inNewsletteronPhilosophyandComputers,PiotrBoltuc(ed).

AmericanPhilosophical
AssociationNewsletters07(2)Spr2008

TheShrinkingDifferenceBetweenArtifactsandNaturalObjects1

LynneRudderBaker
UniversityofMassachusettsAmherst

Artifactsareobjectsintentionallymadetoserveagivenpurpose;naturalobjects
comeintobeingwithouthumanintervention.Ishallarguethatthisdifferencedoesnot
signalanyontologicaldeficiencyinartifactsquaartifacts.Aftersketchingmyviewof
artifactsasordinaryobjects,Illarguethatwaysofdemarcatinggenuinesubstancesdo
notdrawalinewithartifactsononesideandnaturalobjectsontheother.Finally,Ill
suggestthatphilosophershavedowngradedartifactsbecausetheythinkofmetaphysicsas
restingonadistinctionbetweenwhatismindindependentandwhatismind
dependent.Illchallengetheuseofanysuchdistinctionasafoundationfor
metaphysics.

ArtifactsasOrdinaryObjects

Artifactsshouldfitintoanyaccountofordinaryobjectsforthesimplereasonthat
somanyordinaryobjectsareartifacts,Wesleepinbeds;weeatwithknivesandforks;
wedrivecars;wewritewithcomputers(orwithpencils);wemanufacturenails.Without
artifacts,therewouldbenorecognizablehumanlife.

OnmyviewIcallittheConstitutionViewallconcreteobjects,exceptfor
simplesifthereareany,areultimatelyconstitutedbysums(oraggregates)ofobjects.
Technicalartifactsartifactsmadetoservesomepracticalpurposeare,like
nonartifacts,constitutedbylowerlevelentities.Constitutionisarelationofunity
withoutidentity.Unlikeidentity,constitutionisacontingentandtimeboundrelation.
Totakeasimplemindedexample,considerawoodenrodandapieceofmetalwitha

AnearlierversionwaspresentedtotheSocietyofPhilosophyandTechnology,
1

ChicagoAPA,April20,2007.

1
holejustslightlybiggerthanthediameteroftherod.Whentheaggregateoftherodand
thepieceofmetalareincertaincircumstances(e.g.,whensomeonewantstomakea
hammerandinsertstherodintotheholeinthemetal),anewobjectahammercomes
intobeing.Sincetherodandthepieceofmetalexistedbeforethehammerdid,the
relationbetweentheaggregateoftherodandthepieceofmetalandthehammerisnot
identity.Itisconstitution.

Typicallyartifactsareconstitutedbyaggregatesofthings.Butnotalways:a
paperclipisconstitutedbyasmallpieceofthinwire;anda$50billisconstitutedbya
pieceofpaper.Nevertheless,thepieceofthinwireandthepieceofpaperthemselvesare
constitutedbyaggregatesofmolecules,whichinturnareconstitutedbyaggregatesof
atoms.So,eventhoseartifacts(likepaperclips)thatareconstitutedbyasingleobject
are,atalowerlevel,constitutedbyaggregatesofatoms.Forsimplicity,Illconsider
artifactstobeconstitutedbyaggregatesofthings,notbyasingleobject.Anyitems
whateverareanaggregate.Theidentityconditionsofaggregatesaresimple:Aggregate
xisidenticaltoaggregateyjustincaseexactlythesameitemsareinaggregatexand
aggregatey.

DifferencesBetweenArtifactsandNaturalObjects

Technicalartifactshaveproperfunctionsthattheyaredesignedandproducedto
perform(whethertheysuccessfullyperformtheirproperfunctionsornot).1,2Indeed,the
generaltermforakindofartifacte.g.,polisher,scraper,lifepreserveroftenjust
namestheproperfunctionoftheartifact.Anartifacthasitsproperfunctionessentially:
Thenatureofanartifactliesinitsproperfunctionwhatitwasdesignedtodo,the
purposeforwhichitwasproduced.3Moreover,artifactshavetheirpersistence
conditionsinvirtueofbeingthekindofartifactthattheyare.Putanautomobileina
crusherandititgoesoutofexistencealtogether.Themetalandplasticcubethat
comesoutofthecrusherisnotthesameobject(youroldclunkerofacar)thatwentin.
Sinceartifactshaveintendedfunctionsessentially,theyarewhatIcallintention

2
dependentorIDobjects:theycouldnotexistinaworldwithoutbeingswith
propositionalattitudes.

Naturalobjectsdifferfromartifactsinatleastthreeways:(1)Artifacts(andnot
naturalobjects)dependontologicallynotjustcausallyfortheirexistenceonhuman
purposes.(2)Relatedly,artifactsareintentiondependent(ID)objectsthatcouldnot
existinaworldwithoutminds.Naturalobjects,whichcanbedeployedtoservehuman
purposes,wouldexistregardlessofhumanintentionsorpractices.(3)Artifacts(andnot
naturalobjects)essentiallyhaveintendedproperfunctions,bestowedonthembybeings
withbeliefs,desires,andintentions.

TheOntologicalStatusofArtifacts

ManyimportantphilosophersfromAristotleonholdartifactsontologicallyin
lowregard.Somephilosophershavegonesofarastoarguethatartifactssuchasships,
houses,hammers,andsoforth,donotreallyexist.4Artifactsarethoughttobelacking
insomeontologicalway:theyareconsiderednottobegenuinesubstances.Although
thenotionofsubstanceisavexedoneinphilosophy,whatImeanbysayingthatthingsof
somekind(e.g.,hammers,dogs,persons)Fsingeneralaregenuinesubstancesisthat
anycompleteaccountofwhatthereiswillhavetoincludereferencetoFs.Ishallargue
thatthereisnoreasonablebasisfordistinguishingbetweenartifactsandnaturalobjectsin
awaythatrendersnaturalobjectsasgenuinesubstancesandartifactsasontologically
deficient.

Ishallconsiderfivepossiblewaysofdistinguishingbetweennaturalobjectsand
artifacts,allofwhicharementionedoralludedtobyDavidWiggins.5Onnoneofthese,
Ishallargue,donaturalobjects,butnotartifacts,turnouttobegenuinesubstances.Let
thealphabeticletterFbeaplaceholderforanameofatypeofentity.

(1)FsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifFshaveaninternalprincipleofactivity.

(2)FsaregenuinesubstancesonlyiftherearelawsthatapplytoFsassuch,or
therecouldbeascienceofFs.

3
 (3)FsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifwhethersomethingisanFisnotdetermined
merelybyanentityssatisfyingadescription.

(4)FsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifFshaveanunderlyingintrinsicessence.

(5)FsaregenuinesubstancesonlyiftheidentityandpersistenceofFsis
independentofanyintentionalactivity.

Letusconsider(1)(5)oneatatime.

(1)ThefirstconditionFsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifFshaveaninternal
principleofactivityhasitssourceinAristotle.6Aristotletookthisconditionto
distinguishobjectsthatcomefromnature(e.g.,animalsandplants)fromobjectsthat
comefromotherefficientcauses(e.g.,beds).Butthisconditiondoesnotruleinnatural
objectsandruleoutartifactsasgenuinesubstances.Apieceofgoldisanaturalobject,
buttoday,wewouldnotconsiderapieceofgold(oranyotherchemicalelement)tohave
aninternalprincipleofchange;conversely,aheatseekingmissileisanartifact,butit
doeshaveaninternalprincipleofactivity.So,thefirstconditiondoesnotdistinguish
artifactsfromnaturalobjects.

(2)ThesecondconditionFsaregenuinesubstancesonlyiftherearelawsthat
applytoFsassuch,ortherecouldbeascienceofFsalsoallowsartifactstobegenuine
substances.Engineeringfieldsblurthelinebetweennaturalobjectsandartifacts.
Engineeringschoolshavecoursesinmaterialsscience(includingadvancedtopicsin
concrete),trafficengineering,transportationscience,computerscienceallofwhich
quantifyoverartifacts.Sincesomethingsbeingofanartifactualkind(e.g.,computer)
doesnotprecludeascienceofit,thesecondconditiondoesnotmakeartifactslessthan
genuinesubstances.

(3)Thethirdconditionissemantic:Fsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifwhether
somethingisanFisnotdeterminedmerelybyanentityssatisfyingadescription.
Demonstrativereferenceissupposedtobeessentialtonaturalkindterms.7Thereference

4
ofnaturalkindtermsissaidtobedeterminedindexically;thereferenceofartifactual
kindtermsissaidtobedeterminedbysatisfyingadescription.8

Membershipinanaturalkind,itisthought,isnotdeterminedbysatisfyinga
description,butratherbyrelevantsimilaritytostereotypes.9Theideaisthis:First,Fs
arepickedoutbytheirsuperficialproperties(e.g.,quantitiesofwaterareclearliquids,
goodtodrink,etc)Then,anythingthathasthesameessentialpropertiesthatthe
stereotypeshaveisanF.So,naturalkindshaveextensioninvolvingsortal
identifications.10Bycontrast,artifactualterms(likethoseIusedearlierbeds,knives
andforks,cars,computers,pencils,nails)aresaidtoreferbysatisfying
descriptions:Aclockisanytimekeepingdevice,apenisanyrigidinkapplyingwriting
implementandsoon.11

Idonotthinkthatthisdistinctionbetweenhowwordsrefercapturesthe
differencebetweennaturalobjectsandartifacts.12Thedistinctionbetweenreferring
indexicallyandreferringbydescription,withrespecttonaturalkindterms,isonlya
matterofthestateofourknowledgeandofourperceptualsystems.13Howevergoldwas
originallypickedout(e.g.,asstufflikethis),nowwecanpickitoutby[whataretaken
tobe]itsessentialproperties:Forexample,Goldistheelementwithatomicnumber79.
Notonlymightnaturalkindssatisfydescriptions,butalsowemayrefertoartifactsinthe
absenceofanyidentifyingdescription.E.g.,archeologistsmaybelievethattwoentities
arebothartifactsofthesamekind,withouthavinganyidentifyingdescriptionofthekind
inquestion.(Weretheyusedinbattleorinreligiousrituals?)

Thus,thethirdconditionFsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifwhethersomethingis
anFisnotdeterminedmerelybyanentityssatisfyingadescriptiondoesnot
distinguishnaturalkindsfromartifactualkinds,nordoesitruleoutartifactsasgenuine
objects.14

(4)ThefourthconditionFsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifFshavean
underlyingintrinsicessencealsofailstodistinguishnaturalfromartifactualkinds.
Althoughsomefamiliarnaturalkindslikewaterorgoldhaveunderlyingintrinsic

5
essences,notalldo.Forexample,wings(ofbirdsandinsects),mountains,andplanets
areallnaturalkinds,butnoneofthemhasanunderlyingintrinsicessence.Their
membershipintheirkindsisnotamatterofunderlyingintrinsicproperties.Somethingis
awing,mountainorplanetnotinvirtueofwhatitismadeof,butinvirtueofits
relationalproperties.Forthatmatter,somethingisabirdoraninsectinvirtueofits
relationalpropertiesitsgenealogicallineage.So,havinganunderlyingintrinsic
essencedoesnotdistinguishnaturalobjectsfromartifacts.

(5)ThefifthconditionFsaregenuinesubstancesonlyifthecharacterofFis
independentofanyintentionalactivityisthemostinteresting.Accordingtosome
philosophers,thecharacterof[a]substancekindcannotlogicallydependuponthe
beliefsordecisionsofanypsychologicalsubject.15Unlikethefirstfourconditions,the
fifthdoesdistinguishbetweenartifactualandnaturalkinds.Anartifactsbeingthekind
ofthingthatitisdependsonhumanintentions.Concedingthatthenecessityofintention
isadifferencebetweenanartifactandanaturalobject,Iask:Whyshouldthisdifference
renderartifactsdeficient?

IfyouendorsewhatJaegwonKimhascalledAlexandersDictumToberealis
tohaveeffectsthereisnodoubtthatartifactsarereal.Whenautomobileswere
invented,anewkindofthingcameintoexistence:anditchangedtheworld.Considering
theworldchangingeffectsoftheautomobile(andcountlessotherkindsofartifacts),
artifactshaveasstrongaclaimtoontologicalstatusasnaturalobjects.

Whatgenerallyunderliesthefifthcondition,Ibelieve,isanassumptionthatFs
aregenuinesubstancesonlyifconditionsofmembershipinthesubstancekindareset
bynature,andnotbyus.16Butitistendentioustoclaimthattheexistenceofartifacts
dependsnotonnature,butonus.17Ofcourse,theexistenceofartifactsdependsonus:
butwearepartofnature.Itwouldbetruetosaythattheexistenceofartifactsdepends
notonnatureasifwedidnotexist,butdependsonnaturewithusinit.Sincenature
hasusinit,thisdistinction(betweennatureasifwedidnotexistandnaturewithusin
it)isnosatisfactorybasisforaverdictofontologicalinferiorityofartifacts.

6
TheInsignificanceoftheMindIndependence/MindDependenceDistinction

Thereisavenerablebut,Ithink,theoreticallymisguideddistinctionin
philosophybetweenwhatismindindependentandwhatisminddependent.Anything
thatdependsonourconventions,practicesorlanguageisminddependent(and
consequentlydowngradedbythosewhorestmetaphysicsonamindindependence/mind
dependencedistinction).AllIDobjects,includingallartifacts,arebydefinitionmind
dependent,inasmuchastheycouldnotexistinaworldwithoutbeingswithbeliefs,
desiresandintentions.Nothingwouldbeacarburetorinaworldwithoutintentional
activity.18Themindindependent/minddependentdistinctionistheoreticallymisguided
becauseitisusedtodrawanontologicallineinanunilluminatingplace.Itputsmind
independentinsectsandgalaxiesononeside,andminddependentafterimagesand
artifactsontheother.

Asecondreasonthatthemindindependent/minddependentdistinctionis
unhelpfulisthatadvancesintechnologyhaveblurredthedifferencebetweennatural
objectsandartifacts.Forexample,socalleddigitalorganismsarecomputerprograms
that(likebiologicalorganisms)canmutate,reproduceandcompetewithoneanother.19
Orconsiderroboratsratswithimplantedelectrodesthatdirecttheratsmovements.20
Orforanotherexample,considerwhatoneresearchercallsabacterialbattery:21These
arebiofuelcellsthatusemicrobestoconvertorganicmatterintoelectricity.Bacterial
batteriesaretheresultofarecentdiscoveryofamicroorganismthatfeedsonsugarand
convertsittoastreamofelectricity.Thisleadstoastablesourceoflowpowerthatcan
beusedtorunsensorsofhouseholddevices.Finally,scientistsaregenetically
engineeringvirusesthatselectivelyinfectandkillcancercellsandleavehealthycells
alone.ScientificAmericanreferredtothesevirusesassearchanddestroymissiles.22
Aretheseobjectsthedigitalorganisms,roborats,bacterialbatteries,genetically
engineeredviralsearchanddestroymissilesartifactsornaturalobjects?Doesit
matter?Isuspectthatthedistinctionbetweenartifactsandnaturalobjectswillbecome
increasinglyfuzzy;andasitdoes,theworriesaboutthemindindependent/mind
dependentdistinctionwillfadeaway.Moreparticularly,asthedistinctionbetween

7
naturalobjectsandartifactspales,thequestionoftheontologicalstatusofwebbased
objects,forexample,becomesmoreacute.

Conclusion

Noonewhotakesartifactsofanysortseriously,ontologicallyspeaking,should
supposethatmetaphysicscanbebasedonadistinctionbetweenmindindependenceand
minddependence.Inanycase,technologywillcontinuetoshrinkthedistinction,and
withit,thedistinctionbetweenartifactsandnaturalobjects.23

8
 1
Thereisalotofliteratureonfunctions.Forexample,seeCrawfordL.Elder,ADifferentKindofNatural
Kind,AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy73(1995):516531.SeealsoAscribingFunctionstoTechnicalArtifacts:A
ChallengetoEtiologicalAccountsofFunctions,byPieterE.VermaasandWyboHoukes,BritishJournalforthe
PhilosophyofScience54(2003):261289.AsVermaasandHoukespointout,somephilosopherstakethenotionof
biologicalfunctiontobebasicandthentrytoapplyortransformtheoriesofbiologicalfunction(whichsinceDarwinare
nonintentionalist,reproductiontheories)toartifacts.IbelievethatVermaasandHoukesareentirelycorrecttoliberatethe
theoryofartifactsfromthenotionoffunctioninbiology.
2
Forathoughtfuldiscussionoffunctions,seeBethPreston,WhyisaWingLikeaSpoon?APluralistTheoryof
Function,JournalofPhilosophy95(1998):215254.
3
Moreprecisely,anonderivativeartifacthasitsproperfunctionessentially.Theconstituterofanartifactinherits
thenonderivativeartifactsproperfunctionandthushasitcontingently(aslongasitconstitutesthenonderivativeartifact).
4
JoshuaHoffmanandGaryS.Rosenkrantz,Substance:ItsNatureandExistence(London:Routledge,1997):173.
5
Alltheconditionseitherfollowfrom,orarepartof,thebasicdistinctionthatWigginsdrawsbetweennatural
objectsandartifacts.Thereisacomplexconditionthatnaturalobjectsallegedlysatisfyandartifactsdonot:...aparticular
constituentxbelongstoanaturalkind,orisanaturalthing,ifandonlyifxhasaprincipleofactivityfoundedinlawlike
dispositionsandpropensitiesthatformthebasisforextensioninvolvingsortalidentification(s)whichwillanswertrulythe
questionwhatisx?AccordingtoWiggins,naturalobjectssatisfythisconditionandartifactsdonot.DavidWiggins,
SamenessandSubstanceRenewed(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001):89.IamnotclaimingthatWiggins
deniesthatthereexistartifacts,onlythathedistinguishesbetweennaturalandartifactualkindsinwaysthatmaybetakento
implytheontologicalinferiorityofartifacts.
6
Asubstancehaswithinitselfaprincipleofmotionandstationariness(inrespectofplace,orofgrowthand
decrease,orbywayofalteration).Aristotle,Physics192b823.
7
Thisclaimissimilartothenotionthatnaturalkindterms,butnotartificialkindterms,arerigiddesignators.(A
rigiddesignatorhasthesamereferentineverypossibleworld.)However,whatmakesthedifferencebetweenwhaleand
bachelorisnotthatonlytheformerisrigid.Rather,onlytheformertermhasitsreferencedeterminedbycausalcontact
withparadigmsamplesoftherelevantkind.Thereisnoreasonthatthetermscannotbothberigid.SeeJosephLaPorte,
RigidityandKind,PhilosophicalStudies97(2000):304.
8
AlthoughWigginsisanAristotelian,thisisnotAristotlesview.ForAristotle,nominaldefinitionsarereference
fixers,usedtoidentifyobjectsforscientificstudy;theycontaininformationthatascientisthasbeforehavinganaccountof
theessenceoftheobjects.Realdefinitionsarediscoveredbyscientificinquiryandgiveknowledgeoftheessencesof
objectsidentifiedbynominaldefinitions.Nominalandrealdefinitionsarenotaccountsofdifferenttypesofentities.
Rather,theyaredifferenttypesofaccountsofthesameentities.Membersofaparticularnaturalkindhavethesame
essence(underlyingstructure).SeeRobertBolton,EssentialismandSemanticTheoryinAristotle:PosteriorAnalytics,II,
710,ThePhilosophicalReview85(1976):514544.
9
E.g.,Wiggins,SamenessandSubstanceRenewed,pp.1112.
10
Wiggins,SamenessandSubstanceRenewed,p.89.
11
Wiggins,SamenessandSubstanceRenewed,p.87.
12
Aristotlewouldagreewithmeonthispoint,Ibelieve.Hisreasonfordowngradingartifactsontologicallyisthat
artifactshavenonaturesinthemselves.
13
Moreover,indexicalityshouldnotbeconfusedwithrigidity,whichdoesnotconcernhowatermgetsconnected
toareferent.ForcriticismofPutnamsconfusionofthecausaltheoryofreferenceandindexicality,seeTylerBurge,
OtherBodiesinThoughtandObject,AndrewWoodfield,ed.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1982):97120.
14
JosephLaPortealsoholdsthatsomekindexpressions(bothnaturalandartifactual)designaterigidly,andsome
designatenonrigidly.SeehisRigidityandKind,PhilosophicalStudies97(2000):293316.
15
JoshuaHoffmanandGaryS.Rosenkrantz,Substance:ItsNatureandExistence(London:Routledge,1997):173.
16
InADifferentKindofNaturalKind,AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy73(1995):516531,CrawfordL.
Elderdiscussesthispoint.ForanalternativethatIfindcongenial,seeAmieThomasson,RealismandHumanKinds,
PhilosophicalandPhenomenologicalResearch68(2003):580609.
17
InChapterOneofTheMetaphysicsofEverydayLife(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),Iargued
thatadistinctionbetweenwhatdependsonnatureandwhatdependsonusisneitherexclusivenorexhaustive.
18
Seealengthydiscussionofartifacts(specifically,ofcarburetors)inmyExplainingAttitudes:APractical
ApproachtotheMind(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995):19596.
19
TheChronicleofHigherEducation:DailyNews,May8,2003.
20
TheNewYorkTimes,May5,2002.
21
TheNewYorkTimes,September18,2003.Theleadresearcher,DerekLovley,whocoinedthetermbacterial
battery,isamicrobiolgistattheUniversityofMassachusettsatAmherst.
 22
EmailupdatefromScientificAmerican,September23,2003.
23
PartsofthispaperappearedasTheOntologyofArtifacts,PhilosophicalExplorations7(2004):9911;other
partswillappearinTheMetaphysicsofMalfunction,ArtefactsinPhilosophy,editedbyPieterVermaasandWybo
Houkes(forthcoming).