17-15217 - Reply To Motion For Sanctions

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Case: 17-15217, 07/05/2017, ID: 10498494, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 1 of 19
Case no:
17-15217
IN THE UNITED STATES APPELLATE COURT
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Madhuri Trivedi vs. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, John F. Kelly, in his
Official Capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Lori Scialabba in her Official Capacity as Director- U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Donald Neufeld -director USCIS service center in his
individual capacity, Greggory Richardson- director TSC - in his individual capacity,
Mark Hazuda- Director NSC - in his individual capacity, John Roth, OIG - in his
individual capacity, Maria Odom-DHS- in her individual capacity
Reply to ECF 46 -Opposition/response by defendants for Motion of sanctions ECF
43 and ECF 44-45 (because defendant attorney has brought that up in her opposition)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, -CASE NO. 16-cv-01122-JD
__________________________________________________________________
Appellant MADHURI TRIVEDI Founder, CEO, CTO OrangeHealth( start up) Peer to Peer
engagement platform for managing diabetes /other health conditiions simple ways to take control of
your health
Madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com
Phone: 650-242-5135
Fax: 708-774-4859
July 4, 2017
Case-17-15217 Madhuri Trivedi v. DHS Appellant reply to motion of sanctions Page 1 of 19

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Court cases
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990).
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) .
Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes on--Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 Vis-
-Vis 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power,..
37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 645 (2004) Wilder v. GL Bus Lines, 258 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.2001),
Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) [24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed.
C1307a] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)).
1-10 Industry Associates LLC v. United States, 528 F.3d 859, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2008);..
Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 551-53 (7th Cir. 2005); ..
Plaintiffs' Baycol Steering Committee v. Bayer Corp., 419 F.3d 794, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2005)...
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) .
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Perichak v. Int'l Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, 715 F.2d 78, 84 & n.9 (3d Cir.
1983); .
Ass'n of Amer. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 187 F.3d 655, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ....
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)
In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 2002 WL 59434, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002), ..

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Rules, statutes, constitution, common law
Inherent Power of courts
Rule 11 ..
28 U.S.C. 1927.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 Rule (1) (c )Serious Crime.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committees notes (1993).
FRCP 46 Rule 3..
Motion for Sanctions
I have filed these motions because despite court order for briefing schedule which was
originally on March 2017, Gisela asked for extension knowing my hardships. And
DHS/DOJ have made a point that prostitution is legal.
Despite I have several times alleged in district court and appellate court about pending work
authorization; Gisela is playing with words that she wrote Madhuri hasnt allegedHowever
playing such games are not allowed in COURT.
1. June 13, 2017, day Defendants 30 day extension was approved; I received a voice message
from Clerks office from Seattle. She was a paralegal. Transcript of the message is below:-
Jun 13, 3:28 PM Hello, this is the 9th circuit court of appeals calling for Ms. Madhuri
you can return my call at 206 224-2204. you used an incorrect docketing event opposing
the motion. So this is not the proper way to take care of that. please return my call. Thank
you.

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I called her back and she said that because my opposition motions filed on June 12 was
not at the proper place in terms of DOCKETING. SO NO one from court has looked at it
nor will look at it. And she already approved 30 days extension. I said I am grateful that
you are letting me know this by calling me
2. The aim of Rule 11 is to "curb abuses of the judicial system,1 and to require litigants to
refrain from conduct that frustrates Rule 1s goal of the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.2
3. Rule 11 imposes two basic categories of duties: when presenting a paper to the court, the
presenter certifies that (1) the paper is not presented for an improper purpose; and (2)
reasonable inquiry was made into the factual and legal contentions made.
4. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer such as Gisela Westwater and her chain of
command to:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induc
eanother to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness orfi
tness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, Fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
5. Please look at entire court record filings;at district court and appellate court to get the
WHOLE BIG picture.
6. I also had to file a document in district court showing how DOJ attorney is misleading court.
DOJ attorneys(s) have shown a pattern
1
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990)
2
.Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committees notes (1993).

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7. Another basis for sanctions lies in 28 U.S.C. 1927, which serves to deter unnecessary
delays in litigation. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986)
8. Rule 11 authorizes the court to sanction both attorneys and their clients.
9. Second, Rule 11(b)(2) states that any claims, defenses, or legal contentions presented to
the court must be grounded in existing law, asserted to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law, or establish new law
10.Rule 11(b) enumerates four standards to which litigants and counsel must adhere when
presenting materials to the court. First, Rule 11(b)(1) requires that the papers not be
presented for an improper purpose. Prohibited improper purposes include harassment,
unnecessary delay, and the needless increase in the cost of litigation.
10.1. Rule 11 also imposes an obligation on counsel to make a reasonable inquiry to
determine the accuracy of assertions made in motion papers.
10.2. The "reasonable inquiry" requirement imposes on the attorney a duty to stop and
investigate the legal and factual basis for a claim or defense before making it in writing
Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003).
11.Safe harbor under Rule 11 is not appropriate/applicable for this case as raised by
Gisela Westwater because;
11.1. Gisela already knows she made false statement as per my filing in Ninth Circuit
ECF 24 on March 9 , 2017 ;I wrote to court that Gisela Westwater had misled court.
Due to Gisela misleading court and while I was crying; and because of that I was not
able to submit reply to Giselas opposition when my motion for injunction was pending
in march with Ninth circuit so that I can go to my fathers funeral . Court relied on DOJ

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attorney false representation; denied my injunction based on intentional false statement
by DOJ /DHS that I have no work authorization pending. Gisela cant just PLAY with
WORDS..It is her ethical , legal, professional durty to representation TRUE picture/facts
to court.
Despite all that and my hardships ( my opposition to the extension is that I am not A
HOOKER ; DOJ/DHS cant use that as illegal TOOL to delay the court proceedings .
They MUST be in JAIL instead due to corruption they are STILL walking free), DOJ
attorney filed for 30 days extension and in her opposition to sanctions again came up with
EXECUSES that given her PROMOTION how busy she is.. If Gisela Westwater is
BUSY as she stated because of her Promotion and handling HIGH profile case; she
should assign some work load to someone else. Being promoted and handling high
profile cases, class actions case against AG Sessions, and president Trump; does not give
her a way to delay. It is also FAILURE of CHAD READLER as Acting AAG to take any
action even though he knows all since Feb 1 2017. They are also acting not only illegal,
unethical but UNHUMAN given my fathers death.
Because of my fathers death; I am eligible for expedite processing of U visa to get
travel document (I get travel document after U visa/work authorization gets
approvedAnd thats why I mentioned that in my filings in March). This is what
Immigration officer from DHS/USCIS told me on Phone and gave me Vermont
U/Violence Against Women phone number Ph::802-527-4888. Immigration officer
stated that because of death ; I am eligible to get it expedited and get work authorization
& MOST importantly travel document. I have left several messages at this number.
But no action was taken by CORRUPT DHS.

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11.2. Congressman Ro Khanna, Senator Kamla Harris , Congresswoman Anna G.

Eshoo did lame duck inquiry to expedite and after lies they did not do anything. I
also contacted congresswoman Rep. Zoe Lofgren; since she is in Immigration minority
subcommittee in congress.
From: Tom Pyke <Tom.Pyke@mail.house.gov>

Date: Monday, March 27, 2017 at 5:42 PM
To: Madhuri Trivedi <madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com>
Subject: Trivedi: More info from Vermont
Hi Madhuri:
This is what I received from Vermont today:
Dear Tom Pyke,

The Vermont Service Center (VSC) received a Privacy Release filed out by from
Congressman Khannas office.
Your constituents Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status (Form I-918), Receipt Number
EAC-16-111-50422, and Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765), Receipt
Number EAC-16-111-50425, are pending at VSC.
Your constituents petition was filed on March 8, 2016. VSC is currently processing cases
filed on or before June 9, 2014.
Our systems do not show any other pending Form I-765 cases, nor an Application for Travel
Document (Form I-131) or an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status
(Form I-485).
Please provide a Receipt Number for any case your constituent is questioning.
If we may be of further assistance, please contact the Vermont Service Center Congressional
Unit.
Since the USCIS had earlier told me that an I-485 was pending, but they needed to an
additional release to get it, I have asked about that.
Otherwise, they have no additional information. As always, my primary suggestion is that

you get an attorney to advise you and to file an I-131 application.
Please send me the death certificate, you never sent that to me.
Thanks, Tom
Tom Pyke
Director of Constituent Services
Office of Congressman Ro Khanna (CA-17)
900 Lafayette Street, #206 | Santa Clara, Ca. 95050
Office: (408) 436-2720
Visit online | Follow on Twitter | Like on Facebook
Click here to join our email list.
---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: Pyke, Tom <Tom.Pyke@mail.house.gov>
Date: Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 2:05 PM

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Subject: Spoke with USCIS Vermont

Hi Madhuri:
I spoke to USCIS Vermont and was given a verbal update; the written response comes about 5
business days after the inquiry (i.e., this coming Wednesday for the 3/15 email).
"She is in good standing because there are several applications that are pending. The I-918 was
looked at two days ago. She can travel because of that."
There is also another I-485 application that is PENDING (you told me it had been denied; is this
another one?). I will send a second inquiry regarding that specific application in order to get the
pending Receipt #. As long as there is a pending application, you are good.
To feel reassured of travel, you can either wait for that USCIS email or contact USCIS herself
(e.g., Infopass, see below). I would encourage you to do the latter also.
In addition, he said "she can change the I-765 (EAD) application to be tied to the I-485, rather
than the I-918, which might come faster." That is something for you or an immigration attorney
to do. Again, we dont provide legal advice or file applications.
Again, what triggered this was your March 10 correspondence that you have actual, pending
claims with USCIS that was the first time you provided documentation of that.
Ill get more information on the I-485, but otherwise my only option is to wait until their written
response arrives.
I think this shows movement. Again, I am here to facilitate communication. I cant act as your
attorney.
Thanks, Tom
Tom Pyke
Director of Constituent Services
Office of Congressman Ro Khanna (CA-17)
900 Lafayette Street, #206 | Santa Clara, Ca. 95050
Office: (408) 436-2720
11.3. DOJ attorney never filed any document to correct that or let court know in reply
to my ECF 24. Given that it is considered that DOJ attorneys were on Notice about
Madhuri appellants filing ..If Gisela cited Rule 11 safe harbor, she had ample time to
correct her BAD faith , conspiracy representation done to ninth circuit court from march
to June but didnt care..hence Appellant Trivedi had met safe harbor requirement for
Rule 11 with 21 days notice as Gisela has been already on notice since March 9,2017..

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11.4. Even in supreme court brief filed March 10 and April 13, 2017 I have mentioned
pending U work authorization with copy of USCIS receipt notice I 797 as ANOTHER
way as well to get it and travel to India.. So Gisela knows about what work
authorization it was that I mentioned. Despite didnt care and hence cant bring up 21
safe harbor.
11.5. In my ECF 43-45; I have also included copy that I emailed on dated March 30,
2017 , to DHS legislative secretary who is TRUMP appointee & staff, Health and
Human Service secretary Tom Price/trump cabinet person and DOJ/DHS defendants
including Gisela Westwater & her chain of command (April 10 2017 ); in which I
mentioned my pending work authorization. Gisela had ample time to correct that
nevertheless she cared to correct it in court filings.
12.Equitable Estoppel As per my district court filing ; and evidence submitted in district court
that San Francisco USCIS/DHS field office Immigration officer REVIEWED my record and
we had 40 minute conversation in which she stated that Madhuri meets EB1 requirement.
She also filed expedite request to adjuncate my pending I 140. Expedite request San
Francisco immigration officer filed was immediately denied within few hours. DHS
defendants have never considered this; words of their own officer.
13.ECF 46 Page 10 Gisela, stated running commentary in my opening brief; most of it are legal
argument. And Gisela should exercise respect to me when writing such thing as it is clearly
not a running commentary.
14.Wilder v. GL Bus Lines, 258 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.2001), stating that Rule 11 sanctions are
appropriate "where the attorney has negligently or recklessly failed to perform his
responsibilities as an officer of the court." Id. at 128. Finally, he reasoned that "[s]ince the
Court as an institution has a far greater interest in weeding out abuses than does any

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individual litigant, there is no reason not to apply the well-established `objective

reasonableness' standard to Rule 11 proceedings initiated by the Court."
15.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 Rule (1) (c )Serious Crime. Serious crime means (2)
any lesser crime a necessary element of which, as determined by statutory or common law defi
nition of such crime in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred, is (i) interference with the
administration of justice, (ii) false swearing, (iii) misrepresentation, (iv) fraud, (vi) deceit, (vii)
bribery, (viii) extortion, (ix) misappropriation, (xi) an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit a serious crime.
FRCP Rule 3. Types of Discipline (a) Discipline for Misconduct. Discipline for attorney
misconduct may consist of disbarment, suspension for a definite period, monetary sanction,
public reprimand, private reprimand, or any other disciplinary action that the court deems
appropriate.
FRCP Rule 3 (b) Disbarment. Disbarment is the presumed discipline for conviction of a serious
crime.
FRCP Rule 3 (d) Sanctions under other Provisions. Assessment of damages, costs, expenses, or
attorney fees
16. Rule 11 authorizes a court to sanction a party who submits a pleading for an improper
purpose. Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) [24 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. C1307a] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)).
17.Inherent Power of the Courts, Inherent Authority and their chilling effect on development
of common law
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts have the power to impose sanctions pursuant to
the court's inherent power even if the violation is subject to sanctions under existing statutes or
rules.
Federal Courts are empowered to "'protect the administration of justice by levying sanctions in
response to abusive litigation practices.'" Kovilic Const. Co., v. Missbrenner, 106 F.3d 768, 772-
73 (7th Cir. 1997); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 (1st

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3
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986), quoting Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy Enters.,
663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir. 1981).
The source of the court's inherent power is "governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962). See also
Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mtichell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986). That authority extends to all matters that come before the court.
There is no limitation as to the type of proceedings - criminal or civil, trial or appeal - in which
sanctions may issue.
In addition to powers deriving from rule or statute, courts also have inherent authority to
sanction litigation misconduct when a party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons." Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.
240, 258-59 (1975) (citations omitted). Such power is governed "by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases."
3 The Inherent Power of the Court ( http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/chapter4/section2 )
The sanctioning power of the federal courts "is not limited to what is enumerated in statutes or in the rules
of civil procedure."94 Federal courts have the inherent power to punish persons who abuse the judicial
process. The inherent power of the court is an "implied power squeezed from the need to make the courts
function."95 Rule 11 and 1927 do not displace the court's inherent power, but instead they exist
concurrently.96
The inherent power to sanction is broad.97 The scope of the power reaches "any abuse" of the judicial
process.98 This includes the authority to sanction for conduct that occurs outside of the courtroom and is
not limited to attorneys or parties.99 Courts also have broad discretion to determine the appropriate
sanction to be imposed.100
Use of the power will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.105

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Accordingly, the Supreme Court has advised that courts "ordinarily should rely on the Rules
rather than the inherent power" if there is bad faith misconduct that can adequately be
sanctioned under applicable rules or statutes. Id. If, however, "neither the statute nor the Rules
are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power." Id.
Inherent power sanctions are the quintessential gap filler of sanctions law. In the leading modern
decision, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Supreme Court made clear that the
existence of a sanctioning scheme in statutes and rules does not displace the courts inherent
power to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct. Whereas rules-based sanctions reach only
certain individuals or conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses
and, at the very least . . . must continue to exist to fill in the interstices
17.1. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (finding that, despite Rule
11 and 28 U.S.C. 1927 both being potentially applicable, court was not required to
resort to using them when inherent power of court was best suited to facts); see
also Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes on--Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware:
Rule 11 Vis--Vis 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power, 37 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 645 (2004) (exploring interaction of Rule 11, 1927, and inherent power of
court, and their chilling effect on development of common law).
( http://www.lawpipe.com/US/Chambers_v_NASCO_Inc.html )
But neither is a federal court forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the
inherent power simply because that conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute or the
Rules.
Furthermore, when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be
adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather

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4
than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor
the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power. Id. at 50
18.A court may also levy sanctions sua sponte . a sua sponte order to show cause does not allow
an attorney the opportunity to withdraw the offending filing.
see 1-10 Industry Associates LLC v. United States, 528 F.3d 859, 867 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 551-53 (7th Cir. 2005); Plaintiffs' Baycol Steering
Committee v. Bayer Corp., 419 F.3d 794, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2005).
19.Including actual knowledge and intentional misconduct. Affirmative misconduct
In general requires deliberate action in the face of a known risk, the likelihood or impact of
which the actor inexcusably underestimates or ignores." Id. at 1219-20. A finding of subjective
4 28 U.S.C. 1927 ( http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/chapter4/section2 )
Another basis for sanctions lies in 28 U.S.C. 1927, which serves to deter unnecessary delays in
litigation.80 The statute authorizes sanctions in the form of excess costs, expenses, and attorneys fees
against any attorney who multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously. Courts
have resorted to 1927 more frequently since the statute was amended to include attorney fees.83
The scope of authority to sanction under 1927 is both broader and narrower than Rule 11.84 Section
1927 is broader in that the attorneys behavior is examined throughout the entire litigation, as a course of
conduct,85 while Rule 11 applies to individual filings. The filing of a frivolous complaint, alone, may
violate Rule 11, but not 1927 because such a complaint does not "multiply" the
proceedings.86Conversely, a course of conduct can be sanctionable under 1927 even though the
individual filings during that conduct comport with Rule 11 standards.
Section 1927 is narrower because, unlike Rule 11 requirement of objective reasonableness, 1927
generally requires subjective bad faith.87 Some courts, however, interpret 1927 as authorizing sanctions
when attorney conduct falls short of bad faith: viewed objectively, manifests either intentional or
reckless disregard of the attorneys duties to the court.88 For these courts, malicious intent or bad
purpose is not required. Thus, the "circuits are split as to whether 1927 requires a showing of subjective
bad faith or whether mere recklessness is sufficient."89
Since Rule 11 and 1927 have different standards, courts deciding whether to issue sanctions under both
may conduct a separate inquiry into 1927 and Rule 11. 91 Sanctions under 1927 serve both deterrence
and compensatory functions. As a result, the amount awarded need not be the least amount necessary to
deter subsequent misconduct and is approrpiately payable to the opposing party.92 The circuits are
divided on whether it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to reduce a fee award to account for the
sanctioned attorney's ability to pay it.93

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bad faith requires "willfulness" or "deliberate intent to harm." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Sullivan,
938 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The bad faith must also be material to warrant
sanctions; in other words, it must have occurred in an area "critical to the success of
[plaintiffs'] case." Perichak v. Int'l Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, 715 F.2d 78,
84 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Ass'n of Amer. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 187
F.3d 655, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
20. DHS/DOJ has shown bad faith multiple times at district court/appellate court. Especially
by lying about pending work authorization during my motion for injunction ; such bad faith
was exercised in an area critical to the success of Appellant Madhuris case . They
calculated that by lying, Ninth circuit would not give any relief i.e. Work authorization and
after that approval TRAVEL document. Madhuri will give up and because now that her
father died by lying and delaying NOW ; she will JUST GO AWAY. Given that how much I
loved my father.
Throughout my dealing with DHS/DOJ they have shown Mean Rea and Actus reus..Guilty mind
and action to perform such acts including criminal acts and it was calculated thats why I have
TORT and Biven action claims.
21. Gisela Westwater has cited In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003) in her ECF
46 opposition to motion for sanctions. However in that same case; it is said that it is not
permitted to withdraw filing by attorney under safe harbor provision.
21.1. In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that subjective bad
faith is required when court issues sanctions sua sponte, thereby not permitting attorney
to withdraw filing under safe harbor provision).

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By declining to make the "safe harbor" provision applicable to court-initiated show cause orders,
the Committee was signaling that the unavailability of an opportunity to withdraw or correct
makes the sanction appropriate for conduct "akin to contempt," conduct that traditionally
requires a heightened mens rea standard. We believe we implement the Committee's expectation
by applying a contempt-like mens rea standard to court-initiated show cause orders issued where
there is no opportunity to withdraw or correct. We note that the Advisory Committee considered
and rejected a proposal to provide "safe harbor" protection for court-initiated sanctions:
for "making false statements of fact [on the basis of] an affidavit that any reasonable
lawyer would recognize as perjury. Hence Gisela, her chain of command because Chad A
readler also signed that oppositionDespite my father died and I was asking for relief.
Putting me a spot stating that I am Pro Se in not a bad tactic.
which is conduct akin to contempt in its egregiousness. " Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty,
Inc., 2002 WL 59434, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002),
DHS/DOJ/Gisela and Chad Readler has clearly shown egregiousness
22.Even federal judge have ask DOJ attorneys to take ethical training and said that DOJ attorney
misled him. Justice Department has notched 132 different cases of self-reported ethical
misconduct in just four years, more than two dozen of those involved lawyers misleading the
courts. governments conduct intentionally deceptive conduct is certainly not worthy of
any department whose name includes the word Justice. He added, Suffice it to say, the
citizens of all fifty states, their counsel, the affected aliens and the judiciary all deserve
better. DOJ purports to represent all;not just those who are in favor of whatever actions DOJ

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is seeking.The end result never justifies misconduct. http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Judge-Hanen-ethics-ruling-5-19-16.pdf
23.From: Madhuri Trivedi [mailto:madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 3:15 PM
To: Westwater, Gisela (CIV) <GWestwat@civ.usdoj.gov>
Cc: Readler, Chad A. (CIV) <creadler@CIV.USDOJ.GOV>; Peachey, William (CIV)
<WPeachey@CIV.USDOJ.GOV>
Subject: Conference call
Gisela , Chad and William my father has passed away .. I will have someone in a conference
call with me . This is a humanitarian hardship as well . Please let me know asap.
CONCLUSTION
This Ninth circuit Court MUST find that the misrepresentations detailed above by Defendants
and their attorney(s): (1) were false; (2) were made in bad faith; and (3) misled the Court (4)
affirmative misconduct (4) were done to cause undue delay (5) done to harass Appellant Trivedi
(6) done to continue put Appellant in Financial distress (7) thus take advantage of her situation
My statements are not mere statements but it has merits about DOJ misconduct , public
corruption.
DOJ attorneys are not doing job they are supposed to do; instead of Investigating GE fraud
against government..Instead using their power to obstruct justice. Including but Not limited to
for these reasons, motion for sanctions is appropriate.
Bad faith tactic so (1) misled court so Madhuri does not get work authorization (2) due to not
having work authorization , unable earn money and hence spend resources , money for litigation
and pay my bills (3) by filing 30 day extension again cause delay so I continue run into financial

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hardshipFor all these ; sanctions and criminal charges against DOJ and DHS are appropriate
and legal.
==DOJ attorney has again narrowed down issues in her ECF 46 improperly to (1) 30 day
extension she filed (2) false statement she made about Madhuri not having any pending work
authorization. But sanctions are for their behavior throughout including these two reasons
mentioned above.
Contempt of court can involve acts of omission. Criminal contempt is harassment of another
party i.e. Appellant Madhuri Trivedi. DHS/DOJ has shown both civil and criminal contempt of
court.
I have asked private prosecution because then DHS/DOJs terrorism towards me would have
ended long time ago.

(18 of 35)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 4, 2017, I filed the foregoing document
electronically, via the Courts ECF system. All participants in the case are
registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the CM/ECF system
Dated: July 4th 2017 Respectfully submitted,
s/Madhuri Trivedi
24.---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: Madhuri Trivedi <madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:36 PM
Subject: Info
To: "Atkinson, Ronald A" <Ronald.A.Atkinson@uscis.dhs.gov>
Cc: "Corbin, Susan" <susan.corbin@hq.dhs.gov>
Donald Nuefeld who is a director of service operations for all service center Texas , California,
Nebraska and Vermont ; is one of the defendant . He knows my matter from the beginning .. he
replied my email and mentioned call 800 number and more things around my petitions .. I have
mentioned about all this in my lawsuit documents ..... He as a director oversees all adjudicating
petitions . .. so may be he is doing something that Unit is doing this way .. letting you know this .
---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: Atkinson, Ronald A <Ronald.A.Atkinson@uscis.dhs.gov>
Date: Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 11:07 AM
Subject: RE: Info
Ms. Madhuri:
I assure you, the information you have sent to me, along with the urgency of the matter, have all been
communicated with the operations unit.
Thank you,
Alan

(19 of 35)
25.From: Madhuri Trivedi [mailto:madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com]

Sent: Monday, April 10, 2017 2:06 PM
To: Atkinson, Ronald A
Cc: Corbin, Susan
Subject: Re: Info
Susan, Roland I need to take steps and can't wait like a ********;.....depending on outcome of
unit .. I have to file papers in court asap...I am thinking that while waiting for unit to do things I
should just file my papers in court regardless because I am loosing time and more while waiting .
I know you mentioned you have control but still can tell them that it is important that they take it
seriously and timely ..
On Monday, April 10, 2017, Madhuri Trivedi <madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Roland please let me know what unit did .. tnx
26.---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: Madhuri Trivedi <madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, May 30, 2017 at 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: HHS secretary Tom price forwarded me to you Susan: Fwd: Immigration
healthcare fraud ; DHS must leave me alone
To: Ben.cassidy@hq.dhs.gov, Madhuri Trivedi <Madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com>,
gina.thomas@associates.hq.dhs.gov, tpmd1@hhs.gov, rose.lusi@hhs.gov, "Corbin, Susan"
<susan.corbin@hq.dhs.gov>, "Atkinson, Ronald A" <Ronald.A.Atkinson@uscis.dhs.gov>,
reidp@cbsnews.com, Josh Margolin <Josh.Margolin@abc.com>, bpenn@bna.com,
diane.sawyer@abc.com, James.McCament@uscis.gov, James.McCament@hq.dhs.gov,
James.McCament@dhs.gov, dan.levinson@oig.hhs.gov, "Westwater, Gisela (CIV)"
<Gisela.Westwater@usdoj.gov>, "Goettel, Kate (CIV)" <kate.goettel@usdoj.gov>,
Chad.a.Readler@usdoj.gov, Donald.W.Neufeld@uscis.dhs.gov,
mark.hazuda@uscis.dhs.gov, gregory.richardson@uscis.dhs.gov,
officeofthesecretary@hq.dhs.gov, William.peachey@usdoj.gov, francis.Cissna@hq.dhs.gov,
Julie.Kirchner@dhs.gov, John.Roth@oig.dhs.gov, Elaine.Duke@hq.dhs.gov,
HSAC@hq.dhs.gov

(20 of 35)
Case no:
17-15217
IN THE UNITED STATES APPELLATE COURT
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Madhuri Trivedi vs. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, John F. Kelly, in his
Official Capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Lori Scialabba in her Official Capacity as Director- U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Donald Neufeld -director USCIS service center in his
individual capacity, Greggory Richardson- director TSC - in his individual capacity,
Mark Hazuda- Director NSC - in his individual capacity, John Roth, OIG - in his
individual capacity, Maria Odom-DHS- in her individual capacity
Reply to Opposition/response by defendants for ECF 43, ECF 44-45 (because
defendant attorney has brought that up in her opposition)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, -CASE NO. 16-cv-01122-JD
__________________________________________________________________
Appellant MADHURI TRIVEDI Founder, CEO, CTO OrangeHealth( start up) Peer to Peer
engagement platform for managing diabetes /other health conditiions simple ways to take control of
your health
Madhuri.orangehc@gmail.com
Phone: 650-242-5135
Fax: 708-774-4859
July 4, 2017
Case-17-15217 Madhuri Trivedi v. DHS Appellant reply to motion of sanctions ECF 44-45 related Page 1 of 16
(21 of 35)
Court cases
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 86364 & n.11 (1988) (quoting
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 61314 (1949)) (link)
Jenkins, 478 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2007)
Rules, statutes, constitution
Inherent Power of courts..
28 U.S.C. 1651..
CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE TO RULES 21-1 TO 21-4 A
Rule 18. Stay Pending Review.
Federal rule of civil procedure Rule 9 (e) .
Federal rule of civil procedure Rule 8 (e) CONSTRUING PLEADINGS. Pleadings must be construed
so as to do justice..
28 U.S.C. 1291..
Rule 60(b) Rule 60(b)(6).
(22 of 35)
ECF 44-45 Motion for Injunction/ stay , Writ of Extraordinary Relief , Writ of
Mandamus , Motion to Expedite , Motion for relief
I have filed these motions because despite court order for briefing schedule which was
originally on March 2017, Gisela asked for extension knowing my hardships. And
DHS/DOJ have made a point that prostitution is legal.
For all applicable statutes, laws, constitutional matter and rights, Due process right
common law and anti public corruption provisions; apply to Appellant Madhuris case
here in the Ninth circuit for GRANTING RELIEF ECF 43, 44-45 Motion for Injunction/ stay
, Writ of Extraordinary Relief , Writ of Mandamus , Motion to Expedite , Motion for relief
Please read/consider my opening brief filed in Ninth circuit and all other Ninth circuit
documents as part of my ECF 43,44,45. My ECF 17-21 has details of GE including
deposition and fraud.
As per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(c) OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS. An
application for an extraordinary writ other than one provided for in Rule 21(a) must
be made by filing a petition with the circuit clerk with proof of service on the
respondents; Proceedings on the application must conform, so far as is practicable,
to the procedures prescribed in Rule 21(a) and (b). Madhuri Trivedi Appellant has
properly filed and served WRIT OF EXTRA ORDINARY RELIEF ECF45.
The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.
(23 of 35)
Appellant have also filed WRIT for extra ordinary relief ECF 45 which under Ninth circuit rule
treated in same fashion as a motion- CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE TO RULES
21-1 TO 21-4 A petition for writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition or other extraordinary relief is
processed by the clerk and motions attorneys in the same fashion as a motion.
I have added second I 140 denial as supplemental briefing in District court with receipt number
and Form. For First I 140, I 485, I765 denials; Appellant has included receipt numbers in Ninth
circuit and district court filings.
1. Madhuri has established a prima facie case
2. Appellate court have wider, broader jurisdiction to SERVE JUSTICE.
3. In ECF 46 Filed July 3, defendants have mentioned on Page 13 ,Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd. v Panasonic Corporation Case No. 12-15185 (C.A. 9, Apr. 4, 2014).
FOOTNOTES
1. Because this case is an appeal of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the facts
are taken from the complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to Samsung.
But in that same case in the footnote 1; it says, because Samsung claims were dismissed
under FRCP 12(b)(6) and the case was an appeal for the dismissal; appellate court viewed it
in the light most favorable to Samsung Applying that same standard; Ninth circuit
court MUST view my appeal in the light MOST favorable to appellant Madhuri Trivedi
3.1. In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v Panasonic Corporation Case No. 12-15185 (C.A. 9,
Apr. 4, 2014) appellate court ruling; there is one footnote about district court not
reaching merits of the case which Gisela Westwater used in ECF 46 page 13.
Gisela cant JUST USE one footnote from one antitrust case and say that appellant
is not entitled to relief. By all due respect; applying such common law MAKES
(24 of 35)
USA legal system subjective and not objective..There are so many factors involving
Samsung case ; there is no relation between that and mine.
3.2. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v Panasonic Corporation Case No. 12-15185 (C.A. 9,
Apr. 4, 2014). We review de novo a district courts dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
Defendant attorney Gisela has cited this a line from this case.. For this antitrust case,
district court dismissed Samsung claims twice on based on four year statutory
requirement U.S. District Judge Jeffrey White twice dismissed the suit, ruling that
Samsung sued after the four-year window required to make claims of Clayton Act and
state antitrust violations closed on the 2003 licensing agreement. But the appellate panel
found that the suit was timely. And reversed dismissal of Samsung claims done by
district court. Panasonic filed for writ of certiorari in supreme court and supreme court
denied it. Thus let Samsung litigate its claims in court and Panasonic was a looser in
this case.
3.3. There is not direct and clear correlation for DOJ attorney to cite a FOOTNOTE form that
case to tell the court not to grant relief to Appellant. For that same case, Ninth circuit
found that district court also didnt consider equitable claim dismissal was implicit.
Applying that same standard; when District Judge Donato in Madhuri Trivedi case
dismissed the case; implicitly my injunctive /declaratory relief was also dismissed/moot.
Judge Donato didnt even read anything to understand the whole case. So Ninth circuit
MUST look at how I suffered from district courts error.
3.3.1. Below is Samsung case opinion text
(25 of 35)
The district court dismissed Samsung's claims under the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and California state antitrust law, known as the
Cartwright Act, as well as a claim for equitable relief. The district court concluded
that dismissal of these claims was controlled by the untimeliness of the federal
antitrust claims. But because we have concluded that the federal antitrust claims
were timely, we vacate the district court's dismissal of the state law claims and
remand.4
Finally, the district court did not address Samsung's equitable claim in its order
dismissing the case as untimely. We have held that the deadline for suits for
equitable relief under the antitrust laws is governed by laches, and that the four-year
statute of limitations in 15 U.S.C. 15b furnishes a guideline for computation of
the laches period. Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913,
926 (9th Cir.1975), disapproved of on other grounds, California v. Am. Stores Co.,
495 U.S. 271 (1990). Construing the district court's order as an implicit dismissal of
the equitable claim, we vacate that dismissal and remand for a determination of
whether the equitable claim was timely as well.
4.
Also in ECF 46, defendants have mentioned Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1137-38 (9th
Cir. 2014) .. Appellant Madhuri tried to find;but what Gisela has cited in her opposition
declining to decide; I cant find that sentence anywhere for this case so far. So dont
know what Gisela interpreted?
5. Writ has jurisdiction and thats what I have filed writ for extra ordinary relief and writ of
mandamus relief .
(26 of 35)
6. I filed U visa day before I filed district court lawsuit and because my U visa was on the way
in FedEx shipment the day I filed complaint; and I didnt have a receipt number I didnt
mention U visa. After that, Judge Donato was HOSTILE from the beginning and in all that it
didnt occur to file NOR would judge Donato have cared about my U visa.
7. Supreme Court attorney said on phone May 15 , 2017 about my case that Madhuri you have
a case, supreme court works differently. District court faulted then appellate court handles it.
Supreme court works differently many times for conflicting opinions from various district
and circuit court comes to supreme court and supreme court handles that. My denial of
Emergency application by full court does not mean that I have no case. I have a case.
Madhuri was asking supreme court attorney about Writ of Certiorari as Appellant asked
supreme court to rule on that WRIT and supreme court attorney said they havent denied
your Writ of Certiorari.
8. In Appellant Madhuri case, she also filed motion for injunctive and declaratory relief at
District court; which Judge Donato never ever looked at. For that motion turning moot ;
appellate court is required to do De novo review and it is Extra ordinary relief. (Judge
Donato didnt care to look at any document filed other than complaint and just reiterated
what defendants attorney wrote with some legal case citation such as Bell Atlantic supreme
court case. As Appellant wrote in her Opening brief, various circuit courts and district courts
have take Bell Atlantic in different strides. And as per my opening brief in FTC v. D Link
case; Judge Donato himself in court said that just putting defendants on notice meets
pleading requirement. So judge showed prejudice and bias. )..For all these reasons I am
entitled to relief given that Judge Donato never looked at any merits of the claims, nor gave
injunctive declaratory relief, didnt care to give Justice.
(27 of 35)
9. 28 U.S.C. 1291 There are exceptions to the final judgment rule, however. These include
instances in which a trial court commits a plain or fundamental error,
9.1. For appellant Madhuri these whole conduct immediately and permanently destroy
plaintiffs business and it cause irrevocable, immutable, permanent, and final
injury..such as loss of income, emotional distress, other multinational company stealing
my IDEA for my start up OrangeHealth.
10. District Judge Donato dismissed several of my claims with prejudice and for one ruled that
as a PRO SE it was not pleaded properly. This is were Judge Donato erred. He himself came
from a CORPORATE LAW FIRM. It is REALITY, fact and Truth that given my matter
involves retaliation for whistleblowing for General Electric and discrimination; it would be
almost impossible to get a law firm To bring up laws that would help my case. Most of
Corporate law firms have GE as their client in past/current and for them it is lots of money
they can make. Rather then taking up individual case and because by taking my case they
relations..
11.Thousands of women protested when Trump became president and thats when David
Johnson Assistant director of FBI mentioned briefly in January 17 when I was complaining ;
that Madhuri you should have gone to that women protest rally then.
11.1. Treatment of women under Trump administration is a matter of great concern.
11.2. Obama admin was also harassing me because of various reasons including but not
limited to CEO of GE Jeff Immelt went to WHITE HOUSE 22 times under Obama
admin (http://www.marketwatch.com/story/whod-have-thought-new-study-of-white-
house-visits-finds-lobbying-pays-off-2017-05-01 )
(28 of 35)
11.3. The Unholy Marriage Of GE And President Obama At The Altar Of Industrial
Policy
https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/04/08/the-unholy-marriage-of-ge-and-
president-obama-at-the-altar-of-industrial-policy/#37c46dc37a45
12.Rule 18. Stay Pending Review
13.Federal rule of civil procedure Rule 9 (e) JUDGMENT. In pleading a judgment or decision of a
domestic or foreign court, a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or a board or officer, it suffices
to plead the judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to render it
14.so as to do justice. after an independent de novo review
15.Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading; Appellant Madhuri met this requirement in court filing at
district court level and appellate court level; for ECF 43,44,45.
Federal rule of civil procedure Rule 8 (e) CONSTRUING PLEADINGS. Pleadings must be construed
so as to do justice.
16.The Supreme Court has championed the cause of litigants who file their own lawsuits.
17.Ninth circuit allows hearing for TRO, consider it that and please set up hearing/oral
arguments. Ask defendants to file Opening brief in couple of days if court wants it.
18.However, courts have on occasion held such factual errors to be deserving of sanctions
Jenkins, 478 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2007).
19.Rule 60(b), however, has long been available to provide relief from judgment to losing
litigants where justice so demands. The rule states that a court may relieve a party from final
judgment [o]n motion and just terms under five enumerated grounds (including mistake,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, and judgment satisfaction) and one catchall
(29 of 35)
provision.1 The catchall, Rule 60(b)(6), provides that a court can relieve a party from
judgment for any other reason that justifies relief.2 Because a judgment constitutes a final
decision, Rule 60 creates some tension between justice and finality. To address this tension,
the Supreme Court has imposed the nontextual requirement that a movant present
extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 86364 & n.11 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 61314 (1949)) (link). This rule is known as the extraordinary
circumstances doctrine
20.Appellant Madhuri company creating ; The new app will provide peer-to-peer crowd
sourced community support with deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to better
manage diabetes and other health conditions. The peer-to-peer support is essential for those
dealing with a health issue to learn from one another and access a supportive environment to
help manages the illness. The crowd community sourced self management tool such as
Trivedi has created will work to fill a critical need where there is a gap between patient care
and patient needs.
20.1. Madhuri has made major significant contributions in extraordinary ability and
national
interest while working at Fortune 10/50 corporations, successful entrepreneurial
startups. Only individuals with both exceptional technical ability as well as persistence
and commitment can deliver what Trivedi has in a high-risk environment with do or die
start up success.
20.2.
Trivedi has solid engineering tenure and business credentials including education from
the MIT Sloan School of Management and a masters degree in computer information
(30 of 35)
science from Cleveland State University in Ohio. Trivedi also has post-graduate diploma
in business administration and a bachelors degree in electronics and
telecommunications engineering from India.
20.3. In 2004, Trivedi completed a masters of science solar storm artificial intelligence
project and wrote an article on its result. Deep learning and predictive analytics was
used widely. In the U.S. NOW regulations require energy companies to have a
measures/mitigation strategy against solar storm related outage. Trivedi created a
program for a simple neural network that performs supervised learning by
backpropagation. (It shows Madhuris forward, critical, highly complex, technical and
subsequently business, legal impact, original thinking and contribution; given DHS,
White House made laws. )
21.
After Madhuri did arbitration with General Electric; Mike harsh CTO,
John Dineen CEO GEHC, and Mike Swinford CEO service left GE. Mike Swinford and
Mike Harsh came to testify at arbitration hearing when I issued subpoena. Arbitrator was
hostile. Arbitrator didn't let me examine witnesses & didn't let enter FDA letter,
deposition of GE architect into evidence.
After Madhuri did arbitration with General Electric; Mike harsh CTO, John Dineen CEO
GEHC, and Mike Swinford CEO service left GE. Mike Swinford .
General Electric knowingly released 100,000+ medical devices with critical defects including but
not limited to violation of HIPAA and HITEC regulations, security
vulnerabilities for several years. Madhuri worked as a Lead Engineer at GE. For not
participating in their fraud scheme, GE in retaliation &
discrimination cancelled/withdrawn my work authorization, H1B visa.
(31 of 35)
After investing 15 years here and contributing in extra ordinary ability including in
National interest, DHS has stalled and denied my work permits for three years,
despite the attached Harvard Medical job offer and founding a startup
22.
22.1. Alternative Means of Review. There are other considerations which sometimes
motivate appellate courts to grant review through the All Writs Act. One is the non-
availability of an alternative method of review, such as an appeal from final judgment.
Such is the case when a district judge effectively denies a requested injunction simply by
declining to rule on a plaintiff's motion. There is no order to review and the only remedy
available is to petition the circuit court for an extraordinary writ, such as an injunction pending
appeal. See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 369
(1961).
22.2. denial of the preliminary injunction with no available means of appeal except
through the Act.
However, the Seventh Circuit in Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy(226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955),
aff'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.) found a
basis for mandamus in "the necessity and great expense of protracted trials which conceivably
may eventually lead nowhere but to a complete retrial of the causes before a competent
tribunal.(90 226 F.2d at 712.)
(32 of 35)
The Fifth Circuit was armed in its decision with the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in LaBuy that
proper judicial administration requires supervisory control of the district courts by the courts of
appeals and that in proper circumstances such supervisory authority might be exercised through
extraordinary means.
22.3. The Power of the Courts of Appeals The Court reaffirmed that proper
judicial administration requires supervisory control of the district courts by the
courts of appeals and that in proper circumstances such supervisory authority might be
exercised through extraordinary means. Further, the Court made it clear that the
circuit courts have the "naked power"2 to issue extraordinary writs whenever they could
at some future stage of the litigation exercise jurisdiction to review on appeal from a
final judgment. In such a situation, issuance of a writ of mandamus would be "in aid of
appellate jurisdiction," and the requirements of the All Writs Act would in that regard be
satisfied. (bd. 81 Ibid)
(http://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3860&context=smulr )
22.4. "trial court's abuse of discretion," "lack of trial court power and jurisdiction-" and
"nonavailability or ineffectiveness of alternative methods of appellate review."
22.5. For the legal arguments made in 22.1 ,22.2 , 22.3 and 22.4 above ; Ninth circuit
has under Alternative Means of Review, All Writs act and as a functioning body to
supervise district court to exercise Extra ordinary means and GRANT to RELIEF
Madhuri Trivedi . As stated above denial of the preliminary injunction with no
available means of appeal except through the Act; district court turned my motion
for relief moot when dismissed my case hence Madhuri exercise means of appeal
through All Writs act.
(33 of 35)
CONCLUSTION
This Ninth circuit Court MUST find that the misrepresentations both for lying in court for not
bringing up pending work authorizations ( So I can get travel document and go to my fathers
funeral) and 30 day extension by Defendants and their attorney(s): (1) were false; (2) were made
in bad faith; and (3) misled the Court (4) affirmative misconduct (4) were done to cause undue
delay (5) done to harass Appellant Trivedi (6) done to continue put Appellant in Financial
distress, emotional and physical distress, continuing TORT (7) thus take advantage of her
situation
My statements are not mere statements but it has merits about DOJ misconduct , public
corruption.
Madhuri Trivedi deserves and be given relief she requested given her mitigating, extra-
ordinary circumstances; ongoing injustice by DHS and DOJ, their conspiracy and scheme
to keep me in hardship illegally.
I have asked private prosecution because then DHS/DOJs terrorism towards me would have
ended long time ago.
All writs act and alternate means of review that allows vacating and reversing the judgement by
district judge Donato; along with GRANTING APPELLANT Madhuri Trivedi relief she
deserves.
(34 of 35)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 4, 2017, I filed the foregoing document electronically, via the
Courts ECF system. All participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served
by the CM/ECF system
Dated: July 4th 2017 Respectfully submitted,
s/Madhuri Trivedi
Given what Judge Donato did to me ; Rule 60 and Rule 60(b)(6) exercised. Appellate court
can consider that because district court based on my experience with Judge Donato has
shown to be a BLACK HOLE were nothing has come out. So Ninth circuit to consider my
ECF 43,44,45 under this rule Rule 60 (b) and Rule 60 (b) (6) and also Madhuris whole
case.
Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order
(b) GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR PROCEEDING. On motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
(d) OTHER POWERS TO GRANT RELIEF. This rule does not limit a court's power to:
(35 of 35)
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding;
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
For extended discussion of the old common law writs and equitable remedies, the interpretation
of Rule 60, and proposals for change, see Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623. See also 3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3254 et seq.;
Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules
Serv. 942, 945; Wallace v. United States (C.C.A.2d, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 240, cert. den. (1944) 323
U.S. 712.
The reconstruction of Rule 60(b) has for one of its purposes a clarification of this situation. Two
types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are specified in the rules as it is proposed to
amend them. One procedure is by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment
was rendered. The other procedure is by a new or independent action to obtain relief from a
judgment, which action may or may not be begun in the court which rendered the judgment.
Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party

are express grounds for relief by motion under amended subdivision (b). There is no sound
reason for their exclusion. The incorporation of fraud and the like within the scope of the rule
also removes confusion as to the proper procedure. It has been held that relief from a judgment
obtained by extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a reasonable time, which might
be after the time stated in the rule had run. Fiske v. Buder (C.C.A.8th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 841; see
also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. (C.C.A.9th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 213. On the
other hand, it has been suggested that in view of the fact that fraud was omitted from original
Rule 60(b) as a ground for relief, an independent action was the only proper remedy.
Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules
Serv. 942, 945. The amendment settles this problem by making fraud an express ground for relief
by motion; and under the saving clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for relief by independent
action insofar as established doctrine permits. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments(1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 653659; 3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et seq.
And the rule expressly does not limit the power of the court, when fraud has been perpetrated
upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co. (1944) 322 U.S. 238.

17-15217 - Reply To Motion For Sanctions

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Case: 17-15217, 07/05/2017, ID: 10498494, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES APPELLATE COURT

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

individual capacity, Maria Odom-DHS- in her individual capacity

Reply to ECF 46 -Opposition/response by defendants for Motion of sanctions ECF

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, -CASE NO. 16-cv-01122-JD

Case-17-15217 Madhuri Trivedi v. DHS Appellant reply to motion of sanctions Page 1 of 19

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) .

-Vis 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power,..

C1307a] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)).

Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 551-53 (7th Cir. 2005); ..

In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).

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Rules, statutes, constitution, common law

Inherent Power of courts

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 Rule (1) (c )Serious Crime.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committees notes (1993).

FRCP 46 Rule 3..

Motion for Sanctions

DHS/DOJ have made a point that prostitution is legal.

playing such games are not allowed in COURT.

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you are letting me know this by calling me

determination of every action.2

eanother to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

tness as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, Fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

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existing law, or establish new law

presented for an improper purpose. Prohibited improper purposes include harassment,

unnecessary delay, and the needless increase in the cost of litigation.

10.1. Rule 11 also imposes an obligation on counsel to make a reasonable inquiry to

determine the accuracy of assertions made in motion papers.

Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003).

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attorney false representation; denied my injunction based on intentional false statement

WORDS..It is her ethical , legal, professional durty to representation TRUE picture/facts

unethical but UNHUMAN given my fathers death.

Because of my fathers death; I am eligible for expedite processing of U visa to get

travel document (I get travel document after U visa/work authorization gets

approvedAnd thats why I mentioned that in my filings in March). This is what

Immigration officer from DHS/USCIS told me on Phone and gave me Vermont

U/Violence Against Women phone number Ph::802-527-4888. Immigration officer

But no action was taken by CORRUPT DHS.

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11.2. Congressman Ro Khanna, Senator Kamla Harris , Congresswoman Anna G.

From: Tom Pyke <Tom.Pyke@mail.house.gov>

This is what I received from Vermont today:

Dear Tom Pyke,

Otherwise, they have no additional information. As always, my primary suggestion is that

---------- Forwarded message ----------

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Subject: Spoke with USCIS Vermont

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nevertheless she cared to correct it in court filings.

defendants have never considered this; words of their own officer.

not a running commentary.

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individual litigant, there is no reason not to apply the well-established `objective

Weekly Fed. C1307a] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)).

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663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir. 1981).