Maet of the current attention given to Latin Amer-

ica centers around Nicaragua and its Sandinista

aouernment. This article examine8 the current - in
I N JULY 1979, a broad-based coalition
led by
ation Front
%
&sndinisto National Liber-
SLN) deposed the unpopu-
technical and military advisers were sent
to Nicaragua in large numbers+
Further evidence of alliance with the
lar dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Soviet bloc ie demonstrated by Nicara-
Debayle and ended a family dynttsty guas almost exclusively p,ro-Soviet
which had ruled Nicaragua for nearly 40 United Nations voting record, President
years. The succese of this uprieing can be Daniel Ortagas vieita to the Soviet Union
directly attributed to the significant inter- and the Sandintstis pledge to support the
national assistance and the withdrawal of spread of Marxiem throughout Central
recognition of the Somoza government on America. In the view of many former sup-
the part of the United States and the porters, the Sandinista regime has de-
Organization of American States (OAS). based the name of the revolutions patron,
Also, in the last months of the revolution, Augusto C6sar Sandino, the fervent
success can be attributed to Nicaraguan Nationalist of the 1920s and 1930s who
popular support on the basis of the prom- opposed all forme of foreign interference in
iees made by the Sandirsistas before that Nicaraguan affaire. Popular discontent
organization that the oppressive dictator- with the radicalization of the Sandirzistu
chip would be supplanted by a democratic government and its association with Cuba
government committed to political plural- and the Soviet Union has been manifested
ism, a mixed economy and a nonaligned in protests by the church, attacks by the
foreign policy. local news media and, most significantly,
The junta created in the wake of Somo- an armed rebellion by a large insurgent
zae collapee initially seemed to confirm force, many of whom participated in th~
the belief that the anticipated political revolt which deposed Somoza.
traneformation would occur. Instead, the
Sarsdinistas pursued alignment with the
Soviet bloc, instituted a government even Geostrategic Importance
more repressive than the one it replaced
and created a military establishment far
out of proportion to defensive needs. Any Cuba and the Soviet Union viewed the
pretense to democracy wae ended on 25 Sandinista victory as the first real oppor-
August 1981 when Nicaraguan Minister tunity in 20 yeare to undermine the foun-
of Defense Humberto Ortega officially dations of US policy in Central America.
proclaimed Marxism-Leninism to be the The establishment of another Marxist
scientific doctrine guiding the Sandinista state in the Caribbean and the potential
revolution.. internationalization of the conflict in that
The Sandinistas wasted little time in region forced the United States to reassess
establishing a close affiliation with the its traditional north-south Latin-Ameri-
Soviet Union despite the fact that the can strategy (intema) security) and con-
United Statee was providing unprece- sider the situation within an east-west
dented economic aid. Formal ties were framework (continental defense).
also developed between Nicaragua and In addition to massive arms transfers
other communist statee. Major quantities ostensibly for the purpose of supporting
of Soviet military hardware were chipped Marxist-inepired insurgenciee such as the
to Nicaragua, pilotz were trained in East- one in El Salvador, the Soviets have con-
ern Europe and Soviet-bloc and Cuban tributed heavily to improving selected

MILITARY REVIEW August 1986 29

 The establishment of another Marxist state in the Caribbean and
the potential internationalization of the conflict in that region forced the
United States to reassess its traditional north-south Latin-American
strategy (internal security) and consider the situation within
an east-west framework (continental defense).

Nicaraguan airfields, the principal pur- for the construction of an interoceanic

pose of which can only be to project power. canal across the San Juan River and Lake
Runways at Puerto Cabezas and Blue- Nicaragua and an agreement for the
tields on the Caribbean coast and at Mon- t-epair and use of the Pacific port of San
t41imar on the Pacific coast have been Juan del Sur have also been reported.
extended to accommodate MiG fighters. When considered in conjunction with
Protective revetments for high-perform- the construction of port facilities at El
ance aircraft have been completed at San- Bluff capable of berthing ships up to
dino Airport. Furthei, the new 3,200 - 25,000 tone, a Soviet threat to interdict,
meter runway at Punta Huerte is capable , US sea-lanes in the Caribbean is clearly
of handling any aircraft in the Soviet discernible. Since most US heavy divi-
inventory, to include the Backfire bomber. sions designated for North Atlantic
Accese to these facilities would give the Treaty Organization (NATO) reinforce-
Soviets a capability to conduct reconnais- ment are slated to embark from Gulf of
sance. flighte along both the US Pacific Mexico ports, the active presence of hos-
and Atlantic coasts using Tu -95 Bear-n tile naval vessels in the Caribbean repre.
bombers. A secret accord with the Soviets sents a plausible threat to the defense of

30 August 1986 M{ LITARY FIEVJEW 1

Western Europe. The success of such sea-
denial operations would negate one of Military Situation
NATOs few advantages, that of superior
reinforcement capability.
Additionally, Soviet naval operations With the help of 3,000 Cuban advisers
from San Juandel Sur on Nicaraguas and massive Soviet aid, the Sandtnista
Pacific coast could impede alternate ship- regime has created the largest and most ;
ping lanes between the Persian Gulf and formidable standing military force in Cen-
the US West Coast. In this context, the tral America, one far in excess of actual
Soviet presence in Nicaragua and Cuba defensive needs and at least five times
may represent a greater threat to US larger than Somozas military at the
national security than do Marxlst- height of the conflict. Nicaragua now
inspired insurgences in contiguous coun- boasts an armed force of 62,850, of which
tries. On balance, Soviet intentions in perhaps 25,000 are conscripts servmga
Central America appear to encompass two two-year service obligation. Another
objectives: 57,000 men serve in the reserves and mili-
. In the near term, the Soviets seek to tia, of whom 29,000 are in the army.
aggravate the existing situation and These forces are equipped with 34o
establish themselves as an influence in tanks and armored vehicles, 70 large-
the regional peacemaking process. caliber howitzers and rocket launchers,
Inthe long term, the Soviet goal is to and 30 helicopters, eix of whi~ are the
threaten Western alliance life lines by formidable Mi-24FIind-D gunship. The
projecting power into the region. armored force consists of 120 Soviet ?55

MILITARY FIEVIEW* August 1986 31

 Arme ehipmentsto Nicaragua were
stepped up significantly in Ootober 1985,
probably in reeponseto increased rebel
activity and ae a palliative againet San- .
dinista anxiety over a purportsd US inva-
sion. This equipment, including addi-
tional T65 tanks, was unloaded at the
Cuban port of Mariel, transferred to Nica-
raguan cargo veesels and delivered to the
port of El Bluff. The circuitous manner of
entry may have been a Soviet ploy to
avoid controversy prior to the November
1985 summit in Geneva between Ronald
Rsagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.
Nicaragua also serves as the principal
conduit for arms shipments to the Fara-
bundo Martf National Liberation Front
(FMLN) inEl Salvador. Originating in
Cuba and in the Soviet Union, these arms
are moved into El Salvador by means of
air, sea and land routes. The principal
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega sporting land route begins in Nicaragua and passes
peace pin over hem and designer glasses at a
rally in Managua, 30 October 19e4 through Hondurae into El Salvador.
There, an intricate road and trail network
medium tanks and 30 PZ76 light amphibi- has been developed to accommodate the
ous tanks. While these combat vehicles tactical needs of the rebels. Arms are also
may be obsolete in terms of the high- delivered across the Gulf of Fonseca to
intensity European battlefield, they are predesignated points along the coast of El
sufficiently potent for use in Central Salvador, using oceangoing canoes pow-
America. ered by outboard motors. Finally, some
The Soviets have also furnished the supplies are airdropped or airlanded at
Sandznisfas with flatbed trucks, fuel some 150 isolated airstrips that dot the
tankers and amphibious ferries which %lvadoran countryside.
facilitate the movement of armored fm-ma- Theimportance of this logistical net-
tions across territory laced with water and work is reflected in a report from the
terrain obstacles. while the Sarsdinistas House Intelligence Committee chaired by
at present do not possess any high- Representative Edward P. Boland. This
performance fighters, delivery by the report concluded that the insurgency in El
Soviet Union of MiG21s could negate Hon- Salvador depends for its lifeblood upon
duran air superiority, thus decreasing the outside assistance from Nicaragua and
vulnerability of a Nicaraguan armored Cuba, intheform of arms, ammunition,
thrust through the narrow Choluteca gap financing, logistics and command and con-
into Honduras. The Nicaraguan pilots trol facilities.ls
peeded to fly these aircraft and mechanice This covert support began ehortly ef&
to maintain them have already .been the overthrow of Somoza and has contin-
trained in Bulgaria. ued with little diminution ever since. The

32 August 19S6* MILITARY REWEW


Stwsdinistas are also deeply involved in
training Salvadoran rebels, operating at
least three Cuban-staffed training centers
ineide Nicaragua. One training center is
at Ostinal in the province of Rivas, and
another is at a converted national guard
camp near Rio Tamarindo. A third center
is at Tamaga, just outside Managua.l In
Sandino Betrayed
If Augusto Cesar Sandino were allve
today, he would be mortified to see his
name used synonymously with the com-
mupist Sarzdmistaregime of Nicaragua.
Sandino, born in 1893 the son ofs wealthy
Nicaraguan landowner, was a rather m]d-
dle-of-the-road liberal m todays terms of
reference. But, above all, he wsss NatIon.
alist with a strong bellef in the dlgmty of
the Indian.
During the Nicaraguan liberal uprising
of 1926-27, Ssndmo raised a force to fight
for the liberal cause. US Envoy Henry L.
Stimson was sent in 1927 to resolve the
uprising. Backed up by s strong contin-
gent of US Marines, he succeeded in effect-
MILITARY REVIEW August 1986
NICARAGUA
committing full support to the Salvadoran
insurgency, the Samiinista regime has
honored its pledge to export Marxism and
linked its own credibility inextricably to
the guerrillas success.
Virtually from the inception of Sars-
dinista authority in Nicaragua, internal
and external resistance to the new leaders
ing a peace plan. Under the Peace of Tipi-
tapa, the liberal forces were to disband,
presidentml electlons would be held and
an apolitical national guard would be
formed under US tutelage,
Sandino refused to stand down and took
his forces to the hills to wage guerrilla war
against tbe US Marines and Nicaraguan
government forces. For more than five
years, %mdinos troops conducted sporadic
fighting in the northern area of Nicsra-
gua. Sandlno became a Western media
celebrity snd was heralded by the Western
social ehte as a sort of modern-day Robin
Hood. Sandino attracted the attention and
support of a number of the worlds social-
ist, commumst and religious groupe, all
attempting to have %mdino embrace their
cause. While in Mexico m 1930, SanJino
was supported by the Mexican Communist
Party, and the famed Salvadorian commu-
mst Agustin Farabundo Marti was his sec-
retsry. This support notwithstanding,
Sandino refused to accept communism. In
1931, when he returned to the fight ]n Nit-
aragua, the Communists turned on him
and denounced hlm as an imperialist.
When the Marines left Nicaragua ]n
1933, Sandino agreed to an armistice and
disbanded his army. Shortly after this, he
was kidnapped by tbe National Guard tmd
executed on 21 February 1934.
It is monic that, years later, the Nmwa-
guan communist revolutionaries would
choose Sandino as their symbolic martyr.
The one ideology that Sandino clearly
refused to accept was communism.
For further reading, see Shirley Chris-
tian, N1$aragua: Resolutionm theFamily,
Random Houee, N, Y., 1985. This is per-
haps the best researched and written
account of events in Nicaragua during the
past 60 years,
33
began to manifest itself. Small groups of
former guardia soldiers, Somo.ristas and
other expatriates made their way to the
United States and other locatione where
they began organizing to regain power in
Nicaragua. For nearly two years, these
disparate factions produced few tangible
results ds the exiles were unable to recruit
mft%ient vnkmteem m Create %&e%egis%ie
int%etmsture necessary to present a via-
ble threat.
Tbie eituation began to improve in early
1981 as the Reagan administration fo-
cused renewed attention on the crisis in
Central America. With the assistance of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the locus of the stmggle shifted to Ho,ndu-
ras where base camps for insurgents were
set up along the border adjacent to the
Nicaraguan province of Nueva Segovia.
After much delay and a good deal of
political intrigue, the rebels, now better
armed and trained, began the first series
of forays into Nicaragua in March 1982.
Since that beginning, this armed reaction
to the Sandinista revolution has become a
fuil-fledged %surgeney SXppmted by %he
largest guerrilla force in Central Ainerica.
The democratic resistance movement is
a cross-section of the Nicaraguan popula-
tion, comprised mainly of young peasants
but also including businessmen, studenta,
clergymen, former Sandinistas and
former national guardsmen, Most of the
resistance fighters fall under the umbrella
organization known es the United Nicara-
 ? NICARAGiJA
.1

guan Opposition (uNO). The most signifi-

cant of the three resistance groups is the
Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) led
by Enrique Bernnidez, Nicaraguas former
representative to the Inter-American
Defense Board in Washington, D.C. Con-
sisting of some 17,000 men, the FDNs 14
regional commands operate principally
along Nicaraguas frontier with Honduras
and in the area north of Lake Nicaragua.
The two lesser organizations, UNO-South
(2,000 men) and the UNO-KISAN (1,800
men), conthe their activities to the Costa
Rican border and Mosquito Coast areaa
respectively.~
Since their successful attacks at La
Trinidad and Cuapa in mid-1984, Contra
activities have diminished considerably
due to the suspension of US military aid,
logistical constraints and improvements
in the tactics, organization and equipment
of the Sandinista army. Congress halted
military aid in August 1984, following
revelations of the CIA-sponsored Secret
War, and the $27 million in nonlethal aid
approved in July 1985 ran out on 31
March 1986.
The entire issue of aid for the Contras
has been debated in the US Congress,
with the House of Representatives ini-
tially rejecting the Reagan administra- capability by 50 percent. io
tions request for a package of $100 mil- In addition to logistic constraint, the
lion, $70 million of which was to be allo- Contras have also been hampered by the
cated for military purposes. Despite this Sancfinista armys increased proficiency
setback, the president continued his in the conduct of counterinsurgency oper-
efforts to obtain some form of military aid ations. During the past two years, a dozen
for the rebels. Winning approval of so new irregular warfare battalion have
large a package from a skeptical Con- been created to carry out long-range
gress, increasingly constrained by federal patrols in mountainous terrain. Deploy-
spending reductions, however, became one ment of these battalions astride the infil-
of the Reagan administrations tougheet tration routes out of Hondurae bas
Iegielative fights. The urgency of a impeded Contra freedom of movement and
resumption of military aid was empha- compelled operations in smaller groups.
sized by FDN Commander Bermtidez The %ndinista military has also used
who indicated that the ehortage of eup- 12 new Soviet+uilt Mi-8 transport heli-
pliee in 1985 reduced Contra military copters and the six Mi-24 Hind-D gun-

MILITARY REVIEW August 1986 35,

 ,.
. .
SwWnm& GSP IrNVY amphibious fefrj on pamda in Managua. 7he GSP con carry the 7S5 tank and
was wad by tha EgypUans during their asssuit across the SueJZCanal In Oatokr 1973. (Oppostto) ZUS3
tlalroratl gtlrr enrplsownmts.

ships in prosecuting its war against the tives are to threaten the Rama Road over
.Contras. These aircraft have been which military hardware arriving at the
employed with considerable efficacy in port of El Bluff is transported and to draw
dkupting rebel movements and respond- Sandinista forces southward, relieving
ing to attacks with rapid reinforcement the pressure on the Honduran infiltration
and aerial firepower. There have also been routes. But, since the fall of 19s5, Contra
reports, primarily from Sandinista defec- operations in most other areas of Nicara-
tors, of Cuban advisers wearing Nicara- gua have been reduced, and pressure on
guan uniforms, piloting Soviet-built heli- the Sandinistas has lessened.
copters and sometimes engaging in com- Those operations still being conducted
bat. It is reasonably certain that the crew are limited in scope and intended only to
of the Mi-8 helicopter shot down on 2 maintain some measure of visibility until
December 1985 by a Contra SA 7 shoulder- an infusion of military aid can spark a
fired missile was piloted by Cubans. The renewal of more decisive attacks.n Hum-
nationality of the crew notwithstand- berto Ortega claims that the Contras are
ing, the destruction of this helicopter suffering an irreversible dieintegration.
prompted the Sandinistas to adopt great- Even so, guerrilla skirmishes in the vicin-
er caution in executing airmobile opera- ity of Cuapa and Santo Domingo and
tions. along the Rama Road continue to inflict
Despite attenuation of cross-border casualties upon Sandinista forces.z
operations, the Contras have continued to The guerrillas are also exacting a toll on
attack targets from bases inside Nicara- Nicaraguas fragile economy which has
gua. Recent operations conducted north of suffered considerably einca US aid wae
Lake Nicaragua by the Jorge Salazar halted in 1981. In a radio broadcast on 20
Operational Command of the FDN have January 1986, Minister of Agriculture
focused upon two objectives. The objec- Jaime Wheelock noted that the Contras

36 August 19L36 MILITARY REV[EW

destroyed 120,000 quintals of coffee from sures leading, then, to the downfall of the .
the last crop and rustled 2,000 head of cat- Sandinista dictatorship.
tle. Attacks on tobacco plantations cost
the government some $3.5 million in
export revenues. To this, be added the Peace Prospects
deaths of 79 technicians, laborers and
peasants. But these kinds of operations
generate Iittle publicity and have scant The prospects for peace in the region are
prospect of long-term success. not bright. Despite the recent return of
The armed democratic opposition democratically elected civilian govern-
remains dependent upon external mili- mentin Guatemala, Honduras and EI Sal-
tary assistance. It is convinced that a vador and thesuccessesof El Salvadorian
major increase in aid would not only dealing with its own incipient rebellion,
directly assist them but also mobilize the situation in Nicaragua remains dis-
uncommitted Nicaraguan to oppose the concerting. The Reagan administration is
communist regime. The armed democratic unwilling to accept another Soviet-
resistance leaders believe that it is in this aligned nation in the Caribbean Basin
manner that the opposition goals can be and has reaffirmed its policy of supporting
achieved of pressuring the communist armed resistance against repressive
government in Nicaragua to sit at the Marxist regimes. Nicaragua, for its part,
negotiating table with aH of the opposition remains committed to the goal of creating
to initiate a process of national reconcilia- a communist state ruled by an elite van-
tion and democratization. If they are guard party.
unable to pressure the Communists to do Despite promises to the OAS to establish
this, the armed opposition has agreed to a responsive and pragmatic government ded-
continue to promote the necessary pres- icated to reenlving the nations social and eco-

MILITARY REVIEW August 1986 37

 Despite promises to the Orga -
ization ofAmerican States (OA$ J
to establish a responsive and
pragmatic government dedicated
to resolving the nations sociai and
economic problems, the Sandinistas
have enacted measures which
are worse than those of the
Somoza regime.
nomic problems, the Sandinistas have
enacted measures which are worse than
those of the %moza regime. Such excesses
have served O+Y to precipitate a halt in US
aid and to diwllueion several prominent sup-
porters of the revolution.n
The deterioration of the situation in
Central America and the intransigence of
the contending sides prompted four Latin-
American nations to initiate a peace proc-
ess outside the established framework of
the OAS. The members of the so-called
C!ontadora Group (Mexico, Colombia, Ven-
ezuela and Panama) asserted that the
roots of the problem in Central America
were indigenous social and economic ineq-
uities and should, therefore, not be placed
in the context of the east-west conflict.
Since its inception in January 1983, the .
OAS-sanctioned group has sought to cre-
ate conditions in which substantive nego-
tiations could be carried out. Efforts to
bring these negiotiatione to fiwition have
been stymied by Nicaraguas continuous
rejection of the draft agreements prepared
by the Contadora Group and refusal to
address key areas of disagreement in the
final treaty text.g
The sole result of three years of negotia-
tions has been the drafting of the Act of 1
Contadora, a document which endeavors
to bind the five Central Amercan nations
to a treaty encompassing ce 4 am specific
requirements. The act sets forth rules for
military maneuvers, bans new foreign
military bases or training facilities, pro-
poses elimination of existing facilities
within one year of the treatye signing,
atllrms the need to end arms salee, pro-
poses the establishment of a mechanism
for verification through a permanent and
autonomous commission, and upholds the
principle of a pluralistic political system.
To avert further militarization of Nica-
ragua and Honduras, the Contadora
Group and Contadora Support Group
nations have urged the Reagan adminis-
tration to halt its support of the armed
democratic resistance. This request ema-
nated from the member ministers meet-
ing in Caraballeda, Venezuela, on 11-12
January 1986 and was later endorsed by
all Central American nations and the
European Economic Community. In
return for a halt in economic and military
aid, Nicaragua would be compelled to take
positive steps toward national reconcilia-
tion, to include opening negotiations with
the Corstras.
In response to this latest initiative from
the Contadora ministers, Secretary of
State George P. Shultz offered to renew
bilateral talks with Nicaragua in return
for initiation of simultaneous negotiations
with the UNO and restoration of the civil
liberties which have been progressively
restricted since the imposition of a state of
siege in March 1982.$1 While Nicaragua
seems inclined to engage in direct talks
with the United States, it has impeded
and delayed any Contadora peace initia-
tives which threaten to attenuate its polit-
ical radicalization. For its part, the
Reagan administration is unlikely to
abandon its efforts to secure a resumption
of military aid for the Contras unless a
comprehensive and verifiable settlement
can be reached. In light of such divergent
and contradictory policies on the part of
the principal antagonists, the prospects
for a negotiated settlement of the conflict
in Nicaragua remain dim, at least in the
near term.
While not yet displaying all the trap-
pings of a consolidated Marxist state like
Cuba, the Sandinistas have created a
repressive single-party regime adhering
to Leninist precepts. Established military
ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union
threaten US strategic interests in the Car-
ibbean Basin.ss The anti -Sandinista insur-
gency which has grown in response to the

MILITARY REVIEW August 1986

BTRSOwnmredpereonnel oarrler,one of mora than 346 armored
vehlclea In the&nd/nkfa arsenal, on pamde In Managua

While not get displaying all
the trappings of aeonsolidated Marx-
ist state like Cuba, the Sandinistas
have created a repressive single-
partg regime adhering to Leninist
preaepts. Established military ties
with Cuba and the Soviet Union
threaten US strategic interests
in the Caribbean Basin.
The options available for resolving this
conflict have been reduced considerably
by the intransigence and continued radi-
calization of the Sandinista regime. It is
improbable that the Sandirzistas will con-
sent to negotiate with the democratic
opposition without a renewal of miii~au
ald from the United States. Even with a
sizable increase in aid, that goal may be
unattainable as the Soviets and Cubans

1 aPPear quite willing to negate any advan-

tage gained by the Contras with substan-
steady deprivation of civil liberties and tial aid of their own.J5 Economic sanctions
forced. socialist transformation of the soci- imposed against Nicaragua by the United
ety is a popular resistance movement that States since 1981 have been ignored by
will not be easily eradicated.3~ Despite pos- other nations and, in themselves, have
itive developments in the other Central failed to generate efficient pressure to
American nations, the Nicaraguan situa- influence substantive policy changes.
tion remains irreconcilable without a Direct US military intervention against
major policy shift by the participants. A Nicaragua is out of the ques$on, short of
decisive militaf~ victory by one side or the an outrageous Sandinista blunder such as
other will not reconcile these differences a massive armed invasion of Hondu as.
unless accompanied by genuine democ- While the Contadora process ha~ made
racy as understood in the Western World. some progress, its fundamental objective,

.
 NICARAGUA

a diplomatic solution to regional security, agreement for peace in the region remains
remains elusive at best. The group has questionable, especially with the growing
succeeded in defining the issues inherent Soviet and Cuban presence in Nicara-
in regional stabilization and initiating a gua.w In the near term, it ie likely that the
dialogue in which grievances have been United Statee will continue to support the
aired, but Nicar~guas expanding offen- armed democratic resistance in the hope
sive military capability has increased the that, in combination with economic eanc-
apprehension of its Central American tions and a strong US military training
neighbors and hardened Reagan adminis- support for Honduras, these measures will
tration policy. compel the Sandinistas to seek a negoti-
Whether renewed negotiations can ated settlement and adopt a more pluralis-
reduce tensions and bring about a lasting tic political system. ~

NOTES
7 PhtllPP. Boum.amad Ham HorIg, N(cx.@ua The Revolu!>o Nuw.guan knmcrcm RLIWIWC., of[,cb of the Asststan!Swre!w
my OPtm., , Revolubon m Ce.1r81.4nmnca edwd by Slanlord C.n!ml for l.twn,wum.l $erj.rly A1lmmI I.lw.mnocm.. RowOnl, WiIshlnQto,
Amen.. Am(on Network John A1!holl,.1 .! Westwew Pws% 80163,, D C A!Jnl19S6
Cd. 1083 !)0 438.37 19 Joan. Om.n!J, Lall Peace Tt31kMove Ve!060, The WaShfglo
2 J... M D.t Agurl.. Cen!td AI!wra.an V.rnerablhty to SOVIW Post, 16 Febmaw 1885. P =5
Cuba. P.netra!,o., Joum81.! fnter.mencan Sfuoms..0 WoIIdAfl.w$ 20 Edward C-cdy,%andl.i$t. T.dux Hem I. Contras. 7h. W.$h!np
Summer 1985..797 m Post, 8 DecemLMr~005
3 Gsb!iel i.iarcetl., Dofe$e .1 the Western Hcm(9Phere Slrat09y 2% J..... Omahg, Cubans FtghlingConlrns Huh1.10,, The wash.
10,tiw 1993s, Jomel of lnteremwlcm Stud#es.9.3 WOf7dAHWS, fell mgfo PM, 7 Dacmnber1985
1985,$.2 22 Cc+ Op c~t
4 Ashley J TWI., Whe G6QF.2!1rcalSlakes 1. Central AnmrtcanC.- 23 Joseph Culr.ms,, Arms 800 the Confrss, Neiv.wesk, 10 FeIxu.
,,,. , SWatmlc Revmw. Fall ?9S5.047 q 1988, P 53
5 fb(ti, iAS 24 D.. F@Skmnonm Contra SCIIWIC.9m Ncnmg.. Washinglmt
6 Ibd l.a.tmr. $0 Jan.arj ?986
7 (b(d, @51 25 Wh.9@.X!t. Economic Leases From Contra A!laCk$3,Fmffg
S The Mllltmy Beta..., 19S5. ~Q88, The !nlor..!mnal 1.s1,!.1. !., Broaac.st !nfommucmSem,co D@ R.porf, 23 January 19S4 P 27
S!rateg,cStems, !s7.6.., E.g, Autumn1SS5,0152 2s Canmw.q.e W@ B.WC Agreemml$ Doc.men! sfmeci by un$l.d
9 The SOw.t. Cuban Cu.necuon m central Amen.. ma the Cenb. Ncw.sgud Omm$ttr. Ior,dors Ado!!o Cal.ro, Alto.,. 170bdo &ci
D..., Depwlmen! of S1.1. a.e DepWIme.t .! 0.1.3.s., Washmgt.an. Arim J Cmz. 29 May %986. M,am, l%
D C..MarciI79S5,002223 27 Sanchez, 0,0 Clt P 22
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74 Ib!d 32 10$0
15 Ch8!OIXIerDickey, tWth the Contras A l%ofler ! the W,Ids O! 33 Jtrt Valenla Ntc.mg.a Sovmt.C.ban Paw. or Non A1tgImd
Ntcareg.a, Sm.& Sch,ler, N Y $9S5 P118 CCWIIV? Jorn# of lteremermm Stud,., .0 World .411.!rs Felt
16 Ibla p$.89.91 1985. P ?71
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>
/- Colonel Wdlaam A. Depalo Jr. IS a brigade.
[euel command dewgnee awmtmg asmgnmcnt to
the 4th PsychoIogica[ Operatmns Group, Fort
Bragg, North (!arolma He recetved a B.S. from
New Me.rIco State UnuxrsLty and an MA from
the UnLuerscty of Oklahoma and IS a graduate of
the USACGSC and the Inter-A mwlcnn Defense
College. He has served as an instructor, Depart.
ment of Tact=s, US Army Command and Gen.
end Staff College, Fort Leaven worth, Ka IMaS,
A and as commander, 1st Battalion lMeckantzed),
10th Infantry, 4th In fantv Dwcslon (Mccha.
n tied), Fort Carson, Colorado.
/

MILITAFIY REVIEW August 1986 41