ExistentialPhenomenologyandEmbodiedCognitiononMentalIllness

RatcliffeandBroomesupporttheexistentialphenomenologicalapproachtounderstanding
mentalillness.TheytakeinsightsfromSartre,Merleau-Ponty,andHeideggerabouthowall
experiencesofrealityarestructuredbyonesfeelingofbelongingtotheworldandthepossibilitiesone
detectsinentitiesandevents.Iamsympathetictotheirphenomenologicaldescriptionsofmental
illness.However,thelanguagefromthistraditionisunclearandpoetic,andIfearanalytic
philosophersandscientistswillnottakethistraditionseriouslyduetoitsbroad-sweepingstyle.Inthis
paperIwouldliketieRatcliffeandBroomesideasintothemoreanalyticandempiricaltraditionof
embodiedcognitionandcognitivescience.FirstIwilloutlineRatcliffeandBroomespointsonhow
existentialphenomenologycanexplainexperiencesofschizophreniaanddepression.Second,Iwill
identifytheweakest,vaguestaspectsoftheirideas.Third,Iwilladdresstheseweakspotsand
re-explainthemthroughtheoriesinembodiedcognition.Fourth,Iwillshowhowexistential
phenomenologycanalsoenhancetheoriesinembodiedcognition.Iwillarguethereisaveryfruitful
intersectionbetweenthesedisciplines,andtheycanworktowardsacomprehensivephilosophyof
mentalillnessthatnotonlydescribesmentalillnessaccuratelybutalsopointtowardspotentialnew
therapies.
InExistentialPhenomenology,PsychiatricIllness,andtheDeathofPossibilitiesRatcliffeand
Broomedemonstratehowexistentialphenomenologicalconceptsandhelprevealthenatureofmental
illnesses,suchasschizophreniaanddepression,thatgoesbeyondanythingthattraditionalpsychology
andsciencecoulddo.Theydrawonfirst-handaccountsofpeoplesexperienceswithmentalillness
andonmajorworksinexistentialphenomenology,andtheyuseeachtoilluminatetheother.Notonly
dotheythinkexistentialphenomenologyhelpsusunderstandtheexperienceofmentalillnessandthe
possiblecausesofit,butalsopeoplesexperiencesofmentalillnesscanhelpmakesenseofconceptsin
existentialphenomenology.Onesuchconceptisthedeathofpossibilities,whichiscentraltoSartres
BeingandNothingness(1943).Realityisexperiencedintermsofthepossibilitiesthepotential
functionalityandmeaninginherentineveryobject,person,andtheself.Becausetheworldthat
consciousnessrevealsisnotneutral,detached,andindifferentbutshapedbyvalues,projects,and
goals,itispossiblefortheworldtobestrippedofthisinherentstructureofintentionalityandtofeel

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utterlyalien.Thedeathofpossibilitiesisanextremeexperiencethateveryonefacesattimes,but
peoplewithmentalillnessmightundergoitmoreregularlythantheaverageperson.
Togiveabasicexampleofthedeathofpossibilities,RatcliffeandBroomepresentSartres
famouscaseofamanlookingthroughthekeyholeonadoorandspyingonsomeone.Themanis
engagedinthisactuntilhesuddenlyhearssomeonesfootstep.Atthatverymoment,manfeelsshame
strikeandoverwhelmhisbody.Thisemotionmakeshisbodysalientanddisruptiveinhisexperienced
world.Themancannolongerbeimmersedinthemomentandengagedinhisactivity;heisplucked
outfromhisengagementandforcedtofeelthepresenceofhisbody,asanobjectseenbyanother
person.Thepossibilitiesofhisbeingarereducedatthemomentofknowingthatsomeoneelsemight
bewatchinghim.Hecannolongerbeasubject,butheisinsteadreducedtoanobject.Inthiswaythe
presenceoftheotherisinherentinfeelingssuchasshame.
RatcliffeandBroomegoontodescribehowcertainexperiencesofmentalillnesssuchas
schizophreniaanddepressionarerootedinchangesinbodilyfeelingandthedeathofpossibilities.
Peoplewithschizophreniaarehypersensitivetotheothersgazeandtheyundergoanespecially
catastrophicdeathofpossibilitiesininterpersonalexperiences.Apersonwithschizophreniamight
feelherselfcompletelyreduced,vulnerable,andendangeredundertheothersgaze,evenifthisgazeis
benign,letaloneloving.Depressioncanbedescribedintermsofpossibilitiesandthebodyaswell.The
bodyscapacitiesdeterminethefunctionalityandsignificanceofobjectsintheworld.Forexample,ifa
personhastheabilitytoholdacup,thenthecupwillappearwiththesignificancethatitisgraspable.In
casesofdepression,thebodyfeelsheavyanddead,asifithaslostallitscapacities.Withthislossof
abilitiesinaperson,objectsintheworldalsolosetheirsignificance.Moreover,thereisthepainful
awarenessthatshehaslostherabilities,andobjectsandeventsoftheworldjustwillnotaffectheras
theyoughtto.
IhavethreemaincomplaintswithRatcliffeandBroomespaper.First,althoughthe
manipulationofpossibilitiesinherentinpeopleandobjectsisthecentralideatotheirpaper,theydo
notdefineormakeclearwhattheymeanbypossibilities.Second,theyalsodonotexplainhowitis
thatanotherpersonsgazecanradicallyreducethesepossibilities.Whatisthecausalmechanism
here,orwhatistherelationbetweentheothersgazeandasubjectspossibilities?Third,theymake
vagueclaimssuchasthebodyisnotanobjectofexperience.Insteaditisexperiencedastheworldwe

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inhabit.Howcanthebodybeexperiencedastheworld?Whatdoesthisstatementreallymean?Iwill
addresseachcomplaintinmoredetail,andintheprocesspresenttheoriesfromHaugelandon
HeideggerandNoonsensorimotorcontingencytheory.LastlyIwillelaborateontheimplicationsof
thesetheoriesIconnecttoRatcliffeandBroome,andhowembodiedcognitioncanbenefitfrom
existentialphenomenologyandvice-versa.
Tostartoffwithmyfirstcomplaint,themostdetailRatcliffeandBroomeprovideonwhat
theymeanbypossibilitiesistorefertothebackgroundofvalues,projects,andgoals.Theyalso
implythatapersonspossibilitiesisrelatedtoherbeingasubjectthatbeholdsaworld,orthather
consciousnessisanopeningontotheworld,andthedeathofpossibilitieswouldbeherfeeling
reducedintoanobjectthatisseenbyanotherperson.HaugelandinDaseinDisclosed(2013)givesavery
thoroughencompassingdefinitionofpossibilitiesinHeideggersphenomenology.Accordingto
HaugelandsinterpretationofHeidegger,adaseinprojectspossibilitiesontoanentityasanentity.
Whatthismeansisthatadaseingivesparticularformandsignificancetoentities.Theworld
independentofdaseinisindeterminate;therearenodistinctentitiesandnosignificancestothem.A
dasinisawayofbeingthatunderstandsitswayofbeing(thinkofalifestylesuchasaphysicistorpoet;
thereisaparticularwayofseeingtheworld,setofselfandworld-definingactivities,andpersonal
commitmentsorpurposesrelatedtoeachlifestyle).Onlywhenadaseinisbeholdsitsworlddoesitcut
throughtheindeterminacyanddrawforthparticular,meaningfulentities.Aphysicistseesobjectsof
accelerationsandmassesandtheirsignificanceinsolvingequations.Apoetseesobjectsofmetaphors
andstrangeadjectivesandtheirsignificanceincontributingtoapoem.Ithinkthepossibilitiesthat
RatcliffeandBroomerefertoaretheseparticularentitiesthatbelongtoadasein,andthesignificance
totheseentities,includingtherolestheseentitiesplayandthegreaterprojectsthatinvolvethem.
WhenthisredescriptionofpossibilitiesisappliedtoRatcliffeandBroomespaper,itis
evidentthattheirexamplesofthedeathofpossibilitiesareextremelylimitedinconcerningonly
issuesrelatedtoapersonsself-identity.Thedeathofpossibilitiesshouldalsobeapplicabletothe
possibilitiesinherentinallentitiesrelevanttoapersonslife.Inbothschizophreniaanddepression,a
commonsymptomisanhedonia,ortheinabilitytofeelpleasure.Itispossibletodescribethissymptom
intermsofthedeathofpossibilities,extendedintotheentitiesandsignificancesoftheworld.Inthese
mentalillnesses,thepreviouspathsofactionapersoncouldfeelbreakingthroughandstructuringthe

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worldareabsent.Theentitiesthatwouldvebeensalientduetotheirrolesinsuchpathsofactionare
alsoabsent.Forexample,apersonnormallylikestoinviteherfriendoverandhaveteaand
conversations.Anhedoniaforhermightbeexpressedasacompletelossofinterestinpursuingthis
pathofaction.AlthoughitisarguablyangeneralizationofHeideggerstermdaseinwhichhemightnot
haveintendedfor,Ibelieveitisreasonabletoregardthispersonspracticeofbeingsociableasa
componentoforacompletedasein;itisawayofbeingforher.Withthelossofthisdasein,thereisa
lossoftheentitiesoffriendship,interestinhowherfriendisdoing,thrillofbeingcaredforbyher
friend,meaningfulnessofthetraditionoftakingtea,responsibilityandroleofbeinghospitable,andso
on.Thesearepossibilitiesofentitiesasentities,andwithoutthem,therearenosuchentities.
HaugelandsinterpretationofHeideggernotonlyexplainsmorethoroughlythemeaningof
possibilitiesbutitalsoshowshowthesepossibilitiesfittogetherandinfluenceeachotherinaholistic
networkbelongingtoadasein.
Formysecondcomplaint,IamdissatisfiedwithRatcliffeandBroomestreatmentofthe
phenomenathattheothersgazehasthepowertoreduceasubjectspossibilities.Now,withthe
understandingthatasubjectspossibilitiesreferstothedaseinsheembodiesandthenetworksof
interdependententitiesandtherolesoftheseentities,thisquestioncanberephrased:Howcanthe
feelingofbeingobservedbyanotherpersonalterasubjectsdaseinandthenetworksofentitiesand
meaning?Iproposethatthereisaseparatedaseinthatexistsforsocialsituations.Peopleallgrowup
learningtobehaveandthinkinparticularwayswhentheyfindthemselvesinsocialsituations.They
automaticallyadjustintothissocialdaseinwhentheyencounterpeople.Dependingonwhetherthe
otherisastrangerorfriend,andonwhetherasubjectiscomfortablesociallyoranxious,hersocial
daseinwillhaveadifferentqualityandcomewithadifferentnexusofentitiesandmeanings.One
socialdaseinapersoncouldhaveistheoneRatcliffeandBroomedescribe;throughthissocialdasein,a
personfeelsthatsheisreducedintoanobjectandinspectedorviolatedbytheother.Buttheauthors
cannotclaimthatthisisthedefiningdaseinofanysocialencounterforpeopleofmentalillness.Itisa
universalphenomenathatpeoplewillshifttheirwayofbeing,ordasein,whentheyareinsocial
situations,andtheparticularsocialdaseinisidiosyncraticforeachperson.Itisnotthattheothersgaze
hasthepowertoreduceapersonintoanobject,butratherthattheothersgazesignalsthatthe
situationissocialinnatureandelicitsthesocialdaseinforaperson,whichcouldbethefeelingthatshe

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isanobject,orcouldbesomethingelse.Itisthisshiftbetweendifferentdaseinthataccountsforthe
manipulationordeathinpossibilities,nottheothersgazeinitself.
Nowtomythirdcomplaint:whatdoRatcliffeandBroomemeanbysayingthatthebodyis
experiencedastheworld?IwanttobeascharitabletoRatcliffeandBroomeaspossible.Theydo
explainthatthebodyistheworldinthesensethattwoprimarystructuresofexperiencedependonthe
body:(1)thefunctionalityandsignificanceofobjectsdependonbodilycapacities,and(2)the
shatteringeffectoftheothersgazealsodependonthesubjecthavingabodyandbeingseenasabody.
However,theirexplanationsdonotprovideanyspecificprocessesormechanismsinvolved,andthey
arepuzzlingempirically.Iwillprovidefurtherexplanationsthatprovideempiricallytenable
mechanismsthathelpjustifyexistentialphenomenologytoanalyticphilosophersandscientists.This
elaborationrequiresexplainingaradicallynewtheorycomparedtoHaugelands,andinvolve
presentingmanymoredetails.Althoughthispresentationmightseemlikeadigressionduetoits
lengthanddetail,IpromisethatitiscompletelyrelevantandessentialtogroundingRatcliffeand
Broomestheory,aswellasHeideggerstheoryofdasein,inanempirical,analyticframework.
ThetheorythatIwillusetodescribewhatitmeansforthebodytobeexperiencedastheworld
isNossensorimotorcontingencytheoryofperception,asgiveninPerceptioninAction(2004)andThe
VarietiesofPresence(2012).Accordingtothistheoryperceptionisneitheramodeloftheworld
constructedinthebrainnoradirect,transparentaccessintosomeobjectiveworld.Perceptionis
ratherakindofaction,andtheenvironmentorworldisenacted.AlthoughNostheorycenterson
explainingvisualperception,hesuggestsitcanbeextendedtoexplainingotherkindsofperception,
suchastheperceptionofparticularfunctionsandmeaningsofobjectsspecifictosubjectdomains
(whichsoundsalotlikedasein!),whichhavebeentraditionallyregardedasjudgementor
categorizationprocesses,distinguishedapartfromperception.Nostheorybasicallyproposesthata
personssensorimotorskillsenactthespatiality,visualdetail,andfunctionalityofentities,allina
single-strikeortogetherinaunifiedperceptualprocess.Itisbasedontheempiricalfactthatthevisual
fieldislargelyindeterminate(soundslikethemetaphysicsofHaugelandsHeidegger!).Although
classicopticaltheoristsassumethatthevisualfieldcontainsthelayoutanddetailsofallobjects,aclose
analysisofpersonalexperiencerevealsthatthisassumptioniswrong.Infact,thevisualfield
disappearsontheedges,andonlyasmallfocalcircleinthecenterofthefieldhasclarity.Psychological

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studiesofvisualfallibilitiessuchaschange-blindnessallsupportthisfactofnaturethatvisionislargely
indeterminate.
Althoughtheliteralvisualfieldisextremelyscant,apersonneverusuallyperceivesthevisual
field.Rather,apersonperceivesafull,realworld,andthisworldisenactedthroughhersensorimotor
skills(coughcoughRatcliffeandBroomescapacitiesofthebody).Asensorimotorskill,atitsmost
basicform,istheskillofunderstandingthedimensionalityandvolumeofobjects.Becausethe
experienceofinteractingwithbasicsolidformsfromalldifferentanglesissocommonplaceand
well-known,aperson,whenlookingatanobjectstaticallyfromoneangle,canexpectwhattheobject
wouldlooklikeifsheturneditaroundorwalkedaroundit.Allthesepotentialviewsoftheobjectare
concurrentlypresentinherexperienceoftheobject.Sheexperiencesorperceivesthatwhichisabsent
fromhervisualfieldbutalsowhichispossibleormadeaccessiblebyhersensorimotorskills.Notalks
aboutsensorimotorprofilesasthesetofdifferingappearancesofagivenobjectthatdependonthe
differinganglesofapersonspositionrelativetotheobject.Thereisafunctionbetweenwherea
personstandsandwhattheobjectlookslike,andthepersonperceivestheobjectasifalltheoutputsof
thisfunction,orthesensorimotorprofile,wereactivated.
Noextendsthistheorynotonlytoimmediatelypresentobjects,buttoalsoverydistant
objects.Heexplainsthatevenafriendontheothersideoftheworldcanbeperceivedandfeltas
present,duetothesamemechanismsandprocessthatmakesalocalobjectsfulldimensionality
perceivedandfeltaspresent.Apersonhastheskillsthatenablehertoaccessherfriend,suchasthe
skillsoftextingherfriend,takinganairplanetovisither,orseeingherlifethroughphotosandvideos
ontheinternet.Havingtheseskills,shecanexpectwhatitwouldbeliketoengagewithherfriendin
theseways,andthesepossibleinteractionsaremadepresentoractualinperceptualexperience,dueto
thefamiliarityshehaswiththeseskills.Althoughthisaccessisindirect,andthequalityofthepresence
ofherfriendwillaccordinglybelessdirectorsubstantialcomparedtoanobjectinherimmediate
vicinity,herfriendisnonethelessperceivedandfeltaspresentinasense.Noevensuggests,butonly
verybriefly,thattherecouldbecognitiveskillsthatenactavarietyofpresencethatisdifferentfrom
thatofsensorimotorskillsbutonthesamecontinuum,suchasthepresenceofapersonsownfuture.
IwouldliketoextendNostheorytowhatIbelieveisitsfullpotential.Ithinkthisbasicidea
thatskillsthatapersonhasdevelopedskillsthatinvolveidentificationofrelevantentities,

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manipulationofaccessoftheseentities,andexpectationsoftheexperienceofsuch
interactionscreatethesubstanceofthemajorityofreality.Skillscanhavethismuchpowerto
constituterealityduetothefundamentalfactthatrealityismostlyindeterminateorabsent.Skillscan
createalmostallaspectsofhumanexperience,suchastheinterpersonal,emotional,narrative-based,
andexistentialexperiences,andnotmerelyspatial-visualaspects.TheexamplesRatcliffeandBroome
giveofhowapersonwithschizophreniaisextremelysensitivetotheothersgazeandexperiencesitas
violentlydestroyinghercanbeexplainedintermsofNosskills;thisexperiencehappensnotfromthe
presenceofmaladaptiveskillsofthesensorimotorkind,butperhapsalackofexistentialskillsand
socialskills.Iunderstandthatitseemsinappropriatetoclaimthatapersonhasschizophrenic
experiencesduetoskillsbecauseskillshavetheconnotationofbeingdeliberate,willed,andpracticed,
anditisobviousthatschizophreniaisneverwilledforandratheralargelygenetic,uncontrollable
phenomena.Forthatreason,Icalltheseexperiencesofschizophreniaasduetoalackofskillsrather
thanapresenceofskills.Forwhateverreason,apersonwithschizophreniahasdifficultydeveloping
andusingtheexistentialskillsthatwouldmakeasocialinteractionsmoothandpleasant.
WhatdoImeanbyexistentialandsocialskills?Iamproposingaverytentativetheorythatwill
undergomuchrevisioninthefuture.Fornow,todefineexistentialskills,Iamtryingtogetat
whateversetofskillsinvolvingknow-how,memories,expectations,beliefs,andthelikethatare
causallyrelevanttoenablingapersontofeelengagedinandcompetentinasocialinteraction.Iusethe
termexistentialtorefertothissetofskillsbecausetheyarefundamentaltoonesexistenceinthe
worldanddeterminehowapersonlives,howsheaffectsothers,andwhosheis.Todefinesocialskills,
Irefertotheskillsthatenableapersontohavepleasantsocialinteractions,suchastheabilitytofeelthe
otherperceivingherasarespectedfineperson,basicfolkpsychologytohaveasufficient
understandingofwhattheothermeansbytheotherswordsandbehaviors,andinterestormotivation
toengagewiththeother.Iamsuretherearemanyothercomponentsthatcouldbemoreaccurateor
essentialtotheexistentialorsocialskillsthatIamtryingtodefine,butthisdescriptionisenoughfor
now.
ToexplainRatcliffeandBroomesexampleofcasesofdepressionintermsofNostheoryof
skills,Iconsiderexperiencesofdepressiontobetheresultofalackofavarietyofnarrative,existential,
andsocialskills.WhatdoImeanbynarrativeskills?Iconsidernarrativeskillstobecomposedof

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abilitiesrelatedtobeingconnectedtoafutureself,tohaveimportantlong-termprojects,andtobe
responsibletooneself,community,andworld.Narrativeskillswouldalsoincludetheabilitiesto
identifytheimmediateparticularentitiesrelevanttotheseresponsibilitiesandtoworkwiththese
entitiestofulfilltheseresponsibilities.Iusethetermnarrativetorefertohowtheseskillsarerelated
toapersonssenseofselfhoodandroleintheworld,orthemeaning/purposeofapersonslife,and
whatshedoesandwilldotofulfillthat.Ifapersonlacksnarrativeskills,shedoesnthavethese
capacitiesthatwouldidentifyrelevantentitiesintheworldandinteractwiththeminawayto
constitutemeaningfulactivitiesandahealthyevaluationofself.RatcliffeandBroomegivethe
examplethatapersonwithdepressionmightfeelunabletobeaffectedbytheloveoffriendsand
familiesandispainfullyawareofthisinability.Iseethatthisinabilitycanbeanalyzedintermsofthe
lackofnarrativeskillincludingthatofaccessingandperceivingonesself-worth.Thisinabilityalso
involvesthelackoftheexistentialskillofdetectingandunderstandingtherealityofthelovefrom
others.Or,theseskillsthepersonlacksmightberegardedassocialskills,becausetheyinvolvefolk
psychology.Thesevaryingtermsnarrative,social,andexistentialareallfluidandinterdependent,
soitisnotclearwhichtermismostappropriateforwhichsituation.Theterms,atthistime,arentmy
priority;Iaimtomakemyideasevidentinthispaper.
Mymainideahere,tosummarize,isthatexistentialphenomenologyaspresentedbyRatcliffe
andBroomeandbegivenmorenuancebyHaugelandsinterpretationofHeideggeriantheories.Also,
Nosembodiedcognitioncangiveanempiricalfoundationtothisexistentialphenomenology.I
understandthatsecuringthisempiricalfoundationdependsondemonstratingthatthesenarrative,
social,andexistentialskillslieonthesamecontinuumofsensorimotorskillsofNostheory.Making
theconnectionbetweenthetwomightseemlikeastretchtothereaderuninitiatedtothegeneralfield
ofembodiedcognition,soIllgivesomeevidenceforthisconnection.Thefulltaskofdemonstrating
theconnectionrequiresmuchmoreevidenceanddetail,andthatconstitutesapaperonitsown,which
Iwillsaveforanothertime.Fornow,Iwillmaketwomainpoints.First,wecanseethatbothkindsof
skillsinvolveapersonscapacitiestoidentifyrelevantentities,accessormanipulatethem,andevaluate
theinteraction(whichgivestheperceptionresultingfromsuchaninteractionanormativedimension
andmakesitobjective).Second,therearevariousempiricalstudiesthatsupportthehypothesisthatall
abstractabilitiesofcognitionwhetherconceptualizationofemotions,narrative,morality,oreven

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mathdependonthebasicbodilyabilitiesofmovementandmostinstinctualexperiencesofgravity
andphysicallimitationsandpossibilities(seeLakoff&JohnsonsPhilosophyintheFlesh(1999)or
JohnsonsTheMeaningoftheBody(2007)formoredetails).
Now,Iwouldliketoelaborateonthenew,revampedtheorythatresultsfromcrossing
HaugelandsinterpretationofHeideggersdasein,being-in-the-world,andtotalitiesofinvolvements
(thenexusesofentitiesandtheirroles),withNossensorimotorcontingencytheoryquanarrative,
social,existentialskills.Whattheembodiedcognitiontheorylacksissomeoverallstructuralfeatures.
Whatexistentialphenomenologylacksisspecific,empiricalmechanisms.Iseethattheymakethe
perfectmarriage.Thestructuresofdasein,being-in-the-world,andtotalitiesofinvolvementscan
helporganizetheoriesinembodiedcognition.Adaseincanberegardedasaninterdependent,
coherentsetofskillsthatarecorrelatedwithatotalityofinvolvements,sincetheapersonsskills
makesparticularentitiesandtheirrolessalient,enableshertointeractwiththem,andbringsfortha
particularrealityrelevanttotheseskillsandentities.Toreturntotheexampleofthedaseinofthe
lifestyleofapoet,theskillspertainingtothisdaseinmightinvolvetheskillsofseeingtheworldlikea
child,respondingtotheaweattheworldthroughwords,metaphors,orphrases,andhavingan
intuitivesenseofrhymeandrhythmwords.Suchskillsgiverisetotheentitiesofbeautiful,
bewilderingdetailsinnatureorpeople,andtheseskillsinteractwiththeseentitiestogiverisetothe
realityofcommuningdeeplywithlifeandhelpingmakethebeautyoftheworldexplicitandvisibleto
others.Thisrealitybelongstothedaseinofapoet.Here,itisevidentthattheoriesinembodied
cognitiontraditionallylackanyholisticorganizationtotheskillstheyhypothesize,orhowtheseskills
relatetoapersonsidentity,wayoflife,andsocialrole.Existentialphenomenologyprovidesthese
featuresandgetsanempirical,analyticfoundationinreturn.


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No,Alva.2012.VarietiesofPresence.Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress.

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Ratcliffe,Matthew,andMatthewBroome.2012.ExistentialPhenomenology,PsychiatricIllness,and
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