000 per month from June was already in existence and occupied by
23, 1993, and allowed the oset of the amount of tenants. In its decision dated May 26, 1995 in
P53,000 due from the Nuguids against the G.R. No. 115814, the Court declared the rights
amount of rents collected by Pecson from June and obligations of the litigants in accordance with
23, 1993 to September 23, 1993 from the tenants Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These
of the apartment.
provisions of the Code are directly applicable to

the instant case.

After conducting a hearing, the lower court

issued an Order dated, directing the spouses to
pay the sum of P1,344,000 as reimbursement of
the unrealized income of Pecson for the period
beginning November 22, 1993 up to December
1997. The sum was based on the computation of
P28,000/month rentals of the four-door
apartment
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful
Pecson filed a petition for review before this
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the
option, either to appropriate the improvement as
his own upon payment of the proper amount of
indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in
good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full
expenses incurred; it also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made.

Court. The Court handed down the decision

remanding to the trial court for it to determine the While the law aims to concentrate in one person
current market value of the apartment building on the ownership of the land and the improvements
the lot. The value so determined shall be thereon in view of the impracticability of creating
forthwith paid by Spouses Juan and Erlinda a state of forced co-ownership,it guards against
Nuguid to Pedro Pecson otherwise the petitioner unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith
shall be restored to the possession of the builders improvements are concerned. The right
apartment building until payment of the required of retention is considered as one of the measures
indemnity.
devised by the law for the protection of builders
in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and
On the basis of this Courts decision, Pecson filed prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual
a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion to possessor to remain in possession while he has
Render Accounting, praying respectively for not been reimbursed (by the person who
restoration of his possession over the subject defeated him in the case for possession of the
256-square meter commercial lot and for the property) for those necessary expenses and
spouses Nuguid to be directed to render an useful improvements made by him on the thing
accounting under oath, of the income derived possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith
from the subject four-door apartment from cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the
November 22, 1993 until possession of the same period of retention nor be disturbed in his
was restored to him.
possession by ordering him to vacate. In

addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is
ISSUE:
prohibited from osetting or compensating the
necessary and useful expenses with the fruits
received by the builder-possessor in good faith.
19 of 28
Otherwise, the security provided by law would be
impaired. This is so because the right to the
expenses and the right to the fruits both pertain
to the possessor, making compensation
juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to
reduce the other.
take the property free from the builders lien.
The text of the decision in G.R. No. 115814
expressly exempted Pecson from liability to pay
rentals, for we found that the Court of Appeals
erred not only in upholding the trial courts
determination of the indemnity, but also in
ordering him to account for the rentals of the
apartment building from June 23, 1993 to
September 23, 1993, the period from entry of
judgment until Pecsons dispossession. As
pointed out by Pecson, the dispositive portion of
our decision in G.R. No. 115814 need not
specifically include the income derived from the
improvement in order to entitle him, as a builder
in good faith, to such income. The right of
retention, which entitles the builder in good faith
to the possession as well as the income derived
therefrom, is already provided for under Article
546 of the Civil Code.
plainti the rightful owner of the disputed land
Eect of Alienation by Owner of Land with
Improvements
(1) Where purchaser paid only price of land
A purchaser, in accordance with Article
453, who buys land with improvements belonging
to another knowing such fact, places himself in
the position of an owner of land who has acted in
bad faith
been shown that Maximo Francisco was notified
(2) Where purchaser paid also value of
improvements
The action may still be brought against
him without prejudice to his right to recover the
former owner.
the possessor was not unaware that his
It can be presumed that the purchase
price of the land includes the improvements.
(3) Option given to purchaser
contention that on the date of the service of
A purchaser in good faith is given the
choice, if the former owner had not exercised his
option, either to pay for the value of the house, or
require the builder to pay for the value of the
land.
Edu Notes: Property
(4) Where land registered under the Torrens
system
Any purchaser for value, without notice,
who buys the land on reliance on such title will
Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith
Instances of Bad Faith:
Case No. 86: Rodriguez Sr. vs. Francisco GR.
No. L-13343. Dec. 29, 2962
Exequiel Ampil executed a deed of sale covering
the land in favor of defendant Maximo Francisco.
Sometime thereafter, the defendant took
possession of the premises which, upon his
death, was continued by his heirs up to the
present, publicly and in the concept of owner.
Despite the sale, the Torrens title continued until
1937 in the name of the vendor Exequiel Ampil.
Upon the foregoing facts the trial court adjudged
and ordered defendant to deliver its possession
to him, but found defendant to be a possessor in
good faith and hence free from liability for
damages.
The judgment appealed from was armed in so
far as it declared plainti the owner, and therefore
entitled to the possession, of the land in
question. SC is of the opinion, did not necessarily
make appellee a possessor in bad faith. It has not
or had actual knowledge of the said proceeding
for consolidation of ownership in appellant.
The possession having begun in good faith the
presumption is that it continued to be enjoyed in
the same character until it could be proven that
possession was wrongful (Article 528 and 529,
Civil Code).
However, we agree with appellant's alternative
summons upon appellee in this case, considering
that the former was thereafter declared owner by
final judgment, appellee's possession in good
faith was interrupted and hence from that time he
lost the right to the fruits.

20 of 28
Considering, however, that there is no evidence
as to when the cultivation of the land started and
when it was finished in the year 1950, appellee
should be held liable for damages, consisting of
the fruits of the land in question, only from the
year 1951.
themselves their rights would be as if both of
Therefore, defendant-appellee, as administrator
of the estate of the deceased Maximo Francisco,
is ordered to pay, plainti-appellant.
alone; but so did the court's declaration of
Case No. 87: Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap
GR. No. L-17681. Feb. 26, 1965
By deed entitled "Mutual Agreement," executed
on May 10, 1964, Rosenda A. de Nuqui (widow of
deceased Sotero Dionisio) and her son Sotero
Dionisio, Jr. sold three parcels of residential land
and another parcel of land in favor of Ildefonso D.
Yap. Included in the sale were certain buildings
situated on said lands as well as laboratory
equipment, books, furniture and fixtures used by
two schools. The buyer, Ildefonso D. Yap,
obtained possession of the properties by virtue of
the sale, took over the operation of the two
schools
the purchase with the knowledge of the dispute
The court a quo rendered judgment that the
Mutual Agreement was null and void and that
defeddant (Yap) is ordered to restore to the
plaintis in said case all the buildings and
grounds described in the Mutual Agreement
together with all the permanent improvements
thereon. The trial court held that Erlinda as well
as her husband acted in bad faith, because
"having reasonable notice of defendants' having
unlawfully taken possession of the property, they
failed to make reasonable demands for (him) to
vacate the premises to respect their rights
thereto."
of the RTC and CA leave no room for doubt that Jose
The lower court correctly found that both vendors
and vendee in the sale acted in bad faith and
therefore must be treated, vis-a-vis each other, as
having acted in good faith. The return of the
properties by the vendee is a necessary
consequence of the decree of annulment.
Case No. 89: Santos vs. Mojica, GR.
There can be no doubt that Erlinda D. Diaz is
entitled to recover a share of the said rents in
proportion to her own interest in the lands and
the interest of her four co-owners which she had
acquired. Rosenda Nuqui and her son Sotero, it
is true, acted in bad faith when they sold the
properties as theirs alone; but so did the
Edu Notes: Property
defendant Yap when he purchased them with
knowledge of the fact that there were other co-
owners.
Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes
that of the other and hence as between
them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of Yap's good faith
ceased when they sold the properties as theirs
liability for the rents thereafter is correct and
proper.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
only so long as his possession is not legally
interrupted, and such interruption takes place
upon service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and
1123, Civil Code).
Case No. 88: Lumungo vs. Usman, GR.
No. 25359. Sept. 28, 1968
FACTS:
Dominga Usman sold and transferred her rights in and
to 3 lots in question to Jose Angeles. The latter made
between Atty. Usman, Domingas husband and by the
plaintiffs. Angeles, upon taking possession of the land
planted the same with coconuts and most of fruit
bearing trees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Jose Angeles is entitled to the
reimbursement of the coconut tree he planted on the
property under litigation
HELD:
NO. It should be noted that such improvements are not
necessary expenses of preservation which a builder,
planter or sower in bad faith my recover under the first
paragraph of Arts. 452 and 456. The facts and finding
Angeles was a purchaser and builder in bad faith.
According to Art. 449, He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity.
No. L-25450, January 31, 1969
Facts:
On 19 March 1959, Teodorico, Carmen, Antero,
Vidal, Catalina, Melanio, Manuel, Felicidad,
Aurelio, Pacita and Eleuteria, all surnamed
21 of 28
Allanigue (being brothers and sisters), brought an
action (Civil Case 217- R) before the CFI Rizal
against their sister, Lorenza Allanigue, her
husband, Simeon Santos, Maria San Agustin and
Felicidad San Agustin, for partition of a 360-sq.
m. lot situated at San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal,
and for the annulment of certain conveyances
involving the same. Defendants having been
declared in default, the trial court, after hearing
the plaintis evidence, rendered judgment
ordering the partition of the lot among the 11
plaintis and the defendant Lorenza Allanigue. In
a subsequent order the court set o Lorenza
Allanigues share against the amount that she had
failed to pay as rents to the plaintis as directed
in the decision. A writ of execution was issued on
the judgment ordering the defendants to vacate
the lot and deliver its possession to the plaintis.
Leonardo Santos, not a party defendant but a
son of defendants Simeon Santos and Lorenza
Allanigue, owned a house standing on the lot. He
filed with the sheri a third-party claim, and with
the court, a motion to recall the writ of execution
insofar as his house was concerned. The motion
was denied. On 15 March 1962, the defendants
and movant Leonardo Santos having failed to
remove their houses from the lot within the period
given them, the court ordered the sheri to
demolish said houses. On 2 April 1962, Leonardo
Santos and the defendants in the case, as
petitioners, filed in the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (GR L-19618),
against Judge Angel H. Mojica, the Provincial
Sheri of Rizal and the plaintis in the case, as
respondents. In its decision of 28 February 1964,
the Supreme Court denied the petition after
finding that Leonardo Santos did not follow the
procedure sanctioned by law in vindicating his
alleged ownership, i.e., he should have filed an
ordinary civil action to vindicate his alleged
ownership of the house and the portion of land
on which it was built. After the said decision of
the Supreme Court had become final, the lower
court (Judge Angel H. Mojica), on motion of the
plaintis in the same Civil Case 217-R, ordered
the demolition of the defendants houses. The
defendants having voluntarily removed their
houses, the only house that remained standing
on the lot was that belonging to Leonardo
Santos. Subsequently, the Judge, on motion of
the plaintis, issued an order dated 9 December
1965, directing the sheri to demolish the house
of Leonardo Santos. Hence, the present petition
Edu Notes: Property
for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, with
costs against the petitioner Leonardo Santos.
Successor-in-interest bound by the judgment in
Civil Case 217-R Property, 2003 ( 182 )
Haystacks (Berne Guerrero) Leonardo Santos is
bound by the judgment in Civil Case No. 217-R
because he is a successor-in-interest of his
parents, Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue,
defendants in Civil Case 217- R, and his right, if
any, is claimed under them. The fact that the sale
to Leonardo Santos from his parents was
registered, is of no moment because, he is bound
by the judgment against them.
Improvement of the house made after
predecessor-in-interest were summoned; Santos
a builder in bad faith, no right of indemnity
Leonardo Santos house having been built and
reconstructed (after March 1962) into a bigger
one after his predecessors-in-interest, his
parents, had been summoned in 1959 in Civil
Case 217-R, he must be deemed a builder in bad
faith. As builder in bad faith he lost the
improvement made by him consisting of the
reconstructed house to the owners of the land
without right to indemnity, pursuant to Article 449
of the Civil Code (He who builds, plants or sows
in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.)
Options of the landowner in good faith The
owners of the land became owners of the
improvement consisting of the house built in bad
faith if they chose to appropriate the accession.
(Article 445 and 449, Civil Code.) However, said
owners could choose instead the demolition of
the improvement or building at the expense of
the builder, pursuant to Article 450 of the Civil
Code, which, in part, provides The owner of the
land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of
the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built,
planted or sowed. In the present case, the
Allanigue brothers and sisters chose to have the
house or improvement built by Leonardo Santos
demolished pursuant to their motion for
demolition.
Res Judicata; Identity of the case The present
petition is barred by the prior judgment of the
Court in GR L-19618. Petitioner Leonardo
22 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

Santos, was one of the petitioners in that case Real property taxes

against the same ocial and private respondents

in the instant petition; having an identity of NOTE: Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
subject matter (the portion of the lot and the every possessor, including one in bad faith but
house standing on said portion alleged by only th possessor in good faith is entitled to
petitioner to belong to him), and identity of cause retain the thing until he is reimbursed. (Art. 546)

of action (the order of the Judge for the removal

or demolition of the houses standing on the lot). 2. Right of retention (Art. 546); Right to
The prior judgment, based on merits, had expenses of production

become final. The judgment thus in GR L-19618

is res judicata in the instant case on the question Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be
of the validity of the order of demolition of 9 refunded to every possessor; but only the
December 1965.
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until
he has been reimbursed therefor.

Article 449, 450, & 451

Art. 449. He who builds, plants or towns
in bad faith the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which
Useful expenses shall be refunded only
to the possessor in food faith with the same
retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the
in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.

anything has been built, planted or sown in bad

faith may demand the demolition of the work, or
that the planting or sowing be removed, in order
to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter
Rights of Owner of the Land (Art. 450 451)
1. 3 Alternative rights of a landowner in good
faith:

to pay the price of the land, and the sower the a. To appropriate what has been built,
proper rent.
planted, or sown in bad faith without
any obligation to pay any indemnity
Art.451. In case of the two preceding therefor except for necessary expenses
articles, the landowners is entitled to damages for the preservation of the land, plus
from the builder, planter or sower.
damages

b. To ask the removal or demolition of

Consequences for Bad Faith what has been built, etc. at the
builders, etc. expense, plus damages

(1) Loses what is built, planted or sown without c. To compel the builder or planter to pay
right to indemnity
the price or the value of the land,
whether or not the value of the land is
(2) Owner may demand demolition, have the considerably more than the value of the
planting or sowing removed at the expense of improvements, and the sower to pay
the person who built, planted or sowed
the proper rent, plus damages

(3) Builder or planter to pay the price of the land; NOTE: Basis for the damages is the amount
Sower pay the proper rent
which reasonably corresponds with the value of
the properties lost or destroyed as a result of the
Rights of Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith occupation in bad faith, as well as the fruits from
the properties that the owner of the land
Examples of necessary expenses for the reasonably expected to obtain.

preservation of land
Defense work to prevent erosion

Litigation in defense of the land against

claims of usurpers

23 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

Art. 453 is also not applicable because it requires

Article 453
that both parties should be in bad faith.

If there was bad faith, not only on the Petitioner has no right to reimbursement of the
part of the person who built, planted or sowed on value of the house which he has erected on the
the land of another, but also on the part of the residential lot of the Evangelistas, much less to
owner of such land, the rights of one and the retention of the premises until he is reimbursed.
other shall be the same as though both had acted The rights of the petitioner are more akin to those
in good faith.
of a usufructuary who, under Art. 578 may make
on the property useful improvements but with no
It is understood that there is bad faith on right to be indemnified therefor.

the part of the landowner whenever the act was

done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.
Article 454

Case No. 90: Floreza vs. Evangelista, GR. When the landowner acted in bad faith
No. L-25462 and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in
good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall
FACTS: apply.

The Evangelistas were the owner of a residential

lot in Rzal. They borrowed 100.00 from Floreza.
Floreza then occupied the lot and built a house
on light materials with the consent of Evangelista;
additional loans were made by Evangelista.
If the materials, plants or seeds belong to
Floreza demolished the house of light materials
and constructed one of strong materials. Floreza
has not been paying rentals since the beginning
of their transactions. Eventually, Evangelista sold,
Article 455
a third person who has not acted in bad faith, the
owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for
their value and only in the event that the one who
made use of them has no property with which to
pay.

with right to repurchase within 6 years, their land

to Floreza. Seven months before the expiration of This provision shall not apply if the owner
the repurchase period, the Evangelistas were makes use of the right granted by Article 450. If
able to pay in full. Floreza refused to vacate the the owner of the materials, plants or seeds has
lot unless he was first reimbursed for the value of been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the
the house he built.
latter may demand from the landowner the value
of the materials and labor.

Evangelistas files a complaint. RTC ruled based

on Art. 448, saying that the Evangelistas have (1) Owner of materials acted in good faith
the choice between purchasing the house or regardless of the good or bad faith of the
selling the lot to Floreza. CA ruled that Art. 448 others.

was inapplicable and that Floreza is not entitled

to the reimbursement of his house and could He is entitled to reimbursement for the
remover same at his own expense.
value of the materials principally from the builder,
etc. because he is the one who made use of the
ISSUE:
same.

Whether or not Floreza is entitled to

reimbursement of the cost of his house
If the latter is insolvent, the owner of the
land shall be subsidiarily liable, because he is
HELD:
benefited by the accession when he appropriates
No. Issue of reimbursement is not moot because what is built etc.

if Floreza has no right to retention, then he must

pay damages in the form of rentals. CA was (2) Owner of material acted in bad faith but the
correct in saying that Art. 448 is inapplicable other in good faith

because it applies only to builder in good faith.

24 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

If the materials were used with his negligence, which give right to demand under
knowledge and without opposition on his part, article 2176

but the owner of the land and the builder, etc.

acted in good faith, he forfeits his rights to his Article 457
materials without the right to be indemnified, as
the case falls under Article 449 and makes
himself liable for any consequential damages.
To the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
(3) Only builder, etc. acted in bad faith
gradually receive from the eects of the current of
the waters.

If the owner of the land appropriates the

accession, the builder, etc. shall be principally Alluvion
liable to the owner of the materials for their value
plus damage.
The accretion which the banks of rivers
gradually receive from the eects of the current of
In case of insolvency, the owner of the the waters and which belong to the owners of
land shall be subsidiarily liable to the owner of lands adjoining the said banks.

the materials for value but not for damages for he

acted in good faith.
Accretion

(4) Only owner of land acted in good faith

The process whereby soil is gradually
deposited on lands adjoining the banks of a river.

T h e l a n d o w n e r c a n e x e rc i s e h i s
alternative right under Articles 449 and 450 with a Requisites of alluvion or accretion
right to demand damages from both.

(1) The deposit or accumulation of soil or

(5) All acted in bad faith
sediments must be gradual and
imperceptible;

Article 455 will apply for, in accordance (2) The accretion results from the eect or action
with Article 453, their rights shall be the same as of the current of the water of the river; and

though all of them acted in good faith.

(3) The land where accretion takes place must be
adjacent to the bank of a river.

(6) Liability of landowner (Requisites to be liable)

Reasons given for granting a riparian owner the

(a) The owner of the materials has not acted in right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river;
bad faith;

(b) the builder, etc. has no property with which to (1) To compensate him for the danger of loss or
pay;
diminution that he suers because of the
(c) The landowner appropriates the accession to location of his land;

himself
(2) To compensate him for the encumbrances
and various kinds of easements to which his
(7) Right of Builder, etc. who pays owner of property is subject;

materials
(3) To promote the interest of agriculture for the
riparian owner is in the best position to utilize
(a) The builder, etc., acted in good faith;
the accretion.

(b) The owner of the land appropriates the

improvement
Accretion aecting lands registered under the
Torrens system.
Article 456
(1) In case of diminution of area

In the case regulated in the preceding The torrens registration of the land does
articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude not protect the riparian owner against diminution
25 of 28
of the area of his land through gradual changes in
the course of the adjoining stream.
Whether or not the respondents have a better
(2) In case of increase of area
An alluvion is automatically owned by the
riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit
can be seen, does not automatically become
registered land, just because the lot which
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens
Title, thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible.
receive from eects of the current of the water. It
Case No. 91: Oce of the City Mayor vs. Ebio.,
GR.. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
Facts:
may have been added. The only restriction by law
Respondent Ebio claimed that they were the
absolute owners of the lot in question. However,
petitioner Oce of the City Mayor insisted that
the subjected land is public domain and cannot
be appropriated through private ownership. The
said land was an accretion of Cut-cut Creek.
Respondent has been the original occupant and
possessor of the said parcel of land was their
great grandfather and from then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and
possessed said land. Furthermore, Pedro had
already obtained for tax declaration over the
property in his name. Since then, respondent
religiously paying real property taxes.
Pedro executed a notarized transfer of right
ceding his claim for over the entire parcel of land
in favor to Mario Ebio.
Facts:
The Sanguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a
resolution seeking assistance from the City
Government of Paranaque for the construction of
an access road along Cut-cut creek. Aected
re s i d e n t s fi l e d o p p o s i t i o n s t o t h e C i t y
Government. In 2003, residents were surprised
when several ocials from the barangay and the
city planning oce proceeded to cut eight
coconut trees planted on said lot. Threatened of
the claim of ownership and being evicted from
the said lot, respondents went to RTC Paranaque
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC issued an Order denying the petition of the
respondents. Respondents elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals, CA issued an Order
arming their claim. Petitioner Oce of the City
Mayor raised the Issue to the Supreme Court.
Edu Notes: Property
Issue:
claim over the lot-an accretion of Cut-cut Creek.
Held:
Respondent has the right over the lot in question.
Under Article 84 of the Spanish law now known
to be Article 457 of the Civil Code states that to
the owners of land adjoin the banks of rivers
belong to the accretion which they gradually
is explicit to say that the alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it
to the owner is that the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system by
acquisitive prescription.
Furthermore, with regards of the state being an
interested party of the case, the SC held that the
state is neither a necessary nor an indispensable
party to an action where no positive act shall be
requiring for it or where no obligation shall be
imposed upon it, such in the case at bar.
Hence, SC Denied the petition of the Oce of the
City Mayor for lack of merit.
Case No. 92: Republic vs. Abrille., GR. No.
L-39248, May 7, 1976
The Republic, represented by the Director of
Lands, filed a complaint for Annulment of
Certificate of Title alleging that the subdivision of
a parcel of land owned by defendant into two lots
included an excess area of 82,127 square meters;
the land registration Commissioner approved
said petition for subdivision and in view of which
transfer certificate of title, which included the
excess area, were by the Register of Deeds. The
lower court rendered judgement cancelling the
new certificates of title containing the area and
ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new ones
in lieu thereof after the increased portion had
been deducted. Hence appealed to the CA, the
latter certified the case to the SC since it involved
purely questions of law.

26 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

Issue:
duplicate original certificate of title to the
Whether or not the excess 82,127 square meters applicant by the register of deeds upon
be registered on the name of private persons.
payment of the prescribed fess.

Held:
Since not all of the requisite are present, lower
The lower was correct in cancelling the transfer court decision is armed.

certificate of title with regard to the increase area

of 82,127 square meters.
Case No. 93: Grande vs. CA., GR. No. L-17652,
June 30, 1962
Under Sec. 44 of ACT 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest of the herein defendant- Facts:

appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
previously registered lands. In the instant case, with an area of 3.5032 hectares by inheritance
part of the tract of land, particularly the 82,127 from their deceased mother Patricia Angui. A
square meter, has not yet been brought under the gradual accretion on the northeastern side took
operation of the Torrens System. Furthermore, place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
there was no notice to all parties in interest, River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
particularly the director of lands.
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters
from its original site. Petitioners instituted the
For an application to have his imperfect title present action in the Court of First Instance of
under ACT. 496, the following requisites should Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said
be satisfied:
portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion when in September, 1948 respondents
(1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a entered upon the land under claim of ownership.

duly licensed private surveyor;

The Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4,
(2) Filing of application for registration by the 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
applicant;
ownership of the portion in question to
(3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the petitioners which was reversed by the CA
application by the court;
declaring that prescription had already
(4) Transmittal of the application and the date of supervened in favor of the defendants-
initial hearing together with all the documents respondents.

or other evidences attached thereto by the

Clerk of court to the Land Registration Issue:

Commission;
whether respondents have acquired the alluvial
(5) Publication of a notice of the filing of the property in question through prescription.

application and date and place of the hearing

in the ocial Gazette;
Ruling:
(6) Service of notice of the upon continuous No dispute that both under Article 457 of the new
owners, occupants and those known to have Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners
interest in the property by the sheri;
are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as
(7) Filing of answers to the application by any they are the registered owners of the land to
person whether named in the notice or not;
which it adjoins. However, we agree with the
(8) Hearing of the case by the court;
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
(9) Promulgation of Judgement by the court;
unregistered land purchased by the registered
(10)Issuance of the decree by the court declaring owner of the adjoining land does not, by
the decision final and instructing the land extension, becomeipso factoregistered land.

Registration Commission to issue a decree of Ownership over the accretion received by the
confirmation and registration;
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil
(11)Entry of the decree of registration of the Land Code and registration which is governed by
Registration Commission;
registration decrees confirms the title protecting
(12)Sending copy of the decree of registration to the owner from prescription of third persons.
the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
h o w e v e r, t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s n e v e r s o u g h t
(13)Transcription of the decree of registration registration of said alluvial property thus never
book and the issuance of the owners became registered property, and hence is not
27 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

entitled or subject to the protection of property is bounded on the east by Talisay River,
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property on the West by Bulacan River and on the North
under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the
subject to acquisition through prescription by Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water,
third persons.
extra land of about 17hectares (thats about the
size of Disney Park!) formed in the northern most
Case No. 94: Ignacio vs. Director of Lands., GR. section of the property. It is this property he
No. L-12958. May 30, 1960 sought to register.

FACTS
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a
parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged he
acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a
parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land
forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court
dismissed the application holding that said land
formed part of the public domain. Thus the case
be foreshore land and part of public domain
(remember, accretion formedby the sea is public
dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration
likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry
again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers
deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He
claimed this land as riprarian owner. The Director
of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal
opposed.

at bar.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro

ISSUE:
jumped into the fray opposing the same
Whether or not the land forms part of the public application, stating the he leased part of the
domain
property sought to be registered. He sought to
protect his fishpond that rested on the same
HELD: YES
property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed
ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in Navarro used stealth force and strategy to
inapplicable in the present case because it refers occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers case against Navarro so he appealed. During the
while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which appeal, his original land registration case was
is held to be part of the sea
consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died)
The heirs of Pascual took over the case.

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of
Waters that lands added to shores by accretions
caused by actions of the sea form part of the
pubic domain when they are no longer necessary
for purposes of public utility, only the executive
and the legislative departments have the
authority and the power to make the declaration
that any said land is no longer necessary for
public use. Until such declaration is made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.
Manila Bay which is sea!) Aggrieved, the
Case No. 95: Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. IAC.,
GR. No. 68166, Feb. 12, 1997
On 1975, the court decided that the property was
foreshore land and therefore part of public
domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of
Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also
denied his land registration request. Pascuals
heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the
IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for
registration! The reason? The accretion was
caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence
it wasnt foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies
in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to
Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration
(Government insists it is foreshore and hence,
public domain). The Apellate court denied all
motions of the Director and the Government.

FACTS:

Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land The matter went to the SC.

registration case. The story begins on 1946 upon

his desire to register land on the northern section
of his existing property. His current registered
28 of 28 Edu Notes: Property

ISSUE:
Article 458
Whether or not the accretion taking place on
property adjacent to the sea can be registered
under the Torrens system.
The owner of estates adjoining ponds or
lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the
HELD:
natural decrease of the waters, or lose that
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public inundated by them in extraordinary floods.

domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article

457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14- Definition

hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint

action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: (1) Ponds

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and a small body of stagnant water without
requires the concurrence of the following an outlet, larger than a puddle and smaller than a
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or lake, or a like body of water with a small outlet.

sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it

be the result of the action of the waters of the (2) Lagoon

river; and (3) that the land where the accretion a small lake, ordinarily of fresh water, and
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
not very deep, fed by floods, the hollow bed of
which is bounded by elevations of land.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of

ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If (3) Lake is a body of water formed in depressions
theres any land to be claimed, it should be land of the earth, ordinarily fresh water, coming from
ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The rivers, brooks or springs, and connected with the
law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the sea by them.
river bank may be registered. This is not the case
of accretion of land on the property adjacent to
Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a

sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law
is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that
accretion along sea shore cannot be registered
as it remains public domain unless abandoned by
government for public use and declared as
private property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August

3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and

alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for the
coast-guard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was

reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be
allowed.