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VASQUEZ DE ARROYO
GR No. L-17014 AUGUST 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and
have lived together as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away
from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband.
Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain.
Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of
the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of
separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as
permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the
evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification nor her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with
each other?
HELD:
No, it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the
other. Where the property rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction
the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof, and the experience of these countries where the
court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore
unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint, though he is without doubt entitled
to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital
home without sufficient cause, and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263 NOVEMBER 2, 1916
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The order under appeal are reversed and set aside and the case
remanded to the court of the origin for further proceedings
comfortable to the decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER
G.R. No. L-7487 DECEMBER 29, 1913
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by
Barnuevo against Fuster who are citizens of Spain.
HELD:
Yes, the CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for,
although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their
domicile herein. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal
domicile other than which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the 17
years preceding the date of the complaint. He had kept open house and had
acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object
of conjugal society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife
resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899.
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant Daniel V. Estacio from the orders
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal of November 18 and 28 respectively, the
first of which denied his motion to reconsider the order of August 23, 1938
directing his arrest, and the second of which denied his motion of November 7,
1938, for the same purpose. It appears from the record that the plaintiff-appellee,
Felisa S. Marcelo, married the defendant-appellant, Daniel V. Estacio, on April
24, 1921, but she separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17,
1937, when she learned that the defendant had been named justice of the peace
of the municipalities of Moncada and San Manuel, Province of Tarlac, said
plaintiff-appellee brought suit for support. In its judgment of October 25, 1937,
the court ordered the said defendant-appellant to pay to the plaintiff-appellee a
monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. On November 18, 1937, the
defendant-appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court
in its order of December 7, 1937. On January 8, 1938, the said defendant-
appellant announced his exception and intention to appeal. On February 5,
1938, the said defendant-appellant filed his bill of exceptions. On February 8th
of the same year, the attorney for the plaintiff-appellee filed in the Court of First
Instance of origin a motion asking that the said defendant-appellant be ordered
to pay her the allowance awarded to her in the decision, or to post a bond of
P2,000 notwithstanding the appeal taken by him to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not affording the defendant an
opportunity to prove his poverty and his inability to pay his wife, the plaintiff-
appellee, the allowance for support to which he was sentenced.
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in its ruling denying the petition
for support pendente lite for the by reason that herein petitioner is
engaged in gainful occupation.
HELD:
Yes, court erred in its ruling when it denied the petition for
support. The law expressly provides that while for the properties be
exempt from attachment and executions, courts cannot provide for
the other exemptions. Cost is against the respondent.
ENRIQUE T. JOCSON and JESUS T. JOCSON
vs.
THE EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. L-10792 April 30, 1958
FACTS:
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority
and thereafter appointed guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique
and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts,
claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the guardianship
funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority,
Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of
illegality of disbursementswhich Empire Insurance Co. and
Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these
should have come instead from the support, which they were entitled
to receive from their father.
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: