1

VALLESvs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ
Dismissng the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections
for governor of Davao Oriental.
Facts:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier

Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco,
a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, CamarinesNorte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but
as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and
was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by
her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned
resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary
proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently prove
her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus
Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents
. . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the
allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not
a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship. [1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran

for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco
Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification,
contesting her Filipino citizenship
2

but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table
definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The
present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already
passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but
likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any
new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character
or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the
dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in
its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section
4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in
EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental
governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent
is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
3

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and
operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by
the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said
acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a
Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to
reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election
of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian
citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person
and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines;
petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in
applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration;
citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which
the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
4

July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens

of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine
citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to
the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.Private respondents father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue
of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth Telesforos
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
5

is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue
of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and
1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship.If Australia follows the principle
of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her
Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR)
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application
of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the
case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado
vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
6

respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an

American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American
passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship,
the same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case
of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones
citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in
the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus,
at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship.Since private respondent
did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states SEC. 40.
Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled
the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.[9] Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
7

the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer

to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore,
it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that
they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.[11] This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares
that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein
private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11,
1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as
certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid
acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that
private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an
issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision
thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,[13] an
exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that
case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
8

resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on
citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort
easier or simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the
prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and
EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially
the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed
to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of
such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business

LEE
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City,
in Reconstitution pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes,
Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed
Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate
area
of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of
Title
No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. [3]
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an
9

action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land.[4] The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against
aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial
or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
appealed
to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
granting the sale to be null and void and cannot give title to the vendee, it
does
not necessarily follow there from that the title remained in the vendor, who had
also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to
recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the
prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the
equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily
conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto.[5]
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with
Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto,
Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action
for recovery of the same parcel of land.[6] Citing the case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Lui She,[7] they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for
being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong filed
with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.[8] On
October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial court denied the motion.[9] The heirs
of
Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22,
1977, the Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss
the case, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.[10]
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of
the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City.[11] Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the
deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner
of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee Liongs
widow, Ang Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an
extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to themselves the subject
parcel of land.[12] Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an
extra-judicial settlement and donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband
Lee
Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession
from
her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial
settlement.[13]
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz,
issued a certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in the
name of Lee Liong.[14] However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were
10

burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners
filed
a petition for reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the
basis of an approved plan and technical description.[15] The dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is
ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of
Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in
paragraph
2 of this decision. This decision shall become final after the lapse of thirty (30)
days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA
of a notice of such judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of
such officials.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Roxas City, Philippines,
June 10, 1994.
JOSE O. ALOVERA
Judge[16]
On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch
17 issued an Entry of Judgment.[17]
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional
Trial Court, Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Solicitor General
contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title,
since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he
was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
judgment of reconstitution void.[19]
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[20] On February 18, 1997, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion.[21]
Hence, this petition.[22]
Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking
annulment of the judgment of reconstitution after failing to object during the
reconstitution proceedings before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged
that the Solicitor General merely acted on the request of private and politically powerful
individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two
previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their
predecessorin-
interest, Lee Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the
land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the
land for more than sixty years.
11

On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the
reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public
agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land.[23] The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been
when the loss or destruction occurred.[24]
In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong,
alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during
World War II. All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz,
which include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all
destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title was
not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer
certificate of title had not been issued.[25] In the trial court proceedings, petitioners
presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and
the
latters subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial
court, after examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the
name of Lee Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own
land in the Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, [26] aliens could not
acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.[27] Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. [28]
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate
the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. [29] In sales of real estate
to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution
both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional
violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either
party.[30] The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was
done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of
judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to
assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against
the
State.[31]
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the
doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. [32]
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because
the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died
12

and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.[33] Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no
longer
be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.[34] The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of
title must be based on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted.[35] In this case, reconstitution was based on the
plan
and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.[36] This renders
the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support.[37] A judgment with absolutely
nothing to support it is void.[38]
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of
title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.[39] It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. [40] Any change in the
ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit.[41] Thus, although
petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh
out
the issue of ownership of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of
reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas
City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

CALILUNG vs .DATUMANONG
QUISUMBING, J : p

1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from

implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending
for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
13

unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that

states,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by
law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003,
reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy . It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act. TIDaCE

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: DcITaC

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
14

oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or TSHEIc

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or

noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which
they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby
shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
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In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep.
Act No.
9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of dual
allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He
avers that
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not
dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-
born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship
without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said
law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply
taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The
Constitution,
however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. ASEcHI

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares
as a state
15

policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath
in Section
3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino
citizen is an
effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the
applicant
taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines
is an
unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of
Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed
law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual
allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations
exist the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is
inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual
allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution.
IEAacT

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said
that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it
addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an
oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred
from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that
will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added
that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and
competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of
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the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now
requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from
16

the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.

xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce
his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign
government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine
government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress
because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the
dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration
of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed
that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says
nothing about the other citizenship.cHCSDa

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created
wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to
another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces
all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign
country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present
measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last
he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the
problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines
but of the other foreign country. 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth
Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by
reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize
dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear
17

out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the
issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to
the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet
passed
any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be
justification
why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true
that
there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v.
Manzano, 6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual
allegiance from
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dual citizenship. 7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance
is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues
regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy
and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance.
In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was given a
mandate
to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance.
10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including
this Court,
to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. cADTSH

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the
case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual
18

allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we said that the courts must assume
that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed
laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of
the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial
restraint
and act with caution and forbearance. 12 The doctrine of separation of powers
demands
no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what
constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what
acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., are on leave.

COQUILLAvs. THE HON. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M.
Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001
Elections

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined
the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen.[2] From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on
leave from the U.S. Navy.[3] Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S.
19

Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United
States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5,
2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171[5] to
the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on
November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of
the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on
November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.
115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election
Registration Board on January 12, 2001.[6] On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two (2) years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent
mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had
been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for
only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the
elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the
highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a
margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private
respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy on the basis of the following findings:
Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in
Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985
cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would
qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of
compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement
contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided
or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen
and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when
he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be
added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until
20

May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow
or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the
Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of
computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence
requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections. [9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this
case: (a) whether the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the
COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case
notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the
petition in this case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that the
COMELEC en banc had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for being
pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for
filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution,
dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001, so
that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the
petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be
considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed.
Private respondents contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be
filed within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not
pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision,
resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not
pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, 2
should be counted from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of
the COMELEC Division.[10] In this case, petitioner received a copy of the
resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001.
Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On
February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002, of
the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later,
on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question,
therefore, that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of
the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed within the period provided for in
21

Rule 19, 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), 7 of the
Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this
petition because the motion was pro forma and, consequently, this petition
should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed,
however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the
COMELEC en banc that
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his
averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither
did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a
reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes
the said Motion pro forma. [11]

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was
not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for
certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the
issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a
motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration
of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.[12] But, as we have held in
another case:[13]
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed,
one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and
improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the
movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the
court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party
would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro
forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for
reconsideration,[14] or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must
specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence,[15] or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,[16] or
(4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,[17] or (5) the
adverse party was not given notice thereof.[18] The 16-page motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of
the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that
petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations
raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise new
matters. Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day
period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within
the reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents
petition for cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy before the elections
on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was
22

proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the
COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private
respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in
Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before
the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be
counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been
rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant,
the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their
disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are
strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the
cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before
the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the
winners. In Abella v. COMELEC[19] and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,[20] the candidates
whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were
voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly
proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second,
reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of
candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction
upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.
II.
On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001
as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he had not.
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
23

immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to dwelling or habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal
residence,[22] that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).[23] A domicile of origin
is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).[24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a
U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws
may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as
a U.S. citizen. Title 8, 1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization . Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be
naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of
filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United
States for at least five years and during the five years immediately
preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present
therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided
within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States
in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2)
has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the
application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all
the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of
good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of
the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
the United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court ruled that immigration to the United
States by virtue of a greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that
country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more
reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was compelled to adopt American
citizenship only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.[26] It is
noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies
to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171,
which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others,
24

natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or

economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized
abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the
Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10,
2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence
in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections
of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by constantly
declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor
in the May 14, 2001 elections.[27] The status of being an alien and a non-resident
can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien
before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires
Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa
under 13[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other
hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,[30] in which case he waives
not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered
the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and
June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration [] Balikbayan in his 1998-
2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the
added inscription good for one year stay.[31] Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino
citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when
petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a
visafreebalikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence,
petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a nonresident
only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.[32] He lacked the requisite residency to qualify
him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[33] in
support of his contention that the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local
Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen of the
Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did
not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was
whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his
term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the
citizenship requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship
may be possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the
case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the Local Government Code
requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality for at
25

least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.[34] What the Court held in that case was that,
upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga,
Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a
candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,[35] however, registration as a voter does not
bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency.
Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail
him any. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[36]
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly
lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in
the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality
of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed
to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to
7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a
formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial
of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a
Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he
submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners
claim, are complete and intact in the records.
III.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate
is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus
Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including
its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
26

his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of
candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident
of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so[37] or that the candidate was a naturalborn
Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen[38] constitutes a
ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we
held inSalcedo II v. COMELEC[39] that a candidate who used her husbands family
name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of misrepresentation
concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed
the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact
justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation
of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order,
dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.

ANGATvs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
27

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September
1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City
in Case No. N-96-03-MK, entitled In the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y
Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No.
63, as amended, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 965 and 263[0].
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost
his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69
New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March
1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his status as a
citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and
Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, applying for
naturalization, he averred that -
FIRST. - His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest
picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition.
SECOND. - His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident
Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas,
U.S.
THIRD. - His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the
properties
of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival here in the
Philippines.
FOURTH. - He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He
was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the
United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto attached as
Annex A.
FIFTH. - He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila
and now resides at petitioners residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of
their marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex B.
SIXTH. - He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in
1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as Annex C.
SEVENTH. - He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63
as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine
citizenship, and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in
Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six
months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He
has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire
period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living.
EIGHT. - He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any
28

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and
predominance of mens ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the
practice
of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war
with the Philippines.
NINTH. - It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a
citizen.[1]
On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice
setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January 1997[2] which, along with the petition
and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on 10 May
1996.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the trial
judge in his order of 12 July 1996.Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996
to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an
order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other things, that -
A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said
law considering that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the
petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise show
that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under
R.A. 8171.[3]
Concluding, the court ruled:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated
July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the
undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.[4]
After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by
the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz:
After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken
by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the
petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate
of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
29

petitioner upon the finality of this order.

Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for
reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been
dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was
the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285
(AO 285), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had
tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A.
8171. The motion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in an order, dated
22
September 1997, it adjudged:
"This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General on March 19, 1997.
"The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated
August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of
repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file
a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of
the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as
members, which shall process the application; that if their applications are
approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
"The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the
same should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization.
"The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein
petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y
Legaspi
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996,
the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the
Philippines.
"On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its
appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on March 19,
1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion.
"The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein
30

petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on
Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case,
the
order granting the same is therefore null and void.
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court
dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and
the
herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its re-filing before the Special Committee on
Naturalization.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the
aforequoted order asseverating that since his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, or
months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the
President
under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to take cognizance
of
the case.
In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure
submits the lone assignment of error that -
The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by
giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on
Retroactive Application.
Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for
naturalization[7] filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a
repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following
the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03 October 1996.
The contention is not meritorious.
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing
for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions of the
law read:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic
necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
31

or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized

government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 725,[8] dated 05 June 1975,
amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by
natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee
on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of
Instruction
(LOI) No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491
issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency
was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of 27 March
1987, it was not, however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections,[9] the
Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely
directed the Special Committee on Naturalization to cease and desist from undertaking
any and all proceedings x x x under Letter of Instruction (`LOI) 270. [10] The Court
elaborated:
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of
P.D.
No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because
then
President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by
Leedid
not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or
was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention
it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied
repeal will not be allowed `unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist.
32

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative

enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an
exercise
of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed
to
the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for
repatriation pending whatever 'judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution'
might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to
the
first Congress - once created - to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal
such
law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that
clearly
indicated the intention of 'the present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound
discretion to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of
the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee,
would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common
sense as well.[11]
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995;[12] hence, when petitioner filed
his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order
285,[13] promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely
then a confirmatory issuance.
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition
should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had
no jurisdiction thereover. The courts order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and
void,
and it did not acquire finality[14] nor could be a source of right on the part of
petitioner.[15] It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was
one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic
Act No. 965[16] and R.A. No. 2630[17] since these laws could only apply to persons who
had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed
forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a
factual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the
person
desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition
in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22
September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil
Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
33

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

ALTAREJOS vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set
aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos
from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the
COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon
Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent
resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter[1] from the Bureau of
Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S.
resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on
November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846
issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.[2]
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer[3] stating, among others, that
he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor
because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition
for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that
his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as
mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their
Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum,
while petitioner did not file one within the required period. [4] Petitioner, however,
filed a Reply Memorandum[5] subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and
hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified
from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:
34

xxx
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of
elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide
as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province
or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least
twentyone
(21) years of age on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not
have
a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or
must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence
that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is
proven
by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3
November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No.
320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division,
Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25
June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of
35

Immigration and Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen
under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to
respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited
Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that repatriation shall be
effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau
of Immigration.
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he
has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of
Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino
citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has
taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has
registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau
of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA
DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section
13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an
indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not
register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The
rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt
should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs.
Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).
xxx
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino
citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear
that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of
San
Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant
to
the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has
also
committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even
perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation
constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a
candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
x x x.[6]
36

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First

Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ
ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name
deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. [7]

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached
the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for
repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration
on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the
Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by
said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18,
2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on
Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was
furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of
petitioner for the cancellation of petitioners registration in said office as an alien,
and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino
citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on
Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending
petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in
their records and for petitioners reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En
Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the
Resolution of the First Division. [8]

The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to
justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19,
Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted
during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties
which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence
of
the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First
37

Division) the respondents only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation

dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of
evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which
consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea
Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date
respondent
is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the
certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that
the
name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation.
(page
42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the
evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence
of
the petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to
introduce
to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore
allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex
2 Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification
Certificate; c) Annex 4 Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City;
d) Annex 5 Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto,
Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e)
Annex 6 Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by
Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more
reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of
[misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation.
He
failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.]
8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil
Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez
Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of
2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004.
(page
65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil
38

registry only on February 18, 2004.

The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on
March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification
Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex 3.
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the
time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the
requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation
constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a
candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such
ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778) [9]

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying
that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the
respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the
questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7,
2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the
COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor
of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass
the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered
declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions
promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the
COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing
petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
In its Comment,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the
information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioners name, as a mayoralty
candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted
upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also
informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners opponent, Dr. Emilio
Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has
rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
In his Reply,[11] petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that
the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty
candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to
believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said
COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected
as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if
39

there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the
Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought
about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special
Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati
City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any,
in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the
date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of
petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.[12] Nonetheless,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.[13]
First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No.
8171,[14] thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997,
but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati
City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of
Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office
apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[15] the Court ruled that the citizenship
qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the
40

elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must
be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where
he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the
term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he
was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x
x Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons,
if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance
to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achievedby construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time
of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his
term. (Emphasis supplied.)
[16]

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court

ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of
his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
41

Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court
therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is
retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing
of his application was justified by the Court, thus:
xxx
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit
the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy
and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there
is
all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such
law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made
to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is
nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the
part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or
breach of some constitutional guaranty.
xxx
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and
the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American
citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should
not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. [17]

Republic Act No. 8171[18] has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No.
725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of
natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for
repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
42

position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the
COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of
the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before
the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation.
Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the
COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the
COMELEC en banc correctly stated:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to
justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19,
Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted
during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties
which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence
of
the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners. [19]

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are
repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in
case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division
dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Puno, and Tinga, JJ., on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.

Republic versus Dela Rosa

DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared
private
respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as
Governor
of the Province of the Sorsogon.
43

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in these petitions
docketed
as G.R. No. 104654, G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were
consolidated
since they principally involved the same issues and parties. LibLex
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the
Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court,
Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91--58645, which re--admitted private respondent
as a
Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A.
No.
473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February
27,
1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the
Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re--admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines
under
Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17--23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on
March
16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication
of
which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further
required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the
Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-- 26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of
Schedule,"
where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He
alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day
before
the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be
moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27--28).
The Motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the
petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy
thereof posted. cdrep
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He
submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order
dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2)
44

Certificate of Publication of the order issued by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B");
(3)
Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B--1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the
National Press Club with private respondent's picture (Exhs. "C" and "C--2"); (5)
Certificate
of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy of a
Plaque of
Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy
of a
Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao--Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8)
Certification
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of
private
respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (9) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the
United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision,
disposing
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is
re--admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization,
thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born
Filipino citizen" (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were
tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General
interposed a
timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for
temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the
COMELEC,
which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92--273. The said petition
sought to
annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor--elect of the Province of
Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for
the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas--National Union of Christian
Democrats
45

(Lakas--NUCD) for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of
private respondent as Governor--elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1)
that
the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine
citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes cast in
favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of
the
remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. llcd
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed
the
petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said
section
provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions
affecting
its composition or proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion
when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent's disqualification in the
guise
of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent's name in the list of registered
voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a
voter
in 1987, he was an American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not
yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent's proclamation as Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent's name from the list
of
candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor--elect
based
on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his
oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the
COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92--
016,
against private respondent. LLphil
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining
order.
46

The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC's immediate resolution of SPA Case
No. 92--
016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of
candidacy
filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo,
p.
18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen,
and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province
of
Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court's decision re--admitting private respondent as a
Filipino
citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the
decision to be valid, private respondent's oath of allegiance, which was taken on the
same
day the questioned decision was promulgated, violatedRepublic Act No. 530, which
provides for a two--year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by
the
applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less
than
four months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition
prayed for the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy and the
deletion
of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations
therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same
office
for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that
the
decision re--admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3)
that
no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter. LLjur
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent's certificate
of
candidacy (Rollo, p. 37).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for
cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all
petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
decided
"not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.Commission on
Elections, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre--proclamation controversies
should
be summarily decided (Rollo, p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino
citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory
47

(Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not
among the grounds allowed in a pre--proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92--
273.
Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its
time,
thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92--016. It argues that under
Section 5
of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a
disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It
also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he
filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92--35. The quo
warranto proceedings sought private respondent's disqualification because of his
American citizenship. LLjur
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent's citizenship.
In his comment to the State's appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship
in
G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in
the
country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States,
and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that
repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost
their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49--50). His
request to
Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
failed
to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
He also claims that the re--scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date,
without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General.
He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jampacked. LLphil
It is private respondent's posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and
that the public was well--informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity
given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two--year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath
of
allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the
waiting
period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the
applicant
48

and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case,
private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that
his
life, both private and public, was well--known. Private respondent cites his
achievements as
a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is
meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91--58645 was full of
procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. LLphil
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed
by
the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements
which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which
be
believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a
citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost
her
Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private
respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance
taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
it
for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional
(Po
Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the
petition and the order must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction ( Sy v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of
the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character;
(2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is
able
to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission
to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is
excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
49

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA
400
[1992]).
Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who
vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required bySection 7 of
the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his
certificate
of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. LLphil
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two--year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted
from
the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of
Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be
able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated
himself continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies. prcd
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision
granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino
citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for
certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc
resolution of
the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92--273, which in turn is a petition to annul
private
respondent's proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private
respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the
State
in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. The
COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three--
day
50

period for questioning the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. prcd
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private
respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this
aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,
174
SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the
respondent's
title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered
by the ten--day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure; once any of the required
qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioner's argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is
untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Filipino
citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate,
at
the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally
reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent
be
considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number
of
votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC , 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled
that
where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also
Geronimo v.
Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]). prLL
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition
in
G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both
GRANTED
while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared
NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to
SURRENDER the same to the Vice--Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this
decision
51

becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. cdll

SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., took no part. Related to a party.
Cruz, J., took no part. Related to one of the counsel in the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
||| (Republic v. De La Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, 105715, 105735, June 06, 1994