G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997 of a quorum. 1 Rep.
of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought
this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This
bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and
transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with
certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at
8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep.
Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,
proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was
interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After
a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence
was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in
the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and
Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November
21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and
ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the
motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none,
approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood
up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended
for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned
until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript
of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators
of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.
of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4)
the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the
word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions,
cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the
world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is
repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the
sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the
question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,
there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that,
in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend
that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35
and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting
the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the
years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation
of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to
approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the Chair refused to
recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's
motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of
Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair
suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it
is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the
session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the
time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De
Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the
existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed,
considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of
grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government,
and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of
the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In
addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of
powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there
is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of
its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such
as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under
the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering
the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr.
Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved
on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that
there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held:
"At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a
mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred
upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution
and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having
made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it
appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no
court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with
the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof,
and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893
Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a
bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in
case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court
of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the
requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature
should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its
own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision
for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction,
and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage
through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for
the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone,
even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly
signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50
N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co.
v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of
Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the
internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our
government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into
an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly
decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art.
VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond
judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice,
however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to
the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we
have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII. 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There
being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this,
however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report
should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this
case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the
fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically
requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on
the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino
and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after
the debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from
Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point of order. I
should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
 one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and
nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved
on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So
I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are
against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
"this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed
to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval
of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nayshad already
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration
allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session
was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore.
While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of
Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not.
The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair
declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis
added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one
objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own
making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act
upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as
an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was
not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep.
Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an
end to any further consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that
in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of
the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the
phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the
power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure
of the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat,
the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners
in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one,
except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which
the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in
the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and
Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved;
while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have
voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice
Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure,
there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill
and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill
has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to
determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on
the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they
have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come
to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill
sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution
that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is
cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule
rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
 leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the
massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure
from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the
Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind
on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since
our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken
by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the
membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which
shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has
been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion
made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court
spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that Separate Opinions
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which
VITUG, J., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon
which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being
thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term
grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like
the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress
under whose province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do
otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the
framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-
honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the
understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction
over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political
issues is shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and
companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the
dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not
elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent
with, my firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge
to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both
substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the
majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant
decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every
argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial
breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to
have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that
the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the
position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did
not call for their application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful
to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited
to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence
and substance of the law itself. Thus:
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural
irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot
continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially
alter the essence and substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since
constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes
are over facts whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are
in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both
legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by
its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal
legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify
the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are
also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed
that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not
only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference
committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of
a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded
invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of
the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in
the Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would
not hold true in the instant petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by
respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the
House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions
of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been
introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of
the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from
invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional
standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous argument that
the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the
dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill
doctrine in light of what I perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do
I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of
rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the
Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or
even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional
rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of
Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may
move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either
of the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent to the President
before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a
nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the
Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to
reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has
been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President
who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the
confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation. The
President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdictionover the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable
rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its
own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that
adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and
delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power
to make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say that another rule
would be better. A rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the
vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover,
should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons,
above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are
confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to
perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out
in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was
charged with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum
when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the
members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
 xxx xxx xxx
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of
the said Committee, and that "at least that number must have been actually and
physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet
at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the
progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question
was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain
there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee
as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of
that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a
continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee.
Under the House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of
quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with
Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and
whether they have been followed." It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course
none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead
Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of
continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has
the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions
that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that
was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were
satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible
finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a
consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment
is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a
quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a
majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was
a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the
face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum
need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary
to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right.
That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime
charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once
established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this
decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the
vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United
States. 5Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of
Congress on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee
or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes that the
interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or
the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session for the
purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public
hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers
at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's
practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of
the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the
witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to
do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply
because the witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not
fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous
in obeying its own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political
thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot
reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to
our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond
dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of
Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security
cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government
by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I
posited the following postulates:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the
Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute
political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the
view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the
legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically changed
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among
the three great branches of our government the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission
strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the
security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members." It
also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar
Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective appointees to the
judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies in
the judiciary ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the
Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees
by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ".
. . designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions."
While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of
the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now
subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This
provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened
other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to
justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by
the proper officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the
legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as
judicial as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing
and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally
attacked. 10 In England, theconclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus
made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament;
for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions
have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule,
the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the
enrolled bill unless there affirmativelyappears in the journals of the legislature a statement that
there has not been compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other
jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.13 Some limit the use of extrinsic
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern
rationalefor the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department
to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The
doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty
on laws passed by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is
to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an
amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold
the alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the
United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion
cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the
withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally
attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether
rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the
"enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents and
conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent
for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices
and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not
conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains provisions that
have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of
the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the
journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled
bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated
on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et
al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively
reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of
decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the
legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look
behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if
there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was
properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to
determine the propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for
adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes
of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and
anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and
expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up
the records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim.
There are fourhistorical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and,
as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of
the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in every
presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated,
record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities
required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its
critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as
follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2)
Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do not accord
with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping
devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5)
The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide
a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled
bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The
maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by
precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's
Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question
to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and
practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the
course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule
to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that
has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly
result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon
sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be
discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-
keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the
rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters,
duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic
voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the
General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and
developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits
may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government
requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our
copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional
and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228
of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any
person, corporation, state agency or branch or government are brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland
describes as the "extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called
enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that
an enrolled bill is valid. . . .
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United
States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and
the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be
attacked by any authoritative source of information." 19
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case
ofMabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling
inCasco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however,
that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club,
Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it
is well settled that enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes,
61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections,
L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which
 we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:
. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of law-making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done
in Congress. After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The
ponencia stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that
in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered
on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to
apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a
co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
"[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has 'passed
both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In
rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In
a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question
was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenezlaid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case
of U.S. vs.Pens, where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion
cases. 25Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even
inTolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive
pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is
appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution
and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken
away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our
Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been
repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive presumption
does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution.
The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of
truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to
implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an
enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues
posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out,
the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question
of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor
does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection.
The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these rules
are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon
which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being
thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term
grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like
the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress
under whose province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do
otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the
framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-
honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the
understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction
 over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political
issues is shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and
companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the
dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not
elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent
with, my firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge
to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both
substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the
majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant
decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every
argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial
breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to
have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that
the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the
position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did
not call for their application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful
to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited
to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence
and substance of the law itself. Thus:
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural
irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot
continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially
alter the essence and substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since
constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes
are over facts whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are
in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both
legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by
its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal
legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify
the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are
also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed
that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not
only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference
committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of
a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded
invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of
the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in
the Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would
not hold true in the instant petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by
respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the
House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions
of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been
introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of
the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from
invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional
standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous argument that
the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the
dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill
doctrine in light of what I perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do
I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of
rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the
Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or
even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional
rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of
Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may
move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either
of the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent to the President
before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a
nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the
Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to
reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has
been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President
who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the
confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation. The
President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdictionover the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable
rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its
own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that
adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and
delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power
to make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say that another rule
would be better. A rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the
vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover,
should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons,
above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are
confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to
perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out
in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was
charged with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum
when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the
members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of
the said Committee, and that "at least that number must have been actually and
physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet
at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the
progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question
was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain
there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee
as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of
that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a
continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee.
Under the House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of
quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with
Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and
whether they have been followed." It held:
 xxx xxx xxx
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course
none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead
Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of
continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has
the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions
that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that
was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were
satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible
finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a
consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment
is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a
quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a
majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was
a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the
face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum
need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary
to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right.
That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime
charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once
established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this
decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the
vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United
States. 5Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of
Congress on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee
or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes that the
interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or
the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session for the
purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public
hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers
at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's
practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of
the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the
witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to
do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply
because the witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not
fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous
in obeying its own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political
thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot
reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to
our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond
dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of
Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security
cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government
by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I
posited the following postulates:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the
Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute
political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the
view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the
legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically changed
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among
the three great branches of our government the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission
strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the
security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members." It
also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar
Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective appointees to the
judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies in
the judiciary ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the
Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees
by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ".
. . designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions."
While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of
the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now
subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This
provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened
other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to
justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by
the proper officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the
legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as
judicial as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing
and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally
attacked. 10 In England, theconclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus
made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament;
for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions
have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule,
the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the
enrolled bill unless there affirmativelyappears in the journals of the legislature a statement that
there has not been compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other
jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.13 Some limit the use of extrinsic
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern
rationalefor the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department
to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The
doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty
on laws passed by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is
to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an
amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold
the alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the
United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion
cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the
withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally
attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether
rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the
"enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents and
conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent
for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices
and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not
conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains provisions that
have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of
the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the
journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled
bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated
on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et
al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively
reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of
decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the
legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look
behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if
there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was
properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to
determine the propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for
adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes
of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and
anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and
expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up
the records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim.
There are fourhistorical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and,
as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of
the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in every
presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated,
record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities
required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its
critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as
follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2)
Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do not accord
with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping
devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5)
The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide
a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled
bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The
maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by
precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's
Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question
to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and
practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the
course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule
to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that
has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly
result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon
sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be
discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-
keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the
rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters,
duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic
voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the
General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and
developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits
may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government
requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our
copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional
and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228
of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any
person, corporation, state agency or branch or government are brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland
describes as the "extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called
enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that
an enrolled bill is valid. . . .
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United
States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and
the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be
attacked by any authoritative source of information." 19
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case
ofMabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling
inCasco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however,
that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club,
Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it
is well settled that enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes,
61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections,
L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which
we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:
. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of law-making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done
in Congress. After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The
ponencia stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that
in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered
on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to
apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a
co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
"[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has 'passed
both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In
rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In
a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question
was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenezlaid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case
of U.S. vs.Pens, where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
 Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion
cases. 25Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues
posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out,
the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question
of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor
does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection.
The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these rules
are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even
inTolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive
pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is
appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution
and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken
away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our
Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been
repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive presumption
does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution.
The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of
truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to
implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an
enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.

III