THE TWO ISLANDS IN IRELAND DEVIDED BY

EVIL SETTLERS, AND THEIR GREED AND

TREASON ACTS of BETRAYAL AGAINST THE
IRISH CITIZENS IN REPUBLIC OF IRELAND,
WITH THE HELP OF EUS BREXIT SELL OUT
The Good Friday Agreement | Sinn Fin
The Good Friday Agreement. ... in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-
Irish ... to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
LAW OF EVIDENCE
TreasonAct,1939RoadTrafficAct,...Healy(2004)IrishLawsofEvidence,...LawofEvidence.
http://www.keiabroad.org/ireland/syllabus/law/Law%20of%20Evidence.pdf

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Declaration of Support

2. Constitutional Issues

Annex A: Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British Legislation

Annex B: Irish Government Draft Legislation

3. Strand One:

Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland

4. Strand Two:

North/South Ministerial Council

5. Strand Three:

British - Irish Council

British - Irish Intergovernmental Conference

6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity

Human Rights

... United Kingdom Legislation

... New Institutions in Northern Ireland

... Comparable Steps by the Irish Government

... A Joint Committee

... Reconciliation and Victims of Violence

Economic, Social and Cultural Issues

7. Decommissioning

8. Security

9.. Policing and Justice

Annex A: Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland

Annex B: Review of the Criminal Justice System

10. Prisoners

11. Validation, Implementation and Review

Review Procedures Following Implementation

ANNEX: Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.

DECLARATION OF SUPPORT
1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the
agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new
beginning.

2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable
legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been
injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh
start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of
reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and
vindication of the human rights of all.
3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the
basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South,
and between these islands.

4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively

democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political
issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any
political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.

5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing,

and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to
strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement
within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge
that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every
one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is
accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements - an
Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council,
implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of
Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland - are interlocking and
interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and
the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success of
each depends on that of the other.

6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement

to the people, North and South, for their approval.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish
Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-
Irish Agreement, they will:

(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a

majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status,
whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or
a sovereign united Ireland;

(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by
agreement between the two parts respectively and without external
impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of
consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a
united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be
achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of
a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;
(iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern
Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island
of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people
of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the
Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United
Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to
make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent
of a majority of its people;

(iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise
their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii)
above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both
Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments
legislation to give effect to that wish;

(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the

people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with
jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of
all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be
founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political,
social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens,
and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity,
ethos, and aspirations of both communities;

(vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so
choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and
Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be
affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.

2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly
undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to
propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland
and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern
Ireland.

ANNEX A
Draft Clauses/Schedules for incorporation in British legislation

1. (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains

part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the
consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held
for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1.
(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern
Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such
proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of
Ireland.

2. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is repealed; and this Act shall have
effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment.

p> 1. The State may consent to be bound by the British-Irish Agreement

done at Belfast on the ... day of ... 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement.

2. Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise the

powers and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or any part of
the island of Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution conferring a like power or function on any person or any organ
of State appointed under or created or established by or under this
Constitution. Any power or function conferred on such an institution in
relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or controversies may
be in addition to or in substitution for any like power or function conferred
by this Constitution on any such person or organ of State as aforesaid.

3. If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, pursuant
to the Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this Consti225;isin
na hireann.

(ii) the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the
English text:

Article 2

It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of

Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation.
That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in
accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad
who share its cultural identity and heritage.

Article 3

1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the
diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland
shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a
majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in
the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by
this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the
laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately before the
coming into operation of this Constitution.

2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared

between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective
responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers and
functions in respect of all or any part of the island."

iii. the following section shall be added to the Irish text of this Article:

8. [Irish text to be inserted here]"

and

iv. the following section shall be added to the English text of this Article:

8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with

the generally recognised principles of international law."

4. If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and

subsection 3, other than the amendment of this Constitution effected
thereby, and subsection 5 of this section shall be omitted from every
official text of this Constitution published thereafter, but notwithstanding
such omission this section shall continue to have the force of law.

5. If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section

being added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be provided
for by law, this section shall cease to have effect and shall be omitted from
every official text of this Constitution published thereafter.

STRAND ONE
Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland

1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in

Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of
exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to
protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

The Assembly
2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing
Westminster constituencies.

3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in

respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six
Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking
on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this
agreement.

4. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community

basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved
responsibilities.

Safeguards

5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community

can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these
institutions and that all sections of the community are protected,
including:

(a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership

in proportion to party strengths;

(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly
nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;

(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed
to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland;

(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community

basis;

(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and
voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations
present and voting;

(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including

at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present
and voting.

Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in

advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other
cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought
by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108).

(e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote

equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between
the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints
against public bodies.

Operation of the Assembly

6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a

designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of
measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant
provisions above.

7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-
community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above.

8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of

the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the
Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d'Hondt
system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party
strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee
places is available to all members.

9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and

consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is
associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation. They will have
the power to:

* consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the

context of the overall budget allocation;

* approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of

relevant primary legislation;

* call for persons and papers;

* initiate enquiries and make reports;

* consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its

Minister.

10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be

established as may be required from time to time.
11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report
on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with
equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee
shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its
consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of
the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the
cross-community consent procedure.

12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the
Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting
on a cross-community basis.

13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall
vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to
this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-
community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special procedure shall be
followed. Executive Authority

14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a

First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with
Departmental responsibilities.

15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into
office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to
5(d)(i) above.

16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister,
the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the
d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the
Assembly.

17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be

convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First
Minister.

18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include,
inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive
Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to
external relationships.

19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of,
and of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good
faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office.
24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of
responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive
Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole.

25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the

Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence
of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his
or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set out in the Pledge of
Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent
means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office
under these provisions.Legislation

26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for
Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to:

(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it
which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant
legislation null and void;

(b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision

on a cross-community basis is required;

(c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental

Committee;

(d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish

Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between
the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament;

(e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions

in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament,
especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g.
social security, company law).

27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the
approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary sembly
legislation on reserved matters;

(c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet;

(d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation.

33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for

Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will:(a) legislate for non-
devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the
approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of
Parliament;

(b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international

obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland;

(c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select
Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise

representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and
such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First
Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and
cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by
agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and
establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic
Forum.Transitional Arrangements

35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without
legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working
practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the
Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council
and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those
members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their
commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic
means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any
political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into
being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to
appointed Ministers.Review

36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements,

including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's
procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the
interests of efficiency and fairness.

ANNEX A
Pledge of Office

To pledge:

(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office;

(b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic
means;

(c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in
accordance with the general obligations on government to promote
equality and prevent discrimination;

(d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for

government;

(e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within
the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly;

(f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the Executive
Committee and Assembly;

(g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.

Code of Conduct

Ministers must at all times:

* observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving

impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of
public funds;

* be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the

Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship
of public funds and the extent to which key performance targets and
objectives have been met;

* ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users
of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that
Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an
open and responsible way;

* follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on
Standards in Public Life;

* comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds;

* operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and

equality of treatment;
* not use information gained in the course of their service for personal
gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their
private interests;

* ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and
hospitality that might be offered;

* declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their
responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests.
Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests
which members of the public might reasonably think could influence their
judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;

STRAND TWO
NORTH/SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

1. Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of

relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas,
a North/South Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those
with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish
Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the
island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and
cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence
of the Administrations, North and South.

2. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides.

Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First
Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach
and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the rules for
democratic authority and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland
Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council to
be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the
two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate
normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government
and the First and Deputy First Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland
Administration to be able to make alternative arrangements.

3. The Council to meet in different formats:(i) in plenary format twice a

year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and
Deputy First Minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach;

(ii) in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each
side represented by the appropriate Minister;
(iii) in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral
matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement.

4. Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the

two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for
consideration or action.

5. The Council:

(i) to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-

operating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both
Administrations, North and South;

(ii) to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common

policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all-island
benefit, and which are within the competence of both Administrations,
North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any
disagreements;

(iii) to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation

separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the
competence of both Administrations, North and South;

(iv) to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island

and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established
as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

6. Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the

defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place
for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side
to remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas respectively,
whose approval, through the arrangements in place on either side, would
be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of those attending.

7. As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland

Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the
British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their
transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently
on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and
the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus
operandi.

8. During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern

Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the
Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government
operating in the North/South Ministerial Council will undertake a work
programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at least
12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October
1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will
take place. Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the
Annex.

9. As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at
least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the
following categories:(i) Matters where existing bodies will be the
appropriate mechanisms for co-operation in each separate jurisdiction;

(ii) Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed
implementation bodies on a cross-border or all-island level.

10. The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other
enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these
bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work programme,
function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish Agreement and the
transfer of powers, with legislative authority for these bodies transferred
to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for
the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the
transfer of powers to the Assembly.

11. The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They
will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in
the Council.

12. Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in

the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland
Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences and
responsibility of the two Administrations.

13. It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the

Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one
cannot successfully function without the other.

14. Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format

described at paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement
between the two sides, experts could be appointed to consider a particular
matter and report.

15. Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the
Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public
function.
16. The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by
members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service.

17. The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant

matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and
proposals under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements to be
made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and
represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings.

18. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider

developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers
from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual interest and
concern.

19. Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent

consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, representative of
civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with
expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues.

ANNEX
Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the
following:

1. Agriculture - animal and plant health.

2. Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges.

3. Transport - strategic transport planning.

4. Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and

waste management.

5. Waterways - inland waterways.

6. Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers

and fraud control.

7. Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development.

8. Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their

successors.

9. Inland Fisheries.
10. Aquaculture and marine matters

11. Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-
border issues.

12. Urban and rural development.

Others to be considered by the shadow North/ South Council.

STRAND THREE
BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL

1. A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-Irish

Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial
development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these
islands.

2. Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and

Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United
Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel
Islands.

3. The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; in
specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented by
the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to consider cross-
sectoral matters.

4. Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever

procedures for democratic authority and accountability are in force in
their respective elected institutions.

5. The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best
endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual
interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations. Suitable
issues for early discussion in the BIC could include transport links,
agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues,
education issues and approaches to EU issues. Suitable arrangements to
be made for practical co-operation on agreed policies.

6. It will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common actions.

Individual members may opt not to participate in such common policies
and common action.
7. The BIC normally will operate by consensus. In relation to decisions on
common policies or common actions, including their means of
implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members participating
in such policies or actions.

8. The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will

provide such financial support as it may require.

9. A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish
Governments in co-ordination with officials of each of the other members.

10. In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will
be open to two or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral
arrangements between them. Such arrangements could include, subject to
the agreement of the members concerned, mechanisms to enable
consultation, co-operation and joint decision-making on matters of mutual
interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions they may
reach. These arrangements will not require the prior approval of the BIC as
a whole and will operate independently of it.

11. The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop

interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish
Interparliamentary Body.

12. The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of
the Council, including a formal published review at an appropriate time
after the Agreement comes into effect, and will contribute as appropriate
to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party
negotiations.

BRITISH-IRISH
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE
1. There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of
relationships. It will establish a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference, which will subsume both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental
Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985
Agreement.
2. The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments to
promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual
interest within the competence of both Governments.

3. The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister

and Taoiseach). Otherwise, Governments will be represented by
appropriate Ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, will
attend as appropriate.

4. All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments. The

Governments will make determined efforts to resolve disagreements
between them. There will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either
Government.

5. In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern

Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in
relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of
the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on
which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These
meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and
cross-border co-operation on non-devolved issues.

6. Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include

facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will
address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in
Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern
Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two
Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters.

7. Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration will

be involved in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews referred to in
paragraph 9 below to discuss non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.

8. The Conference will be supported by officials of the British and Irish

Governments, including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials dealing
with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.

9. The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new British-
Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it,
including a formal published review three years after the Agreement
comes into effect. Representatives of the Northern Ireland Administration
will be invited to express views to the Conference in this context. The
Conference will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall
political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations but will have
no power to override the democratic arrangements set up by this
Agreement.

RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
Human Rights

1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil
rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the
background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm
in particular:

* the right of free political thought;

* the right to freedom and expression of religion;

* the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;

* the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate

means;

* the right to freely choose one's place of residence;

* the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity,

regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;

* the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and

* the right of women to full and equal political participation.United

Kingdom Legislation

United Kingdom Legislation

2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern

Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with
direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention,
including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds
of inconsistency.

3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British

Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory
obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their
functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in
relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age;
marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be
required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement
this obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy
appraisal, including an assessment of impact on relevant categories,
public consultation, public access to information and services, monitoring
and timetables.

4. The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5

below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in
Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European
Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of
Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and
experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual
respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of
esteem, and - taken together with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights
for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the
Commission will be:

* the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies

fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and
ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and

* a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to

equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.

New Institutions in Northern Ireland

5. A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership

from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be
established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, with
an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under
review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making
recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and
promoting awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation
referred to them by the new Assembly; an and conforms with
internationally accepted norms in relation to policing standards;

* the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law

and the community they serve, so:

* they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the law;
* their powers and procedures* the management of public order events
which can impose exceptional demands on policing resources is also
addressed.

The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other

aspects of the criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing,
including the role of the police in prosecution, then it should draw the
attention of the Government to those matters.

The Commission should consult widely, including with non-governmental

expert organisations, and through such focus groups as they consider it
appropriate to establish.The Government proposes to establish the
Commission as soon as possible, with the aim of it star any lay
participation in the criminal justice system;

* mechanisms for addressing law reform;

* the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice

agencies on both parts of the island; and

* the structure and organisation of criminal justice functions that might be

are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit
from the arrangements. The situation in this regard will be kept under
review.

3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time

frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The
review process would provide for the advance of the release dates of
qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the seriousness
of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need to
protect the community. In addition, the intention would be that should the
circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody
two yeas agreement, the Governments will then introduce and support, in
their respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be necessary to give
effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will take whatever ancillary
steps as may be required including the holding of

Review procedures following implementation

5. Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise in
its operation and, where no other institution is affected, take remedial
action in consultation as necessary with the relevant Government or
Governments. It will be for each institution to determine its own
procedures for review.
6. If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which
have implications for another institution, they may review their operations
separately and jointly and agree on remedial action to be taken under their
respective authorities.

7. If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the ran majority
of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they
prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign
united Ireland;

(ii) recognise that it is for the people of ty of its people;

(iv) affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise
their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii)
above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both
Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments
legislation to give effect to that wish;

(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the

people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with
jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of
all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be
founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civilent;

(b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the
section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement shall
have been approved by Refere>

For the Government of Ireland

ANNEX 1
The Agreement Reached

in the Multi-Party Talks

ANNEX 2
Declaration on the Provisions of

Paragraph (vi) of Article 1

In Relationship to Citizenship
The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint
understanding that the term "the people of Northern Ireland" in paragraph
(vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, for the purposes of giving effect
to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the
time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish
citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any
restriction on their period of residence.

OD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2009/goodfriday.pdf
Northern Ireland: Charles Powell minute for MT (Anglo-
Irish Agreement: Speech in the debate) [draft] [released 2015]
http://d56ddea33f0f1bf171c7-
0d3b9304851da04b7a689f475e7e240f.r47.cf2.rackcdn.com/851122%20CDP%20mnt
%20NI%20DEB%20DRAFT%20THCR%202-6-3-116%20PART1%20f51.pdf

Supplementary Agreement between the Government of the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia concerning the
Anglo-Australian Optical
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273277/67
67.pdf
Ireland and the EU- A History - DFA - Minister for Foreign .
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/irelandintheeu/irela
nd-in-the-eu-history.pdf

Ireland country brief

Overview
Ireland, also called the Republic of Ireland, has a population of just
over 4.7 million (2016). The country comprises 26 of the 32
counties that constitute the island on which it is located. The
remaining six counties in North-East Ulster are part of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The Republic of Ireland was founded through the conclusion of the
Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. The Constitution of 1937 and the
Republic of Ireland Act 1948 severed Ireland's last formal links with
the UK. Ireland remained neutral during the Second World War and
does not belong to any military alliance. Ireland became a member
of the United Nations (UN) in 1955 and joined what is now the
European Union (EU) in 1973.
Ireland's international engagement was given new impetus when it
chaired the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) in 2012, held the rotating EU Presidency from January to
June 2013, and was elected to the UN Human Rights Council (2013-
2015). Ireland is seeking a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council for the 2021-22 term.

Political overview
System of Government
Ireland is a republic, with a system of parliamentary democracy.
The National Parliament (Oireachtas) consists of the President and
two houses: the Dil ireann (the House of Representatives) and
the Seanad ireann (the Senate).
The President is directly elected for a seven-year term. Michael D
Higgins was elected President in October 2011. Presidents can
serve a maximum of two terms, consecutive or otherwise. The
office of the President is largely ceremonial.
The two Houses of the Oireachtas, the Dil and the Seanad, make
laws. A general election to elect members to the Dil must take
place within five years of the previous election (the next one must
take place no later than 12 April 2021). There are 166 members in
the Dil who are elected directly via a system of proportional
representation. The Dil elects the Prime Minister, known as the
Taoiseach (Tee shock). The President appoints the Taoiseach and
then the Taoiseach nominates the other members of the
Government for the approval of the Dil. The Government has the
power to appoint Ministers of State (junior ministers) directly. The
Deputy Prime Minister is known as the Tnaiste (Tawn-ish-ta).
The Seanad (Senate) has limited powers and largely functions as a
review body for the Dil. It can delay, but not block, legislation. The
Seanad has 60 members, none of whom is directly elected. Eleven
are directly appointed by the Taoiseach, six are elected by
graduates of certain Irish universities, and 43 are elected from five
panels of nominees, known as vocational panels consisting of
members of the Dil, senators and local councillors.

Recent political developments

The last Irish general election, held on 26 February 2016, initially
proved inconclusive with no party able to form government.
However, on 6 May 2016 the centre-right Fine Gael party and a
group of independents managed to form a minority government
after agreeing a 'confidence and supply' arrangement with the
Fianna Fil party. Following this, Mr Enda Kenny was re-elected
Prime Minister (Taoiseach).

Major parties
Ireland's two main political parties, Fianna Fil and Fine Gael, do
not divide on a right/left basis on political, economic or social
issues. Both are centre-right and have their roots in differing
community attitudes to the 1921 Treaty of Independence (from the
UK). Fine Gael represents the tradition that accepted the treaty as
a stepping stone to an eventual republic of the whole island.
Fianna Fil represents the tradition that rejected the treaty
because the present six counties of Northern Ireland were
excluded from the outset. These traditions are still reflected in
slightly different approaches towards Northern Ireland but there is
bipartisan support for the peace process and the 1998 Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement.

EU/European issues
Active participation in EU policy-making is a priority for the Irish
Government. Ireland joined the European Community in 1973 and
seeks to coordinate its foreign policy with other EU Member
States. Ireland held the rotating EU presidency for the period
January-July 2013, the seventh time it had done so.
The Irish constitution requires that European treaties go to a
national referendum and this has resulted in a high level of debate
on Ireland's role in the EU and the future of the EU. In 2008 the
Irish electorate rejected the Lisbon Treaty. After receiving specific
assurances from the European Commission, the Lisbon Treaty was
ratified in a second referendum in 2009.
Northern Ireland Peace Process
In December 1999 the UK Parliament devolved power to the
Northern Ireland Assembly and its Executive Committee of
Ministers. The Northern Ireland Assembly was established as a
result of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 10 April 1998. The
Agreement was the outcome of a long process of talks between the
political parties of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish
Governments. The Belfast Agreement significantly reduced
terrorist activity and delivered tangible, community-level benefits.
Australia retains an interest in the peace and reconciliation
process through its role as an observer at meetings of the
International Fund for Ireland.

Economic overview
Ireland's economy, while relatively small, is modern and trade-
focused. Industrial activity is focused on pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, computer hardware and software, food products,
beverages and brewing, and medical devices. Ireland's low rate of
corporation tax has seen many multinational companies relocate
to Ireland in recent years, particularly in the IT and pharmaceutical
sectors. Ireland's principal export markets are the United States,
the UK and Belgium.

Bilateral relationship
Australia has maintained an embassy in Dublin since 1 September
1946. 2016 therefore marked the 70th anniversary of diplomatic
relations between the two countries.
Australia and Ireland have a number of bilateral agreements
covering areas such as taxation, social security, extradition,
medical treatment for travellers and working holidays for young
people. Australia and Ireland signed a bilateral social security
agreement in 2005 to give improved social security protection to
people who have lived and/or worked in both Australia and Ireland.

People-to-people links
The Irish were among the first European settlers in Australia and
contributed substantially to the development of contemporary
Australian society. Irish migration has been almost continuous
throughout the period of European settlement of Australia. In the
2011 Census, nearly 2.1 million Australians indicated they had
some Irish ancestry.
Some tens of thousands of Irish people may be visiting Australia at
any one time, including through working holiday visa arrangements.
In the year ending October 2016, more than 57,500 Irish residents
visited Australia.
Although Ireland is not a major source country for international
students, both governments are supportive of the development of
bilateral research and development and academic links. The Irish
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS)
has developed a relationship with its counterpart in Australia, the
Academy for the Humanities. University College Dublin hosts the
Keith Cameron Chair of Australian History, which was established
in 1985.

High level visits

Recent high level visits and meetings include:
Mr Tom Hayes TD, then Minister of State at the Department of
Agriculture, Food and Marine with Special Responsibility for
Food, Forestry Horticulture and Food Safety, visited Australia
in March 2015 for St Patrick's Day celebrations, and to
promote trade, investment and tourism, and meet Irish
community groups, political representatives, and business
leaders.
Mr James Deenihan TD, Minister of State for Diaspora Affairs,
led an engineering and construction mission to Australia in
November 2014.

Bilateral economic and trade relationship

In 2015-16, Ireland was Australia's 23rd largest goods and services
trading partner (valued at $4.2 billion two-way). Total merchandise
exports to Ireland were valued at $71 million and total merchandise
imports at $2.4 billion. Australia's principal exports were
medicaments and wine. Australia's services exports to Ireland in
2015-16 were valued at $534 million and services imports from
Ireland at $1.2 billion. Recreational travel remains a significant
component of Australian services exports to Ireland.
Constitution Treaties Declaration
http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm

In 2015, Ireland's total investment in Australia was valued at $18.4

billion, while Australia's investment in Ireland was valued at $10.1
billion.

THE DRAFT EU - en.euabc.com

http://en.euabc.com/upload/rfConstitution_en.pdf

THETREATYESTABLISHINGCONSTITUTIONFOEUROPETHEEUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION...AttheendoftheNiceTreatyadocument...speakaboutthefamousNice
Declaration

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The Treaty establishing a Constitution for

Europe:
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https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Res
earch/Europe/bn-dpjun04.pdf
TreatiesoftheEuropean...FundamentalRightsintheEuropeanUnion

The role of the Charter after Irelands defeated no Lisbon Treaty

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/554168/E
PRS_IDA(2015)554168_EN.pdf

From EU Constitution to the Irish referendums on the Lisbon ...

theIrishreferendumsontheLisbonTreatyByJensPeterBondeTheEUConstitution,theLisbonTreaty
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THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACTS, 1939 - 1998

Emergency Powers Act 1939,
ire'sneutralityduringWorldWar...EmergencyPowersActLawpassedbytheDilin...and
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White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

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thattheEuropeanUnion

http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Politics/documents/2004/09/09/EU_white_paper.pdf

CENSORSHIP OF PUBLICATIONS ACTS, 1929 TO 1967 REGISTER OF

PROHIBITED PUBLICATIONS 1. Alphabetical list of books
prohibited on the gro und that they were indecent or obscene
(correct to 31st December, 2012
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Register%20of%20Prohibited
%20Publications%202012.pdf/Files/Register%20of%20Prohibited
%20Publications%202012.pdf

IrishStatuteBook1922toDate
HereontheIrishGovernmentWebsite,www.irlgov.ie,youcan
viewthetextofthevariousActsandStatutoryInstrumentsissued
bytheIrishGovernment.Ofparticularinteresttousherearethose
issuedbetween1939and1946,includingtheEmergencyPowers
ActandOffensesAgainsttheStateAct.SomeAct'sofparticular
interest19391945are
No.13/1939:OFFENCESAGAINSTTHESTATEACT,1939
No.21/1939:AIRRAIDPRECAUTIONSACT,1939No.
28/1939:EMERGENCYPOWERSACT,1939

TreasonAct,1939
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1939/act/10/enacted/en/print.html
?printonload=true
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Denmark and the Ratification of the

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2189.pdf
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http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jun/
lisbonireland.pdf

National Governments and EU Referendums: Sorcerers or Apprentices? (February

2009), viewed on 13 June 2011
http://maurits.myweb.uga.edu/Research/ReferendumDebates.pdf
ReferendumsArguments for and against

Claimed positive features of referendums

13. Evidence in favour of referendums and citizens' initiatives (a related
device which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 4) included:

THAT REFERENDUMS ENHANCE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

14. Witnesses referred to arguments that referendums enhanced democracy

by giving voters greater opportunities for involvement. Caroline Morris,
Senior Research Fellow, Centre of British Constitutional Law and History,
Department of Law, King's College London, cited academic arguments that
"referendums are a 'first-best' form of democracy for which representative
democracy (the 'second-best' form) attempts to substitute" (p 127).
Professor Stephen Tierney, Professor of Constitutional Theory, University of
Edinburgh, asserted that referendums could be seen as "'pure democracy' ...
unmediated by representatives; a symbolic reminder that democratic
authority finds its legitimacy in the consent of the people" (p 48). Professor
Graham Smith, Professor of Politics, Centre for Citizenship, Globalisation and
Governance, University of Southampton, argued that referendums offered
the potential "to reshape the political division of labour between citizens and
legislators" (p 15).

15. Professor Bogdanor thought that it was "illusory" in the modern world
"to believe that you can confine legislative matters solely to
parliamentarians" (Q 78). The Government acknowledged arguments that
referendums could ensure that the public are consulted on significant issues
(p 94).

16. Peter Browning argued that "at a time when public trust in this system is
probably lower than ever in living memory", referendums could help restore
faith in British democracy (p 112). Nigel Smith made a similar point (p 144).
Unlock Democracy argued that referendums could help to counteract the
sense of cynicism and powerlessness amongst voters (p 18). The
Government stated that it could be argued that referendums could help
strengthen confidence in the UK's democratic system (p 94).

17. Professor Robert Hazell, Director, Constitution Unit, University College

London, argued that referendums could be "an important legitimising
mechanism", by demonstrating that a policy has the specific support of the
public (Q 5), as did Professor Michael Gallagher, Professor of Comparative
Politics, Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin (p 120).
Dr Eoin O'Malley, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University,
stated that referendums could give a decision "democratic weight" (p 129).
Peter Browning suggested that the 1975 referendum on whether the UK
should remain in the European Community had helped to ensure popular
acceptance of the UK's membership, but that the Government's failure to
hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty had undermined its legitimacy in the
eyes of some sections of the British people (p 113).
18. The Government stated that it could be argued that referendums could
provide the government of the day with a mandate to undertake change, and
could provide Parliament with an indication of public opinion on a given issue
(p 94). The Rt Hon Michael Wills MP, Minister of State, Ministry of Justice,
said that referendums could "legitimise a significant change" (Q 229).

THAT REFERENDUMS CAN BE A "WEAPON OF ENTRENCHMENT"

19. In the opinion of some witnesses, an important feature of referendums

was that they make it difficult to reverse a policy that had demonstrable
public support. Unlock Democracy asserted that they were one of the few
ways under the UK's constitutional settlement that Acts of Parliament could
be entrenched: "This is not to say that the Acts are codified, just that if a
measure has been endorsed in a referendum it would not be politically
possible to repeal it without a further referendum. This is particularly
significant as it ensures that constitutional changes, such as devolution, have
some time to establish themselves rather than being subject to an immediate
repeal if there was a change of government" (p 18).

20. Likewise, Dr Andrew Blick, Federal Trust for Education and Research,
argued that referendums had helped to place new institutions such as the
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, as well as the Northern Ireland
peace process, on a stable footing (p 110).

THAT REFERENDUMS CAN "SETTLE" AN ISSUE

21. Some witnesses argued that referendums were able to "settle" a debate
on a controversial issue, at least for a period. Peter Kellner, President,
YouGov, argued that the 1975 referendum on membership of the European
Community "put to bed" the issue "for a generation" because "the opponents
of British membership accepted that verdict for a period and without the
referendum it might have been re-opened" (Q 45).

22. Professor Gallagher referred to the outcome of the Irish referendum on

divorce in 1995, when divorce was approved very narrowly and then "ceased
overnight to be a political issue; opponents immediately folded their tents
following this decision in a way that they would have been very unlikely to do
had the decision been made by Parliament alone" (p 124).

THAT REFERENDUMS CAN BE A "PROTECTIVE DEVICE"

23. Witnesses saw the value of referendums as a "protective device", a

safeguard against controversial decisions being taken unless and until public
support could be demonstrated. Professor Hazell opined that this was the
case in Northern Ireland, where people have been told since 1973 that Irish
unity will not occur save with the consent of the people (Q 5).
24. Professor Bogdanor asserted that the key to the referendum's
constitutional role was that it should constrain the government of the day. He
argued, for example, that it would now be very difficult for a government to
avoid having a referendum on a devolution matter (Q 74). Peter Browning
argued that it would also be almost impossible for the UK to adopt the
European single currency without holding a referendum (p 113).

THAT REFERENDUMS ENHANCE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

25. Other witnesses opined that referendums enhanced public engagement

with the democratic and political process. Dr Daniel A. Smith, Associate
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, asserted that
by offering the opportunity to participate directly in policy-making, they
made the public more likely to participate in political activity, "as they
understand that their participation in the electoral process has real policy
implications" (p 141).

26. Caroline Morris suggested that referendums could combat "political

alienation and malaise" (p 127), and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Edinburgh Law
School, argued that an appropriately well-structured system of direct
democracy could "create incentives for engagement" (p 139). Professor
George Williams, Anthony Mason Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New
South Wales, argued that referendums had helped "to generate popular
ownership and legitimacy in Australia's constitutional structure" (p 150).

THAT REFERENDUMS PROMOTE VOTER EDUCATION

27. Some witnesses recommended referendums for the debates that they
could engender to promote political knowledge, as with Unlock Democracy's
mention of "the opportunity for public education and discourse on a
contentious issue" (p 22). Dr O'Malley stated that referendums allowed "the
people and political class to focus on an issue in quite a concentrated way",
thus enabling citizens "to learn quite deeply about the topic" (p 129).
Dr Daniel A. Smith reported that research into experience in the US,
Switzerland and Canada showed that direct democratic tools enhanced
political knowledge of the issue in question amongst citizens (p 142).

28. Professor Bogdanor argued that the 1975 referendum on the European
Community had raised awareness of the issues in question (Q 78). Likewise,
Professor Hazell argued that the referendum campaigns in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland raised awareness about the proposals for devolved
assemblies (Q 5).

THAT VOTERS ARE ABLE TO MAKE REASONED JUDGMENTS

29. In response to those who queried whether referendums were a suitable

vehicle by which to determine policy on complex issues,[8] some witnesses
asserted that voters are well-equipped to make reasoned judgments on
issues put before them at referendums. Peter Facey, Director, Unlock
Democracy, argued that voters were "perfectly capable" of making a complex
decision, so long as there was adequate public education (Q 42). Professor
Gallagher suggested that, if pushed too far, "the arguments highlighting the
supposed incompetence of voters to decide on specific policy issues ... can
become an argument against allowing people to vote at elections" (p 121).

30. Jenny Watson, Chairman of the Electoral Commission, considered that

"most things can be explained and distilled down to a reasonably simple
premise" (Q 193). Michael Wills MP agreed that "complex technical issues can
with effort, hard work, rigour, intelligence be distilled down to certain key
principles and choices ... it would be a terribly retrograde step to take the
view that some issues are just too complicated to bother the people's heads
with. That would be a return to an aristocratic principle of government that
we have, fortunately, long since rejected in this country" (Q 238).

THAT REFERENDUMS ARE POPULAR WITH VOTERS

31. Some witnesses suggested that referendums were popular with the
public. Unlock Democracy asserted that this was so, because they are seen
as a fair way of resolving difficult or significant issues (p 18). Professor
Bogdanor asserted that studies of the international use of referendums
showed that people welcomed the opportunity to participate so long as they
thought that their participation would have some result and was not a
"talking shop" (Q 85).

32. Professor Tierney said that while the turnout on ordinary referendums
might be low, evidence suggests that referendums on "big constitutional
issues", such as the Belfast Agreement, the Danish referendum on the euro,
and referendums on independence in Montenegro and Quebec, produced a
high turnout (Q 90).

THAT REFERENDUMS COMPLEMENT REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

33. A number of witnesses stated that referendums could complement

representative democracy. Professor Bogdanor argued that "the dichotomy
between 'representative' and 'direct' democracy is ... highly misleading. For
the referendum, even in Switzerland, is used not to replace, but to
supplement representative democracy. There is little danger that it will come
to subvert parliamentary government" (p 45). Professor Michael Saward,
Professor of Politics, Open University, opined that enhancing the role of the
referendum could enhance representative and parliamentary democracy
(p 15). Professor Gallagher stated that "we cannot point to any case where
the referendum has led to the collapse of a democratic system ... If used
sparingly ... and in a regulated fashion, the referendum can enhance rather
than subvert representative democracy" (p 120).
34. A number of witnesses pointed to international experience, for instance
in Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Ireland, where, it was argued,
referendums and representative democracy successfully coexist (QQ 10, 54,
pp 19, 133).[9]

35. Michael Wills MP told us that it was a "fundamental proposition that

referendums ... should not be any kind of replacement for representative
democracy; they are an augmentation of it in circumstances where there are
fundamental changes" (Q 217).

Claimed negative features of referendums

36. Witnesses recited a number of drawbacks to the use of referendums:

THAT REFERENDUMS ARE A TACTICAL DEVICE

37. A principal objection to referendums was that they may be used as a

tactical device by the government of the day. Professor David Butler,
Emeritus Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, told us that
referendums in the UK "are only going to happen when the Government of
the day wants it or when it would be too embarrassing (because of past
promises) to get out of it. Normally they will have a referendum because
they think they are going to win it and they will not have it if they are not
going to win it. They will just dodge the issue. It is a matter ... of straight
politics" (Q 5).

38. Steve Richards, Chief Political Commentator, The Independent, said that
"a leader does not dare hold a referendum unless they are convinced they
are going to win it, so they are tools for leaders to avoid decisions ... It looks
as if they are being rather noble in giving powers away from themselves to
take decisions and giving them to the voters to do it. The motives for holding
them are far more complicated than that" (QQ 123, 131).

39. Peter Kellner argued that the decision to hold the 1975 European
Communities referendum "was a constitutional outrage ... it was wholly to do
with holding the Labour Party together" (Q 46). Other witnesses made similar
points (QQ 84, 125). Professor Bogdanor asserted that the offer of the 1979
devolution referendums was made for tactical purposes in order to overcome
backbench opposition in Parliament (Q 79).

40. Steve Richards argued that the 1997 Labour manifesto "was almost like
a halfway bridge to power and then a lot of the awkward decisions and
debates took the form of promises of referendumsthe euro, Scottish
Parliament, London mayor, electoral reform" (Q 122). He also told us that
the decision to hold a referendum on Scottish devolution was only made
because Tony Blair, observing that a referendum had been proposed on the
euro, "did not think he could go through an election campaign with that
contradiction ... it was not that he thought out of principle 'We must do this';
he was worried about the contradictions in a Labour election campaign"
(Q 129).

41. Michael Wills MP opined that the referendum had been used in the UK as
a "political tool", but did not see anything wrong with that, because "politics
can be a noble profession; it does, at its best, represent the battle of
competing values and ideals and ideologies" (Q 236).

THAT REFERENDUMS ARE DOMINATED BY ELITE GROUPS

42. Some witnesses argued that referendums tend to be dominated by elite

groups, including politicians, the media, and wealthy individuals, rather than
"ordinary" citizens. Dr Uwe Serdlt, Centre for Research on Direct Democracy
(c2d), asserted that "the arsenal of direct democracy is an institutional
weapon for organized interests (political parties, interest groups, employer's
and employee's associations) and not for the people as such" (p 137). Peter
Browning warned that referendums were rarely if ever free from influence by
politicians and minority groups (p 112). Dr Blick opined that referendums
could give extra influence to the media and commercial interests (p 110).
Steve Richards stated that "the British media is not necessarily the most
reliable institution to mediate on the complexities of these issues ... I do not
think a referendum on anything to do with Europe, for example, will be fairly
reported" (QQ 122, 147). Michael Wills MP said that "the whole system can
be hijacked by populist and often very wealthy, very powerful people who
can afford to run these campaigns" (Q 226).

43. Several witnesses cited examples. Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Executive

Director, Democratic Audit, highlighted the Californian experience of citizens'
initiatives (see Chapter 4), as an example of how referendums can
"effectively be hijacked by organised interests, particularly those which have
access to substantial financial resources (i.e. private corporations, political
parties and large campaign organisations)" (p 36). Professor Butler referred
to the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, where "a leading,
flamboyant, rich man charged in and moved opinion really quite substantially
in the opinion poll evidence and got a 'no' vote" (Q 16).

THAT REFERENDUMS CAN HAVE A DAMAGING EFFECT ON MINORITY

GROUPS

44. Professor Gallagher stated that referendums are accused of allowing

majorities to override the rights of minorities (p 120). Caroline Morris also
warned of "the danger that minority rights may be overridden by populist
sentiment" (p 127).

THAT REFERENDUMS ARE A "CONSERVATIVE DEVICE"

45. Some witnesses viewed referendums less as a "protective device" than

as a "conservative device": a block on progress. Dr Blick asserted that in the
UK, referendums were most often conceived of as "a means of placing a
brake on certain developments", such as European integration (p 110). Steve
Richards told us that, with referendums, "the status quo can often seem
more reassuring and less threatening than ... change" (Q 151).

46. Peter Kellner pointed out that, in Switzerland, women were not given the
vote until 1971, because male voters had rejected votes for women in a
referendum in 1959 (Q 43). Professor Williams stated that the Australian
system, where a majority of states, as well as a majority of voters, are
required to vote in favour of a change in order for a constitutional
amendment to be carried, has made change to the constitution extremely
difficult, if not impossible (p 150).[10]

THAT REFERENDUMS DO NOT "SETTLE" AN ISSUE

47. Some witnesses argued that referendums did not "settle" the issue in
question. Dr Wilks-Heeg pointed out that the 1970s referendums in Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland had not brought to an end Irish, Scottish or
Welsh nationalism, but rather, the issues were revisited in referendums in
the 1990s, with further referendums planned in Scotland and Wales (p 37).

48. Peter Facey told us that "different generations will take different
decisions, in the same way that we do not just have one election and then
expect us all to live with it for the next 50 or 60 years" (Q 45). Steve
Richards noted that the 1975 European Community referendum was only
binding on the Labour Party's position for four years before they wished to
change it (Q 125).

49. Dr Wilks-Heeg also pointed out that, in the case of other EU states that
have held referendums on EU treaties, governments had been able to force
repeat referendums to get the result they wanted (p 37). The two Irish
referendums on the Lisbon Treaty are a case in point.

THAT REFERENDUMS FAIL TO DEAL WITH COMPLEX ISSUES

50. Several witnesses argued that referendums were not an appropriate

means by which to take decisions on complex issues. Dr Blick suggested that
referendums could oversimplify a complex issue into a simple "yes" or "no"
option (p 110). Professor Tierney stated that whereas "elected
representatives bring expertise and time to problems that ordinary citizens
don't have; they may be more detached and hence objective; and they see
the bigger picture of how different issues inter-relate ... a referendum
addresses single issues one by one without proper regard to this larger
canvass" (p 48). Steve Richards was concerned that in issues of complexity
the arguments and technical detail could get lost. He stated that Parliament
was in a better position to make such decisions (QQ 122, 138).
51. Dr O'Malley suggested that it is unrealistic to expect ordinary citizens to
be interested in or qualified to have informed opinions on important
constitutional issues (p 130). Caroline Morris argued that the New Zealand
experience of citizens' initiated referendums[11] demonstrated how
referendums were not well suited to determining complex questions of law or
policy (p 127).

THAT REFERENDUMS TEND NOT TO BE ABOUT THE ISSUE IN QUESTION

52. Some witnesses argued that referendum campaigns could become

dominated by peripheral issues. Dr O'Malley suggested that when issues are
too complex for voters to understand, other issues are projected on to the
actual questions. He cited the Lisbon Treaty referendums in Ireland, where
abortion and conscription became major issues (p 129). Peter Browning
asserted that a referendum is often used to express a view on the governing
party rather than the issue in question (p 115). Lord Fraser of Carmyllie said
that referendums could be "a barometer on the attractiveness of the political
party at any given time". He cited the 1997 referendum on Scottish
devolution (when he was Director of the "no" campaign), which, he argued,
voters saw as "a second opportunity, in less than six months, to indicate why
they thought the Tory Party was unpopular" (Q 101). Daran Hill pointed out
that the "yes" campaign for the 1997 Welsh devolution referendum (for
which he acted as National Co-ordinator), "had an aeroplane flying across
South Wales trailing a banner which said, 'Vote Yes, Vote Blair', which really
had nothing to do with the question being posed at all! It chimed in with the
political mood" (Q 101).

THAT VOTERS SHOW LITTLE DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN REFERENDUMS

53. Other witnesses argued that there was little public appetite for
referendums to be used. Peter Browning stated that while people may be
prepared to vote every four or five years, even then turnout is falling. On
past evidence of referendum turnout in the UK, he thought that it was
doubtful whether voters would turn out to vote in similar numbers as for
elections. He stated that low turnout would weaken the legitimacy of the
result (p 112). Professor Butler cited the rapid decline in turnout in
Switzerland, often viewed as the European exemplar of direct democracy
(Q 6).[12]

54. Professor Michael Marsh, Professor of Comparative Political Behaviour,

Trinity College Dublin, told us that one of the difficulties with referendums is
that voters "do not necessarily want to know, they have much more
important things on their mind ... It does not fit too well with some of our
notions about democratic theory but I think it is like youth is wasted on the
young, democracy is sometimes wasted on the people" (Q 174).

THAT REFERENDUMS ARE COSTLY

55. Evidence was received about the cost of referendums. Professor Hazell
pointed out that a national referendum costs about the same as holding a
General Election, about 120 million (Q 7).

56. Nigel Smith pointed out that referendums cost money and take time
(p 143), and Caroline Morris also referred to "logistical difficulties" (p 127).
Unlock Democracy stated that referendums are "costly in terms of money,
time and political attention and the use of such resources needs to be
carefully considered" (p 25). Dr Helena Catt, former New Zealand Electoral
Commissioner and former Associate Professor, Auckland University, told us
that referendums are "very expensive to do properly and if you are not going
to spend the money on it, it is not worth doing it" (Q 157).

THAT REFERENDUMS UNDERMINE REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

57. A number of witnesses thought that referendums undermined, or had

the potential to undermine, representative democracy. Peter Kellner said that
"one has to be very careful about the relationship of referendums to
parliamentary sovereignty and to the principles of deliberative democracy
that underpin parliamentary sovereignty ... I would not couch the argument
against referendums in terms of some cataclysm for parliamentary
democracy but I do believe it weakens parliamentary democracy"
(QQ 41, 54). Steve Richards said that evidence suggested that referendums
undermine the parliamentary process (Q 123).

58. Peter Browning stated that the sovereignty of Parliament "is certainly
threatened by the use of referendums. Referendums put the people before
parliament. The sovereignty of parliament becomes the sovereignty of the
people ... Introducing direct democracy into the political system ...
challenges the indirect, representative democracy that has been the essence
of UK democracy. If the people vote one way, their representatives another,
who should prevail, who is sovereign?" (pp 112-3).

Conclusion

59. Michael Wills MP told us that he was "really alarmed sometimes when I
hear some politicians speak as if measures of direct democracy are panaceas
for all the political challenges that we face. They are not" (Q 266). Professor
Marsh told us that "there are all sorts of apparent strengths ... The
unfortunate thing is that on the whole it does not do any of those things and
quite often it leaves you worse off than you were before" (Q 157).

60. Dr Wilks-Heeg argued that the appeal of referendums was

understandable, but that "they must not be seen as a magic bullet. More
wide-ranging work would first be necessary to reform the defects in our
constitutional arrangements" (p 39).
61. Nine national or regional referendums have been held in the UK since
1973, although only one has been held on a UK-wide basis. Referendums
may become a part of the UK's constitutional system. Some witnesses stated
that once referendums are in the democratic bloodstream, they are unlikely
ever to be removed (Q 62, pp 136, 144).

62. The balance of the evidence that we have heard leads us to the
conclusion that there are significant drawbacks to the use of
referendums. In particular, we regret the ad hoc manner in which
referendums have been used, often as a tactical device, by the
government of the day. Referendums may become a part of the UK's
political and constitutional practice. Where possible, cross-party
agreement should be sought as to the circumstances in which it is
appropriate for referendums to be used.

63. It is therefore necessary to consider when it is appropriate for

referendums to be held and what laws and regulatory framework should then
apply

If a referendum is un-British, so is lying

By Philip Johnston
12:01AM BST 03 Sep 2007

Is the concept of a referendum un-British? Since we have had half a

dozen in the past 40 years, that might sound an odd question; but it
was, once, widely considered inimical to our idea of parliamentary
democracy to put issues directly to the people by plebiscite, rather
than through their elected representatives in the House of Commons.
In 1975, the Conservatives, then led by Margaret Thatcher, were
opposed to a referendum on Britain's continued membership of the
Common Market. As she notes in her autobiography, The Path to
Power, the referendum motion was tabled in Parliament by the
Labour government just a few weeks after she became Opposition
leader.
"The position I inherited from Ted was that of outright opposition to
the whole idea of a referendum on the grounds that it was an
unconstitutional and un-British practice.

"There was not time to change this even if I wanted to... It was,
moreover, a rich source of political advantage to attack the
referendum as a constitutional monstrosity devised simply to
keep the Labour Cabinet together."
A disdain for referendums is still held by many senior Conservatives.
However, Mrs Thatcher was astute enough to recognise that this
might not be a position that would hold for ever.
In her speech to the Commons, she said it might be necessary to call
for a referendum on an issue that divided the nation, but not the
parties, making a general election an inappropriate instrument for
settling it.
As she also pointed out, referendums are not wholly alien to the
British system. They were advocated, if not used, in connection with
Irish Home Rule, the powers of the House of Lords in 1911, and the
imposition of food tariffs. In 1945, Winston Churchill considered a
referendum to extend the life of Parliament until Japan was defeated.
In the opinion of A V Dicey, the great constitutionalist: "The
referendum is the people's veto; the nation is sovereign and may well
decree that the constitution shall not be changed without the direct
sanction of the nation."
As Lady Thatcher has since discovered, remaining in the Common
Market was a great constitutional issue that merited a referendum,
even if it was proffered by Labour as a device for bridging deep
Cabinet divisions over membership.
There was also a case for a referendum over the Maastricht Treaty in
1993 but the Conservative government opposed it, as did Labour,
though MPs on both sides voted in favour of conducting one.
Labour has since staged referendums for Scottish and Welsh
devolution, to endorse the Good Friday agreement, for regional
government in the North East and even to ask Londoners whether
they wanted an elected mayor, hardly a matter of great constitutional
moment. But what they all had in common is not that they were
constitutional reforms, but that they involved a transfer of power, as
does the new EU treaty.
None the less, Tony Blair's decision to concede a referendum over
the proposed treaty after so implacably opposing one was probably
the most stunning U-turn of his premiership.
In the months before his announcement in April 2004, Mr Blair was
adamant. He said: "There will not be a referendum. The reason is that
the constitution does not fundamentally change the relationship
between the EU and the UK... There is a proper place where this
constitution can be debated. It is Parliament."
But Mr Blair changed his mind under pressure from senior ministers,
including Gordon Brown and Jack Straw. The key point is that these
ministers agreed to a referendum even though they continued to
argue that the treaty would not fundamentally change the relationship
between Britain and the EU.
That is still their view. Yet now they are denying the country one on
precisely the same grounds.
Planning for a referendum was sufficiently advanced during the last
Parliament that the Government brought forward legislation. During
the Second Reading debate, Mr Straw, then Foreign Secretary,
dismissed "myths" about the proposed constitution: "It does not hand
control of our borders, foreign policy or Armed Forces to the
European Union.
"It does not take away our seat at the United Nations, and nor does it
replace Her Majesty the Queen as Head of State... The treaty will set
a stable, predictable and limiting framework for the European Union."
Despite all these apparent safeguards, the Government still came to
the conclusion that it should be put to a referendum and included this
promise in its manifesto, as did the other parties. Yet now it maintains
that, since the treaty was "renegotiated" this year, a referendum is not
needed.
Ed Balls, the Schools Secretary, said yesterday: "I don't think the
British people want some big debate about Europe.... I don't think the
treaty is a big change." Even ministers who were most strongly in
favour of a public vote three years ago are said to be arguing against
one. No wonder people are cynical about politics.
What the British people want is evident from the many thousands of
readers who have signed our petition and from the YouGov poll
carried in The Daily Telegraph today. A substantial majority want a
referendum and do not accept the Government's protestations that
the treaty fails the accepted test for a referendum - that it amounts to
constitutional change involving a transfer of power.
Mr Brown is said to be considering a snap autumn election which,
should he win, he would take as a mandate for pushing the treaty
through Parliament without a referendum. This, then, is no longer a
question about procedural niceties; it is about trust in our political
leaders.
Labour conceded the principle of a referendum on precisely the same
basis that it now denies one. How can we leave an issue of this
importance to a general election when promises made in the last one
have been so casually tossed aside? If a referendum is un-British,
then so is lying to the voters.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/per
sonalview/3642414/Ifareferendumis
unBritishsoislying.html
This House would hold a referendum on any new EU treaty
The European Union (EU) is the economic and political partnership of 27

member states, primarily based in Europe. Based on precedence set from

treaties signed in the wake of the Second World War, the European Union

established itself under its current title in 1993. Since this time it has grown in

size and undergone several constitutional changes, most notably the Treaty of

Lisbon, which came into force in 2009. Up until now the process through

which proposed amendments are accepted has not been uniform. For example

a draft Constitution drawn up in amended form at a European Summit in June

2004 caused a divide when some countries ratified the treaty through national

parliaments while others opted for a referendum within their country. As a

result the Treaty was rejected by popular vote in France and the Netherlands,

and abandoned. In October 2007 the idea was again resurrected in the Lisbon

Treaty that proposed similar reforms to the draft Constitution in order to

streamline the workings of the European Union. However unlike the Reform

Treaty, when the Lisbon Treaty needed to be ratified many member states

including UK, Poland and the Czech Republic that had previously decided on

holding a referendum passed the Treaty through national parliaments, leaving

only Ireland and Denmark committed to holding a referendum on these

important constitutional changes. In France and the Netherlands the decision

to not repeat the public vote was broadly accepted, in spite of the previous no

vote. However in Britain Gordon Brown's decision to not hold a referendum

was met with heavy criticism. Proponents of holding a referendum for

constitutional changes to the EU suggest that such important changes, which

affect national sovereignty, need to be ratified by public vote in order to

remain democratic. However opponents argue that referendums are ineffective

and that the public know little about EU constitutional issues and therefore

would not vote effectively. This debate will not cover whether or not reform

itself is beneficial, but only the vehicle through which reform should be agreed

upon.

EU leaders sign landmark treaty

EU leaders have signed a treaty in the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, that is
expected to greatly alter the way the 27-nation body operates.

The treaty creates an EU president and a more powerful foreign policy chief.

The document, signed at a ceremony at the city's historic Jeronimos Monastery, also
scraps veto powers in many policy areas.

It is a replacement for the EU constitution, which was abandoned following French

and Dutch opposition.

EU leaders insist that the two texts are in no way equivalent.

But the Lisbon treaty incorporates some of the draft constitution's key reforms, and
several governments face domestic pressure over the document.

In a speech before the signing, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso
called on European leaders to use the treaty to make freedom, prosperity and
solidarity an everyday reality for all European citizens.

"From this old continent, a new Europe is born," he said.

Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates, whose country holds the rotating EU
presidency, said the treaty would create a more modern, efficient and democratic
union.

"The world needs a stronger Europe," he said.

The leaders signed the treaty, translated into the EU's 23 official languages, using
specially engraved silver fountain pens as a choir sang Beethoven's Ode to Joy.
UK signing

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown signed the treaty later in the day after missing the
ceremony, citing a prior engagement in the British parliament.

Foreign Secretary David Miliband attended the signing ceremony.

The UK's opposition Conservatives accused Mr Brown of "not having the guts" to sign
the treaty, which is politically controversial in Britain, in public.

Having started this year with a celebration of its 50th birthday, the EU hopes the
signing of the Lisbon treaty will end the serious mid-life crisis brought about by the
death of the constitution, the BBC's Oana Lungescu reports.

There will be a lot of relief, said a senior European diplomat, but also some
apprehension about what happens next.

Ireland is the only country planning to hold a referendum, but most voters there
seem either undecided or indifferent.

Parliaments in Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark are also expected to give a
turbulent reception to the 250-page text.

However, Germany, France and Poland have pledged to be among the first to ratify
it, so that the new reforms can come into force in 2009 as planned.

The treaty is a slimmed-down version of the European constitution, with a more

modest name and without any reference to EU symbols such as the flag and anthem.

It is meant to ease decision-making, by scrapping national vetoes in some 50 policy

areas, including sensitive ones such as police and judicial co-operation.

There will also be a foreign policy chief, controlling a big budget and thousands of
diplomats and officials, and a permanent EU president appointed for up to five years.

But some already fear that instead of giving Europe a strong single voice in the
world, the new posts will only generate more rivalry, our correspondent adds.

The Treaty of Lisbon is the same as the rejected constitution. Only the
format has been changed to avoid referendums.

http://www.tuks.nl/docs/From_EU_Constitution_to_Lisbon_Treaty_april_2008.pdf

TheEuropeanUnion?OntheFrenchandDutchRejectionsoftheEUConstitution
ByMG.PanZhenqiangShanghaiInstitutefortheInternationalStrategicStudies
Beijing,June5,2005

http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6849544230.pdf
Why non and nee to the EU ... European Union founding members to reject the
Draft Treatydiffer ... 1 The French rejected the Constitution w ith 45.13%

http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers
/grosskopfa01h.pdf
The European Unions Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metadc689210/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21618
_2009Oct21.pdf
Europe in crisis after Dutch, French reject treaty
(Agencies)
Updated: 2005-06-02 07:42

The European Union was in disarray on Thursday after the Netherlands followed
France in resoundingly rejecting the bloc's new constitution, possibly stalling future
expansion and disrupting decision making.

The rejection of the charter by two of the six countries that founded the bloc in the
1950s could deal a fatal blow to a treaty designed to make the EU run more
smoothly following its enlargement from 15 to 25 states last year.

The votes also cast doubt on the EU's hopes for a stronger foreign policy and its
plans to expand further to the western Balkans, Turkey and Ukraine, and raised
questions about its appetite for economic reform amid mounting global competition.

The Dutch "No" vote of 61.6 percent was even more decisive than the nearly 55
percent scored by French opponents of the treaty. Turnout was also a strong 62.8
percent, well above the 39 percent in last year's European parliament election.

EU leaders urged member states to press on and ratify the constitution, but analysts
said they should admit the document is dead. EU leaders are due to decide how to
proceed when they meet for a regular summit on June 16-17.

"To have such a very, very large turnout after the French vote but also to have such
an overwhelming "No" is really crushing for the constitutional treaty," said Richard
Whitman from the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, who was criticized for a lacklustre "Yes"
campaign, could face a parliamentary vote of confidence on Thursday but it has little
chance of success. Balkenende has said he would not quit.
Latvia's parliament is expected to approve the treaty with a big majority on
Thursday, meaning 10 members representing almost half the EU's 454 million
citizens will have approved it.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso called on member states to

proceed with ratification and not preempt their summit meeting with "unilateral
decisions" before then.

UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Britain faces a decision next week on whether to suspend or go ahead with

legislation to pave the way for a referendum.

Poland said on Wednesday it would decide how and when to ratify the constitution
after the EU summit. It had planned a referendum in October, but the opposition has
demanded a delay.

The Czech Republic said on Wednesday it would seek an extension of the November
2006 deadline for ratification to give countries that vote "No" more time to
reconsider.

Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker voiced concerns on Wednesday

about the July 10 referendum on the treaty in his broadly pro-Europe state after the
Dutch "No."

"I myself and others must plead the European cause with lots of vigor," he told
reporters in Brussels.

Juncker, whose country holds the EU presidency, also said the Dutch and French
rejections do not alter the economic fundamentals underpinning the euro, despite
the single currency touching a new eight-month low after the Dutch result.

The euro has fallen by nearly 10 percent from its level in mid-March, when markets
began factoring in the possibility of national rejections of the treaty.

Former European Central Bank chief Wim Duisenberg agreed with Juncker that the
euro should not suffer lasting damage, but said the votes would be a blow to
economic reforms in the bloc.

"The political uncertainty created will hamper the efforts in Europe to introduce more
structural reforms which are so very, very necessary," Duisenberg told CNN
television. "It will take us a couple of years at least to reassemble ourselves."

The result is also likely to make it harder for EU leaders to reach a deal on the long-
term EU budget, already difficult because of a looming early German election.

Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm signaled the Netherlands would toughen its
demands for a cap to the EU budget after the "No" vote and push for a cut to the
Netherlands' per capita contribution, which is the highest of all 25 member states.
 The votes could cast doubt on the EU's plans to expand further. Romania and
Bulgaria are likely to join in 2007 as their accession treaties have already been
signed but membership bids by Turkey, Ukraine and Balkan hopefuls might be
disrupted.

"Enlargement is going to be one of the big casualties of this decision," said Mendeltje
van Keulen, analyst at the Clingendael Institute near The Hague.

"Romania and Bulgaria have probably just got in time ... but for Croatia or Turkey
it's a different story."

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc
/200506/02/content_447855.htm
CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION. CONTENTS ...
Protocols annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties
establishing ... FRENCH .

http://www.basiclaw.net/Appendices/eu_c
ons_treaty_en.pdf
The Lisbon Treaty - Digital Library
The European Union (EU) is a treaty-based, institutional framework that defines
and ... Frenchvoters rejected the constitution by 55% to 45%

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metacrs10595/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21618_
2008Jul03.pdf
Holland rejected in ... effects to the Constitution for Europe which the French and ...
By transforming the legal character of the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty

http://www.people.ie/contreaty/np2.pdf
BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm
 European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) Working Paper No. 12
http://www.epin.org/pdf/WP12_KurpasIncertiSchoenlau.pdf

Europa.eu.int

Reflections on the Treaty of Rome and todays EU ... the birth of the European
Union solely on the Treaty of ... the French and Dutch rejection of the EU ..

RobertSchumanReflectionsontheTreatyofRomeandtodaysEUJoaquinRoyJean
Monnet/RobertSchumanPaperSeriesSpecialApril2007Publishedwiththesupportofthe
EUCommission.TheJeanMonnet/RobertSchumanPaper

http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Roy_Re
flectionsTreatyRome_spec07_edi.pdf

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French ... so when Ireland rejected the
Lisbon Treaty in a referendum in June ... Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU gained .

http://civitas.org.uk/content/files/TR.6.Co
nstitutionLisbonTreaty.pdf
European Union (Referendum) ... rejected by the House of Lords in one parliamentary
session to ... it would hold a referendum in the UK on European Union ...
From EU Constitution to the Irish referendums on the Lisbon ...

http://en.euabc.com/upload/from_eu_cons
titution.pdf
Implications of EEA membership outside the EU ... (having rejected membership in a
national referendum in ... had during the EU referendum campaign in the UK,
http://www.allenovery.com/Brexit
Law/Documents/Macro/EU/AO_BrexitLa
w__EEA_Membership_Jul_2016.PDF
Investment Management ... conspicuously failed even to endorse membership of ...
the EU Referendum.

https://www.7im.co.uk//media/files/broch
ure/q32017modelinvestment
update.pdf?la=en

Background Briefing: The Lisbon

Treaty and Ireland

Background Briefing: The Lisbon Treaty and ... a few million Irish cannot decide on
behalf of 495million ... cannot decide on behalf of 495 million Europeans.

http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Content
/documents/Pdfs/irelandbriefing.pdf

An unloved Parliament, The Economist (7 May 2009), viewed on 13 June

2011 http://www.economist.com/node/13610228Elections
2009, eu4journalists viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.eu4journalists.eu/index.php/dossiers/english/C90/386/ The EU Reform
Treaty A Response to Criticisms, Euromove (October 2007), viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=6658The EU treaty what Lisbon
contains, the Economist (25 October 2007), viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.economist.com/node/10024471?story_id=10024471The Further
Enlargement of the EU: threat of opportunity? House of Lords European
Union Committee (23 November 2006) viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/273/273.pdfT
he Lisbon Treaty for Dummies, The Independent (15 May 2008), viewed on 13
June 2011 http://www.independent.ie/national-news/lisbon-treaty/the-lisbon-treaty-for-
dummies-1376340.htmlTreaty of Lisbon. Questions and Answers, Europea.eu,
viewed on 13 June 2011 http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/faq/index_en.htm#1Valry
Giscard d'Estaing: The EU Treaty is the same as the Constitution, The
Independent (30 October 2007), viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/valeacutery-giscard-
destaing-the-eu-treaty-is-the-same-as-the-constitution-398286.htmlBBC News, EU
leaders sign landmark treaty, viewed on 13 June
2011 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7141651.stmBBC News, Europe Q&A, (1
July 2008), viewed on 13 June
2011 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6901353.stmBrowne, Vincent,
Gobbledegook and the case against Lisbon Treaty, Irish Times, (5 March 2008),
viewed 13 June
2011 http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/0305/1204240539595.htmlDuff,
Andrew, Why Ireland must say Yes to Lisbon Financial Times (12 May 2008),
viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_andrew_duff_why_ireland_must_say_
yes_to_lisbon/European Commission, Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty, viewed
on 13 June 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/84/en.pdfFoley, Kathy,
Lisbon treaty: yes, no or eh?,Sunday Times (13 January 2008)Johnston, Philip, If
a referendum is un-British, so is lying, The Telegraph (3 September 2007), viewed
on 13 June 2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3642414/If-a-
referendum-is-un-British-so-is-lying.htmlLu, Chien-Yi Lu, Fallacies in Embracing a Silent
European Public: A Post Lisbon Treaty
Analysis', http://www2.scu.edu.tw/politics/journal/doc/j284/2.pdfMcNamara, Sally, The
Heritage Foundation (20
EU Reform Treaty: A Threat to Transatlantic Alliance,
February 2008)Parliament, Referendums for and against, viewed on 13 June
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/99/9904.htmQv
ortrup, Matt, Democracy by delegation: The decision to hold referendums in the United
Kingdom, Representation, 42, 1 (April, 2006)Van der Veen, A. Maurits, National
Governments and EU Referendums: Sorcerers or Apprentices? (February 2009), viewed
on 13 June 2011 http://maurits.myweb.uga.edu/Research/ReferendumDebates.pdf

ConstitutionalReview:DevolutionintheUK
The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law undertook a major Review of the implications of
devolution as it is developing for the UK as a whole. The Review seeks to assist the mapping of a
path to a new settlement for the UK government and parliament.
The Review was chaired by the Bingham Centre Director, Sir Jeffrey Jowell QC and consisted of
experts from law, history, political science, journalism and public finance.

The Final Report, titled A Constitutional Crossroads, was published on 20 May 2015 and launched
at an event at Middle Temple in London.

The Review concluded that the UK is at a constitutional crossroads and needs major changes to
work effectively. The piecemeal development of devolution means that the overall constitutional
fabric of the UK has been weakened. The process should start with a new Charter of the Union to
provide the framework for a fair and durable settlement between the four nations of the Union.

AConstitutionalCrossroadsReport
https://www.biicl.org/documents/595_a_c
onstitutional_crossroads.pdf?
showdocument=1

Giscard:EUTreatyistheconstitution
rewritten
ValryGiscardd'Estaing
ByTobyHelm,ChiefPoliticalCorrespondent

6:33PMGMT29Oct2007

ValryGiscardd'Estaing,thearchitectoftheabandonedEuropeanConstitution,hasadmittedthatthe
documenthasbeenrewrittenbyEUleadersinadifferentorderjusttoavoidtheneedforreferendums.

ThestatementbytheformerFrenchPresidentwhochairedthebodyofmorethan100European
politiciansthatframedtheoriginalconstitutionhasledtonewcallsforGordonBrowntogranttheBritish
peopleavote.

InanopenlettertotheFrenchnewspaper
LeMonde,MrD'Estaingsoughttoclarify
hisviewonthedifferencesifany
betweentwotreaties.

"Lookingatthecontent,"hewrote"the
resultisthattheinstitutionalproposalsof
theconstitutionaltreaty.arefound
completeintheLisbonTreaty,onlyina
differentorderandinsertedinformer
treaties.."

19 Oct 2007

Hemadeclearthatthepurposeofthe
rewrittenTreaty(nowcalledtheLisbon
Treaty)wastomakepeoplethinkthenewversiondidnotmeritbeingputtothepeopleinreferendums.

"Aboveall,itistoavoidhavingreferendumsthankstothefactthatthearticlesarespreadoutand
constitutionalvocabularyhasbeenremoved,"headded.

LessthantwoweeksagoGordonBrowngavehisblessingtotheEUReformTreatyatameetingof
EuropeanheadsofstateandgovernmentinLisbon.

HesaidtherewasnoneedfortheGovernmenttohonourits2005electionmanifestopromisetoholda
referendumbecausetheredraftedversionwasmuchlessfarreachingthanthedefunctConstitutional
Treaty.

Labourneverhadtohonouritspledgetoholdareferendumbecausebeforeitcouldholdone,the
ConstitutionalTreatyhadalreadybeenrejectedbyvotersinbothFranceandtheNetherlands.

TocomeintoforceanewEuropeanTreatyhastoberatifiedineachmemberstateeitherinareferendum
orinavoteinthenationalparliament.
WhileMrBrownandDavidMiliband,theForeignSecretary,havestucktothelinethatmanyofthebig
changeshavebeenremovedfromthetext,astringofothertopEUpoliticianshaveconfessedthatitisthe
sameastheconstitutioninallbutname.

MarkFrancois,theToryspokesmanonEuropesaidthatMrd'Estainghad"letthecatoutofthebag."

"ThemanwhochairedthebodywhichdraftedtheoriginalEUConstitutionhasnowconfessedthatits
revivedversion,thesocalledReformTreaty,wasdeliberatelydraftedtotryandavoidthepeopleof
Europehavingtheirsayonit.

"TheFrenchpeoplewereallowedavotein2005asweretheDutch,andtheIrishwillnowgetavoteonthe
revivedversionsowhycan'ttheBritishpeoplehavetheirsaytoo."

Morethan110,000havesignedTheDailyTelegraph's"LetthePeopleDecide"campaignforareferendum.

ThelatestYouGovpollforthispapershowedalmosttwiceasmanypeoplewouldvote"No"(38percent)
as"Yes"(20percent)ifareferendumwereheld.43percentsaidtheywereundecided.

Publisherswishingtoreproducephotographsonthispageshouldphone44(0)2079312921oremail
syndication@telegraph.co.uk

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
1567804/GiscardEUTreatyisthe
constitutionrewritten.html

GiscardmakescaseforUnitedStatesof
Europe
ByDavidHaworthinBrusselsandTobyHelm

12:01AMGMT29Oct2002
TheEuropeanUnioncouldberenamedtheUnitedStatesofEuropeorevenUnitedEurope,accordingtoa
controversialproposalfromtheheadofaforumchargedwithreformingthecommunity.

Theidea,floatedbyValeryGiscardd'Estaing,theformerFrenchpresident,inafirstdraftreportbythe
ConventionontheFutureofEuropewasimmediatelydismissedbyBritishdiplomats.

"Thereisnotacatinhell'schanceofitbeingcalledtheUnitedStatesofEurope,"saidoneBritishofficial
whoinsistedthatthecurrentnamewasquitegoodenough.

"IfanythingitwillbecalledtheEuropeanUnion."

Withoutsuggestingapreference,MGiscardd'Estaing'sreportsaidtheunioncouldbecalledtheEuropean
Community,theEuropeanUnion,UnitedEuropeortheUnitedStatesofEurope.

EuroscepticshavelongclaimedthatEUintegrationistsharbourambitionstocreatea"UnitedStatesof
Europe",buildingonecountryoutofEurope'sindependentnationstatesonafederalstructuresimilarto
thatofAmerica.

MGiscardd'Estaingpresentedthedocumentaftermonthsofdiscussionbytheconventionwhichischarged
withchartingapoliticalcourseforanenlargedEUofupto30members.

"WeneedaconstitutionaltreatytomarkthebeginningofarenewedEuropeasweacceptnewmember
statesintoourmidst,aEuropeinwhichallcitizensshouldrecognisethemselvesasEuropean,"hetoldthe
convention.

Despiteprovokingargumentoverapossiblenamechange,Britishgovernmentsourceswelcomedthedraft
ofadocumentthatwillnotbefinaliseduntilthespring.

Whileitdodgedmanykeypointsoninstitutionalreform,itsuggestedthatanewconstitutionforEurope
shouldincludeacharteroffundamentalrightsandthatpeoplelivingintheEUshouldhavedualcitizenship
oftheUnionandoftheirowncountry.

ThedualcitizenshipideawasmetwithincredulityindiplomaticandofficialcirclesinBrusselsbecause
membersoftheconventionhavenotsofardebatedthesuggestion.

Onediplomatdescribeditas"abeeinGiscard'sbonnet"whichhadlittleprospectofeventualapproval.

ThedraftreportalsosuggestsawayforcountriestoleavetheEU,andtheideaofacongressthatwould
includeEuropeanParliamentmembersandnationalmembersofparliament.

ThisCongressofthePeoplesofEuropewouldnotpasslawsbutwouldoverseestrategicdirection.

ThetextalsoincludesthepossibilityofincludingafixedpresidentfortheEuropeanCouncilofheadsof
stateandgovernmentintheconstitution.

ThisproposalisbackedbyBritain,FranceandSpain,butopposedbymanysmallerstates,whichfearaloss
ofinfluencetothebiggerEUmembers.

TheconstitutionwouldreplacethemyriadoftreatiesandagreementsunderwhichtheEUcurrentlyworks
andaimtomaketheworkingsoftheblocmoreconcreteforitscitizens.
"WehavetoworktotellthecitizenswhatEuropeisaboutandgivethemarealfeelingof'Ibelongtothat
Europeanentity',"saidJeanLucDehaene,theformerBelgianprimeministerandMGiscardd'Estaing's
deputyattheconvention.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1411554/GiscardmakescaseforUnited
StatesofEurope.html

REPEATEDEUROPEANREFERENDA:FROMMAASTRICHTTOLISBON

http://www.su.lt/bylos/mokslo_leidiniai/jmd/10_01_26_priedas/jurgelionyte.pdf

GordonBrowntodefendEUTreatydeal
GordonBrownwithJoseZapatero(right)
andtheCzechRepublic'sMirek
Topolanek
ByBrunoWaterfieldandTobyHelminLisbon

8:32AMBST19Oct2007

GordonBrownwillturnhisfireonEuromythsashetriestodefyagrowingBritishandinternational
campaignforareferendumontheEuropeanUnionTreatyagreedintheearlyhoursofthismorning.

ThePrimeMinisterhascommittedtheUKtoanewReformTreatytoreplacetheEUConstitutionkilled
offbyDutchandFrenchreferendumrejectionstwoyearsago.

MrBrownjoinedotherEuropeanleadersataLisbonsummittocrackopenthechampagnetotoastanew
EUblueprintthat,hehopes,theGovernmentcanforcethroughparliamentwithoutgivingintotheclamour
forapopularvote.

ItisnowtimeforEuropetomoveonanddevotealloureffortstotheissuesthatmattertothepeopleof
Europeeconomicgrowth,jobs,climatechangeandsecurity,hesaid.

ButConservativeleaderDavidCameronhasrespondedbyaccusingtheGovernmentofbreakingits
promiseandtreatingpeople"likefools".

HetoldBBCBreakfastthatthe"redlines"insisteduponbyMrBrownwere"completeredherrings".
"Theyhavesignedaconstitution
thattransfers,thatgetsridof,
ourrighttosayno,ourveto,in
60areas,"hesaid.

"They'vecreatedapermanent
EUpresident,apermanent
foreignminister,adiplomatic
service.Thisisareally
significanttransferofpower
fromBritaintoBrussels."

Portugal,currentholdersofthe
EUpresidencyandhostsofthe
summit,hadinitiallyhopedthat
Europesleaderswouldtoastthe
Treatywithaglassofchilled
whiteAlentagowineoverafish
supperbuttalksdraggedonpast
dessert,andmidnight,asPoland
andItalyhaggledovertiny
detailsofthesmallprintuntil2amthismorning.

ThenewTreatyofLisbonwillbeformallysignedbyallEUleadersinPortugalscapitalonDecember
13beforebeingdebatedlinebylineinHouseofCommonsnextyearandenteringintoforceinJanuary1
2009.

ButtheGovernmentmustfacedownastridentcampaignforareferendumonaTreatythatmanyregardas
theoldEUConstitutioninnewclothes.

DavidMiliband,theForeignSecretary,claimedthatdemandsforapopularvotearebasedonscarestories
andmythsandthatreferendumsweretherefugeofdictatorsanddemagogues.

Wehaveaparliamentarydemocracy.WeelectMPseveryfouroffiveyears,thepeopleelectustodoa
job.Iftheylikeittheyrelectusiftheydontkickusout,hesaidthismorning.

Thatiswhereparliamentshouldcomeintoitsownlookingatthedetail,makingsurethatthequestionsare
flushedintotheopenandthegovernmentheldaccountable.

TheConservativeshavepledgedtouseuptothreemonthsofHouseofCommonsdebateintheearlyNew
Yeartorallypublicopinion,70percentbackareferendum,behindacampaignforapopularvote.

ShadowEuropeministerMarkFrancoissaid:InthesmallhoursofthenightGordonBrownhasagreedthe
revisedEUconstitutionwhichpotentiallytransfersmassivepowersfromBritaintotheEU.

"Hehadabsolutelynodemocraticmandatetodothisandwewillnowstepupourcampaigntosecurethe
referendumwhichhepromisedtheBritishpeopleallalong.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
1566651/GordonBrowntodefendEU
Treatydeal.html
ProsandConsoftheConstitutional
Treaty
http://www.qcea.org/wp
content/uploads/2011/04/bpconst4
prosconsensep2004.pdf
MULTILEVELCONSTITUTIONALISMANDTHE
TREATYOFAMSTERDAM:EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONMAKINGREVISITED?...ofthe
Treaties,shouldthepeoplesofEuropesowish.

http://www.whiberlin.eu/documents/whi
paper0499.pdf
WTO288...DeclarationoftheEuropean...
thoseprinciplesincludethoseestablished
intheTreatyoftheEuropeanUnionand
theTreaty
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/docu
ment/ST134632016REV1/en/pdf
Political Manipulation in the European Convention

TheArtofPoliticalManipulationintheEuropeanConvention...Europeantreaties,...aConventionon
theFutureofEurope.AccordingtotheLaekendeclaration,

http://www.svenoliverproksch.com/uploa
ds/1/2/9/8/12985397/jcms2007.pdf
CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 4, 1958

amendingtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandthe...asdefinedbytheDeclarationof1789,confirmedand
complementedbythePreambletotheConstitution

http://www.conseil
constitutionnel.fr/conseil
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/co
nstiution_anglais_juillet2008.pdf

Theconstitutionand...foundationsforeconomicdevelopmentasafirststepinthe
federationofEurope,(RobertSchuman,Declaration...theParisTreatyof...

http://www.robertschuman.eu/en/doc/divers/9thmaydeclarationwebsite2011.pdf
ARTICLE42OFTHETREATYONEUROPEANUNION...PROTOCOL(No35)
ONARTICLE40.3.3OFTHECONSTITUTIONOF...DeclarationonArticle8of
theTreatyon...

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st06655re01.en08.pdf

ImplementationofInternationalTreatiesintothe...theGenevaDeclarationofthe
Rights...tionaltreatiesamendingthefundamentaltreatiesoftheEuropean

http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_10_neudorfer_14.pdf

Democracy and the European Superstate - brugesgroup.com

officialEUdocuments,...theTreatyontheEuropeanUnionstatesthatitshall...Constitution,toldthe
EuropeanParliamentsConstitutional..

https://www.brugesgroup.com/images/me
dia_centre/comment/EuropeanSuperstate
.pdf
NEW ZEALANDS CONSTITUTION
Treaty of Waitang

http://www.ourconstitution.org.nz/store/d
oc/TOW_Booklet.pdf
THEDECLARATIONAsUR
CONSTITUTION:THEBIZARRE
JURISPRUDENTIALPHILOSOPHY...
Britishrecognitionofthesameinthe
Treatyof...THEDECLARATIONAsUR
CONSTITUTION
https://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/f7a65af
28a5648ca96c435228b3bf8e9.pdf
MadridAgreementConcerningthe
InternationalRegistrationof...Europe.12
Withadeclarationthatthisaccessionshall
notextendtoTokelauunlessanduntila
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf

Second referendum? Don't go there

We've commissioned the leading Irish pollsters Red C to look at how people in
Ireland feel about the idea of a second referendum

It looks like they would be made to force a second vote. The key numeros are below:

- 71% oppose a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Only 24% are in favour.

- Of those who expressed an opinion, 62% said they would vote "no" in a second
referendum, compared to 38% who would vote "yes".

- 17% of those who voted "yes" in the recent referendum would vote "no" in a
second referendum, while only 6% of those who voted "no" would now vote "yes".
Perhaps most significantly of all, those who did not vote last time would vote more
than two-to-one against in a second referendum: 57% would vote "no" and 26%
would vote "yes".

- 67% agreed with the statement that "politicians in Europe do not respect Ireland's
no vote". Only 28% disagreed.

- 61% disagreed with the statement that "If all of the other 26 EU countries ratify the
Treaty in their parliaments then Ireland has to change its mind and support the
Treaty." Only 32% agreed.

- 53% said they would be less likely to vote for Brian Cowen at the next election if he
called a second referendum. In particular, 43% of Fianna Fail voters said they would
be less likely to vote for him.

The full results of the poll are available at:

http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/redc.pdf

OffencesAgainsttheStateAct,1939IrishStatuteBook
OFFENCESAGAINSTTHESTATEACT,1939.
ARRANGEMENTOFSECTIONS.PARTI.Preliminaryand
General.Section.1....EuropeanLegislationIdentifier
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1939/ac
t/13/enacted/en/print.html?
printonload=true
Supreme Court of Ireland

AdescriptioniftheIrishlegalsystem.Home...TheSpecialCriminalCourtwasestablishedunderthe
termsoftheOffencesAgainsttheStateAct,1939

http://www.supremecourt.ie/supremecour
t/sclibrary3.nsf/pagecurrent/D5F78352A3
87D74480257315005A419E?
opendocument&l=en
CriminalLawinIrelandisa...Offences
againsttheStateAct1939Emergency
PowersAct1976CriminalJusticeAct198
Introduction
http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ances
try.com/~irishancestors/Law/CLI4flyer.p
df
EUfreedomofmovementintheEU....
andthedept.ofjusticeinIrelandare
illegal2004
http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:EN:PDF
Article 41 .1 of the Irish Constitution EU Directive 2003/86 ...

Article41.1oftheIrishConstitution...howlongtheyhavelivedinIrelandoInlegislation...2007non
EEAfamilymembersofEUcitizensresidentinIreland

http://www.migrantproject.ie/documents/FamilyReunificationLegislationandMigrantIntegr
ation-June2008.pdf

COMMUNICATIONFROMTHECOMMISSION
Freemovementofworkersachievingthefullbenefitsandpotential

http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=COM:2002:0694:FIN:EN:PDF
ImmigrationAct2004(Visas)Order
2011.
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2011/si/
146/made/en/pdf

The Constitution of the Irish Free State 1 entered into force on December 6, ...
origins of the irish constitution

https://www.ria.ie/sites/default/files/int
roduction-to-the-origins-of-the-irish-
constitution.pdf
CONSOLIDATED TEXTS OF THE EU TREATIES AS AMENDED BY ... - gov.uk

consolidatedtextsoftheeu...presidentofireland,thepresidentoftheitalianrepublic,hisroyalhighness
thegranddukeofluxembourg,her

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa
ds/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/228848/7310.pdf
Treaty of Lisbon - Saylor

Languages23EUlanguagesTreatyofLisbonat...on1819June2004underthepresidencyofIreland.
TheConstitution,...themintoonedocument.
https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/Treaty-of-
Lisbon.pdf

Report of the
Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Reportof the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate ...
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279160/00
29_x.pdf
Bloody Sunday Ireland, 1972 Two Sides, Two Stories Key Stage 4
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/education/bloodysundaypack.pdf
Lord Saville of Newdigate is sorry for Bloody Sunday delay ...
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/newspapers/the_times/gibb_tt_081108.pdf
The Widgery report: ... Bloody Sunday, headed by the British
Law Lord, ... Lord Saville opens the proceedings with a vow to fully
investigate Bloody Sunday
http://www.iisresource.org/Documents/BS41_Widgery_Report_Critique_BBC.pdf

CELEBRATING THE SAVILLE REPORT

http://therightsfuture.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/The_Rights_Future_CT9_Saville.pdf

the Constitution and were declared by section 2 of the Constitution of ... origins of
the irish constitution ch1-6: ... In the period between 1922 and 1937
https://www.ria.ie/sites/default/files/introduction-to-the-origins-of-the-irish-
constitution.pdf

DUBLIN IS JUST A SUNNINGDALE AWAY?

THE SDLP, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND
THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT
http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/82_pml.pdf
SUNNINGDALE:
AN AGREEMENT TOO SOON?
http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/80_sf.pdf
Attempts at a settlement in Northern Ireland, 1973-98 1. Sunningdale Agreement &
the Power-sharing Executive, 1973-74 2. Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985 3. Good
Friday Agreement, 1998
http://www.iisresource.org/Documents/01_NI_Settlements_SDA_GFA.pdf
ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 . AGREEMENT between THE GOVERNMENT OF
IRELAND ... either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government,
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernir
eland/Anglo-Irish-Agreement-1985-1.pdf

Fitzpatrick,David,TheTwoIrelands
19121939(Oxford,1998).Foster,...
Harkness,David,Irelandinthe
TwentiethCentury:DividedIreland
(London,1996).
https://www.ucd.ie/quinn/t4cms/SBUS300
20%20From%20Colony%20to
%20Republic.pdf
Parades,PoliticsandthePeaceProcessin
NorthernIreland
http://historyhub.ie/wp-content/files_mf/1391082957MelSutton1_WP9Augustedit_r.pdf
CreditandConstitutionMaking,Irish
Style
http://historyhub.ie/wp-
content/files_mf/1364570578Tom_Murray_Credit_and_Constitution2.pdf
TheCrisisoftheConstitutionByVernonBogdanor...continued
membershipoftheEuropeanUnion....ScotsortheNorthernIrish
couldprovokeaconstitutionalcrisis.
http://www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/COSJ4072-Crisis-of-Constitution-
2nd-Ed-12_15-WEB.pdf

UnderstandthefunctionandimportanceoftheIrishConstitution...theprimarysourceoflawinIreland.
Itisalegaldocument...ofEuropeanUnion
http://www.accountingtechniciansireland.ie/Files/Documents_and_Forms/Law_Ethics_R
OI.pdf

Issue Histories Ireland: Series of Timelines of Policy Debates

http://www.quing.eu/files/results/ih_ireland.pdf

Duringthe1930s,thegovernmentofirefrequentlystateditscommitmenttoindependenceinforeign
policy.

InApril1939deValeramadeitclearhewouldkeephiscountryoutofanypotentialwar.

On4thSeptember1939,threedaysafterGermanyinvadedPoland,theDilpassedtheEmergencyPowers
Act,givingthegovernmentextensivepowersoverthecountry.

DeValeradeclaredirewouldremainneutralintheSecondWorldWar,whichwasreferredtoas'The
Emergency'.

irewastheonlydominionintheCommonwealthnottojointhewar.

Whydidireremainneutral?
NeutralitywasawayofshowingiresindependencefromBritain.

ThispolicyhadbeenmadepossiblebythereturnoftheTreatyPortsin1938.
irewasnotequippedtofightawarbecauseitsarmywassmallanditsweakeconomymeantmoneywas
tooscarcetobespentonmilitaryaction.

DeValerafearedsupportingthewarwouldsplitthegovernmentandcountry,andalthoughmany
sympathisedwiththeAlliedcause,themajorityoftheIrishpopulationwantedneutralitybecauseitwasa
British,notanIrish,war.

SomepeoplefeltmoreofaconnectionwithGermanythanBritaingiventheformer'sassistanceduringthe
1916Rising.

Othercountries,suchastheUSA,haddeclaredtheirneutralityin1939,andirefollowedtheirexample.

WhydidBritainwantanendtoire's
neutrality?
AsthewarcontinuedirecameunderincreasingpressurefrombothsidesoftheAtlantictojointhe
fighting.

Britainmadeseveralattemptstopersuadeiretoenterthestruggle,especiallyafterWinstonChurchill
succeededChamberlainasPrimeMinisterofBritaininMay1940.

TheBritishwantedtoendire'sneutrality(removelink)because::

Britain was suffering heavy shipping loses in the Atlantic. Re-routing British
merchant ships to ports in Northern Ireland, instead of using ports in E ire,
was placing a great strain on the vital supply route across the Atlantic from
the USA

Britain was worried E ire might be invaded and used by Germany as a base to
attack it from, effectively becoming a stepping stone to Britain

E ire did not have blackout regulations. Therefore, Northern Ireland was an
easily identifiable target for the Luftwaffe.

HowdidtheAlliesattempttogetireto
jointhewar?
AsthewarcontinuedirecameunderincreasingpressurefrombothsidesoftheAtlantictojointhe
fighting.

Britainmadeseveralpoliticalandeconomicattemptstopersuadeiretoenterthestruggle,especiallyafter
WinstonChurchillsucceededChamberlainasPrimeMinisterofBritaininMay1940.
Political pressure

InJune1940,ChurchillproposedtheendingofthepartitionofIrelandinreturnforBritishforcesusing
ire'snavalbases.

DeValerarefusedtheofferbecausehewasunsureiftheBritishwouldhonourthedecisionafterthewar,
especiallyiftheunionistswereunwilling.

HethoughtBritainmightlosethewarsothepromisewouldbeworthless.Healsodidnotwantto
compromiseire'shardwonindependencefromBritain.

SeveralsubsequentattemptsbyChurchillin1941and1942tosecureanendtoire'sneutralitywere
unsuccessful.

Economic pressure

BritainreducedthenumberofitsshipsusedbothtotransportgoodstoireandtoprotectIrishcargoships.
iredidnotreceiveinternationalfinancialaidundertheUSA'sLendLeaseprogrammebecauseofits
neutrality.

Propaganda pressure

AftertheUSAjoinedthewarinDecember1941,itsPresident,FDRoosevelt,alsoputpressureonireto
jointheAllies.

Hefeltiresneutralitywasdetrimentaltothewareffort,soamediacampaignportrayingdeValeraas
proGermanwaslaunched.

Relationsdeterioratedfurtherin1942when,inspiteofdeValerasprotests,UStroopsarrivedinNorthern
Irelandtotrainandtohelpwithdefence.

Whatdid'BenevolentNeutrality'mean?
Althoughofficiallyneutral,iredidhelptheAlliesinanumberofways.

OfficiallyirewasneutralduringWorldWarTwo.Forexample,whenHitlerandRooseveltdied,de
ValeravisitedtheDublinembassiesofbothcountriestoconveyhisofficialcondolences.

However,deValeradidcooperatewithBritaininanumberofimportantways:

E ire allowed British airmen who crashed on its territory to return home, but
German pilots were interned

In 1941 fire crews from Drogheda and Dundalk helped when Belfast was
blitzed by the Luftwaffe

The RAF was allowed to fly over the Donegal Air Corridor in order to patrol
the Western Approaches during the Battle of the Atlantic, saving British
planes a 100-mile detour

In 1941 de Valera banned the German Ambassador, Dr Hempel, from using

his radio to contact the Third Reich and in 1943 he confiscated the radio,
thereby limiting the Ambassador's ability to communicate Allied manoeuvres
to Berlin
 Weather reports were secretly transmitted to the Allies, and proved very
valuable during the D-day landings in June 1944

In February 1945 de Valera gave permission for the British to establish secret
radar bases in E ire

PlansweredrawnupbybothBritainandireofficialsforjointcooperationifGermanyinvadedandfor
theBritisharmybasedinNorthernIrelandtomoveintoire.

However,allcooperationwaskeptsecret.MostmembersoftheBritishandIrishgovernmentwere
unawareofit.

Whatimpactdidthewarhaveonire?
Despiteneutrality,almosteveryaspectoflifeinirewasaffected.

The economy shrank

Many items were in short supply because 95% of imports had previously
been transported by British ships

Agricultural production decreased due to a decline in the import of fertilisers

The scarcity of coal meant electricity was available for only a few hours each
day. Irish turf was a poor substitute. By the end of 1940 there was very little
petrol in E ire

New industries withered because of a shortage of raw materials.

The public suffered

Wages did not keep pace with inflation

Unemployment soared and many people went to Britain and Northern

Ireland for work. 50,000 Irish people joined the British armed forces

Rationing of bread, butter and clothing was introduced, leading to increased

smuggling and the emergence of black market trade. Fruit and chocolate
were almost unavailable

Diseases like TB increased because of lack of food and heating

Thirty-four people died and several hundred houses were destroyed when
Luftwaffe bombs accidentally fell on E ire in 1941
Nevertheless,irewasaffectedlessthanBritainandNorthernIreland.

WhatwereeffectsofneutralityonAnglo
Irishrelations?
DeValeraandChamberlaininitiallyhadagoodworkingrelationship,partlybecauseconscriptionhadnot
beenextendedtoNorthernIrelandinearly1939.

RightupuntiltheoutbreakofwarinSeptember1939,ChamberlainhadthoughtdeValerawouldmake
somesortofdefensiveagreementwithBritain.Inparticular,hehopedfortheuseoftheTreatyPorts.He
wasthereforedisappointedbyire'sneutrality.

ThegulfinAngloIrishrelationswidenedfurtherafterChurchillbecamePrimeMinisterinJune1940.

ire'srejectionofChurchill'soffertoendpartitioninreturnforire'sparticipationinthewarandthe
removalofBritishprotectionforIrishcargovesselssouredrelations

DeValera'sprotestatthestationingofAmericantroopsinNorthernIrelandandhisvisittotheGerman
embassyinApril1945infuriatedtheBritish.

Attheendofthewar,thedeteriorationinrelationscontinuedwhenChurchillrevealedhehadconsidered
takingoverireduringthewar.

HealsocausedresentmentbypraisingNorthernIreland'scontributiontothewareffortbutcriticisingire's
role,inspiteofits'benevolentneutrality'.

Whatweretheeffectsofneutralityon
EiresrelationshipwithNorthern
Ireland?
Thewarledtoafurtherdeclineinnorthsouthrelations.

In1939theyclashedoverire'sneutralitywhichCraigcondemnedasdisloyal.Thelackofablackoutin
irealsocausedfriction.

In1940CraigbrandedChurchill'sanddeValera'sdiscussionsonendingpartitionanactoftreachery.

In1941theissueofconscriptionfurthersouredrelations:

Craig again supported the proposal to introduce it in Northern Ireland.

However, objections came from leading Catholic bishops and de Valera, who
described conscription as an act of oppression
 A protest rally in Belfast was attended by ten thousand nationalists and the
Inspector General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) warned
conscription might lead to serious disorder

The strength of opposition meant that the unionist leadership, after

welcoming the idea, realised conscription would create more problems than
it would solve

HoweverdeValera'squickresponseduringtheBlitzin1941throughthesupplyoffirefighterstohelpin
Belfastwasmuchappreciated.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/guides/zsm26sg/revision

Bloody Sunday, Irish citizens

Murder by British state
by Simon Basketter in Derry
The crowd outside the Guildhall in Derry (Pic: Socialist Worker)

The Saville report released on Tuesday stripped away key lies that
the British establishment had told for 38 years about the murder of 14
civilians in Derry, Northern Ireland, in 1972.
Lord Saville says that none of the casualties on Bloody Sunday was
posing a threat or doing anything that would justify their shooting.
They were innocent. None of the soldiers fired in response to attacks
by petrol bombers or stone throwers.
He adds that many of the soldiers lied about their actions. Lord
Saville talks of the soldiers of 1 Para losing self control on Bloody
Sunday, and of the widespread loss of fire discipline.
The report says the soldiers involved in the massacre made
knowingly untrue statements. It also points out that the soldiers did
not fire by accident.
For instance the soldier known as Lance Corporal F did not fire in
panic or fear without giving proper thought to whether he had
identified a person posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.
However the report exonerates the British state for the massacre and
retells an old lie against one of the victims.
Saville dismisses any idea of a conspiracy or cover-up or pre-
mediation by the army or the state.
He says it cannot be sustained that either that what happened on
Bloody Sunday was intended and planned by the authorities or that it
was foreseen by the authorities.
Saville found no evidence of toleration or encouragement for the
use of unjustified lethal force saying it was not pushed from the top.
While Saville says British officers committed errors of judgment he
does not apportion blame.
The declaration that the victims of Bloody Sunday were recognised
as innocent was greeted by cheers of the thousands in Guildhall
Square, the site of the inquiry and where the original anti-internment
march was attempting to reach.
However in the case of one victim, Gerald Donaghey, Saville says
that nail bombs were probably on Gerald Donaghey when he was
shot.
However we are sure that Gerald Donaghey was not preparing or
attempting to throw a nail bomb when he was shot and we are
equally sure that he was not shot because of his possession of nail
bombs.
Over the years many witnesses have come forward to confirm that
before and after Geralds death he did not have nail bombs on his
person.
Saville concludes that the shootings on Bloody Sunday were not the
result of any plan to shoot selected ringleaders.
But he also notes that Major General Ford, the commander of land
forces in Northern Ireland, expressed the view that he was coming to
the conclusion that the minimum force required to deal with the Derry
young hooligans was, after clear warnings, to shoot selected
ringleaders.
Savilles report is a huge climbdown and its welcomed.
David Cameron admitted on Tuesday that British soldiers had shot
unarmed demonstrators on the street.
That admission would not have come without decades of
campaigning by the families of the victims and others. Such
campaigners were often slurred and vilified.
But the report does not mention unlawful killing and murder. There is
no other way to describe what happened on Bloody Sunday.
There was a conspiracy, there was pre-mediation, and there was a
cover-up by the highest levels of the state.
Tony Doherty, the son of Patrick Doherty, spoke to the crowd of
thousands outside of the Guildhall in Derry. Patrick Doherty was
murdered as he tried to call for safety.
He said, The parachute regiment were frontline assassins for
Britains political and military elite.
Our campaign was for justice but we didnt fight for ourselves.
We fought for all those who have suffered at the hands of
unaccountable power.
The repression we suffered was the same as against ordinary
people all over the world as in Sharpeville, Tiananmen Square,
Darfur, Fallujah and Gaza.
Families tore up the Widgery Report at the Guildhall, which was full of
lies.
All of those who organised and carried out murder on Bloody Sunday
should be brought to justice especially those at the top of the army
and the state.

http://intsse.com/wsw
spdf/en/articles/2001/
01/inq-j31.pdf

Release Saville report now

(for the Derry Journal)

It is crucial that the new Northern Ireland
Secretary of State Owen Paterson ensures
that the Saville Inquiry findings into Bloody
Sunday are published without any further
delay.
The families were assured by Mr. Patersons
predecessor, Shaun Woodward, that he could envisage
no obstacles preventing its publication as soon as a
new government was installed following the election.
The sooner Owen Paterson can offer the families, the
injured and the wider Derry community such an
assurance, the better. As such, he should indicate a
publication date as a matter of urgency.
The families were rightly concerned that the British
government may get advance access to the report
and, perhaps, control the release and content of the
report.
The families have made it clear that they are not
looking for special treatment. All they want is equality
and justice at this crucial time. They simply want to
be treated fairly.
Bloody Sunday, more than any other single day,
shaped the Troubles that claimed thousands of lives
and divided entire communities.
The people of Derry know what happened on the
streets of the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. The British
establishment, too, knows what happened. But what
we are still waiting to hear is why it happened.
The truth of Bloody Sunday is known to the people of
Derry. It is something we have known for 38 years.
It was a massacre carried out in broad daylight in full
view of hundreds of eyewitnesses, including scores of
independent media witnesses.
Irish people, North and South, have known for years
that unarmed civil rights demonstrators were
murdered in cold blood by British paratroopers. Yet, at
the highest level of the British political and judicial
establishments a crude cover up was concocted. This
cover-up, conspiracy of silence, call it what you will,
continues to this day.
The people of Derry, knowing the hurt that Bloody
Sunday caused, trust that Lord Saville and his team
will robustly discredit such outrageous cover-ups.
The facts boiled down to the simplest level are that 13
unarmed civilians were shot dead by the so-called
elite of the British military.
The families of the dead and wounded are not seeking
recrimination, simply the truth about what happened
on January 30, 1972.
Their concern is to establish the truth and to close
this painful chapter once and for all.
Indeed, one cant help but be struck by the dignity of
the families in their quest for the truth.
Thirty eight years on, the relatives of those gunned
down on Bloody Sunday, backed by the people of
Derry, remain steadfast in their demands: we simply
want truth, justice and, most important of all, closure.
We can only hope that justice, at whatever level, will
prevail.

http://republican-
news.org/current/new
s/2010/05/release_sav
ille_report_now.html
Orange disorders exposed

There is a growing media focus on the Orange

Order in the north of Ireland over reports
emerged that the secretive anti-Catholic
organisation has a violent initiation ritual
known as riding the goat, after its members
were told not to use the phrase Rest in
Peace as it is too Catholic.
Last week the Orange Order asked its members to
stop using the term RIP to express grief or sympathy
following a death as it believes it is a prayer for the
dead and therefore unbiblical.
In a publication marking the 500th anniversary of the
Reformation, the Order called on Protestants to stop
using the abbreviation for rest in peace.
From a Protestant point of view, we believe, when
death comes, a person either goes to be with Christ
for all eternity, or into hell, it declared.
It is thought the Orange Order decided to speak out
after its members were seen using the phrase on
social media, where it is widely used to mark the
passing of someone.
The Orange Standard said that while the term was
probably used innocently it was a illustration of
spiritual confusion within Protestant circles.
The letters RIP meaning Requiescant in pace or
rest in peace, have long been used by the Roman
Catholic Church, and can be frequently seen, for
example, in death notices and gravestones, the
article said.
In response to a media debate over the use of the
phrase, a former Presbyterian Moderator admitted
there was a reservoir of anti-Catholicism and
sectarianism in the Orange Order.
The controversy comes after photographs emerged
last week of Orangemen in Scotland dressed in racist
and sectarian costumes while attending an event at
an Orange Hall there.
Rev Ken Newell urged the Order to address their
sectarianism by engaging in dialogue with Catholics.
He was quickly attacked by unionists and Orangemen.
But as a result of the debate, a prominent
Orangeman this week confirmed the Order has indeed
a violent ritual to terrify new recruits into silence
about the organisation.
David McNarry, a former unionist Assembly member,
described how prospective members must go through
an initiation ritual know as riding the goat before
they can become full members of the institution and
take the secret oath of membership.
In the ceremony, a member is believed to be hooded
or covered in a blanket before being beaten by
members of the chapter. The ritual is understood to be
a foretaste of the treatment initiates will receive if
they break their oath.
Over the years some initiates were seriously injured,
with the most serious incident happening in 1925
during a lodge meeting in Newry in County Down in
which a prospective member was shot dead.
In modern times at least, the ceremony doesnt
usually involve an actual goat. McNarry described it
as fearsome. Refusing to reveal details of the
ceremony, he said only: It scared the hell out of me.
http://republican-
news.org/current/news/2017/07/orange_disorders_
exposed.html
Archive files show
how Thatcher vetoes
shaped 1985 Anglo-
Irish agreement
The word No recurs in the margin of
letters and documents circulating between
Belfast, London and Dublin

Garret FitzGerald and Margaret Thatcher after signing the Anglo-

Irish agreement in 1985. Photograph: Peter Kemp/AP

Margaret Thatchers repeated veto of Dublins

proposals proved a decisive force in shaping the
Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985, newly released
files from the National Archives in Kew show.
The word No, usually in Thatchers preferred
blue or black felt-tip pen, recurs in the margin of
letters and documents circulating between
Belfast, London and Dublin. In the context of
Anglo-Irish relations, however, history has
awarded Ian Paisley, rather than Thatcher, the
epithet Dr No.
The signing of the agreement on 15 November
1985 was preceded by intensive diplomatic
exchanges as Thatcher tried to assuage unionist
fears that the Republic was being offered partial
control over Northern Ireland.
On a report from Dublin in November 1984
containing plans to establish a standing joint
committee, the prime minister noted: Bad too
near joint sovereignty.

An Irish suggestion that there should be joint

north/south courts was dismissed by Thatchers
handwritten No and the note: They are asking
far too much. Possibly this is deliberate.
Lord Lowry, the lord chief justice of Northern
Ireland who had escaped an IRA assassination
attempt, was known to oppose judicial
cooperation. [He] has consistently taken the
position that all the judges in Northern Ireland
would resign if joint courts were introduced,
Thatcher was informed by her officials.
Garret FitzGerald, the Irish taoiseach, or prime
minister, knew he had an uphill task in
persuading Thatcher of the need for an
agreement. Charles Powell, Thatchers chief
adviser on foreign affairs, left a detailed note of
a meeting they had on the fringes of an EU
gathering in Milan.
Speaking with considerable emotion, Powell
recalled, the taoiseach said that he wanted the
prime minister to understand that the Irish
government and people did not want a role in
Northern Ireland. He was the only person willing
to take risks and force the Irish people to face
up to the need for an agreement. He did so
because he believed that otherwise Sinn Fin
would gain the upper hand amongst the minority
in the north and provoke a civil war which would
drag the Republic down as well.
There were people on the sidelines, like Colonel
Gaddafi who were ready to put up millions of
pounds to achieve this aim [arming the IRA]. For
800 years Britain had occupied Ireland to protect
its flank. There was a now a serious risk of
ending up with what we had always tried to
avoid, an Ireland under hostile and sinister
influence.
Robert Armstrong, the cabinet secretary,
suffered frequent rebuffs. He pointed out that the
Irish had pressed us to indicate in the
communique that we would be making changes
concerning the Ulster Defence Regiment.
Thatcher indicated her objection in capital
letters: NO.
Armstrong sought support for an early release
scheme, informing her that if this leads, as both
governments hope, to a real and sustained
reduction in the level of violence, that will be
among the factors to be taken into account by
the secretary of state for Northern Ireland in
reviewing the release of prisoners who have
been convicted of terrorist offences. This
proposal has been agreed with the NIO [Northern
Ireland Office]. The prime minister vetoed it,
replying: Not with me.
By August 1985, Thatcher was clearly frustrated,
puncturing one of Armstrongs drafts about
changes to military deployments with the
putdown: Shouldnt dream of putting my name
to such terrible English.
The prime ministers relations with female
inmates in Northern Ireland contained in a file
on the republican Price sisters, Marian and
Dolours show how her attitudes to the Troubles
fluctuated. Both sisters were jailed for their part
in the IRAs 1973 bombing of the Old Bailey.
In 1980, Thatcher agreed to both being released
on compassionate grounds, at one point
mistakenly believing they were twins. But when
Dolours moved to the Irish Republic and the
Northern Ireland secretary, Jim Prior, cancelled
her residence requirement because it was
impractical to force her return, Thatcher wrote
on the letter: I think the decision is wrong.
By 1985, Dolours had married the actor Stephen
Rea and the prime minister was informed that
they had been stopped at Folkestone. Thatcher
wrote on the letter: I do not think that Mrs Rea
should be allowed to live here. She was
transferred to NI on conditions which should
continue to apply. If, understandably, she and her
husband wish to be together, they should reside
in Northern Ireland.
When the Northern Ireland Office and Home
Office attempted to regularise Prices position by
altering her required residence to England,
Thatcher responded: No. Do nothing. She got
out of prison on false pretences.
Thatcher's shock
admission that UK got it
wrong on Irish border in
1921
By Ralph Riegel and Adrian Rutherford
December 30 2016

Thatcher and FitzGerald shake hands on the Anglo-Irish

Agreement
A series of extraordinary admissions between Mrs Thatcher and Taoiseach Garret
FitzGerald emerge in previously classified papers made public for the first time
today.

Documents released in Belfast, Dublin and London provide a new insight into
political developments on both sides of the Irish Sea in the late 1980s.

They have been made public under the 30-year rule, which has seen a trove of
previously secret Government papers declassified.
Both leaders were in close contact throughout 1986 as the UK and Republic
attempted to stand behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement amid growing unionist
anger.

The agreement had granted the Republic a formal role in Northern Ireland for
the first time.

The Prime Minister and Taoiseach met on December 6, 1986, in London - and
Mrs Thatcher made a series of blunt admissions in assessing the security
situation along the border.

"You (the Republic) haven't the resources to maintain protection on the other
side of the border," she said.

"I do feel very depressed at times about the whole situation. The violence has not
been defeated. The SDLP have not done what we are expecting them to do.

"However, it is Christmas - and I had better stop feeling depressed," she said.

Mr FitzGerald praised the RUC for the work it had done in co-operating with the
Garda.

"And he pressed for all UDR patrols to be accompanied by the police.

But he warned: "Both forces have a next-to-impossible border to watch."

Mrs Thatcher bluntly admitted: "Yes, we got it wrong in 1921."

The meeting concluded with one Irish civil servant noting: "The Prime Minister
then went on... including a rather wistful reference to whether she could
continue, in all seriousness, to send young men to their death in Northern
Ireland."

Both Governments expressed repeated concerns about the security situation.

This was due to the upsurge in unionist and loyalist protests and demonstrations
over the Anglo-Irish deal.

Mrs Thatcher warned that such a reaction was "negative and very dangerous".

"The unionists are saying they have lost everything and have got nothing," she
said.

One briefing note warned that RUC Chief Constable Sir John Hermon (below)
was "genuinely frightened" by the implications of one demonstration at
Hillsborough.

Another briefing note warned that: "Dublin has not grasped the fundamental
reality that Northern Ireland is and will remain ungovernable."
Files released by the Public Record Office in Belfast include new insights into
Anglo-Irish relations in the 1980s.

One memo from the British Ambassador to Dublin stated "if it were not for
history we should get on well with the Irish", noting good relations on every
matter - except Northern Ireland.

In London, the files shed new light on the fall of Mrs Thatcher after 11 years in
power.

http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/archive/thatchers-shock-admission-that-uk-got-
it-wrong-on-irish-border-in-1921-35328461.html
15-05-2015, 10:58

Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (Hillsborough Agreement)

The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was signed at Hillsborough Castle (the symbolic seat of British
power in Northern Ireland) on 15 November 1985 by the British and Irish premiers, Margaret
Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald. It was the sixth in a series of intergovernmental summits that began in
May 1980. Hillsborough was qualitatively different in that the earlier summits had taken place in an
atmosphere strained by the hunger strikes, the Falklands/Malvinas War, and the Brighton bomb. The
communique accompanying the agreement recognized its historic significance. It came into effect
on 29 November after it was ratified by the Dail and the British House of Commons and was
registered at the United Nations on 20 December 1985.

The agreement had a strong institutional framework. Article 2 represented one powerful axis. In part
2(a) it established an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with
relations between the two parts of Ireland to deal on a regular basis with "(i) political matters; (ii)
security and related matters; (iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice; and (iv) the
promotion of cross-border cooperation"; and 2(b) stated that "the United Kingdom Government
accepts that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating
to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference insofar as those matters are not the
responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland." It could be said that Article 2 gave
constitutional nationalism greater influence than it had ever enjoyed since partition. The
countervailing axis existed in Article 1, which attempted to reassure unionists of the
prevailing constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and in Articles 4(b), 5(c), and 10(b), which acted
as a catalyst toward achieving devolution in place of an enhanced role for the conference.
Additionally, Article 11 allowed for a review of the working of the conference within three years.

The AIA is significant for three reasons. First, both governments were now committed to working
together on the historic Anglo-Irish conflict. A permanent Anglo-Irish secretariat (staffed by senior
personnel from Dublin and London) was a manifestation of its rigor. The structures were built to
withstand boycotts, physical threats, general strikes, or whatever. The Intergovernmental Conference,
chaired by the British secretary of state and the Irish foreign minister, represented both structure and
process. Second, the agreement received much international approbation. A goodwill manifest in
Article 10(a) promoted cross-border social and economic development by securing
international support through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was established on 18
September 1986 with financial support from the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. In the next
fourteen years the IFI was associated with investing 1.1 billion pounds. Third, the agreement
symbolized profound attitudinal change. Article 1 represented a historic shift in Irish
nationalists' attitude toward Northern Ireland. Equally, British concessions to the Irish heralded an era
of intense intergovernmental cooperation. They had set in motion a process of change that was to
culminate in the Belfast Agreement of April 1998.

SEE ALSO Northern Ireland: Constitutional Settlement from Sunningdale to Good Friday; Northern
Ireland: The United States in Northern Ireland since 1970; Ulster Politics under Direct Rule; Primary
Documents: Anglo-Irish Agreement (15 November 1985)

Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985: Motion (Resumed)

Wednesday, 20 November 1985
The following motion was moved by the Taoiseach on 19 November 1985:

That Dil ireann hereby approves the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985,
between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which
was signed at Hillsborough, Co. Down, on 15th November, 1985 and copies of which
have been laid before Dil ireann.
Debate resumed on amendment No. 1:
To delete all words after Dil ireann and substitute the following:
having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland;
recalling the unanimous Declaration of Dil ireann adopted on the joint proposition of
An Taoiseach, John A. Costello and the Leader of the Opposition, Eamon de Valera, on
10 May 1949 solemnly reasserting the indefeasible right of the Irish Nation to the unity
and integrity of the national territory;
recalling that all the parties in the New Ireland Forum were convinced that a united
Ireland in the form of a sovereign independent state would offer the best and most
durable basis for peace and stability;
re-affirming the unanimous conclusion of the Report of the New Ireland Forum that the
particular structure of political unity which the Forum would wish to see established is a
unitary state achieved by agreement and consent, embracing the whole island of Ireland
and providing irrevocable guarantees for the [2705] protection and preservation of both the
unionist and nationalist identities;
while recognising the urgent need that exists for substantial improvement in the situation
and circumstances of the nationalist section of the community in the North of Ireland and
approving any effective measures which may be undertaken for that purpose, refuses to
accept any recognition of British sovereignty over any part of the national territory;
and requests the Government to call upon the British Government to join in convening
under the joint auspices of both governments a constitutional conference representative
of all the traditions in Ireland to formulate new constitutional arrangements which would
lead to uniting all the people of Ireland in peace and harmony.
(Deputy Haughey)
An Ceann Comhairle: Deputy Denis Gallagher moved the
adjournment of the debate and has 27 minutes remaining.
The two Governments may have agreed to make determined efforts to resolve any
differences that may arise but the Conference will not be a decision-making body. Full
responsibility for the decisions and administration of Government will remain with the
United Kingdom Government north of the Border and with the Irish Government south of
the Border.
An Ceann Comhairle: Would the Deputy give the reference?
Mr. D. Gallagher: The Irish Times, Tuesday, 19 November.
The Tnaiste: This agreement is a major step towards the
bringing together of opposing traditions and the healing of ancient
wounds. It meets the requirements of Labour Party policy on Northern
Ireland. It recognises the aspiration to the unity of the people and
territory of this island through reconciliation.
An essential element in the search for that reconciliation is the formal assurance given in
the agreement that only if the people of the North consent to unity, would unity come
about. But it does more than this: in article 4 (b) the agreement states that it is the
declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of
certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should
be [2713] devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread
acceptance throughout that community and the Irish Government support this policy. The
agreement provides a stimulus to efforts within the North to find effective structures for
devolution which will have widespread acceptance. As we have made clear, our
involvement in devolved matters will cease when those structures are agreed by both
communities.
This agreement commits the two Governments in accordance with the policy of our party
to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland
which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent
years. In furtherance of this endeavour we will be seeking international support,
particularly from the Socialist group in Europe from whom I received a telegram of
support on Monday last. I believe that this agreement demonstrates the result of that
realistic, honest and positive dialogue with the British Government for which the Labour
Party have called in the past and which we have been pursuing in Government since the
adoption of the Forum report.

We accept that Deputies have the right to scrutinise this agreement which has been
prepared painstakingly and with difficulty since the conclusion of the Forum. We want
this House to examine its implications and to debate it thoroughly.
It is a major agreement. But let us also remember our obligations as constitutional
Nationalists to each other and especially to our fellow members of this Forum in the
SDLP. Let us remember [2714] also the sensitivities of the Unionist community, the validity
of whose identity and sense of Britishness we accepted in the Forum report as a major
reality FR. 5.1 (9) and 5.2 (4).
I plead, therefore, today for understanding and restraint. I plead for understanding of this
agreement for what it is, and I plead for restraint in its interpretation. This is a time to
lower the political temperature, not to raise it. It is a time for cool heads, not hot heads.
We have been through too much suffering on this island and there is so much at stake. I
believe the great majority of Deputies in this House are conscious that the eyes of the
world are upon Dil ireann today. This debate will be a test of our political maturity as a
nation.
In the Forum report we recognised the immense cost of violence on this island. We all
joined to reject and condemn paramilitary organisations and to reject and condemn all
who resort to terror and murder to achieve their ends. We strongly urged people in
Ireland of all traditions and all those who were concerned about Ireland elsewhere in the
world to refuse any support or sympathy to these paramilitary bodies and associated
organisations
We said that the acts of murder and violence of these organisations and their denial of
the legitimate rights of others have the effect of undermining all efforts to secure peace
and political progress. As constitutional Nationalists we said we were determined to
secure justice for all traditions. We called in the Forum for the strongest possible support
for political progress through the democratic process Chapter 4.11.

By this agreement we are setting our face resolutely against the path of violence and we
are following instead the path of political progress. We have sought in this agreement
the acceptance of the validity of both the Nationalist and Unionist identities in Ireland and
the democratic rights of every citizen on this island Forum Report 5.2 (4). I believe
that we have taken a great step along that road. This agreement has the aim of
promoting peace and stability in Northern [2715] Ireland, of helping to reconcile the two
major traditions in Ireland and of creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation
between the peoples of Britain and Ireland. The agreement commits us to improve co-
operation in combating terrorism. We will implement this element of the agreement, and
every other element in it, wholeheartedly.
The constitutional Nationalist party of the North, the SDLP, have accepted this
agreement. I should like to pay a tribute to the unremitting efforts of that party and their
leaders whose political efforts down through the years have been an example to all of
us, particularly in the South who do not have to work in the same trying conditions as
they do in the North. This House should pay a special tribute to John Hume, Samus
Mallon, Austin Currie, Joe Hendron, Brid Rogers, Eddie Magready and others in the
SDLP who for a long time have pursued the politics of constitutional nationalism in
Northern Ireland. They did so while retaining a dignity that we expected from them. We
are all indebted to them. They are realists. They have to be realists. Their party was born
of the agony of the last 16 years and they are the Nationalists who must face in every
minute of their day the continuing problems of Northern Ireland, the lack of peace and
stability, the deep unemployment among workers, the lack of acceptance of the
Nationalist identity, and the murderous violence of the IRA. These are the people in the
field. They have said they are satisfied with this agreement. They do not see it as
impeding their right to work for unity. On the contrary, they see the agreement as
recognising the legitimacy of the Nationalist position. We warmly welcome their support
as we embark on this further stage of the Anglo-Irish process.
There are two major questions in this debate. The first is the question of the status of
Northern Ireland and the second is the question of undertaking action now to make the
political progress which is required to bring peace and reconciliation to Northern Ireland.
First, the question of status: as the [2716] Taoiseach said in his opening remarks to the
press conference at Hillsborough on Friday last, he and the British Prime Minister came
to the negotiations with different historical perspectives, and as it were, the different title
deeds. The British constitutional position on Northern Ireland remains the same. Our
constitutional position on Northern Ireland also remains unchanged. Articles 2 and 3 of
our Constitution remain. In answer to those who have suggested that Articles 2 and 3 of
our Constitution should have been amended, I need only point to the hysteria whipped
up in the last few days to show that both Governments were wise to maintain the
constitutional positions as they now are and to concentrate on the facts of the situation.
Those facts of the situation include the fact that any change in the status of Northern
Ireland would come about only with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland. In this House on 10 November 1981, the Leader of the Opposition gave it as his
view that those words merely recognised the practicalities of the situation.
The Leader of the Opposition opposes this agreement now on the basis that the
Government would be acting unconstitutionally in proceeding with it. His arguments in
support of this contention seem to me to be thin, to say the least. He has put forward
diffuse and non-specific points and makes his case by making general assertions to the
effect that the Government are acting in a manner repugnant to the Constitution of
Ireland by fully accepting British sovereignty over a part of the national territory and by
purporting to give legitimacy to a British administration in Ireland.
In making these assertions the Leader of the Opposition assures us he is not indulging
in rhetoric. How can he sustain this when he has made no more specific arguments
against the Government's position then those made in his speech yesterday? If the
Leader of the Opposition can advance specific comprehensible arguments on this issue
he has a duty to this House, to the Constituation and to the people to enumerate
them [2717] before this debate concludes so that the House and the people may make a
reasoned judgment. For my part I cannot see any formal surrender of de jure Irish
sovereignty over Northern Ireland.
The Leader of the Opposition has made the point also that no future Government need
be bound by the provisions of an international agreement such as this if it were
incompatible with the Constitution. His point appears to be that the Government do not
have the competence to make this agreement and that therefore it is and will be void
and inoperative ex tunc. I believe this is entirely unsustainable. Deputy Haughey has not
demonstrated any specific or general want of legal or constitutional competence on the
part of the Government in the signing of this agreement. More important, as Deputy
Haughey has raised this point, the House is entitled to know what his intention might be
in relation to the agreement. Does he intend to denounce it or to treat it as void? We
should be allowed to know, to be let in on the secret. Certainly, the constitutional
Nationalists of Northern Ireland will want to know his attitude on this. It is too important
for them for there to be any doubt about his position.
It is a practicality of the situation that the only unity which constitutional Nationalists
would want is a unity achieved without violence and by consent. Can any one of us here
seriously imagine a unity brought about by force? Can anyone here imagine what it
would be like to live in a united Ireland with one million people in rebellion? No Leader of
our State has envisaged such a prospect. I will simply quote Mr. de Valera in this House
on 24 June 1947. He said: I believe that it [the problem of Northern Ireland] cannot be
solved, in any circumstances that we can now see, by force and that if it were solved by
force, it would leave a situation behind it which would mean that this State would be in
an unstable position.
I believe passionately that the abjuring of the use of force is not only a practicality, that it
must also be a principle in politics. It must be a principle that we [2718] will have nothing to
do with those who seek to shoot and bomb our fellow Irishmen until they acquiesce in a
united Ireland.
What kind of love of Ireland is that? James Connolly said it best:
reland, without her people is nothing to me; and the man who is bubbling over with love
and enthusiasm for Ireland and can yet pass unmoved through our streets and witness
all the wrong and the suffering, the shame and the degradation wrought upon the people
of Ireland aye, wrought by Irish men upon Irish men and women without burning to
end it, is, in my opinion, a fraud and a liar in his heart no matter how he loves that
combination of chemical elements he is pleased to call Ireland.

I turn now to the question of political progress and this is what we should keep to the
forefront of this debate and to the forefront of the development of Irish politics. Connolly
recognised another practicality the practicality of human suffering and human
deprivation. We must ask ourselves honestly: do we want to do something to end this
problem? Or do we want to do nothing? Do we want to postpone forever the day of
action? Or do we want to start now? I stated in my speech to the last Labour Party
conference held earlier this year in Cork that we were prepared to take a risk for peace.
Do we want to take that risk? Or do we want to take no risk at all? I need hardly say that
it seems to me that the path of taking no risk at all, is the path of greatest risk. For if we
leave the business of ending the Northern Ireland problem to the gunmen we can only
push back the possibility of unity; and we can only promote the danger to our democratic
institutions.
Twelve years ago, my respected predecessor as Leader of the Labour Party, Brendan
Corish, said in the debate on Sunningdale, as reported at columns 2029-30 of the
Official Report:

The events of the past five years have shown us that there is no magic way
by [2719] which the Border could be ended. If it has done that it is difficult to say it
has done some good. At least it may prevent further loss of life.
Brendan Corish was right to introduce that note of caution. Twelve years on, there are
still some among us who believe there is a magic way. Of course, there is no magic way
by which the Unionist community of Northern Ireland will agree to a united Ireland. Their
agreement will have to come in time, as we act towards them with patience, with honesty
and sincerity, with transparency of motive and with hard application to the solving of
immediate problems. The creation of conditions in which the Nationalist community in
the North can more readily identify with structures of government will help peace and
stability to emerge in this island. For Unionists who have suffered the rejection of the
most precious human right the right to life in the past 16 years, this agreement with
the British Government provides a practical and careful plan not only to ease their
present suffering, but to help towards the re-establishment of devolution on a basis of
widespread acceptance, and to help towards the creation of better and more prosperous
times for all.
It is important to be clear both about the nature of the role of the Irish Government within
the Conference and about the background to that role. First the background: it is not
right to suggest that the British Government before Hillsborough always accepted that
the Irish Government had a right to put forward views and proposals in relation to the
North. Such a right was never before formally accorded to the Irish Government. What is
more, Deputies will remember that British ministers, and indeed the present Prime
Minister, have denied categorically in the past that such a right was recognised by the
British Government. For example, in the House of Commons on 29 July 1982, following
discussion between a Minister of State at [2720] the Foreign Office and an Irish
Ambassador which had taken place on 26 July, Mrs. Thatcher said the following:
My right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, made it
perfectly clear to the Irish Ambassador that no commitment exists for Her Majesty's
Government to consult the Irish Government on matters affecting Northern Ireland. That
has always been our position. We reiterate and emphasise it, so that everyone is clear
about it.
Of course, Irish Governments have always believed that we have a right and a duty to
ensure that the British Government are aware of our views on the North. All parties here
are agreed on that. It is a fact, however, that that was never accepted as a right on our
part by the British Government and, what is more, it is a fact that it was formally denied
on a number of occasions.
Second, the Agreement: article 2 (b) of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 states: The
United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views
and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the
Conference...
It is also important that we should understand that the right now for the first time formally
given to the Irish Government to put forward views and proposals on matters relating to
Northern Ireland goes beyond that; it goes beyond a right to consult or to be consulted.
The agreement, again in article 2 (b), in a provision which governs the entire working of
the Conference on matters relating to Northern Ireland states that, in the interest of
promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference
to resolve any differences.
Thus on the central question of the role and nature of the Conference itself, the position
of the Irish Government has changed in two fundamental respects: first, the British
Government have for the first time formally accepted the right of the Irish Government to
put forward views and proposals on Northern Ireland, [2721] having previously rejected
that position; and, secondly, the two Governments for the first time commit themselves,
as a matter of obligation under an international agreement, to the effect that determined
efforts shall be made to resolve any differences.
I cannot claim ties of kinship with anyone in the North. I do claim many friendships, both
among members of my own profession and among sportsmen who live in the North. In
every single case, these are friendships that I value deeply, and friends from whom I
have learned a lot. They are Catholics and Protestants, Unionists and Nationalists, and I
cannot honestly say that I feel closer to one or the other.
I hope and believe that these many friends will know of me that I have no interest in
forcing my aspirations down their throats. I would be dismayed to discover although I
do not think I shall that any one of them believed that I had abandoned either my
Republican aspiration on the one hand, or my commitment to dialogue, persuasion and
above all, consent, on the other.
I must and do respect the views of those who have lived closer to violence than I have. I
have had many opportunities to discuss the stagnation of ordinary life with them, and I
believe as a result that many of them many who are Unionist among them believe
increasingly that the only way forward is to talk across the divide; to break down barriers
of distrust that years of ascendancy have built up.
Many of these people represent the middle ground. I appeal particularly to them to
suspend judgment to wait and see. I believe they will discover that the Irish
Government are operating in good faith. And I believe that that good faith will be
translated into action to promote dialogue, dialogue aimed at bridging the sectarian gap
and building trust between two communities who, in the final analysis, will be dependent
on each other for economic and social progress. [2722] I cannot help but reflect that my
political perspective owes nothing to the divisiveness of the twenties. Like the rest of my
generation, I have no link with that tragic period, like the rest of my generation, I want to
look to the future and not agonise over the past. While I recognise fully that our history is
part of what we are, I prefer to believe that the generation of which I am part will make its
own history.
How is that history likely to be read? Is it to be a story of continuing violence and strife; a
history of chronic unemployment for young people in the North; a history of sectarian
division; a history of a continuing period of no opportunities and no hope? Or is it
possible that this generation can write a history of reconstruction, of new opportunities,
of peace and respect for one another? I believe it is. Around the world, it is this
generation that has led the move towards greater democracy in many authoritarian
rgimes. It is this generation that has alerted the world to the insanity of nuclear arms. It
is this generation that has inspired the worldwide response to hunger and tragedy in the
Third World.
Here in Ireland, North and South, it is this generation ultimately that will confront the
economic and social challenges of the end of this century and the beginning of the next.
It is this generation that will write the history from now on. I hope and believe that there
are in this generation the seeds of new opportunities and new awareness, coupled with
a growing rejection of the nihilistic violence of those who have no interest in building
anything.
The Government have dealt with the practicalities of the situation as we see them, not
with dreams and fantasies. We have calculated what we can do now, not what could be
done sometime. We have judged our own capacity to act, not our capacity to wish. We
will not be hypnotised by prejudice or propaganda. The Government will act with tenacity
in implementing this agreement because we believe it to be in the interest of all the
people of these islands, but especially of the people of Ireland, North and
South, [2723] Nationalist and Unionist, Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter.
Mr. Allen: May I put on the record of the House
An Ceann Comhairle: No, you cannot
Mr. Allen: the wish of so many backbenchers
An Ceann Comhairle: The Deputy is out of order.
Mr. Allen: I want to know if we will get an opportunity to place
our views on the record.
An Ceann Comhairle: If the Deputy wanted to raise that point
he should have done so yesterday morning when the order of this
debate was being regulated.
Mr. Allen: I am asking for an extension of time today
Mr. O'Kennedy: I hope that this point is not being made in my
time. Before giving its approval to the terms of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement as proposed by the Government, Dil ireann must
examine its terms and consider its implications in an objective and
detailed manner. The Taoiseach has acknowledged that the length of
the negotiations and the level at which they were conducted reflect
the extreme complexity of the issues being tackled and the delicacy
of the issues at stake.
I hope that this point is not being made in my time. Before giving its approval to the
terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement as proposed by the Government, Dil ireann must
examine its terms and consider its implications in an objective and detailed manner. The
Taoiseach has acknowledged that the length of the negotiations and the level at which
they were conducted reflect the extreme complexity of the issues being tackled and the
delicacy of the issues at stake.
Each Member who contributes here has but half an hour to seek clarification on these
complex and delicate issues and the Government who have spent 18 months in
negotiations must respond fairly and fully to the queries we raise. If this agreement is to
bind us, we must understand what it means before endorsing its effect.
Yesterday the Taoiseach expressed his gratitude to the various Governments and
associations for their extraordinary and unanimous support for this agreement. In many
cases this support was [2724] expressed simultaneously with the signing of the
agreement. The extraordinary unanimity and the coincidence of response might suggest
that we might offend those friends by being critical here. Despite the complex and
delicate issues involved the media generally were quite spontaneous in their approval
and commendation. It may be that the instant commendation was confined to the
intention as communicated by the two Governments but our role in this Parliament, in
this Opposition, has to be more critical. Approval from this Dil is not just an instant and
passing commendation. It involves a binding obligation under the terms of our
Constitution. We must not dishonour our role and ignore that Constitution by superficial
analysis and vague generalisation.
Much has been made of the alleged conflict between Fianna Fil and the SDLP in our
responses to this agreement. The SDLP's support is not unconditional. While offering full
co-operation with the proposed Conference, party Leader, John Hume, has indicated
that much will depend on the implementation of the agreement and on the policies
particularly in the field of justice. The SDLP, he said, will monitor that implementation
very carefully. Mr. Samus Mallon, Deputy Leader has indicated that it was an
agreement which I would be prepared to give every opportunity to work. In effect, and
quite prudently the SDLP are adopting a wait and see attitude
I have been privileged to know them as contemporaries and to work with them in
international fields. I have experienced in their homes, their courage in the face of
threats and intimidation which aroused in me an abiding respect for their courage,
integrity and dedication. In their unremitting search for justice and permanent peace
through political action they have won the right to be heard at home and abroad. Their
Ireland is not one of domination or hatred but of equal rights and mutual respect. We
share those views and respect their intentions but our role in this issue is different from
theirs. We are being asked to give our support and approval to the terms of an
agreement in [2725] accordance with our constitutional obligation to Dil ireann. We
cannot wait and see the actual effects of the implementation. We are called upon now to
state our position and we cannot be criticised for raising the issues that are fundamental
to this State and the Constitution under which we operate.
While it is the clearly expressed intention of the Government to register this agreement
at the UN, it must be said that the agreement in its form and terms is very vague and
capable of different interpretations which in the end can raise the most fundamental
issues for this State. Apart from the limitation in the Irish Government's role to putting
forward views and proposals, there is no precise indication as to the legal obligations
which attach to the British Government in this agreement. Phrases such as determined
efforts to resolve any differences in Article 2 (b) and generalisations such as the the
business of the Conference will thus receive attention at the highest level and the
procedures for small and flexible groups in Article 3 are totally inappropriate to a binding
international agreement.
The Government should explain what precisely is meant by proposals for major
legislation and on major policy issues in respect of which they may put forward
proposals or views on political issues in Article 5 of the agreement. A similar explanation
must be forthcoming before this debate ends in respect of an opportunity to address
policy issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events. Who is to be the arbiter of what
is major in these clauses or what will be understood as serious incidents? If this Dil is to
approve the terms in the agreement it should be clear where the responsibility will lie for
interpreting the terms of that agreement. If it is the prerogative of the British Government
to exclude matters from the Conference which do not conform to their interpretation and
their intentions, the role of the Conference, limited though it already may be, can be
totally undermined unilaterally by the British Government.
In any assessment of this agreement [2726] we must look at what it means for the whole
country. Over the years we have won international recognition of the sovereignty of this
State. This must be protected. On it depends our right to take decisions on internal
affairs and express our position on foreign policy. The protection of our right to be neutral
and independent in times of conflict such as a world war is a cherished objective of our
foreign policy. Our security is our affair. This agreement makes this and other matters the
affair of an Anglo-Irish Conference. The Conference has not got to deal with the affairs of
Northern Ireland alone, but Article 5 of the agreement records as coming within the
authority of the Conference, matters relating to electoral arrangements, economic and
social issues including unemployment, cultural and so on and then makes it clear that
the possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the Irish
Government in their jurisdiction shall not be excluded. This is more specifically stated in
Article 8 which says:
The Conference shall deal with issues of concern to both countries relating to the
enforcement of criminal law. In particular it shall consider whether there are areas of the
criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might benefit be
harmonised.
It is clear, therefore, that this Conference is to have a say, to what limited extent that may
be, in the internal affairs of this State. The agreement is, therefore, an erosion of the
right to control our own security by this sovereign Parliament which was won under the
1938 agreement by Eamon de Valera. The significant thing is that there is no reciprocal
right enshrined in the agreement for matters of internal security in Britain to come within
the range of the Conference discussion and consideration of recommendations to be
made in respect of anxieties we might have on security policy in Britian, and we have
many such anxieties.
When one considers the implications of the Birmingham Six Trial and the application of
the Prevention of Terrorism [2727] Act and the tensions they caused in Britain and
between our two Governments, it is quite extraordinary that the right to make
recommendations in respect of our internal affairs is not reciprocated by a similar right in
respect of the internal affairs of Britain. Ireland and Britain will meet in the Conference
which will deal not only with the North but with the whole of Ireland. The Conference will
not deal with internal British issues which are of considerable importance to this State.
There is at least a grave risk that this agreement will erode our State sovereignty and the
total effect of this in the areas of security can have tremendous consequences for us and
our neutrality in any future world conflict or war. I acknowledge that it is not the intention
of the Government to give rise to any such possibility, but when we consent formally to
an agreement in this House, discharging our role under the Constitution, we consent to it
on the terms of the agreement and not just on the hopes, expectations or intentions of
our own Government if they are not clearly expressed in that agreement. Of course, it
can be said that the role of the Conference is purely consultative but the Taoiseach
stressed that it is as near executive authority as makes no difference. In claiming great
achievements on behalf of his Government within Northern Ireland when he laid
emphasis on the extent of the power of the Anglo-Irish Conference, the Government
must explain how such powers within the Six County area are also proposed to be
extended to the Republic. The Government cannot have it both ways and suggest that
the Conference has a significant role within the internal affairs of the North but none
down here. Furthermore, while matters in regard to the internal administration in the
North will be withdrawn according as they are handed over to a devolved government in
the North, no such time limit is placed in the agreement on the Conference's right in
regard to the Republic's internal affairs.

Let no one suggest in this that I am raising unreal possibilities. In this I am

[2728]
discharging, as I believe our role in this House is to discharge, a duty to examine an
agreement for what it says and not to rely on vague expressions, intentions or
statements of intent by the Taoiseach or anyone else. In referring to statements from the
Taoiseach, let me add a matter which is not included in my text as issued but which I
want to address now very briefly. The Taoiseach in the course of his statement after the
summit agreement referred particularly to the fact that the Supreme Court decision in the
McGlinchey case particularly had got rid of the constitutional impediment to extradition.
What understanding does that show of what the Constitution represents? The
Constitution is not an impediment; it is a protection. The decision in that case was a
decision made in respect of the issues in that case based on the facts brought forward in
that case. It must be said that in no sense could it be suggested as getting rid of the
constitutional impediment as the Taoiseach proposed to the world in his press
conference. Indeed, many of us in this House and outside were very much concerned
with the rushed manner in which that case was presented to the Supreme Court. The
consequence is that we have now, here in our jurisdiction, someone for trial who has
been returned from the statelet to which he was extradited in respect of whom we can
press only charges that are in accordance with the return from the North. So much for
the Taoiseach's understanding of extradition or what he calls a constitutional impediment
in relation to extradition. While I am at it, let me say that we will have another opportunity
of addressing this when any proposal to accede to the European Convention on
Terriorism comes before the House. I just want to record as fact that many countries
which accede to that convention have reservations expressed in their accession on two
fundamental points, (1) many of them do not extradite their own citizens under any
circumstances (2) many of them exclude political offences from their [2729] accession to
the convention. When we come to address the issue in terms of decision by this
Parliament on that occasion we will go into these in much greater detail.
As to the contribution which this surrender of our autonomy will make to an improvement
of affairs within Northern Ireland, nobody can make any concrete claims. We all hope for
peace. We will all make considerable sacrifices to that end. We are obliged to make
sacrifices, particularly in the light of the constant suffering and tragedy that have fallen
on those people in this island. We are prepared to acknowledge the good intentions
and bona fides of the Government in their efforts, but we should not delude ourselves or
allow ourselves to be deluded. In the final analysis we must ask what is the whole aim of
the document which the Taoiseach proposes for approval to the Dil. Is it the restoration
of internal devolved Government as so clearly indicated many times by the British Prime
Minister since this agreement was signed? If Britain once again wishes to get away from
the public gaze and international scrutiny, this must not be allowed to be sanctioned by
this Dil. We must not allow our members in the Conference to act as a screen to cover
British actions. Our public servants, who will be constantly involved in this, must not be
seen to be involved in any even unwitting attempt to conceal from the gaze of the world
any complaints, criticisms or proposals we have to make in respect of British failures and
injustices in the North.
The Irish Government may make proposals in the Conference in so far as they relate to
the interests of the minority community but not on the wider issues which are at the
base of this tragic problem. Once devolution is achieved the Irish Government in this
Conference will be allowed no input on the matters which are devolved. This agreement
suggest an intention on the part of Britain to use the Irish representation on the
Conference as a shelter before the world if devolution fails to come about, but the input
is to be minimal. The Conference may be used [2730] to put forward the views of the Irish
Government yesterday the British Prime Minister said make the
representationsWhere the interests of the minority community are significantly or
especially affected. Despite the difficulty of defining the word significantly it is quite
clear that the role of the Irish delegates will be minimal.
The British Government have had to face public opinion throughout the world since 1974
without a devolved administration to hide behind. The response from our partners
throughout the world to this, spontaneous though it may have been, may not have been
the consequence of detailed consideration. Nonetheless, that response may be an
expression and a consequence of the constant international attention which Irish
Governments in recent years I was involved in this like others have succeeded in
promoting. Are we to limit our right to raise these issues internationally? Will we provide
cover for the basic injustices that are at the root of the problem in Northern Ireland in a
charade of a Conference the agenda and proceedings of which will be secret? Our
Government will be presented as being partly responsible for policy in the North without
having any real authority to affect it. Criticism will be kept down and we may be forced
into a position of giving a new lease of life to the very cause of the problem, the partition
of this country. In fact, the reference constantly throughout the agreement to the minority
community suggests I am not saying deliberately a partitionist approach.
Are the Nationalists of the North henceforth to be seen as a minority not just by us but in
the eyes of the world before which this agreement is now to be registered? If there is a
minority there must be a majority. Are we now to concede that the consequence of a
partition which we have always opposed confers a democratic right to the majority in a
condition that defies democracy? It seems clear that as far as the Nationalist community
in the North are concerned, this secret Conference will offer far less protection than the
open diplomacy [2731] between sovereign Governments which has been a very healthy
feature of recent years. No longer will the Minister for Foreign Affairs be addressing his
protests to the British Government openly, he will be confined to putting forward
proposals privately in a conference the members of which will have a special interest in
making it work. Their task will be to dampen down Nationalists' grievances.

The Irish Government and their representatives must not be silenced by this agreement
and the Nationalists must not become as alienated from them as they were from
Stormont. The great risk of this Conference is that the Irish Government have accepted
responsibility without power and without getting anything in return to formalise the
relationship of constitutional Nationalists, for instance, with our Houses of the
Oireachtas. No Nationalist from the North may sit in either Dil or Seanad without being
disbarred from the principal elected body of Northern Ireland if and when devolution
comes about. We cannot allow a situation to emerge where Nationalists will have no
parliamentary way of presenting their point of view to a Government who take
responsibility for representing them.

If the machinery of the Conference fails, or if the good faith of the British Government is
not forthcoming, this Conference could be a recipe for further tragedy not only in the
North of Ireland but in our jurisdiction also. As long as the Republic is sovereign and
independent its voice cannot be silenced. Its voice may not be as effective as we might
wish, but at least it can be used with credibility and standing. We cannot cede the right to
criticise the administration of affairs in the North in our open bilateral negotiations with
the British Government and before the family of nations in the organisations to which we
have acceded.
I should like to make specific reference to the financial package and the support
internationally in that respect. I know a little about financial packages. I was Minister for
Foreign Affairs when the Carter initiative came through after detailed negotiations with us
in Government. [2732] The condition there was not just a Conference of this kind but an
acceptable agreement and total devolution and support from both Governments within
the North of Ireland. We achieved that at that time. As Minister for Foreign Affairs I
managed to introduce the European Community to their obligation. I should like to recall
that the role of the European Community we note and welcome their interest in this
connection has long since been raised. I should like to refer specifically to 1977 when
I, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the first time I must stress that raised and got
support from the Foreign Ministers of the Community for cross-Border projects to relieve
the economic pressures in those areas. Since that time the Leader of the SDLP, John
Hume will acknowledge this in the relatively short period I spent in the Commission I
managed to get Commission support for major proposals for the North of Ireland in
respect of integrated programmes right across Northern Ireland. Let no one suggest that
what we are hearing now is being heard for the first time. The record is there to prove
that in recent years support was already on the way
I should like to mention one reserve. The Minister, Deputy Noonan, indicated that we
were going to get a package of the order of 500 million, but the State Department is
quoted in yesterday's Daily Telegraph as saying clearly that there was no commitment to
any specific package. One has to ask: is this another indication of the vague hopes and
intentions? Is it not quite extraordinary that we are told that had the agreement been
signed a day earlier it could have given rise to an agreement on financial support? That
has to be either a terrible mistake in timing or, quite frankly, a deliberate decision in view
of the fact that no such commitment has been given. I hope, believe and expect it will but
let us not express vague hopes until such time as the matter has been finalised and we
have seen the effect of it here and in the North of Ireland.
As late as yesterday in the House of Commmons, the British Prime
Minister [2733] indicated that, representations made by the Irish Republic to the proposed
Inter-governmental Conference will not normally be made public. Surely the effect of
this agreement cannot be to confine us to making representations in private where
previously we had won the right not only to make representations but to express strong
and trenchant criticisms in public.

With regard to the impact of this agreement on Articles 2 and 3 of our Constitution it
must be restated again that these Articles do not represent a claim by the South on the
North they never could and never should but a statement of the territorial integrity
of the whole nation. In that nation to which we aspire and which is enshrined in our
Constitution, there is no place for domination by a majority over a minority. The very
existence of Partition has spawned these terms and the nation that has so consistently
argued in favour of equal rights for all in every area of conflict throughout the world
cannot now reverse our policy and acknowledge the existence of permanent majorities
or minorities within our own country.

Much has been made of the provision in Article 1 which declares that: if in the future a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the
establishment of a united Ireland, they the Governments will introduce and support in the
respective Parliaments, legislation to give effect to that wish. Who is to determine how
this wish is to be expressed or how clearly it is to be expressed? Who is to initiate the
machinery for expressing the formal consent referred to in the article? If the British
Government refuse to propose a referendum or to launch the necessary procedure, this
article will have no effect.
In the final analysis an agreement which is stated, and on the part of our Government
genuinely intended, to promote reconciliation let me acknowledge that may have
the unforeseen consequence of maintaining division and dissension. Already the
reaction of the Unionist population, and their representatives, demonstrates very clearly
their [2734] distrust of the British Government and their motives in this connection.
The time has now arrived for us in the spirit of the Forum report to acknowledge the role
and contribution of the Unionist population on this island. The Taoiseach has many times
referred to his own Protestant background which is undoubtedly a matter of respect. I
can make no such claim in family ties of blood beyond the fact that since boyhood I
remember with great pride and affection, the visits of many Protestant Orangemen to our
home in Tipperary, people who had befriended my father in the years he spent in Belfast
after his release from Belfast jail during the War of Independence. I have been privileged
to know and respect their independence and integrity and to appreciate even more fully
the unlimited role which they can play in a new Ireland where a future based on co-
operation and understanding will offer new promise and new hope for all the people of
this island.
The Republic to which Thomas McDonagh, a son of Cloughjordan in the constituency I
am proud to represent which is a happily integrated Protestant and Catholic community,
was committed was one based not on domination by one tradition over another but on
the recognition that stability and peace in Ireland could only come through arrangements
which accommodate both of the main Irish traditions, the Republican tradition and the
Unionist tradition, no majorities, no minority. Let us not forget it. Both are Irish traditions
and if we are to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation, both will have
to come together in agreement and harmony.
We in the Republican tradition are proud of our past. We remember 1916 and Thomas
McDonagh with pride and satisfaction. Those in the Unionist tradition take pride, and
rightly, in their past, in Derry, Enniskillen and the Boyne. We understand and respect
their feeling of pride. The debates of the past are matters for historians, not for
politicians. Our obligation is to the present and our aim is to build for the future political
structures

I hope that if the agreement goes [2735] through it will not create further divisions between
minorities and majorities but that rather it will be the beginning of something much richer.
It is for those reasons that our reservations are genuinely expressed. All of us welcome
the fact that the debate in the House has been conducted in a calm and reasoned
manner and I hope nothing will be said to misunderstand or misrepresent our role in
Opposition. We have an obligation as an Opposition to question and seek answers. I
hope the answers to some of the questions I have raised will be forthcoming before the
debate concludes or otherwise it will not have served its purpose.
Finally, I should like to re-echo what our leader said yesterday. All of us, particularly
members of our party, are conscious of the fact that, as constitutional politicians we
cannot and must not ever cede the ground to those who have shamed the very meaning
of republicanism. If the risk of that cession is there, all of us will be guilty at least of an
oversight or something much more serious. For that reason I plead with the House, and
the Government speakers who will be responding, not just to engage in general vague
commendations and hopes of reconciliation. We all share those hopes but I appeal to
them to answer our reservations and explain to us in particular if the terms of the
agreement will give effect to the intentions and cannot be used to give effect to the
intentions that all of us will totally and utterly oppose

Mr. Cluskey: I have been a little over 20 years in this House and
in all that time, in all the issues that have come before the House, I
have never felt the same sense of responsibility as I do in contributing
to this debate. That is because the issue before the House is one that
can have very far reaching effects indeed on the whole future
development of this island. It can have those effects either for good or
for evil,
At the outset, I would like to make one thing perfectly clear. As far as I am concerned,
the people who have engaged [2736] in these negotiations have been motivated at all
times by one over-riding consideration, the preservation of human life on this island and
reconciliation between the two traditions in Northern Ireland. They have worked
unceasingly, not only through their political careers and for that effort that they have
made and I know will continue to make, I salute them.
Rules have been laid down for this debate and I think, very sensible self-imposed
restraints. In order to ensure that I do not cross over these, I must say this about the
Fianna Fil position, I do not agree with it full stop. As far as rules go and apart from
the one that I have mentioned, I have made a personal decision that I am going to
dispense with rules that one normally imposes on oneself speaking on major political
issues. Long time serving Members of the Dil, used to political life, usually consider
their political careers and I have done it over the years; every politician who is neither
very foolish nor very naive does it. I am suspending that consideration. I am making no
attempt whatsoever, in my contribution to this debate, to cover my political backside. I
feel and have always felt with regard to the tragedy of Northern Ireland that one is not
entitled to have any other allegiance that would supersede the preservation of human life
and one must make any and every contribution possible to bring some form of peace
and normality to our fellow Irish men and women of all traditions. I intend to use that as
my only criterion in my comments here.
I have fears about the possible outcome of this agreement. I wish it well; I think most
people of goodwill wish it well. However, wishing it well would not make it work. All the
goodwill and good faith of people on either side British or Irish Governments will
not make it work. As is clearly established in the agreement itself, it can only work if it
has the co-operation and participation of both communities within Northern Ireland. I
must say that I am less than optimistic about [2737] the participation or co-operation of
any Unionist in Northern Ireland to this agreement. As the Taoiseach and the Tnaiste
have rightly said, this agreement, if it were to work, would help to defeat the men of
violence in Northern Ireland, it would draw away support from them. I accept that and I
know what is motivating our negotiators in this to defeat the men of violence and to
stop the killing. But the other side of that coin is that if the agreement does not work, if
they can be the losers in one situation, they can be the winners in the other. If anyone
were taking bets at this moment looking at the reaction right across the whole spectrum
of Unionism, the odds would not be on this agreement working.
Dealing still with the North, and I see this agreement in two parts its effect on
Northern Ireland and its possible effect on this part of the island we had a
Sunningdale experience that lasted for five months, of an Executive shared by both
communities. There is a considerable difference between that arrangement and the
present one. First of all, Sunningdale had the backing of all parties in this House; this
one quite clearly has not, so we are starting off, tragically in my opinion, with a division
within Dil ireann on this agreement and a division which can widen and deepen as
things possibly may develop over the next few weeks or few months. We also had the
active participation and the support of the majority, in my opinion, of Unionists within
Northern Ireland for the Sunningdale arrangement and, in fact, some of their leading
men Brian Faulkner, for instance, a Unionist, and a hard Unionist all his life, and a
very astute politician to boot was not only supporting it, he was presiding over that
Executive. That is not the situation today.

We have reaction from the wild men on the Unionist side and God knows they have
them, just as the Nationalist side have them right down to where we see the
moderator of the Presbyterian Church now going to No. 10 Downing Street to register
their fears on the agreement. That would lead me to believe that the possibility of this
agreement as now [2738] presented working is very slim indeed. I say that and I hope that
everyone listening to me believes that I say that with very deep regret indeed. There was
a genuine effort made in this to achieve a very desirable end. However, wishing for
something, hoping for something, wanting something does not make that something
become a reality.
I believe that there are very big dangers in the present situation. They are not dangers
confined, in my opinion, to the northern part of this country. Again, I am saying things
here and I am taking no account of political cover for my back because one has to say
them when one thinks of the over 2,000 people who have been killed on this island over
the past 15 or 16 years. Please God there will be no more, but the possibility exists of
more joining that number. There is therefore deep obligation on us to speak out truthfully
and honestly on this.
In this agreement there is an arrangement for an Irish Minister and Irish civil servants to
be involved with the British Secretary of State and British civil servants in the
administration of Northern Ireland. There have been different presentations of this: how
consultative is consultative? On our side, the Taoiseach, the Tnaiste and other
people, have piped up that this is more than consultative. It is not merely a consultative
role; it is somewhat more than consultative. It falls somewhere between being
consultative and being joint authority. It is clearly being conveyed that if it is more than
consultative there is a degree of responsibility for the administration of the North and for
the security forces operating in the North. Certainly I would not accept responsibility for
all the security forces in Northern Ireland at present. To me the possibility of the
repercussions of that arrangement on this part of the island raises grave fears indeed.
We have had the difficulties in Northern Ireland over the past 15 or 16 years terrible
sufferings, killings and atrocities. We have had some down here too but nothing of the
same degree. Does any sane, responsible person think that the happenings on this
island over the last 16 [2739] years have not, to some extent, destabilised our democratic
institutions? If one looks at our democratic institutions at present one will see that there
are many things assailing them. We have very large unemployment figures. We have a
population who, to say the least, are sick to the teeth with a taxation system
acknowledged by all, Government and Opposition to be unjust and which places an
almost intolerable burden on one sector. We have had an escalation of violent crime, a
very considerable escalation. Over a period of 15 or 16 years all of these things tend to
destablise and, let us acknowledge it openly, lead to widespread disillusionment with this
House and a questioning of its relevance. All of these ingredients are very dangerous in
any democracy. Let us not under-estimate that.
I intend to speak up. I have said we have had wild men on the Unionist side in Northern
Ireland. Of course, we have seen the atrocities and the cold blooded murder perpetrated
by the IRA over that period. Let us not just look at them and say: we will have none of
that. We all know, if we want to openly acknowledge it that things could develop in
Northern Ireland in the foreseeable future and the possibility of their developing under
this agreement for which we could be perceived by our own people as being
responsible and which could have very serious effects on this part of the island. I am
going to ask openly: What was the mood in this part of the island when, not the UDR or
the B Specials, but a British para-regiment cut loose and killed 13 people on Bloody
Sunday? What was the mood, the reaction here? It was very widespread and we all
know that to be the case. If, and God forbid, an atrocity of that type were to recur with
our people sitting in Belfast accepting a degree of responsibility for it, I shudder to think
what that might do and what a destabilising effect that might have on this part of the
island. We must face up to these matters. We must put them out on the floor and at least
address ourselves to that possibility. [2740] I believe, and I have always believed, that a
start in trying to solve the situation in Northern Ireland can be made only within Northern
Ireland. The main thrust of this agreement is to try to get the Unionist people, the SDLP
and constitutional Nationalists, to sit down and arrive at an arrangement that would allow
them, as fellow Ulstermen, to have a power-sharing arrangement at executive level and
there is an inbuilt incentive in this agreement for just such an endeavour. In this
agreement there is a mechanism whereby, if the Unionists and constitutional Nationalist
parties can sit down and arrive at an agreement for devolved Government, certain
aspects of the administration of Northern Ireland would be taken from the Inter-
governmental Conference and handed over to them. That provision was inserted, very
wisely, as one of the most appealing aspects of the agreement.
Let us look at the situation from the Unionist side. Unionists would not concede power
sharing at executive level since the fall of Sunningdale. As the Taoiseach said in his
introductory remarks, many of us here still believed that power sharing offered the only
real chance of a beginning to the solution of the Northern Ireland tragic situation. The
Taoiseach said in his remarks I do not necessarily have to quote him directly that
he had held that view even after 1980, that some time after 1980 he sought a solution in
a wider context. I still hold the view that that offers the only chance of a beginning to the
solution.

One could readily see from the television interview last night with the Moderator of the
Presbyterian Church how deep a shock the whole Unionist community has received
through the emergence of this agreement. What may not have been acceptable and
would have been dismissed out of hand last month might seem much more realistic now.
That is also implicit in this agreement.
In my opinion the Unionists will not in any circumstances co-operate or participate in
anything that involves the Inter-governmental Conference to be established under the
agreement. That is an [2741] arrangement which the Nationalist community in Northern
Ireland have sought over the years. I am fully aware of that. The Taoiseach, the
Tnaiste, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, John Hume and Samus Mallon have all said
one thing the agreement is fine if we can implement it. That is where we are now. It is
not a matter of who did what in 1916 or 1974 or 1980. We must address ourselves to the
problem of where we go from here. How do we get some normality into the political life
of Northern Ireland? That is the only priority.
In another context as a trade union official I have seen workers in a factory demanding
an increase of, perhaps, 30 per cent and being advised by those responsible for carrying
on the negotiations that their demand might have certain consequences if it were
conceded, yet being pushed into demanding the 30 per cent increase and having no
alternative but to pursue that aim. They were in full agreement with the aspirations of the
people they were representing; they could see the logic and justice of their claim and
totally identify with them; but they could also see that the successful pursuing of the
claim could have the effect of closing the factory. There are no winners if a factory
closes.
This agreement is not worth the paper it is written on if it cannot be implemented and I
do not believe it can be implemented if we exercise our full rights under its terms. We
and the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland have achieved in a solemn
agreement, signed and published, the right of an Irish Government to have direct input
into the affairs of Northern Ireland. We all have rights in certain situations and certain
aspects of our lives but many times we may choose for various reasons not to exercise
those rights. I am not suggesting that this major achievement on behalf of the Nationalist
community should be put aside and dismantled. I am suggesting that if it would allow
serious discussions to commence between the two communities in Northern Ireland for
an executive power-sharing arrangement, it might be extremely beneficial if [2742] we
were to say that, in the event of such a power-sharing executive being established and
maintained, we would seriously consider not actively exercising our rights for the
continuance of the arrangement at Conference level.
We may disagree profoundly with the Unionist viewpoint, but let us recognise the reality
that once they see us actively participating in governing they will not operate at any level
within Northern Ireland. If that happens let nobody be under any illusion. I greatly fear
that what we have seen in that part of the island up to now would count as very little
compared to what we might see in the future. I also emphasise my fear that these
developments would affect the whole island.
I set out the rules for what I would say in my opening remarks. I am not seeking to score
political points. I have been a member of the Labour Party since the age of 16 years. I
have always adhered to the party and always tried to further their views. Nothing,
including the Labour party or any other considerations, personal or political, supersedes
the overriding consideration I have always had in relation to Northern Ireland the
preservation of human life. It is in that spirit that I have contributed to this debate.

Dr. O'Hanlon: I fully support the amendment in the name of

Deputy Vincent Brady, the Fianna Fil Chief Whip, which was clearly
enunciated in the House yesterday by the Leader of our party. I would
support any effective measures which might be taken to improve the
position of the people in the Six Counties, particularly the
Nationalists. Having listened to the Taoiseach's opening statement, I
am convinced that we in Fianna Fil made the right decision in
submitting our amendment which, I believe, is more in keeping with
the wishes of the Irish people and a truer representation of the
findings of the Forum report.
Article 1 of the agreement gives no commitment to a united Ireland. I would like to have
seen a declaration by the [2743] British that they believe it would be in the best interests of
all sections of the communities on both islands if Ireland were to be united on terms
acceptable to all the people of Northern Ireland. That has been the position of the
Nationalist parties here through the years. They would have wished the British
Government to make such a declaration. The SDLP have also suggested that the British
Government should make such a declaration. Indeed, the British Government, following
the partition of this country, recognised that eventually the country would have to be
united. Had such a declaration been included in Article 1 it would have been a positive
step in that direction.
Article 1 of the agreement contains a declaration that if in future the majority of the
people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a
united Ireland, they will introduce and support legislation to give effect to that wish. That
is not entirely new because section (1) of the British (Northern Ireland) Constitution Act,
1973, says something similar. It declares that Northern Ireland remains part of Her
Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom and it is hereby affirmed that in no
event will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions
and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people in Northern
Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with section 1
of this Act. In other words, in the last official recognition by law in the British Parliament
it was recognised that if a majority in the Six Counties decided as a result of a poll that
they wanted a united Ireland, the British Government would not stand in their way.
Therefore, there is nothing new in that section and while it has been stated on numerous
occasions by successive British Prime Ministers over the last 15 years it is not the first
occasion on which that was written into law by Parliament in Britain.
This part of the declaration was never accepted previously by an Irish
Government. [2744] It is now incorporated in the Anglo-Irish agreement. Article 1 (a)
affirms that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the
consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This is legitimising the prop to
the Unionists and writing it into an international treaty which will be registered at the
United Nations. This guarantee has always been opposed by all Nationalists, including
the four parties to the Forum. It is unfortunate that the Taoiseach should have moved so
far from the position taken by one of his predecessors, John A. Costello, who with the
then Leader of the Opposition, Eamon de Valera, proposed a declaration which was
adopted unanimously by Dil ireann asserting the indefeasible right of the Irish nation
to the unity and integrity of the national territory. That has been the position of all the
parties in this State since then.
In the same declaration in May 1949, they also condemned the British legislation which
first introduced the guarantee to the Unionists in 1949 in the Ireland Act following the
declaration of a republic. The Forum represented at least 90 per cent of the
constitutional Nationalists on this island and chapter 4, paragraph 1, stated that this fails
to take account of the origin of the problem, namely the imposed division of Ireland
which created an artificial political majority in the North that has resulted in political
deadlock in which decisions have been based on sectarian loyalties. Chapter 5,
paragraph 1, states that the guarantee has in its practical application had the effect of
inhibiting dialogue necessary for political progress. It has had the additional effect of
removing the incentive which would otherwise exist on all sides to seek a political
solution. It is quite clear that the Forum were totally opposed to the guarantee and saw it
as a major stumbling block to any progress in a solution to the tragic situation which
exists.
Following the Sunningdale Agreement, Jack Lynch said that we wanted to maintain the
substance and principle of the original motion passed in 1949. That [2745] was a
reference to the unanimous declaration of this House to which I referred earlier. Despite
the Forum's condemnation of the guarantee, it has been included in the present Anglo-
Irish Agreement and for the first time in a legal document, an international treaty, which
will be registered at the United Nations.
The British Prime Minister has no commitment to Irish unity in the future and she made
that very clear on Monday in the House of Commons when, in reply to Adam Butler who
asked her to confirm that a united Ireland was not the aim of her Government, she said
Most certainly not, I confirm that. She also stated in the House of Commons and on
television that the agreement contained the most formal commitment ever given by an
Irish Government about the status of Northern Ireland. In negotiating this agreement, the
Irish Government started from a weak position because of the Taoiseach's attitude to
Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. On numerous occasions he has given his views on
these Articles and this week he stated in Cork that he regretted their inclusion in the
Constitution. Some years ago he started a constitutional crusade to have them removed
from the Constitution. This was a weakness in the negotiations because our negotiators
were opposed to Article 2 of the Constitution. Article 1 of the agreement is a
contradiction of Article 2 of the Constitution. Article 2 of the agreement provides for the
establishment of a Conference at which the Irish Government will have the power to put
forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland, for example,
political matters, security and related matters, legal matters and the promotion of cross-
Border co-operation. The Irish Government will only have the power to put forward
views. The word consultation does not appear in the agreement. The British Prime
Minister and the Taoiseach have made it clear that decision-making will be retained for
Northern Ireland by the United Kingdom. This puts our Government in an impossible
position as they will only be able to put forward views. They will be assuming a
certain [2746]responsibility for actions but there is no indication that their views will even
be listened to. Listening to the Taoiseach yesterday in the House, I failed to understand
how he could say that this provision goes beyond a consultative role. I believe that the
power to put forward views falls very far short of a consultative role. While our
Government can put forward views there is no indication anywhere in the agreement or
indeed from anything that has been said since that the British Government would consult
the Irish Government about any matter.
In a leading article on 10 November in The Sunday Times it is stated:
Dr. FitzGerald's Government would have responsibilities to the Nationalist majority
without the power to exercise them.
That puts the Government in a very difficult position because they will just have the
power to put forward views, to make proposals, but there is no indication that any of
these will be accepted. The Government do not have any authority other than to put
forward views.
Article 3 provides for a secretariat to be established by the two Governments to service
the Conference. There seems to be some doubt as to where the secretariat will be
based. The Taoiseach informed us yesterday that it would be based in Belfast, but the
British Prime Minister made it very clear in a television interview last Friday that the
decision to place the secretariat would depend on the advice of security chiefs. In other
words, she did not state that the secretariat would be in Belfast or indeed in the Six
Counties. The agreement provides for devolved government in the Six Counties. In his
opening address the Taoiseach stated:
If devolved government in Northern Ireland can be agreed upon the Inter-governmental
Conference now being established shall no longer have any competence in those areas
affected by devolution.
This means that in the event of a fully devolved administration in the Six
Counties [2747] the Irish dimension would go into voluntary liquidation. In other words, as
each department would be devolved the Irish Government no longer would have a role
to play, and in the event of a return to a Stormont administration the Irish Government
would no longer be involved. In my view, this means we would have a return to the
Stormont type Government, with the added disadvantage of an internationally binding
agreement accepting the guarantee. This would be totally unacceptable not only to the
people of the Six Counties but to those in the whole of Ireland.
All the democratic rules which apply throughout Europe and which we all cherish never
existed in the Six Counties. There can be only two forms of administration there, power
sharing between the various parties, which is not the democratic way in other European
countries, and the alternative, majority rule, through which the artifically contrived
majority, as they did for 60 years, would have total control. The only settlement which
can bring lasting peace and stability must transcend the present Six Counties boundary,
and this can best be done by a constitutional Conference involving the British and Irish
Governments and both communities in the Six Counties, who could then formulate a
new constitution for the whole nation. That is what we should have been looking for, but
we have missed the opportunity. The opposition given in the Forum report pointed in that
direction. It was the Forum's wish that there would be a permanent settlement to the
tragic situation that exists today.
As a representative here for two of the Ulster counties, I resent the application of the
name Ulster to the Six Counties. If the people who use this terminology, members of the
British Parliament and the British Press, studied the geography of Ireland they would
have a better understanding of the artificial nature of the Six Counties boundary and of
the reason why it was set up as a State to ensure the permanent majority of
one [2748] community over the other. If the suggested constitutional Conference were set
up, the Taoiseach said yesterday, the Unionists would boycott such a Conference. As
long as the guarantee is there, there is no need for the Unionists to interest themselves
in such a Conference. It is in the interests of the Unionists, as it is in the interest of all the
people on this island, to have a permanent settlement which would bring peace and
harmony. The only way that can come about is through the unity of the country. I believe
the Unionists should have and would have a say in the formulation of a Constitution for
the whole island. That is what the Taoiseach should have been looking for.
Article 5 of the agreement states that the subjects for consideration will include
measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral
arrangements, the use of flags and emblems and the avoidance of social and economic
discrimination. Article 5 (b) states:

The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but the
possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the Irish Government in
their jurisdiction shall not be excluded.

I hope that whoever is replying to the debate will explain that part of that Article and tell
us the implications it has for the Republic. For example, are there implications in it for a
change in the electoral arrangements? The Article states that the Irish Government may
put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of the police authorities.
The joint communique issued after the Summit states that the conference at its first
meeting will consider:
(a) the application of the principle that the armed forces (which include the Ulster
Defence Regiment), operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular
objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional
circumstances, [2749] there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct
contact with the communities.
I attended the conference of the SDLP before this agreement was signed and I listened
to the unanimous call for the disarmament of the UDR. It was stated at the conference
that a former Chief Constable of the RUC had said that the regiment should be
disbanded. That has been the view of the minority community in the North and indeed of
our people in the South that the UDR should be disbanded, that they are a sectarian
force which succeeded the B Specials which were disbanded. The only commitment we
got in the agreement is that they will still be there, still operational, but that they will have
an RUC man with them. It is reasonable to say that no Nationalist in the Six Counties will
be happy with that. The behaviour of the UDR is well enough known to all of us.
Our Garda and our Army are doing an excellent job in Border areas and I am concerned
that as a result of this agreement there will be the danger of our security forces being
drawn into much closer liaison with a security force who are discredited as is evident
from the numerous reports of senior British legal personnel down through the years,
apart from what we know about these forces.
In an article headed, Fixing Ulster, in the current issue of The Economist, there is the
comment that Mrs. Thatcher has won, but by no concession of principle, a new sword for
fighting terrorism and a new ploughshare for uprooting the Irish soil in which it grows. If
that is a reference to this side of the Border it is a reference that I would resent.
Everybody here knows that 99 per cent of the violence in Northern Ireland originated in
that part of the country. I abhor violence either in Northern Ireland or elsewhere. Human
life is sacred and should be respected. There is no need for this massive uprooting of
the Irish soil as The Economist puts it.
In today's issue of the Financial Times[2750] in an article written by A. H. Hermann and
Raymond Hughes it is stated that the agreement provides for British proposals to be
made for certain aspects of Government within the Republic as well as the other way
around, mostly in matters of security, and that a tough British stance on extradition and
on cross-Border joint patrols would demonstrate that the Republic has agreed also to a
degree of informal joint authority on its own territory. I would be very concerned at the
possibility of our security forces becoming involved in closer liaison with what are a
discredited security force.
I am concerned also because the British Prime Minister stated in the House of
Commons on Monday that the proposals and the views of the Irish Government would
not be made public. Regardless of who might be in power here and putting forward
proposals or views or accepting any liaison with the security forces on the other side of
the Border particularly where that might involve joint patrols, as is suggested in
the Financial Times this morning, the Government of the day would have a duty to
inform this House of their proposals and thereby give to the House an opportunity to
make a decision in that regard.
A much more radical change than that outlined in the communiqu would be necessary
to make the security forces acceptable to the Nationalist community. There are many
aspects of the administration of justice which need radically and urgently to be altered.
For example, the use of plastic bullets which has been the cause of so much death and
injury should cease, while the supergrass trials which were the subject of a motion in this
House last year should be abolished. It is interesting to note that the Government's
response to that motion was not to condemn the supergrass system but merely to note
it. Although the agreement was signed only on Friday last, the British Prime Minister has
said already that she does not see how mixed courts could work. One may ask if she is
standing back now from the spirit of the agreement.
The Taoiseach said it was the intention of his Government to accede as soon
as [2751] possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. It is a
matter for concern that persons charged with political offences should be handed over to
a jurisdiction in which there is so little confidence. Persons alleged to have committed
such offences should be tried under our judicial system.
The only way in which the Northern Ireland problem can be settled is through peaceful
means. Though I am disappointed with the outcome of the agreement I consider the
Taoiseach to have been right to continue the negotiations at intergovernmental level,
something which he criticised the leader of our party for in 1980. The then Deputy
FitzGerald believes that the route to progress is through the Unionist community. I am
pleased the Taoiseach has now accepted the route initiated by Deputy Haughey.
Article 9 of the agreement deals with cross-Border co-operation on security, economic,
social and cultural matters. It relates to the conference setting out a programme of work
to be undertaken by the Commissioner of the Garda and the Chief Constable of the RUC
and, where appropriate, groups of officials.
Section (b) of that article provides that the conference shall have no operational
responsibilities. The main thrust of the agreement is based on security. Our Government
are placing themselves in an impossible position by accepting responsibility for security
without having executive powers. I should like them to elaborate more on the matter of
cross-Border economic co-operation. Will that co-operation benefit both sides of the
Border? It has been recognised for many years that as a result of Partition the Border
region of the Twenty-six Counties has been deprived. One need only consider the towns
along the Border for evidence of this. Clones which is surrounded on three sides by the
Border is an example of that deprivation. There is no indication in the agreement that
there will be any special economic assistance for those counties on both sides of the
Border. There has been EC aid by way of various cross-Border economic
funds, [2752] but is there to be any special aid now from that quarter as a result of this
agreement?
For a number of years there have been in operation cross-Border development
committees consisting of elected and executive members of local authorities. Do the
Government intend to support efforts of this kind? They have not done so in the past.
In his opening statement the Taoiseach referred to the implementation in the agreement
of Forum principles. I had the honour to be a member of the Forum, a body which
represented 90 per cent of constitutional Nationalists on the island. The Forum in their
report were very clear regarding the structure they would like to see emerge. That is
outlined in Chapter 5.7. The principal recommendations of the Forum were rejected
totally by the British Prime Minister in her now famous out, out, out speech.
I am concerned, too, at the legitimising of the guarantee in an international agreement of
no commitment to work for a united Ireland. I am concerned also at the implications for
our security forces and the lack of any positive commitment to a radical change in the
administration of justice in the Six Counties. A great opportunity has been missed to
progress towards a settlement which would bring lasting peace and harmony to all the
people, Nationalists and Unionists, in the whole island.

I was not around in 1921 in the historic days of the setting up of this State and the
winning of our national freedom. I can only look at those events through the window of
history. If one could draw the blind of history down, one would realise that what has been
achieved in recent days is as good a starting point as could have been achieved at any
time in our past from which we can progress and develop our country.
I had the honour to serve as a Fine Gael Member on the New Ireland Forum. I was
privileged to be a part of that historic political momentum. While its perferred
recommendations were not acceptable in any of the three forms to the
British [2754] Government, breaching as they did that Government's definition of
sovereignty, it did bring before the peoples of this trouble-ridden island the realities of
political life and the difficulties of today. While the recommendations were naturally
nationally biased, they played an important role in bringing to the attention of all Irish
people at home and abroad the degree of determination which democratic, nationally-
minded and constitutional politicians in this part of the country, and some from the North,
were prepared to display and implement in order that this sad saga might be brought to
a new plane with more positive and beneficial results for all. The achievement of the
historic Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 focuses on the reality of political life in Ireland
today. The measure of the old and oftentimes misdirected republicanism has been laid to
rest.
The rules covering this debate are logical and have a common sense approach. It would
be very easy to resurrect the ghosts of the past which have wandered through this
House at various times. This agreement has bred a new understanding, a realistic and
enlightened form of nationalism in its truest sense. The old ideas belong to a different
era. We can justly take a sense of pride from what I consider to be turning the country
towards moderation and peace. Let there be no hysterical screaming or emotional
elation at the new direction in which Irish nationalism is pointing. There will not be any
promises of unity within ten years, as was promised by some Fianna Fil speakers in
earlier times. Instant unity, unlike instant coffee, is not readily available.
This agreement must work. To do nothing is to maintain the status quo and this means
the continuation of murder, mayhem and carnage; it also means countinuing fear,
trepidation and human suffering on all sides to an intense degree. It makes one wonder
what kind of mentality, from whatever tradition, brings young people or their elders into a
position where they shoot and maim people. The perpetrators of violence and murder
must be shown that democracy can, and [2755] will, prevail and all moderate and
reasonable opinion must be led to understand this without fear to their rights, dignity,
values or ethos.
This agreement must work. To do nothing is to maintain the status quo and this means
the continuation of murder, mayhem and carnage; it also means countinuing fear,
trepidation and human suffering on all sides to an intense degree. It makes one wonder
what kind of mentality, from whatever tradition, brings young people or their elders into a
position where they shoot and maim people. The perpetrators of violence and murder
must be shown that democracy can, and [2755] will, prevail and all moderate and
reasonable opinion must be led to understand this without fear to their rights, dignity,
values or ethos.
This agreement falls short of executive functions and goes beyond a mere consultative
role. It is the best that could have been achieved at this time, and it must work. It is a
sophisticated, intelligent agreement; it is also very fragile and delicate. For 700 years
people have been speaking about the problem of Northern Ireland and the domination of
this country by British rule. The distinguished journalist and editor of The Spectator, Paul
Johnson, outlined what had been attempted by various British administrations during the
centuries. At the start of the last decade he wrote:
In Ireland over the centuries we have tried possible formula direct rule, indirect rule,
genocide, apartheid, puppet parliaments, real parliaments, martial law, civil law,
colonisation, land reform and partition. Nothing has worked. The only solution we have
not tried is absolute and unconditional withdrawal.
It has been accepted by politicians in this part of the country over the years that to
attempt to unite Ireland by force would undoubtedly lead to carnage and civil war.
Therefore a determined effort had to be made, and has been made, to do something in
the meantime. There is no point in talking about this unless we do something about it.

The implementation of this agreement is of crucial importance. The difficult work has
been done and great credit is due to the teams concerned. The drafting of the
agreement entailed many hours of detailed discussion over 18 months. Can we now
convince the Unionists of the validity of our case? Do we really care about Northern
Ireland? Its importance in our list of priorities in the Twenty Six Counties must be
considered. Have we tried over the last number of years to build this country into one
that would be attractive to the people in the North and elsewhere that would encourage
them to [2756] join us, to live in harmony with us, to prosper and develop? Have we really
tried that? I have heard rabid Republicans shout about the fourth green field and in many
cases their friends, relatives and spouses will have spent the day shopping in Northern
Ireland to the detriment of our economy. It is a twisted version of Nationalism that has
emerged over the years.
We can validly point to what has happened to people of different religious persuasions in
the Twenty-Six Counties. In this administration we have elected people of the Protestant
and Jewish persuasion. We appointed Jewish Lords Mayor in various cities and the late
President Childers was a Protestant who carried out his duties in an exemplary fashion.
Can we not convince people in the North by talking to them that this is not an
assumption of power by a Dublin Government or an attempt to overrun by force or
devious means the people of the Six Counties?
The Nationalist community can feel genuinely secure in that they will have as the
Permanent Representative at the Conference, Deputy Peter Barry, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who in his capacity as Minister has been accepted across the divide in
Northern Ireland as a reasonable, logical and determined individual. We could not find a
better person to take up the first appointment as Permanent Representative to the
Conference. It is important that Catholics and Nationalists can have their grievances and
difficulties aired at the Conference by a person of the stature of Deputy Peter Barry. The
British Prime Minister stated that the right of sovereignty over Northern Ireland is not
breached so far as the British Government are concerned. I am sure that the discussions
between the civil servants, the Ministers, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister went into
detail about the definition of determined efforts in the agreement.
It is of paramount importance that after the initial meetings of the Conference positive
progress comes from the discussions, otherwise people will say [2757] that this is merely
a propaganda exercise and a talking shop. I do not accept that it will be such but, as
Deputy Cluskey said this morning, we remember the deep tribal feelings that were
unleashed in this part of the country after the events of 1969-70. There are people on
both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland who are bad minded enough to attempt to
provoke similar happenings. In that context that courage and determination of the
delegation from the Twenty-Six Counties must be admired.
The Unionist position is shocking at this time. The comparison has already been made
that if tomorrow the British Prime Minister in conjunction with the President of Argentina
were to announce the appointment of a Minister or Commissioner to look at the Falkland
Islands, objective opinion might say that the writing was on the wall, that the British
intended to pull out. I am sure some Unionist opinion tends that way. The reverse would
happen here were we to have involvement by the RUC or Ministers of the Crown. The
agreement is delicate and fragile but it contains the seeds of progress which must be
acted upon.
The Fianna Fil attitude towards this agreement is somewhat unclear. The initial remarks
of the party leader implied total rejection. They seem to have mellowed somewhat. I
would have thought that the Leader of the Opposition, having got due recognition from
the Taoiseach for his part in initiating these Anglo-Irish discussions, would have
accepted this agreement for what it is worth although it might not go as far as he would
wish, while hoping to get back into power. Deputy Haughey may have felt that the
person to whom credit will go for sorting out the Northern Ireland question will achieve a
place in history of monumental proportions. Perhaps such a feeling spurred Deputy
Haughey to initally reject this historic agreement. I am sure moderate opinion in Fianna
Fil wants to accept this agreement and give it a chance to work.
I have spent ten years here as an elected representative and have seen the [2758] Office
of the Taoiseach occupied on six occasions. Since the foundation of the State we have
had a small number of Taoisigh. I am sure Fianna Fil opinion in a general
commonsense approach agree that this agreement should be given a chance to work.
There has been a general feeling of relief rather than surprise and opposition from other
sides towards the agreement. The agreement has the approval of world opinion and
local opinion. There is no point in people here saying they want unity. Everybody aspires
to unity. That aspiration has been recognised in the Forum and it has been recognised in
this agreement. It is the duty of politicians to legislate and lead and we must say how we
want to achieve unity. This agreement is a start. The average Nationalist opinion in
Northern Ireland in the context of unity would mean Brits out but that cannot happen for
obvious reasons. The process started here is distinct from the evolution of political ideas.
It is important to spell out the steps to unity. This agreement is the start of that process. It
starts on the path towards reconciliation and equality and makes an eventual approach
towards achieving the legitimate aspirations of all nationally minded people. It is
important that the momentum inherent in this agreement be maintained and highlighted
in a positive and beneficial way.
Unionists must understand that the three important items in Unionist feeling are
accommodated. They are their Protestantism, their Britishness and, to a degree, the
context of power which has been extremely important to them over generations. The
British Prime Minister said after the last Anglo-Irish agreement: We must not close our
eyes to new ideas. I am glad that after the Chequers Summit, which was not received
well in this country for many reasons, the Government here and the Taoiseach in
particular have been able to convince the British Prime Minister of the necessity for and
the validity of the case for attempting to do something about this very long standing and
bitter problem.
Through emigration and so on a very high percentage of people from my [2759] county
live in Britain and from speaking to them I realise that they feel that, if this agreement
can be implemented and seen to work for the benefit of Nationalists and all the people of
the North, the attitude of Irish people living in Britain towards the British Prime Minister in
the next election could be very different from what it was on the last occasion. It would
be ironic if, instead of seeing her as the devil in disguise, because her conviction and
strength held out and the agreement was implemented beneficially they supported her
and her party to a degree never experienced in the past.
It is important that the British Prime Minister should be seen as having the capacity and
strength of leadership to withstand Unionist reaction. I hope and trust that vigilance
abroad will protect everybody in the best way possible. All agreements have ripples and
difficulties and in that context this one is no different from any others signed over the
years. Probably people expect that there will be a reaction of one sort or another from
extremists in the context of violence and people must understand that that is possible,
but unity is preferable to and more acceptable and desirable than disunity, and to
maintain the status quo is not sufficient. We must point the way forward and indicate the
steps towards where we want to go for the achievement of everybody's legitimate
national aspiration.
Anglo-Irish relations will never be the same again. The lodging of this signed agreement
internationally with the UN changes for ever the status of Anglo-Irish relations. The
common perception in the streets of Ireland is that at this time world opinion Fine
Gael, Labour, the SDLP, the US Government, the Speaker of the House of Congress,
the British Government and others across the globe supports this agreement. On the
other hand, albeit for different reasons. Fianna Fil, Sinn Fin, Unionist opinion and the
DUP oppose it. Everybody with common sense can understand the economic benefit of
achieving better progress. North and [2760] South, than we have had to date. I understand
that this morning Congressman Biaggi mentioned $400 million for the economic benefit
of the North if this agreement is accepted by both Houses here. That will have to be
debated in the Houses in America. At present the IDA compete with the IDB for the
attraction of manufacturing industry into our country. That is a waste of effort and of
money in many cases and we have lost out as a country.
I would have thought that, having been in the front line of Nationalist politics in the North
through all these troubled years, the SDLP would have received unanimous Nationalist
support from this part of the country. If the SDLP did not back this agreement it would not
be worth the paper it is written on. Through the years the SDLP leaders, for whom I have
the greatest admiration, have been burdened with the pressures of Nationalist politics in
Northern Ireland and have performed exceptionally well. The hope expressed in some
Fianna Fil quarters that the Deputy Leader of the SDLP, Samus Mallon, would reject
this agreement is a monstrosity. He has been under tremendous pressure. I have great
admiration for him. He has a very keen understanding of the complex problems of the
North and has never been afraid to stand up and speak his mind on behalf of those
whom he represents. To attempt to pressurise him into not accepting this agreement
could have disastrous consequences
The implementation of the agreement is now our problem and I trust that in that area the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and his team will not be afraid to spell out to their
counterparts in Belfast the difficulties as we see them and as pointed out to them by
Nationalist opinion in the North. What happens when the delegation from this side raise
a problem which is not acceptable to the other side, when the Secretary of State says
that they do not accept our views on this matter? At the end of the day will the Taoiseach
have to telephone the British Prime Minister [2761] and say: Let us get this sorted out if
we can?
If support for the men of violence falls off, as it did during the power sharing executive of
1974 when Catholics and Nationalists could see that their representatives were in a
position to do something, that would be very beneficial. I would prefer to see a devolved
power structure in the North sooner rather than later. I would like to see the agreement
leading to that as rapidly as possible. The Inter-governmental Conference could then
withdraw from both areas that were not covered by their common brief.
We stand at a crossroads in our history. I trust that the effect of the agreement will be to
bring about a devolved power structure as soon as possible and that all traditions in the
North can be accommodated. There will be no all-party constitutional conference. We
had the Airlie House experiment in Washington with Fianna Fil, Fine Gael, Labour, The
Workers' Party, the SDLP, the DUP, the OUP, Alliance, Conservatives and the British
Labour Party represented around the one table. There were divergences of opinion,
extreme in some senses, and there were some areas of common ground. An emotional
debate at that conference centred on security, and this will be of paramount importance
in the context of this agreement. I am impressed by Robert Kennedy's words: Few men
have the greatness to bend history itself but each of us has the opportunity to change
events in our daily lives, and in the sum total of these changes shall be written the
history of the present generation. I trust that this agreement will write a new chapter in
Irish history.
I conclude by quoting the words of Dr. Paisley when he said recently, We are going to
show people that Ulster people have grit, courage and determination. I ask him and his
followers to use that grit, courage and determination not for the destruction of Ulster or of
the island but for its future development, prosperity and happiness. This agreement must
work. A line from Yeats is going through my head: Who knows what is yet to come? I
put my faith in this agreement. [2762] I put my trust in the Government who have brought it
about, and I hope and pray that the delegation led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs will
achieve positive, beneficial results for everybody on the island as a result of this
agreement.
Mr. Noonan: (Limerick West): I agree with Deputy Kenny's final
words expressing the hope that this agreement must work, and we all
hope it will work. Nevertheless, I must give the agreement a
somewhat guarded welcome. I have no doubt that the Taoiseach, his
officials and the Ministers concerned acted in all sincerity in drafting
and accepting this agreement, or that all concerned believed and felt
that they were working towards peace and stability in the North. That
is a noble and worthy objective. Unfortunately, that is as far as it
goes. There is nothing in the agreement which could not have been
obtained without reneging on a far more noble and worthy objective,
that of national unity. No matter how the Taoiseach tries to crawl
away from that reality, I am afraid he cannot escape it.
Debate adjourned.

Sitting suspended at 1.30 p.m. and resumed at 2.30 p.m.

http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates
%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail1985112000004
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND CONFLICT REGULATION- THE ANGLO-IRISH
AGREEMENT (1985) AND THE MECHANISMS OF CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications/discussionpapers/institutionalchangeandconflictregula
tion/todd%20-%20discussion%20paper%204.pdf
ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 Treaty Series
http://opac.oireachtas.ie/AWData/Library3/Library2/DL045908.pdf
Good Friday Agreement
At the beginning of 1998, the prospects for peace in Northern Ireland were poor. To
the untrained eye, plenty of positives had begun to emerge: multi-party talks had
been established in June 1996; Irish Republican Army (IRA) paramilitaries had
restored their ceasefire in July 1997; and, by September of that year, the political
representatives of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries were engaged in the
talks at Stormont in Belfast.
While all were undoubtedly significant breakthroughs in the peace process, problems
were still plentiful and a successful outcome appeared remote.
Unionism disunited
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the largest political party in Northern Ireland at the
time, refused to engage directly with negotiators from Sinn Fin, the political wing of
the IRA. This was because the IRA had yet to give up its weapons a process known
as decommissioning. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the UK Unionist Party
(UKUP) had earlier left the talks over the same issue. They also feared the
negotiations might weaken Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom.
Paramilitary problems
There was also the very real possibility that negotiators for the loyalist paramilitaries
would withdraw from the talks process. On 4 January the Ulster Defence Association
(UDA) prisoners in the Maze prison took a vote on the matter, with two thirds in
favour of withdrawal. The Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble went to the Maze to
talk to them but he was unable to persuade them to change their minds. Remarkably,
following a request from the leader of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which
represented the UDA, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, made
the same journey herself.
It later transpired that Mowlam did not consult Prime Minister Tony Blair or any of his
aides ahead of this unprecedented step. Blair's chief of staff, Jonathan Powell,
recalled: "If she had asked us we would certainly have said no. But in the event she
was right and we were wrong."
Her engagement with the paramilitary prisoners assured them that their concerns
were being taken seriously at the highest level and a potentially show-stopping
hurdle was overcome.
Missed deadline
The involvement of the UDA and IRA in further killings in January and February 1998
led to the exclusion of their political representatives, the UDP and Sinn Fin, from
negotiations. Talks were stalled yet again. Frustrated at the lack of any real progress,
the talks' chairman, former US Senator George Mitchell, concluded that a deadline
was crucial to securing a settlement. After persuading all the participants to agree,
Mitchell set it at the stroke of midnight on Thursday 9 April.
The final week was to prove a hectic and dramatic finale to a process which had
begun almost two years earlier. At half past midnight on Tuesday 7 April 1998,
Mitchell presented the negotiating teams with a 65-page draft document for
consideration as the basis for the final round of negotiations. It was rejected by the
unionist parties.
This prompted British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Irish Prime Minister Bertie
Ahern to join the negotiating parties at Stormont. The Thursday midnight deadline
passed as the parties increased pressure on both governments to get the best
possible deal.
Agreement
In the early hours of Good Friday, the Ulster Unionist team was still unhappy with
some of the detail, particularly the sections dealing with the decommissioning of
paramilitary weapons and the release of paramilitary prisoners. A personal assurance
from Tony Blair to UUP leader David Trimble smoothed these last ripples of
discontent.
At 5.30pm on Friday 10 April 1998, George Mitchell stated: "I am pleased to
announce that the two governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland have
reached agreement".
The Belfast Agreement (or Good Friday Agreement as it would become known)
contained proposals for a Northern Ireland Assembly with a power-sharing executive,
new cross-border institutions with the Republic of Ireland and a body linking devolved
assemblies across the UK with Westminster and Dublin. The Republic of Ireland has
also agreed to drop its constitutional claim to the six counties which formed Northern
Ireland. There were also proposals on the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons,
the future of policing in Northern Ireland and the early release of paramilitary
prisoners.
Ratification and referendums
Although the Democratic Unionist Party was the only major party in Northern Ireland
to oppose the agreement (along with the more marginal UKUP), both the UUP and
Sinn Fin said that they would have to refer the document to their wider
memberships before signing up to the deal.
While UUP leader David Trimble received the support of his wider party for the deal,
he lost the support of six of the party's ten members of parliament. These dissenters
joined forces with the DUP and the UKUP to campaign for a 'No' vote in the
referendum which was to follow on 22 May 1998.
Referendums were held on the same day in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland. In the north, voters were asked to ratify the deal. In the south, they were
asked to approve a change to the constitution of Ireland. All sides agreed a credible
majority was required if the deal was to survive. While most nationalists and
republicans were clearly in favour, a unionist and loyalist majority was far from
certain.
In Northern Ireland, campaigning was fierce as DUP leader Ian Paisley urged a 'No'
vote to safeguard the union. The 'Yes' camp, by necessity carrying a more mixed
message in attempting to appeal to both sides of the community, only really
gathered steam days before the vote. In an iconic moment at a rock concert in
Belfast, Irish rock star Bono managed to cajole David Trimble and John Hume (leader
of the nationalist SDLP) to appear alongside him onstage, the three linking arms as
the crowd cheered.
In Northern Ireland, 676,966 people voted in favour of the deal, while 274,879 voted
against. The 'yes' vote was 71.12%. Turnout was a record 81.10%. In the Republic the
recorded 'yes' vote was 94.39%, with 1,442,583 people voting in favour and 85,748
voting against.
A new assembly
Elections to a new 108-member assembly to sit in the Parliament Buildings at
Stormont swiftly followed on 25 June 1998. The assembly would be the centre of
power in the new Northern Ireland and would elect the new power-sharing executive.
Its rules were unconventional. No one party would be able to control the assembly.
Decisions would have to be taken on the basis of parallel consent, requiring the
endorsement of a majority of nationalists and a majority of unionists. So instead of
fighting an election to win control of the assembly, the parties fought a campaign to
win over 'their side', with non-aligned parties such as the Alliance Party designated as
'others'.
Sixteen parties, and more than a dozen independents, vied for six seats in each of
Northern Ireland's 18 constituencies. The UUP got the most seats with 28, followed by
the SDLP with 24, the DUP with 20, Sinn Fein with 18, Alliance with six, UKUP with
five, independent (anti-agreement) unionists with three, and two seats each for the
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Women's Coalition. With 58 seats won on the
unionist side, David Trimble would become First Minister, with the SDLPs Seamus
Mallon as Deputy First Minister.
Post-agreement problems
The Good Friday Agreement came into force in December 1998 when Northern
Ireland's politicians took their seats at the assembly in Stormont, but it would not be
plain sailing from this point on. Disagreements over contentious issues like the
annual unionist/loyalist Orange Order marches, policing and the decommissioning of
paramilitary weapons occurred on a regular basis. There were also attacks from
dissident paramilitaries who opposed the peace process, the worst of which was the
atrocity in Omagh when a Real IRA bomb killed 29 people and unborn twins on a busy
shopping street.
The assembly stuttered on through three suspensions before a fourth suspension saw
the re-introduction of direct rule from London in October 2002. Devolved government
only returned to Northern Ireland in 2007 following the amendments known as the St
Andrew's Agreement in 2006. When the assembly returned to business in March
2007, it was one of political extremes. The loyalist DUP's Ian Paisley became First
Minister and republican Sinn Fin's Martin McGuinness the Deputy First Minister.
It was a political alignment of polar opposites that would have been unimaginable in
1998 and a sign of just how far Northern Ireland had come from the darkest days of
the Troubles.

Cameron Report
An investigation into the violence and civil disturbance since 5 October 1968.

On 15 January 1969, the Government of Northern Ireland announced the

establishment of a commission:
to hold an enquiry into and to report upon the course of events leading to, and
the immediate causes and nature of the violence and civil disturbance in
Northern Ireland on and since 5 October 1968; and to assess the composition,
conduct and aims of those bodies involved in the current agitation and in any
incidents arising out of it.

This became known as the Cameron Commission and consisted of Lord Cameron,
Sir John Biggart, and James Campbell. By the time the report was published in
September 1969, much had changed in Northern Ireland. Key events include the
following: a Stormont election resulted in a split in the Ulster Unionist Party
(UUP). The Ulster Unionist Parliamentary Party voted for one man, one vote.
Terence ONeill resigned as Prime Minister. Unity candidate Bernadette Devlin
became the youngest woman ever to be elected to Westminster. A loyalist
bombing campaign targeted electricity and water plants. Increased sectarian
strife across Northern Ireland resulted in the Battle of the Bogside, the deaths
of six people in a Belfast riot and the deployment of British troops in Northern
Ireland.

North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association ... Northern Ireland Assembly and of the

Library ... as the Irish government has highlighted, Ireland has unique
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-
2021/2016/northsouth/8816.pdf
Why did the Nelson
Inquiry not mention
collusion?
29 May 2011

Rosemary Nelson's children follow their mother's coffin

IT was set up specifically to definitively
address the allegations of collusion but after
a six-year probe costing 46.5 million, the
Rosemary Nelson Inquiry made no reference
to the c word in its final report.
Following the long awaited publication of the
Nelson inquiry, reaction to the reports
findings has been divided, with diametrically
opposing views as to whether or not the
inquiry did or did not find collusion.
All that has been agreed is that the debate
surrounding collusion remains as polarised as
it was at the time of Mrs Nelsons murder 12
years ago.
The work of the inquiry itself received scant
attention during the years when it was
running, with public hearings only being
intermittently reported by the media. In
particular, public service broadcasters
decided to stay away and only sporadically
reporded on evidence given at public
hearings.
However the reaction which has greeted the
inquirys findings has highlighted the real
difficulties of truth-recovery exercises in
general, including the receptiveness of both
those being investigated and a wider
audience to the final verdict.
The first reaction to what the inquiry panel
had found came from Secretary of State Owen
Paterson, the minister who heads up the
Northern Ireland Office, the government
department which had come under close
scrutiny and criticism by the inquiry.
When Mr Paterson walked to the dispatch box
in the House of Commons on Monday
afternoon to announce the inquirys finding he
was quick to alert MPs to the fact that the
inquiry had ruled out collusion involving the
NIO or the RUC.
There is no evidence of any act by or within
any of the state agencies we have examined
(the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Northern
Ireland Office, the Army or the Security
Service) which directly facilitated Rosemary
Nelsons murder, he told the House.
The Secretary of State did go on to say that
the inquiry could not "exclude the possibility
of a rogue member or members of the RUC or
the Army in some way assisting the murderers
to target Rosemary Nelson but pointedly
informed MPs, although the panel does not
provide specific evidence on this.
Secretary of State Owen Paterson
In apparent bullish form, he went on: Mr
Speaker, those who are looking for evidence
that the state conspired in or planned the
death of Rosemary Nelson will not find it in
this report.
But Mr Patersons interpretation of the Nelson
report differed somewhat on the other side of
chamber.
In an unlikely breakdown of Commons
decorum, former Northern Ireland Minister
Shaun Woodward told the House:
Im afraid I am unable to draw the same level
of comfort about the findings and implications
as he (Mr Paterson) has done in his
statement.
He added: "This doesnt prove collusion but
today Mr Speaker the Secretary of State has
been too hasty in his dismissal.
Mr Paterson immediately hit back saying he
regretted Mr Woodwards tone and insisted he
had made it "quite clear that the report had
included criticisms of state agencies,
however in a telling remark, he added:
The key point is she did not ask for
protection.
The steadfastness of Mr Patersons position
that the agencies of the state had been
exonerated meant it inevitably became the
focus of subsequent coverage.

Rosemary Nelson's brothers Tony and Eunan Magee address the

media
Mrs Nelsons brother Eunan Magee accused
Mr Paterson of attempting to put a positive
spin on the reports conclusions.
We believe the secretary of state has seen fit
to gloss over any findings in the report which
he thought were particularly damning," he
said.
When questioned about the inquirys failure to
use the word collusion in its conclusions, Mr
Magee said:
If it sounds like a duck and it walks like a
duck, well, the chances are.."
He went on: We have seen many aspects in
this report that are at odds with Owen
Patersons summary, we hope people will
draw their own conclusions.
Former SDLP deputy leader Brid Rodgers also
expressed alarm at the secretary of states
comments, stating:
Its disappointing, at the very least, to hear
the secretary of state trying to emphasize
what was not in the report rather than what
was in the report.
The remarks and the handling of the
publication of the Nelson inquiry were in
marked contrast to Prime Minister David
Camerons announcement of the findings of
the Bloody Sunday inquiry in June 2010.
Mr Cameron won both national and
international praise when he described the
shooting of 14 people on Bloody Sunday in
January 1971 as unjustified and
unjustifiable.
It was wrong, the prime minister told the
Commons, These are shocking conclusions
to read and shocking words to have to say.
But you do not defend the British army by
defending the indefensible."
However the issue of collusion, particularly
post ceasefire in the late 1990s, clearly
remains divisive and unresolved.
What appears to have been forgotten in the
seven years since Judge Peter Cory first
recommended public inquiries into the deaths
of Rosemary Nelson, Billy Wright, Robert
Hamill, Pat Finucane and RUC officers Robert
Buchanan and Harry Breen, is that these
inquiries were specifically established to
prove or disprove security force collusion in
these killings.
Nelson and Wright are the only two inquiries
which have so far reported.
However the public discourse surrounding
both reports has seen much wrestling over
the definition of collusion.
Critics argue this has diverted attention away
from what the reports were actually supposed
to tell us about the conduct of those under
investigation and instead have clouded the
issue of how the reports finding should
impact on the future for the agencies
concerned.
Critics further question whether these
diversions have been deliberately used to
obscure the very point of why inquiries such
as that into the killing of Rosemary Nelson
was established in the first place.

Judge Peter Cory

In 2003 Judge Cory outlined his definition of
collusion, stating: There cannot be public
confidence in government agencies that are
guilty of collusion in serious crimes.
Because of the necessity for public
confidence in the army, the police, and
security services the definition of collusion
must be reasonably broad when it is applied
to actions of these agencies.
This is to say that army and police forces
must not act collusively by ignoring or turning
a blind eye to the wrongful acts of their
servants or agents.
Any lesser definition would have the effect of
condoning, or even encouraging, state
involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all
public confidence in these important
agencies.
In April 2004 he recommended a public
inquiry into Mrs Nelsons murder stating:
I am satisfied that there is evidence of
collusion by governmental agencies in the
murder that warrants holding a public
inquiry."
He added: Without public scrutiny doubts
based solely on myth and suspicion will linger
long, fester and spread their malignant
infection throughout the Northern Ireland
community.
A year earlier in April 2003, Britains most
senior police chief, Sir John Stevens,
announced that he had found evidence of
security force collusion in the murders of
solicitor Pat Finucane and Protestant
teenager Adam Lambert.
I have uncovered enough evidence to lead
me to believe that the murders of Pat
Finucane and Brian Adam Lambert could have
been prevented, he said.
I also believe that the RUC investigation of
Pat Finucanes murder should have resulted in
the early arrest and detection of his killers.
I conclude there was collusion in both
murders and the circumstances surrounding
them.
Lord Stevens said that he defined collusion as
the wilful failure to keep records, the
absence of accountability, the withholding of
intelligence and evidence, the extreme of
agents being involved in murder.
In January 2007 then Police Ombudsman
Nuala OLoan adopted these two definitions of
collusion when reporting of the actions of
RUC Special Branch officers and Mount
Vernon UVF informer Mark Haddock.
However, despite Judge Corys initial
definition of collusion a different course was
adopted by the Wright and Nelson inquiries.
The subtle changes went largely unnoticed by
the outside world.
When the inquiry into the LVFs leaders
murder was established in 2005 chairman
Ranald Maclean opted for a more restrictive
definition, which stated that collusion could
only be proved if it could be shown that
officials in positions of authority had
deliberately agreed to commit unlawful acts.
When the Nelson inquiry was established,
chairman Lord Michael Morland chose not to
define collusion at all.
In total, collusion was mentioned just 57
times in the 505 pages which made up the
Nelson inquirys final report.
In the vast of majority of instances in which
collusion is mentioned in the report, it relates
to witness allegations of wrongdoing against
the security forces.
The inquiry team itself makes no reference to
collusion anywhere in its two and a half page
conclusion.
But what impact will the Nelson inquiry have
on society?
John Finucane
Pat Finucanes son, John, has raised concerns
over the establishments apparent agenda to
play political semantics with the findings of
the various inquiries.
I am worried about the way they are trying to
dilute the definition of collusion, he said.
Stevens and Judge Corys definition of
collusion had no agenda and was very much
an impartial and democratic interpretation of
what collusion should mean.
However since Cory and Stevens, agencies
like the NIO and the current Police
Ombudsmans Office have done their best to
dilute that definition of collusion and tried to
move away from it.
If you take an agenda-free definition of
collusion when you read the report into
Rosemary Nelsons murder, then I think that
you could come to no other conclusion other
than there was collusion.
Highlighting criticism of the secretary of
states handling of the Nelson inquiry, he said:
The element of spin was very disappointing.
To a lesser extent its the cover up
continuing, when the government cant even
deal with whats in the report in an honest
and fair fashion, as opposed to embracing it
and making it very clear that this was
something which went wrong in the past and
it will never happen again.
When the government tries to deny whats in
front of it, it leaves a very sour taste in
peoples mouths.
Murdered solicitor Rosemary Nelson
Rejecting claims that Mrs Nelson had not
personally done enough to protect her own
life, Mr Finucane said:
My father thought that most of the NIO
complaints mechanisms or the benefit of
security from the state would either be
ineffective or wouldnt be forthcoming.
But Rosemary did speak out publicly and she
did ask for help and protection.
She went to America, to the United Nations
and still no one in authority here thought to
offer her any help.
Instead they created a climate of danger and
legitimized her as a target by leaking
intelligence.
If thats not collusion then I dont know what
it takes before theyre going to accept this.
Collusion shouldnt be a dirty word for the
state; they should admit what happened, but
tell the public its never going to happen
again.
While the government continues to deny
collusion in cases like Rosemary and others it
creates a very bad impression.
Former Police Authority member Chris Ryder
is also critical of the secretary of states
handling of the Nelson inquiry.
I think he (Owen Paterson) was totally
disingenuous, he said.
He was trying to put a gloss on it, theres
absolutely no doubt about that.
His response would have been far more
credible if he hadnt attempted to put that
gloss on it.
While Mr Ryder agrees with the secretary of
states conclusion that there was no collusion
in Mrs Nelsons murder, he is nonetheless
critical of Mr Patersons handling of the
announcement.
Theres no evidence of collusion, but there
are still many serious questions about the
way in which Rosemary Nelson was treated
and there was no room for spin or
complacency on the part of the government in
this.
For him, though, the latest row raises wider
questions about the nature of inquiries into
the past.
If I was the widow or the son of a Troubles
victim, who wasnt one of these high profile
cases, I would be extremely hurt.
There are many people nursing hurts and
grievances and who deserve justice, whose
cases dont get any attention whatsoever.
Its as if those people were never alive or
never died.
Claiming that republicans had escaped the
spotlight of public inquiries, he said:
All the focus is on the apparent misdeeds of
the security forces.
There hasnt been one word of attrition by
the IRA or Sinn Fein and loyalists have only
made only very conditional attrition.
The whole thing is a complete and utter
shambles and my strong feeling is that if this
society is to move on, it has to stop picking at
the scabs, which have got to be allowed to
heal.
We cant continue for the next 40 years
rehashing every atrocity.

European Security Challenges in

the Era of Trump and Brexit
http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/Trump-and-Brexit-Implications-for-Global-
Security.pdf

Cameron Report - Disturbances in Northern Ireland (1969)

http://www.iisresource.org/Documents/DM29b_Cameron_Report_Summary_Of_Conclus
ion.pdf
Sunday Bloody Sunday U2 Notes - Tune Into English
Saville Report, an inquiry ... Sunday, bloody Sunday. Sunday, bloody Sunday. Wipe
the tears from your eyes,
http://www.tuneintoenglish.com/sundaybloodysunday.pdf

Saville on Bloody Sunday: From the Past

to the Future?
http://www.thinkingfaith.org/sites/default/files/20100622_1.pdf

Britain: Saville Inquiry continues

cover-up of Bloody Sunday massacre
By Chris Marsden
18 June 2010
The Saville Report into Bloody Sunday in Londonderry, Northern
Ireland, on January 30, 1972, maintains the cover-up of one of the
most infamous massacres ever perpetrated by British imperialism.
Even after the passage of 38 years, the truththat the murder of 14
unarmed civil rights protesters was carried out under orders from the
Conservative government of Edward Heath and the army top brass
is denied.

British troops during the occupation of Northern Ireland

The report, released Tuesday, continues the whitewash that first
began immediately after soldiers from the 1st Parachute Regiment
perpetrated their crime. In the face of overwhelming evidence, the
Saville Inquiry is forced now to accept that none of those shot by
soldiers was armed with a firearm or posed any threat of causing
death or serious injury, and that, In no case was any warning given
before soldiers opened fire.
It also concedes that claims soldiers responded to IRA gunfire are
false. A soldier fired first, with other soldiers supposedly losing their
self-control and firing themselves, forgetting or ignoring their
instructions and training.
But this claim that soldiers lost control is meant to exonerate the
military and political elite from charges that Bloody Sunday resulted
from the preceding adoption of a shoot-to-kill policy that was
approved by the British Tory government in power at the time.
The report claims, In the months before Bloody Sunday, genuine and
serious attempts were being made at the highest level [of the British
government] to work towards a peaceful political settlement in
Northern Ireland.
Any action involving the use, or likely use, of unwarranted lethal
force against nationalists on the occasion of the march (or otherwise)
would have been entirely counterproductive to the plans for a
peaceful settlement; and was neither contemplated nor foreseen by
the United Kingdom Government.
We found no evidence of such toleration or encouragement of the
use of lethal force, the report adds.
An estimated 50,000 people attended the march in Derry, organised
by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), demanding
an end to anti-Catholic discrimination in the North. The ensuing
killings were a turning point in the development of The Troubles.

A skirmish between Irish youth fighting with stones and British

paratroopers
It led to the imposition of direct rule from London and helped drive
broader sections of the Catholic working class behind the IRA and
consolidate the bitter sectarian divisions that gave rise to three
decades of civil war.
An April 1972 inquiry into Bloody Sunday by former Lieutenant-
Colonel Lord Widgery was a naked cover-up. It found that the
soldiers had shot in self-defence, having been fired on first, and
claimed to have produced forensic evidence that those protesters
who were shot had handled firearms. Widgery said there would have
been no deaths if there had not been an illegal march.
It was only in order to secure the support of Sinn Fein for the May
1998 Good Friday Agreement, aimed at ending paramilitary conflict in
Northern Ireland, that, in January 2000, the British Labour
government acceded to the demand for a fresh inquiry headed by
Lord Saville and two judges from Commonwealth countries. Then-
Prime Minister Tony Blair made clear that its purpose was not to
accuse individuals or institutions, or to invite fresh recriminations.
Our concern now is simply to establish the truth and to close this
painful chapter once and for all.
Proceedings opened in March that year after nearly two years of
investigations. The final witness was heard in January 2005. In total,
2,500 statements were taken and 922 people were called to give
direct evidence. The inquiry also considered 160 volumes of
evidence, 121 audio tapes and 110 video tapes.
The report of the inquiry, chaired by Mark Saville, a senior British
judge, was originally scheduled for publication in 2005. It was
repeatedly postponed and there was clear evidence of a cover-up
throughout.
In July 1999, the High Court rejected an appeal that the identities of
17 paratroopers who fired their guns on the day of Bloody Sunday
should be revealed, and hundreds more soldiers were granted the
same anonymity.
In February 2000, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) admitted that it had
destroyed two of the five remaining rifles used by the British Army on
Bloody Sunday. Of the 29 rifles that may have been fired, 14 were
destroyed by the MoD and 10 were sold. Large parts of MI5 (secret
service) and British army documents made available to the inquiry
were redacted, and critical documents made the subject of public
interest immunity certificatessigned by government ministers and
the MoDpreventing them being disclosed.
Despite these limitations, the material presented to the inquiry was
damning.
The forensic scientist who carried out the original tests said to have
shown that some of the demonstrators shot by British soldiers had
handled firearms said he was wrong. John Martin acknowledged that
the lead deposits found on several of the victims' hands could have
come from other sourcesincluding emissions from car exhausts.
Independent experts appointed by the Saville Inquiry described the
evidence presented to the Widgery inquiry as worthless. Evidence
was also heard that a nail bomb was planted on one of the victims,
Gerald Donaghey, but this was rejected by Saville.
Eye-witness testimony made clear that those shot were unarmed,
with one of the victims, Jim Wray, 22, lying on the ground when he
was shot twice. The bullets hit him from just one metre away, a
deliberate act of murder. Barney McGuigan, a 41-year-old father of
six, was shot in the head with an illegal dumdum bullet, which
fragments on impact.
However, much of the evidence presented has been ignored in order
to arrive at the inquirys findings, particularly relating to the shoot-to-
kill policy drawn up in preparation for the demonstration.
A top-secret communication in October 1971 from the head of the
army, General Michael Carver, to Prime Minister Heath suggested it
might be necessary to go into the predominantly Catholic Bogside
district to root out the terrorists and hooligans.
A confidential memorandum from Gen. Sir Robert Ford, commander
of land forces in Northern Ireland, to his superior, Gen. Sir Harry
Tuzo, expressed concern at the number of no-go areas that the army
was prevented from entering by pro-Republican youth, the Derry
Young Hooligans (DYH). He wrote, I am coming to the conclusion
that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and
order is to shoot selected ringleaders amongst the DYH, after clear
warnings have been issued.
On December 14, 1971, a British Cabinet committee on Northern
Ireland was addressed by General Ford, who outlined a deliberate
policy of provocation focusing on stopping a scheduled march by the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. Ford had discussed issuing
soldiers with rifles adapted to fire .22 rounds to enable ringleaders to
be engaged with this less lethal ammunition. Thirty of the rifles were
sent for zeroing and familiarisation training. Ford stated that we
would have to accept the possibility that .22 rounds may be lethal.
Ford noted in a statement to the inquiry that there was a meeting at
10 Downing Street on 27 January, 1972, in which plans to suppress
the march were discussed. On the same day, a document by Colonel
Dalzell-Payne was circulating in the Ministry of Defence (MoD),
warning that disperse or we fire methods would have to be used
against demonstrators. Ford also pointed to a 19 April, 1972,
statement to the House of Commons in which Heath admitted that the
plan prepared to confront the march had been known to ministers.
A memo to the commander of 8 Brigade told them to prepare a plan
over this weekend, taking into account the likelihood of some sort of
battle. Witnesses John Roddy and Charles McDaid told the inquiry
how they had received warnings from a friendly soldier and a
telephonist at the Royal Ulster Constabularys (RUC) headquarters in
Derry to stay away from the civil rights march because the
paratroopers were coming in shooting and would kill people.
Witness 027, a soldier placed in a witness protection programme
after receiving death threats, told how the night before Bloody
Sunday groups of paratroopers boasted about how they expected to
get kills. When they arrived in Derry, one paratrooper leapt out of
the armoured vehicle and started firing immediately at some 40
civilians running in an effort to get away. [Soldier] H fired from the
hipat a range of 20 yards. The bullet passed through one man and
into another and they both fell, one dead and one wounded. He
then moved forward and fired again, killing the wounded man. They
lay sprawled together, half on the pavement and half in the gutter.
[Soldier E] shot another man at the entrance of the park, who also fell
on the pavement.

Youth running away from British troops in the Bogside area of Derry,
Northern Ireland, where the massacre took place
When the soldiers had arrived, the demonstrators had stopped
immediately in their tracks, turned to face us and raised their hands.
This is the way they were standing when they were shot.
Alongside the Army command and the Conservatives, the Labour
Party bears direct responsibility for what happened on Bloody
Sunday. Three years earlier, in 1969, the government of Harold
Wilson had sent the British Army to Northern Ireland, claiming this
was to defend the Catholic minority against a campaign of sectarian
attacks and assassinations by Protestant Loyalist gangs.
In reality, the sending in of troops was part of an escalating campaign
of repression by the British state, directed against the nationalist
parties such as the Official IRA and the breakaway Provisional IRA,
the civil rights movement and, ultimately, the political ferment and
anti-imperialist sentiment within the Irish working class.
In August 1971, the Northern Ireland government introduced
legislation under the Special Powers Act that provided for internment
without trial. Mass arrests began, and by mid-January 1972 there
were over 600 internees.
The brutal response of the British bourgeoisie in Northern Ireland was
conditioned by their fear of an emerging challenge to their rule, not
just in the north, but throughout the UK. The explosive development
of the civil rights struggle coincided with the first national miners
strike in Britain since the 1926 General Strike.
This was the beginning of an escalating wave of struggles that
culminated with the bringing down of the Heath government by a
second miners strike in 1974. Against a background of major social
and political upheavals throughout Europe, the ruling elite viewed
Ireland as a testing ground for measures they believed would be
required in order to deal with a potentially revolutionary challenge by
the working classone that was ultimately averted only by the
combined betrayals of the Labour and trade union bureaucracy and
their political apologists.
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/06/bloo-j18.html
Saville Inquiry rules
Bloody Sunday deaths
'unjustifiable'

Families of the victims of the Bloody Sunday shootings

march from the Bogside to the Guildhall holding
photographs of their relatives, to gain a preview of the
Saville Report on June 15, 2010
rime Minister David Cameron told the Commons that the inquiry said none of the
casualties posed any threat to British troops.

He said the inquiry found that the first shots were fired by British troops, no
warnings were given, and some of the soldiers lost control.

The 14 civilians died after British troops opened fire on a civil rights march in
Londonderry on January 30 1972.

Mr Cameron told MPs: "What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified
and unjustifiable. It was wrong."
advertisement
He added that ""what happened should never have happened".

"The Government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces.
And for that, on behalf of the Government, indeed on behalf of our country, I am
deeply sorry."

The inquiry found that the soldiers of the support company who went into the
Bogside, where the march was taking place, did so "as a result of an order which
should not have been given" by their commander.

It concluded that "on balance" the first shot in the vicinity of the march was fired
by British soldiers.

None of the casualties was carrying a firearm and while there was some shooting
by republican paramilitaries, "none of this firing provided any justification for the
shooting of civilian casualties".

In no case was any warning given by the soldiers before opening fire and the
support company "reacted by losing their self-control ... forgetting or ignoring
their instructions and training".

The result was a "serious and widespread loss of fire discipline".

Afterwards, many of the soldiers involved "knowingly put forward false accounts
in order to seek to justify their firing".

The inquiry found that some of those who were killed or injured were clearly
fleeing or going to the assistance of others who were dying.

The report's detailed review of the events of January 30 1972 in Derry catalogued
scenes of horror that included the image of unarmed victims shot dead as they
tried to crawl away.

The key finding were:

 "The firing by soldiers of 1 Para caused the deaths of 13 people and injury
to a similar number, none of whom was posing a threat of causing death or
serious injury." This also applied to the 14th victim, who died later from injuries;

"Despite the contrary evidence given by soldiers, we have concluded that

none of them fired in response to attacks or threatened attacks by nail or petrol
bombers." The report added that no one threw, or threatened to throw, nail or
petrol bombs at soldiers;

The accounts of soldiers were rejected, with a number said to have

"knowingly put forward false accounts";

Members of the official IRA fired a number of shots, though it was

concluded it was the paratroopers who shot first on Bloody Sunday;

Northern Ireland Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, second in

command of the provisional IRA in Derry in 1972, was "probably armed with a
Thompson submachine gun", and though it is possible he fired the weapon, this
cannot be proved. The report concluded: "He did not engage in any activity that
provided any of the soldiers with any justification for opening fire."

Lord Saville concluded the commander of land forces in Northern Ireland,

Major General Robert Ford, would have been aware that the Parachute Regiment
had a reputation for using excessive force. But he would not have believed there
was a risk of paratroopers firing unjustifiably;

The commanding officer of the paratroopers, Lieutenant Colonel Derek

Wilford, disobeyed an order from a superior officer not to enter troops into the
nationalist Bogside estate;

Lord Saville found his superior officer, Brigadier Patrick MacLellan, held
no blame for the shootings as if he had known what Col Wilford was intending, he
might well have called it off;

No blame was placed on the organisers of the march, the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association;

Neither the UK nor Northern Ireland governments planned or foresaw the

use of unnecessary lethal force.

The report referred to one person who was shot while "crawling ... away from the
soldiers" and another who was probably shot "when he was lying mortally
wounded on the ground".

A father was "hit and injured by Army gunfire after he had gone to ... tend his
son," the report said.
"The immediate responsibility for the deaths and injuries on Bloody Sunday lies
with those members of the support company whose unjustifiable firing was the
cause of those deaths and injuries," the report said.

It added that "none of the casualties was posing a threat of causing death or
serious injury, or indeed was doing anything else that could on any view justify
their shooting".

Mr Cameron said: "These are shocking conclusions to read and shocking words to
have to say. But you do not defend the British Army by defending the
indefensible.

"There is no point trying to soften or equivocate what is in the report. It is clear

from the tribunal's authoritative conclusions that the events of Bloody Sunday
were in no way justified."

Memories of the Bloody Sunday dead boomed out across Derry's Guildhall
Square as bereaved relatives read out the names of their loved ones to an
audience of thousands who had packed into the space in front of the city's historic
walls.

As each relative in turn came to the microphone on the steps of the venue, they
read out a name of one of those killed by the Paras, before shouting the word:
"Innocent."

John Kelly, whose 17-year-old brother Michael was found by the report to have
been shot by soldiers without justification, made an emotional address to the
crowd that recalled the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

"We have overcome," he declared, prompting cheers from the throng.

He said the report had vindicated the families and it would now be the verdict of
history for all time.

Mr Kelly produced a copy of the shamed Widgery report, which had largely
exonerated the soldiers only months after the killings.

He said the whitewash had been laid bare, before ripping the Widgery document
into pieces.

http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/bloody-
sunday/saville-inquiry-rules-bloody-sunday-deaths-
unjustifiable-28541683.html
The 1972 inquiry was headed by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord
Widgery

The Widgery Tribunal was the British government's immediate response to

Bloody Sunday.

The day after the army had shot dead 13 protestors in Londonderry the Home
Secretary, Reginald Maudling, announced there would be an inquiry and
appointed the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, to lead it.

Many Irish nationalists were sceptical that a British tribunal held in Coleraine,
a predominantly unionist town 30 miles from Londonderry, would be impartial.

The tribunal sat for just three weeks in February and March 1972, with the
final report published on 18 April.
Biography: Lord Widgery

Born 1911, he served in the Royal Artillery in WW2

 Called to the Bar in 1946

Became a judge in 1961, and later Lord Justice of Appeal (1968-71)

He was appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1971

It was in this capacity that he was invited by the then Prime

Minister, Edward Heath, to chair a public inquiry into the events of
Bloody Sunday

Lord Widgery concluded that the soldiers had been fired on first, and there
was "no reason to suppose" that the soldiers would have opened fire
otherwise.

He said there would have been no deaths had there not been an illegal march,
which created a "highly dangerous situation in which a clash between
demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable".

However there were inconsistencies in the report.

The investigation found no conclusive proof that the dead or wounded

were shot while handling a firearm, yet Lord Widgery concluded the soldiers
had been fired on first. He also admitted the soldiers' firing "bordered on the
reckless".

Many important witnesses were not called to give evidence, and testimony
was not taken from wounded survivors.

The interpretation of the forensic evidence was flawed. Widgery concluded

from firearms residue found on swabs taken from the bodies of the deceased
that they had been in close contact with firearms. He dismissed any other
explanations, including the possibility that the residue was due to transfer
from soldiers or their vehicles.

The possibility that victims were hit with gunfire directed into the Bogside
from soldiers on the city walls was not given proper consideration

The Widgery report was widely regarded as a

whitewash, and relatives of the victims and
nationalists campaigned for a new inquiry.
These campaigns were unsuccessful until 1997,
when the Irish government submitted a detailed
dossier of evidence to their British counterparts.
'Whitewash
Lord Saville was appointed to lead the fresh inquiry
The 178-page document included many
previously unconsidered witness statements, an
assessment of fresh information about the
shootings, and a damning indictment of the
Widgery report.
The British government spent seven months
studying the evidence before agreeing to a new
investigation.
In January 1998 the prime minister, Tony Blair,
announced an independent judicial inquiry into
Bloody Sunday.
The prospect of a fresh investigation formed part
of the peace process negotiations leading up to
the Good Friday Agreement, and was viewed by
many as a concession to Sinn Fein.
The inquiry would be headed by the British Law
Lord, Lord Saville of Newdigate, and two judges
from Commonwealth countries.
It would have the legal power to subpoena
witnesses and compel the disclosure of
documents and its findings would be made
public.
Announcing the inquiry, Mr Blair acknowledged
there had been flaws in the Widgery report.
"The timescale within which Lord Widgery
produced his report means he was not able to
consider all the evidence available.
"Since his report was published much new
material has come to light about the events of
that day.
"It is the interests of everyone that the truth is
established and told."

UVF funeral gets PSNI approval

November 19, 2016
The kid-gloves handling of a unionist
paramilitary funeral has exposed the rank
hypocrisy of British policing in Ireland,
according to Republican Sinn Fein.
Last weekend the PSNI allowed a former senior UVF
commander to be buried with his funeral cortege
flanked by columns of unmasked UVF paramilitaries.
The UVF men, dressed in black clothes, hats and
gloves and wearing UVF armbands, flanked the coffin
of Sam Pinky Austin as it made its way along the
Shankill Road last Saturday. The coffin was also
draped with a loyalist flag and topped with a black hat
and gloves and accompanied by a display bearing the
words No 1 Platoon.
The overt show of paramilitary strength drew no
political comment, but the next day a republican
commemoration to remember a young IRA Volunteer
sparked loud condemnations over three children
dressed in berets and sunglasses.
The impunity afforded to the UVF contrasts with the
arrests mounted in the wake of recent republican
events, according to RSF.
This loyalist sectarian force gets immunity from the
police as always to as they please, they said.
Mark this in contrast to the treatment of republicans
in their own communities. In May of this year, twelve
members of Republican Sinn Fein were arrested and
charged with having taking part, in an illegal parade
while commemorating their patriot dead in County
Armagh.
Others face more serious charges as the policing and
law system try to slap membership charges on those
who were in the RSF colour party. Up to sixty others
have received summons in the post with the courts
expecting to prosecute up to seventy people by April
next year.
Republican Sinn Fein condemn the rank hypocrisy of
the RUC/PSNI, we are not surprised, they would rather
spend resources, keeping the peace, keeping people
safe and in doing so cautioning children as young as
ten for attending public events.
STAND TOGETHER
Republican Sinn Fein and Saoradh have also
continued to challenge PSNI harassment, and have
been highlighting videos of PSNI stop-and-search
operations against residents in nationalist areas. An
English fitness trainer who was the target of one such
operation also brought attention to their oppressive
nature when he recorded his treatment while outside
his workplace in Omagh, County Tyrone.
Their oppression makes us stronger, RSF said in a
statement. For anyone in any doubt as to the levels of
this harassment just type in online or on You Tube
PSNI Stop and Search to see some of the videos
which have recorded this harassment.
Communities must stand together and raise their
voices against this harassment.

Tories evasive as questions hang

over new DUP role

July 29, 2017

The British government may be planning to supplant the

power-sharing Executive at Stormont with the consultative
committee set up as part of the deal with the Democratic
Unionists to prop up the Tory government at Westminster, it
has been warned.

British Direct Ruler James Brokenshire has been urged to clarify the
exact role of Tory-DUP committee as Colum Eastwood, leader of the
nationalist SDLP, voiced fears that it could act as an interim
executive.

Mr Eastwoods call comes amid continued fears about how the

committee of MPs will operate and how it will handle a controversial
billion pound bung offered up by the Tories as part of the deal to keep
their minority government in power.

In a British statement it is claimed the consultative committee will

discuss and agree the handling of legislation. In a second statement
from Tory HQ, however, its role is described as a mechanism by which
both the Tories and DUP can agree the funding Northern Ireland
needs.

If there is no Stormont executive due to the ongoing deadlock over the

implementation of previous agreements, Mr Eastwood said it must not
be replaced by the DUP-Tory committee.

And he warned if the DUP is allowed to distribute funding in the event

of a direct rule scenario, there will be less incentive for the DUP to
compromise to restore power-sharing.

People in Northern Ireland voted for a broad range of parties to

represent them in the assembly -- our pluralistic institutions cannot be
supplanted by DUP/Tory rule, he said.

Mr Eastwood said the consultative committee cannot act like an

interim executive.

The prospect that the Tories under the DUP thumb will have a free
hand to spend this money, supposed to be for all of us, is a dangerous
one, he said.

This should be an incentive to all political parties to get a deal done.

Sinn Feins Michelle ONeill also said it would be unacceptable for a

group of Tory and DUP MPs to decide where public funds are to be
spent in the north.

She said that she is similarly unclear what the committees remit is --
and believes the Tories and DUP arent entirely sure themselves.
One thing Im very clear on -- itll be executive ministers here wholl be
taking decisions where that money will be spent, she said. The
democratic accountability needs to happen here.

Nevertheless, she said she remained optimistic that power-sharing

could be restored by Christmas.

Ms ONeill insisted that an Irish language act had become a totemic

issue and must be delivered. She said her party would only agree to a
standalone Irish language act, but this was a modest demand and it
would go no further than corresponding legislation in the 26 Counties.

It has become an issue of peoples Irishness and of them wanting to

see their Irishness protected in legislation, she said.

FRAYED PROCESS

Since the collapse of negotiations last month, contacts between Sinn

Fein and the British government have been erratic. Last weekend, Tory
environment minister Michael Gove met with senior DUP members in
County Antrim, but cancelled planned discussions with Sinn Fein at the
last minute.

Sinn Fein party chairperson Declan Kearney said Mr Gove had given no
reason for the cancellation of the pre-arranged meeting and warned of
the political fallout from DUP/Tory pact, saying it will be more difficult
to reach a resolution over the norths political crisis.

However, Gerry Adams held face-to-face talks with the British Direct
Ruler on Monday when both were in Washington DC on separate
business.

Mr Adams, who was in the US capital for a Memorial Mass for Martin
McGuinness, said he requested the meeting after learning through the
media that Mr Brokenshire was visiting America this week. He said he
raised concerns with Brokenshire about the British governments
handling of legacy issues.

I challenged him on his governments cover-up and refusal to give

information to victims of British actions or the actions of their allies, as
well as the quite deliberate withholding of the funding the lord chief
justice has asked for to allow inquests to proceed, he said.
The Sinn Fein leader said conflict-related inquests was not solely a
republican position but affected all victims of the conflict.

Im disappointed that it appears he is seeking to make this a

negotiating position as we have refused to negotiate on it, he said.
The right to an inquest is a very modest entitlement and should not be
subjected to political negotiations - once again, this is one rule for
people in the north and a different for those elsewhere in the British
state.

Mr Adams said he also challenged Mr Brokenshire on being silent

about effigies and other offensive material appearing on a number of
Eleventh Night bonfires, including a coffin bearing an image of Martin
McGuinness.

I asked him why he was silent on the antics around some of the
bonfires around the Twelfth, because Im sure he was as perplexed and
outraged as anybody at the image of Martin McGuinnesss coffin being
burnt on a bonfire, he said.

The Louth TD said he did not get a satisfactory answer to that

question from Brokenshire.

It was obvious that like some unionist leaders, they prefer to be silent
on these issues as opposed to making it very clear that this is
unacceptable behaviour, he said.

Mr Adams told hi that Sinn Fein was ready and able to assume its
place in the Six County Executive but only the basis which his party
has previously outlined - That is on agreements broken or not
implemented being dealt with in an acceptable way.

http://republican-
news.org/current/news/2017/07/tories_evasive_as_questions_ha.html

Defiant Varadkar will not advance

new electronic border

There are indications that the Dublin

government may be waking up to the risks
involved in reinforcing the partition of Ireland
after it rejected the prospect of a new
economic border to impose Brexit.
The 26 County Taoiseach Leo Varadkar said if Britain
wants to propose technological solutions for a
frictionless border between the two jurisdictions on
the island, that is up to them.
What were not going to do is to design a border for
the Brexiteers because theyre the ones who want a
border, he said.
Its up to them to say what it is, say how it would
work and first of all convince their own people, their
own voters that this is actually a good idea.
So let them forward their proposals as to how they
think a border should operate and well ask them if
they really think this is such a good idea.
The media described the response as a hard-hitting
following criticism of his recent meeting with British
Prime Minister Theresa May at Downing Street in
which he appeared overawed and, revealed he was
put in mind of the romantic comedy, Love Actually.
Mr Varadkar dismissed suggestions by reporters there
would be an angry response by unionists and Tories
to his governments defiance.
It is the British and the Brexiteers who are leaving,
so if anyone should be angry its us quite frankly, he
said.
But we are not going to get angry. We are going to try
and find solutions or at least minimise the damage to
relations between Britain and Ireland, to the peace
process and to trading links, he said.
He said both he and Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon
Coveney are in agreement on the issue.
Earlier, Mr Coveney said Ireland cannot support
proposals resulting in border checkpoints across the
island, and that Brexit will require flexible and
imaginative solutions. Last week he also dismissed
British suggestions that the use of scanning and
camera equipment would allow the border to be
invisible.
However, he backed away from a report in the Times
newspaper that the Dublin government believes the
Irish Sea is the most natural post-Brexit border.
Speaking on Irish state TV, Minister Coveney said
Britain has chosen to leave the EU and there is an
onus on it to make sure the consequences of that
decision do not harm Ireland.
He said: We have a border that is 500km long. There
are 400 road crossings along that border.
Anybody who suggests to me that we can solve this
problem by putting cameras on this border ... I dont
think that is the approach we can take.
The DUP, needed by British Prime Minister Theresa
May to prop up her minority administration in the
House of Commons, said the suggestion of customs
and immigrations checks at ports after Brexit as
absurd and unconstitutional.
DUP MP Ian Paisley said his party would use its
influence over the Tory government to spike the idea.
He said the position of the Dublin government
appeared to leave two alternatives - a very hard
border or that Ireland will wise up and leave the EU
as well.
Ulster Unionist Party leader Robin Swann claimed the
Taoiseach was going to use the border to make a
name for himself. Although a majority of voters in the
Six Counties voted to remain in the EU, Swann
claimed Mr Varadkar is showing total disrespect to
the people of Northern Ireland and their right to self
determination.
SHAMBLES
Sinn Fein MEP Martina Anderson meanwhile branded
the Conservative governments Brexit process as
clueless and a shambles.
She was speaking after London announced that free
movement of people between the EU and its
jurisdiction would end in March 2019.
They have provided no detail about how they propose
to tackle the disastrous impact of Brexit on our
economy, on agriculture, on human rights, on the
issue of the border, on the Good Friday Agreement or
on the future of EU citizens who have made Ireland
their home, she said.
http://republican-
news.org/current/news/2017/07/defiant_varadkar_will_
not_adva.html

Pat Finucanes widow

wins permission for
Supreme Court appeal
 Pat Finucane
The widow of solicitor Pat Finucane has been granted
permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court over her failed
legal bid to overturn the UK governments refusal to hold an
inquiry into his 1989 murder.
Geraldine Finucane and her family are long-time
campaigners for a public inquiry into the murder of Mr
Finucane.
He was shot in his Belfast home by loyalist paramilitaries who
the UK government has acknowledged were colluding with
security forces.
Mrs Finucane has repeatedly argued in court that the previous
Labour-led administration had promised an inquiry would be
held and Prime Minister David Cameron had unlawfully
reneged on this.
Solicitor Peter Madden of Madden & Finucane Solicitors
said: The only way that the full truth about Pats murder can be
firmly established, and the extent to which a policy of extra-
judicial assassination of which Pat was a victim was authorised
by government is by a full transparent public inquiry where
witnesses and documents are subject to intense scrutiny.
We will seek to persuade the Supreme Court at the hearing of
this appeal that David Cameron acted unlawfully in refusing a
public inquiry and that the Court should quash his decision.
http://www.irishlegal.com/8027/pat-finucanes-widow-wins-permission-for-
supreme-court-appeal/

High Court rules UK

lawfully refused Finucane
inquiry

Mr Justice Stephens
The High Court in Belfast has ruled that the UK
governments refusal to hold a public inquiry into the murder
of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane was lawful.
His widow, Geraldine Finucane, brought a judicial review
against the government after it refused to hold a statutory
inquiry into the 1989 murder, in which it is alleged British
security forces colluded with loyalist paramilitaries.
Prime Minister David Cameron previously acknowledged
shocking levels of collusion after the UK government published
the results of a review conducted by Sir Desmond de Silva.
However, Mr Finucanes family said the 2012 review was a
sham that fell short of a full public inquiry.
Mrs Finucane, who was not in court when the judgement was
read out, believed the decision not to hold an inquiry
was indefensible.
Making his judgement on Friday, Mr Justice Stephens said: I
uphold that the decision was lawful and accordingly I dismiss
that part of the challenge.
The judge also said an inquiry would be protracted and long.
John Finucane, the deceased solicitors son, told the Irish
Independent that the family had not yet decided whether to
appeal the judgement.
However, the Government of Ireland has agreed to continue
pushing for a full public inquiry into Mr Finucanes death.
Foreign affairs minister Charlie Flanagan said: My
thoughts at this time are with Geraldine Finucane and all the
Finucane family, who have campaigned so tirelessly for more
than a quarter of a century in pursuit of the full truth in the case
of Pat Finucane, including the role of collusion in his murder.
http://www.irishlegal.com/2404/high-court-rules-uk-
lawfully-refused-finucane-inquiry/

Date set for appeal in Pat

Finucane inquiry case

Lord Chief Justice Sir Declan Morgan

A bid by the widow of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane to
overturn a High Court ruling which found that Prime
Minister David Cameron was justified in refusing an inquest
into his death will be heard in April.
At a review hearing on Friday, Lord Chief Justice Sir Declan
Morgan fixed the fresh appeal for three days beginning on
Monday 25 April 2016.
A judicial review brought by Geraldine Finucane against the
UK government failed in the High Court in June.
The action was launched after the UK government refused to
hold a statutory inquiry into the 1989 murder, in which it is
alleged British security forces colluded with loyalist
paramilitaries.
Mr Cameron previously acknowledged shocking levels of
collusion after the UK government published the results of a
review conducted by Sir Desmond de Silva.
However, Mr Finucanes family said the 2012 review was a
sham that fell short of a full public inquiry.
In June, Mr Justice Stephens in the High Court ruled that the
UK governments decision not to order a full inquiry was
lawful.

Widow of murdered
solicitor to appeal against
rejection of inquiry

Pat Finucane
The widow of murdered Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane will
appeal against a ruling that the governments rejection of a
statutory public inquiry was lawful.
In September, Geraldine Finucane lost a legal challenge in
Belfasts High Court against the UK governments 2011
decision not to order an inquiry.
Her solicitor Peter Madden, who co-founded Madden &
Finucane Solicitors with the late Mr Finucane in 1979, has
confirmed appeal papers have been lodged and the case will go
before the Court of Appeal.
Mr Finucane, a human rights lawyer, was shot dead in 1989 by
loyalist paramilitaries who were colluding with MI5, according
to previous investigations.
In 2012, Prime Minister David Cameron apologised for the
shocking levels of collusion involved in the killing as he
launched the Pat Finucane Review, the product of an
examination led by British lawyer Sir Desmond de Silva.
However, Mrs Finucane said de Silvas report was not the truth
and did not constitute an independent statutory inquiry as
originally promised by the UK government.
Mr Madden said former Northern Ireland secretary Owen
Paterson had engaged in a sham exercise, inviting
representations from the family as to the model of inquiry which
would be acceptable to them but had absolutely no intention of
establishing such an inquiry.
He added: A full independent and international tribunal of
inquiry, where documents will examined in public and witnesses
shall be compelled to attend and be cross examined by
Geraldines lawyers, remains the only model capable of achieving
the truth of Pats murder.

http://www.irishlegal.com/2580/widow-of-murdered-solicitor-to-appeal-against-
rejection-of-inquiry/
The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC
December 2012
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2
46867/0802.pdf
The widow of Belfast-based solicitor Pat Finucane has lost her challenge
against a refusal by the British Government to hold a public inquiry into his
murder.
Mr Finucane represented IRA hunger strikers and was killed in front of his family by
UDA/UFF gunmen at his home in February 1989.
Geraldine Finucane had appealed against a 2015 judicial ruling that the decision
taken by then-Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011 was lawful.
The family have long campaigned for a full public inquiry.
Her son Michael says the decision is disappointing.
"The court found that the reversal of that decision was lawful - but I think everyone
knows that doesn't make it necessarily right.
"An inquiry was promised by a previous British government, and that promise should
have been kept.
"And I think it's a mark of what the promises of the British Government in
Westminster are worth".
A report carried out by barrister Desmond da Silva in 2012 found that employees of
the British State and State agents played a key role in his murder.
Geraldine Finucane given permission to take public inquiry bid to
Supreme Court

26 July 2017 at 9:22pm

The widow of murdered solicitor Pat Finucane has been granted permission to
take her bid for a public inquiry into his death to the UK's highest court.

The 39-year-old Belfast lawyer was shot dead at his house in north Belfast in
1989 by loyalists in an attack found to involve collusion with the state.

Former prime minister David Cameron decided not to hold a public inquiry but
instead ordered an investigation by a senior lawyer, a decision which will be at
the heart of the Supreme Court hearing.

The review by Sir Desmond de Silva QC, a former UN war crimes prosecutor,
concluded there was "no overarching state conspiracy" in his death, but found
"shocking" levels of state collusion involving the army, police and MI5.

Peter Madden of Madden & Finucane Solicitors said: "This afternoon we have
been notified that a committee of Supreme Court justices have granted Geraldine
Finucane permission to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal that
David Cameron was justified in reneging on a commitment given to Pat's family,
and to the Irish government, that it would hold a public inquiry into the
circumstances of Pat's murder."

The Finucane family has fought a lengthy battle for a public inquiry through the
courts. Mrs Finucane has described the De Silva report as a "whitewash".
Her lawyer added: "The only way that the full truth about Pat's murder can be
firmly established, and the extent to which a policy of extra-judicial assassination
of which Pat was a victim was authorised by government is by a full transparent
public inquiry where witnesses and documents are subject to intense scrutiny.

"We will seek to persuade the Supreme Court at the hearing of this appeal that
David Cameron acted unlawfully in refusing a public inquiry and that the Court
should quash his decision."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRXIsQmvFHc

Last updated Thu 27 Jul 2017

http://www.itv.com/news/utv/update/2017-07-26/geraldine-
finucane-given-permission-to-take-public-inquiry-bid-to-supreme-
court/

IRA membership charges on the

increase
July 29, 2017

By Cait Trainor (for Damn Your Concessions)

Over the last few months I think we have all
noticed the upsurge in IRA membership
charges facing Republicans in the 26
Counties, it seems every other day someone
is up in the Special Criminal Court; and this
year alone we have seen a number
Republicans convicted and sent to Portlaoise
prison to serve sentences of a few years or
more.
As Republicans we keep a keen eye on such
developments, many of the people facing these
charges will be friends of ours, for some of you, they
may even be your family. The general public is
apathetic towards such things and is not aware of the
high number of people charged, in their mind the war
is over, the jails are full of criminals, there are no
Political Prisoners. How the truth would shatter their
illusions.
In the 32 Counties of Ireland, we have over 70 current
Political prisoners; this does not take into account the
scores of people on bail awaiting trial. Within this
number we have people such as Tony Taylor, interned
without trial, no charges levied at him at all, and also
the widely accepted miscarriage of justice which is
the Craigavon two. What I dont see being spoken
about too much is the onslaught of IRA membership
charges; surely this is a campaign in itself?
A few weeks back I decided to look into the volumes
of people facing IRA membership charges, active
cases not those who have already been convicted. I
found over 20 individuals who had active cases
pending. This shocked me, I like to believe that I am
very up to date on all cases, I knew about them
individually but when they were put together as a
group the sheer volume was startling.
It is clear to me that IRA membership charges are
being brought against Republican activists in an
attempt to censor them, in an attempt to hamper the
good work they are doing. Any Republican can be
arrested and charged with IRA membership, all it
takes is the belief of a Chief Superintendent. No
evidence need be provided just simply the belief of
one person. When the charged person eventually gets
to court; and the Superintendent is questioned on
their belief they have in the past used privilege, in
other words, secret information. Essentially you can
be arrested, charged and convicted of IRA
membership without having any specific allegation or
evidence ever given to justify it.
If any such evidence did exist it would, of course, be
provided by informers, these class of people who are
open to the highest bidder and will say anything a
person wants to hear in order to get paid. When
information, if it exists at all, is secret, it removes
your fundamental right to defend yourself; you cannot
address what you do not know.
To add insult to injury the Court used for IRA
membership is not a normal court, these cases are
heard in the Special criminal court, which is a non-
jury Diplock court presided over by 3 judges.
Let us look for a moment at the Garda Siochana, the
police force who brings these charges, the people
who we are supposed to believe act with such
integrity that their word should be taken on
accusations without evidence.
This Police force has been dogged by scandals in
recent years, information from Whistle-blowers have
exposed their blatant abuse of power, from annulling
thousands of penalty points for influential people to
recording nearly 1 million phantom alcohol breath
tests on the system, just to be clear recording test
results that never actually took place.
In the not so distant past, the Morris Tribunal was set
up to investigate Garda The tribunal investigated
allegations of wrongdoing and corruption in the
Donegal division and ran from 2002 to 2008. It
concluded that Gardai in Donegal had fabricated
explosives finds and had planted firearms in order to
justify the arrests of targeted people. It also found
some members had fabricated informants and
intelligence received.
This is just a brief mention of some of the more
familiar scandals that have emerged about an Garda
Siochana, these are the same people who arrest
Republicans and put them on trial, the only thing
needed is the Word of a Garda Chief Superintendent.
Now ask yourself is the belief of a Superintendent in
this force reputable? If they are prepared to lie about
breath tests, they are surely prepared to lie in high
profile court cases.
It would appear to me that the onslaught of charges
against Republicans is more corruption from the
Gardai; they are once more abusing their position of
power to put away those who challenge the status
quo, those who are seen to be dissidents, those who
are seen to be a problem. In the recent and ongoing
Jobstown Trial, had the defendants been subject to
the same kind of trial as those on IRA membership
charges; Paul Murphy and others would most certainly
be in jail.
We must now look at these cases collectively, the
people charged may be from different organisations,
indeed some are independent Republicans, all,
however, are victims of a corrupt Police force intent
on quashing any kind of Political dissident.
As more and more cases come to Court I believe we
must up the ante in our support, we have to be more
vocal and expose what is going on, at any time it
could me you or me facing these charges, if we can do
nothing for the people currently facing charges, at
least we can let the state know we are aware of what
is happening and that the jig is up!
http://republican-
news.org/current/news/2017/07/ira_membership_charges_on_the_.html

Britains Secret Terror Force

November 23, 2013

An account by BBC investigative journalist

John Ware on what he learned about Britains
secret terror force, the Military Reaction
Force.

10 pm, May 7 1972, Belfast: a 16-year-old youth

emerges from a school disco with his girlfriend.
Like many other youths in this part of Catholic,
nationalist west Belfast, he had previously thrown
stones at the British army.
Suddenly there is a burst of machine gun fire from a
car. As it speeds off, the boy writhes in agony from
bullets in the stomach and arm. A few weeks later a
car cruises into view of a bus stop. The driver is said
to have waved a friendly wave, only for a machine gun
to flame into life from a rear window, cutting down
three men chatting to each other.
Between May and September 1972 -- the most violent
year of the conflict -- there were several similar drive
by attacks, which nationalists assumed were by
loyalist gunmen.
In fact the gunmen were soldiers in civilian cars,
dressed up as locals, and sometimes armed like the
local IRA -- with the IRAs favourite weapon, the
Chicago grinder, a Thompson sub-machine gun also
favoured by the 1920s gangster al Capone.
In each case the soldiers claimed they were fired on.
Yet there was no independent evidence to show that
any of the dead or wounded were armed, or that they
provoked the attacks, or even that they were
members of the IRA.
These soldiers belonged to an experimental
undercover British army unit called the Military
Reaction Force (MRF) whose mysterious activities
have been the subject of lurid speculation in Belfast
for 40 years.
Ex-MRF members have generally shunned the
limelight. So controversial were their activities that
the force was soon disbanded.
The closest former MRF soldiers have come to
breaking cover is as the pseudonymous authors of
two semi-fictionalised paperbacks, one of whom has
referred to the MRF as a legalised death squad.
The factual account of the MRF may not be quite as
colourful. Nonetheless, the evidence gleaned from
seven former members, declassified files and
witnesses does point to a central truth: that MRF
tactics did sometimes mirror the IRAs.
Co-located with the Parachute Regiment in Palace
Barracks just outside Belfast, the MRF was shielded
even from the view of their uniformed comrades by
corrugated sheeting.
Within the MRF compound were prefabricated units
housing an operations and briefing room, an armoury
and space for cars, typically Hillmans and Ford
Cortinas with microphones built into their sun visors.
Some were stolen. MRF members were selected from
all regiments, including the SAS and Special Boat
Service. They had to be single, and able to work
unsupervised using their own initiative.
Their main role was surveillance by melting into the
background of nationalist west Belfast. To help them
live this role, members were demilitarised on joining.
First names were used instead of ranks.
These soldiers did not lack for cold courage. By
adopting a variety of disguises -- drunks, road
sweepers, dockers and press photographers with fake
press cards -- they ventured into IRA strongholds.
Soldier E recounted how he posed as a merchant
seaman in Ardoyne, a near suicidal act of courage in
this IRA lions den.
Had he been banged up against a wall and his
underarm Walther pistol discovered, torture and
execution would have followed. It was a hairy job and
we used to get the shakes after it, but it had to be
done, he said.
The soldiers we spoke to also said the MRF had a
hard-hitting anti-terrorist role. We were not there to
act like an army unit, explained Soldier F. We were
there to act like a terror group.
One tactic was to deliberately act as bait, to entice
the IRA to come out to fight. It was like dangling a
red flag to a bull, said Soldier E, to get them to
engage you rather than their covert operations, laying
ambushes and bombs etc.
The bait -- typically -- was an unmarked vehicle with
two soldiers in the front armed with pistols, and a
third in the back seat with a sub-machine gun.
Youd have one [car] standing off and wed put one as
a decoy in such a place as they would come up to
you, explained Soldier G. And if they did? If they had
weapons on them they were f***ing going down.
Thats the beginning and end of it.
These baiting tactics were outside the rules
governing the use of lethal force known as the Yellow
Card, which required a soldier to challenge a gunman,
offering him the chance to put down his weapon
before opening fire -- unless the soldier felt his life
was in imminent danger.
In the real world of Belfast 1972, one man with a gun
confronted by another was only ever going to end one
way. All of the MRF soldiers we spoke to say they
often ignored the Yellow Card. If we didnt do what
we did, nothing was going to get done, said soldier H,
a grizzled SaS veteran.
And in 1972, according to Anthony Le Tissiet, then a
major in the Royal military police, the prevailing
attitude was that you could just about do anything
you wanted.
In this piratical climate, releasing a few enthusiasts
on to the street and spontaneous events were bound
to occur.
It was a time when we enjoyed the challenge of
going out and having a fight, said Soldier H.
We had to break the rules in many cases but not so
badly that, you know, there was murder done, or
anything like that, said Soldier G.
That depends how murder is defined, and for Soldier
G shooting someone found with a weapon in a car --
even if it wasnt actually on him -- doesnt seem to
have qualified: The rule of thumb was to take him in
and get some information out of him, but we were sick
of that sh*t, you know.
What about assassination in its conventional
meaning: a cold-blooded plan to identify, track down
and execute a target?
None of the MRF soldiers we spoke to say that they
were given instructions to hunt down a named
member of the IRA for execution.
On the other hand, the MRF had an effective way of
identifying known players. Attached to the MRF was
the British armys first agent-running unit in Northern
Ireland where captured members of the IRA were
turned.
Known as Freds, they were housed in married
quarters on the base. They were taken out in
armoured personnel carriers, and through its slit
windows they identified members of the IRA who
were then photographed. MRF patrols were
sometimes tasked on the basis of intelligence
provided by the Freds.
Was there within the MRF, an understanding as to
what would be permissible if some of these more
active IRA players were spotted in circumstances
where they could be dispatched?
Soldier D sometimes patrolled with a silenced
weapon. We had to use our own initiative, he said.
Thats why I was selected for this operation -- to use
my own initiative.
If he came across a well-known shooter whod
carried out assassinations and if the opportunity
arose, he would be taken out.
By the start of 1972, according to the army, soldiers
were killing or wounding about 15 terrorists a week.
Its impossible to say whether the MRFs contribution
to that was disproportionately high in relation to its
size of about 40 men.
Many MRF soldiers are now dead, there were daily
multiple shootings of unknown origin and the MRFs
day-to-day records have been destroyed.
However, some MRF soldiers do seem to have taken a
trigger-happy approach to vigilantes manning
barricades -- often amateurish affairs erected to
protect nationalist enclaves from attacks by
marauding loyalists.
As potent symbols of insurrection, it fell to the army
to discourage their presence.
Soldier G admitted he and other MRF soldiers engaged
in a fair bit of drive-by shootings -- provided he saw a
weapon. You just ease up, slow -- and spray a few.
Some soldiers said they operated on the assumption
that there would always be a weapon at a barricade
--whether it could be seen or not.
Wed give em a blast anyway, said Soldier F, with the
insouciance of someone blow-drying his hair.
On the night of May 12 1972, an MRF patrol gave a few
blasts of automatic and pistol fire to half a dozen men
dismantling a barricade close to a loyalist area in
south Belfast.
Patrick McVeigh, a father of six children, died on the
spot.
The MRF soldiers told the Royal Military Police theyd
been confronted by up to half a dozen gunmen who
opened fire.
Yet forensic tests on McVeigh and his friends were
negative, nor were any of them in the IRA.
A uniformed soldier quickly on the scene said: We
were under the impression we were dealing with
ordinary guys trying to prevent trouble who werent
gunmen.
Covering up the MRFs role, an army statement said
the attack was a motiveless crime -- code for
loyalist murder gang.
Ten minutes earlier, the same MRF patrol car that had
killed McVeigh had been in convoy with another MRF
patrol car which had also opened fire on another
barricade, wounding 19-year-old Eugene Devlin who
was walking close by.
Devlin was not a member of the IRA and he too tested
negative for firearms. Again the MRF soldiers told the
military police they came under fire. Devlin insists the
only gunfire came from the MRF car.
We operated initially with them thinking that we
were the UVF, said Soldier H. But to what end? We
wanted to cause confusion, said Soldier F.
My take on that was Great, no problem, said Soldier
H, who was quite happy for the IRA to think the UVF
was responsible.
Did some MRF soldiers also seek to exacerbate the
murderous internal tensions amongst republicans by
mimicking the Official IRA from whom the Provisional
IRA had split in December 1969?
Stored in the MRFs own armoury were two Thompson
sub-machine guns, then a weapon popular with both
IRA factions.
One of the two Tommy guns was privately owned by
Captain Hamish McGregor, one of the MRFs
commanders, who had won a Military Cross in Aden.
The other had been captured from the IRA by the
police and then loaned with ammunition to the MRF by
the Special Branch. The MRF had told the Branch that
they needed the guns for training to familiarise their
soldiers with the sound and characteristics of a
standard enemy weapon.
However, the Tommy guns appear to have had another
use as well.
We found a major who had told the Royal Military
Police that, when patrolling his area, one of Captain
McGregors section leaders had sometimes been
armed with a Thompson.
His name was Sgt Williams, a Royal Military Policeman
on attachment to the MRF and he had also been the
commander of the MRF patrol that shot dead Patrick
McVeigh.
Soldier H told us that he too sometimes took out a
Thompson on patrol because it had hitting power and
it felt better... it had a bloody big slug.
Shortly after noon on June 22 1972 a volley of bloody
big slugs from a Thompson hit three young men
standing at a bus terminus on the Glen Road, west
Belfast, and a fourth man whose bedroom was in the
line of fire.
According to one witness, a car slowed to a halt 20
yards away on the main road and the driver gave a
friendly wave -- only for the black barrel of a Tommy
gun to flame into life from the back seat.
Once again, the gunman was Sergeant Williams.
Soon word reached detectives that a plain-clothes
army unit was operating in west Belfast with its own
rules.
I thought there was some great master plan behind
these guys driving about in plain-clothes cars,
shooting at civilians, says Alan Johnson, then a
detective constable. If there was, it certainly
escaped me. I couldnt quite grasp it, nor could any of
my colleagues.
Detective Inspector Bill Mooney couldnt grasp it
either. The MRF patrols version was that Williams had
been armed that day with the armys standard issue
machine gun, the 9mm Sterling. Yet surgeons had
removed 0.45 calibre bullets from the victims.
Eventually, the bullets were forensically matched to
one of the two Thompson sub-machine guns in the
MRFs armoury -- the one owned by MRFs last
commanding officer Captain McGregor. Only then did
Williams admit the truth -- that he had taken
McGregors Thompson from the armoury with him on
patrol.
Eventually Williams and McGregor were charged with
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Williams was also charged with three counts of
attempted murder.
That day the attorney-general, Sir Peter Rawlinson
QC, is recorded as saying that McGregors revelation
that a Thompson sub-machine gun had been loaned by
the Special Branch might not be helpful -- which was
something of an under-statement.
He also told the then secretary of state, Willie
Whitelaw, that the whole case was extremely
embarrassing and might become more so because
the blue Cortina car alleged to have been used by
the MRF in the Glen Road shooting had figured in
other alleged crimes.
Sergeant Williams had indeed been involved in other
controversial shootings, including the fatal shooting
of Patrick McVeigh.
Officials then came under attack from ministers for
not having been forewarned of potential stinkers like
the Williams case which had burst upon the Ministry
of De-fence.
Why, ministers asked, had not someone... pick(ed) up
the potential dynamite in this particular case much
earlier and warn us that it might be a particularly
tricky one?
But army HQ Northern Ireland had -- they just hadnt
known how to defuse it which presumably explains
why HQNI had not been particularly helpful and why
the MoD in London was anxiously awaiting what
position would be adopted by the defence.
Particular concern was expressed about something in
one of McGregors formal statements described by
the army deputy under-secretary as horrific,
warning of its possible implications.
We cant say what so horrified him -- our Freedom of
Information request for the statements was refused.
The firearms charges against McGregor and Williams
were dropped.
Williams alone now faced trial charged on three
counts of attempted murder. In London, the MoD
scrambled around for any legitimate diversionary
tactic that might help distract the press from
identifying the MRF.
There was considerable advantage in maintaining as
much confusion as possible.
In the event, at his trial Williams did admit to the
MRFs existence, but the damage to the army was
significantly limited because the illegal firearms
charges against him and McGregor had been dropped.
As a result of that, whatever explanation there might
have been as to why Williams had a Tommy gun on
patrol never emerged in court.
Williams told the court the only reason he had the
Thompson with him was that hed been on a firing
range demonstrating it to new MRF recruits -- not an
explanation we understand he offered the police.
Nor did the jury hear evidence from the major whod
spoken about knowing that Williams had been armed
with a Thompson on previous patrols.
After a brief trial, Williams was acquitted on all
counts by a majority verdict.
Both Williams and McGregor were eventually
promoted -- McGregor ending his army career in 1998
as a brigadier, and Williams as a captain.
On September 27 1972, three months after the Glen
Road shooting, another MRF patrol shot dead 18-year-
old Daniel Rooney, telling the police he was armed
with a rifle.
His friend Brendan Brennan, who the MRF said was
armed with a pistol, was wounded.
Declassified papers show that the army briefed the
secretary of state Willie Whitelaw that Rooney was a
volunteer in D Company, 1st Btn IRA and that
Brennan belonged to the same gang as Rooney.
These claims are no more credible than the MRF
soldiers claims that their targets were armed.
As before, the swabbed hands and clothes of both
youths showed no sign of having been in contact with
firearms, consistent with eyewitness accounts that
neither was armed.
Rooney does not appear on any IRA roll of honour, he
is not buried in the republican plot in Milltown. There
were no IRA death notices and his family and friends
insist to this day he was not in the IRA; nor is there
any evidence that Brennan was either.
When I called at the home of the soldier who shot
Rooney he said that if I set foot on his property again
Ill punch you... and I can punch pretty hard.
In November 1972, a review of the MRF ordered by the
army top brass found there was no provision for
detailed command and control and said it should be
replaced by a better-trained unit, which eventually
morphed into 14 Intelligence Company.
Prime Minister Edward Heath sent a message to the
army emphasising that special care should be taken
to ensure that the new unit should operate within the
law.
An implicit recognition, perhaps, that some MRF
soldiers activities had been illegal?
The head of the army, General Sir Michael Carver, said
the new training arrangements would automatically
reduce the risk of nonsenses.
Yet what had been the military logic behind those
nonsenses? And why exactly had MRF soldiers
sometimes been armed with IRA-style weapons?
In 1993, the RUC began a lengthy inquiry into the
MRFs shooting of Patrick McVeigh.
Interviewed at his retirement home in Spain was the
MRFs first officer commanding, a Parachute
Regiment captain, Arthur Watchus, who had also
served in the SAS:
POLICE: Did you have knowledge of what weapons
were being used in the car by patrols? How
disciplined a unit was it?
WATCHUS: It was a disciplined unit but what they (his
soldiers) did away from me, who can say?
Watchus is now dead. So I asked his successor
Captain Hamish McGregor if he had authorised
Williams to take his privately owned Tommy gun on
the day when Williams fired it at three men the police
believed were unarmed.
McGregor declined to say but insisted the only reason
that the MRF had Tommy guns in its armoury was for
training, describing Williams as one of our very
experienced and respected operators and pointing
out that he answered to 39 Brigade, Belfast.
Commanding 39 Brigade for most of 1972 was
Brigadier Sandy Boswell, who ended his career as Lt
Gen Sir Alexander Boswell, General Officer
Commanding, Scotland. Did the MoDs verdict that
there had been no provision for detailed command
and control mean that lethal MRF operations were
not under proper control? Boswell declined to
respond.
Williams emigrated to Australia where we caught up
with him. Opening his door, a burly, vested figure
barked Im not interested and then promptly closed
it when I began to ask questions.
Meanwhile, McGregor wrote to say he ran a pretty
tight ship with proper control over his men. He also
complained that by publicising the claims of some of
his former soldiers we were dignifying
unsubstantiated and fanciful theories.
Hunting down IRA members to shoot them would have
been against the law and his soldiers had abided by
the Yellow Card. He remained very proud of the
pioneering work we carried out in what was a very
hazardous environment.
The MRFs work was indeed hazardous and
pioneering. It was the prototype for more
sophisticated army undercover units that penetrated
and disrupted IRA active service units, reconciling the
IRA leadership to the reality that an armed struggle
would never force a British withdrawal from Northern
Ireland.
As to death squads -- a label paradoxically shared by
nationalists with long memories and one of the two
former MRF soldiers turned author -- Soldier D said: I
totally reject death squad, only to pause and add:
Put yourself in my situation: weve got a dirty war, a
war that was out of control. We knew who the
operators were, we knew who the shooters were. So
what are you going to do about it, John?
Soldiers are not policemen. They are required to close
on the enemy and, if necessary, to kill them, even if
innocent bystanders are in their midst.
Some in the MRF seem to have had particular
difficulty in distinguishing one from the other,
inflicting grave damage to the reputation of the
British army which could otherwise take credit for
having fought -- and won -- an asymmetric war against
terrorists.
Asked about the allegations that unprovoked, MRF
soldiers shot unarmed civilians, the Ministry of
Defence said it had referred them to the police in
Northern Ireland.
Thirty years of conflict has a long tail.
http://republican-
news.org/current/news/2013/11/britains_secret_terror_force.html
Loyalists seeking confrontation
with marches
July 29, 2017
Loyalists marched through a mixed
community in south Belfast on Friday night in
a show of strength in tribute to notorious UDA
paramilitaries linked to a string of sectarian
atrocities.
The parade through residential streets off Ormeau
Road was held for the 23rd anniversary of the death of
Joe Bratty and Raymond Elder. The pair were involved
in a massacre at Sean Graham bookmakers along the
same street in 1992 in which five Catholics were
killed.
The march had been restricted by the Parades
Commission from several streets including Ormeau
Road. However, loyalist paramilitary flags were flown
from lampposts on Blackwood Street where the
parade started - flouting parade rules against
paramilitary trappings.
Before the march began, two photographers standing
on the street were pushed and threatened by men
who told them to leave the area and not to take
pictures.
The police, who were stationed at several points
along the parade route, made no attempt to intervene.
About ten bands took part in the march, which set off
shortly after 7.15pm and finished on Haywood Drive at
a controversial memorial garden funded by the
Housing Executive.
The parade was first held in 2014 after the housing
body spent eleven thousand pounds building the
monument. A plaque bearing Bratty and Elders names
was subsequently fixed to the memorial. The Housing
Executive has since rejected calls to remove the
structure.
The organiser of the latest march admitted a tribute
to Bratty and Elder was again taking place at the
memorial.
SDLP South Belfast MLA Claire Hanna had branded
the parade offensive, while Alliance councillor
Emmet McDonough-Brown called it a coat-trailing
exercise.
FASCISTS JOIN LOYALIST PROTEST
A far-right group meanwhile said it intends to join
loyalists in a counter-protest against a civil rights
parade in Belfast city centre next weekend.
A loyalist anti-terrorism march is due to take place
at the same time as the anti-internment parade is
being organised by republicans and progressivists.
The organisers of the annual anti-internment parade,
the Anti-Interment League, plan to march from north
Belfast through the city centre on Sunday August 6
before making their way to a rally at Dunville Park in
the west of the city. Up to 5,000 people are expected
to take part.
A rival event is to be addressed by Britain First leader
Paul Golding and his deputy Jayda Fransen, who
promote themselves as pro-British, anti-Islamic, anti-
immigration.
Golding was jailed for eight weeks last year after
breaching a High Court ban on him entering any
mosques in England and Wales.
One of the groups founders was Jim Dowson, a
Scottish loyalist who lives in the North and at one
time was close to Golding. Dowson and Golding were
also linked to the Protestant Coalition, which
emerged from the loyalist flag protests.
Anti-Internment League spokesman Dee Fennell met
with the Parades Commission, which has the power to
adjudicate on contentious parades and is still
considering both events.
He said that parade organisers have voluntarily
agreed to start earlier and have reduced the number
of bands taking part to five.
He expressed concern at the possibility of a perverse
situation where republicans marching on a human
rights issue will be banned while far-right leaders are
seemingly able to travel to Belfast from Britain and
have a free rein.
http://republican-news.org/current/news/2017/07/loyalists_seeking_confrontatio.html

The Orange Order is a Protestant group that seeks to maintain the political union
between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom and thus protect British control of
the country. Each year, on July 12th, the Orange Order facilitates a march along
Garvaghy Road, which runs through a predominately Catholic area. This event is
organized to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne.

The Battle of the Boyne began in 1690 and resulted in the Scottish Protestant King
William of Orange defeating the Catholic King James II of Ireland and securing his
position as king of Great Britain. This event has become a key element of the Orange
Order identity as it exemplifies Protestants triumphing over Catholics and is glorified
through the Marching Season which lasts from Easter to September. The Catholic
people living on Garvaghy Road are constantly in opposition to these marches. They
believe that by marching on this particular route the order is being offensive and
provocative infringing on the civil rights and the local community2

The Orange Order was originally founded in Armagh in 1795 after a confrontation
now known as The Battle of the Diamond. During the battle thirty Catholics were
killed and in the years following many of the anti-catholic penal laws had been
removed with some of the civil rights restored. The Protestants were felt to be a
threat to their political and economic dominance. These fears continued and after
1791 a new nationalist group was formed known as the United Irishman. The
overriding goal for the United Irishman was independence for Ireland which required
the complete severing of all the political connection binding the island to Britain.
During the 1798 United Irishmen Uprising, the British government used members of
the Orange Order as a counter-revolutionary force. They viewed the Orange Order as
a valuable organization for defending their interest especially against the republican
challenge. The Orange Order viewed themselves as defenders of Protestantism and
crucial for the survival of Britains political interest in Ireland. The United Irishmen
failed in the ending months of 1798 causing the British government to create the
United Kingdom. Ireland lost its own parliament and was represented by the
Westminster parliament in London. During this time only Protestants could be
members of the parliament. No Catholics were allowed4

Every year on July 12 residences along Garvaghy Road leave their houses in order to
avoid the pending pandemonium. However, not everyone is able to flee and thus
some must stay and endure. During this time more people are likely to be killed in
the grand tradition of the Orange Order marching through Northern Ireland and with
more rioting and violence occurring.9].

According to Rachel Macnair, in the Psychology of Peace, Psychological Causes of

Nonviolence include Resisting Destructive Obedience is a strong force in non violent
campaigns. Resisting destructive obedience is most likely present when the
authority is not present. British rule came from a long ways a way allowing for a
stronger rebellion. An example of this is the United States rebellion from King George
III rule from across the ocean. The Americans resisted policies that were good for
England to the detriment of the Americas by nonviolently refusing to comply. This is
similar to the origins of the rebellion of Northern Ireland from British rule 10

Another psychological cause is The Appeal of Nonviolent Campaigns. The Orange

Order Marches started as a nonviolent campaign that developed cohesion and unity
among the Protestants.

Any kind of nonviolent campaign gives pride in ones self by belonging to a greater
group and helping achieve its ends. It gives a sense of aliveness as part of the vast
undertaking ( pg 61).

This pride in each side led to the emotions that cause a deep divide between the
Protestants and the Catholics11

The author warns that with any nonviolent campaign there is a fear of it Getting out
of Hand They do not always run according to plan. By raising the emotions and the
spirit of resistance and breaking down apathy violent outbursts occur. For example in
America in the civil rights movement there were riots do in part to this reason. In
Northern Ireland the immense feeling of injustice felt by the Catholics or betrayal
and treason felt by the Protestants led to emotional outbursts which preceded the
violence that occurred. Some of the violence that went on was petrol (gasoline)
bombing, and similar civil disobediance.12

During our tour on the Shankill road in Belfast, Ireland, Irish humor was exhibited
by our tour guide. What he was talking about was serious and disturbing so he
constantly had to lighten the mood to be able to share his story. When I was on the
Falls Road, the other side of the troubles, our tour guide was showing us the street
where the Orange Order marches take place. I asked a follow up question and during
his answer he had to make several jokes because the subject matter was so serious.
It caused such a strong emotional response that this was our tour guides defense
mechanism.
The Orange Order Marches occur every year during marching season to make sure
that discussion continues on the issues that are important to the Protestant
community. It always produces controversy and discussion even if it is negative. By
continuing this discussion yearly this is their way of getting the word out to as
many people as possible and insuring that the subject doesnt fade into the
background of history. Talking to some of the locals in Belfast confirmed that this
was their general view of why the marches continue to this day.

The mural below was painted in remembrance of the Battle of the Boyne in 1690
where King William of Orange defeated King James II. It is showing where he is
crossing the river. This mural was unveiled during an Orange Order March and added
to the tension

AGREEMENT AT ST ANDREWS

https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/st-
andrews-agreement.pdf
The St Andrews Agreement, October 2006 - GOV.UK 2
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st
_andrews_agreement-2.pdf

Northern Ireland (St Andrews

Agreement) Act 2006
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/nistandrewsact221106.pdf
St Andrews Agreement An Aid for Dialogue with EU
http://www.communitydialogue.org/PDFs/St%20Andrews%20Booklet.pdf

Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Bill

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/nistandrewsbill161106.pdf

The Agreement
Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/ag
reement.pdf
Cabinet: Minutes of Full Cabinet - CC(85) 26th (Parliamentary
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Community Affairs, Industrial Affairs,
Home Affairs, Northern Ireland affairs) [Anglo-Irish Agreement
draft] [declassified Dec 2014]
Parliament, Commonwealth (South Africa), Defence (general), Industry, Trade, European Union (general), Foreign
policy (Africa), Foreign policy (Asia), Foreign policy (USA), Foreign policy (Western Europe - non-EU), Local
government finance, Northern Ireland, Terrorism, Transport
http://7f11a30961219bd1a71e-
b9527bc5dce0df4456f4c5548db2e5c2.r10.cf1.rackcdn.com/850725%20CC%2026th.pdf

Cabinet: Minutes of Full Cabinet - CC(85) 26th (Parliamentary

Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Community Affairs, Industrial Affairs,
Home Affairs, Northern Ireland affairs) [Anglo-Irish Agreement
draft] [declassified Dec 2014]
http://7f11a30961219bd1a71e-
b9527bc5dce0df4456f4c5548db2e5c2.r10.cf1.rackcdn.com/850725%20CC%2026th.pdf
Cabinet: Whitelaw memo circulated to Cabinet - C(85) 26 (Public Expenditure Survey
1985) [declassified Dec 2014]
http://7f11a30961219bd1a71e-
b9527bc5dce0df4456f4c5548db2e5c2.r10.cf1.rackcdn.com/851106%20C
%2885%29%2026%20WHITELAW%20MEMO%20PUBLIC%20SPENDING
%201985.pdf
Anglo-Irish agreement between the government of Ireland and the government of
the United Kingdom
Signed at Hillsborough on the 15th of November 1985
From the Documents Laid Collection, DL045908
The late 1960s saw the beginning of a thirty year period of violent conflict in Northern
Ireland known as The Troubles, which resulted in the deaths of over 3,500 people and
the injury of almost another 50,000. The Troubles began as a result of both the conflict
between nationalist and unionist communities regarding Northern Irelands status within
the United Kingdom, and the discrimination against the nationalist minority by the
unionist majority. In 1964, a civil rights campaign began in Northern Ireland, calling for
the end of discrimination against Catholics and Irish nationalists. Although initially
peaceful, violence soon erupted between Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups.
The conflict escalated to such a degree that by 1969 British forces were sent to Northern
Ireland to intervene, and by 1972, the British government suspended the Northern
Ireland Parliament and imposed direct rule from London. An All-Ireland arrangement was
considered as the most likely way of resolving the crisis. The first attempt at this was the
1973 Sunningdale Agreement, which provided for both a devolved, power-sharing
administration and a role for the Irish government in the internal affairs of Northern
Ireland. However, this agreement fell apart in May 1974. A decade later, another attempt
was made to bring an end to The Troubles.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement (pictured above) was an agreement signed on the 15th of
November 1985 by Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald and the British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher at Hillsborough Castle in County Down which gave the government of Ireland
an advisory role in Northern Irelands government. It established the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference which provided for regular meetings between ministers in
the Irish and British governments on matters affecting Northern Ireland, and outlined
cooperation in four areas: political matters, security and related issues, legal matters and
the administration of justice, and the promotion of cross-border cooperation. It also
determined that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern
Ireland unless a majority of its people agreed to join the Republic and set out the
conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus government in the region.

The agreement was voted through the British House of Commons by a majority of 426,
with the majority of the Conservative party, the Labour party and the Liberal-SDP in
favour of it. It was also approved by Dil and Seanad ireann, despite opposition from
Sinn Fin and Fianna Fil. However, the agreement received severe backlash from
several different groups. In the Republic of Ireland, republican dissent stemmed from the
Agreement confirming the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, with
assertions that it did harm to Irelands claim over Northern Ireland, while for Northern
Ireland Republicans, the deal fell short of providing them with a united Ireland. The
Anglo-Irish Agreement was also met by fierce opposition by the unionist community of
Northern Ireland. Unionist leaders resented being excluded from the negotiations leading
to the agreement and were concerned that it would pose a threat for Northerns Ireland
place within the United Kingdom. A campaign of protest was led by the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), including mass protest rallies
organised under the campaign heading 'Ulster Says No'. On the 23rd of November
1985, over 100,000 people gathered in Belfast to hear speeches of protest from UUP
leader James Molyneuax and DUP leader Ian Paisley. Both unionist parties
subsequently resigned their seats in the House of Commons and suspended district
council meetings in protest. Thatcher received significant criticism relating to the
agreement, with Ian Paisley accusing her of having prepared Ulster Unionists for
sacrifice on the altar of political expediency. They are to be the sacrificial lambs to
appease the Dublin wolves.
The Anglo-Irish agreement was not successful in bringing about an end to the conflict in
Northern Ireland, with ongoing attacks by paramilitary groups continuing for many years
after. However, it did achieve co-operation between the Irish and British governments
co-operation that is today seen as playing a significant role in the Peace Process
through facilitating the creation of the Good Friday Agreement on the 10 th of April, 1998.
Although there have been occasions of violence since 1998, the Good Friday Agreement
is seen by most as the end of The Troubles.

http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/about/libraryresearchservice/onlinecataloguecollectio
ns/documentslaidthroughthedecades/1980s-theanglo-irishagreement/