BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS V .

GO, 25 SCRA 890

Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, started living maritally in Malitbog,
Leyte, in 1934. They bore the following childred: Beato, Manuel, Gonzalo, and Julio. In 1946, they went to
Amoy, China, on vacation, but Go died there the same year.

In 1961, the children applied with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the Philippines
as Filipino citizens.

The Consulate then received a cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to
investigate whether the petitioners for entry were the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino
citizen.

After investigation, the office issued a certificate of registration and identity to the effect that the
applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to
register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the Philippines.

But Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the
findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano
and others, were not authentic.

All this was done without previous notice served nor hearing granted to said parties.

Board of Immigration Commissioners, upon review, found that:

1. that, in view of the fact that the cable authorization referred to heretofore is a forgery, all the
proceedings had in connection therewith are void and, as a result, the private respondents must
be deported as aliens not properly documented;
2. that, granting that they were Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that
citizenship, firstly, by staying in China for a period of 15 years, and secondly, because they were
recognized by their common-law father, they became citizens of the Republic of China in
accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.

Ruling:

First, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently acquired Chinese
citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is
a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by a
Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of China. For, the settled rule of international
law, affirmed by the Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the
International Court of Justice, is that Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a
particular state should be determined in accordance with laws of that state.

Second, the petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by
Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code
which provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article
IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine
citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship

1. by naturalization in a foreign country;

2. express renunciation of citizenship;
3. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country;
rendering service to, or
4. accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country;
5. cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; d
6. declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war;
7. in the case of a woman by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.

Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by
reason of such recognition.

Renunciation must be express.

Where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was brought
by his parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the
Philippines at 25 years of age, The fact that a minor child in those conditions was taken to China and
remained there for several years is not sufficient ground upon which to hold that he has changed his
nationality, when, after reaching his majority, he did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his
father.

Respondents were all minors when they were brought to China. Upon reaching the age of majority, Beato
even applied registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into the country (having clear indicia of
intent to continue his former status).

UGDORACION, JR. V. COMELEC, APRIL 18, 2008

U ran for mayor in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol. He stated in his COC he had resided in
Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent
resident or an immigrant to a foreign country.

Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Services (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254. He was a
green card holder.

Tungol, his rival, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose
Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracions declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material
misrepresentation.
COMELEC cancelled his COC.

Ruling:

First. A Filipino citizens acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones
status as a resident of the Philippines.

Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and remain
(animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of
choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of
law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.

Second. The contention that Ugdoracions USA resident status was acquired involuntarily, as it was simply
the result of his sisters beneficence, does not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a
petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws, the petitioned party is
very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status.

Third. There must be a waiver of status as a green card holder as manifested by some acts or acts
independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, [Ugdoracion]
presented a photocopy of a document entitled Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status
dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny of this document however discloses that it is a mere application
for abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not bear any note of
approval by the concerned US official.

Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion] is still disqualified for he failed
to meet the one-year residency requirement. [Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment of residence
only on 18 October 2006 or for just about seven (7) months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, which
clearly fall short of the required period.

SOBEJANA -CONDON V. COMELEC, AUGUST 10, 2012

P is born of Filipino parents in 1944. She became a naturalized Australian citizen due to her marriage with
an alien.

In 2005, she applied for reacquisition of PH citizenship under Sec. 3 of RA 9225.

After the applications approval, she took an oath of allegiance to the Republic in December 2005.

In Sept. 2006, she filed an unsworn Declaration to renounce her Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.

She ran for mayor in La Union in 2007. She lost and ran again in 2010 for V-Mayor. She won.
Respondents sought to disqualify her from holding the elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen
and that she failed to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Ruling:

First. Under the provisions of 9225, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held
dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

Second. The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity: Those seeking elective public office in
the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws:

1. He or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy.
2. The renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
3. duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath
4. stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

Third. It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and
not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship.
Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens
are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that
the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.

The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with
respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the
principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it
mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire
their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn
affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI
of the Constitution on public officers primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

Fourth. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already
deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law
may also be established through:

1. a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the
foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same
was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and
2. likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the
prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light
of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered."
Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the
Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law.

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods.
As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of
the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already
renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in
disregarding the same.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read
the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

VALLES V. COMELEC, 392 PHIL. 327, 340 (2000); MERCADO V. MANZANO, 367 PHIL. 132, 152-153 (1999)
ARE SUPERSEDED.

While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate
of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already
adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the
additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Despite her win, the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not
a matter of popularity.