White Light Corporation vs City of Manila relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist &
Development Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On
December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of
Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid
and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist
from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise
of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.
However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners
of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street,
a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open
Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed for
a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition
of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA question
the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St.
then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority
to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of
the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate
one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as
a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA
7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and
not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is
merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is
illegal.
MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion
problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating
the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing
transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR
and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the
different transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for
the project.
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion
in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had recommended a plan
to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilitieswhich plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport
System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and
policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037
expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the
different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas,
the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares
of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was
poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing,
all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the
pretext of traffic regulation. This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure
of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A.
No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services
including those of transport and traffic management.
ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional
HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized
to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific
grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the
MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its
efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These
efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation
of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law,
however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the primary policy,
planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative
entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications
which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with
Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957
(Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3
subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration
of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered
into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed
commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of
the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards,
signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009,
whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island,
posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA,
MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of
advertisement.
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and
exterior structures of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to
develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income
therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the
MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of
the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material
to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for advertising
services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising,
Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks right to install
the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The
latters right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no
power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and
other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of
billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but
MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government
and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does
not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00
for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved
said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since
it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of
police power under the general welfare clause.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which
was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo
et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
PASEI vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386
Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department
Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the
character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills," and that it is violative of the right to travel. It
was likewise held to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." In addition, it
was contended that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior
consultations. It was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause,
in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the
Order be further enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should
be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers, "but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD151 SCRA 208
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators
adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%)
of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province,
and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is
collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by
the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline
in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting
in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability
of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of
the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the
flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question
that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought
about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors
permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Republic v. MERALCO (G.R. No. 141314)
Facts:
Respondent (MERALCO) filed with the Petitioner (ERB) an application for the revision
of its rate schedules to reflect an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt hour
(kwh) in its distribution charge. Petitioner granted a provisional increase of P0.184 per
kwh, subject to the condition that should the COA thru its audit report find Respondent
is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the latters
customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor
for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. The COA submitted its
Audit Report to which Petitioner adopting its recommendation, authorized Respondent
to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017 per kwh, and ordered
that the provisional increase granted is superseded and modified and the excess
average amount be refunded to Respondents customers or correspondingly credited
in their favor for future consumption. Petitioner also adopted the recommendation of
COA that income tax should not be treated as operating expense and in applying the
net average investment method as the computation of the rate base. On appeal, the
CA set aside the ERB decision. Petitioners filed separate motions for reconsideration
but were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is
valid.
Ruling:
We grant the petition.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public
utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose
and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject
to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation
may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property
is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against
arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services
rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to
prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return
on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair
return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and
one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and
reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
The ERB was created under Executive Order No. 172 to regulate, among others, the
distribution of energy resources and to fix rates to be charged by public utilities involved
in the distribution of electricity. In the fixing of rates, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. It has been held that even in the absence of an
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. What is a
just and reasonable rate is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good
sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be
confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate is
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are GRANTED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. Respondent MERALCO is authorized
to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kilowatt hour, effective with
respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance
with the decision of the ERB dated February 16, 1998, the excess average amount of
P0.167 per kilowatt hour starting with the applicants billing cycles beginning February
1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCOs customers or correspondingly credited
in their favor for future consumption.