Canon 10 the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice Honorable Court suspending the

Republic of the Philippines Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in part: redemption period and the
Supreme Court consolidation of ownership over the
Baguio City PRIVATE Urban Bank properties sold during
EN BANC RESPONDENT MAGDALENO the execution sale. Private
IN RE: A. C. No. 6332 M. PEA, pro se, respectfully states: respondent was aghast because by
SUPREME them, more than two weeks had
COURT Present: 1. Despite all lapsed since the redemption period
RESOLUTION the obstacles respondent has had to on the various properties had
DATED 28 CORONA, C.J., hurdle in his quest for justice expired. At that juncture in fact,
APRIL 2003 IN CARPIO,* against Urban Bank and its Certificates of Final Sale had
G.R. NOS. VELASCO, JR.,* officials, he has remained steadfast already been issued to the
145817 AND LEONARDO-DE in his belief that ultimately, he will purchasers of the properties. The
145822 CASTRO, be vindicated and the wrongdoers only step that had to be
BRION, will get their just deserts accomplished was the ministerial
PERALTA, [sic]. What respondent is about to act of issuance of new titles in
BERSAMIN, relate however has, with all due favor of the purchasers.
DEL CASTILLO, respect, shaken his faith in the
ABAD, highest Court of the land. If an 4. Private
VILLARAMA, JR., anomaly as atrocious as this can respondent composed himself and
PEREZ, happen even in the august halls tried to recall if there was any
MENDOZA, of the Supreme Court, one can pending incident with this
SERENO, only wonder if there is still any Honorable Court regarding the
REYES, and hope for our justice system. suspension of the redemption
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. period but he could not remember
2. Private any. In an effort to hide his
Promulgated: respondent wishes to make clear discomfort, respondent teased
that he is not making a sweeping Atty. Singson about bribing
April 17, 2012 accusation against all the members the ponente to get such an
of this Honorable Court. He cannot order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
x------------------------------------ however remain tight-lipped in the Singson did not even bother to
-------------x face of the overwhelming evidence deny and in fact explained that they
that has come to his knowledge obviously had to exert extra effort
DECISION regarding the actuation of because they could not afford to
the ponente of this Honorable lose the properties involved
PER CURIAM: Division. (consisting mainly of almost all the
units in the Urban Bank Plaza in
3. In the Makati City) as it might again
Factual Background evening of 19 November 2002, cause the bank (now Export
This administrative case originated when private respondent received a call Industry Bank) to close down.
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent from the counsel for petitioners,
Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through 5. Since private
Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003[1] (the his cell phone number respondent himself had not
subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated 09189137383) who very excitedly received a copy of the order that
petitions involving respondent that were pending bragged that they had been able to Atty. Singson was talking about, he
before the Court.[2] This motion is directed against secure an order from this asked Atty. Singson to fax him the
advance copy that they had
received. The faxed advance copy
that Atty. Singson provided him
bore the fax number and name of
Atty. Singsons law office. A copy
thereof is hereto attached as Annex
A.
6. Private
respondent could not believe what
he read. It appeared that a supposed
Motion for Clarification was filed
by petitioners through Atty.
Singson dated 6 August 2002, but
he was never furnished a copy
thereof. He asked a messenger to
immediately secure a copy of the
motion and thereafter confirmed
that he was not furnished a
copy. His supposed copy as
indicated in the last page of the
motion was sent to the Abello
Concepcion Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA,
however, was never respondents
counsel and was in fact the counsel
of some of the petitioners.
Respondents copy, in other words,
was sent to his opponents.
7. The Motion
for Clarification was thus resolved
without even giving respondent an
opportunity to comment on the
same. In contrast, respondents
Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 19 November
2001 had been pending for almost a
year and yet petitioners motions for
extension to file comment thereon
[were] being granted left and right.
8. In view of
these circumstances, private
respondent filed on 10 December
2002, an Urgent Omnibus Motion
(to Expunge Motion for
Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution). He
filed a Supplement to the said
motion on 20 December 2002.
9. While private
respondent was waiting for
petitioners to respond to his
motion, he received sometime last
week two documents that
confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this
Honorable Court has not actually
granted petitioners Motion for
Clarification. They indicate that the
supposed 13 November 2002
Resolution of this Honorable
Court which Atty. Singson had
bragged about WAS A Division agreed that petitioners
FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private
respondent anonymously received
were two copies of the official
Agenda of the First Division of
this Honorable Court for 13
November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies
(apparently secured from the office
of two different members of the
Division, one of which is the copy
of the ponente himself),it is clearly
indicated that the members of the
Division had agreed that
petitioners Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion
to Resolve were merely NOTED
and NOT GRANTED contrary to
what was stated in the 13
November 2002 Resolution. This
makes the 13 November 2002
Resolution (at least the version that
was released to the parties)
a falsified documentbecause it
makes it appear that a Resolution
was issued by the First Division
granting petitioners Motion for
Clarification when in fact no
such Resolution exists. The real
Resolution arrived at by the First
Division which can be gleaned
from the Agenda merely NOTED
said motion. Copies of the two
Agenda are hereto attached as
Annexes B and C.
11. At this point,
private respondent could not help
but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson
was bragging to him about. The
clear and undeniable fact is the
Honorable members of this
Motion for Clarification would
only be NOTED but
the ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution
misrepresented that the same was
GRANTED.
12. Respondent is
not just speculating here. He is
CERTAIN that the ponente has a
special interest in this case.
Recently, he also found out that the
ponente made a special request to
bring this case along with him
when he transferred from the Third
Division to the First Division.
Respondent has a copy of the
Resolution of this Honorable Court
granting such request (hereto
attached as Annex D). Indeed, this
circumstance, considered with all
the foregoing circumstance,
ineluctably demonstrates that a
major anomaly has occurred here.
 13. In view of
these, private respondent is
compelled to move for the
inhibition of the ponente from this
case. This matter should be
thoroughly investigated and
respondent is now carefully
considering his legal options for
redress. It has taken him seven
years to seek vindication of his
rights against petitioners, he is not
about to relent at this point. In the
meantime, he can longer expect a
fair and impartial resolution of this
case if the ponente does not inhibit
himself.
14. This
Honorable Court has time and
again emphasized the importance
of impartiality and the appearance
of impartiality on the part of judges
and justices. The ponente will do
well to heed such pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is
has now become incumbent upon
this Honorable Court to clarify its
real position on the 19 November
2001 Resolution. It is most
respectfully submitted that in order
to obviate any further confusion on
the matter, respondents Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated 09
December 2002 (as well as the
Supplement dated 19 November
2002) should be resolved and this
Honorable Court should confirm
that the stay order contained in the
19 November 2001 Resolution does
not cover properties already sold on
execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit
the ponente, Atty. Pea attached to the subject Motion
to Inhibit two copies of the official Agenda for 13
November 2002 of the First Division of this Court,
which he claimed to have anonymously received
through the mail.[3] He also attached a copy of the
Courts internal Resolution regarding the transfer of
the case from the Third Division to the First Division,
upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the
latters alleged special interest in the case.[4]
In response, the Court issued a resolution on
17 February 2003 to require Atty. Pea and Atty.
Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the
consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on
03 March 2003 for an Executive Session.[5]
The reason for the required appearance of
the two lawyers in the Executive Session is explained
in the Courts Resolution dated 03 March 2003.[6] It
states:
The executive session
started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally
opened the executive session and
then requested Associate Justice
Jose C. Vitug to act as chair.
Justice Vitug stated that the
executive session was called
because the Court is perturbed
by some statements made by
respondent Atty. Magdaleno Pea
involving strictly confidential
matters which are purely internal
to the Court and which the latter
cites as grounds in his Urgent
Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondents Urgent Omnibus
Motion.
Respondent/movant Atty.
Magdaleno Pea and counsel for
petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson
attended the session.
The matters under
inquiry were how respondent was
able to obtain copies of the
documents he used as annexes in
his motion to inhibit, and
whether the annexes are
authentic.
The court also clarified
that these matters were to be taken
as entirely different and apart from
the merits of the main case.
Justice Vitug called the
attention of respondent to the three
(3) annexes attached to the motion
to inhibit, Annexes B, C and
D, questioned how the latter was
able to secure copies of such
documents which are confidential
to the Court and for the sole use of
the Office of the Clerk of Court,
First Division and the Justices
concerned.
Annex B is alleged to be a
photocopy of the supplemental
agenda of the First Division for
November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62),
with an entry in handwriting
reading 10 AC on the left side and
what appear to be marginal notes
on the right side of both
pages. Annex C is alleged to be a
photocopy of the same
supplemental agenda of the First
Division for November 13, 2002,
with marginal notes on the right
side of pages 61-62. Annex D
appears to be a photocopy of the
resolution dated September 4, 2002
of the Third Division transferring
the instant case to the First Division
(an internal resolution).
Atty. Pea was made to
understand that all his statements
taken during this executive session
were deemed under oath. Atty. Pea
acceded thereto.
 Atty. Pea was asked
whether he knows any personnel of
the Court who could possibly be
the source. Atty. Pea replied in the
negative and added that he obtained
those documents contained in the
annexes through ordinary mail
addressed at his residence in
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
sometime in the second or third
week of January 2003; but failed to
give the exact date of his
receipt. He said Annexes B and C
were contained in one envelope
while Annex D was mailed in a
separate envelope. He did not bring
the envelopes but promised the
Court he would do his best to
locate them. On questions by the
Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted
that the envelopes may no longer
be found. He was unable to respond
to the observation of the Chief
Justice that the Court would be in
no position to know whether the
envelopes he would later produce
would be the same envelopes he
allegedly received. Atty. Pea
further admitted that his office did
not stamp Received on the
envelopes and the contents thereof;
neither did he have them recorded
in a log book.
When asked by the Chief
Justice why he relied on those
annexes as grounds for his motion
to inhibit when the same were
coursed only through ordinary mail
under unusual circumstances and
that respondent did not even bother
to take note of the postal marks nor
record the same in a log
book, Atty. Pea answered that he
was 100% certain that those
documents are authentic and he
assumed that they came from
Manila because the Supreme
Court is in Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Pea
was reminded that since he assured
the authenticity of Annexes B, C
and D, he should be willing to
accept all the consequences if it
turns out that there are no such
copies in the Supreme Court or if
said annexes turn out to be
forged. Atty. Pea manifested that
he was willing to accept the
consequences.
When further asked by the
Court whether he had seen the
original that made him conclude
that those photocopies are
authentic, he replied in the
negative, but he believed that they
are official documents of the
Court inasmuch as he also
received a copy of another
resolution issued by the Court
when the same was faxed to him
by Atty. Singson, counsel for
petitioner.
Atty. Pea expressed his
disappointment upon receiving the
resolution because he was not even
furnished with a copy of petitioners
motion for clarification, which was
resolved. He found out that his
copy was addressed to Abello
Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law
Offices, which was never
respondents counsel and was in fact
the counsel of some of the
petitioners.
He also expressed
misgivings on the fact that the
motion for clarification was acted
upon even without comment from
him, and he admitted that under
said circumstances, he made
imputation of bribery as a joke.
As to the statement of the
Chief Justice making it of record
that Justice Carpio and Justice
Azcuna denied that Annex B is
their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the
agenda, Justice Carpio also said
that per verification, Annex B is
not Justice Santiagos copy. Thus,
Justice Carpio added that Annex B
does not belong to any of the
Justices of the First Division. It
was also pointed out that each of
the Justices have their respective
copies of the agenda and make
their own notations thereon. The
official actions of the Court are
contained in the duly approved
minutes and resolutions of the
Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug
called the attention of both Atty.
Pea and Atty. Singson to
paragraphs 3 and 4 of respondents
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondents Urgent
Omnibus Motion, which contain
the following allegations: (Atty.
Singson) very excitedly bragged
that they had been able to secure an
order from this Honorable Court
suspending the redemption period
and the consolidation of ownership
over the Urban Bank properties
sold during the execution sale.
Private respondent was aghast
because by then, more than two
weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various
properties had expired. In an effort
to hide his discomfort, respondent
(Atty. Pea) teased Atty. Singson
about bribing the ponente to get
such an order. Much to his surprise,
Atty. Singson did not even bother
to deny and in fact explained that
they obviously had to exert extra
effort because they could not afford
to lose the properties involved.
For his part, Atty. Singson
admitted that he faxed a copy of the
resolution dated November 13,
2002 to Atty. Pea and expressed his
belief that there was nothing wrong
with it, as the resolution was
officially released and received by
his office. He explained that his
staff merely copied the parties in
the resolution of February 13, 2002
when the motion for clarification
was prepared. Hence, the
respondent was inadvertently not
sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further
denied the allegations made in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to
inhibit, reasoning that all he said
was about the suspension of the
redemption period which was the
subject of the motion for
clarification. Atty. Singson branded
as false the allegation of Atty. Pea
that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to
bribery in order that the suspension
of the redemption period would be
granted.
On questions by the
Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted
that he was only joking to Atty.
Singson when on the cellular
phone he intimated that Justice
Carpio could have been bribed
because he has a new Mercedes
Benz. When pressed many times
to answer categorically whether
Atty. Singson told him that
Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty.
Pea could not make any candid
or forthright answer. He was
evasive.
After further deliberation whereby
Atty. Pea consistently replied that
his only source of the documents in
the annexes is the regular mail, the
Court Resolved to require Atty.
Magdaleno Pea within fifteen (15)
days from today to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be
held in contempt and be
subjected to disciplinary action
as a lawyer if he will not be able
to satisfactorily explain to Court
why he made gratuitous
allegations and imputations
against the Court and some of its
members that tend to cast doubt
or aspersion on their integrity.
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to
submit within fifteen (15) days
from today his response to the
allegations of Atty. Pea,
particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4
and 6 of respondents motion to
inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Pea and Singson
from the executive session at 11:35
a.m. and resumed its regular
session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in
these cases, the Court Resolves
to GRANT the motion by counsel
for petitioner praying that
intervenor-movant Unimega
Properties Holdings Corp. be
directed to furnish aforesaid
counsel with a copy of the motion
for reconsideration and intervention
and that they be granted an
additional period of ten (10) days
within which to file comment
thereon and require said intervenor-
movant to SUBMIT proof of such
service within five (5) days from
notice.
The manifestation and comment of
petitioners in G.R. No. 145882,
Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the
motion for reconsideration with
intervention by Unimega Property
Holdings Corp. is NOTED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Pea duly submitted his Compliance
with the Courts Order, where he stated that:[7]
PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro
se, respectfully submits the
following explanation in
compliance with the Resolution of
this Honorable Court dated 3
March 2003:
1. This
Honorable Court in its 3 March
2003 Resolution required
respondent to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt and
be subjected to disciplinary action
as a result of the allegations he
made in his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30
January 2003. As this Honorable
Court stated during the 3 March
2003 hearing, the members of the
Court were perturbed by some
statements respondent made in the
motion.
2. At the outset,
respondent wishes to apologize for
the distress his statements may
have caused the members of this
Honorable Court. While such
distress may have been the
unavoidable consequence of his
motion to inhibit the ponente, it
was certainly not his intended
result.
3. In the course
of the discussion during the 3
March 2003 hearing, it appeared
that this Honorable Court was most
concerned with how respondent
was able to secure Annexes B and
C of his motion (referring to the
two copies of the Supplemental
Agenda of the First Division for 13
November 2002) and why
respondent used those documents
as basis for his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit.
4. Respondent
had explained that he received the
two annexes by ordinary mail at his
residence in Brgy. Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental
sometime during the second week
of January. The sender of the
document was unknown to
respondent because there was no
return address. Despite efforts to
locate the envelope in which these
documents came, he was unable to
do so.
5. Respondent
has no record keeper or secretary at
his residence. Since he is often in
Manila on business, it is usually the
househelp who gets to receive the
mail. While he had given
instructions to be very careful in
the handling of documents which
arrive by registered mail, the
envelopes for Annexes A and B
may have been misplaced or
disposed by the househelp
because it did not bear the stamp
registered mail.
6. When
respondent read the documents, he
had absolutely no reason to doubt
their authenticity. For why would
anyone bother or go to the extent of
manufacturing documents for the
benefit of someone who does not
even know him? The documents
contained a detailed list of the
incidents deliberated by this
Honorable Court on 13 November
2002. Definitely, not just anyone
could have access to such
information. Moreover,
respondent subsequently received
another mail from apparently the
same sender, this time containing a
pink copy of this HonorableCourts
4 September 2002 Resolution
(Annex D, Urgent Motion to
Inhibit) transferring this case from
the Third Division to the First
Division. The receipt of this last
document somehow confirmed to
respondent that whoever sent
him the copies of the
Supplemental Agenda really had
access to the records of this
Honorable Court.
7. Respondent
wishes to reiterate that the main
basis of his motion to inhibit was
the information relayed to him by
Atty. Singson during their
telephone conversation on 19
November 2002. As stated in
respondents Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not
categorically claim that they had
bribed the ponente to secure the 13
November 2002
resolution,however, he made no
denial when respondent, in order
to obtain information, half-
seriously remarked that this was
the reason why the ponente had a
brand new car. Atty. Singson
retorted that obviously, they had to
take extra-ordinary measures to
prevent the consolidation of
ownership of the properties sold as
the bank may again close
down. Indeed, one would normally
be indignant upon being accused of
bribery but Atty. Singson even
chuckled and instead justified their
extra-ordinary efforts.
8. Respondent
very well knew that mere suspicion
was not enough. An implied
admission of bribery on the part of
Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may
not have been sufficient basis for a
motion to inhibit. However,
respondent did not have to look far
for evidence. Atty. Singson in not
denying the allegation of bribery is
considered an admission by silence,
under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Further, Atty.
Singson faxed to him the advance
copy of the 13 November 2002
Resolution. To respondent, that was
solid evidence and in fact to this
day, Atty. Singson fails to explain
exactly when, from whom, and
how he was able to secure said
advance copy. The records of this
Honorable Court disclosed that
Atty. Singsons official copy of the
13 November 2002 Resolution was
sent to him by registered mail only
on 20 November 2002 (a copy of
the daily mailing report is hereto
attached as Annex A). Why then
was he able to fax a copy to
respondent on 19 November 2002
or a day before the resolution was
released for mailing?
9. Despite all
these, respondent hesitated to file a
motion to inhibit. He only finally
decided to proceed when he
received the copies of the
Supplemental Agenda. To
emphasize, the Supplemental
Agenda merely confirmed what
Atty. Singson had earlier told
him. Contrary to the apparent
impression of this Honorable
Court, respondents motion is not
primarily anchored on
anonymously received documents
but on the word of petitioners
counsel himself. The copies of the
Supplemental Agenda are merely
corroborative (albeit extremely
convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any
conscientious lawyer who comes
into possession of the information
relayed by Atty. Singson and the
copies of the Supplemental Agenda
would bring them to the attention
of this Honorable Court. In doing
so, respondent was compelled by a
sense of duty to inform this
Honorable Court of any apparent
irregularity that has come to his
knowledge. It was not done out of
spite but a deep sense of respect.
11. In all honesty,
respondent had been advised by
well-meaning friends to publicize
the incident and take legal action
against the parties involved.
Instead, respondent decided that a
motion to inhibit before this
Honorable Court was the most
appropriate channel to ventilate his
concerns. Respondent is not out to
cast aspersions on anybody, most
especially members of this
Honorable Court. He had to file the
Urgent Motion to Inhibit because
he sincerely believed, and still
firmly believes, that he could not
get impartial justice if
the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent
sincerely regrets that documents
considered confidential by this
Honorable Court leaked out and
assures this Honorable Court
that he had absolutely no hand in
securing them. Respondent just
found himself in a position where
he had to come out with those
documents because his opponent
was crude enough to brag that their
extra-ordinary efforts to secure a
stay order from a certain ponente
had bore fruit. Respondent has
devoted at least seven years of his
life to this cause. He almost lost his
life and was nearly driven to
penury fighting this battle.
Certainly, he cannot be expected to
simply raise his hands in surrender.
13. At this point,
respondent is just relieved that it
was confirmed during the 3 March
2003 hearing that Annex C of his
Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a
faithful reproduction/replica of the
relevant portions of the
Supplemental Agenda (TSN dated
3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81)
on record with the first
Division. With this, respondent
rests his case. [8] (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of
his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July
2003,[9] categorically denied having bragged to Atty.
Pea and that he did not employ extra efforts to obtain
a favorable suspension order from the Court.[10]
After considering and evaluating the
submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court
ordered that a formal investigation be undertaken by
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions
of Atty. Pea.[11] The Courts Resolution dated 28 April
2003 in the consolidated petitions, which is the
subject matter of this separate administrative case,
reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno
M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to
Inhibit the ponente of the instant
case. Respondent Pea attached to
his Urgent Motion Annex B, a copy
of pp. 61-62 of the First Divisions
Agenda of 13 November
2002. Respondent Pea claimed that
Annex B bears the recommended
actions, in handwritten notations, of
a member of the Court (First
Division) on Item No. 175 of the
Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to
the Urgent Motion for Clarification
filed by petitioner on 7 August
2002. The purported handwritten
notation on Annex B for Item No.
175 (f) is N, or to simply note the
motion. However, the Court issued
a Resolution on 13 November 2002
granting the Urgent Motion for
Clarification. In his Urgent Motion
to Inhibit,respondent Pea claimed
that the Resolution of 13
November 2002 was forged
because the recommended and
approved action of the Court was
to simply note, and not to
approve, the Urgent Motion for
Clarification.
Thus, respondent Pea stated in his Urgent
motion to Inhibit:
9. While private respondent was copies Resolution
waiting for (apparently arrived at by the
petitioners to secured from the First Division
respond to his office of two which can be
motion, he different gleaned from the
received members of the Agenda
sometime last Division, one of merely NOTED s
week two which is the copy aid
documents that of the ponente motion. Copies of
confirmed his himself), it is the two Agenda
worst fears. The clearly indicated are hereto
two documents that the members attached as
indicate that this of the Division Annexes B and
Honorable Court had agreed that C.
had not actually petitioners
granted Motion for 11. At this point, private
petitioners Clarification and respondent could
Motion for Urgent Motion to not help but
Clarification. The Resolve were conclude that this
y indicate that the merely NOTED a anomaly was
supposed 13 nd NOT confirmatory of
November 2002 GRANTED contr what Atty.
Resolution of this ary to what was Singson was
Honorable Court stated in the 13 bragging about.
which Atty. November 2002 The clear and
Singson had Resolution. This undeniable fact is
bragged about makes the 13 the Honorable
WAS A November 2002 members of this
FALSIFIED Resolution (at Division agreed
DOCUMENT! least the version that petitioners
that was released Motion for
10. What private respondent to the parties) Clarification
anonymously a falsified would only
received were document be NOTED but
two copies of the because it makes the ponente
official Agenda it appear that a responsible for
of the First Resolution was the 13 November
Division of this issued by the 2002 Resolution
Honorable Court First Division misrepresented
for 13 November granting that the same
2002, the date petitioners was GRANTED.
when the Motion for
questioned Clarification On 3 March 2003, the Court called
Resolution was when in fact no respondent Pea and Atty. Manuel
supposedly such Resolution Singson, counsel for petitioner
issued. In both exists. The real Urban Bank, to a hearing to
determine, among others, the
authenticity of the annexes to
respondent Peas Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, including Annex B. In the
hearing, respondent Pea affirmed
the authenticity of the annexes and
even manifested that he was willing
to accept the consequences if the
annexes, including Annex B, turned
out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the
members of the Court (First
Division) informed respondent
Pea that the handwritten
notations on Annex B did not
belong to any of them. In
particular, Justice Carpio, to whom
the case was assigned and the
apparent object of respondent Peas
Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the
ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution, stated
that his recommended action on
Item No. 175(f) was a & f, see
RES, meaning on Items 175(a) and
(f), see proposed resolution. In
short, the handwritten notations
on Annex B, purportedly
belonging to a member of the
Court, were forgeries. For ready
reference, attached as Annexes 1
and 2 to this Resolution are a copy
of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpios 13
November 2002 Agenda, and a
copy of Justice Carpios
recommended actions for the entire
13 November 2002 Agenda,
respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court
directed respondent Pea to show
cause why he should not be held in
contempt and subjected to
disciplinary action for submitting
the annexes to his Motion to
Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3
April 2003, respondent Pea did
not give any explanation as to
why he attached B to his Urgent
Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his
Compliance, respondent Pea did
not mention at all Annex B.
Respondent Pea, however, stated
that he just found himself in a
position where he had to come out
with those documents because his
opponent was crude enough to brag
that their extra-ordinary efforts to
secure a stay order from a certain
ponente had bore fruit. In
petitioners Opposition to the
Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty.
Singson stated that he categorically
denied that he had bragged to PEA
about the Resolution of this
Honorable Court dated November
13, 2002 and that extra efforts have
been exerted to obtain the same.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Court hereby DIRECTS the
Office of the Bar Confidant to
conduct a formal investigation of
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Pea for submitting to the Court a
falsified document, Annex B,
allegedly forming part of the
confidential records of a member
of the Court, in support of his
Motion to Inhibit that same
member of the Court. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is directed to
submit its findings, report and
recommendation within 90 days
from receipt of this
Resolution.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC,
Attys. Pea[13] and Singson[14] duly submitted their
respective Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still
pending, some of the other parties in the consolidated
petitions specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin
Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group),
the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 manifested before
the Court other malicious imputations allegedly made
by Atty. Pea during the course of the proceedings in
the said petitions. They moved that these be
considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite
him for contempt of court.[15] The Court likewise
referred this matter to the OBC.[16]
In reply to the accusations leveled against
him by the De Leon Group, respondent Pea denied
having used abrasive, insulting and intemperate
language in his pleadings; and argued that his
statements therein were privileged and could not be
used as a basis for liability.[17] He also accused Urban
Bank and its directors and officers of violating the
rule against forum shopping by dividing themselves
into separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R.
Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822) against the same
Decision of the Court of Appeals with the same
causes of actions and prayers for relief.[18]
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing,
wherein respondent Pea and Atty. Singson appeared
and testified on matters that were the subject of the
administrative cases.[19]Several hearings were also
held with respect to the additional contempt charges
raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter, respondent
Pea filed his Memorandum.[20]
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report
on the instant administrative case and made
recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report).
As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at
length, nor even disclose the dispositive
recommendation of the OBC in administrative
investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty.
Pea, despite the fact that the OBC Report is
confidential and internal, has obtained, without
authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed
that this Court should apply to him the non-penalty of
an admonition against him, as recommended by the
OBC.[21]
Furthermore, he has already voiced
suspicion that the present ponente of the consolidated
petitions[22] from which this separate administrative
case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
would exclude or suppress material evidence found in
the OBC report from her ponencia in the parent case
in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice
Carpio had given her by allegedly recommending her
to the Supreme Court.[23] The specific allegation on
the supposed loyalty by one Member of the Court to
another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support
it, is too undignified to warrant a response in this
Decision. To allay his fears that Justice Sereno would
participate in any undue attempt to suppress material
evidence, the Court shall summarize and quote from
the OBC Report the four charges of professional
misconduct in connection with the instant
administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous
imputations against members of the Court, the OBC
found that respondent Pea gave the impression that
some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the
Courts First Division in issuing the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution. According to
respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the
action of the First Division from simply NOTING the
motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to
GRANTING it altogether. The OBC opines that
although respondent Pea may appear to have been
passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the
language he used is not to be considered as malicious
imputations but mere expressions of concern based
on what he discovered from the internal documents
of the Court that he had secured.[24] Moreover, the
OBC ruled that respondent did not make a direct
accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the
formers remark about the latter having received a
new Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence of
the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone
conversation between him and Atty.
Singson.[25] Respondents profound apologies to the
Court were also taken cognizance by the OBC, which
suggests the imposition of a simple warning against
any such future conduct.[26]
Further, the OBC recommended the
dismissal of the second charge that respondent
supposedly submitted falsified documents to this
Court as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit,
specifically Annex B which appears to be a
photocopy of the agenda of the First Division on 13
November 2002 with some handwritten notes.[27] It
reasoned that the submission of falsified documents
partakes of the nature of a criminal act, where the
required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but
respondent Pea is not being charged with a criminal
offense in the instant case. The OBC noted the
statement of the Clerk of Court during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session that Annex B does not exist
in the records.[28]
On the third charge for contempt against
respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise
suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall,
respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated
petitions where he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of
having used his influence over Justice Arturo B.
Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of
his clients.[29] The OBC suggests that respondent be
acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and
disrespectful language against Members of the Court
and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends
that respondent be advised to refrain from using
unnecessary words or statements in the future.[30]
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a
finding on the fourth charge of forum-shopping
leveled by respondent Pea against Urban Bank and
the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit,
respondent accused the bank and its directors and
officers of having violated the rule against forum-
shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and
filing three separate petitions to question the
unfavorable decision of the Court of
Appeals.[31] However, since not all the parties to the
consolidated petitions participated in the hearings in
the instant case, the OBC recommends that separate
proceedings be conducted with respect to this
counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and all of
the concerned directors and officers, including their
respective counsel, to defend themselves and present
witnesses and/or evidence in support of their
cause.[32]
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the
OBC submitted the following recommendations for
approval of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in light of the
foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended the following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous
allegations:
1. To DISMISS the
charge on the ground that the statements in
his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not constitute
malicious imputations as he was merely
expressing his concern of what he has
discovered based on the documents he has
obtained. However, let this case serve as his
FIRST WARNING, being an officer of the
court, to be more cautious, restraint and
circumspect with his dealings in the future
with the Court and its Member.
2. To ADMONISH
respondent for making such non-sense and
unfounded joke against Honorable Justice
Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due
respect and courtesy from no less than the
member of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson
should also be ADVISED to be more
cautious in his dealing with his opposing
counsel to avoid misconception of facts.
B. On the charge of falsification:
1. To DISMISS the
charge of submitting falsified documents on
ground of lack of legal basis. A charge of
submitting falsified documents partakes of
the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of
the Revised penal Code, and the quantum of
proof required to hold respondent guilty
thereof is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
This is to avoid conflicting findings in the
criminal case. The administrative
proceedings of the same act must await of
the outcome in the criminal case of
falsification of document.
C. On the contempt of court filed
by private complainant:
1. To DISMISS the
charge considering that the statements cited
by Atty. Pea in his pleadings previously
filed in related cases, while it may appear to
be offending on the part of the complainant,
but the same do not categorically contain
disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language
or intemperate words that may tend to
discredit the name of the complainant.
Respondent merely narrated the facts based
of his own knowledge and discoveries
which, to him, warranted to be brought to
the attention of the court for its information
and consideration. He must be ADVISED
however, to refrain from using unnecessary
words and statements which may not be
material in the resolution of the issued raised
therein.
D. On the counter-charge of
forum-shopping
1. To RE-DOCKET the
counter-charge of forum shopping, as
embodied in the Comment dated 22 August
2003 of Atty. Pea, as a separate
administrative case against the petitioners
and counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No.
145818 and G.R. No. 145822;
2. To FURNISH the
petitioners and their counsel a copy of the
said comment dated 22 August 2003 for
their information.
3. To REQUIRE the
petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON
VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented by
ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA
ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA &
CRUZ represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A.
VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S.
D. AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B.
SEE to comment thereon within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)
ISSUES
In these administrative matters, the salient
issues for the Courts consideration are limited to the
following:
(a) whether respondent Pea made gratuitous
allegations and imputations against members of the
Court;
(b) whether he can be held administratively
liable for submitting allegedly falsified documents
consisting of internal documents of the court;
(c) whether he can likewise be held
administratively liable for the contempt charges
leveled against him in the Manifestation and Motion
filed by the De Leon Group; and
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual
bank directors and officers are guilty of forum
shopping.
OUR RULING
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless
Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing
against a Member of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the
OBC on this charge.
Respondent Pea is administratively liable for
making gratuitous imputations of bribery and
wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen
in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his
statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session, and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling
effectively the same imputations in his subsequent
pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member
of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent
Pea, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards of
the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-
bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers.[34] They are to abstain
from offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the court[35] and must refrain from attributing
to a judge motives that are not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.[36]
While lawyers are entitled to present their
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of foul and abusive
language.[37] Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.[38] A lawyers language should be forceful
but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.[39]
In the subject Motion for Inhibition,
respondent Pea insinuated that the then ponente of
the case had been bribed by Atty. Singson, counsel of
Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of
the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
suspending the period of redemption of the levied
properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to
Inhibit reads in part:
4. Private respondent
[Pea] composed himself and tried
to recall if there was any pending
incident with this Honorable Court
regarding the suspension of the
redemption period but he could not
remember any. In an effort to hide
his discomfort, respondent teased
Atty. Singson about bribing the
ponente to get such an
order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to
deny and in fact explained that they
obviously had to exert extra effort
because they could not afford to
lose the properties involved
(consisting mainly of almost all the
units in the Urban Bank Plaza in
Makati City) as it might cause the
bank (now Export Industry Bank)
to close down.[40] (Emphasis
supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session by the First Division of this Court,
respondent Pea explained that his reference to the
bribe was merely a joke in the course of a telephone
conversation between lawyers:
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:
Regarding that allegation made by
Atty. Pea on [sic] when you made
mention earlier of him saying about
Justice Carpio?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, Your Honor, he said kaya
pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si
Carpio, eh.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
He said to you that?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, that was what he was referring
to when he said about bribery.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PEA:
First of all I would like to
everything that he said, he told me
that he got, they got a stay order, it
is a stay order from the Supreme
Court through Justice Carpio
and then I gave that joke. That
was just a joke really. He got a
new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you
see, he was the one who told me
they got a stay order from the
Supreme Court through Justice
Carpio, that was what happened
CHIEF JUSTICE:
You mean you made a joke?
then ponente of the consolidated petitions with
ATTY. PEA: respect to the issuance of the 13 November 2003
Resolution. To respondents mind and based on his
You Honor? interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which
he anonymously received, the First Division agreed
CHIEF JUSTICE; only to simply note Urban Banks Motion for
Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned
You made a joke after he told you Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by
supposedly that he got (interrupted) facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence,
respondent Pea attributed the modification of the
ATTY. PEA: action of the First Division to simply note the
Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent
He got a stay order from Justice Pea, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly received
Carpio. a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered
resolution.
CHIEF JUSTICE: However, as pointed out by the Court in the
Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has his
And you say that is the reason own respective copy of the Agenda, where he can
why he got a new Mercedez [sic] make his own handwritten notations on the action for
Benz, you made it as a joke? each item and case, but [t]he official actions of the
Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and
ATTY. PEA: resolutions of the Court.[42]Hence, contrary to the
insinuations made by respondent Pea, Justice Carpio
Your Honor, that is a joke between had not altered the action of the First Division in
lawyers. granting Urban Banks Motion for Clarification in the
consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the
CHIEF JUSTICE; approved resolution agreed upon by the Justices then
present. The ponente of the case
That is correct, you are making it as had not recommended that the Motion for
a joke? Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had
referred to a separate resolution, i.e., a) & f) See
ATTY. PEA: RES., disposing of the said item (F) including item
(A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice
Your Honor, I think, because how Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official
they got (interrupted) minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session,[43] Justice
Carpio submitted for the record his written
CHIEF JUSTICE: recommendation on the agenda item involving the
consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his
If it were a joke why did you recommendation, and the minutes confirm the
allege in your motion that it was approval of this recommendation.[44]
Atty. Singson who said that The Court, through a unanimous action of
Justice Carpio was bribed or the the then Members of the First Division, had indeed
ponente was bribed, is that also adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of
another joke?[41](Emphasis Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the
supplied.) Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
Respondent Pea insinuated ill motives to the completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that
the action had been issued without any sufficient
basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so
with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is
not adequate to immediately justify the imputation of
such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a
Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of
specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of
bribery involving a member of this Court, in
exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave
accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be
jokingly alleged by parties, much less by counsel in
pleadings or motions. These suspicions or
insinuations strike not only at the stature or
reputation of the individual members of the Court,
but at the integrity of its decisions as well.[45]
Respondent Pea attempts to draw a
connection and direct correlation between Urban
Banks failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for
Clarification, purportedly denying him an
opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the
supposedly corrupt means by which the unfavorable
Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely
untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply confined
the issue to an alleged deprivation of due process,
then there would hardly be any controversy regarding
his conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
The purported lack of notice of the Motion for
Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated
petitions could have been raised as a valid concern
for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Pea
insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of the
Court imputing the failure of a private party to give
him due notice to be, in effect, a failure of the Court.
This merits the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers over him as a member of the Bar. To allege
that bribery has been committed by members of the
judiciary, a complainant especially, a lawyer must go
beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations or
even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.
Based on the two lawyers disclosures during
the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent
Pea appears to have been caught by surprise by his
telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who
informed him of the suspension of the redemption
period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order
over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment
of respondent would seem natural, since he was
caught unawares of Urban Banks Motion for
Clarification, which was the subject matter of the 13
November 2002 Resolution. His supposed joke,
which he himself initiated and made without
provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it
suggested that the bank had obtained the Order from
this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury
automobile.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering
snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the
reputation and integrity of members of this Court,
and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis
for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of
investigating the veracity of Atty. Singsons
revelations, respondent read too much into the
declarations and the purported silence of opposing
counsel towards his joke. Respondent made
unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific
Member of the Court. Such conduct does not befit a
member of the legal profession and falls utterly short
of giving respect to the Court and upholding its
dignity.
Respondent Peas defense that the allegation
of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio,
Atty. Singson and the petitioners was a joke fails to
convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the
charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his
alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a joke
between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone
conversation regarding the case. Although the courts
and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they
are not immune to criticisms nor are they beyond the
subject matter of free speech, especially in the
context of a private conversation between two
individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself
was responsible for moving the private matter into
the realm of public knowledge by citing that same
joke in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this
Court. In general, courts will not act as overly
sensitive censors of all private conversations of
lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the
duty to afford proper respect and deference to the
former. Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away
from exercising its disciplinary powers whenever
persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and
bring such imputations themselves to the courts
attention through their own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the
accusation of bribery was only made in jest,
respondent has never backed down since he first
made the accusation in January 2003 and
continually raises as an issue in the consolidated
petitions how Justice Carpio purportedly changed
the agreed action of the First Division when he
issued the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution, even after the Court in the 03 March
2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to
him that no impropriety had attended the issuance
of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit
dated 21 January 2010[46] and 22 August 2011,[47] he
repeatedly insists on the anomalous/unusual
circumstances surrounding the issuance by Justice
Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which was
allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in
the copies of the Agenda that he received.
Respondent Pea most recently capitalized on the
purported alteration or falsification supposedly
committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics
complaint against the latter, where he alleged that:
Sometime thereafter,
respondent Pea received a copy of
the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1st Division
of this Honorable Court with a
notation in handwriting 10AC on
the left side and marginal notes on
the right side. A perusal thereof,
reveals that when this Honorable
Court took up the matter of the
Motion for Clarification of
petitioner Urban Bank, this
Honorable Court merely N or
Noted the Motion for Clarification
of petitioner Urban Bank and did
not grant the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the foregoing (I was
not furnished a copy of the Motion
for Clarification, or required to
 comment by the Honorable Justice
Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty.
Singson, being able to secure an
advance copy of the assailed 13
November 2002 Resolution), the
matter brought out in the Executive
Session and the admission made by
Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the
Honorable Hilario Davide and the
Honorable Justice Vitug with
regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic]
Agenda 1st Division of this
Honorable Court which was sent to
respondent Pea was correct and that
the Motion for Clarification was
merely N or NOTED. However, the
Honorable Justice Carpio issued a
Resolution Granting the Motion for
Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice
Carpio issued the 13 November
2002 Resolution in an
anomalous/falsified manner and
in clear contravention of this
Honorable Courts Decision to
merely Note the same. A clear
judicial administrative
violation.[48] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery joke which respondent
himself initiated has gotten the better of him.
Respondent has convinced himself of the veracity of
his own malicious insinuations by his own repetitious
allegations in his subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from
imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in
the presence of mitigating factors, such as the
acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of
remorse.[49] In this case, the profound
apologies[50] offered by respondent Pea for his
insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and
hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he
expressed remorse for having caused the Court
distress because of his statements,[51] he refuses to
acknowledge any unethical conduct on his part for
his unfounded accusations against the actions of
Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted
in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even
after the latter had recused himself from the case
since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent
resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious
attacks against the integrity and impartiality of
Members of this Court. Earlier in the proceedings
of the consolidated petitions,
respondent assailed how retired Justice Arturo B.
Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon Group,
when the latters petition in G.R. No. 145822 was
reinstated on a second motion for reconsideration:[52]
It has come to the
attention and knowledge of herein
respondent that petitioners counsel
has been making statement to the
effect that they could get a
favorable resolution from the
Supreme Court, on their second
motion for reconsideration. In
short, petitioners counsel is
practically saying that they are sure
to get the Supreme Court to
entertain the second motion for
reconsideration even if it violates
the rules.[53]
1. The motion for
voluntary inhibition is directed at
Justice Buena because it was he
who penned the challenged
Resolution, which granted the
second motion for reconsideration
in violation of the Rules. It was he
who crafted, drafted and finalized
the said Resolution. It was he who
tried to justify the violation of the
Rules. It was from Justice Buenas
office that contents of the
challenged Resolution was
apparently leaked to the
petitioners counsel long before its
promulgation.[54]
What miracle did Atty.
Vinluan perform and what
phenomenon transpired? Why are
herein petitioners very special in
the eyes of Justice Buena?[55]
It is quite obvious that the
partiality of Justice Buena has
been affected by his relationship
with Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced
by the above-described facts and
circumstances.[56]
Surprisingly, Justice
Arturo B. Buena, the assigned
ponente, reinstated the petition
without any explanation
whatsoever, and in gross
violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This was highly irregular by
itself. But what made reinstatement
more suspicious was the fact that
even before the release of the
Resolution reinstating the petition
in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel
for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan, was already boasting that
he would be able to reinstate their
petition. Obviously, even before the
release of the Resolution in
question, Atty. Vinluan already
knew what Justice Buenas
resolution would be.[57] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In no less than six motions,[58] he similarly
accused former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban of prejudice based on his affiliation with
the Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and
officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even
claimed that Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank
to meet with some of the directors and officers, who
consulted him on the legal issues arising from
criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main
petitions, citing only an unnamed reliable source:
The friendship and close
relationship of the three (Justice
Panganiban and Urban Banks
Arsenio Archit Bartolome and
Teodoro Ted Borlongan) went
beyond their being Rotarians. As a
matter of fact, Justice Panganiban
was seen a couple of times going to
Urban Bank to see Archit and/or
Ted, before the banks
closure. Respondent has also
discovered, through a reliable
source, that Justice Panganiban
was known to have been
consulted, and his legal advice
sought, by Borlongan and
Bartolome, in connection with
the above-entitled cases, while the
same was still pending with the
Court of Appeals and in connection
with the four (4) criminal cases
filed the with the MTC [Municipal
Trial Court] at Bago City by herein
respondent against Borlongan, et
al., for introducing falsified
documents in a judicial proceeding.
In the latter cases, it was even
Justice Panganiban who
furnished a copy of the SC
Decision in Doris Ho vs.
People (his own ponencia) to
Bartolome and Borlongan, for
the purpose of giving his friends
a legal basis in questioning the
issuance of the warrants of arrest
against Borlongan and the rest of
his co-accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City
(now appealed to Supreme Court;
see Footnote No. 1 denounce criticism made by anyone
below).[59] (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Pea raised the issue of
unmitigated partiality against retired Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that
the latter resolved a separate case involving related
issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing
parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R.
No. 143591, entitled Teodoro C.
Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M.
Pea, et al, are also the same
petitioners in the above-entitled
consolidated cases G. R. Nos.
145817 and 145822; and the
respondents in the above-entitled
consolidated case G. R. No.
162562. Under the circumstances,
herein private respondent is
ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that
the extreme bias and prejudice of
Justice Nachura against him in
G. R. No. 143591 would certainly
be carried over to the above-
entitled consolidated
cases.[60] (Emphasis supplied.)
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show
sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of
bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in
fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in
moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.[61] Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no
longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can
pardon given certain mitigating circumstances.
Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently cast
unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter
disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the
Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[62] the Court
chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia,
when the latter imputed devious motives and
questioned the impartiality of members of the Court,
despite its earlier warnings:
The Supreme Court does
not claim infallibility; it will not
against the Court for, if well-
founded, can truly have
constructive effects in the task of
the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor
allow the erosion of our peoples
faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in
the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial
officers and, indeed, should insist
on similar conduct by others. In
liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning
the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar
disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot
be countenanced especially for those privileged
enough to practice law in the country. To be sure,
Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the
practice of law after showing sincere remorse and
having renewed his belief and respect for the Court,
almost eight years from the time the penalty was
imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Pea
be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
for his apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly
imputing unfounded motives and partiality against
members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified
Internal Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of
the OBC with respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its
Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003,
expressed administrative concern over Atty. Peas
behavior on three points: (1) his submission of a
falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme
Court documents that are highly restricted and
confidential, and (3) his use of court documents
(genuine or false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Pea submitted a falsified
internal court document, Annex B, had illegal access
to confidential court documents, and made improper
use of them in the proceedings before this Court. The
Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC
based on the charge that respondent Pea had
submitted a falsified document to this Court.[63] The
charge of falsification stems from his submission of
an alleged copy of the Courts Agenda[64] (Annex B)
purportedly belonging to a member of the Division
handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject
Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private
respondent anonymously received
were two copies of the Official
Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November
2002, the date when the questioned
Resolution was supposedly
issued. In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two
different members of the
Division, one of which is the copy
of the ponente himself), it is
clearly indicated that the members
of the Division had allegedly
agreed that petitioners Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and
NOT GRANTED contrary to what
was stated in the 13 November
2002 Resolution (at least the
version that was released to the
parties) a falsified document
because it makes it appear that a
Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners
Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The
real Resolution arrived at by the
First Division which can be
gleaned from the Agenda merely
NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as
Annexes B and C.[65] (Emphasis
supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session, respondent Pea expressed his absolute
conviction that the document attached as Annex B
was an exact copy of the Agenda of the
then ponente of the case.[66] It was later discovered,
however, that no such copy existed, either in the
latters records or in those of any other member of the
Division concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again
that insofar as Annex B is
concerned it was confirmed by
the Office of the Clerk of Court
of this Division that the original
of that does not appear in the
record, is not in the record and
that nobody, none of the
members of the division has a
copy of, that copy of Annex B of
your pleading does not come
from anyone of the members of
the division. That is the position of
the Court now as explained earlier.
Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said
that Annex B, specifically with that
capital A. capital C preceded by 10
did not come from his office, was
not based on the document in his
office and that is also true to each
of the members of
this Division.[67] (Emphasis supplie
d.)
The falsification, subject of the instant
administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent
Pea submitted to the Court a document he was
absolutely certain, at the time of such submission,
was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In
supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent
misled the Court by presenting a document that was
not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the
assurances made in the same motion[68] he made
allegations that were false and submitted documents
that were not borne out by the records of this case.
Instead of verifying the contents of Annex B, which
came to him through dubious means, he
unquestioningly accepted their genuineness and
veracity. Despite the Courts own explanation that
Annex B does not exist, he continues to insist on its
existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the
qualities exacted and expected from members of the
legal profession.[69] Thus, lawyers shall commit no
falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.[70] As disciples of truth,
their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of
the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusions.[71] Courts
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.[72] In
the instant case, the submission of a document
purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member
of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into
doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a
disciple of truth.
Respondent Pea would argue, however, that
falsification as a criminal act under the Revised Penal
Code was not judicially established during the
proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus, he
cannot be held liable for falsification. The
comparison of the present administrative and
disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of
falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative
proceedings is confined to whether there is
administrative liability for the submission of a
falsified document namely Annex B, which
respondent Pea claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a
genuine copy of the Agenda of the ponente. The
issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical
standards demanded of lawyers, by which they
should be truthful in their dealings with and
submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly
does not include the determination of criminal
liability, which demands a different modicum of
proof with respect to the use of falsified documents.
At this time, the Court makes no definitive
pronouncement as to the guilt of respondent over his
violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the use of falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe
that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of
the ponentes Agenda, just to support the subject
Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy
was later found to have been inexistent in the courts
records. Regardless of whether or not Annex B was
criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the
present disposition. What is now crucial is whether
respondent was candid and truthful in claiming
absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and
authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Pea that the
typewritten contents of Annexes B and C appear to
be genuine and accurate is unconvincing and cannot
exonerate him from liability. Although Annex C was
determined to be in the Courts records,[73] the bare
similarity of its typewritten contents with those of
Annex B will not shield him from disciplinary action.
Although the typewritten contents of the two
Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes
located at the right-hand side are different.
Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes
come from two different members of the Division,
one of them the then ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on
the veracity of the handwritten remarks not on the
printed contents which are allegedly contrary to the
substance of the Courts 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson.
Respondent Pea cannot claim the genuineness of
Annex B (which is not in the records), based on the
apparent identity of its printed contents with those of
Annex C (which is in the records). The handwritten
notes are markedly different and, according to him,
made by two different members of the Court. In his
Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to substantiate
his assertion that Annex B and the notes made therein
belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes
that respondent Pea has not explained, to the
Courts satisfaction, how he managed to obtain
internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea would have the Court
believe that he happened to obtain the two copies of
the Agenda (Annexes B and C) and the internal
Resolution (Annex D) in two separate envelopes
anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly
received them sometime during the second or the
third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office
in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.[74] He, however,
failed to present the envelopes containing the
documents, but explained that these may have
already been thrown away, since he had no system of
recording incoming communications in his
home/office in the province. The Court is not
persuaded by his account of the receipt of these
restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Courts action thereon, as
well as the Resolution (Annex D), are internal
documents that are accessible only to court
officers,[75] who are bound by strict confidentiality.
For respondent Pea to have been able to secure
originals or photocopies of the Courts Agenda is
disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the
rules of strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably,
the Agenda purportedly sent to him did not contain
all the items for deliberation by the Courts First
Division for that day; the copies sent were limited to
the incidents pertaining to his pending case. This
circumstance can hardly be considered as random,
since the exact item (Item No. 175) of concern for
him specifically, the Courts action on Urban Banks
Motion for Clarification was what had been sent
directly to his provincial home/office, and what he
conveniently acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that
confidential court records just coincidentally and
anonymously appeared in the provincial home/office
of respondent Pea through ordinary mail. Also
incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that
contained the documents, and that could have led to
the identification of their source were opportunely
misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave
importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly
improbable that a personnel of the Court would
breach the rules of strict confidentiality[76] to send to
litigants or their counsel the Courts Agenda, together
with handwritten notes and the internal resolutions of
the Court, without any prodding or consideration, and
even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and
administrative penalties.[77] Respondent Peas account
of having lost the envelopes appears too convenient
an excuse to assuage the Courts skepticism towards
this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Pea flaunted his
continued access as recent as 2010 to other internal
and confidential records in the proceedings of this
case. Despite the administrative proceedings leveled
against him for having illicitly obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Courts First Division, he
brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by
surreptiously acquiring no less than the confidential
and still unreleased OBC Report on the very
administrative case of which he himself is the
subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20
February 2010,[78] respondent Pea prayed that the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled
on the ground that there was a mistake in its issuance
based on the copies of the Agenda he had
mysteriously received. In support of this motion, he
casually cited and attached a photocopy of the
confidential OBC Report.[79] This OBC Report has
not been released to any party, and was then in fact
still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the
attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the
unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it
actually appears in the rollo of the administrative
case.[80] Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in
the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy
thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by
respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report from
the Courts own records already speaks of an
appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court
will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of
an administrative case for obtaining confidential
court records, he continued to have access to other
internal documents of the Court. His actions have
established that he is incorrigible and not likely to
change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding
ethical standards and ignoring the rule of
confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less
than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the
profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit,
respondent Pea even tried to bolster his claim that the
then ponente of the case had a special interest in the
case by attaching aninternal resolution of the
Court.[81] In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R.
Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred from the
Third Division to the First Division, where Justice
Carpio was subsequently assigned.[82] How
respondent Pea was again able to secure this internal
document is another disturbing mystery in this case,
especially since the resolution was sent by the Third
Division Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of
Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial Records
Office only, and not to any of the parties. Similar to
the copies of the Agenda of the First Division,
respondent Pea again purportedly received this
Internal Resolution by mail.[83] What is more
alarming in this instance is that he received not just
any photocopy of the Courts Resolution, but a pink
copy itself, the very same material used for such
internal resolutions in the Courts records. As he
himself admitted, respondent Pea could not have
gotten hold of the said internal Resolution, which was
on its face declared an internal matter, without the
assistance of a person who had access to the records
of his case in the Court.
This claimed major anomaly of the transfer
of the case, which is being decried by respondent in
the subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross
misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of
various Divisions due to the retirement of other
Justices, the cases already assigned to a Member-in-
Charge are required to be transferred to the Division
to which the Member-in-Charge moves.[84] Hence, in
this case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members of
the Court at that time, did not lose his case
assignments but brought them with him when he
transferred to the First Division. In fact, the transfers
of the assigned cases to the new Division are made
by request from the Member-in-Charge, because
otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is
Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in
which he is no longer a member. Thus, the transfer of
the two consolidated petitions to the First Division
that is being heavily criticized by respondent Pea was
simple compliance with the established internal
procedures of the Court, and not attributable to any
undue interest or malicious intention on the part of
the then ponente to retain the case for himself.
Respondent had raised irresponsible
suspicions[85] against the integrity of
the ponente without any understanding of the
Supreme Courts processes in the transfer of cases.
Respondent Pea had, in fact, previously used
this deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court
records to call for the inhibition of Justices of the
Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of
Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired
Justice violated the rules with respect to a second
motion for reconsideration when the latter reinstated
the Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No.
145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment
extended by Justice Buena to his supposed
association with the De Leon Groups counsel, Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To
establish this special treatment, he attached a
complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division[86] composed of 58 pages and showing 77
cases dismissed by the Court due to failure to pay the
required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not
reinstate:
10. A review of the
records of the Supreme Court will
show that for the past several
months alone, seventy-seven
petitions were dismissed by the
Supreme Court, mainly for failure
to pay the required fees. Out of that
number, NONE WERE
REINSTATED upon the filing of a
SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. If Justice
Buena willingly disregarded the
Rules by reinstating petitioners
petition (De Leon Group Petition in
G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing
of a second motion for
reconsideration, then he should
have reinstated also the aforesaid
77 cases in order to be fair. At the
very least, he should now reinstate
all of said 77 cases if only to show
that he is not biased in favor of
herein petitioners. He could not and
will not do so, however, because
those cases are not favored ones.
Photocopies of the case titles and
numbers, as well as the resolutions
dismissing the aforesaid seventy-
seven cases, consisting of 58 pages,
are attached hereto collectively as
Annex A.[87]
Respondent Pea was able to attach to this
motion for inhibition the portions of the Courts
Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12
February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February 2001,
28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26
April 2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August
2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August
2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08
October 2001 and others which were undated. The
attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which
were dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees,
among others. It was unclear if the cases were
specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if
respondent Pea represented any of the parties therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he
obtained confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining
to other cases, which specifically dismissed or denied
petitions on the failure of the parties to pay necessary
fees. This could not have just been mere coincidence
again since it required some legal understanding and
familiarity with the cases in order to be able to sift
through and identify the kinds of cases, which were
dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the
parties to these cases were notified and given copies
of the Courts resolutions, what respondent Pea
obtained were the actual copies of the Minutes that
included other items in the Courts Agenda and that
were not released to the public. Under the Courts
own Internal Rules, only the Minutes pertinent to the
parties are those that are distributed to the parties
concerned.[88] Yet, respondent was able to attach
wholesale Minutes of dozens of cases to his pleading.
 Although the above confidential documents
that were accessed by respondent totaling 58 pages in
all are not the subject of the investigation of the
administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as
2000 confirm in no uncertain terms his access to
internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but
of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that
respondent Pea would accuse his fellow lawyers of
allegedly having an inside track to members of the
Court, when he in turn, on record, had mysteriously
easy access to confidential court documents. That
internal documents of the Court (whether voluminous
or in relation to his case or otherwise) would
suddenly find themselves in the hands of respondent
Pea through registered mail is too incredible for this
Court to attribute any good faith on his part.
Even if the Court were to give some
modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how
respondent Pea came upon these internal documents,
it looks with disapproval upon his actions with
respect to those documents, which were supposedly
sent to him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent
official judicial records that are confidential in nature
and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for
them would be to make a candid and immediate
disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for
proper investigation, and not as proof to further the
merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself
acknowledged that reporting the leaked out
documents was a duty he owed to the Court[89] more
so in this case, since the documents were sent
anonymously and through dubious circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to
his continuing fitness to be a member of the legal
profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of
the leaked court documents, and nothing more. Yet,
he not only failed to immediately disclose the
suspicious circumstances of his having obtained
confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to
use the documents sent through suspicious means to
support his request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he
should have known better than to hinge his motions
and pleadings on documents of questionable origins,
without even verifying the authenticity of the
contents by comparing them with sources of greater
reliability and credibility.
If respondent Pea entertained doubts as to
the veracity of the Divisions actions with respect to
the pending incidents in his case, as allegedly
embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him,
then he should have simply checked the records to
verify the genuineness of the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty.
Singson. It is through officially released resolutions
and decisions that parties and their counsel are
informed of and guided by the Courts actions on
pending incidents, and not by the confidential and
handwritten notes of the individual members of the
Court. Respondents wholesale reliance on copies of
the Agenda purported to be those of individual
members of the Court and anonymously sent to him
is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there
was in fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon
action of the Division and the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions
of respondent Pea. He grounded the subject Motion
to Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent
copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for
Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply
be noted,[90] but it was instead granted by the Court.
The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing
irregular about annotating the first item with SEE
RES (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the
incidents with N (Noted). In fact, these annotations
conform with the recommended actions submitted by
the ponente for that particular item.[91] The
Resolution identified in the first item governs and
contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents
in the pending case.[92] To be sure, what governs as
the final action of the Court en banc or in Division is
the minutes of the proceedings,[93] which lists the
dispositions of the items taken up during the session,
reviewed by the members, and finally approved by
the Chief Justice or the Division chairperson.
Contrary to respondents suspicions, the action taken
by the Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was
accurately reflected in the questioned Resolution
released by the Court.
Respondent Pea has no one else to blame but
himself, since he allegedly, blindly and mistakenly
relied on anonymously sent unverified photocopies of
the Courts Agenda, in order to support his call for the
inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he
rely on the alleged bragging of Atty. Singson which
the latter denies to impute ill motive to judicial
officers. Whether Atty. Singson actually exerted
extraordinary efforts to secure the suspension Order
or freely divulged it in their telephone conversation,
respondent should have been more circumspect in
making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly or not)
without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back up his
claim.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly
using confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in
bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal
court documents has not been properly explained.
The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this
Courts confidential documents would simply find
themselves conveniently falling into respondents lap
through registered mail and that the envelopes
containing them could no longer be traced is
unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to
infer that laws and its own internal rules have been
violated over and over again by some court
personnel, whom respondent Pea now aids and abets
by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents
could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to
even conclude that criminal liabilities have been
incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code[94] and
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty.
Pea benefitting from the same.[95] Respondents
actions clearly merit no other penalty than
disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the
more justified by the earlier imposition of an
indefinite suspension. If taken together, these two
violations already speak of respondent Peas inherent
unworthiness to become a member of the Bar.
Although an indefinite suspension opens up the
possibility of future reinstatement after a clear
showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in the
case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be
incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion
of the Court. Not only has respondent thumbed his The charges of forum shopping are hereby accusations of partiality. A sampling of his
nose on the integrity of the persons occupying the dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far,
Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and hearing of separate administrative eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to
wrongdoing, he has also showed disdain for the complaints[97] against petitioners Urban Bank, shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:
sanctity of court procedures and records by his Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo 1. Peas Motion to
haughty display of illegal access to internal Supreme H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Inhibit (Re: Justice
Court documents. Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of Artemio V. Panganiban)
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peas insinuations of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro dated 12 January 2001;
wrongdoing and collusion between C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be 2. Urgent Motion to
members of the Court and another included in any future administrative action in Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo
counsel. relation to these matters. On the other hand, Ben Y. Buena) dated 20 August
Aside from attributing bribery to Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent 2001;
the ponente, respondent Penas allegations of Pea and therefore, is not a real and direct party to the 3. Letter Complaint (Re:
collusion between previous members of the Court case. Justice Buena) dated 28
and the counsel for the De Leon Group are October 2001;
unfounded and contravene the ethical duties of EPILOGUE 4. Motion to Inhibit (Re:
respondent to the Court and his fellow lawyers. His As parting words, the Court herein Justice Panganiban) dated
actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peas 18 February 2002;
disconcerting and administratively punishable. actions in the administration of justice. In order to 5. Reply (Re: Justice
However, considering the ultimate penalty foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy Panganiban) dated 15
of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Pea, the in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the March 2001;
Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on the public and the Bar. 6. Urgent Motion to
third charge, as any possible administrative liability Lawyers shall conduct themselves with Inhibit (re: ponente) dated
on this matter would be a mere superfluity. courtesy, fairness and candor towards their 30 January 2003;
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping professional colleagues.[98] They shall not, in their 7. Motion to Inhibit (Re:
is not the proper subject of the present professional dealings, use language that is abusive, Justice Leonardo A.
allegations of administrative misconduct. offensive or otherwise improper.[99] Lawyers shall Quisumbing) dated 08
The counter-charge of forum shopping has use dignified language in their pleadings despite the July 2004;
been made by respondent Pea against petitioners and adversarial nature of our legal system.[100] The use of 8. Motion to Inhibit (Re:
their respective counsel in his defense.[96] However, intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no Justice Panganiban) dated
this is already beyond the scope of the subject matter place in the dignity of a judicial forum. [101] 28 December 2004;
of this administrative case. It will be recalled that he The Court cannot countenance the ease with 9. Motion to Inhibit (Re:
assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De Leon which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their Justice Eduardo Antonio
Group, and the other group of bank officers filed cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and B. Nachura) dated 17
three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even December 2007;
and 145822, respectively) before the Court. They all wrongdoing against other members of the legal 10. Motion for
questioned therein the rulings of the appellate court profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to Inhibition (Re: Justice
affirming the grant of execution pending appeal. abstain from all offensive personality and to advance Panganiban) dated 28
Considering that this claim is the subject of no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a December 2004;
administrative penalties, and that other interested party or witness, unless required by the justness of 11. Reiteratory Motion to
parties did not participate in the investigation the cause with which they are charged.[102] Recuse dated 03 March
conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity It has not escaped the Courts attention that 2006 (Re: Justice
dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the respondent Pea has manifested a troubling history of Panganiban);
meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and all praying for the inhibition of several members of this 12. Motion to Inhibit (Re:
parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases. Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another Justice Nachura) dated 07
Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded January 2008;
 13. Urgent Consolidated sparse relations between the parties and the members Division, with another member being designated to
Motion to Reiterate of the Court to wild accusations of partiality on mere replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another
Request for Inhibition (Re: conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent Division altogether. Respondent Peas odd prayer in
Justice Antonio T. Carpio) accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to
dated 02 June 2008; based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to
14. Urgent Motion for Re- which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then President of him, except for one member.
Raffle (Re: Justice Urban Bank, was likewise an officer.[103] He moved In Chin v. Court of Appeals,[110] the Court
Presbitero J. Velasco) for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on the ground that warned against litigants contumacious practice in
dated 10 July 2008; she was a close judicial ally of Justice Carpio, and in successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in
15. Supplement to the turn, the latter, according to respondent, was order to shop for one who is more friendly and
Urgent Motion for Re- antagonistic toward him during the Courts 03 March sympathetic to their cause:
Raffle (Re: Justices 2003 Executive Session in this administrative
Conchita Carpio Morales case.[104] We agree that judges have
and Dante O. Tinga) dated Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to the duty of protecting the integrity
04 August 2008; have the case re-raffled from the Courts Third of the judiciary as an institution
16. Urgent Consolidated Division because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a worthy of public trust and
Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court confidence. But under the
Justices Carpio Morales, through the endorsement of former Executive circumstances here, we also agree
Tinga and Velasco) dated Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of that unnecessary inhibition of
14 August 2008; the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former judges in a case would open the
17. Urgent Consolidated President Fidel V. Ramos.[105] He similarly sought the floodgates to forum-shopping.
Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close More so, considering that Judge
Justices Arturo D. Brion, professional and political ties with former President Magpale was not the first judge that
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Ramos.[106] He likewise assailed the partiality of TAN had asked to be inhibited on
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law the same allegation of
Velasco, Quisumbing) school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief prejudgment. To allow successive
dated 28 August 2008; Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential inhibitions would justify
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, petitioners apprehension about
Justice Carpio) dated 21 according to respondent Pea, President Ramos, the practice of certain litigants
January 2010; through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his shopping for a judge more
19. Very Urgent Motion to influence over the Honorable Justice Brion.[107] friendly and sympathetic to their
Inhibit (Re: Justices Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of cause than previous ones.
Carpio Morales and Ma. Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of
Lourdes P. A. Sereno) Urban Bank because of his decision in a related As held in Mateo, Jr. v.
dated 30 March 2011; case[108] and his prior appointment as Undersecretary Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for
20. Very Urgent Motion to of Education during the Ramos presidency, judges to disqualify themselves
Inhibit dated 22 August respondent Pea impliedly prayed that his case be need not always be heeded. It is not
2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); specifically retained in the Courts Third always desirable that they should
and Division.[109] Respondents peculiar request, which do so. It might amount in certain
21. Very Urgent Motion to was not included in his other motions, gives the cases to their being recreant about
Re-Raffle dated 01 impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura their duties. It could also be an
September 2011 (Re: inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless did not want instrument whereby a party could
Justices Carpio, Jose Perez his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his inhibit a judge in the hope of
and Sereno). only intention was to raise the possibility of bias getting another more amenable to
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not his persuasion. (Emphasis
these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and matter whether his case remained with the Third supplied.)
 The Courts warning in Chin applies squarely
to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition
and re-raffle filed by respondent Pea. Lest other
litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no
uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice,
most especially in the highest tribunal of the land.
This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons
why this administrative case has dragged on for
years. Not only does it impute ill motive and
disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise
delays the administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Pea has been less
concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving the
case than about making sure that the wrong or
unfriendly Justices in his perception do not sit and
rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted
interruptions caused by his numerous motions for
inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case
languishing in this Court for years and clogging its
dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly
behavior and must be made an example so that
litigants be reminded that they cannot bend or toy
with the rules of procedure to favor their causes.
Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules
of basic courtesy in imputing sinister motives against
members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent Pea has violated several canons of
professional and ethical conduct expected from him
as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct,
demeanor and language with respect to his cause of
action in this Court, no less tend to undermine the
integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as
inflict unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers.
Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny
ability to obtain confidential and internal court
records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings
in furtherance of his cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short
shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for
the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on
unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or
contrition for his ways. Atty. Pea has shown and
displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen short
of the ethical standards of the noble profession and
must be sanctioned accordingly.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating
Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to
the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Peas personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed
to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to
secure copies of the following: (a) copies of the
Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Courts First
Division, attached as Annexes B and C of respondent
Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30
January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, attached as Annex D of the same
motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11
December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, attached as Annex 5 of respondent Peas
Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and
(d) the Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages,
attached as Annex A of the Reply (to Petitioners
Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit)
dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Pea. She
is further required toSUBMIT such an investigation
report with recommendations on the administrative
and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court
personnel possibly involved therein, as well as
suggestions for protecting confidential and internal
court documents of pending cases within NINETY
(90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
10. 01
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994
ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO
A. UMALI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting,
plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the
Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the
following order:
The Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is
hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation with the end in view
of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to
have been falsified and to institute
such criminal action as the
evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final
Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through
herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:
That sometime in May 1984 in the
City of Manila, at the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila,
Philippines, the above-named
Respondents, as Counsels for
PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil
Case No. 84-24144, entitled
PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff
vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant,
did then and there, knowingly,
willfully introduced/presented in
evidence before the aforesaid
Regional Trial Court, a falsified
Sheriff's Return of Summons
during the hearing of the aforesaid
Civil Case thereby impending
and/or obstructing the speedy
administration and/or dispensation
of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p.
69, Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied
having any hand in the falsification of the said
sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the
resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988,
the case was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National
Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the
signature above the typewritten name Florando
Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil
case is not his signature, complainant, through
counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with
respect to Atty. Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP
submitted the following report and recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in
the records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do
with the falsification of the
Sheriff's Return on the Summons in
said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The oral and documentary evidence
of the complainant strongly tend to
show the following: (1) The
Sheriff's Return of the Summon in
the said civil case was falsified as it
was not signed by Deputy Sheriff
Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J"
Sworn Statement of Rodolfo
Torella dated February 1, 1985, and
Exh. "S", which is the falsified
Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons
was received from the clerk of the
Court of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo
Romero, a messenger in the law
office of Attys. Umali and Oliva
and said messenger brought the
summons to the law office of the
respondents (Exh. "H"
Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo
Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I"
Sworn Statement dated February
28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva,
Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila;
(3) On the basis of the falsified
Sheriff's Return on the Summons,
Atty. Oliva, counsel for the
defendant [should be plaintiff] in
said civil case, filed a typewritten
Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default (Exh.) "R" Motion to
Declare Defendant In Default in
said civil case signed and filed by
Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty.
Oliva, in his capacity as Operations
Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos
Law Office, sent a final demand
letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant
in said Civil case, for payment of
the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T"
Demand Letter dated March 28,
1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to
Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand
letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the
complaint in said civil case (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the
falsified Sheriff's Return on the
Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion
To Declare Defendant In Default
dated October 30, 1984 signed and
filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1")
were typed on one and the same
typewriter, as shown in the
Questioned Document Report No.
198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V",
"V-1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and
the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court
finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva
committed acts of misconduct which warrant the DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant
facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of
case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up Attorneys.
to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty.
strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Florando Umali.
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of SO ORDERED.
Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does
not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness,
especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty
from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is
essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that
their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the
courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to
assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry,
and only secondarily are they advocates of the
exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he
is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196
SCRA 10 [1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has
manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer
that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty.
Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of
10.01 Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged, among
Republic of the Philippines others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon
Supreme Court an Agent of a Person in Authority and Breach of the
Manila Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de
Leon(de Leon) before the Court of First
THIRD DIVISION Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record
for accused de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat;
that a case for slight physical injuries was filed
RODRIGO A. A.C. No. 1900 against him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge
MOLINA, and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor; that
Complainant, Present: Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the
information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy
ABAD, claiming that a similar case for slight physical
VILLARAMA, JR.,* * injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat.
- versus - MENDOZA, and Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against
de Leon; that Atty. Magat was very much aware of
such fact as he was the counsel and private
prosecutor on record of de Leon from the very start
Promulgated: of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty.
ATTY. June 13, 2012 Magats act of filing the Motion to Quash was a
CEFERINO R. malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the court,
MAGAT, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of
Respondent. which he is an officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise
X ------------------------------------------------------------- committed willful disobedience of the court order
------------------------- X when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2)
occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from
DECISION the practice of law.
MENDOZA, J.: In his Answer,[3] Atty. Magat averred that in
so far as the filing of the motion to quash was
Before the Court is the undated concerned, he was really under the impression that a
Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges was
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by
Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical the other party and was denied by the court. He
conduct and recommending that he be reprimanded. admitted his appearances in court while under
suspension. He explained that his appearance in
the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the
court that the accused was sick and to prevent the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In
The Facts: the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the
accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony
The case stemmed from a complaint for be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of
disbarment[2] filed by Rodrigo A. the court and conveyed his repentance and apology
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the and promised that the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report
and recommendation.[4] Thereafter, the OSG
transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for
proper disposition.
In his Report and
Recommendation[5] dated March 20, 2009, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found merit in the
complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be
reprimanded and fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it
hard to believe that respondent
would have mistakenly been under
the impression that a case for
physical injuries was filed against
his client when there was no such
case filed. Respondent was either
negligently reckless or he had
mischievous intentions to deceive
the trial court. In any case, he
committed a transgression for
which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of
respondent is, and this he admits,
that he appeared as counsel before
a trial court on at least two (2)
occasions notwithstanding the fact
that he had been suspended by the
Supreme Court from the practice of
law. Despite professing his
contrition in his Answer, this
Commission is not convinced.
Otherwise, respondent should have
had, at the onset of the proceedings,
admitted to his misdeeds and put
his fate squarely with the
disciplinary body. Yet, he
proceeded to fight the charges
against him.
Moreover, if respondent
was indeed moved by altruistic
 intentions when he made those
appearances before the trial court
despite having been suspended, he
could have so informed the
Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was
representing could not attend. Yet,
what he proceeded to do was to
enter his appearance as counsel.
Indeed, it is beyond doubt he trifled
with the suspension order handed
by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going
for respondent, it is that the passage
of time with which this case
remains pending makes it difficult
to impose a penalty of suspension
on him. Under normal
circumstances, this Commission
would not have thought twice of
suspending respondent. However,
the acts committed by respondent
occurred over TWENTY (20)
YEARS ago. It would not be fair to
now impose a suspension on
respondent, more so considering
that he is, in all likelihood, in the
twilight of his career.
On the other hand, there is
still a need to discipline respondent
if only to set an example to other
lawyers that suspension orders of
the Supreme Court cannot simply
be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the
undersigned that respondent be
meted a fine of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00)
and that he be heavily reprimanded
for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.[6]
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors passed its Resolution[7] adopting the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It,
however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the
IBP but not with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[8]
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the
standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which
provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the
observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate
intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court
when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat
should not make any false and untruthful statements
in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a
similar case for slight physical injuries that was really
filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a
certification from that court that, indeed, a case was
filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly
admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite
having been suspended from the practice of law by
the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court
and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so. It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved
by altruistic intentions when he appeared before the
trial court despite having been suspended, he could
have informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could
not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his
silence and proceeded to represent his client as
counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino
R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with
a WARNING that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

10. 02
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for
petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of
Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a
resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20,
1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers
& Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life
Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter
referred to as the Unions), while still members of the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into
separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe
Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the
secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president
of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life
Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such
acting president, in a circular issued in his name and
signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the
Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining
the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU),
to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies
hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal
Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a
month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the
FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957
as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for
the Companies in the collective bargaining with the
Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions
jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective
bargaining contracts which were then due to expire
on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed
and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon
retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October
1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's
proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on
the issue of union shop, as a result of which the
Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike
for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several
conciliation conferences were held under the auspices
of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators
urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions'
proposals en toto so that the said Unions might
consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for
union security in exchange for other benefits.
However, the Companies did not make any counter-
proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first
drop their demand for union security, promising
money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and
prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life
Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this
particular demand, and requested the Companies to
answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the
respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to
make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to
the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their
union security demand, otherwise the Companies
"would no longer consider themselves bound by the
commitment to make money benefits retroactive to
October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958,
the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped
their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was
set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining
demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated
on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result
due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.
On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the
Companies final counter-proposals on their economic
demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of
giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15,
1958 presented facts and figures and requested the
Unions to submit a workable formula which would
justify their own proposals, taking into account the
financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions
voted to declare a strike in protest against what they
considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were
reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary
nor in responsibility while negotiations were going
on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These
employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and
picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at
Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting
manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent
to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted
verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege
both to strike and to conduct
picketing.
However, if any of you would like
to come back to work voluntarily,
you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer
or security guard of your intention
to do so.
 2. Take your meals within the
office.
3. Make a choice whether to go
home at the end of the day or to
sleep nights at the office where
comfortable cots have been
prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional
movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work
performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be
made for your families.
The decision to make is yours
whether you still believe in the
motives of the strike or in the
fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the
exception of a few unionists who were convinced to
desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958,
until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions'
picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant
corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section, respectively of the
Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front
of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon
approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard
of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued
between them, in which both suffered injuries. The
Companies organized three bus-loads of employees,
including a photographer, who with the said
respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket
lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus
causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-
breakers due to the resistance offered by some
picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and
with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the
strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila.
During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's
office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for
injunction with damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the
pendency of the various criminal cases against
striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31,
1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further
orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding,
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out
and in, of the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the
respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a
letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last
21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged
and the strike has made us even
more convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you
intend to stay out, but we cannot
hold your positions open for long.
We have continued to operate and
will continue to do so with or
without you.
If you are still interested in
continuing in the employ of the
Group Companies, and if there are
no criminal charges pending
against you, we are giving you until
2 June 1958 to report for work at
the home office. If by this date you
have not yet reported, we may be
forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to
make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal
charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office
and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight
physical injuries" against one striker and "light
coercion" against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June
2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the
striking employees decided to call off their strike and
to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the
Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but
also to be screened by a management committee
among the members of which were Enage and
Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83
strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all
non-strikers with pending criminal charges which
arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being
required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office.
Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had
secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the
Companies readmitted only some but adamantly
refused readmission to 34 officials and members of
the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the
ground that they committed "acts inimical to the
interest of the respondents," without however stating
the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those
who were refused readmission are Emiliano
Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life
Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio
Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and
Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-
NATU. Some 24 of the above number were
ultimately notified months later that they were being
dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given
separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act
1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have
not been readmitted although there have been no
formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint
specifically charged the Companies with (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending
out individual letters to them urging them to abandon
their strike and return to work, with a promise of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if
they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958,
they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating
against the members of the Unions as regards
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of
their union membership and degree of participation in
the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer
denying all the material allegations of the complaint,
stating special defenses therein, and asking for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial
Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez,
rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing
the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August
31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for
reconsideration of the said decision, and their
supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965.
This was denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on
October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions
contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies
guilty of unfair labor practice in
sending out individually to the
strikers the letters marked Exhibits
A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies
guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the striking
members of the Unions in the
matter of readmission of employees
after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies
guilty of unfair labor practice for
dismissing officials and members
of the Unions without giving them
the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in
regard to activities undertaken by
them in the legitimate exercise of
their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement
of officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages, from
June 2, 1958 to the date of their
actual reinstatement to their usual
employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the
letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate
exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree.
The said letters were directed to the striking
employees individually by registered special
delivery mail at that without being coursed
through the Unions which were representing the
employees in the collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying
absent employees individually
during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective
bargaining that the plant would be
operated the next day and that their
jobs were open for them should
they want to come in has been held
to be an unfair labor practice, as an
active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through
dealing with the employees
individually instead of through
their collective bargaining
representatives. (31 Am. Jur.
563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676,
146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
operating under a collective bargaining agreement to
negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his
employees individually in connection with changes in
the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition
regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is
that although the union is on strike, the employer is
still under obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo
Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as
constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus,
the act of a company president in writing letters to
the strikers, urging their return to work on terms
inconsistent with their union membership, was
adjudged as constituting interference with the
exercise of his employees' right to collective
bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d
621). It is likewise an act of interference for the
employer to send a letter to all employees notifying
them to return to work at a time specified therein,
otherwise new employees would be engaged to
perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the
employees or visiting their homes, with the employer
or his representative urging the employees to cease
union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are
unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine
the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to
which they are entitled free from the employer's
molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing
promises of benefits to the employees in order to
entice them to return to work, it is not protected by
the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB
v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same
is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to
obtain replacements for the striking employees in the
event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958.
The free speech protection under the Constitution is
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the
employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit,
or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs.
Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs.
Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement
and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with
"comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional
movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in
excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their
families, so they would abandon the strike and return
to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor
practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus
offered reinstatement are unable to determine what
the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and
join labor organizations are the following acts: the
offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees
of a company shortly after the making of a request by
the union to bargain; wage increases given for the
purpose of mollifying employees after the employer
has refused to bargain with the union, or for the
purpose of inducing striking employees to return to
work; the employer's promises of benefits in return
for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support
of their union; and the employer's statement, made
about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of
strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers
returned to work, they would receive new benefits in
the form of hospitalization, accident insurance,
profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the
acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that
"the officers and members of the complainant unions
decided to call off the strike and return to work on
June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the
Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents
contend that this was the main cause why the strikers
returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B.
This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that
the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly
on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court
of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic
quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which
tended, to interfere with the employees' right to
engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a
strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice
will not cease to be such simply because it was
susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did
not proximately cause the result intended. For
success of purpose is not, and should not, be the
criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited
act constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer
has interfered with and coerced
employees within the meaning of
subsection (a) (1) is whether the
employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said
tends to interfere with the free
exercise of employees' rights under
section 3 of the Act, and it is not
necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in
fact intimidated or coerced by
statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable
inference that anti-union conduct of
the employer does have an adverse
effect on self-organization and
collective bargaining. (Francisco,
Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p.
323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A.,
1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be
considered by themselves alone but should be read in
the light of the preceding and subsequent
circumstances surrounding them. The letters should
be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct
doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an
employer's remarks were to be
evaluated not only on the basis of
their implicit implications, but were
to be appraised against the
background of and in conjunction
with collateral circumstances.
Under this "doctrine" expressions
of opinion by an employer which,
though innocent in themselves,
frequently were held to be culpable
because of the circumstances under
which they were uttered, the history
of the particular employer's labor
relations or anti-union bias or
because of their connection with an
established collateral plan of
coercion or interference.
(Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374,
and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners'
submission of proposals for an amended renewal of
their respective collective bargaining agreements to
the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and
Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the
petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant
corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive
compensations. After the notice to strike was served
on the Companies and negotiations were in progress
in the Department of Labor, the respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without
increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect
compelling these employees to resign from their
unions. And during the negotiations in the
Department of Labor, despite the fact that the
petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the
former drop their demand for union shop and in spite
of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of
Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer
the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was
the chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining between the
former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to
strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of
exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by
inducing them to return to work upon promise of
special privileges. Two days later, the respondents,
thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M.
Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and
others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the
presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one
gate less than two meters wide and in the process,
crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in
injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers.lwph1.t Then the respondents brought
against the picketers criminal charges, only three of
which were not dismissed, and these three only for
slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal
actions, the respondents were able to obtain an
injunction from the court of first instance restraining
the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc.
the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates,
entrance and driveway and the free movement of
persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies' buildings. On the same day that the
injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent
again individually and by registered special
delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with
dismissal if they did not report for work on or before
June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners
reported for work, the respondents thru a screening
committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member
refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the
ground of "pending criminal charges." However,
when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by
the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused
admission to 34 officials and union members. It is
not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among
the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who
were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique
Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico
Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And
despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no
probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the
Companies adamantly refused admission to them on
the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the
interest of the respondents," without stating
specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed.
They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged
inimical acts were the same criminal charges which
were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents
before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A
and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters
formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not
destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the
strikers and secure replacements for them in order to
protect and continue their business, the CIR held the
petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the
basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that
there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and
on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some
union men who did not actually know the very reason
for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which
was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:
TO: BUREAU
OF LABOR
RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of
this notice by the Office, this [sic]
unions intends to go on strike
against
THE INSULAR
LIFE
ASSURANCE
CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga,
Manila
THE FGU
INSURANCE
GROUP
Plaza Moraga,
Manila
INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING
ADMINISTRAT
ION
Plaza Moraga,
Manila .
for the following reason:
DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after
the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27,
1958. This simply proves that the reason for the
strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining
nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated
April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated
what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of
Strike," which so far as material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to
agree with our position on the
union shop, you filed a notice of
strike with the Bureau of Labor
Relations on 27 January 1958,
citing `deadlock in collective
bargaining' which could have been
for no other issue than the union
shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April
15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the
date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual
and main reason for the strike was, "When it became
crystal clear the management double crossed or will
not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice
in the meantime being committed by the management
such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and
[who] became supervisors without increase in salary
or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct.
14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply
proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the
respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners'
proposals, their only excuse being that they could not
go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not
drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents'
letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners
dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents
did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners'
demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the
respondents to make a reply to the petitioners'
demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but
instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account
the financial position of the group companies." (tsn.,
Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for
readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee
must be interested in continuing his work with the
group companies; (2) there must be no criminal
charges against him; and (3) he must report for work
on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced.
Since the evidence shows that all the employees
reported back to work at the respondents' head office
on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having
complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at
whether they also complied with the second
condition. It is not denied that when the strikers
reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of
the Unions were refused readmission because they
had pending criminal charges. However, despite the
fact that they were able to secure their respective
clearances 34 officials and union members were still
refused readmission on the alleged ground that they
committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is
beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also
had criminal charges pending against them in the
fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents
whence the criminal charges against the strikers
evolved, were readily readmitted and were not
required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the
process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec.
4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against
all the strikers in general. They separated the active
from the less active unionists on the basis of their
militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists
belonging to the first category were refused
readmission even after they were able to secure
clearances from the competent authorities with
respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It
is significant to note in this connection that except for
one union official who deserted his union on the
second day of the strike and who later participated in
crashing through the picket lines, not a single union
officer was taken back to work. Discrimination
undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the
union activity of the rehired strikers has been less
prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice
where the employer, although
authorized by the Court of
Industrial Relations to dismiss the
employees who participated in an
illegal strike, dismissed only the
leaders of the strikers, such
dismissal being evidence of
discrimination against those
dismissed and constituting a waiver
of the employer's right to dismiss
the striking employees and a
condonation of the fault committed
by them." (Carlos and Fernando,
Labor and Social Legislation, p.
62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Phil. Air Lines Emloyees
Association, L-8197, Oct. 31,
1958.)
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory
effort to exculpate themselves from charges of
discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning
to work the respondents delegated the power to
readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had
chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records
section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to
work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two
employees having been involved in unpleasant
incidents with the picketers during the strike were
hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of
placing in the hands of employees hostile to the
strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of
discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of
discrimination in rehiring, as is
having the machinery of
reinstatement in the hands of
employees hostile to the strikers,
and reinstating a union official who
formerly worked in a unionized
plant, to a job in another mill,
which was imperfectly organized.
(Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p.
473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7
NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted
Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis
supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the
management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed
against the strikers, they tossed back and around to
each other the responsibility for the discrimination.
Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the
management the authority to screen the returning
employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers
but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6,
1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of
the management's screening committee, while
admitting the discrimination, placed the blame
therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20,
1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking
through the respondent Olbes, head of the
Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision
whether to accept or not an employee was left in the
hands of that committee that had been empowered to
look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6,
1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia
tried to explain the basis for such discrimination
by testifying that strikers whose participation in any
alleged misconduct during the picketing was not
serious in nature were readmissible, while those
whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug.
4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction
between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious
misconduct which the respondents contend was the
basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is
completely shattered upon a cursory examination of
the evidence on record. For with the exception of
Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other
strikers cited the alleged commission by them of
simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record
shows that not a single dismissed striker was given
the opportunity to defend himself against the
supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned,
when the striking employees reported back for work
on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit
them unless they first secured the necessary
clearances; but when all, except three, were able to
secure and subsequently present the required
clearances, the respondents still refused to take them
back. Instead, several of them later received letters
from the respondents in the following stereotyped
tenor:
This will confirm the termination
of your employment with the
Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group
as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your
employment was due to the fact
that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during
the last strike. Because this may not
constitute sufficient cause under the
law to terminate your employment
without pay, we are giving you the
amount of P1,930.32 corresponding
to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group
Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the
check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
President, Insurance Life
Acting President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged
"acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed
strikers were the same acts with which the said
strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the
courts. But all these charges except three were
dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and
members of the striking unions do not indicate
sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement
allegedly because he did not report for duty on June
2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the
overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and
which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the
respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In
his testimony, corroborated by many others,
Tabasondra particularly identified the management
men to whom he and his group presented themselves
on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes'
secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and
later directed them when Olbes refused them an
audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies'
personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated
that he and his group went to see Enage as directed
by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling
the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the
respondents to produce De Asis and Enage who
testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on
several occasions to rebut his testimony. The
respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover,
Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents'
attention to his non-admission and asked them to
inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of
doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their
letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness
required that before being dismissed for cause,
Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to
report for work after notice to return, does not
constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one
case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking
back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination
although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all
of whom were prominent in the union and in the
strike, reported for work at various times during the
next three days, but were told that there were no
openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot
say that its finding is unsupported,
that, in taking back six union men,
the respondent's officials
discriminated against the latter on
account of their union activities and
that the excuse given that they did
not apply until after the quota was
full was an afterthought and not the
true reason for the discrimination
against them. (NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.
333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed.
1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations
and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should
have returned after being refused readmission on
June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer
puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for
work at the time agreed, we consider the employee
relieved from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he
revealed that despite the fact that the Companies
spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of
officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence,
he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies.
We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this
accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the
witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the
respondent Companies and one of the officials
referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange
controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller
on a combined business and vacation trip was
allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52
(Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May
9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the
official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket
money; hence, this was the only amount that would
appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on
January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to
Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank
lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not
therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the
above sum. And his competence in figures could not
be doubted considering that he had passed the board
examinations for certified public accountants. But
assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the
true expenses of Gonzales' trip which the
respondents never denied or tried to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the
sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise
the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance
with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which
guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking
employees of the right to give "publicity to the
existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by
any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed,
it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every
unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the
purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In
labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose
the truth before the public to justify their respective
demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers,
Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on
whether or not the respondent Companies were
justified in refusing to accede to union demands.
After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not
a part of management. And his statement, if indeed
made, is but an expression of free speech protected
by the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for
every faction on any side of the
labor relation is to me a
constitutional and useful right.
Labor is free ... to turn its publicity
on any labor oppression,
substandard wages, employer
unfairness, or objectionable
working conditions. The employer,
too, should be free to answer and to
turn publicity on the records of the
leaders of the unions which seek
the confidence of his men ...
(Concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89
L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain
confidential information, Tongos committed not only
a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral
principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in
the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants
under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the
Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this
stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies
with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client.
And with regard to the testimonies of Juan
Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents
of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the
alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court
should not have given them much weight. The firm
of these witnesses was newly established at that time
and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It
is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were
more inclined to favor the respondents rather than
Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso
Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez,
opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed
by non-readmission allegedly because they not only
prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel
records section of the Companies, from entering the
Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also
caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and
forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of
the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand,
insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner
took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who
elbowed his way through the picket lines and
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers
did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard
and a fight ensued between them in which both
suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting
versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958,
there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not
responsible for what happened.lwph1.t The
picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police
blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3
in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals,
where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the
Companies during the strike were holding offices at
the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason
Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala,
Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant
corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the
personnel records section, reported for work at the
Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable
suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter
building to create such an incident and have a basis
for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in
the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from
the court of first instance. Besides, under the
circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to
yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket
lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the
legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every
reason to defend themselves and their rights from any
assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police
blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not
resort to violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows
exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish
the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the
following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that
some disorder is unfortunately
quite usual in any extensive or long
drawn out strike. A strike is
essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it
are human beings whose feelings
are stirred to the depths. Rising
passions call forth hot words. Hot
words lead to blows on the picket
line. The transformation from
economic to physical combat by
those engaged in the contest is
difficult to prevent even when cool
heads direct the fight. Violence of
this nature, however much it is to
be regretted, must have been in the
contemplation of the Congress
when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act
29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to
strike. If this were not so, the rights
afforded to employees by the Act
would indeed be illusory. We
accordingly recently held that it
was not intended by the Act that
minor disorders of this nature
would deprive a striker of the
possibility of reinstatement.
(Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R.
B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p.
378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al.
and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of
the strike and should not be considered as a bar to
reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union
employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon,
Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the
strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only
to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to
reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has
generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company,
23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of
criminal charges against non-striking employees
before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted,
but those strikers who had pending charges in the
same office were refused readmission. The
reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether
in reinstating persons equally guilty
with those whose reinstatement is
opposed, or in other ways, gives
rise to the inference that union
activities rather than misconduct is
the basis of his [employer]
objection, the Board has usually
required reinstatement."
(Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the
Third Annual Report of NLRB
[1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive
dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he
committed acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers
and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the
strikers that they could use force and violence to have
a successful picket and that picketing was precisely
intended to prevent the non-strikers and company
clients and customers from entering the Companies'
buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses
that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and
that incidents happened only when management men
made incursions into and tried to break the picket
line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra,
picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out
by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front,
charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the
union-management dispute. It may be marked by
colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or
sporadic fights between the pickets and those who
pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the
Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result
of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's
misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a
bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence
presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's
participation in the strike was the testimony of one
Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board
of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group
Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became
a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the
union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel
and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) another
matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair
labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is
good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to
spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of
the respondents is considered unjustifiable
interference in the union activities of the petitioners
and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number
of decisions at espionage by an
employer of union activities, or
surveillance thereof, are such
instances of interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in
connection with their right to
organize, form and join unions as
to constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to
interfere with, restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization than such
activity even where no discharges
result. The information obtained by
means of espionage is in valuable
to the employer and can be used in
a variety of cases to break a union."
The unfair labor practice is
committed whether the espionage is
carried on by a professional labor
spy or detective, by officials or
supervisory employees of the
employer, or by fellow employees
acting at the request or direction of
the employer, or an ex-employee..."
(Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp.
765-766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the
reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to
the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment. Because all too clear from the factual
and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with
settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on
strike because of the unfair labor practices committed
by the respondents, and that when the strikers
reported back for work upon the invitation of the
respondents they were discriminatorily dismissed.
The members and officials of the Unions therefore
are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and
provoked by improper conduct on
the part of an employer amounting
to an 'unfair labor practice,' the
strikers are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay. (Rothenberg on
Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been
dismissed in violation of the
provisions of the Act is entitled to
reinstatement with back pay upon
an adjudication that the discharge
was illegal." (Id., citingWaterman
S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d
760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's
Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v.
Southern Wood Preserving Co.,
135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v.
N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R.
B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d
61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire
Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the
respondents to allege that the positions of these union
members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair
labor practice" caused or
contributed to the strike or where
the 'lock-out' by the employer
constitutes an "unfair labor
practice," the employer cannot
successfully urge as a defense that
the striking or lock-out employees
position has been filled by
replacement. Under such
circumstances, if no job sufficiently
and satisfactorily comparable to
that previously held by the
aggrieved employee can be found,
the employer must discharge the
replacement employee, if
necessary, to restore the striking or
locked-out worker to his old or
comparable position ... If the
employer's improper conduct was
an initial cause of the strike, all the
strikers are entitled to reinstatement
and the dismissal of replacement
employees wherever necessary; ... .
(Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves
is, from what date should the backpay payable to the
unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine
that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not
entitled to back pay during the period of the strike,
even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice.
However, if they offer to return to work under the
same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to The lower court gave inordinate significance to the subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the
re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting payment to and acceptance by the dismissed latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the
to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled respondents' brief: .
(4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is that while employers may be authorized under ... Says the Supreme Court in the
liable for backpay from the date of the offer Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of following decisions:
(Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers employees by serving the required notice, or, in the In a proceeding
Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, absence thereof, by paying the required for unfair labor
Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to practice,
Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal involving a
258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, for union activities. determination as
p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled ... While Republic Act No. 1052 to whether or not
that discriminatorily dismissed employees must authorizes a commercial the acts of the
receive backpay from the date of the act of establishment to terminate the employees
discrimination, that is, from the date of their employment of its employee by concerned
discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and serving notice on him one month in justified the
Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial advance, or, in the absence thereof, adoption of the
Relations, supra). by paying him one month employer of
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to compensation from the date of the disciplinary
report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter termination of his employment, measures against
did. A great number of them, however, were refused such Act does not give to the them, the mere
readmission because they had criminal charges employer a blanket authority to fact that the
against them pending before the fiscal's office, terminate the employment employees may
although non-strikers who were also facing criminal regardless of the cause or purpose be able to put up
indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers behind such termination. Certainly, a valid defense in
who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can it cannot be made use of as a cloak a criminal
thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed to circumvent a final order of the prosecution for
employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. court or a scheme to trample upon the same acts,
This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose the right of an employee who has does not erase or
Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who been the victim of an unfair labor neutralize the
were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena employer's right
not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 to impose
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), [1956].) discipline on said
especially so because their unlawful acts arose during Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that employees. For it
incidents which were provoked by the respondents' the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial is settled that not
men. However, since the employees who were denied Relations are supported by substantial and credible even the acquittal
readmission have been out of the service of the proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from of an employee of
Companies (for more than ten years) during which digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case the criminal
they may have found other employment or other (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. charge against
means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & him is a bar to
whatever they may have earned during that period Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea the employer's
should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]). right to impose
somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite discipline on its
the equitable principle that no one is allowed to for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio employees,
enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the should the act
Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of counsels for the private respondents, on the ground upon which the
Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). that the former wrote the following in his decision criminal charged
 was based
constitute
nevertheless an
activity inimical
to the employer's
interest... The act
of the employees
now under
consideration
may be
considered as a
misconduct which
is a just cause for
dismissal.
(Lopez, Sr., et al.
vs. Chronicle
Publication
Employees Ass'n.
et al., G.R. No.
L-20179-81,
December 28,
1964.) (emphasis
supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited
decision * which contained the underscored portions
of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal
of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito
Vicente, we are inclined to uphold
the action taken by the employer as
proper disciplinary measure. A
reading of the article which
allegedly caused their dismissal
reveals that it really contains an
insinuation albeit subtly of the
supposed exertion of political
pressure by the Manila Chronicle
management upon the City Fiscal's
Office, resulting in the non-filing of
the case against the employer. In
rejecting the employer's theory that
the dismissal of Vicente and
Aquino was justified, the lower
court considered the article as "a
report of some acts and omissions
of an Assistant Fiscal in the
exercise of his official functions"
and, therefore, does away with the
presumption of malice. This being
a proceeding for unfair labor
practice, the matter should not have
been viewed or gauged in the light
of the doctrine on a publisher's
culpability under the Penal Code.
We are not here to determine
whether the employees' act could
stand criminal prosecution, but
only to find out whether the
aforesaid act justifies the adoption
by the employer of disciplinary
measure against them. This is not
sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified
privileged, but even on the
assumption that this is so, the
exempting character thereof under
the Penal Code does not necessarily
erase or neutralize its effect on the
employer's interest which may
warrant employment of disciplinary
measure. For it must be
remembered that not even the
acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a
bar to the employer's right to
impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the
criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us
that for an employee to publish his
"suspicion," which actually
amounts to a public accusation, that
his employer is exerting political
pressure on a public official to
thwart some legitimate activities on
the employees, which charge, in the
least, would sully the employer's
reputation, can be nothing but an
act inimical to the said employer's
interest. And the fact that the same
was made in the union newspaper
does not alter its deleterious
character nor shield or protect a
reprehensible act on the ground that
it is a union activity, because such
end can be achieved without resort
to improper conduct or
behavior. The act of the employees
now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which
is a just cause for dismissal.**
(Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored
words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent
Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this
Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first
underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts
with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it
must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision.
Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in
the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's
decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this
Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in
the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to
warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We
are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a
result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt
on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We
fully realize how saddled with many pending cases
are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to
imagine that because of the pressure of their varied
and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape
their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents'
counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the
quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's
decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in
their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored
sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's
decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully
reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision,
i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of
the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its
employees, should the act upon which the criminal
charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against
inimical to the employer's interest." the respondents.
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to Makasiar, JJ., concur.
reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and Zaldivar, J., took no part.
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed,
there is a salient and salutary reason why they should
do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and
rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and
litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code
which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only
those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said
in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial,
et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this
Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines
in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger
that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions
and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts,
lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
But if inferior courts and members of the bar
meticulously discharge their duty to check and
recheck their citations of authorities culled not only
from this Court's decisions but from other sources
and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions
down to the last word and punctuation mark,
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on
misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in
finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the
respondents' counsels, there was no substantial
change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling
which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for
their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby,
admonished to be more careful when citing
jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and
another is entered, ordering the respondents to
reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to

10.02
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and
DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA,
and RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil
action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A.
No. 7691[1] has divested Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction over election offenses, which are
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six
(6) years.
The antecedents are not disputed.
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29
October 1996, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to file an information for
violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a
public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having
engaged in partisan political activities. The
COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in
Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of
Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed
with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen,
Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-
1442, against private respondents
Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and
Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against
private respondents Esbel Chua and
Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-
1445, against private respondent
Esbel Chua only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449,
against private respondent Diosdada
Amor only.
In an Order[2] issued on 25 August 1997,
respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding
judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records
of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the
COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with
the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground
that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended by R.A. No. 7691,[3] the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the
maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases
does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent
portions of the Order read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are
uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i)
of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264
of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than
one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of
imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of
the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act.
6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
violations of city or municipal
ordinance committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction;
and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with an
imprisonment of not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount
or fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory and other
penalties including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of
time [sic], nature, value and amount
thereof, Provided, However, that in
offenses including damages to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no
jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the
maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6)
years.
The two motions[4] for reconsideration
separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director
of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through
its Legal Department having been denied by the
public respondent in the Order of 17 October
1997,[5] the petitioner filed this special civil action. It
contends that public respondent has erroneously
misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in
arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide election
offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling
in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction
over election offenses.
On 17 February 1998, we required the
respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office
of the Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting
the instant petition on the ground that the challenged
orders of public respondent are clearly not in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public
respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for
private respondents interested in sustaining the
challenged orders to appear for and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain
that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial
Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the
imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of
imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly
provides that all laws, decrees, and orders
inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed
or modified accordingly. They then conclude that
since the election offense in question is punishable
with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is
cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code except those
relating to the offense of failure to register or failure
to vote.[6] It reads as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial
court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to
try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the
Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261
thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private
respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said
Section, thus:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any
officer or employee in the civil service, except those
holding political offices; any officer, employee, or
member of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, or
any police forces, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-
military units that now exist or which may hereafter
be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in
any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public
order, if he is a peace officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for
an election offense under the Code, except that of
failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment
of not less than one year but not more than six years
and the offender shall not be subject to probation and
shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of
Appeals[7] that by virtue of the exception provided for
in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by
specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty
prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those
excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of
not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional,
arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction
thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or
the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling
within the exception provided for in the opening
sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20
of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual
Property;[8] and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972,[9] as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall
within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is
conferred by the Constitution or by
Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section
5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has
the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus
provide by law that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such
law would be a special law and must be construed as
an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of
courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered
as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence,
R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing
laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress
never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such
special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact
that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read
at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any,
to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to
be studious of the principles of law,[10] to administer
his office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself,[11] to be faithful to the law,
and to maintain professional competence.[12]
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena,
Director IV of petitioners Law Department, must also
be admonished for his utter carelessness in his
reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles,
Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration[13] he filed with
the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional
Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election
offenses is already a settled issue in the case
of Alberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M.
No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the
Supreme Court succinctly held:
A review of the pertinent provision of law would
show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the Code
and the RTC shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the same. The
Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises
jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to
register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand
together with the provisions that any election offense
under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and
shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus
Election Code), we submit that it is the special
intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC
jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of
exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction
over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA
7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over
criminal election offenses despite its expanded
jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of
Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286
involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the
lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election
offenses, has ruled, thus:
With respect to the other charges, a review of the
Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant
to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code
the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigations all election offenses
punishable under the code and the Regional Trial
Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to
try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court,
by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to
vote.Noting that these provisions stands together with
the provision that any election offense under the code
shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1)
year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to
probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We
submit that it is the special intention of the code to
vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over
election cases as matter of exemption to the
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found
under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the
amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over
criminal election offenses despite its expanded
jurisdiction.
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would
have known that the correct name of the complainant
in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as
indicated in the motion for reconsideration
nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but
ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not
reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in
the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of
the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration
and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it
appear that the quoted portions were our findings or
rulings, or, put a little differently, our own
words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of
the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted
in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[14] mandates that a lawyer
shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text
of a decision or authority.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders
of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25
August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases
Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and
decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and,
further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with
Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be
more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court
as a lawyer under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10.03
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL
MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA,
VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON.
LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch
XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al.,
instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition,
relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction,
asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court
("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist
from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-
CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed
Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private
respondent Vicente Caeda ("Caeda"), then as
plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants,
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch
X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered
judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendants and all
persons claiming right under them
to vacate the premises and to
remove their house/apartment and
surrender possession of the subject
land to the plaintiff; to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a
month from January 1987 as the
reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises
until the land is actually vacated,
and the costs of suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment
became final and executory. On 22 August 1985,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII)
seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the
ejectment case and to set aside an order of its
execution. The petition was in due time dismissed.
Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of
Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed
by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the
nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case.
The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal
to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of
execution was issued by the MTC for the
enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was
held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the
Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus
an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month
beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of
the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court
was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an
entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC
for execution. When petitioners refused to remove
their house on the premises in question, upon motion
of private respondent, an order of demolition was
issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began.
Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition
for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and
restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February
1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their
complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew
the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief
(docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV),
which, again, issued a restraining order. 2
Private respondent then filed a motion for
an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-
parte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a
second restraining order was this time denied by the
RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial
court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs
against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of
Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its
decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No.
107203, when the property in question was
proclaimed an area for priority development by the
National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by
authority of Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our
resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446,
entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is
intimately related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common
to both cases submitted for
resolution of this court is the
implication of Presidential Decree
No. 1517, otherwise known as the
"Urban Land Reform Law," and its
amendments or ramifications
embodied in Proclamation No.
1893, as amended by Proclamation
No. 1967 and Presidential Decree
No. 2016. All the above statutes are
being implemented by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board,
and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating
Council, Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the
answer to which hangs the
resolution of this case. On May 20,
1992, this Court required the
National Housing Authority to
submit a Comment on the status of
the program of acquisition by the
Government of the land area which however, is under The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in
includes the disputed property, as the solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the
part of the Areas for Priority administration of pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift
Development (APD), under the the Presidential and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold
aforementioned decrees and Commission on and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here
proclamations. Urban Poor reminded of that pledge; thus -
In compliance with said order of (PCUP) for LAWYER'S OATH
this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, acquisition and I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will
Manager of the Metro Manila upgrading. maintain allegiance to the Republic
Project Department of the National (Emphasis of the Philippines; I will support
Housing Authority, submitted the Supplied.) and defend its Constitution and
following report on the status of The above information answers the obey the laws as well as the legal
Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at uncertainty concerning the status of orders of the duly constituted
No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, the alleged negotiation for the authorities therein; I will do no
Manila, known as the Carlos acquisition by the government of falsehood nor consent to its
Estate, an APD site. Pertinent certain areas in Metro Manila. The commission; I will not wittingly or
portions of the report read: NHA is definitely NOT acquiring willingly promote or sue any
Please be the said lot for its program. groundless, false or unlawful suit
informed that Lot It appearing that the purpose of this nor give aid nor consent to the
6-A, Block 1012 Petition for Review is to set aside same; I will not delay any man's
located at No. the decision of the respondent cause for money or malice and will
1890 Obesis St., Court of Appeals which affirmed conduct myself as a lawyer
Pandacan, Manila the decision of the lower courts, in according to the best of my
which is the order to avoid eviction from the knowledge and discretion with all
subject matter of disputed premises and to be good fidelity as well to the courts
the case and allowed to acquire the same as to my clients and I impose upon
located within the allegedly under the Community myself this obligation voluntary,
Carlos Estate Mortgage Program of the National without any mental reservation or
declared as APD Housing Authority, we find the purpose of evasion.
site pursuant to petition without merit and deny the SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis
Presidential same. Consequently, the petition is supplied.)
Proclamation No. DISMISSED. 5 We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that
1967, is not for What immediately catches one's attention to this case any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the
acquisition by is the evident predilection of petitioners, through court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert,
NHA. different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, impede and degrade the administration of justice is
The Carlos Estate from which not even this Court has been spared. The contumacious calling for both an exercise of
is located outside utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions disciplinary action and warranting application of the
of the NHA simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to contempt power. 7
projects under the prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Zonal decision that has long become final and executory. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly
Improvement Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction
Project (ZIP) and counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with
Community different branches of the court, trifling with judicial most severely. Double costs against petitioners.
Mortgage processes. Never, again, should this practice be This resolution is immediately executory.
Program (CMP). countenanced. 6 SO ORDERED.
The site,
 Annex A; and, finding the connected with the NLRC First
10. 03 recommendation fully supported by Division.
Republic of the Philippines the evidence on record and the
Supreme Court applicable laws and rules, and x x x Why did the NLRC, First
Manila considering Respondents Division, uphold the Labor
propensity to resort to undeserved Arbiter in maintaining that the
language and disrespectful stance, separation pay should be only
FIRST DIVISION Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is one half month per year of
hereby REPRIMANDED with a service? Is jurisprudence on this
stern Warning that severe not clear enough, or is there
JOHNNY NG, Adm. Case No. 7252 penalties will be imposed in case another reason known only to
Complainant, [CBD 05-1434] similar misconduct is again them?
committed. Likewise, the counter
Present: complaint against Atty. x x x If this is not grave abuse of
Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. discretion on the part of the
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson Elvin Michael Cruz is NLRC, First Division, it is
, hereby DISMISSED for lack of ignominious ignorance of the law
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, merit. on the part of the commissioners
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, concerned.
CALLEJO, SR., and A verified complaint[1] dated February 15,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against The NLRC wants proof from the
Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the complainants that the fire actually
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission resulted in prosperity and not
Respondent. Promulgated: on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment. losses. xxx Respondents failed to
November 22, 2006 prove their claim of
x------------------------------------ Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents losses. And the Honorable
--------------x in a labor case with the National Labor Relations Commissioners of the First
Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA Division lost their ability to see
RESOLUTION No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for these glaring facts.
complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered x x x How much is the separation
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. a Decision[2] affirming the decision of the pay they should pay? One month
LA.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration per year of service and all of it to
with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),[3] pertinent portions the affected workers not to some
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006- of which read: people in the NLRC in part.
223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of
Governors, to wit: x x x We cannot help suspecting
that the decision under
RESOLVED to ADOPT and consideration was merely copied x x x They should have taken
APPROVE, as it is hereby from the pleadings of judicial notice of this prevalent
ADOPTED and respondents-appellees with very practices of employers xxx. If the
APPROVED, with modification, slight modifications. But we Honorable Commissioners, of the
the Report and Recommendation of cannot accept the suggestion, made First Division do not know this,
the Investigating Commissioner of by some knowledgeable they are indeed irrelevant to real
the above-entitled case, herein individuals, that the actual writer life.
made part of this Resolution as of the said decision is not at all
x x x we invite the Honorable
Commissioners of the First
Division to see for themselves the
evidence before them and not
merely rely on their reviewers
and on the word of
theirponente. If they do this
honestly they cannot help seeing
the truth. Yes, honesty on the
part of the Commissioners
concerned is what is lacking, not
the evidence. Unfair labor
practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-
eyed in his findings of fact, the
Honorable Commissioners of the
First Division are doubly so and
with malice thrown in. If the
workers indeed committed an
illegal strike, how come their only
penalty is removing their tent? It is
obvious that the Labor Arbiter
and the Honorable
Commissioners know deep in
their small hearts that there was
no strike. This is the only reason
for the finding of illegal strike.
Without this finding, they have no
basis to remove the tent; they have
to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its Union Reply
To The Position Paper Of
Management and its Annexes has
shown very clearly that the so
called strike is a myth. But
Commissioner Dinopol opted to
believe the myth instead of the
facts. He fixed his sights on the
tent in front of the wall and
closed his eyes to the open wide
passage way and gate beside it.
His eyes, not the ingress and
egress of the premises, are
blocked by something so thick he
cannot see through it. His
impaired vision cannot be
trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has
enshrined a novel rule on money
claims. Whereas, before, the
established rule was, in cases of
money claims the employer had the
burden of proof of payment. Now it
is the other way around. x x x For
lack of a better name we should
call this new rule the
Special Dinopol Rule. But
only retirable commissioners are
authorized to apply this rule and
only when the money claims
involved are substantial. When
they are meager the ordinary
rules apply.
x x x how
Commissioner Dinopol is able to
say that the pay slips proved that
the sixteen (16) claimants were
already paid their service incentive
leave pay. This finding is copied
verbatim from the cross-eyed
decision of Labor Arbiter
Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record
proving that the alleged blocking
of the ingress and egress is a
myth seem invisible to the
impaired sight of
Commissioner Dinopol. He needs
more of it.x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his
decision under consideration
(as ponente [of] the decision that
he signed and caused his co-
commissioners in the First
Division to sign) has shown great
and irreparable impartiality,
grave abuse of discretion and
ignorance of the law. He is a
shame to the NLRC and should
not be allowed to have anything
to do with the instant case any
more. Commissioner Go
and Chairman Seeres, by
negligence, are just as guilty
as Dinopol but, since the NLRC
rules prohibit the inhibition of the
entire division,
Chairman Seeresshould remain in
the instant case and appoint two (2)
other commissioners from another
division to sit with him and pass
final judgment in the instant
case.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6,
2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant
complaint only intends to harass him and to influence
the result of the cases between complainant and the
workers in the different fora where they are
pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC
when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision
on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers
appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against
misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a
court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are
not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial
Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being
part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who
are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the
NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis are entitled
to some latitude of righteous anger when they get
cheated in their cases by reason of corruption and
collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who
make their lives and the lives of their constituents
miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the
employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore
have no reason to feel aggrieved.[5]
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit
of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it
is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
several instances, such that while the labor case is
pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras and
Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the
Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to
demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the
jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City
Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon
12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed
the disbarment complaint against Alar,
respondents Parass and Cruzs office instigated the
said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's
company did not pay income tax for the year 2000
allegedly for non-operation due to fire and
respondents consented to this act of the employer
which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when
the case started, there were more or less 100
complainants, but due to the acts of the employer and
the respondents, the number of complainants were
reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule
19-01, 19-02 and 19-03.[6]
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14,
2005,[7] respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no
time did they file multiple actions arising from the
same cause of action or brook interference in the
normal course of judicial
proceedings; the reliefs sought before the CEO has
nothing to do with the case pending before the
NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal
structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant
and unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the
CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance
structures located outside the employer's property,
which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other
paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and
egress out of the employer's property and present
clear and present hazards; the Office of the City
Engineer found the structures violative of pertinent
DPWH and MMDA ordinances; thependency of a
labor case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant
since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not
validate or justify the construction of illegal nuisance
structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance
structures pursuant to its power to protect life,
property and legal order; it was not their idea to file
the disbarment complaint against
respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client
on how to go about filing the case, after having been
served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8
should not be perceived as an excuse for lawyers to
turn their backs on malicious acts done by their
brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that
the only reason the number of complainants were
reduced is because of the amicable settlement they
were able to reach with most of them; their
engagement for legal services is only for labor and
litigation cases; at no time were they consulted
regarding the tax concerns of their client and
therefore were never privy to the financial records of
the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding
their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt
at a disbarment case against them is unwarranted,
unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on
his part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was
assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M.
Velez for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of using
improper and abusive language and recommended
that respondent be suspended for a period of not less
than three months with a stern warning that more
severe penalty will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
did not find any actionable misconduct against
Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended
that the Counter-Complaint
against them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP
Board of Governors issued the Resolution
hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with the
findings of the IBP, it does not agree that
respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe
and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not
attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the
NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual
integrity, replete with implied accusations of
partiality, impropriety and lack of
diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive
language in his pleadings that does not admit any
justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,[8] the Court ratiocinated as
follows:

Well-recognized is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges.However, even
the most hardened judge would be
scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion
on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On
its face, the Resolution presented
the facts correctly and decided the
case according to supporting law
and jurisprudence. Though a of them as members of the Bar.[14]
lawyer's language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting
the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts
and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,[9] the Court held that a lawyer
shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does
not run short of expressions which are emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.[10] A lawyer's
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic
but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal
profession.[11]Submitting pleadings containing
countless insults and diatribes against the
NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual
integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a
court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices
and therefore not part of the
judiciary; and that consequently, the Code ofJudicial
Conduct does not apply to them, is
unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,[12] the Court held
that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in
addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law,
whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to
be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics.[13]
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are
entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is
unavailing. It does not deter the Court from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer,[15] thus:
2. What we have before us is not
without precedent. Time and again,
this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees,
members of the Bar for statements,
disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this
Court or the lower courts. Resort
by an attorney in a motion for
reconsideration to words which
may drag this Court down into
disrepute, is frowned upon as
neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a
special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in the motion
are sufficient, and such words
superfluous. It is in this context that
we must say that just because
Atty. Armonio thought best to
focus the attention of this Court to
the issue in the case does not give
him unbridled license in
language. To be sure, lawyers may
come up with various methods,
perhaps much more effective, in
calling the Courts attention to the
issues involved. The language
vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of
unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or which
could have the effect of harboring
and encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn
for protection and relief. Stability
of judicial institutions suggests that
the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question,
respondents aver, was the result
of overenthusiasm. It is but to
repeat an old idea when we say that
enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is
not really bad. In fact, the one or
the other is no less a virtue, if
channeled in the right
direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for
the proper place of courts in our
system of government.[16]
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions
erode the publics perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern
warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is
not proportionate to respondents violation of the
Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of
fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against
Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to
disturb the following findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by
the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-
complainant Batan failed to submit
any position paper to
substantiate its claims despite
sufficient opportunity to do so.
At any rate, it must be noted that
the alleged case with the Office of
the City Engineer really partakes of
a different cause of action, which
has nothing to do with the NLRC
case. The decision was made by the
city engineer. Respondents remedy
should be to question that decision,
not bring it to this Commission
which has no jurisdiction over
it. We can not substitute our
judgment for the proper courts who
should determine the propriety or
sagacity of the city engineers
action.
Furthermore, parties are not
prohibited from availing
themselves of remedies available in
law provided; these acts do not
exceed the bounds of decency. In
supporting the action against
respondents conduct, no such abuse
may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the
attorneys duty as an officer of the
court to defend a judge from
unfounded criticism or groundless
personal attack. This requires of
him not only to refrain from
subjecting the judge to wild and
groundless accusation but also to
discourage other people from so
doing and to come to his defense
when he is so subjected. By the
very nature of his position a judge
lacks the power, outside of
his court, to defend himself against
unfounded criticism and clamor
and it is the attorney, and no other,
who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbents of the judicial
positions. (Agpalo, p. 143
citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil.
572 (1946); Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31
SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v.
Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152
(1957) Whether the disbarment
complaint was filed by Ng or by his
lawyers is therefore not of great
import, what is more apropos
would be the contents of the
complaint and whether the same is
sufficient to consider disciplinary
sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different
matter altogether. Since the
respondent lawyers have already
stated that they were not engaged
as counsels to take care of their
clients tax problems, then they
cannot be held accountable for the
same. If any wrongdoing has been
committed by complainant Ng, he
should answer for that and those
lawyers who were responsible for
such acts be held liable
jointly. There is no showing [that]
attorneys Paras and Cruz were
responsible for that tax fiasco.
Finally, while it may be true
that Batans group has been greatly
diminished from about 100
claimants to less than half the
number is not by itself an
actionable misconduct. Lawyers are
duty bound to foster amicable
settlement of cases; litigation and
adversarial proceedings while a
necessary part of the practice is not
encouraged, because it will save
expenses and help
unclogged[sic] the dockets. If the
compromise is fair then there is no
reason to prevent the same. There
is nothing in the counter-complaint
which shows that the compromise
agreement and waivers executed
appear to be unfair, hence no
reason to hold lawyers liable for the
same. Besides, a compromise is as
often the better part of justice as
prudence the part of valor and a
lawyer who encourages
compromise is no less the clients
champion in settlement out of court
than he is the clients champion in
the battle in court. (Curtis, The
Advocate: Voices in Court, 5
(1958); cited inAgpalos Legal
Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What
is therefore respondent Alar[]s beef
with the execution of these waivers
if these were executed freely by his
clients?
All told, we do not find anything
actionable misconduct against
Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence
the dismissal of the counter-
complaint against them is proper
for absolute lack of merit.[17]
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty.
Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons
8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is imposed a fine
ofP5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

The Counter-Complaint against

Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael
Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
11.05
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ
AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY
JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES
TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner
also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling
in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged
arose from the judge's performance of his official
duties, which is under the control and supervision of
the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the
first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it
only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to
his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO
OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST
JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the
absence of any administrative action taken against
him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE
OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING
COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER
COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected
the true status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a
determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint
against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT
SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to
allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing
pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this:
should a judge, having been granted by this Court an
extension of time to decide cases before him, report
these cases in his certificate of service? As this
question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman
resolve the present criminal complaint that requires
the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the
Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a
referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge
of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
seeks the review of the following orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September
18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order
dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office
alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that
all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period
of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in
five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and
the months beginning January up to September 1990,
or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had
been granted by this Court an extension of ninety
(90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling
in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's
basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed
by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge
who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, service? As this question had not yet been raised
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could
to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
felonious act. complaint that requires the resolution of said
However, We agree with petitioner that in the question?
absence of any administrative action taken against In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or
him by this Court with regard to his certificates of other court employee arises from their administrative
service, the investigation being conducted by the duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of complaint and refer the same to this Court for
administrative supervision over all courts and its determination whether said Judge or court employee
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of had acted within the scope of their administrative
powers. duties.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
administrative supervision over all courts and court dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court this Court for appropriate action.
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme SO ORDERED.
Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of
petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court
over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected
the true status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this
Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify
on this matter, as suggested by public respondent
Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is
evident in this case. Administratively. the question
before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted
by this Court an extension of time to decide cases
before him, report these cases in his certificate of
12.02
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF
COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY
ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE;
SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF
RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY
ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of the respondent's
client is obviously without merit. The respondent was
aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking
relief that was consistently denied, as he should have
expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse
to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that
had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the
obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions
or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law
as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only
as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a
warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by
his example. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of
law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges appurtenant to membership of the
Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October
6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of
Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her
husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa
and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to
Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years
beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and
written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the
expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an
option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the
right of pre-emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that
Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced
various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's
right to regain her property and that all these
proceedings were decided against Lee. The
proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract
and involved the same issues and parties, thus
violating the proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in
defense of his client's right only such remedies as
were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is
narrated as follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed
a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for
specific performance and reconveyance with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On
June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of
action, laches and prescription. The case was
dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10,
1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through
Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and
affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no.
Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino
Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation
on the ground that the issues before the two courts
were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia
and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case
No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco
knew or should have known that it violated the Rule
on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of
petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833
was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-
3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an
appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued
an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding
with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon
motion of the complainant, however, the injunction
was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was
dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals
against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the
other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476,
the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of
Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On
May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil
Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the
other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June
21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition
against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for
certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case
No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil
case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C.
Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that
Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the
unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No.
Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an
appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July
13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining
Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that
case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The
petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on
September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment
in the unlawful detainer case had come final and
executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for
execution in the unlawful detainer case. On
September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the
hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was
nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8,
1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the
petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on
April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside
and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No.
1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and
Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for
reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was
relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but
not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously
without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact
when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized
above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected. He
thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the
courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused
much inconvenience and expense to the complainant,
who was obliged to defend herself against his every
move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts
for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation
of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved
himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as
an officer of the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer
on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and
experience in the practice of the laws, he should have
known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an
instrument for harassment of the complainant and the
misuse of judicial processes. For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only
as punishment for his misconduct but also as a
warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by
his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE
YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant
to membership in the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately
on the respondent and circularized to all courts and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
12.02 Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension He denies he has committed barratry by
EN BANC Office.[3] instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the
ATTY. CARMEN A.C. No. 5859 execution pending appeal was issued in favor of lawsuits that he and George filed against the
LEONOR M. (Formerly CBD Case No. Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact
ALCANTARA, 421) counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]
VICENTE P. defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds Also, the respondent denies that he has
MERCADO, Present: to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was
SEVERINO P. turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and
MERCADO AND CORONA, C.J., latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the that he was merely constrained to seek relief
SPOUSES JESUS AND CARPIO, money to the judge while the balance was his, as elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to
ROSARIO CARPIO MORALES, attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys
MERCADO, VELASCO, JR., an administrative case for disbarment against the fees.
Complainants, NACHURA, respondent.[4] Further, he denies that he had exploited the
LEONARDO-DE On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of problems of his clients family. He argues that the
CASTRO, Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the case that he and George Mercado filed against the
BRION, respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and complainants arose from their perception of unlawful
PERALTA, handling of clients funds and recommending to the transgressions committed by the latter for which they
BERSAMIN, Court his one-year suspension from the practice of must be held accountable for the public interest.
DEL CASTILLO,* law.[5] Finally, the respondent denies using any
- versus - ABAD, Following the release of the aforesaid IBP intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the
VILLARAMA, JR., Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who
PEREZ, against the Mercado family except George Mercado. resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing
MENDOZA, and The respondent also instituted cases against the him of extorting from Rosario shocking and
SERENO, JJ. family corporation, the corporations accountant and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]
the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case After careful consideration of the records of
ATTY. EDUARDO C. Promulgated: where respondent tried to collect the balance of his this case and the parties submissions, we find
DE VERA, alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent ourselves in agreement with the findings and
Respondent. November 23, 2010 also filed cases against the chairman and members of recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - the IBP Board of Governors who voted to It is worth stressing that
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x recommend his suspension from the practice of law the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
RESOLUTION for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
PER CURIAM: committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
For our review is the Resolution[1]of the family problems, and use of intemperate language required by law for the conferment of such
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo lawsuits against the complainants and their family burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege
C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and members, their lawyers, and the family and right to practice law only during good behavior
gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment. corporation.[6]They maintain that the primary purpose and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
The facts, as appreciated by the of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed. one-year suspension from the practice of law meted after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
The respondent is a member of the Bar and out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice right, an attorneys right to practice law may be
civil case filed in 1984 with and gross misconduct under Section 27,[7]Rule 138 of resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an the Rules of Court. based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
administrative case filed before the Securities and In his defense the respondent basically license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities
offers a denial of the charges against him. of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose
of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney,
and thus to protect the public and those charged with
the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.[11]In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12]we explained
that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member
of the legal profession should refrain from doing any
act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may
be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent
committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former
clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution
suspending him from the practice of law for one year.
In summary, the respondent filed against his former
client, her family members, the family corporation of
his former client, the Chairman and members of the
Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said
Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the
case where his former client received a favorable
judgment, and the present counsel of his former
client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various
fora which included the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office;
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the
Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme
Court.[13]
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the
respondent also re-filed cases which had previously
been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal
cases against members of the Mercado family
separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-
137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception
of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are
re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a
lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as
long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with
the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose
other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the
present case, however, we find that the barrage of
cases filed by the respondent against his former client
and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said
client and to show her that the respondent does not
fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the
respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact
that the respondent was in conspiracy with a
renegade member of the complainants family, the
defendants named in the cases and the foul language
used in the pleadings and motions[15]all indicate that
the respondent was acting beyond the desire for
justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of
cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven
by anger and frustration against his former client who
filed the disciplinary complaint against him for
infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court
pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for
a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated
in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be
sanctioned for filing this unfounded
complaint. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise
of the right to litigate, however, this
right must be exercised in good
faith.[17]
As officers of the court, lawyers
have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this
duty by filing frivolous petitions
that only add to the workload of the
judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery
in the administration of
justice. Like the court itself, he is
an instrument to advance its ends
the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the
prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not
only help attain these objectives but
should likewise avoid any unethical
or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of
justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is
very explicit that lawyers must
exert every effort and consider it
their duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of
justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed
frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his
duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper
administration of justice, but he did so against a
former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity.
Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[19]provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall
preserve the confidence and secrets
of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to
the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that
of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his
former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he
was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the
structure and operations of the family corporation,
private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed
by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives
were all acquired through the attorney-client
relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in
direct violation of the Canons and will not be
tolerated by the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo
C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
12.03
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5024. February 20, 2003]
ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, complainant, vs. Atty.
ARSENIO A. MERRERA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:A motion for extension to file an
appellants brief carries with it the presumption that
the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within the
period granted. Failure to so file the brief without any
reasonable excuse is a violation of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility. For such violation, a
lawyer may be administratively sanctioned,
especially if it results in damage to the client.
The Case
This administrative case stems from an Affidavit-
Complaint[1] filed by Arsenia T. Bergonia on March
2, 1999, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Arsenio A.
Merrera for violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged
that his inexcusable negligence, while acting as her
counsel, caused the unceremonious dismissal of her
appeal. Specifically, despite obtaining two
extensions, he still failed to file the required
appellants brief in the Court of Appeals. After a
careful consideration of the Complaint and
respondents Comment[2] thereon dated November 22,
1999, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maalas
November 15, 2001 Report[3] recommending the six-
month suspension of respondent from the practice of
law was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its June 29, 2002 Resolution No. XV-
2002-236. On August 15, 2002, the Notice of the IBP
Resolution[4] and that of the Commissioners Report
were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant by
Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, director for bar discipline
of the IBP.[5]
The Facts
Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a
case for the quieting of title (docketed as Civil Case
No. U-4601) against her niece Josephine Bergonia, as
well as Spouses Rodolfo and Remedios Parayno and
their minor daughter Gretchen.[6] After due trial, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49,[7] promulgated its Decision in favor of the
Parayno spouses and their daughter.[8] On appeal, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court[9] and the
Decision became final and executory.[10]
Since the disputed land was still in the
possession of complainant, the Paraynos instituted
Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover
possession.[11] After the Answer was filed, respondent
became her counsel of record. After due trial, Branch
48[12] of the same RTC rendered its
Decision[13] ordering her to vacate the premises and
to surrender possession thereof to the Parayno
spouses.
Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC
judgment to the CA. Respondent, as counsel,
received a Notice to File Brief[14] on December 17,
1997. Acting on his Motion for extension to file the
appellants brief,[15] the CA in its February 18, 1998
minute Resolution[16] granted him until March 17,
1998 to do so. Even before the first extension had
lapsed, however, he again filed an Urgent Second
Motion for extension to file brief,[17] praying that he
be given until April 16, 1998 to submit the required
pleading. The CA again granted his Second
Motion.[18]Eventually, the deadline, which had
already been extended twice, lapsed without his filing
the appellants brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion of
the appellees, dismissed the appeal in its June 25,
1998 Resolution.[19]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty
of inexcusable negligence. She rejected his
explanation that he had already advised complainant
not to pursue the appeal even before the filing of the
Notice of Appeal. In fact, after the appellee filed a
Motion to Dismiss the appeal, he even filed an
Opposition, thus raising complainants hopes of
eventual victory.
If respondent thought it was best to dispense
with the appellants brief, he should have filed a
manifestation or motion to that effect. Instead, he
opposed the Motion to Dismiss and asked for further
extensions of time. His actions clearly showed how
negligent and irresponsible he had been in filing the
brief.
The board of directors of the IBP concurred
with Commissioner Maala that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBP.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, requires all the members
of the bar to observe the following:
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Expressly stated is the requirement to show
good and sufficient cause for requests of extension of
time to file appellate briefs. Section 12 of Rule 44 of
the Rules of Court provides that an extension of time
for the filing of a brief shall not be allowed, except
when there is good and sufficient cause, and only
when the motion is filed before the expiration of the
extension sought.
From time to time, a request for extension
becomes necessary when an advocate needs more
time to study the clients position. Generally, such
request is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Lawyers who, for one reason or another,
decide to dispense with the filing of the required
pleading, should promptly manifest this intent to the
court. It is necessary for them to do so in order to
prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those
who file motions for extension in bad faith misuse the
legal process, obstruct justice,[20] and thus become
liable to disciplinary action.[21]
A lawyer who requests an extension must do so
in good faith and with a genuine intent to file the
required pleading within the extended period. In
granting the request, the court acts on the
presumption that the applicant has a justifiable reason
for failing to comply with the period allowed.
Without this implied trust, the motion for extension
will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart
the appealed decision. The motion will thus be
regarded as a means of preventing the judgment from
attaining finality and execution and of enabling the
movant to trifle with procedure and mock the
administration of justice.
In this case, respondent twice moved for an
extension of time to file the required appellants brief.
In his first Motion, he alleged that he had a hectic
daily schedule of hearings and other pressures from
work. In his next Motion, he claimed he had acute
arthritis and asthmatic attacks. The granting of his
two Motions implied that he had been given ample
time either to finish researching his case or to
withdraw his appeal. Yet, he still failed to file the
required brief. In its June 25, 1998 Resolution, the
CA noted that the appellees Motion to Dismiss the
appeal was filed only after forty (40) days from the
expiration of the last extension.
Respondent claims that he never planted false
hopes in the mind of complainant. Upon receiving the
Decision in Civil Case No. U-6061, he purportedly
advised her that her chances of winning in the
appellate court were slim, because the ownership of
the disputed land had already been adjudicated to the
other party in Civil Case No. U-4601. He avers that
he tried to persuade her to accept her defeat like a
good soldier.
We are not persuaded. If, indeed, respondent
failed to convince complainant to drop her appeal, he
should have just withdrawn his appearance. Based on
his arguments in his Opposition to the Motion for
Execution and Demolition, however, we do not
believe that he even tried to convince her to withdraw
the appeal. We are inclined to believe that this excuse
was merely an afterthought to justify his negligence.
Moreover, respondent claims that after filing the
Motions for Extension, he surmised that the appeal
would be useless, because he could not show
sufficient cause to reverse the Decision.
This justification is even more inexcusable.
Respondent, should have checked first if there was a
good ground to support the appeal. If there was none,
he should have been forthright in his evaluation of
the case.
Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves
with the causes of their clients before advising the
latter on the soundness of litigating. If they find that
the intended suit is devoid of merit or that the
pending action is defenseless,[22] they should
promptly inform and dissuade their clients WHEREFORE, Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is
accordingly. hereby found guilty of violating Canons 12 and 18 of
Assuming that respondent indeed tried to the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
persuade complainant to abandon the appeal, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
should have manifested to the CA that he had decided of six (6) months from receipt of this Decision. This
not to file the appellants brief anymore, instead of Decision is immediately executory.
just letting the period lapse. His contention that he SO ORDERED.
could not find the appropriate jurisprudence to
support her case is too flimsy to be credible. A
competent and ethical lawyer would have at least
tried to persuade the CA with reason and logic.
Respondent alleges that complainant knew of
the dismissal of the appeal. That she had referred the
Motion for Execution and Demolition to him for
comment allegedly showed that she had already
given up her desire to pursue her appeal. He pointed
out that if she had indeed blamed his inexcusable
negligence for its dismissal, then she would not have
referred that Motion to him.
We are not convinced. Anyone would have
done what complainant did, because no one else
would know the case better than ones lawyer.
Contrary to respondents allegation, we do not read
any intention on her part to withdraw the appeal,
which showed that she wanted to oppose the
execution of the Decision.
We concur in the IBPs finding that respondent
was negligent in the performance of his duties as
counsel for complainant, and that his negligence was
inexcusable. If indeed it was true that he found her
case to be futile, he should have just withdrawn the
appeal, instead of filing several Motions for
extension to file the appellants brief.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence
of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal
profession.[23] Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with
their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels
and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak
the truth and to conduct themselves according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion, and with
fidelity to the courts and their clients. Canon 18.03 of
the Code requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith renders him liable.
12.04
FIRST DIVISION
[Administrative Case No. 1571. September 23,
1999.]
PARALUMAN B. AFURONG, Complainant, v.
ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a verified letter-
complaint for disbarment, filed on December 22,
1975, by Paraluman B. Afurong against Atty. Angel
G. Aquino, for filing frivolous harassment cases to
delay the execution of a final decision, committing
falsehood in an Urgent Motion for Postponement,
and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the
Citizens Legal Assistance
Office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The antecedent facts show that on April 2, 1974,
Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment
with the City Court of Manila for non-payment of
rentals against Victorino Flores. 1 The court rendered
judgment on May 27, 1974 in favor of petitioner
Paraluman Afurong. The court then issued a writ of
execution on February 17, 1975, which was served
on Victorino Flores in March 1975.
Facing eviction from the land he was occupying,
Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to
Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee of said office at
the time.
On April 3, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with
the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order. 2 On May 9, 1975, the petition, after due
hearing, was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.
Atty. Aquino subsequently filed on May 29, 1975,
with the Court of First Instance of Manila a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition. 3 The court set the
pre-trial conference on December 12,
1975.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on October 1,
1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed on December 11,
1975, an Urgent Motion for Postponement, signing
his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and
indicating the address of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office at 715 Gastambide, Sampaloc,
Manila, as his office address.
In the aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement,
Atty. Aquino stated that he would be unable to attend
the pre-trial conference scheduled on December 12,
1975, at 9:00 a.m., of Civil Case No. 97976 because
he needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus
Case 4 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court that same day and hour.
However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court stated that
a decision had been rendered on the aforementioned
special proceedings case, and that there was no
hearing in connection with the case on December 12,
1975, for there was nothing more to be done in the
proceedings and the same was declared closed and
terminated. 5
Thus, on December 22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong
filed a complaint 6 with this Court for disbarment
against Atty. Angel G.
Aquino.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to complainant, appropriate punitive
sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G. Aquino
for filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of
Civil Case Nos. 97265 and 97976, and for giving
false allegations in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement.
Complainant emphasized that when Civil Case No.
97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12, 1975, at
9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the
same date and hour, he would attend the hearing also
on said date and time of Special Proceedings No. D-
00326, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Lordeliza V.
Sohnrey" .
Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G.
Aquino misrepresented himself as an attorney of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office, using the name and
address of said Office to postpone the pre-trial
hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December 12,
1975, despite the fact that he had been separated from
office at the time.
On February 13, 1976, respondent filed with this
Court his Answer 7 to the complaint denying the
charges against him, contending that such acts had
been done without malice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
He admitted, however, that at the time of the pre-trial
of Civil Case No. 97976 set on December 12, 1975,
he was no longer connected with the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office, for he was "included as one of the
employees purged by the President in a list published
in the newspapers last October 1, 1975." 8 Yet, he
reasoned, "Not wanting to remove the case from the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office by appearing as
private counsel for the petitioner and still unable to
wait for my reinstatement which I was informed was
forthcoming, I decided to file a motion to postpone
the pre-trial conference of the case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
He also conceded that, "In order to give more force
to my motion for postponement, I indicated therein
that I had to attend the hearing of another case before
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." 9
He further admitted that the filing of the motion with
the facts so stated "might have caused some delay",
but justifies such act by stating that "such filing was
prompted by some circumstances which we can
consider as inevitable and unavoidable at the
moment." He adds, "If I shall be given another
chance to continue handling the case, I promise that
this mistake shall never be repeated." 10
In a Reply filed on April 6, 1976, 11 complainant
asserted that Atty. Angel G. Aquino was declared
guilty of contempt of court and correspondingly fined
by this Court in a Decision 12 dated February 26,
1976, for making false allegations in his Urgent
Motion for Postponement.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 3, 1976, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The parties agreed, however, to
hold the case in abeyance until the termination of
Civil Case No. 97976. 13
Effective June 1, 1988, all cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General
were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and
disposition as provided in the Revised Rules of
Court. 14
On May 22, 1997, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted a Report, 15 finding that
respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino failed to perform
his duties expected of an attorney as provided under
the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force
at the time of the commission of the acts in question.
Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose
recommended that respondent be penalized with six
(6) months suspension.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On July 26, 1997, the Board of Governors of the IBP
resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
16
We agree.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the
duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. 17 The decision in Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and
Civil Case No. 231552 had reached finality and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6)
execution of such decision was being effected. months commencing upon receipt of notice
Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a hereof.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
petition for certiorari considering that there was no
apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of Let this decision be spread in the personal record of
a valid judgment. respondent in this Court and copies thereof furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall
Furthermore, respondent committed falsehood when provide all its chapters with copies thereof, and the
he stated in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that Office of the Court Administrator which shall
he had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings forthwith provide with copies thereof all other courts
case the same day as the pre-trial of Civil Case No. through the respective presiding Justices and
97976. Respondent himself admitted that he only Executive Judges.
included such statement "in order to give more
force" to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. SO ORDERED.
Such act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics
which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment
of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not
to mislead the court in any manner.chanrobles law
library : red
In this case, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in
his motion for postponement which delayed the
execution of a valid decision. It is worthy to note that
the lower court correctly declared respondent in
contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d),
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. 18
Moreover, Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court
to believe that he was still employed with the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had
been purged from said office. That he was awaiting
reinstatement to the same position at the time does
not remove the fact that he was misrepresenting
himself to the court. By doing so, he has violated his
duty to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law. 19 He could have
delegated the case to another lawyer in the same
office.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent