CIVIL LAW

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1980 BAR EXAMINATIONS

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QUESTION NO. I:

(a) A and B were husband and wife. During their marriage, they built a house on a lot exclusively owned by B, the
wife, with funds earned by A, the husband. They had no children. Upon the death of B, her relatives claimed the house
and lot from A, the husband. The husband refused.

Decide the controversy.

(b) A wife filed against her husband a complaint for legal separation on the ground that the latter had attempted on her
life, with a prayer for support pendente lite. The husband opposed the grant of support on the ground of adultery on the
part of the wife. Over the husband's opposition, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted support pendente
lite. The husband instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the award.

Is the wife entitled to support pendente lite?

ANSWER:

(a) A, the husband, is correct when he refused to give the house and lot to the relatives of B.

The funds used in constructing the house are conjugal. This is so because such funds were earned by A.
Therefore, the house is conjugal. True, the lot upon which the house is constructed is paraphernal. But then,
according to the Civil Code, it will also become conjugal upon compliance with the condition that its value shall
be reimbursed by the conjugal partnership to the wife. This condition can be fulfilled only during the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. This is well-settled. Assuming then that this condition has been fulfilled, both house
and lot are conjugal in character. One-half (1/2) thereof belongs to A, while the other one-half (1/2) belongs to
the estate of B.

To whom shall the estate of B pass? Assuming that B died intestate and assuming further that the relatives of B
are brothers and sisters and/or nephews and nieces, one-half (1/2) thereof shall pass to A and the other one-half
(1/2) shall pass to such relatives in accordance with the rules of intestacy. However, if such relatives are not
brothers and sisters and/or nephews and nieces, the entire estate shall pass to A alone in accordance with the
rules of intestacy.

(Note: The above answer is based on Art. 158, par. 2, Civil Code, and on the cases of Coingco v. Flores, 84 Phil.
284; Vda, de Padilla v. Paterno, 113 Phil. 656; Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474).

(b) Yes, the wife is entitled to support pendente lite/. It is true that adutery of the wife is a valid defense against
an action for support commence by a wife against her husband. This is well-settled. However, the alleged
adultery must be established by competent evdence. The mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery
will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente lite.

(Note: The above answer is based on Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803. A contrary answer may also be
correct provided that the bar candidate qualifies his answer by assuming that the husband was able to prove
adultery of his wife. See Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110; Mangoma v.
Macadaeg, 90 Phil. 508).
 QUESTION NO. II:

(a) C, a Filipino resident of the U.S., sent to his father, D, in Manila $500.00 through X Bank which had a branch in
Manila. Due to mistake of the employees of the bank, D was paid $5,000.00 instead of $500.00. Upon discovery of the
mistake, the Bank demanded from D the return of the $4,500.00. D refused and the bank sued him.

Is the Bank entitled to recover from D?

(b) E and F, Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. Later, they separated. E, the husband, went to San
Francisco, California, to live there permanently. He obtained a divorce in California from F on grounds of desertion
and mental cruelty. Thereafter, he married G, a Filipino, who did not know that E was previously married. E and G had
two children, H and I. They came back to the Philippines where E died.

Discuss (1) the validity of the divorce obtained by E in California; (2) the validity of the marriage of E to G; and (3) the
legal status of H and I.

ANSWER:

(a) Yes. the Bank is entitled to recover the $4,5000 from D. We have in this case an example of a quasi-contract
of solutio indebiti which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through mistake to another who has
no right to demand it (Art. 2154, Civil Code). It's requisites are:

(1) There must be a payment or delivery made by one person to another;

(2) The person who made the payment or delivery was under no obligation to do so; and

(3) The person or delivery was made by reason of mistake.

It is obvious that the above requisites are present in the instant case.

(b)

1. The decree of absolute divorce obtained by E in California is not valid in the Philippines for the following
reasons:

(a) Absolute divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. According to the Civil Code, laws resulting to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad (Art. 15).

(b) Well-settled is the rule that absolute divorce is contrary to public policy. According to the Civil Code, this
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered megatory by the decree of absolute divorce obtained by E in
California (Art. 17, par. 3).

2. The marriage of E to G is not valid. It is void from the very beginning by reason of a prior subsisting
marriage (Art. 83, par. 1, Civil Code). From the point of view of Philippine law, since the decree of absolute
divorce obtained by E in California is not valid, he is still married to F.

3. H and I are natural children by legal fiction. The reason is that they are children born of a marriage which is
void (Art. 89, Civil Code).

QUESTION NO. III:

(a) Several families had erected their houses on the river bank portion of a lot owned by X. The construction of the
houses was with the knowledge and consent of X. The latter did not collect rentals. About five years later, X being in
need of a lot, demanded that the families vacate. The latter refused contending that they were not squatter considering
that X had allowed their occupation and is, therefore, estopped from ejecting them.

1) Are the families "squatters"?

2) Do they have a right to continue in the occupation of the land?

(b) J and his family livedin his house in Metro Manila. Adjoining J's house was a vacant lot. MERALCO purchased
this lot and built thereon a sub-station, which reduced high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to its
customers. the sub-stations transformers made a lot of noise during all hours of the day and night and made life
miserable for J and his family. J filed an action against MERALCO to stop the operation of the sub-station and for
damages.

Decide the case.

ANSWER:

(a)

1) Whether they are possessors by tolerance or squatters, will not make any difference. Legally, they are
squatters. A squatter is one who settles on land of another without any legal authority. This definition
contemplates a right that owes its source from the law, and which accordingly may be protected by and under
the law. In the instant case, it is clear that the families settled down on the land without any legal authority
(Buonavente v. Melchor, 89 SCRA 222).

2) They do not have a right to continue in the occupation of the land. Their occupation by mere tolerance cannot
give rise to a right that the law should protect in their favor as against the true legal owner. Besides, the owner X
is certainly not barred, under any known principle of law, either by estoppel or waiver, to demand that the law
should protect in their favor as against the true legal owner. (Ibid).

(Note: The Committee respectfully recommends that an answer based on the provisions of Arts. 559, 450 and
451 of the Civil Code should also be considered as correct. Objectively considered, the families in the above
problem are builders or possessors in bad faith. They cannot assert any right as against the legal owner.)

(b) Meralco must take appropriate measures to reduce to normal sound levels. At the same time, it is also liable
to J and to the members of J's family for damages plus attorney's fees. That sound may constitute an actionable
nuisance is not settled (Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., 40 SCRA 342). However, it must create a noise which
affects injuriously the health and comfort of ordinary people to an unreasonable extent. The test, therefore, is
whether the health and comfort of J and the members of his family are so injuriously affected by the noise in
question so that they are subjected to a loss which goes beyond reasonable limits. Applying this test, it is clear
that Meralco has not taken the necessary precaution to reduce the intensity level of the noise to normal or
reasonable level. Consequently, the noise constitutes an actionable nuisance.

QUESTION NO. IV:

(a) K & Co. published in the newspaper an "Invitation to Bid" inviting proposals to supply labor and materials for a
construction project described in the invitation. L, M and N submitted bids. When the bids were opened, it appeared
that L submitted the lowest bid. However, K & Co. awarded the contract to N, the highest bidder, on the ground that he
was the most experienced and responsible bidder. L brought an action against K & Co. to compel the award to him and
to recover damages.

Is L's position meritorious?

(b) M and N were very good friends/ N borrowed P10,000.00 from M. Because of their close relationship, the
promissory note executed by N provided that he would pay the loan "whenever his means permit." Subsequently, M
and N quarreled. M now asks you to collect the loan because he is in dire need of money.

What legal action, if any, would you take in behalf of M?

ANSWER:

(a) L's position is not meritorious. According to the Civil Code, advertisements for bidders are simply
invitational to make proposals, and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the
contrary appears (Art. 1326). It is clear that the general rule applies in the instant case. In its advertisements, K
& Co., for instance, did not state that it will award the contract to the lowest bidder. Therefore, inawarding the
contract to N, the defendant company acted in accordance with its rights.

(b) M must bring an action against N for the purpose of asking the court to fix the duration of the term or
period for payment (Arts. 1180, 1197, Civil Code). Once the court has fixed the duration of the term or period, it
becomes a part of the covenant of the two contracting parties. If the debtor defaults in the payment of the
obligation after the expiration of the period fixed by the court, the creditor can then bring an action against him
for collection. Any action for collection brought before that would be premature. This is well-settled. (Gonzales
v. Jose, 66 Phil. 369); Concepcion v. People of the Phil., 74 Phil. 62; Pages v. Basilan, 104 Phil. 882).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER - Normally, before an action for collection may be maintained by the creditor
against the debtor, the former must bring an action against the latter asking the court to fix the duration of the
term or period of payment (Art. 1197, Civil Code). However, an action combining such action with that of an
action for collection may be allowed if it can be shown that a separate action for collection would be a mere
formality because no additional proofs other than the admitted facts will be presented and would serve no
purpose other than to delay. Here, there is no legal obstacle to such course of action. (Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, 47 SCRA 65).

QUESTION NO. V:

(a) O, a very popular movie star was under contract with P Movie Produtions to star exclusively in the latter's films for
two years. O was prohibited by the contract to star in any film produced by another producer. X Film Co. induced O to
break her contract with P Movie Productions by giving her twice her salary. P Movie Productions sued X Film Co. for
damages. X Film Co. contended that it had a right to compete for the services of O and that her contract with P Movie
Productions was in restraint of trade and a restriction on her freedom to contract.

Whose contention would you sustain?

(b) "Q", the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City, gave an option to "R" to purchase said property P100,000.00
within ninety days from May 1, 1979. "R" gave "Q" one (P1.00) peso as option money. Before the expiration of the
ninety-day period, "R" went to "Q" to exercise his option and to pay the purchase price but "Q" refused because
somebody wanted to buy his property for P150,000.00 and because there was no sufficient consideration for the option.
"R" used "Q" to compel him to accept payment and execute a deed a sale in his favor.

Decide the case.

ANSWER:

(a) The contention of "P" Movie Productions should be sustained. According to the Civil Code, any third person
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party (Art. 1314).
However, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of
a third person of the existence of the contract; and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification
or excuse. All of these requisites are present in the case at bar. (See Daywalt vs. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil.
587).

(b) "Q" should be compelled to accept the purchase price of P100,000.00 and to execute a deed of sale of the
subject property in favor of "R". The reason is that there is already a perfected contract of sale.

Undoubtedly, in the instant case, there is a unilateral offer of "Q" to seel the subject property to "R". For that
purpose, the latter is given an option of ninety days from May 1, 1979 within which to exercise the option. The
consideration for the option is P1.00. Since there is consideration for the option, "Q" is now bound by his
promise to sell the property to "R" so long as the latter will exercise the option within the agreed period of
ninety days (Arts. 1324, 1479, par. 2, Civil Code). "R" exercised his option. Therefore, there is laready a
perfected contract of sale.

At any rate, even assuming that there is indeed an insufficient consideration, or that there is no consideration
whatsoever, the result would still be the same. Since "R" accepted the offer before it could be withdrawn or
revoked by "Q", there is already a perfected contract of sale. "Sanchez vs. Rigos 45 SCRA 368).

QUESTION NO. VI:

(a) "S" executed a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land in favor of T" reserving for himself the right to repurchase the same
within five years from the date of the contract. The contract provided that during the repurchase period "S" will retain
possession of the land as lessee and pay the land taxes thereon. The consideration for the sale was P10,000.00 but the
land was worth double the price. "S" failed to repurchase the land within the agreed period and "T" applied to the Court
for the consolidation of his title. "S" opposed the application and claimed that he had the right to repurchase the land.

Whose stand should be upheld?

(b) "U", an American citizen who used to stay in New York, married "V", a Filipina. They lived in Manila. "U" died
leaving a will disposing of his real and personal properties both in Manila and New York according to the laws of New
York. The will was presented for probate in Manila. "V" assailed the validity of the will claiming that the properties of
"U" must be distributed according to Philippine laws where "U" was domiciled at the time of his death.

How would you resolve the issue?

ANSWER

(a) The stand of "S" should be upheld.

In reality, the contract in the instant case is an equitable mortgage. The land is merely the collateral or security
for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00. This is obvious from the deed of sale itself. In the first place, it says that
"S" will retain possession of the land as lessee; in the second place, it says that "S", the vendor, shall pay the
taxes thereon; and in the third place, the purchase price is unusually inadequate. According to the Civil Code,
the presence of any of these will be sufficient to raise the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage.

(Note: The above answer is based on Art. 1602, Civil Code. See also Gardner vs. CA, 80 SCRA 399; Gloria-Diaz
vs. CA, 84 SCRA 483; Labasan vs. Lacuesta, 86 SCRA 16.)

(b) The will itself itself should be admitted to probate.

It must be observed that the issue raised by "V" involves the intrinsic validity of testamentary provision. It is
well-settled that a probate court cannot, as a general rule, inquire into the validity of testamentary provisions.
Its area of inquiry is limited. It can only inquire into the following: (a) the due execution of the will; and (b) the
testamentary capacity of the testator.
There are, however, some exceptions to the above rule. Assuming then that the case at the bar falls under one of
these exceptions, as far as the contention of "V" is concerned, we must distinguish. Thus--

If under New York law, there is no conflicts law rule declaring that it will be the decedent's domicilliary law that
will govern, then "V" is not correct. This is so because according to our Civil Code, it will be the decedent's
national law that will govern. (Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code).

However, if under the New York law, there is a conflicts law rule declaring that it will be the decedent's
domicilliary law that will govern, then "V" is correct. It is now a settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that when
the Civil Code says that it will be the decedent's national law that will govern, it refers not only to the internal
law of the decedent's state with respect to succession but even to the conflicts law rule. So, the case isreferred
back (renvoi) to the internal law of the Philippines where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.
Consequently, as far as the distribution of "U's" properties is concerned, it should be the law of the Philippines
that will govern and not the law of New York. (Agnar vs. Christensen-Garcia, 7 SCRA 95; Bellis vs. Bellis, 20
SCRA 358.)

(Note: If the bar candidate attacks the problem directly by invoking the provision of the second paragraph of
the Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the Committee respectfully recommends that the answer should be considered as
correct. If the candidate attacks the problem from the procedural point of view, basing his answer on Art. 838 of
the Civil Code in relation to the Rules of Court, the Committee respectfully recommends the due credit should
be given.)

QUESTION NO. VII:

(a) In his will, Reverend Father "R" devised a parcel of rice land in favor of "his nearest male relative who would study
for the priesthood." The Will was duly probated. No nephew of the testator claimed the devise and the testate
proceeding remained pending. In the interim, the rice land was to be administered by the Parish Priest of the locality
pursuant to a project of partition approved by the Probate Court.

Twenty-one years after the testator's death, the Parish Priest filed a petition before the Court for delivery of the rice
land to the Church as trustee. The legal heirs of Father "R" objected and prayed instead that the bequest be declared
inoperative ad that they be adjudged entitled to the rice land. It also turned out that the testator had a grandnephew (a
grandson of his first cousin) who was taking the holy orders in a Seminary.

Would you construe the testamentary provision liberally so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy, or
would you declare the bequest inoperative and the legal heirs entitled to the rice land?

ANSWER:

(a) It depends.

If the Seminarian, who is presently studying for the priesthood, was before the death of Father "R", it is
submitted that the testamentary provision should be liberally construed so as to prevent intestacy. The land
should be delivered to the Parish Priest as trustee or administrator. The reason is obvious. There is always that
possibility that the seminarian might not become a priest. True, Father "R" devised the land to his nearest
nephew male relative who would study for the priesthood. Apparently, the condition has already been fulfilled.
It is however, submitted that the testatorial intention is clear. The devisee must not only study for the
priesthood; he must become a priest. Once he becomes a priest, the land should then be delivered to him.

If the seminarian was born after the death of Father "R", bequest is certainly inoperative and the legal heirs of
the testator shall, therefore, be entitled to the riceland. In other words, the land shall be merged in the mass of
the hereditary estate, and from there, it shall pass to the legal heirs in accordance with the rules of intestacy
(Art. 956, Civil Code). The reason is clear. The seminarian cannot inherit from Father "R". Under our law, in
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, legatee, or devisee must be living at the moment the succession opens,
except in case of representation when it is proper. (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

(Note: The above problem is obviously a modification of the problem resolved in Parish Priest of Victoria vs.
Rigor, 89 SCRA 493. Because of the fact that only one out of several conditions imposed by the testator was
retained by the Honorable Bar Examiner in the above hypothetical problem, the Committee respectfully prays
that either one of the above assumptions should be considered as a correct answer. The Committee further
prays that if a bar candidate assumes that the seminarian was born before the death of Father "R" and then
advance the opinion that the land should be delivered to him because the condition has already been fulfilled,
such an answer should be considered as a correct answer.)

QUESTION NO. VIII:

(a) "AA" had no option to purchase a vessel. He entered into a contract with "BB" wherein he assigned his option to
"BB" under the condition that "BB" would appoint him as agent of the vessel for five years. "BB" purchased the vessel
and appointed "AA" as agent in accordance with the contract. After three years of operation "BB" revoked the
appointment of "AA" as agent for loss of confidence. "AA" sued "BB" for damages.

Would you hold "BB" liable for damages?

(b) "CC" owned a two-story commercial building which he leased to "DD" with the agreement that all improvements
made on the building shall belong to "CC". "DD" made improvements on said building purchasing on credit the
materials needed for said improvements from "EE". "DD" failed to pay rentals to "CC" and failed to pay the value of
the materials to "EE".

"EE" sued "DD" for the unpaid value of the materials. "CC" also sued "DD" for the unpaid rentals. "CC" levied on the
materials. "EE" objected to the levy claiming that the materials belong to him.

Who is the owner of the materials--"CC", the unpaid lessor, or "EE", the unpaid vendor?

ANSWER:

(a) "BB" should be held for damages. True, according to the Civil Code, the principal may revoke the agency at
will. But there are no exceptions. These exceptions are sometimes denominated as agency coupled with an
interest. One of them is when the agency is the means if fulfilling an obligation already contracted. It is obvious
that the agency is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted in favor of "AA". "BB" has clearly
breached his contract or undertaking by revoking the agency before the expiration of the term or period of five
years.

(NOTE: The above answer is based upon Arts. 1927, 1930, Civil Code.)

(b) "CC", the unpaid lessor, is the owner of the materials.

When the materials were delivered and installed in the leased premises, "DD" became the owner thereof.
Ownership is not transferred by perfection of the contract but by delivery. This is true even if the purchase is an
credit, as in the case at bar.

Under the contract of lease entered into by and between "CC" and "DD", "CC" became the owner of the above
materials by virtue of the agreement in said contract that all improvements shall belong to the lessor. Therefore,
when levy was made by "EE" on the materials, "DD", the judgement debtor, was no longer the owner thereof.

(NOTE: The above answer is based on Sampaguita Pictures vs. Jalwinder, 93 SCRA 420.)

QUESTION NO. IX:

(a) "FF" and "GG" executed a promissory note binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay "X" Bank P10,000.00
within the 90 days from January 10, 1979. "FF" signed the note as principal and "GG" as guarantor. Upon failure to pay
the note on due date "X" Bank sued "FF" and "GG" for payment. "GG" interposed the defense that he was just a
guarantor and the Bank must first exhaust all the remedies against the principal "FF"

Is "GG's" defense tenable?

(b) "HH","II" and "JJ" inherited from their parents a large parcel of land. "HH" and "II" went abroad to reside in
Canada. In their absence, "JJ" applied for the registration of the whole land in his name only. In due time, "JJ" obtained
a Torrens Title for the land.

When "H" and "H" returned from Canada after seven years, they found out what "JJ" did and sued him for their
respective shares. "JJ" contended that the decree of the title can no longer be reviewed or changed because of the lapse
of more than one year from its issuance.

In whose favor would you decide?

ANSWER:

(a) "GG's" defense is untenable. Had he not bind himself solidarily with "FF" to pay the obligation,
undoubtedly, as guarantor, he could have availed of the defense of benefit of excussion. In other words, he
cannot be compelled to pay the dreditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor. But then
in the promissory note, he bound himself jointly and severally with "FF" to pay the obligation to the creditor.
According to the law, such a defense now invoked by "GG" is no longer available.

(NOTE: The above answer is based on Arts. 2058, 2059, Civil Code.)

(b) My decision is in favor of "HH" and "II".

In reality, the action commenced by plaintiffs against defendanct is an action for reconveyance of their
respective shares in the subject property based on the constructive trust recognized and sanctioned by the Civil
Code which declares that if the property is acquired through mistakeor faurd, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. Since the obligation is created by law, the action commenced by the beneficiaries against him shall
prescribe and the period of prescription is ten years which shall be counted from the time of the discovery of the
fraud. When did the plaintiff discover the fraud committed by defendant? Under the constructive notice rule,
they are deemed to have discovered the fraud as of the date the trustee set up in himself a title adverse to the
title of the beneficiaries. Normally, this would be the date the trustee ("JJ") obtained his Torrens Title. Since the
instant action was commenced seven years after the issuance of said Title, it is obvious that it was commence in
time.

(NOTE: See: Art. 1456, Civil Code; Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 163; Fabian vs. Fabian, 22 SCRA 231;
Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, 21 SCRA 1192; De la Cerna vs. De la Cerna, 72 SCRA 515; Jaramil vs. CA, 78 SCRA
420; Duque vs. Domingo, 80 SCRA 654; Nacalaban vs CA, 80 SCRA 428.)

QUESTION NO. X:

(a) "KK" sued "LL" for damages for breach of contract. At the trial "KK" proved the breach of contract while "LL"
proved that he acted in good faith.

Give the law governing the damages which "KK" is entitled to recover.

If "KK" proved that "LL" acted in bad faith, give the law governing the damages which "KK" is entitled to recover.
(b) "MM", driver of "X" Bus Co. drove the buss recklessly and injured "NN", a pedestrian. "NN" sued "X" Bus Co. for
damages. The bus company is liable to "NN" either under the Revised Penal Code or under the Civil Code.

Explain and distinguish the liability of the bus company under the Revised Penal Code and under the Civil Code with
respect to the nature of such liability and the defense/s that may be interposed.

ANSWER:

(a) If "LL" acted in good faith, "KK" is entitled to recover from him as compensatory damages those
consequences which are natural, probable and which the parties had foreseen at the time when the obligation
was constituted.

However, if "LL" acted in bad faith, "KK" is entitled to recover from him as compensatory damages those
consequences which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. Additionally, he
may even be entitled to recover moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

(NOTE: The above answer is based on Arts. 2201, 2220, 2232 and 2208, Civil Code.)

(b) Under the Revised Penal Code, the bus company is merely subsidiarily liable to "NN". The latter, therefore,
must proceed against "MM" criminally. He may allow the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the criminal
case or he may reserve his right to institute a civil action separately. If "MM" is convicted but is insolvent, the
bus company is subsidiarily liable. May the company relieve itself of liability by proving due diligence of a good
father of family in the selection and supervision of its drivers? It cannot. The reason is the very nature of the
obligation itself. This is well-settled.

Under the Civil Code, however, the bus company is directly and primarily liable to "NN" The reason is this. The
negligence of "MM" is disputably presumed to be the negligence of the company. "NN", therefore, may proceed
against the company alone. The basis will be a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. May the company relieve itself of
liability by proving due diligence in the selection and supervision of its drivers. According to the Civil Code, it
may, in such case, the presumption of negligence on the part of the company has been overcome.

(NOTE: The above answer is based on Arts. 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, on Arts. 2176, 2177 and
2180 of the Civil Code and on a long line of notable decisions rendered by the Supreme Court.)