Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty.

Agra

Mandatory consultation
Hernandez v. NPC
G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006

Facts
Napocor began the construction of 29 decagon shaped steel poles or towers to support overhead high tension cables
in connection with its Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through
South Superhighway, the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmarinas Village proximate Tamarind Road where
petitioners' homes are. Petitioners researched on the possible adverse effects that such structure could cause to their
health and discovered studies linking the incidence of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields (ranging from
cancer to leukemia). They aired this growing concern to Napocor. However, negotiations between petitioners and
Napocor reached an impasse. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor. Napocor sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 provides that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving an infrastructure project of the
government. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue
Whether the trial court may issue a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by Napocor, notwithstanding PD 1818 yes

Held
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders
against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." While its sole provision would
appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural
resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when
Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects,
the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension
and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR
Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. To boot,
petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to conduct prior consultation with them, as the community
affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no project or
program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned are complied with, and
prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally protected right to health and whether
respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the
affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and
subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of
Presidential Decree No. 1818.

Lesley Claudio (A 2012) -1-

Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005

Facts
A petition for certiorari was filed by the province of Rizal assailing the legality of PD 635, which allocated parts of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation for the solid wastes of QC, Marikina, San Juan, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.

The Secretaries of DPWH and DENR and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) which provides that the land property in San Mateo, Rizal which was owned by
MMC will be used as a sanitary landfill site. The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote to the Governor of MMC
alleging that it had passed a resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its
jurisdiction. It turns out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area.

Despite various objections of the Sanggunian and different government agencies, however, the Office of the
President through the Executive Secretary issued Proclamation 635 which excludes parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation to be used as a sanitary landfill site. The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for
certiorari with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, which was denied.

The people of Antipolo staged a rally to which all municipal mayors of the province of Rizal supported. As a result,
MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. However President Estrada directed the DILG
Secretary and the MMDA Chairman to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of
uncollected garbage in Metro Manila. The Court issued a TRO to enjoin the operation of the dumpsite. Meanwhile, RA
9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was signed into law by Estrada.

Issue
Whether PD 635 which provides for the creation of the San Mateo dumpsite is governed by the provisions of the LGC
which mandates consultation with the appropriate local government units - yes

Held
We hold that the San Mateo landfill will remain permanently closed. Contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the
policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior
consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the
sanggunian is obtained.

During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid
Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, he added that (t)his is the problem, sir, the officials we may have been talking with at the
time this was established may no longer be incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to
do now, a continuing dialogue.

The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, all the municipal mayors of the province of
Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further
attempt to dump garbage in their province. The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were
in fact fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows every local government unit to exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare, which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

Lesley Claudio (A 2012) -2-

Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

Lina v. Pano
G.R. No. 129093, 30 August 2001

Facts
Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20
for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to
open the lotto outlet, but was denied. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna (Kapasiyahan Blg. 508), which prohibits illegal gambling, especially lotto, in the province of
Laguna. Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the implementation of the ordinance. The trial court granted the petition. Petitioners
argue that the trial court failed to appreciate their argument that before any government project or program may be
implemented by the national agencies or offices, prior consultation and approval by the local government unit s
converted and other concerned sectors is required. Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy
declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms
of gambling. They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and
approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of
Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. Calvento contends that prior consultation was not mandatory since such a
requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the LGC.

Issue
Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be
operated in a given local government unit NO

Held
The ordinance is not valid. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government
through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a
game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to
prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial
board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

We hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country . From a
careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government,
but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that
lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. Thus, the projects and programs
mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those
enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change;
(3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest
cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna.

Lesley Claudio (A 2012) -3-

Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk Diwata Magbuhos v. Lanzanas

G.R. No. 131442, 10 July 2003

Facts
The DENR issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Napocor, authorizing the corporation to
construct a temporary mooring facility in the Minolo Cave in Puerto Galera. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera
has declared the Minolo Cave which was a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry a eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of Napocor's power barge. Petitioners, claiming to be
fisherfolks from Minolo, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance, which was denied. The
petitioners filed a complaint with the trial court for the cancellation of the ECC, which was dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies since the petitioners failed to appeal before the DENR Secretary prior to filing the
case with the trial court. Petitioners contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary
because the issuance of the ECC was a patent violation of existing laws and regulations, one of which was Sections
26 and 27 of the Local Government Code.

Issue
Whether the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera was required to approve the construction of a mooring facility
NO, Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical

Held
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, this does not apply in the present case. Congress introduced Sections
26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of a sound
ecology and clean environment. These provisions require every national government agency or government-owned
and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the
prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal
or plant species. Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, the mooring
facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in
the law. There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring
facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that
causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However,
what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge.
Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.

Local special bodies

Yujuico v. Atienza
G.R. No. 164282, 12 October 2005

Facts
The City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance authorizing the city mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation
certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. The property chosen is
located along Solis St. near Juan Luna St. in the Second District of Manila. Failing to acquire the land by negotiation,
the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner of the property. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the city. Petitioner filed a motion for writ of execution, which the trial court granted. Pursuant to
the writ of execution, the branch sheriff served a notice of garnishment on the funds of the city deposited with the
Land Bank of the Philippines. The city filed a motion to quash the notice of garnishment on the ground that public
funds cannot be made subject to garnishment. The trial court issued an order for the release of the funds deposited
with the Land Bank in partial payment of the just compensation adjuged to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus against the members of the City School Board (CSB), seeking to compel them to pass a resolution
appropriating the amount necessary to pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to petitioner. The trial
court granted petition for mandamus. The decision became final and executory. However, the respondents filed a
petition for relief from judgment, invoking excusable negligence as a ground for their failure to seasonably file an
appeal. The court granted the petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. Respondents' defense consisted of their claim that CSB has a
personality separate and distinct from the City such that it should not be made to pay for the City's obligations.

Lesley Claudio (A 2012) -4-

Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

Issue
Whether the school board can be compelled by mandamus to disburse funds to satisfy money judgment
yes
Whether CSB is an entity separate from the city no

Held
The school board of a local government can be directed, by mandamus, to satisfy a final money judgment when the
local government identified the source of the payment of just compensation (the Special Education Fund) in an
expropriation case. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered just, for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his/her land while being made to wait for five years.

Contrary to respondents claim, the law does not make the CSB an entity independent from the City of Manila. This is
evident from the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the creation of school
boards. Sec. 98 of the LGC states that there shall be established in every province, city, or municipality, a provincial,
city, or municipal school board, respectively. The city school board shall be composed of the city mayor and the city
superintendent of schools as co-chairmen; the chairman of the education committee of the sangguniang panlungsod,
the city treasurer, the representative of the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the sangguniang
panlungsod, the duly elected president of the city federation of parents-teachers associations, the duly elected
representative of the non-academic personnel of public schools in the city, as members. Section 101 of the LGC
states that the co-chairmen and members of the school board shall perform their duties without compensation and
remuneration.

The fact that the highest ranking official of a local government unit (LGU) is designated as co-chairman of the school
board negates the claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City. The other fact
that government officials in the school board do not receive any compensation or remuneration while NGO
representatives merely receive allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents argument all the more. Indeed,
such would not be the situation if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from the LGU.

Respondents also argue that the members of the CSB cannot be directed to decide a discretionary function in the
specific manner the court desires. The question of whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the
appropriation of a final money judgment rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus has already been
settled. Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its
favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case.

Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioners property categorically states that the
payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF. The source of the amount necessary to acquire
petitioners property having in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the resolution for the
allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a ministerial duty of the CSB.

Initiative and referendum

Garcia v. Comelec
G.R. No. 111230, 30 September 1994

Facts
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan issued Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 which provided for the inclusion
of said municipality of Morong in the Subic Special Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227. The Petitioners filed
a petition with the Sanggunian opposing the resolution contending that the Sangguninang should propose conditions
prior to its inclusion to the SSEZ. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days
after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC. The Comelec denied the
petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance."

Issue
Whether a resolution (Pambayang Kapasyahan) can be subject of a local initiative yes

Lesley Claudio (A 2012) -5-

Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

Held
Thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Likewise, thru an initiative, the
people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the
Constitution, supra any act or law passed by Congress or local legislative body. In due time, Congress respondent
to the mandate of the Constitution. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code governed the conduct
of local initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ."
An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something
done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves,
awards, and determinations . . . ."

Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative
as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is
Section 124 of the same Code which does. Sec. 124 of the Code provides that initiative shall extend only to subjects
or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. This provision clearly does not limit the
application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the
same Code which provides that any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six
(6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the inclusion of the word proposition is
inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives.

We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In
truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance i.e., that a resolution is
used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an
ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Thus,
resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful
administration of the business affairs of a city.

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of
Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance
of its people.

Subic May Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec

G.R. No. 125416, 26 September 1996

Facts
Congress enacted RA 7227, which provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone (SSEZ). Sec. 12 thereof
provides that the city of Olongapo and the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa would be included in the SSEZ
subject to the concurrence by resolution of their respective Sanggunians.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 expressing therein its absolute
concurrence to join the SSEZ. Respondents filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. The petition also prayed that conditions must be imposed by the Sanggunian prior
to joining SSEZ. The Sanggunian acted upon the petition, promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahang Blg. 18 which
requested Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, respondents resorted to their power of initiative
under Sec. 122 (b) of the Local Government Code. Comelec issued Resolution No. 2848 providing for the rules to
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahang Blg. 10. The petitioner instituted

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Law on Public Corporations Part 14 Atty. Agra

the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of the Comelec resolution alleging that
Comelec was intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes the amendment of a national law.

Issue
Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact, i.e.,
whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law" /Whether Comelec grave abuse of discretion in
implementing Resolution No. 2848 which provides for the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul
Kapasyahang Blg. 10 Yes, Comelec erred

Held
To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an initiative but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a referendum only. Local initiative is defined in Sec. 120 of the LGC as the legal process whereby
the registered voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. In contrast,
local referendum is defined in Sec. 126 of the Code as the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. Prescinding from these
definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making
body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or
modify one already existing. On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the
registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections.

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the
law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and
against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or
rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative
are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" of
"No" in the ballot.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it
may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite, namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact, stressing that under
Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as
are within the legal powers of the sangguniang to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such
ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact. Petitioner contends that
Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would
effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the
benefits to be derived therefrom. In contrast, respondent counters that such argument is premature and conjectural
because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal, hence, if the people should reject it during the referendum,
then there is nothing to declare as illegal.

The Court agrees with private respondent that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not
yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only
when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot
issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.

The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers. Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the
Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that
these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission to which then the herein basic
questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In
other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions," the Comelec in the exercise of

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its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and
language are concerned, and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently
and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the
subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the
Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon. We shall not pass upon the issue of ultra vires
(whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact, i.e.,
whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law") on the ground of prematurity .

Role of private organizations, local sectoral representatives, recall and disciplinary action
Socrates v. Comelec
G.R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002)

Facts
Some barangay offiicals of Puerto Princessa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate
the recall of Mayor Socrates. The PRA passed a Recall Resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall. The PRA requested the Comelec to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days
from receipt of the Recall Resolution. Socrates filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to the Recall
Resolution. Comelec gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election.

Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. However, petitions were filed to
disqualify Hagedorn on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having
been elected and having served as mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant
recall election for the same post. The Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue
Whether the Comelec erred in giving due course to the Recall Election - no
Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor yes

Held
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because
a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15,
2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall
Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no
legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.

The three term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides
that "no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official was elected." These constitutional and statutory provisions have two
parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second,
the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa because:

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1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which
ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September
24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30,
2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term;
and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to
choose their leaders.

Adormeo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002

Facts
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of
Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor. Private respondent
Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the
election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that
the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. Private respondent countered
that he was not elected City Mayor for three consecutive terms but only for two consecutive terms, pointing to his
defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Comelec ruled in favor of private respondent Talaga. On May 19, 2001, after
canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. Petitioner contends that
private respondent was disqualified to run for city mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired
portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period May 12, 2000 to June 30,
2001 is considered a full term. Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not
consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during
Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Issue
Whether or not private respondent was disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City for allegedly serving three
consecutive terms - no

Held
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Claudio v. Comelec
G.R. No. 140560, 4 May 2000

Facts
Jovito claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Claudio assumed office on July
1, 1998. On May 19, 1999, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the
Preparatory Recall Assembly. On May 29, 1999, the PRA adopted a Resolution to initiate the recall of Claudio as
Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence. Claudio opposed the holding of a recall election. Comelec granted the
petition for recall and dismissed the opposition against it. Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers
to a process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in 74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims
that "when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the
recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution to
initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and,
since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all

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proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void. Moreover,
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of
prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean
"the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is
normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning
March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.

Issue
1. On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the
Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
2. On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government
Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election

Held
1. We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or
the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then
proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution
or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled
date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be
cited in support of this conclusion. The term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to
the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall

(1) Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such
right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the
one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
(2) Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
(3) Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed
office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

2. The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Indeed, there is a
distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless
otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the
election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second
limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the
people.

To recapitulate, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding
of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits
the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b)
prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly
stated in Paras v. COMELEC,[12] "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

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Afiado v. Comelec
G.R. No. 141787, 18 September 2000

Facts
During the May 11, 1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda became the substitute candidate for his father, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, for the position of Mayor. When the ballots were counted, Joel emerged as the winner over his
opponent Antonio Abaya and he was later proclaimed. Amelita S. Navarro also won and was proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Santiago City.

On May 13, 1998, the defeated candidate, Antonio Abaya, filed before the COMELEC against Joel Miranda a petition
seeking for the declaration of the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and void.
Comelec granted the petition and consequently the election and proclamation of Joel Miranda as Mayor of Santiago
City was annulled. The ruling was affirmed by the SC decision promulgated on July 28, 1999. Navarro took her oath
of office and assumed her position as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999.

Meanwhile, on July 12, 1999, while the SC case was pending, the Preparatory Recall Assembly adopted a resolution
for the recall of Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro for loss of confidence. Navarro filed a petition before the Comelec with
sought the nullification of said resolution.

Issue
Whether an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by
virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still the Vice
Mayor - NO

Held
Anent the corollary issue as to whether or not Mayor Navarro can be the subject of recall election by virtue of
Resolution No. 1 of the Preparatory Recall Assembly which was passed when she was still the elected City Vice-
Mayor, the same has become moot and academic. The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new
Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic.
The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove Amelita S. Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor
of Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated July 12, 1999 expressly states that "it is hereby resolved to
invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of
confidence through a recall election to be set by the Commission on Election as provided for under Section 71 of the
Local Government Code of 1991."[6] However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch
as she has already vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when she assumed the position of City
Mayor of Santiago City.

Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the recall of Amelita
Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides that "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election." There is no more allowable
time in the light of that law within which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as
Mayor will be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding the
next regular election in May 2001.

Malonzo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 127066, 11 March 1997

Facts
Malonzo was the duly elected Mayor of Caloocan City on May 8, 1995, winning over former mayor Asistio. Barely one
year into his term, on July 7, 1996, members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) voted for the approval of the
PRA resolution expressing loss of confidence in Malonzo. PRA resolution was filed with Comelec. In response,
Malonzo filed a petition opposing the recall process. However, the Comelec issued a resolution, giving due course to
the PRA resolution. Malonzo filed a case with the SC to issue a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Comelec resolution. The Court ordered the Comelec to cease and desist from proceeding with the recall election.
Malonzo alleges that the Liga ng mga Barangay is not authorized to initiate the recall and convene the PRA.

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Issue
Whether Liga ng mga Barangay is included in those who are authorized to initiate the recall - yes

Held
Pertinent provisions of law as regards the initiation of the recall process, are found in Sections 69-70 of the LGC.
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng
mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not
an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay
captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may
represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an
entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the
barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7,
1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the
record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members
convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of
the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.

Jariol v. Comelec
G.R. No. 127456, 20 March 1997

Facts
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside Resolution No.
2879 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of 12 December 1996, which adopted the calendar of activities for
the recall election of the Mayor, Vice Mayor and six (6) members of Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Basilisa, Province of Surigao del Norte, and scheduled said recall election on 25 January 1997.

Petitioners, as officials sought to be recalled, submit that the recall was scheduled on January 25, 1997, within one
year immediately preceding a regular election of barangay officials in May 1997. Petitioners contend that under
Section 74(b) of RA No. 7160, no recall should take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. Under Section 43(c) of the same
Code, the term of office of barangay officials and members of the Sangguniang Kabataan shall be for three (3) years,
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May, 1994. Per Resolution
No. 2880 of 27 December 1996, the COMELEC stated that the next barangay election would be on 12 May 1997
hence, no recall election could be done within one year immediately preceding 12 May 1997. The recall then in this
case falls within the prohibited period.

Issue
Whether the recall was within the prohibited period under Sec. 74 of the LGC/Whether the barangay election is the
regular election contemplated in Sec. 74(b) of the LGC - NO

Held
The scheduled barangay election on 12 May 1997 is not the regular election contemplated in Section 74(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 whose conduct is the basis for computing the one-year prohibited period. As we held
in Paras v. Commission on Elections: "It would, therefore, be in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled could be contested and be filled by the electorate." Hence the holding of the recall
election in question can be validly done at any time before the commencement of the one (1) year period
immediately preceding the next general election for municipal elective officials in May of 1998.

Garcia v. Comelec
G.R. No. 111511, 5 October 1993

Facts
Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. On July 2, 1993, the
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) was constituted to initiate the recall of Garcia and a resolution was then passed to
effect such recall. Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to said resolution, alleging that the

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PRAC failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Sec. 70 of the LGC. The
Comelec dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections. Petitioners filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari alleging that Sec. 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive
right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials
belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law.

Issue
Whether Sec. 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of
local elective officials - no it's constitutional

Held
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's
prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reiterated
the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which "shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative and referendum. In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted the Local Government
Code, whereby Congress provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall
assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities, as provided in Sections 69-74 of the LGC. The legislative records reveal there
were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down
on its expenses.

To be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode,
let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating
recall elections. By the constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and
methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. What the Constitution
simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be
effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of
initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has
made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment.

Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the
view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is
also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives.

Petitioners also assail that Sec. 70 of the LGC violates the equal protection clause because the local officials
constituting the majority can form themselves into a PRA and initiate the recall of a duly elected official belonging to
the minority pary. Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. The fear that a
preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall
of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike down
the law as unconstitutional.

Angobung v. Comelec
G.R. No. 126576, 5 March 1997

Facts
Angobung was the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauni, Isabela, in the local elections of 1995. Private
respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. Sometime in September 1996, de Alban filed with the
Local Election Registrar in Tumaun, a petition for recall against Angobung. The Comelec approved the petition for
recall filed by de Alban and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of

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registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code. The Comelec issued a resolution
scheduling the recall election on December 2, 1996.

Angobung now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main
grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in
violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for
recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections.

Issue
Whether the petition for recall can be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number of
registered voters - no

Held
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that recall of any elective x x x municipal x
x x official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of
the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the law does not state that the petition
must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25% of the
registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters. Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing
25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is
indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law. Our legislators did not peg the voter
requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the
constitution and recall statutes in various American states to the same extent that they were aware of the rationale
therefor. Recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small
percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by
the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously
disrupt the running of government.

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