RELEVANT DOCTRINE:

Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to perjury. The assertion must
be deliberate and willful. While there may have been a falsehood asserted, which we are not
prepared to accept, no evidence exists to show that the same was done deliberately and
wilfully. (Saavedra v. DOJ, G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993)

The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a
falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense. (Acuna v. Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005)

FULL TEXT:

G.R. No. 93173 September 15, 1993

HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 67 and GREGORIO M.
RAMOS, respondents.

Andres B. Soriano for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification of Department of Justice
(DOJ) Resolution dated 6 November 1989 1 which dismissed petitioner's Petition for Review of
the Provincial Prosecutor's Resolution dated 25 July 1988 2 finding probable cause for perjury
against petitioner, and DOJ Resolution dated 7 March 19903denying reconsideration.

On 2 July 1987, the owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI for brevity), including private
respondent Gregorio M. Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Honorio Saavedra, Jr.,
for P1.2 million payable in installments. A "Memorandum of Agreement," and a "Deed of
Assignment" were executed to evidence the transaction. The former document contained an
automatic rescission clause in case any installment was not paid on its due date.

Payments were made in the total amount of P936,380.00, leaving a balance of P263,620.00
payable on 15 September 1987. On said date, however, petitioner withheld payment for the
reason that the sellers failed to comply with their warranties. Nevertheless, the balance was
deposited in escrow subject to release once the warranties were complied with.
On 5 November 1987, petitioner filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for
damages4 against private respondent, alleging that he (petitioner) was the President and
principal stockholder of the company. By way of answer, respondent Ramos questioned
petitioner's capacity to sue in behalf of PPI, claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president
when the sale of the PPI, shares of stock to him was automatically rescinded on 15 September
1987.

After executing a document entitled "Recission of Memorandum of Agreement," Ramos and his
group filed a case5on 20 November 1987 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SRC)
praying that the rescission be declared valid and legal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the SEC but the same was denied on 11 December
1987. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court which, on 21 March 1988, upheld the jurisdiction
of the SEC and ruled that under Sec. 5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC has "primary and
exclusive" jurisdiction over the twin issues of ownership and automatic rescission, they being
intracorporate disputes.6Accordingly, proceedings in Civil Case No. 55247 were suspended.

On 7 December 1987, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 3257, private respondent filed a
criminal case for perjury against petitioner with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Pasig
alleging that petitioner perjured himself when he declared in the verification of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 55247 that he was the President of PPI. 7 In his answer-affidavit, petitioner
contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending and
unresolved in the SEC, there was no basis to the charge that he asserted a falsehood by claiming
to be the President of the company especially when he was such per records extant with the
SEC.8

By Resolution dated 25 July 1988, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima facie case for perjury
against petitioner and on 26 October 1988 filed the corresponding Information with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed as Crim. Case No. 74919. 9 The evidence supporting the
charge was the Secretary's Certificate dated 5 December 1987 reflecting private respondent's
election as President of PPI by the former owners thereof when they convened following the
automatic revocation of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and "Deed of Assignment."

Petitioner sought a review of the foregoing Resolution with public respondent DOJ but the latter
subsequently came up with the Resolution now under consideration, upholding the finding of
probable cause for perjury, ruling as follows: 10

There is probable cause against you for prosecution as evidenced by the

Secretary's Certificate dated December 5, 1987 extant on record. This evidence is
a mute but eloquent witness affirming the claim of Ramos that he is the rightful
President of PPI. Indeed, the Secretary's Certificate alluded to readily shows that
the original membership of the Board was reconvened and reassembled, proving
the fact that the presidency of PPI is lodged with Ramos.
 Moreover, in view of the of the rescission of the memorandum of agreement,
deed of assignment and contract of lease, you lost your rights and interest over
the shares of stock previously delivered to you by virtue of the subject agreement.
Consequently, you likewise lost your right to assume management over the
corporation PPI. When you thus stated in your complaint that you were President
of PPI, such assertion constituted a lawful (sic)and deliberate assertion of
falsehood (emphasis supplied).

A Motion for Reconsideration having proved unsuccessful, petitioner took the instant recourse.

Petitioner contends that respondent DOJ gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the
findings of the Provincial Prosecutor that he made a "deliberate assertion of falsehood" on the
basis of the conclusion that automatic rescission had set in. For, the jurisdiction to rule on that
question of automatic rescisssion is lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since
the issue has not yet been resolved, the DOJ should have deferred the proceedings.

There is merit in the petition. In Saavedra, Jr. v. SEC, we categorically pronounced that:

. . . the dispute at bar is an intracorporate dispute that has arisen between and
among the principal stockholders of the corporation due to the refusal of the
defendants (now petitioners) to fully comply with what has been covenanted by
the parties. Such dispute involves a controversy "between and among
stockholders," specifically as to plaintiffs' right, as stockholders, over unpaid
assignment of shares and the validity of defendants' acquisition of the same. In
other words, the present case involves an intracorporate dispute as to who has
the right to remain and act as owners-stockholders of the corporation.

Pursuant to PD No. 902-A, as amended, particularly Section 5(b) thereof, the

primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the present case properly belongs to the
SEC . . . (emphasis supplied). 11

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal 12 having been
so placed within its special competence under a regulatory scheme. In such instances the
judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the
matter in
dispute. 13

Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the legal competence of
an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative agency to
ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, 14 much less can the Provincial
Prosecutor arrogate to himself the jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC.

In the case at bar, the applicable regulatory statute is P.D. No. 902-A conferring upon the SEC
the legal competence to rule on intracorporate disputes, which competence had already been
upheld by us in a number of cases. 15Considering that it was definitely settled in Saavedra,
Jr. v. SEC that the issues of ownership and automatic rescission are intracorporate in nature,
then the Provincial Prosecutor, clearly, has no authority whatsoever to rule on the same. In fact,
if we were to uphold the validity of the DOJ Resolutions brought before us, as respondents
suggest, we would be sanctioning a flagrant usurpation or preemption of that primary and
exclusive jurisdiction which SEC already enjoys. Obviously, it cannot be done. Thus, the
Provincial Prosecutor upon being confronted with the issue of whether the sale of stocks to
petitioner was automatically cancelled while in the course of determining probable cause for
perjury, should have withheld filing any information against the accused.

Public respondent DOJ in attempting to justify the action of the Provincial Prosecutor avers that
the latter is empowered to make a preliminary ruling on the matter for the purpose of finding
probable cause against petitioner, and that petitioner may raise the pendency of the issue
before the SEC as his defense at the trial proper.

We are not persuaded. The duty of a prosecutor during preliminary investigation is not only to
find evidence to warrant continuation of the criminal process against an accused. Of equal
importance, and it has been repeated often enough, is his duty to protect the innocent from
hasty, expensive and useless trials. 16 This duty, in addition to the "primary and exclusive"
jurisdiction of the SEC, demands the outright termination of the criminal prosecution of
petitioner which, at the very outset, was already bereft of factual and legal bases. Indeed, the
prosecution of petitioner cannot be based on a mere Secretary's Certificate which cannot attest
to the validity of the automatic rescission, hence, cannot likewise settle the question as to who
between petitioner and private respondent is the lawful President of PPI.

Besides, the Secretary's Certificate is dated 5 December 1987, while the alleged false statement
was made on 5 November 1987, or one month before when the verified complaint for damages
was filed. Quite obviously, the truthfulness of a statement, or lack of it, cannot be made to
depend on a certificate that was not existing yet when the statement in question was made.
Even assuming the validity of Ramos' election as President of PPI as reflected in the Secretary's
Certificate, it does not prove that petitioner was not President on 5 November 1987 when the
civil action was instituted.

Be that as it may, the outcome of SEC Case No. 3257 is not determinative of whether or not the
charge for perjury against petitioner can prosper. Even if private respondent Ramos succeeds in
proving the validity of the automatic rescission of the sale before the SEC, it does not
necessarily mean that the criminal prosecution has basis. There are four (4) elements of the
crime of perjury to be taken into account in determining whether there is a prima faciecase, to
wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 17

Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to perjury. The assertion must
be deliberate and willful. While there may have been a falsehood asserted, which we are not
prepared to accept, no evidence exists to show that the same was done deliberately and
wilfully. On the contrary, the records tend to show that the assertion was done in good faith, in
the belief that the non-payment of the last installment price was justified by the sellers' non-
compliance with their warranties. Besides, petitioner alleges that he has deposited the balance
in escrow, which is not disputed. Consequently, a finding of probable cause does not follow as a
matter of course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner, for an essential element of the
crime appears to be wanting in the case before us, i.e., that the falsehood is willful and
deliberate.

Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise required by the Rules of
Court, and no rule requires complaints for damages, as in the case before us, to be under oath.
Since the complaint filed by petitioner against private respondent is not required to be verified,
another essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn statement
containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be prosecuted on the
basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading which is not mandated by law to be
verified. 18

Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolution of 25 July 1988 finding
a prima facie case for perjury against petitioner. A fortiori, the assailed DOJ Resolutions must be
struck down as having been issued without sufficient factual and legal bases. Correspondingly,
the Information filed with the Pasig Trial Court pursuant thereto must likewise be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions dated 6 November 1989 and
7 March 1990 of respondent Department of Justice sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor in
finding probable cause for perjury against petitioner are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

Conformably herewith, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 67, or whichever branch of the
same court Crim. Case No. 74919 entitled "People v. Honorio Saavedra, Jr.," may be assigned, is
directed to DISMISS the case. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused, if
any, is cancelled and released.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 144692 January 31, 2005

CELSA P. ACUA, petitioner,

vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City
National Trade School), respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June
2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000 Resolution dismissed for lack of
probable cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acua against respondents Pedro
Pascua and Ronnie Turla. The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Celsa P. Acua ("petitioner") is a former teacher of the Angeles City National Trade
School ("ACNTS") in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent Pedro Pascua ("respondent Pascua")
was ACNTS Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla ("respondent Turla") was a
member of its faculty.2

On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut ("Yabut"), another ACNTS teacher, together with other
school personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua on some unspecified matter.
Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took place on 16 July 1998.
Respondent Turla attended the meeting upon respondent Pascuas directive. Petitioner, whom
Yabut apparently invited, also attended the meeting.

As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting, petitioner charged respondent
Pascua with misconduct ("OMB-ADM-1-99-0387") and with violation of Article 131 3 of the
Revised Penal Code ("OMB 1-99-903") before the Office of the Ombudsman
("Ombudsman").4 In his sworn counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, respondent Pascua
alleged, among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a "rehash and a duplication with a
slight deviation of fact" of an administrative case pending with the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports ("DECS") which petitioner and Yabut earlier filed against him and (2) Yabut
had no authority to invite to the 16 July 1998 meeting a non-employee of ACNTS like petitioner
considering that he (respondent Pascua) was the one who called the meeting. 5 Respondent
Pascua also submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla confirming that respondent
Pascua and not Yabut called the 16 July 1998 meeting.6

The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and OMB 1-99-0903.

Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-
ADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with perjury ("OMB 1-99-2467")
before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ("public respondent"). Petitioner alleged
that private respondents were liable for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed
against respondent Pascua before the Civil Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was
not "the same" as her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not
respondent Pascua who called the 16 July 1998 meeting.7

Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the complaint. 8

The Ruling of the Public Respondent

Public respondent dismissed petitioners complaint in his 4 April 2000 Resolution, 9 thus:

Upon careful evaluation of the case record, we find no evidence to indict respondents for
perjury.

xxxx

It could not be established by the evidence on record that it was Erlinda Yabut who called the
meeting on July 16, 1998 and invited complainant. Annex "B-1" xxx of the complaint is the letter
of Erlinda Yabut to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated July 13, 1998, which shows that Ms. Yabut was
requesting respondent to have a dialogue (sic). The letter states:

"We, the undersigned would like to request your good office to allow us to have a dialogue on
Thursday, July 1[6], to once and for all ventilate our complaints/observations and also listen to
the rebuttal of the other side.

It is the desire of everybody who attended the meeting last time that whatever is the outcome
of this confrontation will be the basis of the next appropriate step.

We would like to request the incoming Administrator or somebody from the DECS to act as
moderator."

Pursuant to such circumstance, respondent Pascua stated, among others, in his counter-affidavit
in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that:

"5. Be that as it may, I vehemently deny the charge that I prevented Complainant Celsa Acu[]a
from testifying against Mrs. Amelia Yambao on July 16, 1998 the truth of the matter being that
there was no hearing or investigation conducted or called by the undersigned on said date but a
dialogue among the teachers of Angeles City National Trade School which I previously headed.
Mrs. Acu[]a at that time was not a teacher to attend the said dialogue, thus I stated openly on
said occasion that I will not start the meeting if there are outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO
GUTIERREZ asked herein Complainant to step out of the room so we could start the dialogue,
xxx;

6. I also deny the charge that she was invited by Mrs. Erlinda Yabut, co-complainant of hers in
the DECS Administrative case, because I was the one who called for that dialogue and not Mrs.
Yabut, thus I never gave any authority to anyone to invite any person who was not a member of
the school faculty or an employee thereof."

Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the aforequoted counter-affidavit of respondent Pascua belie
the commission of perjury since there was no deliberate assertion of falsehood on a material
matter.

Respondent Ronnie Turla could not likewise be indicted for the crime charged. Since it was
respondent Pascua who called him to that meeting, it would be truthful of him to state that
way. There was also no willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of respondent
Ronnie Turla.10

Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion in the 19 June 2000
Order.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable cause. 11

Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing petitioners complaint in OMB 1-99-2467.12

In their Comment, private respondents claim that petitioner filed this petition out of time.
Hence, this petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits, private respondents submit
that public respondent correctly dismissed the perjury charge against them. 13

In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 65").14

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

1. Whether petitioner filed the petition on time; and

2. Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the

complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition, while filed on time, has no merit.

The Petition was Filed on Time

Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this petition beyond the ten-day period
provided in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.15 Section 27 states in part:

Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. xxxx

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in force because this Court in Fabian v.
Desierto16 declared it unconstitutional for expanding the Courts jurisdiction without its consent
in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to
appeals from rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It does not apply to
appeals from the Ombudsmans rulings in criminal cases such as the present case. 17

The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with
this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we held in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario:18

The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders,
directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled
in Fabian, the aggrieved party [in administrative cases] is given the right to appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman xxx
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack [or] excess of jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 alleging that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in dismissing her complaint
against private respondents. Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner had 60 days
from her receipt of the 19 June 2000 Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner received
a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000
within which to file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11 August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed
this petition on time.

The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse

His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467

We reiterate this Courts policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.19 We explained the reason for such policy
in Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman:20

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.

The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to deviate from this long-standing policy.

Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
her complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is untenable. Probable
cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the "existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted."21 The elements of perjury under Article 18322 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.23(Emphasis supplied)

Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in that
private respondents statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not
material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

On the Element of Materiality

In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the "main fact which was the subject of
the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx."24 To hold private
respondents liable, there must be evidence that their assailed statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-
0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The
records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in
OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.
What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascuas counter-affidavit in that case as
quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some inference is
possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioners complaint in OMB-
ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July 1998
meeting. However, it would be improper for the Court to rely on such inference because the
element of materiality must be established by evidence and not left to inference. 25

At any rate, petitioners complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Pascuas
statement that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioners and Yabuts
administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS is immaterial to the
inferred issue.

On the Element of Deliberate Assertion of Falsehood

The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a
falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense.26 Here, the Court finds that
respondent Pascuas statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called
the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was
Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS personnel who requested a dialogue with respondent
Pascua, it was respondent Pascuas consent to their request which led to the holding of the
meeting. Thus, respondent Pascuas statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is
a good faith interpretation of events leading to the holding of the meeting.

Regarding respondent Pascuas allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that

petitioners complaint was a mere "rehash and duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the
DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua, petitioner has
not shown why this is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabuts
complaint with the DECS.

Respondent Turlas statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called the 16

July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. Consequently, it
was correct for public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla merely repeated what he
heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious
statement.

There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.27 No such conduct can be imputed on public respondent. Public
respondent disposed of petitioners complaint consistent with applicable law.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated
19 June 2000 of respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.