ADOPTION

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen,
Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25
years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her
husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the
word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring
and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption,
is likewise silent on the matter.
 Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos.
She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by
her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

ISSUE: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother.

RULING: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s)
of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

LAHOM VS SIBULO, G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name
Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI). These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was
already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.

RULING: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing
at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that
Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute
may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying
him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.