INSEARCHOFINTUITIVEKNOWLEDGE:

ACOMPARISONOF
EASTERNANDWESTERNEPISTEMOLOGY

ArunjitGill
M.Ed.,SimonFraserUniversity,2001

DISSERTATIONSUBMITTEDINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOF
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DOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY

Inthe
Faculty
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OArunjitGill2006
SIMONFRASERUNIVERSITY
Summer,2006

Allrightsreserved.Thisworkmaynotbe
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 APPROVAL

Name: ArunjitGill

Degree: DoctorofPhilosophy

InSearchofIntuitiveKnowledge:
TitleofDissertation: AComparisonofEasternandWestern
Epistemology

ExaminingCommittee:
Chair: Dr.MichaelLing
Lecturer,Professor,SimonFraserUniversity
Dr.ManMacKinnon
SeniorSupervisor
Professor,SimonFraserUniversity
Dr.PaulShaker
Supervisor
DeanandProfessor,SimonFraserUniversity
Dr.HeesoonBai
InternalExaminer
Professor,SimonFraserUniversity
Dr.KarenMeyer
ExternalExaminer
AssociateProfessor
FacultyofEducation,UniversityofBritishColumbia

DateApproved: &. /8&

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 ABSTRACT

Inthisthesis,IdiscussthebasicpostulatesofIndianschoolsofepistemology
with the inherent purpose of highlighting certain axiological contributions for the
benefitoftheIndoCanadiancommunityintheLowerMainlandofBritishColumbia.
ItismysincerebeliefthatanexaminationoftheirIndianhistoricalrootswillincline
themtolookbackattheirsacredpastandfavorahealthylifestyle.Sofartherehas
neverbeenadiscussionoftheinterpretative,evaluativeandacademicimplicationsof
Indianphilosophyinthecommunitysettingforobviousreasons,enamoredaswehave
beenofeverythingWestern.Inexaminingtheabilitytoknowandtoconceivereality,
valuesarealsohscussedtoclarifytheirroleinournotionsofintuition.Important
Western as well as influential Eastern philosophical works by Descartes, Locke, and
Radhakrishnan, will be analyzed. The distinction that sets Indian epistemology apart,
sufficetosay,isitscomprehensivenesswhichembracesmanytenantssuch asspirituality
andselfrealization, all whichareintrinsically linkedandinseparable. Itisduetothe
importantnatureoftheirrelevancetoanycommunityfacingtheillsofthemodernday
that this thesis introduces intuitive knowledge and considers an integration of
epistemologyandaxiologyasapossiblesolution.Asthedemandforknowledgesolutions
becomesgreatereveryday,thequestionofitsphilosophicalsynthesisgainsmorecurrency
intermsofhowbesttoliveourlife.

Keywords:
Intuition,Easternepistemology,philosophyandreligionineducation
 DEDICATION

Forour Dadji, BalramGill,whohasraisedthreechildrenasboth"fatherand

mother"afterthedepartureofGurbuxKaurGill.Thankyouforinstillinginusthetrue
valuesofhardwork,honestlyandbenevolence.Withoutyourguidance,wewouldnot
havebeenabletoclaimsuccessf?omtheterribleafflictionwhichhasclaimedothersin
our community. With heartfelt love, admiration, and respect f?om your loving son.
ShalleneandIaspiretoinstilthesamevaluesinourboys:AjayandArvin.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

WithdeepestthankstoProfessorMacKinnonforunderstandingthedifficultyof

balancingfamilylife,workandacademiaandtherebyextendingthegreatestof
flexibilityandassistanceinthewritingofthisdissertation.
 PROLOGUE

MychoicetowriteintheaforementionedmannerthatIdoistoaddressanurge.
WhilewritingmydissertationIhitapointwhereIwasbecomingintriguedbypeoplein
the IndoCanadian community who had unearthed their true calling and were either
writingstoriesoftheirlifeoronimportantsocialissues.Ineededtoprovidedirectionto
where my thesis was heading, and wanted to ensure that when the ending came it
wouldn't be shallow. It must be something unique, distinct and contributory to the
community.Thus,whenIsawandreadaboutthosewhofoughttheseductionofmoney,
thegloryofgunswithitspowerfulallure,Irelated,understoodandknewwhathadtobe

done.IwasoutofworkwhenIwasmuchyoungerandalsothoughtatthattimethatI
couldhave"hustledup an easylife.Butthenoften,thereweretimeswhenIwasn't
sureifIcould.Fortunately,Ididn't.Thereweremanyotherswhobrokeawayfiomthe
chorustolearnthesoundoftheirownvoice.Nothingseemsbravertomethansetting
onajourneyandfilteringoutthechatterthattellsustobesomeonewe'renot,and
insteadlistentoone'sinnervoice.

I decidedonthesimplestapproachpossiblewhenembarkingonmyresearch.I
would address my topic by reading whatever intrigued me, trusting my intuition;
allowingmyinnervoicetoprovidesomeleads.Ihadnoideathatstickingtothissimple
methodwouldsoontakemetosomuchliterature,andfardeeperintophilosophical

speculationthanI'devergoneasaresearcher.Havingreviewedhundredsofbooks
andspendingcountlesshoursatthelibrary,IsoonrealizedIwasnoexpertonhowto
govi
aboutarticulatingmyfromtheheartresearch. I hadbeenhumbledintoadmittingI knew
nothing,andwascontinuouslyhumbledtime andtime againbythesegreatWesternand
Easternphilosophersandthewisdomtheyseemedtoradiate sonaturallyintheirwriting,

Ilearnedmuchonthemultiplicityofintuitivethought -"Here'swhatthispersonsays,
inasimilarsituation....".Inafewinstances,whenIsensedmyownpassivitywas
inappropriatelytakingawrongturn1triedtoguidemyselfbyremindingmyselfof
mycomprehensiveexaminationquestions.Ididn'thandleallthesedecisionsperfectly
andonlyrevealthesemomentsnowtoshowmyownfallibility.

Manyoftheclassicalphilosophersposedagreatmanyquestionsthathelpedsteer
my research. The majority of these questions were of the rhetorical, merely
intellectuaYdevi17sadvocatetypebutweredifficultandchallengingtoaddress.There
werescreaminglyobviousquestions,butitseemedthattheywerealmostsoobviousthat
Ihadn'tlearnedtocorrectlyanswerthem,asiftheanswersshouldbeobvioustoo,which

they'reweren't.Ifoundthatthebiggestobstacletoansweringthequestionthisthesis
posesthoughrecognizingthepossibilityoftheroleofintuitiveknowledge,peopledo
not"live"it.
Thisthesisdoesnotresearchthehistoryofthequestion,"howweknowwhatwe
know". Ididn't quoteallthegreatphilosophers,EastandWest,whospecifically

articulatedaboutinnateknowledge,nordldIignorethemiftheydidn't.Mybiggestcoup
washowmyfatherfoldedintomyresearchandhelpedasanexpertresourcelreferencein
addressingquestionsrelatedtoIndianepistemology.Hisresponseandadvicehasalways
beento"followyourheart".Writingthisresearchhadn'tcomeeasilyforme.I'vebecome
veryprotectiveofmymethodologicalstylesinceIwasoncesoafiaidthat
vii
"writingfromtheheart"wasincompatiblewithbeingadoctoralstudent.Forthelast
twoyears,thisfearhadstoppedmekornmixingthetwo.It'safardifferentpaperkorn
whatIoriginallyenvisioned.ItreflectswhatIfeltwasworthwritingwithlittleregard
to be inclusive of all viewpoints. I didn't consider writing about any particular
philosopherunlessIhadreadatleasttenortwelvebooksonhim,allweremen.This
itselfwasnoguaranteeforinclusionasevenbythenthemeaningoftheirwritingwas
justbeginningtoshowitself.NowhereisthismoreapparentthaninthewayI've
arrangedtheepistemologicalbeliefs.SincemymethodconveyshowI'msuggesting
wethinkaboutintuitiveknowledge,anexplanationisthereforenecessary.

Thisthesisdoesn'tfollowaconventionaloutline.ItseemedthateveryweekI
sketchedoutanotherscenarioforgroupingthesephilosophers'views.Mosthadfair
claimtoseveralschoolsofthought,whilemanyneverfit.Itwasalwaysclearthatthe
benefitsofcategorizationwereoutweighedbytheharmincompartmentalizinga
RomanisedtermorSanskritconceptforeaseofstructuringmypaper,e.g. tabula
rasa,
parusarthas,etc.

Nevertheless,Icouldn'tshaketheurgetotamethequestionbyshacklingitwith
someorderlyform.Intheend,thehumansoulresistedtaxonomy.Whatnourishesone
personmayharmanother.Irecognizedthatmyurgetoclassifywasanattempttomake
thisjourneyeasyorquick,andtostriveforsimplificationdemonstratedhubrisonmypart
andalackofappreciationfortheintuitiverouteIshouldtake.AndonceI'drecognized
that,Ifinallyfoundtherightarrangement.Philosophershaveallsortsofphilosophical
stumblingblocksthatkeepthemkornproviding all thesoughtafteranswers.Sothis
dissertationisnotsolelyorganizedbyageographicalworldvieworbyaphilosophical

.. .
Vlll
schoolofthought,ratheritisaflowfromoneworldviewtoanother.Itusesthemesto
demonstratemisunderstandingsandshortcomings,andshowshowphilosophershave
confronted them orhavegottenpast them.It'snotmeant tobereadoutoforder,
though there's no harm in that. It is meant to build on each other. Ideas and
terminology brought up earlier and invoked subsequently is meant to resemble a
rollingconversation,butoneinwhichtheideasarecontinuallyreinedinbydogged
reality.Whenpeopleheardmythesis'title,themostcommonquestionI'dgetasked
was,"Soyourpaper'saboutknowledge?"Myresponsewouldbetowarnthemnotto
gettrappedbysemanticsandanswer,"It'saboutbeinghonestwithoneself'.
 TABLEOFCONTENTS
..
Approval............................................................................................................................................................u
...
Abstract........................................................................................................................................................111
Dedication.................................................................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................v
Prologue.....................................................................................................................................................vi
TableofContents....................................................................................................................................x
PARTONE-EASTERNPHILOSOPHY.................................................1
Introduction...............................................................................................................................1
Outline.............................................................................................................................................................3
Method......................................................................................................................................... 5
AimofPhilosophy.....................................................................................................................9
Intuition.......................................................................................................................................13
OverviewofIndianKnowledge...............................................................................................18
BasisofKnowledgeinIndia....................................................................................................22
AimofKnowledgeinIndia......................................................................................................32
ClassificationofKnowledge....................................................................................................36
TheSixSchoolsofThought.....................................................................................................39
Summary..................................................................................................................................50
RadhakrishnanandtheDoctrineofIntuition..........................................................................54
Radhakrishnan'sPhilosophyofMind...................................................................................67
PARTTWO.WESTERNPHILOSOPHY.....................................................................................69
Introduction............................................................................................................................69
IntuitiveKnowledgeintheWest.........................................................................................71
TheBasisofKnowledge...........................................................................................................72
ClassicalWestemEpistemology............................................................................................75
ModernWestemEpistemology................................................................................................78
DescartesandtheDoctrineofIntuition...................................................................................80
Descartes'PhilosophyofMind...............................................................................................87
LockeandtheDoctrineofIntuition.........................................................................................92
Locke'sPhilosophyofMind...................................................................................................101
FoundationofaTranscendentalTheory................................................................................106
APossibleIntegration...........................................................................................................110
PARTTHREE.ANEWTHEORYOFINTUITrVEKNOWLEDGE.............114
RevisitingPhilosophicalUnderpinnings......................................................................114
PhenomenologyAspect.........................................................................................................................120
PhenomenologicalReduction......................................................................................................124
GeneticEpistemology........................................................................................................................... 127
AnalyticalPhilosophy..............................................................................................................................138
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................151
..........................................................................................
3.7 FurtherResearch 157
3.8 DiscussionoftheLocalProblem............................................................................................159
3.9 ContemporaryApplicationofIndianPhilosophy..................................................................163
Epilogue...................................................................................................................................................169
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................170
 PARTONE-EASTERNPHILOSOPHY

1.1 Introduction

MythesisiswrittenwiththedesiretosynergizetheidealsofEasternthoughtwith
thoseoftheempiricaltemperamentoftheWest.Itsmainpurposeistodeterminehow
EasternphilosophymightextendandcontributetoWesternnotionsaboutknowledge.
ThepursuitofknowledgeinIndiaisnotascienceofascertainingfactsbutanidealquest
of values that develops under the conviction that the basic aim of knowledge is to
cultivateaholisticviewofhumanbeings,thecosmosandUltimateReality.Thispaper's
emphasisistorecognize,highlightandcomparetheaspectsvaluedinIndianthoughtwith

thoseoftheWest.Intuitionanditsrole as asourceofknowledgeisexploredfrom
variousperspectiveswithanaimindemonstratingthattherootsofourknowledgelie
inwhatweinnatelypossess.

WhatemergesisacomparisonofIndianandWesternvaluesofknowledgethat
attempts to bring to light the core of "the problem". In the West, empiricism and
rationalismaregenerally"recognized"sourcesofknowledge,whereasintuitionismisn't.
Western epistemology emphasizes scientific principles and shows great regard for
methodology which is measurable and demonstrable, unlike intuition. Indian
epistemology,ontheotherhand,notonlyrecognizesourinnatesenseofknowing,our
innerconsciousnessandspiritualcomponent,butmoreimportantlyconsidersitthebasis
ofknowledge.AddressingthisproblemwillbringahostofotherIndianviewsintoplay:
whatistheaimofknowledge,howisitacquiredandhowdowejudgeitsvalidity.These
questionsshouldevokethesenseofvaluesthatweassigntothemeansofknowing.
Thequestionofvaluesisinevitableinthiscontext.Itprovidesthefoundationtohelp
usdeterminetheaimandobjectiveofourphilosophy.Ourknowledgeandhowwe
perceiveithelpsusprepareforlifeandgivesusmeaningandpurpose.

IndianphilosophyisrootedinIndianculture.ThebasiccharacteristicofIndian
cultureisanintegratedapproachnotonlytoknowledgebuttolife.Themicrocosmand
macrocosmhavebeeninterpretedidenticallywithaneyeontotality,thusincorporating
all aspects:themental,physicalandspiritual.Indianphilosophyofknowledgeisa
happy synthesisofidealismandpragmatism,unityanddiversity.Whilelayingemphasis
uponindividualityandselfrealization,Indianschoolsatthesametimehaverecognized
thevalueofpluralityandcommunalobligationasequallyimportantexpressions(Bishop,
1975,p.17).Thishasbeenreflectedinspecificidealsstrivedforandformsthebasis

which underlies life, which is never left out of sight, and in the ultimate analysis is
regardedasparamount.Thedifficultythatliesinpreservingaunitybetweenthespiritual
andpracticalpointofviewisbasedultimatelyonvalues.Henceitisregardedasessential
thatapupil'slifeshouldbelivedinanenvironmentpermeatedbyworthyideals.Sucha
philosophyofintegratingtheaims,curriculum,teachingmethods,andpracticeofself
realizationhasbeenadvancedinmoderntimesbySwamiVivekananda,SriAurobindo,
SwamiDayananada,M.K.Gandhi,RabindranathTagore,andSarvapalliRadhakrishnan
(Yvas, 1982, p. XIII). These contemporary Indian educational philosophers have
presentedtheancientwineofwisdominnewbottlesintheformoftheirphilosophiesof
knowledge.Theyopenlyswearbytheancientscripturesanddeveloptheirideasonits
foundationsbyinterpretingtheoldprinciplesinthelightofnew
knowledgeandinthecontextofthecurrentage.Mytaskistoanswer"howweknow
what we know" by searching through the annals of ancient Indian philosophy and
determine how the role of intuition can enrich and contribute to Western notions of
knowledge.Itishopedthatthefollowingworksetsouttoexemplifyjustwhatitmeansto

livealifeofharmony,andhowforthemany"apnas ", itispossibletodosoina

worldofcontradictions.

1.2 Outline

ThefirstpartofmythesisisdevotedtothetaskoftheaimsofphilosophyinIndia
andtheWest.Chapter1dealswithhowtheIndianphilosophyofknowledgehasevolved
fiomthephilosophyoflifeasitsbasis.Theseaimsspringoutofthefoundationslaid
down by the sacred books of Indian thought and have either inspired indirectly or
contributeddirectlytotheevolutionofIndianepistemology(Muller,2004,p.214).Hindu
knowledge(samyakjnana),lifestyle(samyakchan'ta),andworldview(samyakdarsana)
areanalyzedthroughvarioussubsets.Thecoreprinciplesofknowledge,thepathIndians
followtoliveuptotheseprinciplesisexplored.Thus,anunderstandingandhistorical
accountofclassicalIndianphilosophyisanecessarypreludetoanunderstandingofthe

Indianworldview.Thechapterprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewofprinciples,which,
admittedly,onemayfindsomewhatunconventionalandthereforecontentious.Theyare
offered,however,inthetypicalIndianspiritofanekantavada(acceptanceofmultiple
viewpoints),whichemphasizesinclusivenessandtoleranceofdifferingsystemsof
thought(Bishop,1975,p.3).This,however,mustnotbeconstruedinanywayotherthan

asanattempttoencourage anunderstandingandactiveongoinginquiryintoIndian
viewsofknowledge.Thenextchaptertacklestheroleofourintuitiveorsubconscious
knowledge in Hindu epistemology that considers logic, perception, inference,
analogy,andscripturesalongwithintuitionasmeremechanismsthroughwhichwe
gainknowledge.ThespecialcharacteristicoftheseIndiantheoriesasdistinguished
komthoseoftheWestisthatthoughthesedifferentschoolsexpressadiversityof
views,allstillpresentamarkofunity;aholisticandintegratedoutlook.Thepointof
agreement among the differentschoolsbecomesevident by thefact that all these
"systems" regard knowledge as a practical necessity and cultivate it in order to
understandhowlifecanbebestled.

Inthesecondpart,Iproposewhatmaybeconsideredacritiqueofthetwomain
sourcesofknowledgeintheWest:empiricismandrationalism.Usinginnateknowledge
asareference,thispaperwillseektoexaminethenatureofthesetheoriesandtherelation
inwhichtheystandtoeachotherandhighlightaspectsthathavebeenoverlooked.Thus,
myinquiryintothefactsandstateofaffairsofthesetwoprevalentschoolsofWestern
epistemologicalthought,thathavelongbeenengagedinaphilosophicaldebate,provides
a background for a new view of knowledge. The construction of a metatheory of
intuition(viaanintegratedphilosophyofknowledgesynthesizedfromIndianidealsand

Western concepts) is undertaken in the third part of the thesis. That philosophy, the
integrationofthedynamicaspectofmetaphysicsandaxiology,theidealisticrelationthat
has always existed between philosophy and knowledge in India, is expounded. This
alternativeviewofintuitiveknowledgehasbeenextractedkomthevariousschoolsof
WesternthoughtandkamestheHindutheory.InassessingtheroleofintuitioninIndian
and Western epistemology, I propose a comparative approach as the most satisfylug
methodindevisingananalyticschemeforunderstandinghowintuitionshapesourlives.
1.3 Method

Therearepotentialbenefitsandrisksofinterpretingthephilosophyofoneculture
through another. In the West, there are clearly demarcated realistic, naturalistic, and
pragmaticphilosophiesofeducation,whereasintheEastthesituationisquitedifferent.
Indiadoesnothaveaneducationalphilosophythatisaseparateintellectualdiscipline.

IndianphilosophydiscussesthedifferentproblemsofMetaphysics,Ethics,Logic,
Psychology,andEpistemology,butgenerallydoesnotdiscussthemseparately.Every
problem is discussed by the Indian philosopher f?om all possible approaches,
metaphysical,ethical,logical,psychologicalandepistemological.(Chatterjee,1950,
p.3)

IndianandWesternphilosophicaltraditionsaresodiversethatitmakeshavingto
determinewhichstartingpointandwhichmethodasthemostadequateforsolvinga
particular problem very difficult. A comparative thesis of Eastern and Western
epistemologynevertheless,hasgreatpotentialities.Bycomparingourselveswithothers,
the critique eventually becomes a critique of ourselves. Such a critique involves the
discoveryofwhathasbeenmissed,whathasbeenoveremphasized,andwhatmayhave
beenincorrectly posited. ORenweareintrigued byanewview ofreality, butifthe
approachandmethodisinappropriatetothatreality,wetendtodiscredititandexplainit
away.Havingexplaineditawayorsubstitutedsomethingelseforit,wefindourselvesat
animpassetoexplaincertainexperiencesthatdependontheformerreality.

AcomparisonofIndianepistemology,whichhasanidealisticandspiritual approach,
maybequitealientotheWesternviewpoint.Primafaciethistaskmayappear

tobedifficultandundesirableforvariousreasons,butonecanarriveatsignificant
conclusionswhichwillopennewvistasinthephilosophicalandsociologicalsceneasit
enablesonetoseewhatislivingandwhatisdeadinone'sowntradition.Suchan
enterprisemaynotsuitthespiritofthemoderndaywhichseekstoidentifythelogic
inothersystems.Lifeinthe presenteraisdominatedbywhatiscalledscientific
temper which gradually hses skepticism in the minds of the present day younger
generation(Prajnanananda,1973,p.5).Theproblemofthisminoritygroupisofgreat
importance because their behavior and that of the majority may be diametrically
oppositetoeachotherresultingintensionandexploitation.Todaytheminoritygroup
isstrivinghardtostrengthentheirwronglysupposedweakposition,andevertryingto
extractconcessionsfiomthemajorityintheformofvicebehavior.Becauseofcertain
prejudices,maliceandhostilityariseinbothgroupswitheachsidereachingcertain
judgmentsabouttheotherwithoutduereasoning.Howdoesprejudicearise?Itdoes
notspringupallofasudden.Itsrootisdeeplyembeddedfiomparticularexperiences.
Certainprejudicescropupbecauseofbadconditionsandparentalattitudes.Bythe
time children become adults their behavior has become a mirror of their parents,
teachersandothersaroundtheminsociety.Prejudicesoftheyoungcan betracedto
theirupbringing.Prejudicesarelearnt.Therefore,theymayalsobeforgotten.

Oneshouldnotdocomparisonjustforintellectualcuriosity,butforapurposeand
to be critical. Thus, while advocating intuition, one of India's greatest philosopher,
SarvepalliRadhakrishnan'stheorywillbecriticized,otherwiseonecannotknowwhether
itstenantsareonesidedordeterminewhatislacking.Whatislackingmaybefoundin
the culture of the other. Comparisons often reveal valuable principles or ignored
consistencies.AcomparisonofEasternandWesternphilosophycanresultinan
integratedglobalphilosophyandberecognizedasanimportantactivityinwhichtheEast
andWestcanbesttrytounderstandeachotherinvariousways. Acomparativestudy
ofphilosophiesprovidesuswithsomecluesinregardtothenatureofhumanvalues
whichareofparamountimportancetotheentirehumanrace.

Thoughacomparisonofphilosophiesisausefulexercise,therearethosewhomay
argue that it is impossible and undesirable. How can Eastern philosophy, i.e. Indian
epistemology,whichisspiritualinessence,becomparedwithWesternphilosophywhich
issecular?TosaythatsuchacomparisonbetweenEastandWestisnotpossibleamounts
tosayingthatwecannotunderstandeachother.Forexample,onemaycompareSpinoza's
conceptionofsubstancewithSankara'sBrahman.Itistrue,thereisanoticeabledifference
between the methods of these two philosophers. Spinoza's substance, like Sankara's
Brahman, transcends discursive thought. However, Spinoza failed to recognize the
inconsistencythatresultswhenmakinganattempttodeducetheempiricalworldfrom
whattranscendsourdiscursivethought.Inaddition,Spinozaassignsaveryimportantrole
tothemethodofdeductioninhisphilosophicalsystem.Onthecontrary,Sankaradidnot
thinkofdeductionasalegitimatemethod."Hismethodisdialectical,makinguseofthe
principle ofnoncontradiction" (Raju,1935,p.98).Sankara'smethodshouldbemore
appropriatelycomparedwiththatmethodofBradley's.Eventhiscomparisonmaynot
appear all that legitimate as Sankara's method has negative significance whereas the
methodofBradleyhaspositivesignificance(Yvas,1982,p.68).Therefore,oneshould
notdocomparisonjustforcomparisonsake.Comparisonshouldbebetweensystemand
system, but not between concept and concept. Eastern philosophers are often
characterized as intuitive, spiritual, mystical, and introversive while their Western
counterpartsaresaidtoberational,materialistic,and
extroversive.Thisdifferentiationisnotacceptedbyoneandallsinceitgoesagainst
theavailablefact;thereareWesternphilosophiesthatmirrorIndianidealismandits
rich religious culture as there are many Indian perspectives that are reflect the
pragmaticphilosophiesoftheWest(Herman,1976,p.178).Mutualunderstandingis
thefnststeptowardsacomparativeanalysis.

As with many older civilizations, much of India's varied and rich

epistemologicalhistoryhasbeencaptured indetailedoraltraditionandacombination
oflore,extanttexts,andreferencescitedfromearlyVedicliteratureandscriptures
(Dalvi,2004,p.95).Conclusionsdrawnfromsuchsourcescan beveryconfusing.Due
tothecloseintertwiningrelationshipbetweenphilosophyandreligion,aconcentrated
effort is madetoseparatethetwotherebyprovidingasecularthesispalatablefora
Westernaudience.InorderforustotrulyviewIndianknowledge inmodernlight,we
needtofirstlyexcavatethefoundationsofitsreligiouscultureinordertodiscoverthe
abidingelementsinit.Secondly,havingsecuredtheabidingelements,wehaveto
buildonthemafirmandimposingstructurewhilepreservingthelivingelementsof
itsancientculture,andreconditionthemtosuitethedemandsofthemodernage.

Differentculturesadvocatedifferenttradition,standardsandvaluesoflife,orthe
sametraditionmayupholddifferentstandardsanddifferentvaluesoflifeatdifferent
periodsofhistory.Whatevermaybethecase,theultimateaimofallphilosophiesisto
digintothenatureoflife.Thediggingmaybedonefromdifferentdirections,orfromthe
samedirection withdifferenttools.Thetaskofacomparative analysis istofindthe
significanceofboththesimilaritiesanddifferencesinresultsaswellasmethodsseenin
varioustraditionsandhighlightthemandtheirrelevancetohumanlife.
1.4 AimofPhilosophy

AcomparativeanalysisofEasternandWesternepistemologywillbeclearerby
aninitialdiscussionoftheaimofphilosophy.Literallyspeaking,theword"philosophy"
involvestwoGreekwordsphilo meaningloveandsophiameaningwisdom '.Inits
originalmeaning,philosophy,asa"loveofwisdomisrightfbllyinterpretedinthesense
of those who are lovers of the vision of truth" (Jowett, 1988, p. 485). With Indian
philosophy,the"finalaimisnotonlytheloveofwisdom,butthelifeofwisdom"(Raju,

1971.p.XIII).Initsoriginalmeaning,philosophy,asaloveofwisdom,actuallycomes
nearesttotheSanskritwordJuyasa,adesiretoknow,ifnotadesiretobewise(Muller,
2004,p.213).Thus,themorethephilosophertriestoknow,thenearertheycometosome
basicprincipleofexperience,whichtheyapplyandpracticeintheirownlife.Therefore,
philosophyresultsinaction.Deweyremarked,"Whenever,philosophyhasbeentaken
seriously,ithasalwaysbeenassumedthatitsignifiedachievingawisdomwhichwould
influence the conduct of life. Witness the fact that almost all ancient schools of
philosophywerealsoorganizedwaysofliving..."(Dewey,1953,p.378).Philosophyhas
adirectandmostintimatedrelationshipwiththeoutlookonlife.Itleadstoadoptinga
wayoflifewhichwouldleadtoadistinctandwellsoughtgoal.Inthisway,philosophy
resultsintheadoptionofacertaindefiniteanddesiredwayoflife.Ifapersonhasa
philosophyoflife,itbecomesofsomeusetothem. A certainbeliefaboutlifeisnot
merelyanacademicmatter,butanexamplewhichcouldenlightenandredeemaperson
ftomgettinglostinaquandary.
 If we consider philosophy as an examination of our means of knowledge
(epistemology)oraswithKantasaninquiryintothelimitsofhumanknowledge,then
theIndiantermdarsanaisappropriate(Muller,2004,p.213). However,theIndian
conceptionofadarsanaisdifferentfiomthewesternideaofasystemofphilosophyin

thewayitistermedandextended.WhileWesternepistemologymaybeunderstoodto be
anexaminationofourknowledge,Indianepistemologytakesitastepfurtherandaddsto
ittheexperiencesofpersonsofclearermindsandpurerheartstreatingthemashuman

witnessestothetruth,oftheAbsolute.Therefore, darsana meansdirectknowledgeof

reality,ofadirectexperienceofBrahmanorintuitionofAtman,thatwhichresidesinus

andtranscendsthecategoriesoftime,spaceandcausationknownasnescience(Yvas,
1982,p.71).

Darsanaisaspiritualperception,awholeviewrevealedtothesoulsense.
Thissoulsight,whichispossible,onlywhenandhowphilosophyislived,is
thedistinguishedmarkofatruephilosopher.Darsanaisputtingtheintuition
toproofandpropagatingitlogically.(Radhakrishnan,1999,P.44)

Inthisregard,theWesterndefinitionofinquirydiffersfiomtheIndianoneofconduct.
However,onemustbecarehlnottocharacterizeIndianphilosophyassolelypractical

andWesternphilosophyastheoretical.Thisisincorrect.Thestatementthatphilosophyis
"love of wisdom" is also misrepresented. Greek philosophers were never merely
interested in transmitting "love of wisdom", they also bequeathed well defined
philosophical doctrines as is the case with Indian philosophy. The philosophies of
Socrates,PlatoandAristotlewerepracticeorientedastheywereintendedtodevelopthe
doctrinesofpolitical,ethicalandsocialaction.Wesimplycannotbrandaphilosophical
traditiontheoreticalorpracticalwithoutunderstandingthecontextonwhichtheseterms
areusedindifferentrealms.Ifwefailtonoticethisfact,theresultisthe"fallacyof
misplacedcomparisons"(Raju,1970,p.66).
ThedifferentdarsanasofIndiantraditionhavepresenteddifferentviewsabout
thenatureoftruth.Truthisoneviewthatdiffersfiomonedarsanatoanother.Thus,

there is a broad division of Indian philosophical systems into groups. A stnking

differencebetweenWesternandIndianphilosophyisthatwhereasintheformerwe
generally find different schools coming into existence successively, each school
becomingprominentandsucceededbyanotherone.Ofthelatter,ontheotherhand,
differentschoolssprangupsimultaneously;theyflourishedtogetherduringmany
centuriesandpursuedparallelcoursesofgrowth.Theprimaryreasonforsuchastateof
affairslayinthefactthatinIndiaphilosophywasapartoflife. Assoonasasystem
cameintoexistence,itwaspracticallyadoptedasawayoflifebyabandoffollowers
who formedaschoolofthatphilosophy.Theyactuallylivedthephtlosophyand
transmittedittosubsequentgenerationsoffollowers,whowereattractedtowardsthem
throughtheirconduct.Hence,Indianphilosophicalthoughtrepeatedlyadvisespeopleto
havedirectknowledgeorimmediateexperienceofthehighesttruth.

Indianphilosophyisnotmerelymetaphysicalspeculationbuthasitsfoundation
intheimmediatedataofexperience.Theveritiesoflifelikethesoulareregarded
bytheHindumind,notasconceptsspeculativeandproblematic,asisthecasein
Westernphilosophy,butasdefinitelyexperiencedtruths.Theseultimatetruths
canbeexperiencednotmerelybyachosenfewbutunderrightconditionsbyall
humanity.(Prabhananda,1977,p.1)
 Theaimofphilosophyraisesqueriesaboutthenatureofmanandthepossibilityof
itsmodificationandtransformation,anddependsonthecultureconcerningtheindividual
andsociety."It",saidG.D.H.Cole,"mustdependonthekindofsocietywemeantolive
in,onthequalitiesinmenandwomenonwhichwesetthehghestvalue,andonthe
estimates whichwemakeoftheeducabilitybothofthosewhoareendowedwiththe
higherintellectualoraestheticcapabilitiesandofordinarypeople"(Cole,1950,p. 47).
Aimingattheguidanceofknowledgeintopracticewasofessentialimportancetothe
sagesofIndiasincetheyregardedphilosophyasameansofshapingone'spracticallife.In
India,philosophyisnevertakentobemerelyspeculativeorhairsplittingbutapractical
wayofmouldinglifewithanendinview.Inotherwords,"TheancientIndiandidnotstop
atthediscoveryoftruth,butstrovetorealizeitinhisownexperience"(Hiriyanna,195 1,
p.18).

Though the basic aim of Eastern and Western educational philosophies is

similar,themaindifferenceisseeninthemethodofphilosophicalinquiry.TheIndian
tendency is synthetic in makeup as its philosophy embraces several sources:
perception,reasonandintuition,whichdifferentiatesitfiomtheWest.Accordingto
Sri Aurobindo,"theworkofphilosophyistoarrangethatdatagivenbythevarious
meansofknowledge,excludingnone,andputtingthemintosyntheticrelationtothe
one truth, the one Supreme and Universal Reality" (Aurobindo, 195 1, p. 72).
Philosophy should be integrated, synthetic and all comprehensive. The special
characteristicsofIndianschoolsofthoughtasdistinguishedfiomthoseoftheWestis
thatintheWestitisoftenconfinedtothesatisfactionofintellectualcuriosity,whereas
inIndiaitistohavelifehllyenlightenedwithinsightfromallsources.
 Althoughphilosophyiscalleddarsana,thisdoesnotmeanthatiteschews
reason.ThisisonecharacteristicdifferencebetweenIndianphilosophyand
Westernphilosophy. The West has gonewholly either for intuition or for
reason.Whenitacceptedthestandpointofintuition,asintheMiddleAges,it
bannedreasonentirely.When,asintheModernAgeitgaveprominenceto
reason,itshowedcontemptforintuition.InIndia,philosophyhasadifferent
taletotell.Therehasneverbeenaconflictbetweenintuitionandreason,and
eachhasalwaysbeengivenitsdueplace.Differentschoolsofphilosophy
discussthehighestachievementsoflifeindifferentwaysandyetthereisa
practicalunanimityamongthoseschools,inlookinguponthenatureofthe
UltimateRealityasthatwhichisrevealedbydirectintuition,andthatiswhy
philosophyiscalleddarsana.(Maitra,1947,p.10)

1.5 Intuition
Asameanstoknowledge,intuitionhasanimportantplacespecifically in
epistemologyandphilosophyingeneral.OriginallyderivedfiomtheLatinwordinhreriit
wastakentomean"tolookat"2.Ithasbeendescribedasahunch,agutfeeling,or
simplyoursixthsense.Itspeakstous,givingusinsighttohelpusmakedecisionsabout
anynumberofactionsthatwetake.Presently,itisusuallydesignated asaformof
mysticalawareness,scientificgenius,poeticinsight,ethicalconscienceaswellas
religiousfaith."Itisunfortunatethatthesingleterm'intuition'hasbeenemployedto
representsomuch.Thoughthesetermsrepresenttheintegralactivityofthemind,the
activityisorientedtowardsknowinginsomecasesandenjoymentorcreationinothers"
(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.200).However,intuitionshouldbereferredtoasanintegrated
experienceasthereisanelementofintuitionpresentinallourknowledgeandeveryday
activities;ourexperiences,actions,awarenessandconsciousness.Eveninthefieldsof
science,intuitionhasplayedaninstrumentalrole.Allinferencesinlogicandmathematics
atonestageoftheirenquirydependedsolelyonthetruthofapropositionnothavingany
prooforevidenceforsupport.Oneeitherknowsitordoesnot.Thenineteenthcentury
FrenchphilosopherHenriBergsongaveabsoluteimportancetointuitionascontrasted
withreasonorintellect.Hebelievedthatwediscoverthe"Clanvital",thevitalimpulseof
the world by intuition rather than by intellect (Tarnas, 1991, p. 383). Similarly,
Radhakrishnanalsogaveutmostimportancetointuition.Theintuitivefacultyisthought
to be a higher faculty of apprehension than intellect itself. While intellect gives a
discursiveaccountofthespecificissueathand,intuition,atoneglance,providesa

syntheticpictureofthewhole.However,inspiteoftheimportantroleofintuitionin
differentfieldsofknowledge,ithasnotbeenabletoclaimcredibilityinthemodernday
West,unlikerationalismandempiricism(Datta,1972,pp.11 -12).

Notonlymustintuitionbeacceptedasoneofthesourcesofknowledge,butit
mustalsoberegardedasaformofthought."Intuitionisnotindependentbutemphatically
dependentuponthoughtandisimmanentintheverynatureofourthinking.

Itisdynamicallycontinuouswiththoughtandpiercesthroughtheconceptualcontentof
knowledge to the living reality under it" (Radhakrishnan, 1982, p. 250). However,
intuitionisqualitativelydifferentfromlogicalthought,thoughnotdiscontinuouswithit.
Bothlogicalandintuitivekindsofknowledgearejustifiedandhavetheirownrights.Each
is useful and has its own specific purpose. Logical thought enables us to know the
conditions sotheworldinwhichwelive,andtocontrolthemforourends.Without
knowing properly we cannot act success~lly,but if we want to know things in their
uniqueness,intheirindefeasiblereality,wemusttranscenddiscursivethinking.The

emphasis,itshouldbenoted, is ontranscendingratherthanabandoningdiscursive
thought.
 Betweenintuitionandotherformsofknowledge,thereisnohiatus.Aperson's
awarenessis,broadlyspeaking,ofthreekinds -theperceptional,thelogicalandthe
intuitive.Allthreebelongtothehumanconsciousness.Thosewhoexaltintuitionat
theexpenseofothermodesofknowledgeoftenbeginwiththemistakennotionthat
themindisaconglomerationofseparatedfaculties.However,thehumanminddoes
notbnctioniniactions.Weneednotassumethatatthesenselevelthereisnowork
for intuition or at the level of intuition there is no work for the intellect. When
intuitionisdefinedasintegratedinsight,thesuggestionisthatthewholemindisat
work(Schilpp,1952,Libraryoflivingphilosophers,p.791).

ThisemphasisonthetotalityoftheknowledgeprocessbringstheIndian
viewofintuitionveryclosetothephilosophicalbasisofGestaltpsychology.Like
theviewsofWertheimerandKaffka,theIndianviewofintuitionconsistsofthe
allinclusivenatureoftheactionofperceptionusingtheword"perception"inthe
widestsense(Wertheimer,1945,p.234)."Alldynamicactsofthinking,whetherin
agameofchessoramathematicalproblem,arecontrolledbyanintuitivegraspof
thesituationasawhole"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.149).Thisistrueat alllevels,
beginning with the simple thinking involved in ordinary processes of life and
endinginthemostcomplexmethodsoflogicalreasoning.Ineverylogicalproof
thereisagraspingoftheintellectualtogethernessasawhole,anintuitionofthe
wholeassustainedbythedifferentsteps.Notonlycreativeinsightbutordinary
understandingofanythingisimpliedinthisprocess(Ibid,p.181).

Whilethusrecognizingthat,byvirtueofgraspingofthewholeinvolvesintuition,
wemustbecarefultogivelogicitsdue.WiththeIndianview,thereisnoconflictwith
reasonandintuitionandaccordinglytheroleofreasonhasalwaysbeenaccepted.The
intellectdoesnotstanddiscreditedsimplybecauseitdoesnotgiveusallwhatwewant.
Thereisadangerofbelittlinglogicand,inthenameofintuition,ofdeclaringphilosophy
tobeamatterofpassionandfeelingratherthanofdeductionandclarification.Intuition,
ifnotadequatelysupportedbytheintellect,will"lapseintoselfsatisfiedobscurantism".
Ifthecontentofintuitionistobedeepeneditmustbemadeintellectual.Intuitionmust
neverbeused"asanapologyfordoctrineswhichcouldnotorwouldnotbejustifiedon
intellectualgrounds"(Radhakrishnan,1956.p.38).

TheancientIndianthinkerswereawareofthedangerthataccompaniesexcessive
dependence upon intuition. They knew that intuition, like Yoga, requires much
preparationandcanbetrustedonlyifoneseekingknowledgeiswellequippedtoemploy
it.Theydemandednotonlyacertainintellectualdevelopmentbutalsoadequatemoral
preparation beforetheintuitivemethodcouldbeexpectedtoyieldthehighestresults
(Schilpp,1952,ThePhilosophyofRadhakrishnan,p.91).Theviewwasthatingenuine
intuition,"themindmustfirstbesetfreefromanxietyanddesire.Theremustbeabsolute
inward purity and selfmastery before shaping the soul into harmony with invisible
realitiesM(Radhakrishnm, 1980, p.111). At times, intuitive thought may demand
continuouscreativeeffortandisoRentheresultofalongandarduousprocessofstudy
andanalysis.Othertimes,intuitiveknowledgeiseffortlessandspontaneous.Guesswork
and speculation cansometimes guideus tothe truthbyaccident. Just as thedeepest
feelingsofagreatpoetaresometimesconveyedinwordsofdisarmingsimplicity,soalso
doesaphilosophersometimesannouncemomentousspiritualdiscoveriesthroughsimple
andeffortlessintuition.Thismayseemtobeinconflictwiththeearlierstatementsthat
intuitiondemandsintensepreparationandrestsuponcertainrigorousprerequisites,
butthecontradictionisonlyapparent.Todeveloptheabilityofwieldingintuitionas
aneffectivetoolofknowledge,ahighdegreeofintellectual,psychologicalandeven
moral preparation is necessary. The actual process of wielding the tool is
characterizedbyaneaseandfacilitythatislackinginothertypesofknowledge.

When all these qualifications have been made and warnings issued, the fact
remainsthatintuitioncanbeconsideredasuperiormeansofknowledgeinmanyrespects
comparedtoothersources.Abettermethodisnotnecessarilytheonlymethod,andthere
maybeoccasionwhenthemethodwhichisdescribedasbestonthewholemaynotbe
altogethersuitable.Theremaybeaspectsofknowledgeinwhichtheintuitivemethod
would be a subordinate element in the process of knowing. Intuition is subjective,
intimatelypersonalandmaybeineffable.Thismaybeconsideredalimitation,butitmust
be remembered that the subtlety and sharpness of thought is also bound up with
individuality.However,atthehighestreachesofknowledgeintuitionoffersadvantages
whichneitherperceptionnorreasoncanoffer.Infact,itmakespossiblean"extensionof
perceptiontoregionsbeyondsenseandleadstoanawarenessofrealvalueswhichare
neitherobjectinspaceandtimenoruniversalsofthought"(Radhakrishnan,1982,p.100).

Thefactthatitisunverifiableinthescientificsense,andthatitisincommunicable
toothersdoesnotdepriveintuitionofitsvalidity.Onemayobjectastowhatproofwecan
offerforthevalidityofintuition?Myreplyisthattheimpossibilityofdenyingitisitselfa
proofofitsauthenticity."Theproofandvalidityoftheintuitiveprincipleissomewhat
similartoKant'sproofofapriorielements.Wecannotthinkthem
away.Wecannotdisbelievethemandremainintellectual.Theybelongtothevery
structuresofourmind"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.156).

1.6 OverviewofIndianKnowledge
DiscussingintuitionasanecessaryprecursortoIndianepistemologyallowsusto
proceedtoexamineitsmoorings.Itneedstobementionedatthispointthattheintuitive
approachisanacknowledgedsourceofknowledgefiomtheIndianpointofviewasare
theempiricalandrationaltheoriesbytheWest. Asstatedearlier,thereareobjections
thattheIndianworldviewthatisproposedtobestudiedistoodifferentfiomtheWestern
worldviewforanysuchmeaningfulcomparison,i.e.therealistandpragmaticapproach
whichformsanimportantpartoftheliteratureoncontemporaryepistemologyinthe
WestisunlikethemetaphysicalnatureofknowledgeembracedintheEast.Theyhave
verylittleincommon.SomeWesternscholarshaveevenlookeddownupontheIndian
traditionasanembodimentofmysticism,occultism,supernatural,andintuitionbereftof
logicalthinking.ItishighlyregretfulthatBritishempiricistJohnLockmadeacaricature
ofIndianphilosophywithoutanyproperinquiryintoitssubjectmatter.InhisAnEssay
ConcerningHumanUnderstanding(1947),hetriestobelittlethewisdomofIndian
philosophybywriting,

HadthepoorIndianphilosopher(whoimaginedthattheearthalsowantedsomething
tobearitup)butthoughtofthiswordsubstanceheneedednottohavebeenatthe
troubletofindanelephanttosupportit,andatortoisetosupporthiselephant;the
wordsubstancewouldhavedoneiteffectively.(Locke,Book11,ChapterXIII,p.19)

Itisnotrighttopasssuchsweepingjudgmentsaboutanyparticularlyphilosophical
system.WhenweassessthephilosophicalstandpointofclassicalempiricistslikeLocke,
wecometoknowthattheirphilosophicalmooring,likethoseoftheIndianschoolof
Carvaka, are rooted in crude senseexperience. Unfortunately, this philosophical
wisdomissolimitedthatitcannotgraspanythingthattranscendsthelimitsofsense
experience. As a result of this limitation, Locke's empiricism could not construct
higherordermetaphysical philosophy. Unfortunately, this philosophical legacy
continues to dominate Western epistemology. Knowledge may start with sense
experience, but does not arise out of sense experience. Similarly, the activity of
philosophizingstartswithcommonsense,butdoesnotendthere.

OneofthereasonsfortheskepticismbytheWestofIndianknowledgemaybe
tracedtoanattitudeofunderstandingIndianphilosophytobeessentiallyandaccurately
spiritualormeditative,andonlyconcerningitselfwiththeUltimateReality(Lal,1978,
p.xii).UnliketheWest'sbifurcationofphilosophyfromspirituality(humanconsciousness
fromunconsciouscosmos)(Tarnas,1991,p.377),allIndianphilosophicalsystemsdeal
with the spiritual aspect, excepting Carvaka. The peculiarity of Indian thought is its
concernfor"inwardness",thesuborsuperconsciousness,whichisAtmanrealization,
translatedgenerallyas"selfrealization"(Muirhead,1929,p.528).Infact,

whatisaimedatinreligionisalsoavailable inIndianepistemology.InIndia,thereisno
separatedbranchcalledtheology.Thoughphilosophyisuniversal,eachculture inthe
worldhasdevelopedaphilosophycharacteristicofitsvalues.Anyphilosophy"issubject
totheinfluencesofraceandculture.Eachnationhasitsowncharacteristicmentally,its
particular intellectual bent" (Radhakrishnan, 1999, Vol 1, p. 23). Indian educational
philosophyhashaditsfoundationinthemetaphysicalaswellasaxiologicaloutlookofits
culture.Inotherwords,thenatureofthelifeIndianscometoliveis,toagreatextent,
determinedbytheirculturalandbeliefsystems.SinceIndia'sculturehasbeenbasedon
itsreligioustradition,itsepistemologyhasnotbeenaseparatebranchofactivity;ithas
beenapartofthetotaloutlookalongwithitssocialbeliefsaboutGod,mankindandthe
universe. Hence, for this reason, we do not find specific books on the subject of
knowledge in its ancient culture. One would have to search for the principles of
educationalphilosophyinthesacredtextssuchastheUpanisads.Thedevelopmentofthe
Upanisadic tradition has been a development of the philosophy of inwardness (Raju,
1985,p.262)."IfWhiteheadclaimsthatwhatiscalledWesternphilosophyisnothingbut
aseriesoffootnotestoPlatoandAristotle,thenwhatiscalledIndianphilosophycanbe
characterizedasaseriesoffootnotestotheUpanisads"(Raju,1971,p.15).Irrespective
ofitsaffinitytomonismorpluralism,realismoridealismIndianphilosophyisoriented

towardsinwardness.TheancientIndianseerswerenotinterestedintheknowledgefor
knowledgesake,butintheknowledgeofthehighestkind,whichisapproachedbymeans
ofinwardness.Theactivityofinwardnessisessentiallyreligiousandreligiousactivityis
theactivityofAtmanrealization,whichistranslatedgenerallyas"selfrealization"(Raju,
1982.p.21).InthewordsofanothergreatIndianphilosopher,SwamiVivekananda,
"religionisintheinnermostcoreofknowledge"(Vivekananda,1997,p.161).

ReligionforIndiansiscertainlynotarevealedreligionlikeChristianity(Moore,
1959, p. 185). Religion is a way of life based on reflection of experience, which is
nothingbutthephilosophyoflife.Itisaformofintuitionandreflectiononone'slifeand
being,i.e.,inwardness.Inotherwords,religionisnotdivorcedfiomphilosophy,butthe
ultimatetruthrealizedinexperience."ReligiontoaHinduisnot,however,thewestern
conceptionoffaith,nordoesitmerelycomprisedogmasandcreeds.Itisrather

anubhuti - realizationandexperience"(Prabhananda,1997,p.1).Thisexperiencecannot
beacquiredbythesensesorbytheintellect as it is transcendental.Inthescaleof
consciousnessitbelongstothefourth,orthelast Turiyastatethetranscendentalstate
whichmaybedescribedasourinnateorinnerconsciousness.Thoughit ispresentin
all,peopledonotrecognizeitintheirstateofignorance.

Therelationshipbetweenphilosophyandknowledgeandbetweenphilosophyand
religioninIndiaisultimatelyintertwined;theformertwopointingtothegoaloflifeand
thelattertothemeansforitsrealization.KnowledgehasalwaysbeenregardedinIndia
"asasourceofilluminationandpower,whichtransformsandennoblesournaturebythe
progressiveandharmoniousdevelopmentofourphysical,mental,intellectualandspiritual
power and faculties"(A1tekar 1957, p. 8). Such a view of considering knowledge as
potentiallydivineinnaturemaymakeitsomewhatchfficultforpresentdaystudentsof
philosophytoclassifyIndianknowledgeasbelongingtoeithertherealmofepistemology
oroftheology.However,thedifficultyinpreservingsuchaunitybetweenthespiritual
andpracticalpointofthisviewisultimatelybasedonvalues.Ifweattributethisdifficulty
moretodowiththedifferenceofcultureandhowweassignvalues,thenwewidenour
awarenessofknowledgeingeneralandbetter ourunderstandingofIndianknowledge
specifically.WiththeIndianapproach,itbecomesnecessarytoconsider"theexperience",
asintegralbecauseitisacceptedasapartofthetotaldevelopmentofknowledge.Indian
theories ofknowledgerecognizeandkeeproomforthenotionofits interrelationship
(Banerjee,1974,p.307).Oneoftheobjectivesofthisdissertationistoemphasizethis
pointofunityamongthetheoriesinquestionaunitylongoverlookedorattheveryleast
insufficientlyacknowledged.
1.7 BasisofKnowledgeinIndia

Indianphilosophyworkswithinametaphysicallyacceptedkameworkwhichhas
beenconstructedoverthecenturies.Formostpeople,modernityrepresents anageoflogic
andreason,notofdogmaandblindfaith.Withtheadventofmoderneducationalsystems,
thereisareluctancetoacceptanystatementsthatlacklogicalsupport.Therefore,since
modernIndiahasbeenheavilyinfluencedbythescientifictemperamentoftheWest,its
contemporaryphilosophycanbeconsiderednothingmorethanwesternthoughtinIndian
garb.ItisintheareaoftraditionalIndianphilosophythatonefindsdisagreementand
controversyonanumberofbroadissuesconcerningwhatweknowandhowweknow
between the occidental and "truly" Indian thinkers. An example to illustrate these
differencesisthatthelatterisbaseduponthespiritualconceptionsofhumankindandthe
universeoneinhabits,whiletheformerissecularanddevoidofthesenseofthesacred.It
ispreciselyforthisreason,accordingtothosefollowingtraditionalIndianthoughtthat
"knowledge in the West has become problematic as it has lost its true purpose. It is
skeptical and in some cases agnostic to any level of knowledge other than scientific
methodology and has thereby brought confusion to the realm of human knowledge"
(Singh,B.,1976,p.73).EvensomeWesternscholarsviewthetrendtowardmodernity -
the trend away kom dogma or faith, and towards reason and rationality with great
concern.HoustonSmithwritesin BeyondthePostModemMind (1992), "A defining
feature of modernity is loss of transcendence. The sense of the sacred has declined.
Phraseslike'thedeathofGod"and"eclipseofGod"wouldhavebeeninconceivablein
earlydays...thechiefassailanthasbeenmodernscience"(Smith,

p.145).Theunfortunateoutcomeofthisdevelopment,however,isthatthevalues
embracedbylivingandleadingaspirituallifealsoerodedsimultaneously,andbase
instincts, such as greed, power, andmaterialism grips the culture. This dichotomy
polarizes Western society into two extreme camps - one remaining focused on
afterlifeandtheotherseekinginstantgratificationThisiscertainlynotmeanttoimply
thatonlythespiritualpathwillleadustoapathofhealthyvalues,butthispathisone
thathasbeenproven.

AlthoughthisproblemisbecomingaserousissueinWesterncountries,Eastern
cultures are no longer immune to it. As Indians themselves are migrating to other
countrieslikeCanada,localstressesarestrainingtheirfamilies.Thecontemporary

problemsintheLowerMainlandhavetobebroughtintothepicture assomeaspectsof
theseissuesareglobalinnature,somearelocalityspecificandothersintenselypersonal.
Theconsequences ofthegradualshiftfrom"jointfamily"to"nuclearfamily"to"no
family"hasbecomeasubjectofdetailedstudyandresearchbylocalleaders(UNITED,
2004).Theseproblemshavebeenwithusforalongtime,buthavebeenexacerbatedin
recenttimes.Therearenoeasysolutionsandcertainlynopanacea.However,areference
toIndianspirituality,culture,anditsworldviewwoulduniquelyequipustodealwith
manyoftheseproblemsbecauseofitsrichphilosophyandindividuals'affinitytotheir
history. Contemporary community leaders and those genuinely concerned with these
issuescandrawmuchfiomthesehistoricallessonsandmakeadifference.Suchaction
wouldbeastrongreactionarypositiontothecurrentturmoilandconfusioncreatedbythe
crumblingoftheIndianfamilystructure.It isnotmeanttoimplythatspiritualvaluesare
theanswerandthatscienceistobeblamedforthelossofspirituality.Infact,whatis
being posited is a focus in shifting fiom the old spirituality, based on dogma and
orthodoxytoanewspiritualitythatisnotnecessarilyemanatingoutofourtemplesand
mosques.Thisnewspiritualityshouldgrowoutofourcities,streets,andfamiliesin
theformofempathy,brotherhoodandmutualrespect.Thehghpriestsofthisnew
spiritualityaretoday'scommunityactivists.CarlSagansuggestedthat,"Areligionold
ornew,thatstressesthemagnificenceoftheuniverserevealedbymodernscience,
might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the
conventionalfaiths"(Sagan,1994,p.94).

Forthemodernmind,spiritualityshouldbeneitherjustfaithnorpurematerialism.
To draw forththe"reserves ofreverence andawe",arevitalized spirituality mustbe
multidimensionalandmultilayered.Itmustblendanewfaithwithlogic,andmustcasta
morecriticaleyetowardtherelationshipbetweenhumansandallotherliving

beings.InWesternthought,theword,"God" isgenerallyusedtodenotearealitythatis
bothcreativeandpersonal.Ithasbeendescribedastheuncausedcauseofeverything,but
alsoasapersonaldeitytowhomonemightprayandbeheard(Coward,1983,p.329).
MovingtoIndianthought,thesituationisratherdifferent.Atthelevelofpopularreligion,
therearethousandsofgodsandgoddesses,eachwithaparticularsphereof

influence,eithergeographicalorintermsofaparticularaspectoflife.Butbeyond
this,thereistheconceptofBrahman.ThisdenotesUltimateReality,arealitywhich
includesthewholeuniversewithitsmultiplicityofgodsandgoddesses.Brahmanis
seenastheinvisiblerealitywithinandaroundeverythingwhilealltheothergods
representalimitedaspectofBrahman(Ibid,p.67).
InadditiontotheBrahman,IndianepistemologyalsoreferencestheAtmanwhich

istheknowingsubjectandpervadesinusall.It isthatwhichknows,experiencesand
illuminatesobjectsofknowledge.TheBrhadaranyakaUpanisadstatesitis"thespirit
consisting ofknowledge(vijnanamaya),shiningwithinthe heart" (Brhadaranyaka
UpanisadIV3.7f.).TheAtmanisthesubject,butnevertheobjectofknowledge. The
Brhadaranyakafurtheradds:

Youcannotseetheseerofseeing,youcannothearthehearerofhearing,youcannot
think the thinker of thinking, you cannot understand the understander of
understanding. It is your self, which is in all things. (www.celextel.org,
BrhadaranyakaUpanisadIII,4.2.)

Additionally,theAtmanisepistemologicallyreferencedas,

Thelightthatenlightenswhenthesun,themoon,starsandfireareextinguished,
thelightoflights,whichisherewithinmenandatthesametimeshinesunder
heaven.Itisthesupremelightintowhichthesoulentersindeepsleep,andissues
forthitsownform.(www.celextel.org,ChandogyaUpanisadVIII3.4;VIII.12.3)

Thus,ashasbeenstatedabovewefindthattheAtmanisincomprehensibleandby
itsverynaturecannotbeperceived,"notbyspeech,notbymind,notbysightcanitbe
apprehended (www.celextel.org,KathUpanisad 11. 3.12)."It is not a datum of
experience,notanobject,thoughallobjectsareofit"(Radhakrishnan,1999,p.158).Our
senses,reason,andintuition,-allexistforthesoulandserveapurpose.Itisthesoulthat
isimmanentinthemandgivesthemlifeandmeaning. However,thesecannotbe
identifiedwiththesoul,forittranscendsthemall."Allknowledgeexistsasitwere"
(www.celextel.org,BrhadaranyakaUpanisadIV,4.19).Thereisreallynoplurality.
WithregardtotheUpanisadtextswhichdenythemultiplicityofobjectsand
asserttheunityofallthings,Idonotmeantodenytherealityofthemanyobjects.Only
thatinallofthemthereisthesameBrahmanonwhichallaredependentforexistence,
just asallgoldarticlesaredependentongold.WhattheUpanisadsdenyisthe
independenceofobjects,nottheirdependentexistence(Iyangar,196 1,vol.1,1.1.1).
 Inlightofthediscussionsofar,weunderstandBrahmanastheeternalprinciple
as realizedintheworldasawhole,andAtmanastheutmostessenceofone'sownsoul.
Indianplulosophyrepresentsthemasrelatingtothephysicaluniverseinthesamemanner
inwhichoursoulisrelatedtothebody.Thetwotermsareusedsynonymously(Sharma,
1979,p.26).Thismeansthatthereisnothingelsebetweentheprincipleunderlyingthe
worldasawhole,andthatwhichformstheessenceofman.Whenwelookattheideaof
theself,wehavetoconsiderthisessence,whichisverymuchdifferentfromtheWest.
Therearetwoselves;onewhichisdeterminedbyitscasteorplaceinthesocialorderand
theotheristheAtman,whichistheselfinitsrelationshiptothewhole,expressedas
Brahman. The Upanisads argue that Brahman and Atman are in fact one. The
fundamentalselfiscoexistentwiththerealityoftheuniverse.Anotherwaytoputthis
would be to say that there is a single reality; when it manifest globally it is called
Brahman,butwhenitmanifestintheselfitiscalledAtman.

Atmanismyselfwithintheheart,smallerthanagrainofriceorabarleyofcorn,ora
grainofmillet;thisismyselfwithinmyheart,greaterthantheearth,greaterthanthe
atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than all the worlds. (www.celextel.org,
ChandogyaUpanisadBook111,14.35)

The identification and deep sense of mystery of Atman and Brahman is very
significantasitistheIndiansolutionforthesearchofhowwecometoknowwhatwe
know.ItistheidentificationofAtmanandBrahmanthatconstitutestheessentialteaching
oftheUpanisads,whicharephilosophicalcolloquies(likePlato'sdialogues)andactas
themineswherewemayquarryforourphilosophicalideas.ItisintheUpanisadsthatwe
findalltheteachingsrecognizedasfundamentaltoIndianphilosophy:the
conceptsofmoska(liberation),dharma(meritorduty),andkarma(actionandreaction),
andartha(wealth),andtheconceptandsynthesisofBrahmanwiththeAtman.Thisis
theessenceofeachentityandbeinginthephenomenalworld.

OfthetwotypesofsacredwritingsinIndia:smrtiandsruti,theUpanisadsare
strictlyspeakingpartofthesrutitraditionofamorephilosophicalperspective.Sruti
means"heard","perceived","understood",or"cognized andreferstothehabitofthe

ancient seers going off to live in the forests, where they become so evolved in
consciousnessthattheycould"hear"or"cognize"thetruthsoftheUltimateReality.The
Upanisads epitomize this andaskquestionsaboutthenatureoftheselfandUltimate
Realityinaveryfocusedwayandreflectacertainreactionagainstthepolytheism,indeed
thetheismoftheVedasandaremuchmoreinward,mysticalandmeditative(Herman,
1976, p.137). There is an emphasis, not on correct ritualistic practices in terms of
sacrificial ritual, chants, incantations and the like, but on intuitive knowledge and
introspection;knowledgebecomesthecentralissue,notrituals.Suchknowledgeiscalled
vidyaorjnana,andthewayofknowledge -jnanamarga-becomesallimportantinthe
VedanticmessagewhichisstillconsideredanestablishedpathtomoksainHinduism
today(Ibid,p.124).Thepathofjnanaisessentiallyanindividualistone.Theroleofthe
guru is to equip the pupil to stand on his own two feet and journey independently,
"transcendingthemindwiththehelpofthemind"(Mehta,1990,p.3).

Thus,theknowledgeofwhichtheUpanisadsspeakofisnotknowledgeaboutthe
world,butaboutUltimateRealty.Itisknowledgeofadeeperkind-intuitiveknowledge,
whichcanonlybeexperiencedatthedeeperlevelsoftheself.Thoughitcanbe"taught"
or "learned", the gurus could only point their pupils in the right direction. However,
withoutaninnerintuitive"experience",theknowledgeofUltimateRealitywasimpossible
(Gough,1979, p. 45).Itisnotdifficulttosee,then,whytheteachingsrelatedtosuch
knowledgewereesoteric.Pupilshadtobeattherightpointoftheirpersonalevolutionto
beabletoexperiencesuchtruthsinthedepthsoftheirbeing.Thereisnosubjectorobject
in the experience of such knowledge and the egoistic "I" which we associate with
receiving knowledge is not evident. Knowledge of this kind exists in a characterless
being,notapersonalityandisarealizationoftruthinthesenseof"seeingofitwiththe
soulandatotallivinginitwiththepoweroftheinnerbeing"(Aurobindo,

1986,p.3).Inmanyways,thereiscertainsimplicityaboutsuchknowledge,andyetitis
veryprofound.Wespendourlivesbusyingourselveswithallsortsofthingsandhave
littletimetoreflect,tojustbestill,andtoacceptlifeforthatmoment.Brahmanisnot
divorcedfiomlifebutisintheessenceofeverymomentandcanbeexperiencedassuch.
There are moments in life when the individual transcends ordinary existence and
experiencejustforafewmomentsthekindofonenessofexistenceknownbyBrahman.

This traditional Indian viewpoint, however, offers a perspective on the many

sourcesofknowledgethataremostlyacceptedonmerefaithbasedoncertaindogmasthat
cannotbesetasidemuchlessaltered.Thereareactuallyasmanyaseighteenmeansof
achieving knowledge (Bosanquet, 1911, p. 285), and in each method of engaged
philosophical investigation, we find that Indian thinkers are bound to certain
presuppositionswhichtheybelievearetruesuchastheidealofBrahman,Atman,andthe

fourendsoflifeforanindividual: dharma,karma,artha,andmoksaallwhchare
integrallyrelated(Banerjee,1974,p.46).
 Abriefdiscussionofthefourendsisinorder.Mokaisthechiefaimoflife.Tofind
one'strueselfonemustbereleasedfiomtheego,whichisthecauseofallunrest.The
highsenseofhumanityistoaspiretouniversalitythroughthemind,reasonandheartby
wayofreincarnation,theideathatattheendofeachlife,theindividualisbornagainin
anotherexistenceinordertocarryonone'sevolutionarypath.Alllifeandmatter,even
knowledge,isconsideredcyclical;evidentinthecyclesoftheplanets,ofnature,andof
humankind. Apart fiom the physical body and the breath that makes one live, the
individualiscomposedoftwoelements.One isthepersonality,theego@vatman),and
theotheristheBrahmanwhichiscalledtheAtman.Theegoisourpersonality;itis
constantlychangingandisthesumtotalofallourexperiencesinlife,allourdesiresand
aversions,ourconsciousandsubconsciouscharacteristics.TheAtmanontheotherhandis
thepartofusthatwhichBrahmanandcannotchangesinceitispermanentandwhichlike
Brahman is Absolute. The Atman does not reincarnate at all. It is simply there in
everythingandmanifestsitselfintheworld.Itistheegowhichissubjecttoreincarnation
(samsara) and the next reincarnation will depend entirely on the personality of an
individualinthepresentexistence.Whatdeterminesthestateoftheindividual inthenext
experienceiskarma.Karmameans"action"andrefersnotonlytoactionsundertakenby
thebody,butalsotothoseundertakenbythemind.ItisactionandreactionforHindus
believethatallactionsproduceresultsanditisthistheorythat isbehindtheconceptof
samsara.Eachpersonchooseshowtoactorthink,soeachperson'skarmaishisorher
ownandequallysoaretheresultsofthosechoicesbelongtothatperson.The

BrhadaranyakaUpanisaddescribesthisverywell."Anindividualcreatesforhimself
hisnextlifeasaresultofhisdesires,hopes,aspirations,failures,disappointments,
achievementsandactionsperformedduringthislifeofhis"(Organ,1974,p.15).Soif
choicesaregood,thentheresultsinthenextlifewillbegood.Inverselythesamewould
apply.Ifactionsareverybad,thenapersonmayactuallydevolveanddegenerateintoa
lowerformasananimal.Westernerssometimeseetheoperationofkarmaasfatalistic,

butitisfarfromthis.Whileanindividualcandonothingaboutthekannaheorshemust
reap, all of an individual's future lives are affected by present actions, thoughts and
words:weshapeourownfuture.Whileitcanbesuggestedbysomethatthiswasusedby
theancientsasameanstomaintainthestatusquoinIndiawithregardtopoverty,onecan
counterclaimthatresponsibilityandcareforthepoorandtoothersisoneofthemeans
bywhichgoodkannacanbepromoted.Applyingthistothepresentdaydisenfranchised

IndoCanadian youth, it can be used as a vehicle to advance ideas which imbibe

positivevalues.

Thus,inordertoachieve kama (selfactualization),itisimportanttolivelife

accordingtodhanna,whatisright.Thisinvolvesdoingwhatisrightfortheindividual,
thefamily,thecommunityandalsofortheuniverseitself.Dhannaisacosmicnormand
ifonegoesagainstthecosmicnormorthenormforthecommunity,badkarmacan
result.Butdhannaalsoaffectsthefuture,foreachindividualhashisorherowndhannic
pathdependentonthekarmawhichhasbeenaccumulated.Soone'sdharmicpathinthe

nextlifeistheonenecessarytobringtofruitionalltheresultsofpastkarmaandisthus
rightfortheindividual,eventhoughitmaybeadifficultpathasmanyofyoungIndo
Canadianmenhaveexperienced.Thissecondendoflifecangivecoherenceanddirection
totheactivitiesoflife.Ittellsusthatwhileourlifeisforourownsatisfaction,itismore
essentiallyforthecommunityandmostofallfortheuniversalselfwhlchexists
ineachofusandallbeings.AccordingtoRadhaluishnan,"ethicallifeisthemeansto
eeedomaswellasitsexpressionsonearth"(McDerrnott,1977,p.191).Artha,another
end, is related to wealth and material being of a person, but not in the sense of
excessivenessasmanyyouthtendtobelieveandadhereto.Itisconsideredinthecontext
ofthebodythatencompassestheAtman.Manydiseasesanddisorders,intellectual,moral
andsocialbreakoutrenderingaweakbody,henceaweakmind.Thefinalandultimate
aimofeveryHinduisthattheendlesscycleofsamsarawillbeover,andtherewillbeno
necessitytobereincarnated.Thiscanonlyhappenwhenthereisnokarmatocausean
individualtobereincarnatedbecausethereisnoegotisticself,no"I"toreapanyresults.
Thisismoksa,liberationfiomthecycleofsamsara.Itisthusachievedwhentheegoloses
itsgoodandbadkarmaandhasnokarmaatalLAswithknowledge,toachievethiskama,
Hindushavemanypaths;itisnotsomethingwhichcanbeachievedinonlyoneway,but
eachandeverypathiswithinusto be discovered.Whenapersonrealizesmoksa,the
AtmanthepartoftheindividualwhichisBrahman-mergeswithBrahmanliketheriver
mergesintothesea.TheegoisgoneandonlypureAtman,whichisBrahman,remains.
Thesubjectandobjectareone.

Thisviewisnotonlycomprehensivebutalsorefieshinglydifferentfiomthesets
ofarguments"for"or"against"ourinnerorintuitivesense.Thefourendsoflifepointto
thedifferentsidesofhumannature;theinstinctiveandtheeconomic,theintellectualand
thespiritual,allmakingupBrahman,astheultimatecosmicprincipleorthesourceofthe
wholeuniversewhichisallcomprehensive.Fromtheviewofcertainty,sucha

conceptionaidsinexplainingtheoriginofknowledge.Thoughthereisnothingthat
compelsustoregardBrahmanasomniscienthowledgethatpervadesinusasactually
existing,however,thereisnologicalabsurdityindenyingit.Itistheestablishmentof
theintuitivecharacterofknowledgeandtheclearingawayoftheuncertaintyaboutits
existencethatareaccomplishedwhenoneidentifiesoneselfwithAtman.

1.8 AimofKnowledgeinIndia

InIndianphilosophy,knowledgeisnotregardedasascienceofascertaining
andacquiringfactsandinformationbutasthequestofvalues.Fundamentally,itisthe

science ofsalvation (moksa).TheUpanisads inthemselves donot aim atthelogical

validity of knowledge. Their main objective is to show the path to liberation, and
knowledgeisameanstothatend.ThehighestknowledgeistheknowledgeofBrahman,
theknowledgethatleadstoliberation(Victor,1992,p.101).Theavowedhtilityofthe
Vediclorestressuponthesameprintrepeatedly;knowledgeisnotvaluedonthemeritof
logicalvaliditybutasameansforethicalprogress(Radhakrishnan,1948,II,46).

GiventhattheultimateaiminIndianthoughtisknowledgeofBrahmaninthe
deepest,intuitivesenseandthehsionoftheselfwiththeSelf,AtmanwithBrahman,itis
easytoseewhyonesinglelifetimewouldbeinsufficientforsuchrealization.Theself
evolvesthroughanimmenseperiodintime,reincarnatingfiomoneexistencetothenext.
ExperienceofAtmanmaybeglimpsedinonelifetimebutlifehastobelivedentirely
rootedinAtman,andtheJiva,theegoisticself,hastobeobliterated.Everyegotistic
thoughtisakarmiccauseandmusthavearesult,whichaccruestothe"I"thatcausedit.
Allindividualsmakesenseoftheworldbydifferentiatingbetweenthisandthat,thatisto
saytheyareperpetuatingtheillusionarydistinctionsofdelusion(maya)bylivinglifeina
worldofdualitiesinwhichtheymakeegotisticchoicesandjudgments.Itisoftenthe
moresubtlechoiceofthemind,evenofthesubconscious,whichcausestheindividualto
perpetuate desire or aversion for one thing as opposed to another. But, as stated,
Brahmanisbeyonddualities,atapointwherethatceasestoexist.For an Indianto
cometothatpointwherethedualitiesoflifedisappearandallisone,theyneedto
reincarnatewhichIndianthoughtviewsasthelogicalevolutionforeachperson(Lott,
1980,p.7).Soapersonmusttranscendtheresultsofhisownactions.Dharmahelpsa
personevolvetothispointbyplacingtheindividualinthelifesituationmostsuitedto
hisorherstageofevolution(caste).

ThegoalinIndianthoughtistolosethekindofkarmawhichattachesitselftothe
egotisticalself.TheIndiansagestaughtthatonecanexperiencetheunityofallexistence
andbecomeBrahman.Thisexperience issat,citandananda(truth,pureconsciousness,
andbliss)(Chennakesavan,1976,p.92).Likethecasebywhichweexperiencedreamless
sleep,moksadoesnothavetobefound,itisalreadythereinoneself.Thesagestaught
thatthroughthepathofknowledge,withdrawalofthesensesandmeditativepractice,the
evolutionoftheselfcouldreachthepointofrealizationofBrahman(Ibid,p.25).To
knowBrahmanistoknowtheknowledgethatresidesinoneself.Knowledgeisoneofthe
constituents onthe pathtomoksaandis experienced whentheSelfisreleasedfrom
bondage,ourignorantstateofajnana(pervertedknowledge)(Ibid,p.114).

Theidealofattainingmoksaisnotsimplyamatterofintellectualconvictionbut
therealgoaloflike.AsMaxMullerputsit,knowledgewasrecommendedinIndia"for
thehighestpurposethatmancanstriveafterinthislife"(Muller,2004,p.370).Moksa,
thoughvaryinginconceptionfromonesystemtotheother,isacommonculminationfor
alltheIndianschoolsofthoughtwithasolitaryexceptionoftheCarvakamaterialism
whichdoesnotbelieveinanyspirituallife(Sharma,1979,p.44).T~ISisallduetothe
factthatthesearchforknowledgedoesnotoriginateinIndiawithafeelingofaweand
curiosity probingintothefacts ofnature. Itarises withaquestforprescribing some
practicaldisciplinewhichcouldleadmantoeternalblissbyeradicatingtheevilsoflife.
ThevariousschoolsofIndianknowledgeallexpresssimilarsentiments.The
Sankhya system promises complete cessation of all sorrows as its chief aim

(www.celextel.org,Sankhyakarika,1).TheYogaisentirelydevotedtotheattainmentof
Kaivalya.GautamainhisNyayasutraenumeratessixteencategoriesandassertsthattheir
knowledgewouldleadtothehighestpurpose,i.e.liberation(Gautama,1913,1.1.1). Inthe
categoryofpyamey(object),onlythoseobjectsthatareimportantintheattainmentof
salvation are enumerated (Bhattacharya, 1987, p. 428). The NyayaVaisesika system
beginswiththeinterpretationofdhamzaasthemeansfortheattainmentoftheworldlyas
wellastranscendentalknowledge(www.celextel.org,Vaisesikassutra,1.1).Mimamasa,
thestrictdevoteeoftheVedas,doesthesamebyexplainingdharmaasaninjunctionof
theVedas(www.celextel.org,Mimamsasutra1.1).BuddhismandJainismalsoexpressthe
same;forexample,Buddhistsaimatnirvana,i.e.appeasementofpassions,whicharethe
chains thatkeepthesoulinbondage(www.celextel.org, Abhidharmakosa IV 127).A
discussionontheJaintheoryofknowledgeisalsodominatedwiththesamespirit.The
spiritualdevelopmentachievedthroughtheremovalofkarmicmatteristhemainthemeof
the Jain scriptures (www.celextel.org, Uttaradhyayanasuta XXVIII, 36). The path for
acquiringknowledgeandspiritualprogress,aimingatthefinalgoalofliberationisthe
centraltoneoftheAgamaz(Ibid,XXIX).
LiberationiseffectedbytheknowledgeoftheAtman.Theemancipationis
alreadythereasthe"hiddentreasureofgoldinthefield".Trueknowledgeisitselfthe
deliveranceoremancipationinallitsfidlness."HewhoknowshimselfasAtman,the
firstprincipleofthings,isbythatveryknowledgefreefromalldesires,forheknows
everythinginhimself,andthereisnothingoutsideofhimselffor himtocontinueto
know"(www.celextel.org,Bhagavadgita,VI,19).

Theignoranceofreality,delusion,isgenerallyrecognizedbytheUpanisadsasthe
causeofbondageandsuffering(Chatterjee,1950,p.18).Thegoaloflifeenvisagedinthe
Upanisads,therefore,istherevelationoftheemancipationfromthebondagethroughtrue
knowledgeofreality.Trueknowledgeabouttherealityistheexperientialrealizationof
thetruthasexpressedintheChandogyaUpanisadwhichsays,

Just as those who do not know the field, walk again and again over the hidden
treasureofgoldanddonotfindit,evensoallcreaturesheregodayafterdayintothe
Brahmaworldandyetdonotfindit,fortheyarecarriedawaybyuntruth.(Iyangar,
1996,UII.3.2)

Toputitinotherterms,therealizationoftheultimateunityoftheindividualselfwith
theUltimateRealityistheliberation(www.celextel.org,BrhadaranyakaUpanisad IV
4.9;MunakaUpanisad111.2.9)Thisunityissomethingproducedbyenlightenment,
therefore,itisnotproperlyanewbeginning,butonlyaperceptionofthatasithas
existedfrometernity,thoughhithertoconcealedfromus.

Theworldviewexpressedsofarhasbeendiscussedinregardstothesourceandaim
ofIndianphilosophyandknowledge.Sincetheviewpointstakenupareinterrelated,there
areboundtoberepetitionhereandthere.However,oneneednotconsiderthemas

repetitious;theymay be treatedasthelinksofachainholdingittogether.Indian
philosophersingeneraladoptaholisticapproachwhichhas manycommonorshared
ideas,idealsandattitudes,aswellasmethods.
1.9 ClassificationofKnowledge

All sources of Indian knowledge can be classified into two categories: Para
(higher)andapara(lower).Aparaknowledgeconsistsofalltheempiricalsciencesand
our perceptual comprehension. (Victor 1992, p S6). It involves our senses viz sight,
hearing,touch,smellandtastewhichareorganbased,whilethemindtheintermediary-

isanonorganbasedquasisense.Acombinationofsheddingappropriateknowledge
obscuringkarmaandstimulationofoursensesbygeneralsources(theobjectofstudy)
results in our becoming conscious of the object (the known). This knowledge is
consideredillusionaryandunreliableandcouldeasilybecorruptedordistortedby
severalfactorssuchasoursense,thestateoftheobject,andthestateoftheknower
itself.Contrarytothis,knowledgethroughtheformer(para)avenuesisatahigher
extrasensory,metaphysical,orinnatelevelandislikelytobelessdistorted.These
avenuesareperfectasin thecaseofintuition.Paraknowledgeiswhathasnotbeen
heardofbecomesheardof,whathasnotbeenthoughtofbecomesthoughtof,what
hasnotbeenunderstoodbecomesunderstood.Itistheknowledgeoftheselforthatof
selfrealization and is considered pure knowledge of reality and of the truth
(www.celextel.org,BrhadaranyakaUpanisad111.4.2).

WhiletryingtounderstandtheIndianconceptionofknowledgeweshouldbear
in mindthedistinctionwhichtheMundakeUpanisadmakesbetweentheparaand
aparaforms:

...twokindsofknowledgearetobeknown,asindeed,theknowersof Brahman
declare-thehigheraswellasthelower.Ofthese,theloweristheRgVeda,the
Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, the Atharva Veda, such as Phonetics, Ritual,
Grammar,Etymology,MetricsandAstrology.Andthehigheristhatbywhich
thesoulisapprehended.(Iyangar,Mundaka
Upanisad1.1.5)
 Theparaformofknowledgehascometobetermedasparamarthadarsana,i.e.
theultimateandfinalknowledgeandaparaform asvyavaharadarsana,i.e.,earthly
orpragmaticpointofview.Thehigherlevelhasbeenvariouslycalledbrahmajnana,

brahmasaksatkara,paramarthajnana,etc.asitisastateinwhichoneexperiencesone's
identity with Brahman (Murti, 1974, p. 243). It is an intuitive state where our
consciousnessistranscended.Attainingthisintuitivevisionintheuniverseandinmanis

regarded as thesummumbonumofman(Kattackal,1980,p. 75). Thevyavahara

stateorapamvidyaexperience,ontheotherhand,istheordinarywakingstate.Thisis
theplaneofsight,taste,smell,andhearingsenses(pleasure,pain,egoconsciousness,
activitiesandsoon).Comparedtotheintuitivestate,thisisalowerstateoraninferior
state of knowledge. It is variously called the state of avidya (ignorance), ajana
(perverted knowledge), maya (delusion), etc. as it is the level of our worldly
knowledge(op.cit.,pp.312314).

TheUpanisads,trulyspeaking,donotrepresentanysystemofphilosophy.They
arestraythoughtswhichareconnectedtogetherincertaingroups.Thereisdiversityof
thoughtscurrentintheUpanisads,yettheypropoundadoctrineaboutrealitythatour
"inmost self is of the nature of pure consciousness, which is the ground of all our
experiencesandwhichisatthesametimetheinnercontrollerofallthediversepowersof
natureandinthelivingbodieswhichcannothowever,haveanyfurtherindependent
realityfiomit"(DasGupta,1993,p.19).Thisdominantspiritrevealsareality,whichis
theultimateinneressenceofapersonandisdifferentfiomwhatweordinarilyunderstand
bythesoul,thefivesenses,andthevitalpowerofthemind.TheBrhadaranyaka
positivelydeclaresthat,thisinnermostself,istheBrahman(Ibid,p. 39).Itispure
perceivingconsciousness,butitissurprisingtonotethatnoattempthaseverbeenmadein
these works to explain how the diverse experiences which make our psychological
experiencesandaresurelymaterialcanspringfiomthispurelyperceivingconciseness.
WehavebeeninformedthattheuniverseisidenticalwithBrahmanorithascomeoutof
Brahman,butsurprisinglyenough,ithasbeenomittedthroughwhatoperationstheinnm
ostselfcanberegardedasthesourcesorcauseofthismanifoldworld.Allthesehave
beenleftbeyondtheapproachofthoughtthoughsomemysticexplanationshavebeen
offered to fill in the vacuum of thought. Anticipating further difficulties from the
intelligentreaderorinquirersomeillustrationshavealsobeenofferedtoexplainwhat
seemstobetrulymysticalforus.TheUpanisadsprobablydonotdenytherealityofthe
visibleworld,nevertheless,theyhavenotfailedtoemphasizethatthebasicrealitydoes
not consist in the phenomena or the appearances of the world but is ascribed to the
conceptofBrahmanwhichaloneistheultimaterealityintheirview.TheUpanisadshave
playedanimportantroleinliberatingphilosophicalthoughtfiommostoftheelaborate
rationalismandsenseriddenmodernoutlook.Theyhavepointedouttoarealitywhich
groundsthewholeuniverseinourinnennostselfandinwhichresideallexperiences,
appearances, etc. In the end, this innate sense of knowing and being is beyond
intelligence,thefivesensesandtheordinarilyunderstoodsoul.Thus,"itisdifficultto
labeltheUpanisadicidealism,eitherassubjectiveidealismorobjectiveidealismoras
absolute idealism" (Ibid,p. 52) according totheterms applied inWestern systems of
philosophy.However,Fitche,whoissupposedtobeoneofthegreatestphilosophersof
subjectiveidealismintheWest,holdsthat "all experienceisegocenteredandisself
conscious"(Chennakesavan,1976,p.108).TheEgoofFitcheisasmuchindividualas
universalandtherefore is veryeasytoconsiderhisdoctrineasasampleofsimilar
idealism.TheinterpretativeelementsasthoseeffortlesslyappliedintheUpanisads
makeitrathersimpletoprovideanalogousidealismtothatofFitche.

1.10TheSixSchoolsofThought

ThevariousschoolsorsystemsofIndianthoughtwhosubscribetotheUpanisadic
philosophyofknowledgecanbe,forsimplicitysake,dividedintotwobroadclasses:the
orthodox and the heterodox. To the first group belong the six chief systems: Nyaya,
Vaisesika,Sankhya,Yoga,VedantaandMimamsa.Theseareconsideredorthodox,not
becausetheybelieveinGod,butbecausetheyaccepttheauthorityofreligioushistoric
Vedictexts,astheultimatesourceofenlightenment(Pappu,1982,p.25).TheSankhya
andtheMimamsadonotbelieveinGod,yettheyaresupposedtobeorthodoxbecause
theybelieveinthetestimonyoftheVedas.Tothesecondgroupbelongthechiefschools
ofthematerialistsliketheCarvakas,asmentioned,alongwiththeBuddhistandtheJains
whodonotaccepttheauthorityoftheVedas,andbyextensiontheUpanisads.Though
thereisdiversityandcriticismofeachother,theseschoolsofthoughtsharesomany
things in commonthatonecaneasilyrealizethattheyaretheproductsofoneandthe
samesoilalbeitcultivatedbydifferentseers.Allofthemattempttounderstandthenature
oftheselfanditsrelationtotheSupremeandthecosmos.Theyallareunitedinthe
commonbeliefthatthenatureoftheUltimateRealityisrealizedonlywhentheright
knowledgeofones'ownselfdawnsuponthem.Theyallbeginwiththeconvictionthat
thereisignoranceandsufferingintheworldwhichcanbeandmustberidof,thus,comes
theselfrealizationoftrueknowledge(Ibid,p.26).
 The heterodox Indian schools of thought emphasize that any character of
knowledgeshouldbeimplicitlyacceptedduetotheirbeliefoftherevealingnatureof
knowledge (Rao, 1998, p. 101). Pramanas, instruments of valid knowledge, are
consideredmeansofknowledgeaswellasmeansofproof. An analysisofIndian
knowledgeindicatesthatthiswasduetoaneedonthepartofIndianthrnkerstofind
means of proof for their beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own
satisfaction,butstillmore,forproducingconvictioninothers(Prasad,1998,p.10).
ThesixschoolsoforthodoxIndianthoughtacceptatleasttwoofthefollowingsix
sourcesofknowledge:perception,inference,testimony,comparison,postulation,and
noncognition apprehension. Vaiseiska accepts the first two, Samkhya and Yoga
acceptthefirstthree,Nayayathefirstfour,MimamsathefirstfiveandVedantaallsix
sources of the aforementioned. Though each school has their own fundamental
interpretationsofasingleReality,theyareallmutuallycomplementary.Theydealt
progressively with the questions of the means and methods of knowledge, the
fundamentalcategoriesofobjectivereality,theprocessofcosmicevolutionincluding
themicrocosmoftheindividualperson,andthemethodofexperiencingtheReality
personally(Raju,1971,p.35).

TheVedantaisthelastschoolofphilosophyamongthewellknownsix,whoare
commonlyreferredtoastheSadDarsana.TheVedanta(lastoftheVedas)schoolisthe
epitomeofIndianphilosophicalthoughtandhashadthemostpervasiveinfluenceon
Indian art, culture,andcivilization.Ithashadthreemajorinterpretersviz.,Sankara,
RamanjuandMadhwa,ofwhichSankara,themostuncompromisingmonisthashadthe
greatestvoguebyreasonofhlsbeingmostrepresentativeofthevisionofthetrueIndian
mind. The Vedanta Sutra (Nyaya) with Upanisad (sruti) and the BhagavadGita
(smriti) constitute the Prasthanatrayi, the three original sources of the Vedanta
philosophy. (Varma, 1969, p.41). The Vedanta is in short, despite continuous
misinterpretationsandcriticism,thepurestwellofIndianthought.Whetherweshall
call it by that name is not terrifically important as Vedanta is the purest idealist
philosophyandrepresentstheveryheartofHinduthought(Ibid,p.49).

The spiritual experiences of the Vedanta are subject to logical criticism and
systematicanalysisfiomtheothersystemsofIndianphilosophy.BuddhismandJainism
havebeeninaccuratelyconsideredtobeagainsttheVedicvisionofReality.Inactuality,
theyrevoltedonlyagainstexcessiveVedicceremonialismandritualism(Moore,1959,p.
45).RealityisOneandMany,withdifferentsystemsofphilosophy,includingJainism
andBuddhism,emphasizingitsparticularaspectsaspartofwholetruth."Almost allthe
Indiansystemsareunanimousinholdingthatthetrueaimofphilosophyconsistsinthe
soul'sperceivingitsintrinsicnatureinanactofdirectandimmediateintuition

(saksatkara)(Singh,B.,1976,p.3).Thesamesoulthatbringsuswisdomrenewsand
expressesitselfthroughinstrumentsmorerichandsuitedtocomprehendthecomplex
andeverenlargingconditionsofeverydayhumanlifeandexperience.

Though the many schools of Indian thought may differ on the number of
pramanas,theyhaverecognizedandassertedthatknowledgecanbederivedfiommany
differentsources.Theaforementionedpramanasare all sourcesofvalidknowledge,
comingwithinthekenofIndianepistemologywhichhasevolveditsownmethodsof
inquiry. Indian epistemology has formulated a hierarchical and coherent system for
determiningthenatureofrealitythroughvarioussourcesofknowledge.Indianlogic
consistsofbothcontentandform.Thecontent is suppliedbythecognitiveorgans
(gianindn's)buttheformalrulesoflogicwhichareusedastestsfordeterminingthe
validityofknowledgeintheWest,asisthecaseofperceptionandreason,arenot
alwaysapplicableorutilized(Op.cit.,p.29).

AbriefdiscussionisneededtobringouttherelativevaluegiveninIndianthought
tothepramanasofperceptionandlogic,asitwillbethetwosourcesofcomparisonwith
Western epistemology. The secular affairs of a person's temporal life may be well
regulatedbyaparaknowledgesuchasperceptionandlogic.AccordingtotheIndianview,
most of the pramanas, which have been mentioned, can be traced to perceptual and
rationalknowledge(Rao,1982,p.1).Onthebasisofpreviousperceptualknowledgewe
canmakeinferences.Therefore,onecanpostulatethatallinductivegeneralizationsabout
the worldcanbe derivedfrom perceptual knowledge andserveas the cornerstone of
inductivereasoning.Thoughithasbeenusedasanindependentmeansandsourceofvalid
knowledgebyWesternphilosophers,reasonalsoplaysaninstrumentalbutdifferentrole
in Indian epistemology. Reason is a means of justifying perceptual knowledge and
cultivatingahighermetaphysicalexperience (Op.cit.,p.177).Anenlightened person
develops a vault of discriminative rational knowledge which enables him/her to
distinguishbetweentruthandfalsehoodandalsocomplimentsthereceiver'sothersources
of knowledge. In apprehending knowledge, the sense organs and intellect are vital,
however,knowledgeisnotstrictlypartakhderivedfromsense,noritispramambasedon
argumentorreasonalone,butasynthesisofmindandsoul."Asamodeofknowledge,
intuitionshouldhavetoberelatedtononintuitivethought"(Mohanty,1993,
p.30).This"complete"knowledgearisesfromanintimatemysticalhsionofmindand
reality,anexperiencewhichisanintegrationofourperceptualequipmentalongwith
ourotherfacultiesthatassistsusinunderstandingthecompletetruth.

Perception,thoughasourceofempiricalknowledge,isofnoavailforestablishing
thetruthorotherwiseinthefieldsofmetaphysics,andknowledgebasedonreasoncan
helpusbuildlogicalconstructsthroughreflectiveventuresabouttheontologicalrealmof
existence.It,however,cannotdispeltheignorance(bharam)duetothedelusion(maya)
causedbyknowledgeobscuringkarma.Aswell,itcannotdispelourdoubts,norcansuch
knowledge provide us with immediate experience of absolute sureness. The use of
perceptionandreasonforunderstandingtheworldaroundusisdefinitelyhelpfulbutit
canneverinvestigatethemetaphysicalrealm,whichtranscendsthistemporalworld.Itis
stressed again that neither perception nor logic can remove bharam caused by maya.
Thesemeansofknowledgeareusefulforregulatingcommonsenseonthetemporallevel
ofrealityandareusefulforcreatingintellectualunderstandingofthewaysofconductand
thenatureofrealitybutthetruthorcompleteknowledgecannotberealizedthroughthese
pramanas(Op.cit.,p.124).Forcomprehendingthecompletetruthonehastoturntothe
higher pramanas such as verbal testimony (sabda) which draws their authority fiom
revelationandintuition,i.e.,animmediateexperience.

Theintuitiveknowledgeofgurus,rishisandsaints,whohavehadanimmediate
experience are in a position to enlighten others with the flame of knowledge. This
pramana,sabda,isgivensignificantimportanceandhighvalueasameansofacquiring

knowledgeinIndianthought(Singh,J.,1990,p.45).Theverbaltestimonyheredrawsits
authorityfiomintuitiveknowledgegainedfiomthescripturesandrevelationofthetruth.
Sabdaheremaybeunderstoodintwosenses:oneasapramanaforguidingone'slife,
andtheotherasnam(name)fortheGuru'sword,intheformofamantra(Ibid,p.106).Only
afterpracticing jap (contemplations)andmediationonthe narn canonedispel bharam or
mayaandattainenlightenment.Therefore,sabdahasadualfunctionofgiving usknowledge
orinstructionssothatwecanleadalifewhichisconduciveforprogress

towardsattainmentofmoksaandsecond,togiveusnamsothatwecanattainastateof
equipoise-astatewhichisattainedwhenselfrealizationofthetruthtakesplace.Itneeds
tobeclarifiedthattheconceptofsabdamayrevealthetruthwhichmayotherwisenotbe
attainablethroughtheothertwolowerpramanasofperceptionandreason. Sabda does
not contradict the knowledge gained through common experience, but actually
complementsit.ThepointthatisbroughthomebytheaboveisthatIndianepistemology

recognizesthefactthatthetruthrevealedby sabdadoesnotgoagainstthecommon
experience, as both the levels of knowledge, empirical and transcendental, are
functioningasacoherentsystemwithinthewholereality(Ibid,p.101).

Thevaluegivento sabda inIndianthoughtnaturallycomestoinfluencethe

practicalaspectsoneone'slife.Indiansvaluethewordsandadviceofmysticsaints
andhavefullfaithandbeliefthantheknowledgeoftheserishisisintuitivelyderived
fromacommunionwithahighermetaphysicalforceandthatthesewordscarrymuch
morewisdomanddeepertruththattheknowledgeofworldlywiseandrichpeople
(Ibid,p.49).Itistruethatthe"word"oftheteacherisreceivedthroughtheperceptive
process. But perception here implies intent listening, followed by reflection,
recollection,faith,intuitiveinsight.

The argumentative condition of the concentrated mind is that wherein it gets

engrossedinthethoughtsofthewordanditsmeaningandunderstanding.When
themindapprehendsawordandmeditatesuponits
 formandmeansandalsoupontheunderstandingofthetwo,itlosesitselfinthething.
(Ibid,p.100)

Thisknowledgeinfactreferstotheparaform:itistotalconsciousnessortotal
reahationthatbelongstotheregionofa"mysticalexperience".Whenreferringto
"hearing",itshouldnotbetakentoimplyordinaryhearing,but"listening"tothevery
voice of reality (i.e. sabda), by "revealing" its inner essence represented by the
embodimentofthehumansoulorthemicrocosm(Dalvi,2004, p. 3).Onemuststrive
to "perceive" the truth enshrined in one's self. Even today, in modernday Indian
society,thisepistemologicalviewisoperativeandinfluencesthepracticallifeofthe
Indianmassesandhasaffectedthedevelopmentandtransformationofthecourseof
Indianknowledge(Opcit,.p.192).

Itisonlywhenthisinnerwisdomlightsuptheselfthatthetruthisrevealedat
theleveloftheworldoffactandforminwhichonelivesandacts,andtheotherlevel
whichilluminatesthesoul.Herethepathofaction(karma)canguidetheknowerto
developamultilateraloutlook.Atthislevel,theindividualself,fieefiomillusion,
ceasestoexistasaseparateentity.Dualismdisappearsandtheselfsynthesizesall
informationleadingtorealizationordarsana.Thismethodofselfrealizationdoesnot
placeexclusiveemphasisandrelianceuponanyoneofthesourcesofknowledge.A
startmaybemadewiththeadoptionofonesource,orcombiningtheelementsofthe
othertwo,perceptionandlogic,sidebyside.Developmentofallthethreeaspectsof
reason,senseandthis"innerwisdom"inconcertsynthesizesinthepersonalityofthe
personharmony,equipoiseandastateofabidingbliss(Radhakrishnan,1980, p.106).

Intuitiveknowledgeitselfisaphenomenonthatcanberealizedonlywhenwe
outgrowthelimitationsofthetraditionalframeworkofourcognition.Thisbecomes
feasiblewhenourintellectalignsitselfwithoursoulandsensibility.Successinthis
venture may not at all easy as continued practice and discipline can allow us to
experiencethatmetaphysicalsource.Thishigherlevelofknowledgecanariseoristhe
outcomeofrigorousdisciplineofselfcontrolandmentalconcentrationwhichmay
requirespecialeffortandtraining.Enlightenmentisnotasdirectandsimpleasnatural
perception is. The methodology of the practice of meditation is essentially a
contemplative way to selfrealization of our intuitive essence. This "path of
knowledge'' was duly evolved fiom the traditional yoga whose goal was self
realization,ortheidentitywithBrahman.(Bishop,1975,p.242).
ThemainfeaturesandstagesoftheclassicalYogamaybesummarizedinthe

followingway;Practice.Theprocessstartswiththeinitiationofanindividualatthe
handsofaguruoraspiritualguide,whorecommendsaconstantrepetitionofamantra
withanaimtoproduceastateofconcentrationonthesound(sabda),orobjectof
thought.(Coster,1957,p.200).Thetruthisalreadypresent inone'sselfbutmustbe
helpedout.Mostpeoplearesubjecttoflashesofintuition,andwilladmitthemif
challenged;butfewhavepausedtoexamineintuitionandrecognizeitasdiffering in
quality,inkind,fiomordinarymentalexperience.Thismethodcatersfortheneedof
thoughtful reflection. The knower feels a presence in their heart and through this
knowledgetheyknowtheeternalself,Itisessentiallyanaffectivestateofthemind,

withoutanystrongelementofrationalizationinit.Intellectorwisdomisnotatadiscount
inthismethodofmeditation,butisratherupheldbyit.Thisselfrealizationispossibleto
anypersonthroughpractice.Yoganotonlyproducesharmonybutissensibleandrational
andwhenadoptedforrealization,canbeconsideredequivalenttointuition(Ibid,p.231).
 Spontaneousmediation: Thehigheststateof yoga is thatwherecontemplation
becomeautomatic.Thisstateofeffortlessmeditationisnotsoeasytoattaininalifefull
ofdistractions.It,nevertheless,isclaimedtobewithinthereachofeveryonewhoaspires
toitandvigorouslypursuesit(Lal,1978,p.219).Itshouldbekeptwellinmindthat
revelationdoesnotmeanthatanideashouldariseinthemindofapersonwhosets
themselftoponderoverathingas,forinstance,poetshavingthoughtouthalfaverseseek
theotherhalfintheirmindsandponderovertheotherhalf.Thisisnotrevelationbutis
theresultofreflection.Whenpeoplereflectuponsomethinggoodorbad,acorresponding
idea arises in their minds. With revelation, on the other, an energy link unites the
individualwiththeirinneressence,affordingoneanexperienceofAurobindo's

Purusottam(supermind).Hereone'spsychologygetstransformed.This"intuitionbrings
tomanthosebrilliantmessageswhicharethebeginningsofhishigherknowledge"andis
perhapsthehighestkindofexperiencethattheseekercanhopetoattain(Op.cit.,p.335).

Traditional yoga inpartsynthesizessomeofintuition'simportantfeatures.True

knowledgeisthatwhichemergesfromtheheartandregulatesandtrainsthebodyand
mind,andmanifestsinpractice.Notypeofknowledge,however,elementaryarrivesatits
climax without practice. For instance, we have always known that baking bread is
perfectlyeasyandinvolvesnogreatart.Allthatisneededisthatafterkneadingtheflour
andpreparingthedough,weshould&videitintoballsofpropersizeandpressingeach
ballbetweenourhandsshouldspreaditoutandplaceitonaproperlyheatedpan,and
moveitabouttillitisheatedintobread.Butthisisonlyacademicallyinstructive.When
without practical experience we start the process of baking, our first difficulty is to
preparethedoughinitsproperconditionsothatitneitherbecomestoohardnorremains
toosoft.Evenifwesucceedinpreparingthedoughaftermucheffortandweariness,
thebreadthatwebakemaybepartlyburntandpartlyunbakedwithlumpsalloverof
irregularshape,despiteourobservationoftheprocessofbakingoveraperiodofour
lifetime.Thusrelyinguponourbareknowledge,whichwehaveneverpracticed,we
would suffer a loss of a quantity of flour. If such is the case of our academic
knowledge in elementary matters,thenhowcanwe rely solelyonourknowledge
withoutanypracticalexperienceinmattersofgreatimportance?

Indian theories advocating this selfrevealing aspect of knowledge make a

distinction betweentranscendental consciousnessthatisneithersubjectnorobjectand
empirical consciousness which arises through the relation of sense organs to external
things.Whileempiricalconsciousnesscanbeanobjectofconsciousness,transcendental
consciousnessistheultimateprincipleofrevelationanddoesnotstandinneedofan
ulteriorprincipleforitsownrevelation(Radhakrishnan,1999,p.395).Pureconsciousness
isselfluminous.Thefoundationalknowledgeisnotwhatjustappearsintheshapeof
metal states in individual minds empirically determined but rather what pre
suppositionallystandsbehindsuchstates.Thisknowledgesubsistsbyitselfindependently
of empirical determination and objective reference. Empirical knowledge appears and
disappears while transcendental knowledge does not. It is eternal, selfrevealing and
cannotremainuncertified.Ifthefoundationalknowledgeisuncertified,theobjectitself
remainsuncertifiedthoughitmaybetrue.Foundationalknowledgecannot

becertifiedbyasecondaryknowledgenorcanitbeselfcertifiedinthesenseofbeingan
objecttoitself.Itisnotrevealedbyanythingotherthanitself(Hiriyanna,1951,p.307).
 This selfrevealing aspect of intuitive knowledge may be criticized on the
followinggrounds.Firstly,itleavesnoroomfordoubt.Ifknowledgeisselfrevealing,
thentherecanbenodoubtaboutanyperceivedknowledge.Inresponse,onecanargue
thatdoubtonlyinfectstheobjectofknowledge.Considerthesentence,"isthatdistinct

objectatreeoraman?"Thissentenceisequivalentto"Isthatdistantobjectknownbyme
atreeorman?" - whichclearlyprovesthatwehavenodoubtaboutknowledgeofthe
objectbutonlyabouttheobjectofknowledge.Itcanalsobearguedthatthetheoryleaves
noroomforillusionbecauseifknowledgeisselfrevealing,illusoryknowledgewillreveal
itself as such and consequently there would be no scope for illusion. Again, illusion
infectsonlytheobjectofknowledge,nottheknowledgeofobject.Intheclassiccaseof
thesnakeropeillusion,forexample,theknowledgeofthesame isnotdenied.Itisshown
bythewayinwhichillusioniscorrected.Whenonesays,"It isarope,notasnake",what
onereallymeanstosayis"whatIhaveknownisarope,notthesnake"(Sinha,1965,p.
89).Thethirdobjectionmaybethatitmakestheproposition"IknowthatIknow"quite
uselessasitimpliestworealmsofconsciousness.But"IknowthatIknow"doesnot
convey the existence of two consciousnesses, only of one consciousness, and if this
propositionisstatedinthisform,itisonlytosatisfytheopponentsoftheselfrevealing
argument,notitsexponents.Thecruxofthematter isthatintuitivecomprehensionisnot
knowninthewaywhichanobjectisknown.

Consciousnessandobjectarefeltintwohfferentattitudes.Consciousnessisfelt
insuchawaythatthisfeelingstandsidenticalwiththeconsciousnessthatisfelt.
Theformerattitudemaybecalledsubjectiveorinward,andthelatterobjectiveis
outward.Thesubjectiveattitudeisnotintrospection,ifbyintrospectionismeant
anawarenesswhichisconsciousnessforitsobject.Forasjustnoted,thebeingof
consciousnessisidenticalwiththefeelingofit.(Bhattacharya,1987,p.1)
 Initscomprehension,thereisnodistinctionbetweentherevealing&omthe
revealed,thoughsuchdistinctionisinevitablewhenwearetoexpressinitlanguage.

1.11Summary

To sum up the discussion on Indian epistemology in general and intuitive

knowledge specifically, I have referenced the Upanisads which on the whole regard
Brahmanasanobjectiveintelligencethatdevelopsitselfthroughthediverseformsofthe
manifold world until it attains the status of conscious intelligence in people. The
Upanisads maintain thatthespirit canberealized throughthemystic intuition, moral
elevationandcessationofalldesires.ThespiritoftheUpanisadshasnothingtodowith
reasonandisconnectedwithdialecticallawevolvingitselfintotwoformsofsubjective
and objective categories. The self in the Upanisads is selfcomplete and, as Spinoza
articulates,theInfiniteRealityisthecausasui,i.e."thathumanknowledgedoesnotpoint
toadivinerealitybutisitselfthatreality"(Tarnas,1991,p. 351).Matterandthoughtare
considered as itstwoattributesandstandindependentofeachother.Individualminds
exist,however,theyareonlyderivativesoftheInf~tSubstance,andthereforelimited
andimperfectbuttheUpanisadicidealismdoesnotconcurwiththeSpinozianconcept.
TheUpanisadsexpresstruthtoresideintheinnermostselfofmankindanddoubtlessly
upholds a causa sui for the reality but it is not its hndamental character, as it is
indescribable and beyond apprehension. It is pure consciousness and pure bliss. The
Upanisadsmaintainthattheinnerselfasthehighestrealityislikeanundisturbedand
dreamlesssleep.Itisiomthisstatethatallexperiencesandallobjectivephenomenaare

knownintheformoftwolevelsofknowledge;one,thatwhichisconfinedtowhatis
givenincommonexperience,aparaviz.,empirical,relatingtothetemporalandsecular
affairsofman;andtheother-parawhichtranscendsthisseeminglyempiricalreality.For
ourunderstandingofandforourcommonsensedealingswiththeempiricalreality,there
isnorequirementtohavecompleteknowledgeoftheobjectsofourexperience.Common
sense knowledge is sufficient to make ourlife workable and practicable at this level
reality.Forthissortofexistence,perceptionandreasonformgoodenoughmeansfor
validknowledge.Buttohavecompleteknowledgeofreality,anotherpramanaisrequired
which is the intuitive sense. By way of conclusion, I must remark that in Indian
epistemology, intuitive knowledge is given high value as one of the means to the
attainmentofcompleteknowledgeandconsideredimmenselyvaluablealongwiththe
otherpramanassuchaslogicandperception.Allareimportant.

It will be clear by now that epistemology is avast area in Hindu educational

philosophyandincludesmanydifferenceswithinit,bothobviousandsubtle.Mymain
contentionregardingintuitiveknowledgeisthatitmustnotberegardedasanalternative
toreason,normustitberegardedasawaytoknowledgeadoptedinmysticalexperience
asagainstphilosophicalendeavour.Byestablishingtherelationshipbetweenourintuition,
senses,andreasononamoresatisfactorybasis,aseriousbiastowardintuitivethoughtcan
beremoved.ThetraditioncarriedonbyIndianphilosophersisasynthesizedapproach;
rationalismandhumanism,realismandidealism,diversityinunityandharmonyofthe
individualandsociety.ThebasiccharacteristicofIndianeducationalphilosophyisrooted
initsculture.Indianepistemologyintegrateslife,alwayskeepingitseyeontotality:its
physical,mental,andmetaphysicalaspectsarea l linterrelated.

Whilelayingemphasisupontheinnerselfandourintuitiveknowledge,Indian
thinkersalsorecognizethevalueofrationalismandexperienceasequallyimportant
sourcesofknowledgeasallareexpressionsoftheUltimateReality,thetotalself.Forour
contemporarytimes,aschemeofknowledgeformulatingbothancientIndianwisdomand
modernWesternscientificthoughtcanbesynthesized.TraditionalIndianthoughtcanbe
reinterpreted as toharmonizewith"scientific"knowledgeandmakeitrelevantforthe
modernage.InthewordsofSriAurobindo"theaimandprinciplesoftrueeducationare
notcertainlytoignoremoderntruthandknowledgebuttoappreciatethefoundationsof
ourownbelief,ourownmindandownspirit"(Aurobindo,1952,p.4). An integrated
approachinknowledgewouldleadtoasynthesisandharmonybetweenthesciencesand
humanities.Thephilosophythatwouldemergeoutofthiswouldbeahealthyhsionof
forces between extremes ofspirituality andasceticism andrationalism. This does not
meanescapismnorisitnotopposedtologic,butwouldprovideinspirationandhopenot

onlytotheEastbuttotheWest asitseekstosetfreetheeducandfromtheshacklesof
materialisticbondageandawaywardpath.

An idealistic and integrated philosophy is possible. While pointing out the

limitationsofempiricalandrationalmethodsinphilosophyandacceptingtheirlimited
value,contemporary Indianphilosophershaveutilized theintuitivemethodwhichcan
delvedeepintotherecessesoftheSpirit.Torealizethis,onemustutilizemethodsthat
delve into their inner self, reaching deep to find the soul. "Reason works under the
limitation of senses and categories of mind, whereas intuition is free from all these
influences.Intuitionisintegralknowledgewhichabsorbssenseexperienceandreasonand
transcendstheirlimitations"(Sinha,1965,p.126.)Thus,onemustadvocatetheuseofan
integratedmethodinordertoarriveatacoherentandcomprehensivetheorynotonlyof
knowledgebutalsoofhumannature.Itistheintegratedaspect,amultisided
scheme of knowledge that is physical, mental, social, moral and spiritual, in its
outlook.Ifsuccessful,itwouldalmostleadtoarevolutionabouttheaims,ideas,and
curriculuminthefieldofeducation.

Withrespecttotheaimsinthesphereofknowledge,Indianphilosophershave
cometobelievethatthecurriculumandteachingmethodsshouldachieveamixtureof
thepastwiththepresentastotakeadvantageofthemeritsofeach.Thereisagrowing
inclinationinmodernIndianinfavorofintegrationineducationalphilosophy.Thisis
thereasoninspiteofincorporatingscientificknowledge,onefindselementsofalmost
allthetraditionalmethodsineventhemostrecentmethodsofteaching(Sahu,2002,p.
49).ThisistheeclectictendencyinIndianknowledgewhichcanalsobecalledthe
tendencyofcompromise.Undoubtedly,theeclectictendencyisbetterthanaonesided
viewbecauseitismorecomprehensive,liberal,andextensive.

Indianphilosophyoftenlookstoaneclecticperspectivetodiscovertheinnerkernel
whichisoftenmissedbythepureandsocialsciences.Itemphasizesthespiritualaspect asan
integratingprinciple;atheoryofhumannatureandknowledgethatincludesphysical,moral
and religious thought in tune to the spirit of Indian culture. The spokesman for this
philosophy, Dr. SarvepalliRadhakrishnan,hashadawideanddeepknowledgeofWestern
science,art,literatureandcultureandfirsthandcontactwiththe

West.ItishencethathistheoryofintuitioniscomparedwiththeviewsoftheWest
resultinginanintegratedviewpoint.Thus,onefindsameetingofancientIndianideals
andmodernwesternprinciples,individualismandsocialisminhiswriting. Dr.

Radhakrishnandrawshisinspirationfiomancientscriptures,theUpanisads,andblends
EasternandWesterneducationalphilosophybyreconcilingmodernthoughtwithancient
ideals(McDermatt,1997,p.37).Inhisprocessofreformulation,traditionalIndian
epistemologicalthoughtcanbesuccinctlyinterpretedinthelightofmodernscience
andwesternideology.

1.12RadhakrishnanandtheDoctrineofIntuition

RadhakrishnanwasarenownedIndianphilosopherwhoheldthecapacityasa
professorandvicechancellorinEasternandWesternuniversities.Alongwithhiswide
experience of the field of education, Radhakrishnan had extensive learning and deep
insightintoIndianandWesternphilosophy,ancientandcontemporary.Therefore,heis
undoubtedlyoneofthemostqualifiedpersonstospeakaboutIndianepistemologywith
authority.Hisviewsarefoundscatteredinvariousbookshewrotesuchas The

philosophyofRabindranathTagore,TheBhagavadGita,andEasternreligionand
Westernthoughttonamebutafew.
AccordingtoRadhakrishnan7sepistemology,theinnerSpirit,whichistheground

ofallbeingwithwhichaperson'swholebeingisunitedattheendoftheirjourney,
contributestotheirsenseofknowing."Whenbuddhivijaniintelligencehasitsbeing
turnedtowardstheself',thenRadhakrishnansays,"itdevelopsintuitionortrue

knowledge"(Ibid,p.153).Inotherwords,Radhakrishnanpresentshistheoryofinnate
knowledgebywayofspiritualknowledge,whichisnotmerelyperceptualorconceptual,
but logical insight. He thought the rationalists were not correct in giving supreme
importancetoreasoninthesenseofcriticalintelligence.However,healsoknewthatthe
driftofthemodernageanditsrulingmethodsofworksupportascientificmethod. Dr.
Radhakrishnan,however,didnotagreeonrelyingsolelyontherationalmethodbecause
heknewthatwhosewhoadoptthemethodandconceptionofanexactanddescriptive
scienceareobligedtoraisethefurtherquestionofthelimitationsandvalueofscientific
knowledge.Inhisview:

Whilethetheoriesofscienceareusefulastoolsforthecontrolofnaturethey
cannotbesaidtorevealwhatrealityis.Electronsandprotonsdonotclearup
themysteryofrealty.Besides,thesoulcannotbetreatedasamathematical
equation.Ourdeepestconvictions,forwhichwearesometimeswillingtodie,
arenottheresultsofrationalcalculation.Thedecisiveexperienceofpersonal
life cannot be comprehendedinformulas.Their drivingpower isin those
urgentandintimatecontactswithrealtywhichconveytousdeepcertainties
whichtransformourlives.Evenscientificrationalismrequiresustoadmitthe
actualityofsuchexperiencesandthephenomenalandincompletecharacterof
merely scientific knowledge. The fact of this integrated or intuitive
knowledgetellsusthatwearenothelplesslyshutoutfiomaninsightinto
realitybytheconstitutionofourmind.(Ibid,p.51)

Radhakrishnanstates,

ThewholecourseofHinduphilosophyisacontinuousconfurnationofthetruththat
insightdoesnotcomethroughanalyticalintellectalone,thoughitisaccessibletothe
humanmindinitsintegrality(Ibid,p.52).

Hefurtheradds,

Intuitiveknowledge,however,isnotopposedtointellectualknowledgeasBergson
sometimesmakesusbelieve.Inintuitiveknowledge,intellectplaysaconsiderable
part. If intuition is unsupported by intellect, it will lapse into selfsatisfied
obscurantism.Intuitionassumesthecontinuityandunityofallexperience.Intuition
tellsusthattheideaisnotmerelyanideabutafact."(Ibid,p.53)

RadhakrishnanwasanidealistphilosopherandanadvocateofancientIndian
Vedantaphilosophy. Thisisverymuchclearfiomhisworks,TheHinduViewofLife,
Brahmasutra,andAnIdealisticViewofLife.Hedefinedphilosophyasacombinationof
reflectionandintuition(Radhakrishnan,1980p.1516).Accordingto himtheaimof
philosophyistosearchthatsynthesiswhichmayincludeallknowledge:reason,logic,
faith,andexperience.Inhisepistemology,Radhakrishnanacknowledgedthevalueof
bothreasonandexperience, butstronglyacclaimed thevalueofintuitive knowledge.
Radhakrishnanviewedintuitiveknowledgeasthehighestknowledgewhichisgainedby
totalselfawarenessandismuchhlgherthananyotherexperiencegainedbyanypartof
man'sbeing(Ibid,p.47).Hisphilosophyhasbeenrightlyinterpretedasanintegrated
schemewhereanintuitiveexperiencefindsplaceforeveryothertypeofexperience.
MypurposeistoexamineRadhakrishnan'sanswertothequestionwhichhe

addressedhimselfinAnIdealisticViewofLife (Ha),namely"isthereoristherenot
knowledge which by its nature cannot be expressed in propositions and is yet
trustworthy"(Ibid,p.100).Radhakrishnanbelievedthattherecould beakindofnon
propositionalknowledge,whichistrustworthy.Hecontrastedintellectwithintuition
andsetupadefenseofintuitiveknowledgeoverrationalknowledge.

OnemaywithoutmuchadoagreewithRadhakrishnanwhenhesaysthatcognitive
experienceresultinginknowledge"isproducedinthreeways".Thesethreemodesof
acquisition of knowledge are "sense experience, discursive reasoning and intuitive
apprehension"(Ibid,p.105).Radhakrishnan'spramanatheorybeginsbystatingthatsince
senseexperienceistheresultofthecontactofoursenseswiththeobjects,itinitiallyleads
ustoperceptualknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Itprovidesusdataforourinvestigation
inthenaturalsciences.Senseexperienceisfoundationaltoourknowledge.Radhakrishnan
expresses the importance of sense experience since "everything is known to us only
through experience. Even such an abstract science as mathematics is based on the
experienceofstatedregularities"(Radhakrishnan,1955p.98)."Logicalknowledge" is
whatRadhakrishnaninAnIdealistViewofLifecallsrationalknowledgeandisarrivedat
bytheprocessofanalysisandsynthesis.Perceptual
knowledgeandlogicalknowledgearerelatedtooneanotherinthat"thatdatasuppliedto
us by perception are analyzed and the results of analysis yield a more systematic
knowledgeoftheobjectsperceived"(Ibid,p.106).Sincelogicalknowledgeistheproduct
ofourreflection,analysisandsynthesis,itisqualitativelymoredistinctthanourideasof
sense qualities or our perceptual knowledge. Logical knowledge "pieces together the
scattereddata,interpretsforusthelifeweharbourandthusfreesthesoulfromthebody...
(it)paysgreatattentiontothelogicofideas,drawsinferences,suggestexplanationsand
formulatestheorieswhichwouldintroducesomeorderintoshapelessmassofunrelated
facts"(Radhakrishnan,1999,p.672).Sincelogicalknowledgededucesrelationsbetween
ourobservations,orwhateverisgiventousandarticulatestheserelations,itis"indirect
and symbolic in its character" (Radhakrishnan, 1980, p.6). There is an intimate
relationship between logical or conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The
organicrelationshipbetweenthetwocanbestbeexpressedinKant'swords,"percepts
withoutconceptsareblind,conceptswithoutperceptsareempty"(Smith,p.75).These
twokindsofknowledgearegroupedunderthecategoryofknowledgewhichweacquire
byintellect.Knowledgeacquiredbyintellectisusefultousbecause"ithelpsustohandle
andcontroltheobjectanditsworkings",andithelpsusto"acquireforpracticalpurposea
controloverourenvironment"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.106).Italso"enablesustoknow
theconditionsoftheworldinwhichweliveandtocontrolthemtoourends"(Ibid,p.115).
Since"wecannotactsuccessfullywithout

knowingproperlyintellectisusefilforaction"(Ibid,p.115).Thus,hesaysitisnecessary
forustohaverationalknowledge.Thiskindofknowledgekeepsevolvingwithtimein
ordertomeetourchangingneedsandsituations.Itisnotstatic,butdynamic.Its
contentsvarywith"ourperceptions,ourinterestsandourcapacities"(Ibid,p. 113).
There is hardly any philosopher who will disagree with this "intellectual kind of
knowledge"whichcomprisesperceptualandconceptualknowledge,i.e.thesynthesis
of knowledge through the avenues of senseexperience and discursive or "logical
reasoning'.Thisintellectualkindofknowledgemeetstheconditionsofknowledge
laiddownandistheproductofacognitivesituation.

Radhakrishnan, however, feels that knowledge based on sense experience and

discursivereasoningorlogicisinadequate.Itdoesnotgiveustheobjectinitselfbuttells
usonlyofthequalitieswhichtheobjecthasincommonwithothersandprovidesuswith
adescriptionofitsrelation(Ibid,p. 121).Accordingtohim,"intellectualknowledgeis
inadequate,partial,fragmentarybutnotfalse.Itfailstorevealthetruthinitsfullness...It
can be trusted within limits" (Schlipp, 1952, Philosophy of Radhakrishnan, p. 792).
Intellectual knowledge by the operation of analysis reduces the object to previously
knownelements,i.e.tothoseithasincommonwithothers.It"breaksupitsunityinto
systemsofseparatetermsandrelations"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.134).This,accordingto
Radhakrishnanresultsin"thefalsificationofthereal"(Ibid,p.134).Hedoesnotonly
separateintellectualknowledgeontheabovegroundsbutalsoconsidersitasinadequate.
Heconsidersitinadequatebecause"whateverbetheobject,physicalornonphysical,

intellect goes about it, but does not take us to the heart of it" (Ibid, p. 1 06).
Unfortunately,Radhakrishnandoesnotexplainwhatitwouldbetogototheheartofthe
matter.Theotherreasonswhyheconsiders"intellectualknowledge"tobeinadequateisit
isa"mixtureoftruthanderror,for(init)practicalmotivesinterferewiththeunclouded
thought"(Ibid,p.124).Finally,"intellectualknowledge"isconsideredtobeinadequate
by Radhakrishnan because it is not able to comprehend the experience like love,
music,momentsofintensejoyandacutesuffering,parentalaffection,truth,beauty
and goodness,theideaoftheuniversal,etc.To understandeach oneofthese, he
arguesthatonehastonecessarilyundergothoseexperiences(Ibid,p.142).

Because of these shortcomings of this intellectual or rational knowledge,

Radhakrishnanarguesinfavorofintuitiveknowledge,i.e.knowledgebasedonintuition
orwhathecallsintheRecoveryofFaithandinFragmentsofaConfessionintegrated
insight.InReplytoCritics,hecategoricallystates"intuitionisoftwokinds,perceptual

knowledge and integrated insight. Personally, I use intuition for integrated

knowledge"(Op.cit. p.792).Whereas Bergsondefines intuition as that "bymeans of
which weproject ourselves into an object in order toachieve identification with that
element which is unique and which is expressible" (Friedlande, 1958, p. 214),
Radhakrishnandescribesit"asapowermoresuperiorthanintellectbywhichwebecome
aware of the real in its intimate individuality, and not merely in its superficial or
discernibleaspects"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.100).However,hedefinesintuitioninterms
ofan"integratedexperience"(Ibid,p.200),theexerciseofconsciousnessasawhole"
(Schillp,p.188),andtreatsitas"theextensionofperceptiontoregionsbeyondsense"
(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.193).Accordingtohim"intuition"isusedtocoverallcognitive
processwhichhasadirectnessorimmediacy,i.e.allnoninferentialcognition.Whatwe
knowbyinferenceorhearsayisnot"intuitiveknowledge"(Op.cit.,p.791).Intuitiongives
ustheknowledgeofthings"intheiruniqueness,intheirindefeasiblereality"andis"vital
incharactersinceitisexpressiveoflifeandnotmerelylogical
analysis"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.115).It"makesusseethingsastheyare,as
uniqueindividuals"(Ibid,p.138).

Intuitiveknowledge"isdifferentfromtheconceptual,aknowledgebywhichwe
seethingsastheyare,asuniqueindividualsandnotasmembersofaclassorunitsina
crowd.Itisnonsensuous,immediateknowledge"(Ibid,p.109).Knowledgebasedon
intuition"arisesfromanintimatefusionofmindwithreality.Itisknowledgebybeing
andnotbysensesorsymbols.It is astateofmind ...itbelongstothestructureofthe
mind"(Ibid,p.109).Intuitiveknowledge"bringsintoactivitynotmerelyaportionofa
consciousbeing,senseorreasonbutthewhole.Italsorevealstousnotabstractionsbut
therealityinitsintegrity"(Schillp,p.791).Thiskindofknowledgeputsus"intouch
with actual being" Radhakrishnan describes it as the highest knowledge which
"transcends thedistinction ofsubject"(hid,p.792).Itisduetothisknowledge"that
logicalknowledgeispossiblebecausethishighestknowledgeiseverpresent.Thus,itcan
only be accepted as foundational". According to him, "intuitive knowledge is a self
subsistent mode of consciousness different from the intellectual or the perceptual.
Whereasperceptiongivesustheoutwardpropertiesofanobject,andintellectdiscernsthe
lawsofwhichanobjectisaninstance,intuitiongivesdepths,meaning,charactertothe
object"(Schillp,p.792).Intuitiveknowledgeis'feltandaffirmedandnotderivedor

explained" (Radhakrishnan,1980,p.105).Itisasetof"convictions arisingoutofa

fullnessoflifeinaspontaneousway,moreakintosensethantoimaginationorintellect
and more inevitable than either" (hid, p. 142). Intuitive knowledge "discloses to us
eternity, timelessness in which time and history are included" (Schillp, p. 792).
Knowledgebasedonintuitionis"anintenseandclose,communionbetweentheknower
andtheknown".Inintuitiveapprehension"thereiscompletehsionofthesubjectandthe
object"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.138).Inintuitiveknowledge,"manceasedtobean
impartialspectator.Hiswholebeingisatwork,notmerelythepowerofobservationand
inference.Itisknowledgebycoincidence.Beingandknowingaredifferentaspectsof
oneexperience.Itissomethingmostimmediateandmostprofound(Schillp,p.792)."It
isanawarenessofthetruthofthingsbyidentity. Webecomeonewiththetruth,one
withthe object ofknowledge" (Op. cit.,p.138).Havingsaidallthis,however,
Radhakrishnanissilentabouthowthisfusionofmindresultinginintuitiveknowledge
takesplace.
Radhakrishnan'spreferenceforintuition,however,isnotwithoutdifficulties.He
admitsasBergsondoes,thattheintellectisneededtoexpresstheintuitiveexperiencein
intelligibleandcognitivelysignificantterms.InhisReplytoCriticshewrote,

Theimmediacyofintuitiveknowledgecanbemediatedthoroughintellectual
definitionandanalysis.Weuseintellecttotestthevalidityofintuitionand
communicatethemtoothers.Intuitionandintellectarecomplementary.We
have to recognize that intuition transcends the conceptual expressions as
realityanddoesnotfitintocategories."(Schillp,p.794)

OnemayreasonablysaythatRadhakrishnanagreedwithSchopenhauerwhenthe
latersaidthatinintuitionthereisa"suddentransitionfromthecommonknowledgeof
particularthingstotheknowledgeofide=...Theknowledgetakesplacesuddenly;for
knowledgebreaksfreefromtheserviceofthewill"(Schopenhauer,1883,p.34).For
Radhakrishnan"the successfulpractice of intuition requires previous study and
assimilationofamultitudeoffactsandlaws,intuitionarisesoutofamatrixof
rationality"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p. 139).WhereasforSchopenhauerintuitionwill
emerge"if(aperson)givesthewholepowerofhismindtoperception,sinkshimself
entirelyinthis,andletshiswholeconsciousnessbefilledwithquietcontemplation"

(Op.cit,p.34),Schopenhaueriscertainthatthenatureofgeniusconsistsinapreeminent
capacity for such contemplation (Ibid, p. 36). However, u&ke Schopenhauer,
Radhakrishnan does not seem to be sure about the nature of persons who can have
intuitiveknowledge.ForinIndianPhilosophy,Vol. I,(1999)hesaysthat,"manhas
thefacultyofindividualthoughtormysticintuitionbywhichhetranscendsthedistinction
ofintellectandsolvestheriddleofreason"(p.36),implyingtherebythateverypersonhas
thecapacityofintuition.Butintheverynextsentencehesays"thechosenspiritsscalethe
highestpeakofthoughtandintuitsreality"(Ibid,p.36)implyingtherebythatintuitive
knowledgeisonlyforafew.Oneofthecharacteristicsofknowledgeisthatanyonewith
sometrainingisinprincipleabletograspit.Wouldwebejustifiedincallingintuitive
knowledge,whichisexpressedbyafewthroughtheirownspecialmethodsandwhichin
principlecannotbeadoptedbyall,knowledge?Tograspit,onehasto beeitheragenius
orachosenspirit.Byitsverynature,intuitiveknowledgeistobeexperienced;itistobe
felt. In it, "there is something incommensurable, eluding expression in words"
(Radhikrishnan,1980,p.148).Likemanyothergreattruthsofphilosophyitisnottobe
"provenbutseen"(Ibid,p.150).Asweknow,communicability,anexpressioninwords,
orarticulationis an integralpartofacognitivesituation.But, an intuitiveexperience
should not be rejected as a valid form of genuine knowledge just on that ground.
Similarly,Radhakrishnantriestosavesucharejectionofintuitiveknowledgebysaying
that "certainty and not communicability is the truest test of knowledge and intuitive
experiencehasthesenseofassuranceorcertaintyandis
thereforeaspeciesofknowledge"(Ibid,p.114).
 Letusnotexaminethepossibilityofprovingitscertainty.Letusnotbeginby
rejectinga priorithataclaimbasedonintuitionisnotknowledge.Onthecontraryletus
beginbyadmittingthatsomeknowledgesayaboutselforvaluesisobtainedbyaspecial
intuition.Nowthisdiscoveryhastobearticulatedinpropositionstoseewhethertheyare
verifiedorconfusedbyexperience.ThisstepisacceptedbyRadhakrishnanwhenhesays
that"knowledgewhenacquiredmustbethrownintologicalformandweareobligedto
adaptthelanguageoflogic,sinceonlylogichasacommunicablelanguage"(Ibid,p.140).
ButifweaskRadhakrishnantoputtheintuitiveknowledgeintopropositionsallthathe is
abletoproduceispropositionslike"Ihaveadirectandimmediateexperienceofthefact
thattheuniverseisgood,spiritualandinsomesensepersonal"(Ibid,p.109).Hethentries
tohidehisfailuretoproducethekindofpropositionsweareaskinghimtoproduceby
sayingthatintuitiveknowledgeis"theonlytruthwehave;allelseisinferential"(Ibid,p.
109).Hegoesontoaddthat"wecannotverifyitandthereforecannotdisputeitasit
transcendsthepartialtruthsofthedividedmind;theintellectualandthesensuous".Itisa
kindofknowledgethatistobeprovedonourpulses".Weneedaveryspecialsubjective
method of proving it because "it is the only kind of absolute knowledge" which "is
possibleonlywhentheindividualisfullyaliveandbalanced".It

canbeseen"trulyonlywhenourinnerbeingisharmonized"sinceitrepresents"the
ultimatevisionofourprofoundestbeing"(Ibid,p.114).Togetoverthischargeof
subjectivity, Radhakrishnan tries to universalize his personal experience which is
embeddedin"Ihavedirectandimmediateexperienceofthefactthattheuniverseis

good,spiritualandinsomewaypersonal"byleapingbackandforthfrom"Istatements"
to"westatements"(Ibid,p.140).Thisleap,however,isunjustifiedsincethe"I
statements"mayormaynotbeofpsychologicalinterest,whichiscapableofneithertest
norproof,andwhichhasnoscientificorintellectualinterestorimportance.Allthatone
cansayofitisthatitmayormaynotbetrue.Buttheuseofthe"westatements7'"implies
that"we"means"everyone"andfurtherthatthedirectperceptionofeveryonethatthe
universeisgoodisaguaranteethattheuniverseisgood(Ibid,p.139).

Thecriterionofcertaintyavailabletoanintuitionististheirownsayingthatthey
knowthattheyhadaparticularintuition.Thereisnootherpubliccheck,nootherwayof
certifyingtheirclaimotherthantheirsayingso.Bydefinition,whateveroneclaimstobe
truehastobetrue.Butjustas"theguaranteebythecompanyofitsproductsisnoproof
thattheproductissound;theguaranteeofintrinsiccertaintyhastobeintermsofsome
wellknowncommonstandard(Lehrer,1978,p.132).Dependingsolelyupontheclaim
and authority of the persons who experience the intuitive knowledge for certainty, it
wouldbelikebuyingseveralcopiesofthesamenewspapertoconfirmanewsitem.

Radhakrishnan fails to produce any intelligible proposit ions, other than

dogmaticallyassertingandreassertingtimeandtimeagain,propositionscontainingterms
like"selfluminous","direct","unmediated","spiritual","selfcontained",etc.alongwith
statementslike,"intuitionisnotlogicalbutsupralogical,itisthewisdomgainedbythe
whole spirit which is above any more fragment thereof, be it feeling or intellect7'
(Radhikrishnan,1980,p.116)or"intuitionsupervenesonintellectualanalysis"(Ibid,p.1
17).Theuseofsuchtermsandstatementsleadsonetosaythathisintuitionhasnot

revealedtohimanyfacts.Forifhereallyhadacquiredanyinformation,hewouldbeable
toexpressit.Hewouldbeabletoindicateinsomewayorotherhowthegenuinenessof
hisdiscoverymightbeempiricallydetermined.Radhakrishnanseemstobeinadilemma
herewhenheadmits,"theimmediacyofintuitiveknowledgecanbemediatedthrough
intellectualdefinitionandanalysis.Weuseintellecttotestthevalidityofintuitionand
communicatethemtoothers.Lntuitionandintellectarecomplementary"(Tillich,1963,p.
253). His failure to supply criteria for verification of intuitive knowledge and
communicatetoothersthecontentsofintuitiveknowledgemakehimsayintheverynext
sentence, "we have of course to recognize that intuition transcends the conceptual
expressionsasrealitydoesnotfitintocategories"(Schilpp,PhilosophyofRadhakrishnan,
p.794).Notonlyishenotabletoarticulatewhatheknows,healsodoesnotdevisean
empiricaltesttovalidatehisknowledgesomuchsothathedoesnothaveanymethodto
knowwhetherwhathecallsknowledgetodaywasthesamewhathecalled

knowledgeatapastoccasion.Astoprovidingajustificationtoothersforhisclaimsof
knowledge,nocriterionofjustificationhasbeenprovided.Thereby,Radhakrishnan
fails to show that intuitive experience is available for anyone other than his own
satisfaction and that intuitive experience is a cognitive state at all. So when an
intuitionistdescribestheirvisiontous,theymayatthemostbedescribingtoustheir
mentalstate.Radhakrishnan'sdescriptionoftheexperiencemaybeinterestingfrom
thepsychologicalpointofviewbutitdoesnotinanywayconfmthatthere issucha
thingasintuitiveknowledge,atleastaccordingtoWesternrulesoflogic.

Radhakrishnanmaydismissthisattackonhistheoryofintuitiveknowledgeby
saying"Nologicalknowledgeispossiblewhichisnotunderlaidbyintuitiveknowledge
(Radhikrishnan,1980,p.124).Hedefendsintuitiveknowledgebysaying"ifintuitive
knowledgedoesnotsupplyuswithuniversalmajorpremises,whichwecanneither
questionnorestablish,ourlifewillcometoanend(Ibid,p.155)andbyarguingthatthe
validityofthehighestideaisnotderivedfromthesenseorprovedbylogic.Itisself
establishedbythereasonof"thesoul'strustinitself'(Ibid,p.124)therefore,neitherthe
condition ofknowledge northecomponents ofacognitive situation areapplicable to
intuitiveknowledge.Butthenwhathashebeentryingtodothroughout?Hashenotbeen
trying tofind alogical account ofintuition andintuitive knowledge? Surprisingly,in
RecoveryofFaith,RadhakrishnanquotesonlythefirstpartofwhatWittgensteinsaysin
Tractatus logicophilosophicus (TLP) 6.52, namely, that "we feel that even when all
possiblescientificquestionshavebeenanswered,theproblemsofliferemaincompletely
untouched" (Radhakrishnan, 1955, p. 76). He tries to prove that Wittgenstein also
supportshisthesisabouttheundernonstrabilityoftheknowledgeofultimatevalues,i.e.
thingsknownbyintuitionofobjectivescience.IfhehadquotedTLP6.52initsentirety,
onewouldeasilyseethatWittgensteindoesnotsupportRadhakrishnan'sdoctrine,rather
hesaysthatnothingisleftoutsidetheambitofscience.Thefulltextreads,

Wefeelthatevenwhen all possiblescientificquestionshavebeenanswered,

theproblemsofliferemaincompletelyuntouched.Ofcoursethereareoftenno
questionsleft,andthisitselfistheanswer.(Wittgenstein,1994,6.52)

RatherthanmisrepresentingWittgensteinbyquotinghalfofhisthoughtitwould

havebeenbetterifRadhakrishnanhadheededWittgenstein'sadviceinTLP 7,"What
wecannotspeakaboutwemustpassoverinsilence"(Wittgenstein,1994).Itwould
havesavedhimsomuchofsomething,whichislogicallyincommunicable.

Inourscientificdiscourse,ofcourse,wedonotanswerthequestion,"Howdo you
know?'bysayingthatweknowbyintuition.That is meaninglessbut in allsuchcases
wherewesaythatsomethingisknownbyintuitionisnotsayinghowitisknown.The
additionoftheexplanatoryphraseservesonlytodenyanexplanation.Whenwesay
"weknowbyintuition",theexpressionbyintuitionisnotmeanttoindicatethesource
fiomwhichweknowbutitonlyexpressesthatwehavenoexplanationwithrespecttothe
sourceofknowledge.Soinanswering"weknow byintuition" wehavesaidnothmg
whatsoever regarding the source of our knowledge. To say that there can be direct,
unmediatedexperienceswithoutsubstantiatingitwouldbemisleading.Allexperienceis
processedthrough,organizedbyandmakesitselfavailabletousinextremelycomplex
epistemologicalways,thisnotionofunmediatedexperiencewithoutqualificationseemsif
notselfcontradictory,atbestempty.

1.13Radhakrishnan'sPhilosophyofMind

Radhakrishnan'sviewofintuitiveknowledgeisbasedonthefactssupportedby
Hindu philosophy. His epistemology (theory of intuition) and metaphysics (theory of
BrahmanAtman)aremutuallydependent.Thecaseofintuitionpresupposestherealityof
theAbsoluteorBrahman,theintuitionofwhichisthesourceandobjectofallknowledge.
Similarly,themetaphysicalclaimsforBrahman,thelevelofrealitywhichitincludes,
presupposesthegreatreligiouspersonalities,suchastheseers(orrishis)whoseinsights
areexpressedintheUpanisads,haveovercomemayaortheappearanceofrealityand
haveachievedselfrealization.AccordingtoRadhakrishnan,recognitionoftheintuitive
experience is precisely what contrasts Indian fiom Western philosophy. By valuing
intuitionoverintellect,heisattemptingtoreversewhatheconsidersthecharacteristically
Westernperspective(Radhikrishnan,1980,p.129).Radhakrishnan'stheoryofintuition
and theory of BrahmanAtman originated fiom and are related to his concepts of an
integratedsystemofknowledge,spirituality,andethicsaswitnessedby
hisstatementsthat,"Knowledgeofrealityistobewonbyspiritualeffort.Onecannot
thinkones'wayintoreality,butcanonlyliveit"(Ibid,128).

LetmeconcludethiscritiqueregardingtheplaceofintuitioninRadhakrishnan's
philosophyofmind.Helaysgreatstressandholdswithgreatconviction"thatintuitive

insightisagreaterlightintheabstruseproblemsofphilosophythanlogicalunderstanding"
(Ibid,p.100).ButallthatRadhakrishnanclaimstohavedoneinhiswork
istotrytoexplainthatinsightinthemodernidiom. Mycontention,however,isthat

Indianepistemologyhasaplaceforanintuitive"visionoftruthinlogicalargument
andproof'(Ibid,p.100).ThetheoriesofIndianphilosophywhch Ihavediscussedin
Part1commonlyshareadifferentapproachtoknowledge.Theveryawarenessthat
there actually exists another approach may break the acknowledged insularity of
certaincontemporaryWesternphilosophersandtheconsequentnarrowviewofthe
origins of knowledge which they have (Tarnas, 1991, p. 1). The viability and
desirabilityofanintegratedapproach,ifestablishedalongWesternlinesoflogic,may
beseenasapowerfulcritiqueofthetwophilosophicalapproaches,rationalismand
empiricism,andtheassociatedviewofknowledgewhichissuefiomthem.
 PARTTWO-WESTERNPHILOSOPHY

2.1 Introduction

Inthecaseofacomplexphilosophicallepistemologicalthemelikethatofintuitive
knowledge,Ibelievethatoneofthemostusefulwaysofclarifymgthenatureofthe
fundamental issue at stake is an analytical investigation. This would bring out the
development of "the problem" and reveal the process of refinement and precise
formulationandgiveourphilosophicalinvestigationanewperspectiveonthesystematic
questionatstake.Inthecaseofanargumentforrecognitionofintuitiveknowledgeinthe
West,thereisarichtraditionofdebatefiomdaysofthepreSocraticperiodonwards.
Thus,accordinglyChapter1ofthisPartwillattemptthiskindofanalyticalclarification.
In the following chapters, I have selectively focused on certain major stages in the
developmentoftheintuitivedoctrine,namelythediscussionsinthephilosophyofRene
DescartesandJohnLocke.Havingmadeathoroughstudyofintuitionin

Radhakrishnan'sthoughtsandfindingwhatwaslivingandwhatwaslackingmaybea
wayofincorporatingtheparticularviewsofphilosophersJeanPiaget,EdmundHussurl
andLudwigWittgenstein.Thiswouldtherebyprovideacompletetheoryofintuition,at
leastonewhichmaystanduptothescrutinyof"Western"standards.

Onthebasisoftheprecedingdiscussionof"theproblem",Iformulate anew
perspectiveoftheconceptofintuitiveknowledgewhichIcallan"Integratedtheoryof
Intuition".ThisreformulationisinspiredbytheRadhakrishnanparadigmofmetaphysical
thinkingwhichIcritiquedearlierasconfusingandcontentious.Whenthequestionis
6
9
posedastowhat is intuitiveknowledge,theUpanisadicformulationsleadustothe
axiological,theological,andmetaphysicallevelwherethetranscendentalformulations

operate. What is lacking is the "scientific" aspect, which will provide the "critical"
meaningofintuition.Apartfromgivingusanewformtothedoctrine,itwillalsogiveus
acluetothepossibilityofdevelopinga"critical"conceptionofintuition.Inthischapter,

theinnateelementinknowingisseenintermsofthea priori synthesiswhichisthe

groundofthepossibilityofknowledge.Theconceptofintuitiveknowledgepresentlyhas

apurelyepistemicsignificanceasstandingforthesyntheticactivityofthemindwhich
isthe very presupposition and grounds of knowledge. This conceptiongets fkther
supportandprecisionintermsofthreephilosophicaldevelopments:Phenomenology,
Geneticepistemology, and Analytical philosophy. These developments bear upon
differentaspectsofthemetaphysicalmodeofthinking;theygiveprecisionandamore
exactformtothebasicideasofRadhakrishnan.Thesecontemporarilymovementsof
thought,therefore,bringouttherelevanceofourpresentphilosophicalconcern,but
alsosuggestpossibilitiesoffurtherdevelopment.
Althoughthesediscussionsformanimportantandintegratedpartofthestructure
ofmyresearch,Ihavebeenselective.Myintentionisnottoprovide anexhaustiveand

normativelycompleteaccount,I am consciousthatIhavenotprovidedadiscussionofthe
historyoftheprobleminallitsdetailsandcomplexities.Evenwithinthelimitsof aparticular
thinker or period, I do not aim to cover all aspects of the particular treatment of the
problem.Forexample,withreferencetoWesternepistemology,IwilltouchonlyonLocke
and Descartes. Similarly,whiledealingwith Indianepistemology, Iconcentratedonlyon
Radhakrishnan.Butperhapsthemostimportantlimitationisintermsofusing
ancientIndianphilosophy.Theselimitationsandselectivityisduetothebasicintention
ofthe project, namely, to bringoutthe "metaphysical" character ofintuition andthe
valuesweassigntoourmodesofknowing.Thus,Ifocusonthe"critical"meaningofthe
doctrine concerning the grounds of the possibility of knowledge. Naturally, I have
thereforeconcentratedonlyonthosecontextualaspectswhichbearuponthemethodical
andepistemologicalheartoftheproblem.ThesameintentionalsoexplainswhyIhave
notconsideredcertaincontemporaryphilosophicalviews,suchasthoseofHenriBergson.
Thesedevelopmentsnodoubthavegreatimportanceandinterestontheirown,butasI
trytoshowinthechaptertitled,"APossibleIntegration",myprimaryconcerniswith
thetranscendentaltransformationofthemeaningandvalueofintuitivethoughtbrought
aboutbyIndianphilosophy.Letusbeginthischapterintheformofacriticalsearchfor
thedoctrineofintuitiveknowledgeintheWesternworld

2.2 IntuitiveKnowledgeintheWest

Averymisleadingandsuperficialviewassumesintuitiveknowledgetobemerely
ofantiquarianinterestintherealmofRomanticismandhasnosystematicrelevancefor
ourpresentmodernday(Tarnas,1991,p.375).However,theconventionalopiniononthis
matter isinaccurate andmisleading onbothhistorical andsystematic grounds.Inthe
historicalaspect,theuntenabilityoftheroleofintuitionisfar&ombeingclearandsettled
intheformthattheWesthasactuallyheld.Itwastherealizationofitscomplexitythat
motivatedmetostudythecontextualaspectoftheproblemformedintheIndianand
Western worldview. When I began to undertake such a study, I was coming to the
realization that the doctrine of intuition is in fact the foundational question of
epistemology.Forinintention,ifnotinactualformulation,thequestionatissuehereis
thenonempiricalconditionsofthepossibilityofexperienceandknowledge.Ibelievethis
isthebasicissuewhichthedoctrinehasattemptedtotackle,henceIconsiderthedebate
overtheconceptofintuitiontobeoneofthoseultimateandcrucialdebateswhichshape
andstructurethedevelopmentofnotmerelyepistemologicalreflection,butofphilosophy
itself.There is anunderliningsystematiccontinuitywhichpersistsinspiteofcultural
differences.Icallthiscontinuity,acontinuityoffunction,forinbothcontexts,thebasic
philosophicalquestioninvolvedisthecondition(s)ofthepossibilityofexperienceand
knowledge.Thoughthisinvariantquestionhasreceiveddifferentcontextualformulations,
nevertheless,ithasathreadofcontinuityinallthedebates.Accordingly, I believethat
bothfromthesystematicandculturalpointsofview,adiscussionofintuitionislikelyto
bearichsourceoffreshandsuggestiveillumination.

2.3 TheBasisofKnowledge

The word "epistemology" is derived from the Greek root "epitome" meaning
knowledgeand"logos"meaningstudy,indicatingastudyofknowledge4. Itisanaccount
ofamentalactivity,whichoperatesnecessarilyinrelationtowhatisknown.Thepeculiar
characteristicofknowledgeissuchthatitinnotanentityinitself intheway"reality"is
anentityinitself.Itinvolvesquiteafewfactorswhenanalyzedcarefdlycanleadtoa
differentcomprehensionofknowledgealtogether.Theproblemofdefiningthenatureand
source of knowledge exist in almost all societies. Sometimes people misconceive
bbknowledge"inareasinwhichamindcannothaveknowledgebutcanhaveonlybelief,
anopinionoranintuitivehunch.Itwillbeworthwhiletodistinguish
schematicallyseveralquestionspertainingtoknowledgebyananalysisofthe
concept,sothatthemainfocusoftheensuingdiscussionmaybeclearlyindicated.

With any knowledge,theobjecthasthepossibilityofnotbeingtruewhilethe

subject'sclaimsittobetrue.Theterm"know"isgenerallyusedtoshowthatwehavea
specialsortofcompetence.Forexample,whenonesaysthat"Iknowhowtodrive"or"I
knowthemultiplicationtable",theyareimplyingthattheyknowhowtodosomething.
The other sense of "know" is used to show that we are acquainted with whatever is
claimedtobeknown.Forexample,theterm"know"isusedwhenonestatesthat "Iknow
the professor of education". In this case, the use of "know" is used in the sense of
"knowingthat".However,itshouldbenotedthatthetwosensesof"know"thatisbeing
distinguishedisnotexhaustiveas"theterm"know"maybeusedinmorethanoneofthese
sensesinasingleutterance"(Lehrer,1978,p.2).Thethirdsenseinwhichweusetheterm
"know"istoshowthatwehavethenecessaryinformation.Forexample,whenonesays
that,"Iknowthattheearthrevolvesroundthesun",or"Iknowthattheearthattracts
everythingtowardsitscenter".Itshould,however,benotedthatthe"informationsense"
oftheterm"know"isoftenimplicatedintheothersensesoftheword"(Ibid,pp.23).As
aresult,theinformationsenseofknow"isfundamentalforhumancognitionandrequired
fortheoreticalspeculationandpracticalinvestigation"(Ibid,p.3).

Irrespectiveofthesenseinwhichthetermknowledgeisused,inordertoqualify
asknowledge,aclaimhastosatisfythefollowingconditions;(1)truthcondition
(2)certaintycondition(3)justificationcondition.Aclaimwouldqualifyto
bea
"knowledgeclaim"ifandonlyifwhateverisclaimedtobeknownistrue,itcanbetrue
eitherintheabsolutesenseasin"itistruethatthesnowiswhite"istrue.Theformermay
becalledabsoluteconceptionoftruth"becausethereisnoreferencetoalanguage,
ortoanypartoflanguage,andthusthisconceptionoftruthisnotinanyway
relativetoalanguage,ortoanypartoflanguage,andthusthisconceptionoftruth
is not in anywayrelativetoalanguageorthemeaningofanyofthetmina
language"(Ibid,p.11).Thelatteriscalledsemanticconceptionoftruth"because
thetruthofasentencedependsnotonlyuponthefactsbutuponwhatthesentence
means,uponthesemanticsofthesentence"(Ibid,p.11).Whetherthesentence
"snowiswhiteistruedependsnotonlyuponthesnowanditscolourbutuponthe
meaningofthesentenceandthewordscontainedtherein"(Ibid,p.11).

Onecannotclaimtoknow"unlessoneiscompletelysureofit"(Ayer,1956,
p.16).Beingsureiswhatdistinguishesknowledgefiombelief.Onecancontinue
tobelieveinsomethingaboutwhichheisnotcompletelycertainand"admitto
whatonebelievestobetruemaynevertheless be falsebutthisdoesnotapplyto
knowledge"(Ibid,p.16). In thecaseofknowledge,to"sayofoneselfthatone
knewthatsuchandsuchastatementwastruebutthatonewasnotaltogethersure
ofitwouldbeselfcontradictory"(Ibid,p.16).

Whateveroneclaimstoknowonemustbeabletojustify.Ayerconsidersitasthe
righttobesurecondition(Ibid,p.16).Whateveronemaycallthiscondition, ineffectit
meansthatoneshouldbeabletogivetheevidenceonwhichone'sclaimtoknowledgeis
based.Thisisespeciallysowhentheclaimtoknowledgeisdisputed.Somethingwould
countasevidenceifandonlyifitisknowtobetrue.Thejustificationconditionwould
alsobemetifweareabletoshowthattheclaiminquestioniscoherentwithinasystemof
beliefs.ThoughRadhakrishnanatnoplaceexplicitlystatedtheconditionsof
knowledge,inoneofhisassertions,namely"certainty...isthetruesttestofknowledge"
(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.14)heseemsto be covertlyagreeingwiththenecessaryand
sufficientconditionslaiddownabovefordeterminingalegitimateclaimforknowledge.
Afterabriefdescriptionofthenecessaryandsufficientconditions ofknowledge,the
cognitivesituationwilldepictthefollowinginterrelatedfactors:asubjectthatknows,an
act of knowing, a content of knowledge, object of knowledge and finally language
(Bhattacharya,1987,p.62).Inthepresenceofthese,knowledgetakesplace.

2.4 ClassicalWesternEpistemology

Apart fiom the difficulty of defining knowledge, there is also the source of
knowledge. Rationalism and empiricism are generally recognized as the sources of
knowledgeinmodernWesternthought,butthishasnotalwaysbeenthecase.Goingback
totheClassicalperiodtothetimeofHomerandotherearlyGreeks,knowledgewas
considered that which was acquired by "personal experience" (Hussey, 1990, p. 13).
Socrates, muchlike the ancient seers ofIndia, gavenogeneral reasons fordisputing
humanclaimstoknowledge.Knowledgeforhimwasthatwhichis"justifiable"bya

method of crossexamination. Thus, for him, knowledge was "examined true belief'
(Woodruff,1990,p.65).Socratesconsideredasortofknowledgethatwasalwayspresent
inaperson,butnevertaught.Whenconsideringquestionsastohowthisknowledgewas
tobeacquired,hearguedlearningisactuallytherecollectionoflessonslearnedbefore
birth. The theory of recollection is a process of gaining knowledge in this life by
recollectingwhatthesoulknewpriortothepresentlife.Thus,itisatheorywhich

advocates the knowledge is a priori in the sense that its source is independent of
experience.Thenatureofthistheoryismadeclearinthecourseofthedialoguebetween
Socratesandtheslaveboyin Meno. Anignorantslaveischosenforthepurposewhohad
nopreviousknowledgeofgeometrybutrecognizedthedifferencebetweenindubitable
trueandfalsepropositions broughttohisnoticeforthefirsttime.Thsrecognition,
withoutthepreviousknowledgeofgeometry,impliesthatthetruthwasapossessionof
the soul incarnated in human form. It also implies that the truth is still in the soul,
otherwisetherewouldbenopossibilityofelicitingthisinthislife.Thus,Plato'sclaimis

that all knowledgeis apriori. Themainpointisthatthetheoryofrecollectiondoes

implysomeconceptionoftranscendentreality.Socratesinfactassumesthatthesoul
wouldhavebeeninastateofknowledgeforalltime,evenbeforebirth.Theslaveinthe
Menopossessedtheknowledgebecausehehadalreadylearntit.Thus,"thetheoryof
Anarnnesislogicallyinvolvesbeliefintranscendentforms"(Ross,1951,p.35).

Socrates'theoryisclearenoughthoughhe,likeRadhakrishnan,didnotsayhow
hethoughtso.It,nevertheless,entailedthatapersonwouldhavetruebeliefsofwhatthey
arenotawareofandthatafterbecomingawareofsuchbeliefsandbeingquestioned
aboutthem,theymaycometoknowinthefullsensethesubjectofthosebeliefs.From
this,itcanbeconcludedthatonemayknowthingsthatonewasnevertaught.

Platowasanotherphilosopherwhoalsoheldthattrueknowledgeisinnate.He
arguedthatknowledgedidnotcometothesoulatorafterbirth."Infact,itisapartof
thesoulitself,andisalwayswiththesoul" (Op.cit.,p.83).Thisconceptionhadled
himtoconcludethatthesoulexistedbeforethebodyandduringtheprenatalexistence
itlearnedallthatwithwhichitisfamiliarinthisworld.But,howdidthisinnate
knowledgecametothesoulintheformerstateofbeing?Platoalsodidnotprovidean
answertothisquestion.
 Platohadspokenofthreekindsofknowledge.Thefirstkindofknowledgeisthat
whichcomesthroughsenses.Forhim,theknowledgethatisderivedthroughthesensesis
nottrue,becausesensesarenotalwaystrue.Thesecondkindofknowledgeisthatof

opinionregardingthings.Anopinionaboutthingsmaybevaluableincertainsituations,
butitcannotbetrueknowledge,nor is itinnate.Thethirdkindofknowledge,which
aloneistrue,isinnateandisinthemind.Allmathematicaltruths,generalconcepts,

absoluteandabstractideasfallwithinthiscategory(Ibid,p. 85). Absoluteideasabout

beauty,justice,goodnessareneveracquiredthoughexperience.Theyareinnateandin

thepossessionoftheminditself,independentofexperience(Ozman,1990,p.2).ToPlato,
therearetwokindsofworlds -theworldofideasandtheworldoftheobjectsofsenses.The
worldofideasisrealandtheotherisonlyashadoworphenomenal.Theworldofideasis
eternal,spaceless,andunchangeable.Itistheworldofthemind,aworldofabstractthought.
Absolute ideas are entities in themselves and form an organic whole, a World of
Ideas. ToPlatoideasareinterrelatedinadivineorderorperfectmind.Theworldof
"ideas"isthemindofGod.Ideasareeternaldivinethoughts;theyaregods

(Ibid,p.3).Platonicidealismregardsthattruerealityisthought,andtherefore,is
spiritual.ThustoPlato,thoughtaloneistrueandperfectanddoesnotbelongtothe
materialworld.

IncontrasttoPlato,noneofAristotle'smajorworkshadasitscentraltopicthe
natureofknowledge.Hedidnotseektoarguethatknowledgeispossible,butassumedits
possibility(Taylor,1990,p.116).Therearetwoconstituentsofhumanlifewhichmakes
itsupremelyworthliving-excellenceofcharacterandintellectualexcellence(Ibid,
p.117).InAristotle'sterminology,whatisknown(orknowable)iswhatcanbetaught
andlearned.Thenecessarytruthscanbelearnedinpreciselytwowayseitherby
deductionorbyinduction.Ineithercase,onelearnsbymakinguseofsomething
which is already known. According to Aristotle, "All teaching is fiom things
previouslyknown"(Ibid,119).

2.5 ModernWesternEpistemology

InthehistoryofmodernWesternthoughtthough,somephilosopherscutloose
fromtheapronstringsoftraditionalidealism.Theyonlybelievedinempiricaldataand
sensoryexperiencesthatcouldleadtoacquisitionofvalidknowledge.Descarteswasone
whoproposedthewholesalerejectionofthelegacyofsupposedknowledgefromthepast
and start from the beginning in order to build an adequate knowledge of the world
(Tarnas,1991,p.276).Thebestthingtodowastodoubteverything,withtheexceptionof
onebeliefthatwecannot be mistakenabout,andthatisthatwearethinking.Evento
doubtthisistoaffirmit.Thus,Descartesconcludedcogitoergo sum, (Ithink,thereforeI
am)(Landesman,1997,p.50).JohnLockewasanothertodeviatefiomthetraditionaldoctrine
of innate knowledge, whose standpoint is known as empiricism. Very roughly speaking,
empiricismtakestheviewthatknowledgeisamatterofacertaincomplexkindofexperience.
ForLocke,therewasnosuchthingasinnateideas.Atbirththemindislikeablanksheetof
paper,atabularasa,(blankslate)uponwhichideasareimprinted. Inotherwords,allideasare
derivedfromexperiencebywayofsensationandreflection.Lockedidnotoverlyconcern
himselfwiththenatureofminditselfbutconcentratedonhowideasorknowledgearegained
bythemind(Gallagher,1982,p.75).WhereastherationalistsleadbyDescartes,wereso
calledsincetheyassumedthatmereexperience,
howevercomplex,doesnotamounttoknowledge,thatknowledgecruciallyinvolves
theuseofreason.

Now,thequestionariseswhatisitaboutthatmakesitacaseofknowledge,rather
thanofmerebelief?Therationalist'sclaimsthatitinvolvesinsightandunderstanding,

and-asarule-somekindofinferenceorproof,insortsomeachievementofreason.The
empiricistsdenythis.Forthemtoknowsomethingisjusttohaveobserveditandto
rememberitintheappropriateway,tohavetherightkindofexperienceofit.Some
empiricistsmaintainthatthekindofexperience,whichconstitutesknowledge,canbe
completelyaccountableforwithoutreferencetoreason.Theydefendtheviewthatwecan
accountforourtechnicalbeliefsandevenforourtechnicalknowledgesolelyintermsof
thesensesandmemory.Empiricistmaintainthat,"Weobservethings;werememberwhat
weobserve;whatwerememberguidesusinwhatwedo,whatwepayattentionto,what
weobserveandthusmemory,ratherthanreason,issupposedtoproducethekindof
complexexperiencewhichconstitutestechnicalknowledge"(Frede,1990,p.226).
RationalismasrepresentedbyDescartesfocusedoncertainessentialaspectsof

knowledge.Knowledgeisaprioriandistobeidentifiedwiththenecessaryconnections
ofideas.ItwouldbeamistaketoconsiderDescartes'realitythroughsenseexperienceas
itistotallyindependentofexperiencesincesenseexperienceacquaintsusonlywiththe
world that changes and appears and cannot represent the total world of reality. The
metaphysicaltheoriesknownasa priori aresupposedtoreflectrealityinitsessential
characteristicsinthewaynotrepresentedineverydaysenseexperiencebutinthewaythe
worldmustbetointellectualinsight.Theroleofaprioriinconceivingaconceptsuchas
asquareisputtoseriousquestionbyempiricistthinkerswhobelievethatthe aprion'
cannot determine any law or principle that manifests itself in science and not
everyday experience. "Of course, the individual as being in possession of this
conceptowessomethingtosenseawareness;perhapsiftheyhadneverseenobjects
withapproximatelysquaresurfaces,theywouldneverwouldhavebeenableto
learnwhatasquare is" (Landesman,1997,p.163).Nevertheless,thedomainof
rationalismisprimarilylimitedtothatoflogicandmathematics.SinceDescartes'
philosophywasrationallyconceived,hedependednaturallyoninnateideasand
theirlogicalconnectionstoknowthenatureofrealityasawhole.Hiswasahighly
intellectualconceptionwherelogicalconnectionscouldonlybeknownrationally.

Keepinginmindfurtherconnectedphilosophicalassumptionsforthetime
beinghere,letusinvestigateReneDescartesandJohnLockeandthedoctrineof
intuitivethought. I concentrateonDescartesandLockinthiscontextbecauseI
considerthempioneersofrationalismandempiricismrespectively.

2.6 DescartesandtheDoctrineofIntuition

Themostsubtleexpositionsoftheconceptofinnateknowledgeanditsrolein
moderndayepistemologyintheWestcanbesaidtobeginwithDescartes.Itisessential
tostudytheCartesianpositionbecauseDescarteswasthefirstwhosuccesshllyandvery
methodicallyrepresentedhisviewspertainingtothedominantroleofintuitionin

epistemology.Toachieveths,Descartesworkedoutaprogram,whchwillbediscussed
considering his earlier and later works. While undertaking to explain his theory, the
centralconcernwouldbetoexplorehisphilosophyofmindasexpoundedinhislater
writings,whichwerealreadyentrenchedinthetreatisecalledtheRegulae,becauseitis
naturalthatone'smethodologyshouldproceedincollaborationwithone'srules.Ifwe
embrace another one of Descartes' major later work, the Mediations, which
contributedtohisprogram,thenitwouldberationaltoconcludethattheywere
implicitintherules,thoughnotfully,butatleastroughly.Letus,hence,studythe
statusoftheRegulaeintheinterpretationofthephilosophyofDescartes.

Letusbeginwiththeimplicationsofhisthirdandfourthrulesmentionedinthe
RegulaeadDirectionemIngenii(Regulae).Inthem,hegaveapreliminaryaccountof
intuition and deduction and claimed that only through these two, can indubitable
knowledge be achieved (MacDonald, 2000, p.98). In the Regulae, Descartes did not
initially talk of the doctrine of intuition and of representative perception. Rather he
adoptedanempiricalrealist'sviewwhichheldthatobjectsaredirectlyapprehendedbythe
mind.Thatapprehensiontakesplaceinanimmediatefacetofacemanner.Subsequently,
Descartesbecameawareoftheincompletenessofhisaccountofthe

sourcesofknowledgeintheRegulaemaking himacceptanaliquidampliustoaccount
foradoctrineofintuition(Smith,1952,p.53).Anotherepistemologicalassumption
foraproperandbetterunderstandingofDescartesiswhenheadoptsthephrase,"clear
anddistinct",whichconsistentlyoccursthroughouthiswritings;thoughonlyoncein
theRegulae,butover30timesintheMeditations(Ibid,p.55).Inthisapplicationof
his clear and distinct perception, he aims to explain the immediate experience of
"facetoface"mannersothattheapprehensionwouldbeclear"eventorustics"(Ibid,
p.59).Thiscapacityforimmediate"facetoface"awarenesscannotbefallacious,and
forthisreasonhespeakselsewhereofthe"naturallightofreason"(Ibid,p.60).

Theproblemofthemeaningof"clearanddistinctperception"isreallythecentral
issueintheinterpretationoftheDiscoursdelaMethode(Method),whichplayedamajor
roleattheheartofDescartes'philosophy.IfthePrincipiaPhilosophiae(Principles)is
takenintoaccount,wefind,

In ourearlyyearsourmindissoimmersed in thebodythatitknows nothing

distinctly, though it apprehends much sufficiently clearly.. .forming many
judgmentsandcontractingmanyprejudicesfromwhichthemajorityofuscan
hardlyevehopetobecomefree.Itermthatclearwhichispresentandmanifestto
anattentivemindjustaswearesaidtoseeobjectsclearlywhen,beingpresentto
theintuitingeye,theyoperateuponitsufficiently,stronglyandmanifestly.But
thedistinctisthatwhichissopreciseanddifferentfromallotherobjectsthatit
containswithitselfonlywhatappearsmanifestlytohimwhoconsidersit ashe
ought....whenforinstance,anintensepainisfelt,ourawarenessofitisvery
clear,butisnotalwaysdistinct;formenusuallyconfounditwiththeirobscure
judgments as toitsnature,assumingastheydo,thatinthepartaffectedtheir
existssomethingsimilartothesensationofpainofwhichalonetheyareclearly
aware. Thus cognition can be clear without being distinct; but can never be
distinctwithoutbeingalsoclear.(Haldane,Vol.I,1955,p.237)

Thisdistinctionaswellastheanalysisregarding"clearanddistinct"perception
oftheDiscoursisinagreementwithanddealtmoreelaboratelyintheRegulae."The
mostcompleteexpositionoftheclearanddistinctideasistobefoundintheRegulaede
inquirendaveritate,thoughitisincludedinthetheoryofMethod.Inbothworks,the
dominatingthemeisthequestforcertaintyanduniversalknowledge"(Gibson,1932,

Tosubstantiatetheabovepointfurther,RuleIXoftheRegulaeshouldbetaken
intoconsideration,whichstates,"Weoughttogivethewholeofourattentiontothemost
insignificantandmosteasilymasteredfacts,andremainalongtimeincontemplationof
themuntilweareaccustomedtobeholdthetruthclearlyanddistinctly"(Vol. I,1955,
p.28).Thephraseclearlyanddistinctly,whichoccursintheRegulaealsooccurs
sufficientlyinhislaterworkssuchastheMeditations.
 Inthe Regulae, twoimportantwaysofacquiringknowledgeareintuitionand
deduction.Intuition,whichDescartesadmittedintheRegulae,isequivalenttotheclear

anddistinctperceptionoftheMeditations(Doney,1968,p.188).Whileexplainingthis,
DescartesacceptedintheRegulaethattwothingsarerequiredforintuition.Oneisthat
thepropositionsintuitedmustbeclearanddistinctandsecondly,itmustbegraspedinits
totality at the same time and not successively (Op. cit, p.8). This presupposes the
epistemology which Descartes advocated in his later writings. Descartes states that
"intuition,notthefluctuatingtestimonyofthesenses,northemisleadingjudgmentthat
proceedsfromtheblunderingconstructionsofimagination,buttheconceptionwhichan
uncloudedandattentivemindgivesussoreadilyanddistinctlythatwearewhollyfreed
from doubt about that which we understand" (Ibid, p.8). In addition to intuition and
deduction,DescartesalsospokeofDivineCertaintywhichhestatedintheMeditations
intheformofveracityofGod.ToquotetheRegulaeinthisconnection,

Thesetwomethodsarethemostcertainroutesofknowledge,andthemindshould
admitnoothers.Alltherestshouldberejected as suspectoferroranddangerous.
ButthisdoesnotpreventfrombelievingmattersthathavebeenDivinelyrevealedas
beingmorecertainthanoursurestknowledge,sincebeliefinthesethingsasfaithin
obscurematters,isanactionnotofourintelligencebutofourwill(Ibid,p.4).

TheexistenceofGod,whichDescartesadvocatedinhislaterwritingsinorderto
certify the certainty of clear and distinct perception, is also controversial. The fact
remains that knowledge of God cannot be apprehended through direct awareness; no
inferenceandanalogycangiveustheknowledgeofGod.Toaccountfortheknowledge
ofGod,DescartesadoptedthatitisonlythroughaninnateideathatGodcanbeknown

(Gallagher,1982,p.38).Gradually,heclaimedanexistenceofinnumerableintuitive
ideastowhichheformedaclassofwhichthedoctrineofcogitoergosumisanexample.
 Whilegivinganaccountoftheacquisitionofknowledge,theconcept"experience"
and its use in the Regulae should be taken into consideration as it presupposes the
epistemologywhichDescartesdemonstratesinhislaterwritings.Hisuseof"experience"
intheRegulaehelpsinunderstandingthetermsintuitionanddeduction.

Forexample,inhisdeductivemethod,hemadeitveryclearthatdeductionisnothing
butsuccessiveintuitions.Theintuition,whichDescartesacceptedintheRegulaeisfiee
fiom anytypeofmysticinterpretation;rather,itistakenasafoundationofallscientific
knowledgeandhasalsobeenreferredtoasnaturallight(MacDonald,2000,p.103).

ExperienceasusedintheRegulaeshouldbeunderstoodinitsimmediatenonfallacious
aspect.Descartesseemstobeverycarehlbecauseheneverintendedtoequateimmediate
experience with sense experience. He used "experience" in two aspects. First is the
commonsenseeverydayawarenessoftheexternalworld,whichheclaims sharplyas
fiequentlyfallacious,buttheotheristheimmediateawarenessinthesenseof Lumen
Naturale(naturallight),whichaimsatclearanddistinctperception(Haldane,Vol. I,

1955 p.4). Thereafter, Descartes' use of "experience" in the Regulae always

indicates its immediate nonfallacious aspect which aims at achievement of
indubitableknowledge.Thisanalysisof"experience"suggeststhatDescartesuses
itasthefoundationofhislaterepistemologyintheRegulaeitself.

Descartes'epistemologycentersonthisdoctrineofintuitioninthe Regulae. To
beginwith,Descartesgavedueattentiontoideasnotasobjectsofdirectawarenessbutin
their representative capacity, whichprovides us additional knowledgeofthem.While
separatingjudgementsfiomimmediateawarenessheclaimsthatinjudgementthereisa
presenceofaliquidampliusandthisaliquidampliusnotonlycallsforadoctrineof
intuitionbutalsoforadoctrineofnaturalbelief(Smith,1952,p.215).Inapassageinthe
Meditations111,Descartesclearlystatedhowanaliquidampliusdistinguishedjudgment
fiomimmediateawareness(Ibid,p.216).There,Descartesclaimedthatwhatisknown
sensuouslythroughpinealpatternsisimaginationwhichisfluctuatingandwhatisknown
rationallythroughcommonnotionsandaxiomsisunderstanding,whichisconstantand
universal.Theimagesareapprehendedthroughanimmediatefacetofaceawarenessbut
thecommonnotionsandaxiomsareinnatenotions,throughwhichwecanobtain
scientificunderstandingevenofappearance(Ibid,p.216).
Inordertogiveanaccountofsensuousandrationalknowledge,Descartesdivides
ideasinMeditation111,asbelow:

Ifindpresenttomecompletelydiverseideasofthesun;theone,inwhichthesun
appearstomeasextremelysmallis,itwouldseem,derivedfiomthesenses,and
tobecountedasbelongingtotheclassofadventitiousideas,theother,inwhich
thesunistakentobemanytimeslargethanthewholeEarth,hasbeenarrivedat
bywayofastronomicalreasoning,thatistosay,elicitedforcertainnotionsinnate
inme,orformedbymeinsomeothermanner.(Ibid,p.218)

ThisaboveclassificationofideasintoadventitiousandinnateinMeditations111hasbeen
acceptedasprovisionalashefurtherwrites,

Someideasareadventitioussuchastheideawecommonlyhaveofthesun,otherare
factitious,inwhichclasswecanputtheideawhichtheastronomersconstructofthe
sunbytheirreasoning,andothersareinnate,suchastheideaofGod,mind,body,
triangle, and in general all those which represent true immutable, and eternal
essences.(Ibid,p.236)

Inthisconnection,iftheRegulaeisalsostudied,itseemsthatDescartesalso
assumedaclassificationofideas,whilehewasdealingwithRuleXII.Hesaid,"Itis
properlycalledmindwheniteitherformsnewideasininfancy,orattendstothose
alreadyformed"(Ibid,p.39).Leavingthisclassificationasidetemporarily,ifhisnotion
ofsimplesoftheRegulaeisto beconsidered,weseehowDescartesreducedeverything
to"simplenotions"becausetheyarewhollyfieefiomfalsity.Theexamplesofsimple
notionsintheRegulaesuchasfigure,extension,motion,etc.clearlyresemblestheinnate
ideas of the Meditations. Even in the Regulae, Descartes further asserted that those
"simplenotions"arepurelyintellectualwhchourunderstandingapprehendsbymeansof
acertaininbornlight,andwithouttheaidofanycorporealimage(Ibid,p.41).

If a comparison is made between judgements of mathematics and cogito

judgements,wefindDescartes,inlinewithPlato.AsPlatoclaimedintheMenothat
geometrical assumptions are innately there in the human mind, Descartes argued that
sincewehaveneverinourlivesseenatruetriangle,oranaccuratelydrawncirclewecan
notderivetheseideasGromsensation.Whenweseeaphysicaltriangle,wearesimply
remindedofthetrueandimmutablenatureofthetriangle,werecognizeitwhenwesee
that(Ibid,p. 227). Thisabilitytorecognizeaninstanceofaconceptisprobablywhat
Descartesmeansbyaninnateidea.ToquoteDescartes,"soindeed,weshouldnotbeable
torecognizethegeometricaltrianglebylookingatthatwhichisdrawnonpaper,
unlessourmindspossessedanideaofitderivedfiomsomeothersource"(Ibid,p.228).

This"someothersource"indicatestheexistenceofintuitivefacultiesinthemind,
whichismorecertainthanmathematicalandgeometricalassumptions.Thereforecogito

- judgementsintheMeditationsclearlyaimsatapossessionofintuitiveideasinthe
humanmindwhichismorecertainthanmathematicalassumptions.
IntheRegulae,mathematicalandgeometricalassumptionshavebeenacceptedas
certain,whereasintheMeditationstheyaresubjecttodoubt.Initially,onemayfindan
inconsistencyherebutactually,ifweinvestigatethispointfurther,weseethatDescartes
isconsistentinsofarasdoubtingisconcernedbecauseinbothworksDescartesisdealing
withmethodicaldoubtnotwithexperimentaldoubt(Keeling, 1968,p.87).Experimental
doubtreferstoacertainstateofmindorattitudewhichdoesnotvoluntarilyoriginate,
whilethemethodicaldoubtrefers,nottoafeeling,buttoadecisionorvolition.Further,
themethodicaldoubtisdifferentfkomskepticism,whileexperimentaldoubtfkequently
contributes to skeptical fkames of mind (hid, p. 88). If this analysis is taken into
consideration,wedon'tfindanyinconsistencysofarastheRegulaeandtheMeditations
areconcerned.Bothrefertomethodicaldoubt,noneinspiresexperimentaldoubt.

2.7 Descartes'PhilosophyofMind

So far I have dealt with the earlier and later works of Descartes and their
relationshiptooneanothertofindoutthecrucialroleplayedbythedoctrineofintuition.
Thisdoct~ewhich,hasbecomecentralinhisepistemology,necessitatesadiscussionof
hisPhilosophyofMind,otherwisethedoctrinewouldcollapse.Becausethedoctrineof
intuitionandthenatureofminddependuponeachotherfortheirexplanation,onewould
loseitsmeaningifoneconsideredeachinisolationoftheother.

Descartes'methodologyleadingtohisepistemologyclearlysuggestsaphilosophy,
whichhehasdevelopedconsistentlywithhisownspeculations.Hisdoctrineofintuitive
ideas would be incomplete unless his psychology is also taken into consideration.
Therefore,inthissection,Ishallconcentrateonhisexplanationofthestatusofsensation
with regards to his conception of soul or how his conception of mind is distinct or
different fkom sensation. Subsequently, it will be seen how his mindbody dualism
emergesoutofthedoct~ofeintuitiveideas.Whileexplainingtheconceptionof
mind or soul in Descartes, I shall take the following aspects into consideration
intuition,powerofreasonandwill.

Intuition is the primary vehicle of grasping a truth. We "know" as in the

"informationsense"throughtheinnatecapacitiesofthemind.Intuitiveideasinthemind
wouldmeanthatourknowledgeisdeterminedinaccordancewithcertainprinciplesand
conceptswhicharenativeinallminds.Thesecannotbeacquiredbyabstractionfrom
senseexperience.Whileexplainingthis,Descartesarguedthatconceptscorrespondingto
thesimplenatures,suchasgeometricalobjectsandequalitycannotbederivedor

acquiredbuttheyareprimitive andinnate inthinking.Inthissenseof"innate",all

ideasthatareideasofsimplenaturesareintuitiveandarereferredtoasfirstprinciples
(Haldane,1955,Vol.111,p.7).Theseinnateideascanbeapprehendedonlybyan
operation,knownasintuition(intuitus)whichisinnateinthesenseofnotacquired.All

clearanddistinctideasderivablefromthemareinnatebecausetheycanonlybeproduced
throughanoperationknownasdeduction,whichisalsoinnate.Becauseintuitionand
deduction are "mental operations by which we are able, entirely without any fear of
illusion,toarriveattheknowledgeofthings",intuitionispurelyanintellectualactivity
whichinreturnisclearanddistinct,becauseitleavesnoroomfordoubt(Ibid,p.8).By
meansofthisintuition,oneattendstothesimplenatureswhichareinnate.The

outstanding characteristic of those simple natures as accepted by Descartes is their

perfectclearnessanddistinctness,butwithonlyintuitionhumanknowledgewouldseem
tobeincompletebecauseitonlygivesknowledgeoffirstprinciples.Fromthesefirst
principles,againthemindbymeansofitspowerofreasondeducesfurtherknowledge.
ToquoteDescartes,"thefirstprinciplesthemselvesaregivenbyintuitionalone,whileon
the contrary the remote conclusions are firnished only by deductionW(Ibid,p. 8).
While explaining the nature of deduction, Descartes affirms that in the steps of
deductiveprocedureintuitionplaysadominantrole,becauseforhimdeductionisbut
asuccessionofintuitions(MacDonald,2000,p.103).

Finally,everythmgdependsuponfieewillwhichisfieedomofthehumanmind.
Weusethisfieedomcorrectlywhenweaffirmonlywhatisquiteclearanddistinctand
refiainfiomassentingwhatisnotclear.Becausewearenotcompelledtodeterminein

theuseofourwill,wemaysuspendjudgmentotherwisewecangiveassent.Thisfieedom
weexercise,yieldingorwithholdingassentisthesinglecharacteristicwhichweposses
thatresemblesthenatureofGod.Ifso,thenhowdoeserrorarise?Descartes'explanation
would be that one would be dominated by inclinations of the body because we are
imperfect,butasGodisabodilessperfectformthenthisquestionneverarises.However,
in the case of humans when the bodily inclinations predominate, it loses its will by
surrenderingtodesires.Butwhenthewillattendstotheclearanddistinctprinciples,the
humanmindachievesperfectionsimilartothenatureofGod(Gallagher,1982,p.39).

Theseaboveaspectsofthemindconstitutetheessentialnatureofthesoul.They
do not have anything in common with the body, which presupposes his fundamental
problemofmindandbody.Havingexplainedthenatureandoperationofmind,wenow

havetoseethatintuition,powerofreason,andwilldonothaveanythingtodowith
thebody.Intuition,whichissupposedtobetheprimarycriterionofgraspingtruth,
hasnothingtodowithbodilyactions.Butbythehelpofintuition,wecomprehendin
separatenonsensiblenaturesandideas.Intuitionisthedirectactionofcomprehensionby
meansofwhichclearanddistinctperceptiontakesplace.Thisclearanddistinct
perception, which is the criterion of truth, has nothing to do with the bodily
movements.Inordertoexplainthispointfurther,wemayconsideritfiomtwoangles.

Firstly,ourmindscannotbecausedtothinkprimalideas,whichDescartesthought
tobeintuitbytheactionsofmaterialbodies.Suchcausalactionswouldbenothingother
thanmovements.Ifaparticularmovementwouldcausethemindtothinkclearlyand
distinctly about anything at all, it could cause it to think about itself, because the
movementbeingparticularthethoughtwouldbeofaparticular.Butbeliefsandemotions
areneitherofparticularsnorofmovements.Hence,materialbodiesandtheirchanges
couldnotbethecauseofourbeliefsandemotions(Landesman,1997,p.115).

Secondly,tosupposethataparticularmovementcouldcausethemindtothinkof
itisalsonotadmissiblebecausemodesofmattercancausenothingbutothermodesof
matter.Materialbodiesandtheiractionscannotcausethoughtsofclearanddistinctideas
to occur because physical actions and thoughts are modes of two mutually exclusive
attributes."Howcanathoughtwhichhasacertaincontentandmeaningbetheverysame
thingasaburstofelectricityorachemicalchangeamongtheneuronsofthebrain"(Ibid,
p.320).Aneventorstate(mode)ofoneordercannotcauseaneventorstateinanother

order.Therefore,noclearanddistinctthoughtisreachedfiomsensibleappearancesor
arecausedbychangesinmaterialbodies.Rather,thoseclearanddistinctthoughts
whicharesupposedtobeinnateareonlyapproachablebyintuition,whichisafaculty
ofthehumanmind.

Thepowerofdeducing,whichissupposedtobethepowerofreason,hasnothing
todowithbodilychangesforDescartesaccepteddeductionsinaveryspecialsense.For
him,asmentioned,deductionisnothingbutasuccessionof intuitions.Inother
words,it
is extendedintuition. Similarly,Descartestookthefieedomofwilltobeanimate
notion.Therefore,hestatesthat"finallyitissoevidentthatwearepossessedofafiee
willthatcangiveorwithholditsassent,thatthmaybecounted asoneofthefirstand
mostordinarynotionsthatarefoundinnatelyinus"(Haldane,Vol.I, 1955,p.234).

Hence,itisseenthatintuition,powerofreasonandwill,havenothingtodo
witheithermaterialbody.Theyaresupposedtobeintuitivecapacitiesofthemind.
Those capacities only contribute toward the construction of knowledge, while the
bodilyactionsareinstrumentaltothat.Thepertinentpointthatcomesouthereisthat
thedoctrineofintuitionbringsaboutadualisminordertodemonstratearational
explanationofDescartes'epistemology.
Tosubstantiatethedoctrineofintuition,wefinditisnotmerelyahypothesisora

concept, but the philosophical principle occupying a central place in Descartes'

epistemology.Hisdoctrineofintuitiondoesnotmerelycontributetohisepistemology,
buthasitsownbearingeveninphysics(Copleston,1962,p.84).Thislineofargument
amplysuggestshowDescarteshaspresentedanintegratedsystemstartingfiomhis

earliestwork,the Regulae, tothelatestworkslikethe Meditations whichareconnectedto

eachother.Itseemsasiftheyconstructa"whole"whereallofhisotherworksbecomesparts.
Hehaspresentedsuchaneatlywovensystem,thatnopartofhisphilosophyshould

bestudiedinisolationfiomtheother.InRulesleadingtotheDirectionoftheMind,
hismethodology,metaphysics,physics,epistemologyandmoralphilosophy,allareso
linkedwitheachotherthatacceptanceofone,involvestheacceptanceofothers.He
oncerightlyremarked,
 Thusphilosophyasawholeislike atreewhoserootsaremetaphysicalwhosetrunk
is physics, and whose branches, which issue fiom this trunk, are all the other
sciences.(Haldane,Vol.I,1955,p.211)

Leaving apart the metaphorical elements of the above statement, it shows the
underlyingprofundityofhisphilosophyasawholeandhowtheymergeandunifyandare
integratedtogether.Forexample,ifonewantstomovearoundanyphilosophicalconcept
fiomanypartofhiswork,ultimatelyonewouldfindoneselfinthesameplace,

fiom where one had started. One would commit a blunder by considering his
philosophyinpartwhendealingwiththeissueofintuitiveknowledge.Nevertheless,
onemayfindsomedeficiencieshereandthererelatingtointuitiveideas(Keeling,
1968,p.l82),butthesephilosophical"deficiencies"arenotat alldeficiencies,rather
theyconstitutefundamentalproblemsforfurtherstudy.

Descartes, said to be the founder of modern philosophy, started a systematic

endeavourtoclearoutthelongfeltphilosophicalprejudicesuptotheRenaissance,and

showedhowphilosophizingcanbedealtwithverymethodically.Asaconsequenceof
this,alongwithhisotherworks,hestartedaphilosophyofmindwhichwascertainly
thefirsttohaveworkedoutthedirectiveideasofpsychologyonourmodernsenseof
theword(Ibid,291).

2.8 LockeandtheDoctrineofIntuition

Descartes'philosophyingeneralandthedoctrineofintuitioninparticularwillbe
madeclearonlyafterwehavemadeareferralanddiscussionofJohnLocke,usinghis

famousworkAnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstandingasmysolestudy.While
discussingLocke'sepistemology,mymainconcernwouldbetotakehiscriticismof
intuitionintoconsideration,anddiscusshowhispolemiciscontroversialbythrowing
lightonitspositiveandnegativeaspects.IcontendthatLocke'srecognitionofnon
sensory sources of knowledge and its analysis never supports his polemic and
subsequently how he failed to supply a corresponding philosophy of mind to his
conceptionofknowledge.

Locke'sempiricismorthetheorythat allknowledgebeginswithsenseexperienceis
adirectattackonthedogmatismoftherationalisticthinkers(Aaron,1955,p.90)alongwith
theidealismofintuition.Lockeexpoundedthedoctrineofsimpleideasofsensationandof
reflectionwhichareimprintedonemptyblanksheetsofthehumanmind(tabularasa).There
isnoroomforadoctrineofintuitionwhichwouldinfluenceordirecthumanbeingstovarious
kindsofknowledgeofmathematicalideas,logicalprinciples,universallawsofnatureand
particularperceptionsoftheworld.Intuitiveknowledge,ifany,wouldhavebeenderived
fiomvariouscombinationsofsimpleideasofsensationandreflection

(Gallagher,1982,p.71).Whatispeculiartoempiricismisthatwhileitcanexplain
knowledgeofparticularswithreferencetoexperience,itisimpossibleforthedoctrine
toexplaintheuniversalcharacteristicsofnatureinthesameway.Justasitisdifficult
fortherationalisttocomedowntoparticularsfiomtheknowledgeoftheuniversals,it
isdifficultfortheempiriciststocomeuptouniversalsfiomtheimmediateknowledge
of particulars. Thus, Locke's polemic needs to be studied in order to justify
consideringitssignificance.
ThefirstBookoftheEssaywhereLockedealswiththepolemicbeginswith,

Itisanestablishedopinionamongstsomemen,thatthereareintheunderstanding
certaininnateprinciples;someprimarynotions,characters,asitwerestampedupon
themindofman;whichthesoulreceivesinitsveryfirstbeing,andbringsintothe
worldwithit.(Fraser,1959,p.37)
Thispassageintheverybeginningofthechapterraisesaveryconcertedefforttoward
epistemologyasawholeandthedoctrineofintuitiveideasinparticular.

Inordertoestablishtheempiricistfoundationsofknowledge,Lockefirststarted
argumentsagainstthetheoryofintuition.Lockeunderstandsthistheory as beingthe
doctrinethatthereare"certaininnateprinciples,someprimarynotions,characters,asit
werestampeduponthemindofman,whichthesoulreceivesintheveryfirstbeing,and
brings into the world with it" (Aaron, 1955, p. 37). Some of these principles are
speculativelikereligiousbeliefsorwhoseexampleswouldbe"whateveris,is,anditis
impossiblefortheretobesomethingandnotbe",(Ibid,p.37)whileothersarepractical

suchasmoralprinciples.Animportantunderlyingaspect,accordingtoLocke, isthe
oneregardinguniversalconsent.Becauseallmenagreeaboutthevalidityofcertain
speculative and practical principles, those principles are originally imprinted on
people'smindsandbroughtintotheworldwiththem"asnecessaryandrealasthey
doofanyoftheirinherentfaculties"(Ibid,39).

Againsttheaboveposition,Lockearguesthatevenifitweretruethatallmen
agree about certain principles this would not prove that these principles are innate,
providedthatsomeotherexplanationscanbegivenofthisuniversalconsent.Secondly,
Lockeopinesthatthearguments,whichwerebroughtinfavourofthetheoryofintuitive
principles,wereworthless,becausethereisnouniversalconsentaboutthetruthofany

principle(Ibid,p.39).Childrenandidiotshaveminds,buttheyhavenoknowledgeofthe
principlethatitisimpossibleforsomethingtobeandnottobe.Hecontinuedfurtherand
assertedthatiftheseprincipleswerereallyinnate,thentheymustbeknown.
Therefore,hecategoricallyremarkedthat"Nopropositioncanbesaidtobeinthemind,
whichitneveryetknew,whichitwasneveryetconsciousof'(Ibid,p.40).Inother
words,ideascannotbeheldmentallyinlatentorunconsciousstate.Therecannotbe
impressionsmadeonthemindwithanaccompanyingconsciousnessofthembecause
amentalimpressionandconsciousnessofitareidentical.Noideascansaidtobe"in
themindofwhichthatmindisnoteitheractuallypercipient,orthroughmemory
capableofbecomingpercipient.Toillustratethis,Lockestatesthat,"agreatpartof
illiteratepeopleandsavagespassmanyyears,evenoftheirrationalage,withoutever
thinkingonthisandthelikegeneralpropositions"(Ibid,p.45).Hetookthesame
positiontowardspractical,speculativeandmoralprinciples(Ibid,pp.6264).

Indefenceofintuitiveprinciples,onemayarguethatallthesepossibilitieswould
be true only when people came to use reason. Furthermore, these principles are
knowledge,whchareonlyimplicitasacapacityforknowledge.Thecapacityitselfis
innate.Tothis,onemayrespondthattherearethosewhoapprehendnogeneralabstract
principlesatall.Lockedidnotdenythatthereareprinciplesofthiskind,butherefusedto
admit that there is any sufficient reason for calling them innate, though he spoke of
intuitivenotions,whichisequivalenttointuitiveideas(Ibid,pp.3839).Itmaybethat
throughoutthepolemic,Lockewasattackingonlyintuitiveprinciples,butnotintuitive
ideas(Ibid,p.6264).Heassumesthatthemindhasinherentfaculties,whichitbrings

intotheworldsincehewrote,"IthinknobodywhoreadsmybookcandoubtthatIspoke
onlyofinnateideasandnotinnatepowers"(Gibson,1968,p.38).Inotherwords,the
mindhasnoinnateideas,butithasinnatefacilities(Sorely,1965,p.144).Thus,themind
whichisendowedwithreasonhasacapacitytointuittheconnectionsofideasandasa
result,derivetheknowledgeofnecessarytruths.Evenwithregardstomathematical
propositions,hedoesnotprefertocallthemintuitivepropositions,ratherheconsidered
that out of a misuse of language, only confusion and misunderstanding could result
(Holland, 1980, p. 14). In order to justify this position, he categorically stated that
intuitive principles are not "a distinct sort of truth" (Op. cit., p. 39), which can be
consideredadirectattackonintuition.Consideringthetruespiritinherentinthethreads
ofhisargument,onewouldbedriventoadilemmabetweenintuitiveprinciplesand

intuitiveideas,however,whatiskeytohiscentralpositionisthatsenseperceptionis
thethrustofknowledge,notintuition.
Thepositiveelementofthepolemiccertainlybringsoutaclearerunderstanding

oftheroleofexperience,whichwasnotexplicit in Descartes'epistemology.Inother
words,anincompleteexplanationbyDescartes issuppliedbyLockewhogivesmore
considerationtotheroleofexperience.WhileinDescartes,experienceisneededasthe
occasiononwhichthemindbringsforthfiomitselfmaterialsthatitpreviouslycontained

onlyvirtually,itwasnotproducedbyexperience(Landesman,1997,p. 52). InLocke,

however,thatveryexperienceconstitutestheessenceofknowledge.Thefundamentaland
philosophicaldistinctionbetweenthemwasonlyconcerningthequestionofmethodrather
thanofsubstance.Descartesassumedtheveryexistenceofexperiencewithoutdelving
deeperwhileLockequestionedtheveryfundamentalroleofexperience.Ofcourse,one
cannotblamesomeoneforacceptingtheviewsofanother.Bothdifferintheirattitude
regardingtheirapproachtoepistemologyasawhole.Descarteswasabove

allasystembuilderwhoinsistedthatthefoundationofwellgroundedcertaintyisonly
to bereachedbytheattempttorenderdoubtuniversal.Havingobtainedhisindubitable
startingpoint,hewasdiscoveringthetruemethodbymeansofwhichaconnectedsystem
ofknowledgemightemergetoleadustowardscertainty,wheretheroleofexperience
wasjustifiablyinsignificant(Tarnas,1991,p. 277). Onthe otherhand,incaseof
Locke,hewasnotattemptingtofurnishanynewmethodofknowledge.Ratherhis
aimwas"nottoteachmenanewwayofcertainty,buttoendeavortoshowwherein
theoldandonlywayofcertaintyexists"(Gibson,1968,p.209).Further,regardinghis
role,heassertedthat"it is ambitionenoughtobeemployedasanunderlabourerin
clearingthegroundalittleandremovingsomeoftherubbishthatliesinthewayof
knowledgen(Ibid,p.209).Insteadofseekingamethodwhichenablesustoproceed
dogmatically, he proclaimed the need for criticism. Therefore, instead of simply
acceptingexperience,hequestionedtheveryfundamentalroleofexperience,whichin
returnbecomesavirtueofhisownepistemology.Thus,oneshouldnotclaimthatthe
empiricismofLockeisanalternativetotherationalismofDescartes,ratheritsupplied
materialtomakerationalismmoreeffective.

ThenegativeelementofthepolemicconstitutesLocke'srecognitionofnon
sensorysourcesofknowledgesuchasintuitionanddemonstration.Hisacceptanceof
threedegreesofknowledge(Intuition,DemonstrationandSensation)inBook IV of
theEssaydeservesconsideration.

ForLockeknowledgeis"theperceptionoftheconnectionofandagreement,or
disagreement andrepugnancyofanyofourideas"(Fraser,1959,p.167).Heclaimed
furtherthatsometimesthemindperceivestheagreementordisagreementoftwoideas
immediately,withoutinterventionofanyother;thatiscalledintuitiveknowledge(Ibid,p.
176).Forexample,thatwhiteisnotblack,thatacircleisnotatriangle,thatthreeismore
thantwoandequaltooneandtwo.Thiskindofknowledgeis"theclearestandmost
certainthathumanfiailtyiscapableof.Thispartofknowledgeisirresistible,andlike
brightsunshine,forcesitselfimmediatelytobeperceived,assoonaseverthemindturns
its view that way" (Ibid, p.177). The next degree ofknowledge, which Locke calls
Demonstration,iswherethemindproceedstodiscovertheagreementordisagreementof
ideasbytheinterventionofotherideas,calleddemonstrativeknowledge.Eachstepof
demonstrationmusthaveintuitiveevidence,orinotherwordsdemonstrationisnothing
butaseriesofintuitions.Thesetwokindsofknowledge,intuitiveanddemonstrative,are
theonlykindsofknowledgeproperlytermed.Thereisanotherthirddegreeofknowledge,
sensitiveknowledge,which"passesunderthenameoftheknowledge"(Ibid,p.185)but
itsaccountisnotverydetailedorcarehl.

Locke'sacceptanceofintuition asthegroundofcertaintyverymuchresembles
theintuitionismofDescartes."His(Locke's)accountofintuitionanddemonstrationis
exactlythesameasDescartesandshowsclearevidenceoftheinfluenceoftheRegulae"
(Woozley,1975,p.46).DescarteswasalreadyexplicitlydealtwithinRegulaewherehe
distinguishedintuition(intutiw),inthethirdruleas"notthefluctuatingtestimonyofthe
senses,northemisleadingjudgementthatproceedsfiomtheblunderingconstructionsof
imagination,butthepureintellectualorganizingofwhichanuncloudedattentivemindis
capable;acognizingsoreadyandsodistinctthatwearewhollyfieedfiomdoubtabout
thatwhichwethusintellectuallyapprehend"(Haldane,Vol.I1955,p.8).Tosumup,
intuitiveknowledgeofthemindisfullyaware,unclouded,whollyattentiveandentirely
fieefiomdoubt.IntheRegulae,Descartesemphasizedthemindsfullactivityinintuitive
knowledge.UsingthisintuitionismasaspectacleofDescartes,onecanlookatLocke's
Essay,particularlyBookIV,andfindsimilarities.Forexample,Lockestates
that,
"Certaintydependssowhollyonthisintuition,thatinthenextdegreeofknowledgewhich
Icalldemonstrative,thisintuitionisnecessaryinalltheconnectionsoftheintermediate
ideas,withoutwhichwecannotattainknowledgeandcertainty"(Fraser,1959,p.178).He
furtherasserted,"Now,ineverystepreasonmakesindemonstrativeknowledge,thereis
intuitiveknowledgeofthatagreementordsagreementitseekswiththenextintermediate
idea which it uses as proof.. .By which it is plain, that every step in reasoning that
produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty7'(Ibid, pp. 18018 1). Locke again adds,
"Thesetwovia,intuitionanddemonstration,arethedegreesofourknowledge;whatever
comesshortofoneofthese,withwhatassurancesoeverembraced,isbutfaithoropinion,
butnotknowledge,atleastinallgoodtruths"(Ibid,p.185).

FromtheabovepassagesofBookIVoftheEssay,itisclearlyseenhowLocke's
conceptionofknowledgeisCartesianinitsessence.AccordingtoLocke,thsknowledge
iseitherintuitive,adirectperceptionoflogicalrelationsofthe"2plus1equals3type"or
thedemonstrative,definedbyDescartesasachainofsuccessiveintuitions."Again,the
deductionoftheRegulaeisindistinguishablefiomthedemonstrationoftheEssay,each
beingconceivedasconsistingofaconnectedchainofintuitions"(Gibson,1968,p.212).

IftheaboveanalysisofnonsensiblesourcesofknowledgebyLockeweretrue,
thenitseemsthatLockereachedacrisisinhisepistemologicalspeculations. Ontheone
hand,hepropoundedarationalisticideaofknowledgehefoundinDescartes,andonthe
otherwashisdoctrineofexperience.Toavoidthiscrisis,Lockemaintainedthatwecan
haveknowledgeofgeneraltruthsbynoothermeansexceptintuitionanddemonstration
which resulted in acquisition of particular truths by an appeal to our senses. As a
consequenceofthis,heacceptedthethirddegreeofknowledgereferredtoassensitive
knowledge. However, acceptance of another degree of knowledge created confusion.
WhenLockestatedthat,"Intuitionanddemonstration,arethedegreesourknowledge;
whatevercomesshortofoneofthese,withwhatassurancesofarembraced,isbutfaith
andopinion,butnotknowledge,atleastinallgeneraltruths"(Fraser,1959,p.185)he
clearly shows the absence of an appeal to sense perception. He may have been
subsequently aware of this inconsistency and as a result admitted the third degree of
knowledge.Nevertheless,itleavesanimpressionthathemayhavebecomeawareofthe
inadequacy ofperception inthe construction ofknowledge. "Itmustbe admitted that
Locke's account of it (sensitive knowledge) is not very detailed or careful, perhaps
becausehethoughtittobehisbusinessasaphilosophertogivehisattentionprimarilyto
knowledgeproper"(Morris,1931,p.48).Aaronalsowrites,"Themannerinwhchhe
introducesthisthirdkindofknowledgerevealshisuncertaintyastoitsprecisenature".He
continuesMherthat"Lockeattemptstogivefurtherdetailsofsensitiveknowledgeboth
inIV,ii14andinIV,xihespeaksinthemostuncertaintones"(Aaron,1955,p.245).The
aboveconsiderationsuggeststhatforLockeonlyintuitiveanddemonstrativedegreesof
knowledgeconstitutethecriteriafortheconstructionofknowledge.Inotherwords,for
Locke intuition isacredible andrecognized formofknowledge,somethingwhich he
borrowed directly from Descartes (Lamprecht, 1955, p. 308). The aforementioned
certainlyrevealsaninconsistencyinLocke'spolemicanddemonstratesthathisteachingis
identicalwithDescartes.SofarastheobjectofintuitionisconcernedLockeisnotintotal
oppositiontoDescartes.ForDescartes,theobjectofintuitionispureandnonsensuous
whileforLockeitissensuous.Asfarasintuitionisconcerned,itstarts
withimmediateapprehensionandinthatimmedacywhethertheobjectofapprehension
wouldbenonsensuousorsensuous,seemsunwarranted.Consideringonecanspeakof
themasdistinct,buttoinferbothasseparateseemsfallacious.Therefore,Aaroncorrectly
arguesthatforLockeintuitionismispartofhisempiricism."Locke,itseemstome,owes
hsintuitionismtoDescartesandinhisdescriptionofintuitioninIV,ii,1oftheEssay,he
bringsoutthisfeatureofDescartes'teachingveryclearly"(Op.cit.,pp.3132).

HavinggoneintosomedetailstotheintuitionismofbothDescartesandLocke,
wefindthatLockewasattheveryleastindirectlyordirectlyinfluencedbyDescartes.
However,Lockedidnotmerelyreceive,ratherherenderedamoredefiniteandmodified
doctrineanddevelopeditintoanewdirection.Indoingso,Lockefailedtomakeuseof
intuitionintheCartesianfashionasheputthistheoryofintuitioninthecontextofhis

contentionthatknowledgegoesonlyasfarasexperienceisconcerned (Op. cit.,p.

308).Asaconsequenceofthis,Lockecouldnotusereasontoleapbeyondideasinthe
mindtothingsoutsideofthemind.

2.9 Locke'sPhilosophyofMind

TheabovediscussionofintuitioninbothDescartesandLockeamplysuggeststhat
CartesianintuitionislikelytobestrongerthanthatofLocke.Anyfurtherunderstanding
ofLocke'sviewofintuitiveknowledgecanonlycomeafteracriticalexaminationofhis
epistemology and his philosophy of mind. It requires a corresponding conception of
knowledge,butitseemsLockedoesnotprovidesuchanaccount.Lockestartedwiththe
presumptionthatsincepeoplearebornwithnoknowledgeinnatein
them,themindatbirthmustbeakindoftabularasa,readytoreceiveimpression,butnot
yethavingreceivedany.Therefore,allknowledgeandbeliefswhichhavebeenacquired
byindividualsmustbefoundedintheexperienceofindividualsduringtheirlivesandnot
from any other source. Since the mind does not possess intuitiveideas, Locke
asserted,duetosensationandreflectionthemindreceivesideas.Reflections,which
arenotsensibleideas,however,dependuponactivitiesofcomparisonandabstraction,
so that in the reception of them the mind cannot rightly be regarded as merely
receivingsensation(Fraser,1959,pp.121122).

Onceagain,Lockeclaimedthatwhatwethinkaboutmustbeprovidedbysome
means other than thinking. Since he did not admit intuitive principles, fiom which
thinkingmaystart,headoptedthatitisprovidedbysimpleideasofsensation.Furtherhis
contentionwasthatthemindmustbeprovidedwithideasbeforeitcanthink,sinceideas

donotcomefiomthinking,thereforetheynecessarilycomeintothemindthroughthe
senses.Ifideascometothemindthroughthesensespriortothought,thenwemustbe
abletodetecttheirpassageintothemind(Landesman,1997,p.120).ThisiswhatLocke
wastryingtodothroughoutwithmuchconfusion.Thereasonforthisconfusionmightbe
duetolackofpsychologicalclarity.Havingbeenconvincedthattheideaswithwhich
thoughtsariseinthemindarethroughsenseperception,heshouldhavesupplieda

careful analysis of senseperception in order to distinguish that of which we are

immediatelyawarefiomthatwhichweconcludefiomourimmediateawareness."Itisan
obviousvulgarizationofLocke'sopiniontosupposethatheheldknowledgetoconsistin
the having ofideas:theywererathertheconditionsofknowledge,ortospeakmore
preciselythereweretwoconditioningfactors -thesupplyofideasandthemind'sability
toperceiveagreementsanddisagreementsamongthem"(Holland,1980,p.12).
Inemphasizingtheroleofexperienceinregardtotheconstructionofknowledge,
Lockeofferedanimportantcontribution.Ontheotherhand,hischallengebecomesfutile
without anyproperanalysis. Lock's psychological method was notitself sufficient to
achievehiscriticalaim(Morris,1931,p.25).ThefactremainsthatLocke'sdoctrineof
experienceandDescartesadherencetothedoctrineofintuitiveideasverywellsuppliesa
solidbackgroundforcreatinganewtheory.Therefore,weseethatthemindinsteadof
beingmerelyatabularasaofLocke,readyandwaitingtoreceiveimpressionswasalso
giftedaspartofitsnaturewithcertaincapacitiessimilartothoseadvancedbyDescartes.

However,LockeandDescartes differfindamentallyastotheassumption"that
thoughtistheessenceofthemindandextensionistheessenceofthebodyofmaterial
substance" (Gibson, 1968, p. 217). Locke claimed on the ontological level that to
comprehendthatnatureofsubstanceistoomuchforourunderstanding(Ibid,p.222).He
was right in arguing that we cannot think of qualities independently, there must be
somethinginwhichtheyinhere.Further,wedonotthinkofanobjectasmerelybeingthe
sumofitsqualities.Theremustbesomething,whichholdsqualitiesandmarkstheobject
an object,withoutthisthequalitiesfallapartandcannotbeunified.Thatsomething
cannotbeapprehendedbysense,becausethatisnotaquality.Fromthisitfollowsthat

accordingtotheprinciplesofempiricalphilosophyitcannotbeapprehendedatall.
Therefore,Lockeclaimedasubstancetobe,"somethingheknewnotwhat''(Ibid,
p.309). Moreover, his polemic against the idea that the soul always thinks is
consideredtobeafallacyofingoratioelenchi(Anscombe,1975,p.189).

To sum up, the views of Locke presented in Book I of the Essay regarding
rejectionofintuitiveprinciplesandtheviewsofBook IVregardingacceptanceofnon
empirical sources of knowledge like intuition, put Locke in between empiricism and
rationalism.Therefore,hisoutrightrejectionofintuitiveprinciplesandideasinBookI
seemtobephilosophicallyflawed.HisdeliberationsinBook IV ofthe Essay seem
quitesignificantbecausewheneverpossiblehefollowedDescartestothemaximum.
Therefore,onecanrightlyremarkthatLocke'sconstructionofgeneralknowledgeis
likeDescartes'innature,oncethematerialsareavailable.Fromtheaboveillustrations,
the natural analysis of knowledge undertaken by Locke becomes clear. Locke's
accountofexperiencewasnotfinal.Lockeonlyaimedatempiricalderivationsof
ideasandtheiroriginsoverlookingthevitalaspect,thatistosaycooperationofthe
senseswithanunderstandingthataimsatjustification(Yolton,1961,p. IX).

IftheaboveobservationsregardingLocke'sattackonintuitiveprinciplesandhis
correspondingphilosophyofmindaretobeaccepted,thetraditionallyacceptedrelation
betweenLockeandDescartesinparticularandempiricismandrationalismingeneralhas

tobemodified.WorksofbothLocke'sEssayandDescartesRegulaearespecificroutesof
intellectualdevelopmentbecausethesetwothinkersareseekingtoapproachthesourceof
knowledgefromdifferentangles.Locke'sachievementsremainmoreofacontinuationof
Descartesashealsoproposedtosurveythefieldofhumanknowledgeashadbeendone,
butfromanentirelydifferentpointofview.Inaddition,fromProblematicIdealismitis
learnt that Descartes' epistemology overlooked the significance of sensation from the
construction of knowledge, rather he deduced judgements concerning reality from
conceptsalonewithoutrelyingonsensation(Aaron,1971,p.31).Ontheotherhand,

fromthePhysiologyofHumanUnderstanding,thequestionofrightorjustification
regardingtheemploymentofconceptsareprimarilyoverthequestionoffactandthis
justificationinthecaseofepistemologycanonlybeachievedthroughthedeductionof
categoriesfromapureunderstanding(Ibid,p.32).
 Unfortunately due to the confusion amongst historians, empiricism, and
rationalismhavebeenacceptedastwoblockshavingdiametricallyopposedviews,which
theyarenot.Ifacomparisonistobedrawnherebetweenempiricismandrationalism,
taking the above views into consideration, the common presuppositions of both
empiricism and rationalism was that a method was required and these two schools
differed,ifinnothingelse,thenatureofthatmethod.Theydifferedabouthowcertainty
wastobeattainedandintheirconceptionofhowideasareformulatedandderivedfrom
theuseofoursenses,asopposedtotheuseofreason.Itshouldbeadded,however,that
thesedifferencesaredifferencesoftendencyonly(Hamlyn,1961,pp.5559). Inasense,
to talk of opposing schools of philosophy is misleading because there is much in
Descartesthatwouldbycertaincriteriamakehimanempiricist,andthereissimilarly
muchinLockethatwouldmakehimrationalist. However,theyexhibittendencies in
oppositedirection.Rationalismtendstoappealtoreasonasthesourceofknowledgeand
of some ideas at least, while empiricists tended to depreciate reason as a source of
knowledgeandinsistthatallideascomefromexperience.Therationalistviewofthe
mindtendstobethatofsubstanceengagingincognitiveactivity,whiletheempiricists
tendtotakeapassiveviewofthemindandeschewthenotionofsubstances.Theissue
between empiricists and rationalism over the genesis of our ideas can be said to be
misplaced.Ifitisstrictlyaquestionaboutthegenesisofthoseideasthenitbelongstothe
realmofpsychology.Ifitisaquestionaboutthelogicalcharacterofthoseideasthenit
seemstobetoocomplextobedealtwithbyasimplemindedespousalofrationalismor
empiricism(Ibid,p.60).Tocomefullcircle,itisfirstnecessarytorememberthatweare
talkinghereoftheoriginofexperienceandofwhatisinit.Thetaskwouldneverbeable
tobedevelopedbutfromacritiqueofknowledge.

2.10 FoundationofaTranscendentalTheory
AnanalysisofintuitivethoughtinWesternepistemologywouldnotbecomplete
without adiscussionofImmanuelKantandhiscontributions,consideredamajor
advanceinepistemologyandlandmarkinthehistoryofphilosophy.Ifonewantstostudy
theactualepistemologicalassumptionsofKantthengoingthroughtheCritiqueofPure
Reasonisamustashistheoryofknowledgeisaverysignificantpartofhisphilosophyas
wellasfortheissuebeforeus.Inthiscritique,Kantattemptsamongotherthings,to
establishthevalidityofknowledge.Theclassofsyntheticaprioiripropositions,whose
logicalnature,functionandsystematicconnectionwitheachotherandwithothertypesof
propositionsarethemaintopicofhisphilosophy
SofarasKantisconcerned,hedoesnotacceptthedichotomyofempiricaland
analyticpropositionsbecausehebelievesthatweareinpossessionofpropositionswhich
donotfallintotheabovecategories. Kant'sclassificationismoreaccuratelynotof
propositionsbutofjudgments(i.e.regardingpropositionsassertedbysomebody).Every
judgmentaccordingtoKantiseitheranalyticorsynthetic.

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to a predicate is

thought ...this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the
predicateBbelongstothesubjectA,assomethingwhchiscontainedin
thisconceptA;orBliesoutsideofconceptA,althoughitdoesindeed
stand in connection with it. In the one case, I entitle the judgment
analytic,intheothersynthetic.(Smith,p.10,2ndEdition,1961)

Kantassertsthatajudgmentiseitherapriorioraposteriori.Ajudgmentisapriori,"if
itisindependentofallexperienceandevenofallimpressionsofthesenses,"(Ibid,p.2).
Judgments,whicharenotapriori,areaposteriori,i.e.theydependlogicallyonother
judgments,whchdescribeexperiencesorimpressionsofthesenses.
Afterstatingthis,thebasicquestionis:Howaresyntheticapriorijudgments

possible? Kant formulated and answered this basic question in the Transcendental
AestheticandtheTranscendentalAnalytic.Thisproblemofsyntheticapriorijudgments

depends on Kant's general view of judging or thinking. One of his fbndamental

assumptionsisthatjudgingandperceivingareirreduciblydifferent.Kantexpressedthis
sharpdistinctionbetweenjudgingandperceivingasonebetweentwodistinctfacultiesof
mind,i.e.,understanding,andsense."Bymeansofsense,objectsaregiventousand
sensealoneprovidesuswithperception;bymeansofunderstanding,objectsarethought
andfiomitthereitarisesconcepts"(Ibid,p.33). Theunderstandingisthefacultyof
recognitionthroughconcepts,whichrefertosensegivenparticularsandareeithera

posteriori or apriori. ToKant,thegeneralnotions,whchareneitherabstractedfiom

perceptionsnorapplicabletoit,areideas.Thefacultyofemployingideasiscalledreason,
whichcoversbothunderstandingandpureformsofperception.Botheditionsof

theCritiqueofPureReasoncontainarefbtationoftheproblematicidealismofDescartes,
whoheldthatthereisonlyoneempiricalassertionthat isindubitablycertain,namely,
that"Iam".

Inordertorefbtetheaboveformofidealism,Kantemployedthethesisthatthe
empiricallydeterminedconsciousnessofmyownexistenceprovestheexistenceof
objectsinspaceoutsideme,whichmeans,Iamconsciousofmyownexistenceas
determinedintime(Ibid,p.276).Butalldeterminationintimepresupposestheexistence
ofsomethingpermanentinperceptionandthissomethingpermanentcannotbeintuitable
intheempiricalself.Foritistheconditionofmyexistenceofsomethingrealoutside
me.Consciousnessintimeisthusnecessarilyconnectedwiththeexistenceofexternal
thmgsnotmerelywiththerepresentationofthingsexternaltome.Inotherwords,one
becomesconsciousofoneselfinperceivingexternalthings.Thequestionofinferring
theexistenceofexternalthingsdoesnotarise.

The problem of the external world, which emerges here needs further
clarification.Kantsaid,"Italwaysremainsdoubthlwhetherthecausebeinternalor
external,whether,thatistosay,allthesocalledouterperceptionsarenotamereplay
ofourinnersense,orwhethertheystandinrelationtoactualexternalobjectsastheir
cause,"(Ibid,1"Edition,p.368).Thisistheclassicalformulationoftheproblemofthe
externalworld.Kant'saimistoshowthatitasapseudoproblem,becausethisarises
fiomfalsemetaphysicalassumptions.Kantreferstothisassumptionastranscendental
realism, which he opposes with his transcendental idealism. The defining
characteristicoftranscendentalrealismisitsconhsionofappearancewiththingsin
themselves. Proponents of this transcendental realism such as Descartes regarded,
"Timeandspaceassomethinggiventhemselves,independentlyofoursensibility"
(Ibid,p.369).Asaconsequenceofthiserroneousconceptionofspaceandtimethey
treatobjectsinspaceandtimeasthingsinthemselves.Thisviewofspaceandtime
givesrisetoaconceptionofrealityornatureascomposedofbodiescontainingonly
primaryandsecondaryqualities.

Becauseoftheassumptionsthatphysicalobjectsexistindependentlyofthemind,
thetranscendentalrealist,''findsthat,judgedfiomthispointofview,alloursensuous
representationsareinadequatetoestablishtheirreality"(Ibid,p.369).Thisleadstoan
empiricalidealismthatwhatisaccessibletoconsciousnessisonlyitsownprivateand
subjectivemodifications,i.e.theCartesianideasandsensations.Itisnodoubtwiththisin

mindthatKantconcluded,"Ifwetreatouterobjects asthmgsinthemselves,itisquite
impossibletounderstandhowwecouldarriveataknowledgeoftheirrealityoutside
us,sincewehadtorelymerelyontherepresentationwhichisinus"(Ibid,p. 378).

Kantofferedhisowndoctrineoftranscendentalidealism,whichheclaimedto
haveestablishedintheTranscendentalAesthetic.Itisdefinedas"thedoctrinethat

appearancesaretoberegardedasbeing,oneandall,representationonly,notthingsin
themselves" (Ibid, p. 369). This account of Kant's distinction between empirical and
transcendentalenablesustoestimateKant7saccountofperceptionandalsotoresolvethe
problem that arises fiom the notion of appearance. The epistemological assumptions
deducedfiomtheaboverefbtationofproblematicidealism,whichleadstothedistinction
of inner and outer appearance and thingsinthemselves is clearly connected with the
contrastbetweensenseandunderstanding.IntheCritiqueofPureReason,therefore,itis
remarkedthat,"Thedivisionofobjectsintophenomenaandnoumenaandtheworldintoa
worldofsensesandaworldofunderstanding,isthereforequiteinadmissibleinthe

positivesense,althoughthedistinctionofconceptsassensibleorintellectualiscertainly
legitimate"(Ibid,2ndEdition,p.11).Itisalsoheldfurtherinthecontrastbetweenthetwo
faculties,thatthisisnotalogicalbuttranscendentaldistinction(Ibid,p. 62).ForKant,it
was merely logical to deny the contrast, that is to deny the dogmatic view that
understandinggivesusknowledgeofintelligibleobjects.Kantadmittedtheexistenceof
anintelligiblecontributiontoknowledgebutontheotherhanddeniesthatthisprovides
knowledgeofanyintelligibleobjects.Theknowledgeofintelligibleobjectscanonlybe
obtainedbythecooperationofbothsenseandunderstanding.Therefore,fiomthe
refutationofDescartes'problematicidealism,Kantarrivedatanewaccountofthe
conceptionofmind.InthecaseofDescartes,themindwasonlyawareofinnerand
subjectivestatesbymeansofitsownunderstandingwithoutrecognizingtheouter,
that is tosayexternalobjects.ButKant'sanalysispresupposesthemindisnotonly
aware of outer objects directly but makes awareness of inner sensation possible.
ThereforetoKantthemindneedsbothsensibilityandunderstandingandtheirnature
issuchthatinisolationofonetheotherisuseless.

2.11APossibleIntegration

Forthesakeofconvenience,IhavedividedmydiscussiononWesternnotions
ofknowledgeandthevalueweassignthemintonegativeandpositiveaspects.Inthe
negativepart,Ihaveprovided,alongwithKant,criticismwithparticularreferenceto
Descartes andLocke.Havingcriticizedtheirepistemology,myconcernisnow to
deduceepistemologicalassumptionsfiomthiscriticism.Thepositiveaspectwouldbe
adiscussionofitsrelevantimplicationstoIndianepistemological.Subsequently, I
willattempttosynergizethedomainofrationalandempiricaldiscourseasKanthad
done, but with Eastern and Western epistemology in order to provide a "new"
integratedtheoryofintuition.
There is a connection between the metaphysical conceptions of Indian

epistemologyandthosedevelopedbyscienceandtheCartesian-Lockeantheoryof
ideas,i.e.thetheorythatideasorsensationaretheimmediateobjectsofconsciousness.

Rationalistsdefinethenatureofintuitioninsuchawaythatitremainstotallyinaccessible
toconsciousness,thustheyunabletojustifyitsroleorvalidityofitsconceptionof
knowledge. It is the misguided rationalism which gives rise to equally misguided
assumptionsthatintuitionismetaphysicalquackery. In oppositiontothisviewandto
skepticism,anintegratedtheoryofintuitioncanempiricallydemonstratethattheissuein
questionisnotmysticalinthesenseinwhichsomerationalistsbelieve.Onecantherefore
maintainthatthisintuitiveexperienceofknowledgecanbeasimmediateandveridicalas
theexperienceofone'sownsubjectivestate.Thisispossiblebecauseintuitionisaform

ofhumansensibilityratherthanasathinginitselfsothatit is notexternalinthe
transcendentalsense.

Thetaskistobreaktheframeworkwithdueregardtobothrationalismand
empiricism.HavingthisasabackgroundwemustoperatewiththeRamsey'sMaxim,
whichmeansthatthetruthliesnotinoneofthetwobutinsomethirdpossibility
which can be discovered rejecting something assumed as obvious by both the
disputants, in order to resolve the controversy (Penelhum, 1969, p. 17). The
similaritiesofthisproblemareechoedintheformoftheCopernicanRevolution.The
predecessorsofCopernicushaddifficultyinexplainingtheapparentmotionsofthe
planets on the supposition that they all revolve around the earth. It was similarly
impossibleinphilosophytoexplainhowtherewouldbeaprioriknowledgeofthings
ontheassumptionthatknowledgeisapassiveconformitytotheobjects.

Similarly,ifphenomenalcharacteristicsareexplainedintermsofthebehaviourof
theknowingmind,itisimpossibletoseehowknowledgecanbeapriori.Fortobean
objectofknowledge,theymustconformtothestructureandactivityoftheknowing
mind,whichmakesknowledgepossible.Toexplaininotherwords,ifoneassumesthat
thehumanmindisthecenterofthephenomenaluniverse,thenthingsmustconformto
ourmind,ratherthanourmindtothings.Thissortofexplanationcertainlygivesleverage
totherationalisticmethodbecausewhileempiricismhastostopatthelimitsofsense
experience, rationalism isperhapsevenmorehithlbeyondthoseboundaries.The
rationalisticmethodaccomplishesthisandmoreasitcannotonlyproveathesiswhich
transcendspossibleexperience,butwithequalforceitcanproveitsantithesis.

Asthemindistheonlyfactorwhichisalwayspresentinexperience,itis
legislativeforallobjectswhichappeartothesensestobeknowninjudgments,which

means that to make a priori knowledge possible, objects must conform to the
transcendentalrequirementsofthemind.Ifthispositionisaccepted,ametatheory
flows.Thisawakeningisanecessityforanewmethodasitisnotpossibletoprove
philosophicalissuesbyempiricalandlogicalmethods.Thisiswhy I posita"new"
method,anintegratedtheoryofIndianidealismandWesternrealism.

Thisconceptionofthemetatheorygerminatedinthenotionofintegrationinthe
philosophyofSriAurobindo(Sharma,1979,pp.383385).AstheCopernicanRevolution
aimedatrectifyingtheambiguityoftheexistingpatternofthinking,thenotionofan
integratedsystemsimilarlyaimsatclarifyingone'smannerofknowing.Itspurposehas
beennotonlytoextendone'sideas ofknowledge furtherbutalsotocorrect whatis
alreadyknownandtosupplyatouchstoneofvaluesorlackofvaluesofconceptsof
knowledge. Thus, it would be opining up a world of ideas by undertaking a most
ambitioustask.Suchataskisthereforeapreparationforanewcompletesystemof
knowledgewhichwasalsoRadhakrishnan'sprimaryconcerninAnIdealistViewofLife.

Puttingthisthoroughametatheoreticalstructure,thecontroversyofrationalism
versesempiricismispavedoverbyfurtherinvestigation.Toexplainthisindetail,
rationalistsassumethereareaprioriprinciplesandtheygivetheknowledgeofthingsof
themselves,whileempiricistsassumethattheonlyknowledgeissensibleknowledgeand
thatthereisnoplacefora priori principles.Tobeginwith,thelatterviewthatwithin
sensibleknowledgethereisnoplaceofaprioriprinciplesshouldberejected;theformer
view that there are a priorprinciples should beaccepted, but also that knowledge is
necessarilysensibleknowledge.Thisconclusioncannotbeshownbyrationalists with
theirspeculativemetaphysicalmethod,orbyempiricistwiththeirphysiologyofmind.
Thus, a new meaning of "experience" must be established which has certain non
empiricalconditionsofthispossibility.Whatarethosenonempiricalconditionsofthis

possibilityandhowtoknowthem?Theanswerwouldbetheyarea prioriinterpretedas
Radhakrishnanwould:theyareintuitiveinaBrahmaniansense.Toputitotherwise,the
verymeansoftheterm,"intuition"needstobechanged.Oneshouldnolongergobackto
theoldmeaningofintuitioninordertograspitsmeaning.Whenthemeaningischanged,
all other corresponding concepts such as "experience" are changed. Naturally, all
connectingissuesrelatingtoepistemologyasawholegetthemselvestransformed.As
prefacedearlierwithIndianepistemology,tostudythemetaphysicalrealitywehaveto
adopt a new method. The richness of Indian thought can be conveyed to a Western
audiencebymakinguseofWesternconcepts.Suchanattemptcertainlydoesnotdevalue
therichnessofIndianthought.Butwhenthismethodofinvestigationisadopted,allthe
crucialconceptsconnectedwithbbknowledge"changeasdoestheconceptof"intuition".
 PARTTHREEANEWTHEORYOF
INTUITIVE
KNOWLEDGE

3.1 RevisitingPhilosophicalUnderpinnings

InreviewofthedoctrineofinnateideasofDescartes,LockeandRadhakrishnan,
thereisnoclarityandmuchconfusionastheyhaveindividuallymixedupboththesense
oftranscendentalandempiricalknowledgebydemarcatingitsboundaries.Asevidence,
Descartes' acceptance of the doctrine was somehow in the virtual sense but Locke
convoluteditbydevelopinghlspolemicconsideringonlytheempiricalaspect.Sourcesof
the confusion may probably be due to Descartes' own formulation of the doctrine.
Radhakrishnan'stheoryontheotherhandseesthedoctrineinitstranscendentalsense
aimingatthejustificationofassigningvaluestononempiricalconditionsofexperience,
but without analytic structure. Thus, a new theory is needed that would organize or
synthesizeourexperience.Itsmodeisintuition.Sointuitionisadescriptionofacertain
modeofintegrationratherthantheproduct.Theintegrationreferredtoisnotempiricalor
psychologicalbutametaphysicalsynthesis.

Whetherornotourintuitionisavalidsourceofknowledgehasbeenafactualand
notametaphysicalquestion.Ametatheory,however,isconcernedwithwhatismeantby
sayingthatsomethingisintuited.Toputotherwise,philosophershavealwaystriedto
determineifknowledgeisintuitive,andifallorsomeideasofthegenesisofourideaare
innate. Theyhavenottiredtoanswerwhatis meantbyintuition itself.The classical
Westernformulationreferstoafirstorderquestionwhilethemetatheoryreferstoa
second order question as pointed out by the Analytical philosophers. Analytic
philosophers, particularly Quine (1960) stated that questions of firstrder refer to
objectswhilequestionofsecondorderrefertowords.Hewrites,

Yetwedorecognizeashiftfromtalkofobjectstotalkofwords...Itistheshiftfrom
talkofmilestotalkofmile!Itiswhatleadsfromthematerialmodeintotheformal
mode,toinvokeanoldterminologyofCarnaps's.Itistheshiftfromtalkingincertain
terms to talking about them. It is precisely the shift that divests philosophical
questionsofdeceptiveguiseandsetsthemforthintheirtruecolor.@p.27172)

Without gong into too much of detail regarding the views of Analytical
philosophers and their linguistic presuppositions, we can see that second order
questionsreallyareconcernedwithconcepts.Thisconceptualanalysishasnothingto
dowithobjects.Thissortofquestionrefersnottothingsbuttoourmodeofknowing
things.Similarlyiftheideasoftheoryandmetatheoryareto befittedintoamodel,
wecansaytheoreticalstatementsarequestionsofthefirstorder,whdeametatheory
referstoquestionsofthesecondorderbecauseitisaboutthetheoryitself.Tousean
Indianperspective,ametatheorydealswithquestionsaboutspeculativepossibilities
ratherthanacriticalone(Herman,1976,p.2).

Themodeloffirstorderandsecondorderquestionsalongwiththedistinctionof
theoryandmetatheoryshouldbeusedinadiscussionconcerningtheWesternexposition
ofthedoctrineofintuitiveideas.Sofartheissuehasbeendiscussedatthesubstantive
levelandnotinamethodologicalperspective;thedoctrineofintuitiveideasdiscussedso
farhasbeenonasubstantivelevelwhichreferstoquestionsoffirstorder.WhenPlato
expoundedthedoctrineofinnateideasinitsontologicalaspect,andempiricistsintheir
psychological tenet, it was simply treating the doctrine on a substantive level. These
philosophersweregroupingaroundthefactualaspectofthedoctrinewhichreferto
questions of firstorder. Their analysis's didn't address the methodical and epistemic
aspectofthedoctrine.Theydealtwithquestionsofactualitybutnotwiththequestionof

possibility.Thisistheprimaryconfusion,thus,thedoctrinemust bedisengagedfiom
itssubstantivelevelanddiscussedinpurelyamethodologicalperspective.However,
nofactualquestionsregardingideasbeingintuitiveareraised.Instead,startingwitha
logicalquestion,thedoctrinewillbetransformedintoamethodalongwithhowths
methodistobeachieved.Sinceitisnotaquestionoffact,itcannotbeestablishedon
the basis of old methods. Therefore, a proper method is suggested for the
interpretationofthepossibilityofhumanknowledgewhichisfreefromthedogmatic
assumptionsofrationalismandskepticalillusionsofempiricism.Hence,thedoctrine
ofintuitionwhichisconsideredatheorywillbearticulatedintheformofameta
theorywhichaimsatthepossibilityoftheoreticalcognition.

Nowtheobviousquestionishowtodevelopthismetatheoryinordertoachieve
itsintendedpurpose.Toanswerthsquestionistodemonstrateitsargument.Fora

philosophical thesis cannot be proved either fiom common sense or by an appeal to

experience.Italsocannot be provedbylogicaldemonstrations.Hence,themethodof
provingaphilosophicalpropositionmustbemetaphysical. In this chapter,takingthe
theoreticalimplicationsoftheCopernicusRevolutionintoaccount,theformofameta
theoryofintuitionanditsimplicationsofepistemologywillbesuggested.Firstly,whatis
involvedinametatheoryofintuitionwillbeconcentratedonandhowtheCopernicus
Revolutionhasradicallychangeditsclaimsandmethods.Criticsmaychallengethevery
validityoftheargumenttosynthesizeametatheoryofintuitionfiomWesternrealism
and Indian idealism by way of integration, but must accept the premise of its
kamework,thepossibilityofthisknowledge,isitselfanalytic.

ThestructureoftheCartesianLockargumentshasalreadybeenexplainedasto
howthemajorpremiseoftheirarguments,interpretations,andfailuretogiveintuitionits
due was developed. A sketch of Radhakrishnan's doctrine of intuition has also been
renderedtoprovidewhatwaslacking.Unfortunately,thatsketchhastobeanalytically
filledinordertogiveitadressingpalatablefortheWesttoconsume.IntheWest,three
possiblelinesoffurtherdevelopmentoftheintuitivedoctrinecanbeseen.Theyaddflesh
tothemetaphysicalschemeoftheRadhakrishnan'sperspectiveofatheoryofintuition,
which we have seen lacked a scientific temperament. Phenomenology, Genetic
epistemology and Analytic Philosophy all begin their investigation of a definite
explanationforthispossibleconditionofhumanexperienceatthispointofdeparture.

Although these three intellectual traditions of Phenomenology, Genetic

epistemology and Analytic Philosophy have their own specific concerns which were
developedinacomplexmannerinattemptstosolvespecificissues,theyallhaveacertain
affinitywiththemetaphysicalphilosophyofRadhakrishnan.Forourpurposes,theymay
be looked upon as both continuing certain lines of investigation suggested by
RadhakrishnanandatthesametimestrengtheningandenrichingtheIndianpositionby
meansoftheirmorerigorousmethodsofdevelopment.It is notherebysuggestedthat
theseschoolswouldnotsuccessfullychallengemanyassumptionsanddoctrinesofIndian
thoughtbutwhatismoreimportanttonote isthecontinuanceofcertainRadhakrishnan
themes.Asakindofgeneralanalogy,wemanythinkofthesethreedifferentkindsof
investigationasconcernedwiththreeaspectsofthestructureofametaphysical
argument.Ofcoursethisistobetakenonlyasakindofanalogysincewhatisintendedis
tobringouttheaffinitybetweenRadhakrishnanandthesethreestylesofthought.

Inthereconstructionofthemetaphysicalargument,Isuggestthatthefirst
premiseissomekindofstructuraldescriptionofourexperience.Forexample,such
statements as that our experience necessarily has a sensuous aspect and that our
sensibilityisofthespatiotemporalkindandsoon.Thesedescriptionsrepresentthe
basicstructuresofourexperience.Ifallsuchdescriptionscouldbetakentogetherin
theirsystematicinterconnection,thenwewouldhaveatotalpictureoftheformsof
experienceasawhole.Suchadescriptionwouldnotbeconcernedwithempirical
contingentdetailsaboutthecontentofourexperiencethanitwouldbeofadescription
oftheessentialstructuresofourexperience.Cognitionofthesestructuresisnotmere
empiricalcognitionnorisitmerelyadeductionfromarbitraryassumeddefinitions. A
cognitionoftheformofourexperienceisconcernedwithessentialstructureandsuch
cognitionhasaremarkablesimilaritywithwhatthePhenomenologistcallas"eidetic
intuition"(Moran,2000,p.134). A thoroughandrigorousattempttodescribethese
essential structures would hence presuppose the method of phenomenological
description.Idonotofcoursecarryoutsuchadescriptionwithmethodologicalrigor
butinprinciplethispartoftranscendentalphilosophyseemstocallforthemethodof
phenomenologicalinvestigation.Inasimilarmanner,thephenomenologicalattempt
maybelocatedwithintheoverallstructureofametatheoryinvestigation.

Thesecondpremiseofmyargumentisconcernedwiththenecessaryconditionsof
thepossibilityofexperience. A similargeneralandhndamentalconditionofpossibility
withRadhakrishnanisofcoursethemeansbywhichitsactivesynthesiswith
theSpiritgroundsthepossibilityofexperience.Theconceptofpureunderstandingis,as
itwere,continuedinthissyntheticact.Fromthispointofview,themetatheorysynthesis
stands for the general cognitive capacity of the mind. This cognitive capacity is not
merelyanempiricalfactordatumforitisthiswhichliesbehindallempiricalfactsand

cognitions.Thiscapacityisthereforeinsomesenseas aprioricapacityofthemind
whichmakesexperienceandawarenessofexperiencepossible.Inotherwords,inthis
part of the investigation I want to lay the foundation for a cognitive structural
psychologywhichwouldaccountforthebasicconstitutionofcognitionasaresultof
anactivepartofthesubject.Suchacognitivepsychologyhasbeenfullyworkedoutin
the theoretical and empirical investigations of Piaget (Richmond, 197 1, p. 3 1).
Hence, this aspect of my position may be taken as finding its fulfillment in the
geneticepistemologyofJeanPiaget.

Thirdly,theentiretranscendentalinvestigationemphasizes thecrucialfactthat
philosophical claims can be validated not by empirical or merely logical methods:
philosophical propositions being synthetic a priori claims require a unique mode of
investigationwhichcouldsettletheirvalidity.Suchamodeofinvestigations Icallmeta
theoretical withtheworkoftheAnalytical philosophersmakingausefulcontribution
here, for they have been mostly concerned with problems of philosophical methods.
StartingfiomMortizSchlicks'sideasabouttheturningpointsinphilosophytoJ.L.Austin
andP.F.Strawson,thereisaverylongandrichdebateonphilosophicalmethodology.
AlthoughtheterminologyusedbytheAnalyticphilosophersisverydifferentfiomthatof
RadhakrishnanandalthoughtheywouldbehighlycriticalofRadhakrishnan'sdoctrine,
yetthereseemstobeafundamentalsimilaritybetweentheir
methodofconceptualanalysisandmethodofthemetatheory.Thissimilarityisseenin
differentwaysineachoneoftheAnalyticalphilosophersIshallbereferringto,namely
Schlick,Wittgenstein,Austin,andStrawson.Fromthispointofview,therefore,wemay
thinkofthewholemovementofAnalyticphilosophyintheWestasastreamwhichfeeds
ariver.TheAnalyticaldevelopmentsactuallyenrich,strengthenandhelpusnavigatethe
Indianwaterway.Ifwelookatthesethreeperspectives,weactuallycanhaveamuch
clearerandmoreprofoundgraspoftheissuewithwhichweareconcerned.

3.2 PhenomenologyAspect

Indiscussingphenomenology,EdmundHusserlwillbetheprimaryrepresentative
ofthephenomenologicalmovement,asheisconsidereditscentralfigure.Indiscussing
Husserl, my main concern will be his Transcendental Phenomenology and how that
further serves the requirements of the metatheoretical investigation. The
phenomenological movement andparticularly Transcendental Phenomenology canbe
consideredanaturalcontinuationofRadhakrishnan'sviewsforthefollowingreasons.It
providesthemeansofcarryingoutsuchaninvestigationandbyprovidingatechnique,it
also clarifies the nature of philosophical thinking itself. Both were present in
Radhakrishnan but were implicit. As Husserl conceives of criticism as one of the
disciplinesofphilosophy,phenomenologicalphilosophyismostaccuratelyconceivedas
criticism(Moran,2000,p.187).Similarly,Radhakrishnan' IdealisticViewofLife was
conceivedasanattempttotransformphilosophicalenquiryintotranscendentalenquiryby
propoundingtoestablishtheconditionsfortheverypossibilityofanidealexperience.The
attempttoachieveanalternativemethodinphilosophicalenquiryseemsverymuch
conspicuousinbothandcertaintyHusserl'sphenomenologysharesitsmethodological
perspective with Radhakrishnan. In An Idealistic View of Life, Radhakrishnan
emphasizes the hndamental place of inner time, the synthetic character of the
understanding of the necessity of the ego, the importance for knowledge of sensory
perceptionandothernotions,allwhichseempartofthephenomenologicalinvestigation.
EvenHusserl'santiempiricalleaningsseemunquestionablesimilartoRadhakrishnan's
attitudetowardsrationalorlogicalspeculations(Husserl,2001,p.142).

This"newmethod"proposesthatobjectsmustconformtoourconceptsandthe
conformationwouldbesoughtwiththedeterminationofbywhatrightandunderwhat
conditionstheseconceptsarelegitimatelyappliedtoobjects.Thisturntoconsciousness
withitsspecificmethodological content givesthebasicsensetothenotionof"meta
physical".Thismethodicalmovewhichmythesisdealswithisnotwhetherthereis a
priori knowledge,buthowsuchknowledgeisatallpossible.Theconsequenceofthis
enquiry into the conditions of possibilities of experience and of the knowledge of
phenomenayieldstheconcretepictureofconsciousnessasunderstandingandreason.This
attemptofdissectingthefacultyofunderstandingitself,whichhasbeenconceivedasthe
propertaskoftranscendentalphilosophy,setsoutuponahndamentallyphenomenological
explication.Bymeansofametaphysicalturn,theessenceofconsciousnessisdiscovered,
both as understanding and as reason. The inherent claims of consciousness must be
explicatedmakingitthefocusofenquirythatattemptstoisolatetheessentialsofhuman
experience and knowledge and to display their interrelationship. Similarly Husserl
characterized his own enterprise as a "method by which I want to establish, against
mysticism and irrationalism a kind of superrationalism which transcends the old
rationalismasinadequateandyetvindicateitsinmostobjective"
(Spiegelberg,1971,p.84).Inalltheserespects,hismethodcoincideswith
phenomenological"criticism".

As one is impelled to establish the metatheory in order to justify necessary

propositions,Husserlsimilarly conceived ofhistranscendental phenomenologyas the
onlyjustificationofnecessarytruth.Toexhibitthepointinmoredetail,phenomenology
has unfortunately been critically referred to as a "methodological solipsism stripping
everythingfiomourintuitions"(Moran,2000,p.189).ButHusserl'sphilosophyissound

andrationalinthathebelievesthereare apriorprinciplesor"truths",however,hedoes
notagreewithtraditionalrationaliststhatthereisafacultyofspecialpowerofreasonthat

wouldidentifythesetruths(Ibid,p.129).Rather,theseaprioritruthsaretobelocated
anddefendedintermofaspecialtypeofseeingandinthissenseHusserlisasortof

empiricist(Ibid,p.95).ButhisempiricismisnotthetraditionalempiricismofLocke
since he maintains what Locke would never allow, that is, there are necessary truths
which can be established though intuit ion. The fbndamental doctrine of Husserl' s
phenomenologycanbesummarizedintheterm,"categoricalintuition"(Op.cit.,p.120).
With rationalism, he maintains that we can and do have knowledge which is neither
empirical nor trivial; with empiricism, he maintains that all knowledge comes fiom
intuition.However,contrarytothetraditionalempiricalmovementheinsiststhatintuition
itselfgivesusthenecessarytruth(Moran,2000,p.127).AndasRadhakrishnan

madeanelegantlistofthefundamental a priori principlesbasictotheverynatureof

human consciousness, similarly Husserl's phenomenology is the investigation of the
natureofhumanconsciousnesswithaviewtowardsdisclosingcertainspecialintuitions
thatyieldnecessarytruths.Thesespecialintuitionsarecalled"eidetic"or"essential"and
aretobedistinguishedfiomthetraditionalnotionof"experience"whichislimitedto
whatHusserlcallsfactualorempiricalintuition.Hisinterestinempiricalintuitionisnot
aninterestintheempiricalcontentsoftheseintuitionsbutratherintheiressentialforms.

Hence,itwouldbeverynaturaltoconcludethatbothRadhakrishnanandHusserlare
similar, particular in their search for a priori foundations of all experience and
knowledge.The"intuition"whichseemstobethedecisivefactorinthefoundationof
thenecessary truthforHusserlappearstobesimilartoRadhakrishnan'snotionof
intuition.IfbothRadhakrishnanandHusserlaretobecompared,intuitionplayssucha
fundamentalrole.Atonelevel,whatHusserlseemstobedoingistoextendthescope
of intuition in any essential structure. On the other level, there is a difference
regarding"intuition"betweenRadhakrishnanandHusserl.Radhakrishnanspeaksof
synthesisproper because hewishestoemphasizetheactivityinvolvedinthought,
whereas Husserl's intuition seems to emphasize the receptivity (Ibid, p. 61). The
emphasisonreceptivitybringsempiricismnearertoHusserlthanRadhakrishnan.

However,inspiteoftheabovedifference,thefunctionofthenotion"intuition"
for both seems to be basically the same. Husserlian intuition is not something
sensuous like that of empiricists (Husserl, 2001, p.42), so far one can say that
Husserl's intuition presupposes some activity, which Radhakrishnan may term
"synthetic insight" (Radhakrishnan, 1980, p. 173) but they are identical.
Radhakrishnan's synthesis may be regarded as the basis upon which the
phenomenological "intuition" can take place. Thus, it can be said that in
Radhakrishnan'snotionsofsynthesisandHusserl'sthesisonintuitionthereisonlythe
differenceofterminology,butfunctionallytheyaddressthesameproblem.
 Thus, in investigating the nature of human consciousness, phenomenology
studiestheessentialstructureofanactandcontentsofconsciousness,astudybased
not on mere empirical generalization but on the intuitive grasp of the essence of
phenomena.Husserlundertooktoexaminehisphilosophyandtoreformulateitin
termsofanewcritiqueofreason,forwhichphenomenologyprovidedthefoundation.
For him hisowncritiquewasevenmoreradicalthatRadhakrishnan'sbecauseitnot
onlymademetaphysicsbutallphilosophyamorerigorousscience.

Since the publication of the Ideen of phenomenology, the science of the

essential structure of "pure consciousness" goes along the name of transcendental
phenomenology.Thetitle"transcendental"thatHusserldevelopedcanbeconsidered
a metaphysical investigation because it executed a transcendental turn in modern
philosophy.Inviewofalltheabovepoints,Husserliantranscendentalphenomenology
is considered a natural offspring of an investigation of the possible condition of
humanexperience(Moran,2000,p.145).

3.3 PhenomenologicalReduction

Phenomenologicalreductionor epoche (literallyabstention)wasconsideredby

HusserltobehisgreatestdiscoverybecauseitbringsustoacrucialpointinhisPureor

Transcendental Phenomenology and at the same time in the history of the

phenomenologicalmovement.Thepurposeofreductionistoguaranteethepurityofthe
descriptionandtoenableinthediscoveryoftheessencethatisessentialtoHusserl's
analysis of necessary truth. The reduction assures us that the object described by
phenomenologywouldbethephenomenon,oronlytheintentionalobjectofexperience.
Thereby,thereductioncompelsustolookatwhywesimplysee,withoutthepresumption
of any interpretation imposed upon it. Consequently, phenomenological reduction
doesnotdenyanyscientificfacts;itonlysuspendsthemsothattheinvestigationcan
beundertakenonlywithwhatwesee(Ibid,p.11).

Reductionguaranteesthepurityofthedescriptionbyforbiddingustodescribe
the"naturalworld".Toputitotherwise,reductionof epoche enablesustodescribe
consciousnessanditscontentsratherthantheworldanditsobjects.Phenomenological
reductionalsoguaranteestheseeingofessencesandnotjustindividuals.Thepurpose
ofthisreductionistoreducedescriptionstodescriptionsofessences;theaimisto
focusattentiononthemeaningofphenomenaratherthanonthevariouspeculiarities
ofaparticularexperience(Bell,1990,p.167).

Finally,thereductionisintendedtoeliminatefromphilosophicalinvestigationa
numberofpuzzles,particularlyregardingtheproblemofexistence.Phenomenological
reductionneverquestionswhethersomethingexistsornotandisrealornot.Becauseit
describesonlytheessence,existenceisirrelevant.Itisnotthatthephenomenologistisnot
interestedintheanalysisofwhatitisforamaterialobjecttobebutthecentralfunctionof
reduction,accordingtoHusserl,isto"bracket"itforthepurposeof
phenomenologytoabstainfromaskingirrelevantquestions(Op.cit.,p.78).

In the Ideen, the implication seems to be that what is transcendental about

phenomenologyisthatitsuspendsalltranscendentclaims,thatisassertionsaboutreality
otherthanthatofconsciousness(Spiegelberg,1971,p.126).Thefullestdwussionofthe
termoccursinHusserl'slastpublicationTheCrisisoftheEuropeanScienceand
TranscendentalPhenomenology.Herehewantstoassignitawidermeaninginlinewith
theCartesianapproach,accordingtowhichatranscendentalphilosophy"reachesback",
(i.e.literally,"askbackfor")totheultimatesourceofallknowledge"(Ibid,p.126)with
theimplicationthatthissourceistobefoundintheego.Thephenomenologicalreduction
makes its appearance when Husserl enters upon the "fundamental meditation" of
phenomenology,whichistoyieldpurephenomena,andwhichcannotbeattainedinthe
"nalve"or"natural"attitude.ItisatthispointthatHusserlturnstoDescartes,butat

thesametime,hemakesitclearthathisownreductionisnottobeinterpreted as a
Cartesiandoubt,whichdenies,experimentallyortemporallyintheexistenceofthe
thingsreduced(Chakravarty,1998,p.94).Eventheterm epoche doesnotmeana
formofuniversaldoubtbutitonlydemands,whatitisforonetobelieve intheirown
existence.Toputitotherwise,theprimaryfunctionofallreduction,forHusserl,isto
makeusawareofwhatisindubitablygiven.

Husserl distinguishes two stages of this phenomenological reduction;

psychologicalreductionisthereductiontotheessence,andisasteponthewaytothe
purifiedphenomena,whilethefunctionofphenomenologicalreductionistofreethe
phenomenafromalltransphenomenalelements,f?omallbeliefs intransphenomenal
existenceandleaveuswithwhatisindubitablyorabsolutelygiven (Op.cit.,p.147).

TofindouthowtheelementoftheIndianconceptionofintuitionmayfithere,we
canturntohowRadhakrishnanmighthaveconceivedofthistranscendentalismandits
presenceinHusserls'phenomenology.Sincetranscendentalknowledgeisoccupiednotso
muchwithobjectsaswiththemodeofourknowledgeoftheseobjects,thismodeof
knowledgeinsofarispossiblybeingapriori.ThespecificclaimofRadhakrishnanisto
attendtoourexperiencingoftheobjects,ratherthantotheobjectsdirectly:"knowinga
thingandbeingitaredifferent"(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.138)whichclearlyresembles
theHusserlianthesisofepoche.ThetranscendentalinvestigationofHusserlcallsfor
suspension of belief of existence and nonexistence in order to achieve this
transcendentalcognitionandepochesisinstrumentaltothat.

Husserldescribesepocheinnegativetermsasthesuspensionofexistentialbeliefs
butinthiswritinghedescribesmodesofawarenessasnotapsychological,empiricalora

mentalstate,butas a prioriawareness,whichisevidentfortranscendentalinvestigation.
Theessenceofphenomenologycorrespondstothisawarenessofobjects.Furthermore,in
ordertoexperiencetheawarenessacertainspecialintuitionisnecessary,whchisnot
possiblebyempiricalexperience,butbyatranscendentalexperience.Asphenomenology
isthestudyoftheessentialstructuresoftheconsciousnesscomprisingitsego,subject,
acts,andcontents,itisnotlimitedtopsychologicalphenomena,ratheritiscarriedout
withcompletesuspensionofexistentialbelief.Hencethesubjectofsuchaninvestigation
wouldneverbeanempiricistselfbutatranscendentalself.Theexperienceofsucha
transcendentalselfwouldbeanabsoluteexperience,absoluteinthesensethatnofurther
questionbehinditispossible.Therefore,thisreductionisnotmerelyamovingawayfiom
the natural world, but a moving towards something and that is none other than
transcendentalsubjectivity.

3.4 GeneticEpistemology

Ifanintegratedmetatheoryistobedevelopedasananalyticexplanationof
Radhakrishnan'sintuition,thenanecessaryandcompatiblepsychologicalcomponent
wouldbeJeanPiaget'sdevelopmentalpsychologybecauseboththinkersstartedtheir
investigationofthepossibilityofhumanexperience,albeittheirowninterpretative
models:Radhakrishnan'sBrahmantoPiaget'sscheme.Asneitherrationalismnor
empiricism can explain the possibility of human experience, similarly for Piaget
neither structure without genesis (counterpart of rationalism) nor genesis without
structure (counterpart of empiricism) can give an explanation of the possibility of
humanexperience(Furth,1969,p.179).Therefore,thedevelopmentalpsychologyof
Piagetwouldbeofmuchvaluewhileexplainingthetranscendentalstructure.

Thesynthesisofhumanexperiencewhichhasalreadybeenintroducedfromthe
RadhakrishnanperspectivecanbeclearedupafteradescriptionofPiagetianschematic
operations, which attempts an explanation of human thinking. The notion of schema
occupiesaveryprominentplacebecausetheveryconceptofexperiencepresupposesthe
operationofschema.Theyplaytheroleofactivesynthesisandtherebymakehuman

experiencepossible.Hence,PiagetunlikeLocke,didnotacceptatabularasatheory
of the mind (Piaget, 1973, p. XI). Rather for him, intellectual operations play an
importantroleintheformationofconcepts,althoughtheyaretiedupwithbehavioral
activities.Thus,theconcernwouldbetoexplaintheoperationsofPiagets'snotionof
schemawithothercorollaryfunctionsandtoseehowhehasexplainedthestructural
conditionsofhumanexperience(Flavel,1963,p.215).

AnimportantfeatureofPiaget'ssystemisthestudyofstructuresofdeveloping
intelligence,whichisopposedtoits function and content. Contentreferstorawand
uninterruptedbehaviordatawhilefunctionsreferstothosecharacteristicsofintelligent
activity,whichholdtrueforallagesandwhichvirtuallydefinetheveryessenceof
intelligentbehavior(Ibid,p.222).AccordingtoPiaget,intelligentactivityisalwaysan

active,organizedprocessofassimilatingthenewtdtheoldandofaccommodatingthe
oldtothenew(Piaget,1972,p.82).Intellectualcontentwouldvaryfromagetoagein
the ontogenetic level, while the functional properties of the adaptational process
remain the same. Besides function and content, Piaget assumes the existence of
cognitive structures. Thestructures,likecontentandunlikefunction,undergochange
withage.
Theyareorganizationalpropertiesof intelligence'andaremediatorsbetweenthe

invariantfunctionsontheonehandandvariegatedbehavioralcontentsontheother
handandthesedevelopmentalchangesconstitutethemajorobjectsofstudyforPiaget
(Op.cit.,p.266).

Piaget,inconsiderabledetaildescribedintellectualfunctioninordertogivean
explanation ofhuman experience. Forhim, while weinherit the mode of intellectual
functioning,wedonotinheritthecognitivestructuresassuch;theycomeintobeingonly

in the course of development. He further held that what we do inherit is a modus

operandi, aspecificmannerinwhichweestablishrelationshipswithourenvironment.
The mode of functioning generates cognitive structures in the course of intellectual
functioning andconstitutes ourbiological heritage, whichremains essentially constant
throughoutourlife.Itisbecauseofthisconstancyoffunctioninginthefaceofchanging

structure,itsfundamentalpropertiesarereferredto asfunctionalinvariants. This

constitutesthecoreofintellectualfunctioning,whichinPiaget'swordswouldbethe

"ipseintellectus"(Piaget,1973,p.16).Thosedefylngattributeswhicharesaidtobe
invariantoverthewholedevelopmentalspanareprincipallyknownas organization
andadaptation.Adaptationcomprisestwootherrelatedbutconceptuallydistinctsub

properties,calledassimilation,andaccommodation.Adaptationmeansadaptationtothe
environmentandoccurswheneveragivenorganism'senvironmentinterchanges.Ithas
theeffectofmodifyingtheorganisminsuchawaythatfurtherinterchangesfavorableto
its preservation are enhanced. This adaptation admits the two above conceptually
distinguishablecomponents.Although assimilation and accommodation aredistinguished
conceptually, they are indissocialble in the adaptional act. Adaptation through its twin
componentsexpressesthedynamicouteraspectofbiologicalhnctioning.Piagetexplained
thatintellectualfunctioninitsdynamicaspectischaracterizedbytheinvariant

process of assimilation and accommodation. An act of intelligence in which

assimilation and accommodation are in balance or in equilibrium constitutes
intellectual adaptation. Both adaptation and organization are closely linked, since
adaptationpresupposesandunderliescoherenceontheonehand,andorganizations
arecreatedthroughadaptationsontheotherhand(Op.cit.,p.60).

ThisexplanationofintellectualhnctioningbecomesclearerwhentakingPiaget's
notionofschemesandschemasintoconsideration.Theideaoccupiesaprominentplace
in his account of cognitive development, especially during infancy. A scheme is a
cognitive structure, which has reference to a class of similar action sequences, these
sequences of necessity being strongly bounded constituent behavior that has been
internalized in the absence of a role model. Schemas are labeled by the behavior
sequences towhichtheyreferandsupport (Op.cit., p.102).Thus,whilediscussing
sensorymotordevelopment,Piagetspeaksoftheschemaofsucking,theschemaofsight
and so on. Similarly in the middle of childhood a schema of intuitivequalitative
correspondencedevelopsbywhichoneknowswhetherornottwosetsofelementsare

numericallyequivalent.Adolescentsalsopossessanumberofoperationalschemas.It
wouldbeinaccuratethoughtosaythatschemasareonlynamedbytheirreferenced
actionsastheydohavemoreofaroletoplay.Whileschemascomeinallshapesand
sizes,theyallpossessonegeneralcharacteristicwhichisthattheconstituent'sbehavioris
sequencedinanorganizedunity.It'sfromthefunctionalinvariantanglethattheschemais
tobestudied.Itisseenthataschemabeingacognitivestructureisafluidformtowhich
actions andobject areassimilated duringcognitive functioning.Schemas,onceagain,
beingstructuresarebothcreatedandmodifiedbyintellectualfunctioning.Atthispoint,a
disparitybetweenRadhakrishnanandPiaget'sconceptionofschemasisnoted.

ForRadhakrishnan,thereisnoindicationthattheconstitutionofaprioriformsundergo
changewhereastheschemasofPiagetdochange(Pulanski,1972,p.185).Nevertheless,
themethodologyofbothremainsthesame,i.e.,theconceptofexperiencepresupposes
thefunctioningofcertainelements,whicharenotderivablefromsensecontent.These
arenothingbutnonempiricalconditionsofhumanexperience.

Iftheoperationsofschemasaretobestudiedinitsdynamicaspect,itwouldbe
knownhow,becauseofschemas,mentalassimilationispossible.AccordingtoPiaget,
oneofthemostimportantcharacteristicofanassimilatoryschemaisitstendencytowards
repeatedapplication.Onlybehaviorpatternswhichrecuragainandagain inthecourseof
cognitivefunctioningareconceptualizedintermofschemas.Piagetreferstothis

repetitionas reproductionandfunctionalassimilation. Onceschemasareconstituted,

theyapplythemselvesagainandagaintoassimilateaspectsoftheenvironment. In the
courseofthisrepeatedexpertise,individualschemasaretransformedinseveralways;this
sortoffunctioningnotonlycreatesstructuresbutchangesthemcontinually.Firstofall,
schemasareforeverextendingtheirfieldofapplicationinordertoassimilatenewand
differentobjects.ThisisaccordingtoPiaget,generalizingassimilation.Asecond
importantchangewhichschemasundergoisthatofinternaldifferentiation.Becauseof
this,recognitionofcertainobjectswithaninitiallyundifferentiatedschemabecomes
possible,whichheregardsasrecognitolyassimilation.Andtheunionofthesethree
basic functional and developmental characteristics of all assimilatory schemas,
repetition, generalization and differentiationrecognition, essentially constitute
intellectuallyfunctioning(Furth,1969,pp.4445).Preciselyspeaking,theoperation
ofschemasduringthecognitivedevelopmentcanbeexplainedasfollows.Repetition
consolidatesandstabilizestheschemabesidesprovidingthenecessaryconditionsfor
change. Generalization enlarges it by extending its domain of application. A
differentiationhastheconsequenceofdividingtheoriginalschemaintoseveralnew
schemas each with a discriminating focus on reality, but instead of undergoing
individual changes of this kind, it also forms interrelationships with other
developmentsuptoapointandthenunitestoformasinglesupraordinateschema,
whichPiagetcallsreciprocalassimilation,i.e.eachschemaassimilatestheother.

Nowithasbeenstatedthatassimilationandaccommodationconstitutethemost
fundamental ingredients of intellectual function. Both functions are present in every
intellectualactofwhatevertypeanddevelopmentallevel.Thus,theirconcurrencemaybe
saidtobestrictlyinvariantbutontheotherhand,theirrelationshipisnotconstant.Rather
theirrelationshipchangescompletelywithinandbetweendevelopmentalchanges

(Piaget,1978,p.213).Becausethefunctionalinvariantsthemselvesconstitutethe
coreofintelligenceinPiaget'ssystem,alternationsintherelationshpbetweenthem
mustnecessarilyhaveimportantconsequencesforthekindofintellectualfunctioning
which takes place. Hence, an analysis of relationships is as necessary in Piaget's
theoryastheinvariantsthemselves.
 The fundamental transformation in the assimilation and accommodation
relationshipbecomesconsciousduringthefirsttwoyearsoflife.AccordingtoPiaget,
assimilationandaccommodationarebothundifferentiatedonefromtheother.Yet,they
areparadoxicallyantagonisticoropposedtoeachotherintheiractionduringthisearly
periodoflifebecauseanobjectandtheactivitytowhichtheobjectassimilatedconstitute
fortheyounginfantasingle,indivisibleexperience(Pulanski,1978.p.108).Thus,theact
ofassimilatinganobjecttoaschemaishopelesslyconfusedwithandundifferentiated
fromtheaccommodatoryadjustments intrinsicinthisact.Itisnotthatinfantsfailto
accountfortheobject,rathertheyhavenowayofdistinguishingtheiractsfromthe

eventswhichthoseactsproducedortheobjectsuponwhichtheybear.Inotherwords,
agentandobject,egoandoutsideworldareinextricablylinkedtogetherineveryinfantile
action.Thedistinctionbetweenassimilationofobjectstotheselfandtheaccommodation
oftheselftotheobjectssimplydoesnotexist.Thiscondition,theoppositionbetween
assimilationandaccommodation,stemsfromthisveryundifferentiatedness,sinceinfants
cannotdistinguishtheiractsfromtheirenvironmentalconsequences(Pulanski,1978,p.
50). Therefore, the necessity to make new and difficult accommodations in order to
assimilatenovelobjectstoalreadyestablishedschemaisnotpossible.
Ifassimilationandaccommodationareundifferentiatedandopposedintheradical

egocentrism oftheneonatethenhowtoexplainthesensorymotordevelopmentintheir
growingarticulationandcomplementation.Thenetworkofassimilatoryschemaissorich
thatitencompassesandinterpretstherealityproducts,whichaccommodationpresentsto
itandthisrichnessofschemaprovidesaguidingframeworkofmeanings,
that can explicitly direct accommodatoryexplorationsfurther into the unknown.
Thereforeschemasnotonlyinterpretwhataccommodationpresents,theyalsoprovide
knowledgeofwhatwouldbenext(Ibid,p.30).

Thus, it is seen that intellectual activity begins with the confusion of

experience and of awareness of the self because of chaotic undifferentiation of
assimilationandaccommodation.Hence,intelligencebeginsneitherwithknowledge
oftheselfnorofthingsassuchbutwithknowledgeoftheirinteraction(Ibid,p.16).
Therefore,theconstantworkingofaccommodationandassimilationgivesriseduring
sensory motor development to an increasingly elaborate and complex schematic
organization. In this way, the transition from undifferentiated antagonism to
differentiationandbalanceorequilibriumisnormallyestablished.

Thus,Piaget'stheoryofintelligenceisasynthesisofseveralepistemological
positions.Itretainselementsofapriorism,especiallyinitsemphasisonconstructive
activityofthesubjectandinitsbeliefthattheobjectisunknowablyindependentof
this activity, yet it rejects a prioiristic staticity and absolutism in favor of
developmental cognitive forms. In the same fashion Radhakrishnan selectively
includesandexcludesviewsofspiritualismandintellectualisminordertoformulatea
theoreticalframeworkofthedevelopmentofhisintuition(Ibid,p.239).

Piaget's microcosmic theory of intelligence, that is the assimilation and

accommodationmodel,canbecomparedandcontrastedwiththeIndianmacrocosmic
epistemologicalacceptanceofmultipleviewpoints(anekantavada)inourquestto

developanintegratedtheoryofintuition.Itistheaccommodationofnewanddifferent
beliefsandpracticesalongestablishedpatternsofknowledgewhichisperhapsthemost
importantfactorinformingtheepistemologicalexpressionsinIndianthought.Such
accommodationhasalonghistory,stretchingbackthroughthecenturiestoVedictimes.
Thisabilitytoaccommodatethemultiplicityanddiversityofnewbeliefsandpractices
displays a remarkable tolerance for the viewpoint of others. This is not to say that
resistancehasalwaysbeenabsentfiomthosewithopposingviews.Onecancertainly
arguethattheinfluenceoftheBritishincursionsintoIndiawithitsimperialistbaggageas
muchastheearlierBuddhistphilosophymetwithmarkedresentment.Indians,however,
have traditionally been tolerant enough to place their views along with other new
expressionsasthosenewphilosophical viewsemerged.Despitethesubjugationwhch
suchaccommodationallowsthereisaveryprofoundunderlyingunityinbelievinginthe
manifestationofallknowledgefiomone,ultimate Groundofallbeing. Theapparent
diversityofbeliefandpracticeservestoallowanapproachtoreceivingknowledgein
whateverwaysuitstheindividual'sevolution.Therecognitionofthisfact,alongsidethe
notionthattheOne,Brahman,cantakeamultiplicityofforms,cansupplyacertainunity
totheapparentsurfacediversity.

From the simplest to metaphysical levels, Indian epistemological thought is

characterizedbywhatseemstobeopposingviewpoints.Theconceptisitselfoneoftotal
nonmanifestationwhichisnirgunaandyetmanifestationinavarietyofformsas
saguna. Ontheonehandwehaveametaphysicalconceptofatotallytranscendent
Brahmanandontheothersideasensuousandrationalbeing(Chennakesavan,1976,

p.121).YetHindusseesnodisparityherebecause allareultimatelyone,Brahman.Then,
again,thecyclonicalconceptionofallexistence,bothinthemicrocosmoftheindividualand
macrocosmofthecosmos,meansthatdualconceptsbecomeunified.Forwhatis
createdmust,ultimately,ceasetoexistinaworldoffluxandtransience,butequallyso,
whatceasestoexist is rebornagain,fromtheuniversetothetiniestflower.Lifeis
death and death is life; all that is born must die and what d e s will be reborn.
Sometimesquiteopposingideashavebeenaccommodatedsidebyside.

Comingbacktoouraimofaccommodatingtheroleofintuitionalongsidereason
andperceptioninintellectualdevelopment,wefindthatinbothIndianthoughtandPiaget,
allthreeareconsideredtobeanactiveagencywhichmakesexperiencepossible.With
intuition,realitytothehumanmindandtoideasisnotreduced,norisitsuggestedthatthe
humanmindcreatesthings.Rather,theassumptionisthatwecannotknow

thingsunlesstheyaresubjecttocertainaprioriconditionsofknowledgeonthepartofthe
subject.TheclaimisthatunlessthisisacceptedthenwecannotknowtheBrahamAtman
idealism whichweinnately possess(Coward,1983,p.18).Hence,themindmustbe
thoughtofasactive.Thisactivitydoesmeanthecreationofbeingoutofnothing.Itmeans
thatthemindimposesitsownformsofcognition,determinedbythestructuresofhuman
sensibilityandunderstanding.Therefore,the"synthesis"whichistalkedofhereisnotof
constructionbutofgettingverifiedbythecontent.Asaresult,allcognitivecontentmust
be verifiable contents of intuitive experience. According to Radhakrishnan's thinking,
boththediviningforceofidealismandtheresistanceofrealismareequally

present(Ibid,p.20).SimilarlyinPiaget'stheory,intelligenceisalwaysconsideredan
activeorganizedprocessofassimilatingthenewtotheoldandofaccommodatingthe
oldtothenew.LikeRadhakrishnan,anintegratedsynthesisoccursinordertoexplain
thepossibilityofthestructuralconditionsofhumanexperience(Ibid,p.17).

WithRadhakrishnanandPiaget,wefindapictureofnovelrelationshipbetween
subjectandobject.Bothadmittedthattherelationshipbetweensubjectandobjectisnota
simplegivendatumbuthighlycomplex.Theageoldconfusingrelationshipofsubject
andobjectisrehtedthroughRadhakrishnan'sidealism,whenhemakesitclearthatthe

subjectbecomesonewiththeobject.Thereforetheknowledgeoftheobjectisalready
presupposedinknowledgeofthesubject.Theknowledgeoftheobjectconstitutesthe
necessary condition of the knowledge of the subject because the object as given to
conscious experience is already subjected to those cognitive forms which the human
subjectimposesbyanaturalnecessity,foritsnaturalstructure asknowingsubject.Hence,
thecognitiveformsdeterminethepossibilityofobjects.SimilarlyinPiaget,oneshould
notstartwithsubjectbutawarenessoftheselfiscomplementarytotheawarenessofthe
object.Therefore,forPiagetknowledgeoftheselfandtheknowledgeoftheobjectare
dual resultants of the successive differentiation and equilibration of the invariant
functionswhichcharacterizessensorymotordevelopment(Richmond,1971,p.80).

Radhakrishnan's primary aim is to deal with nonempirical conditions of human

experiencewhichissimilartoPaigets'smainconcern.Radhakrishnanarguesthat

experienceisnotsomethingmerelygiven,itisconstituted,andthisconstructionis
possible only through nonempirical means. Those nonempirical conditions along
withtheirrelativefunctionsconstitutethemajorstudyofPiaget.
Thefunctionalinvariantswhichconstitutetheessenceofintellectualfunctioning

in PiagetarealsoechoedinthesentimentsofRadhakrishnan.Radhakrishnan'sposition
thatthepurposeofintuitionistoconnectphenomenasothatonecanexperiencethem,
impliesafunctionalinvariant.Heclaimsmherthisasuniversalfunctionofintuition,
thusmirroringPiaget'stheoryoffunctionalinvariantofintelligence.
 DespitethesesimilaritiesbetweenPiagetandRadhakrishnan,yetafundamental
difference emerges when Piaget admits structures as variants (Ibid, p. 64) while for
Radhakrishnanstructureisinvariant.Theydifferintheiraccountofstructure,because
PiagettakesstructureatthesensorymotorlevelwhileRadhakrishnantakesitfurtherwith
themetacognitiveorsymboliclevel.Inaddition,withPiagetthereisalsoacontinuation
of analysis of cognition and biology, whereas for Radhakrishnan it isn't. Piaget's,
intellectualfunctioningisaspecialformofbiologicalactivity:hismodelof

cognitivefunctioningisanapplicationofthebiologicalorder(Ibid,p.73).Whilefor
Radhakrishnantheintellectualfunctioningiscomplimentedwiththespiritualsubject.
Therefore, the subject of Piaget is an individual cognizing subject unlike the
transcendentalsubjectofRadhakrishnan.However,themethodologyadaptedbyboth
remains the same, i.e. explanation of nonempirical conditions responsible for the
possibilityofhumanexperience.

3.5 AnalyticalPhilosophy

IfRadhakrishnan'stheoreticalstructureistobeacceptedasafoundationofthe
metatheory suggested, then the obvious question arises regarding its communicable
requirements.Thetranscendentalmethodraiseshrtherquestionsregardingitsmannerof
explanation,mediumofexpressionandtheresultsofsuchaninvestigation.Theconcern
herewouldbetolocateitsmethod,medium,andresultintermsofAnalyticphilosophy
andtoshowhowsomelinguisticphilosophershavesuccessfullyestablishedthesame.To
thisextent,theymaybeconsideredasmirroringtheIndiantradition.Whiledoingso,
Moritz Schlick's development of the method of philosophical investigation will be
discussedandshownhowLudwigWittgensteindevelopeditfurther.Furthermore,J.L.
Austin'sclaimthat"ordinarylanguage"shouldbeusedasthemediumofexpression
and P. F. Strawson's ideas of a descriptive metaphysics also find a place in this
investigativescheme.

Schlick'seffortsatestablishingapropermethodinphilosophywiththeanarchyof
opinions(Ayer,1956,pp.5359),resemblesRadhakrishnan,becausebothvisualizedthe
samestateofanarchyinphilosophy.Earlier,particularlywithDescartes,philosophical
andmathematicalmethodswereemployedtogether,butSchlickdistinguishedbothand
held that the mathematical method can do nothing but harm in a philosophical
investigation(Simth,1952,p.754).Inordertosteerphilosophyfiomthepathofscience,
Radhakrishnanclaimedthatphilosophicalproblemsarenotfactualproblems,theyare,
however,"judgmentsofvalues"(Lal,1978,p.301).Thiswasthecrucialstepthathetook
inordertochallengeskepticsandtherebymakepossibletheprogressofphilosophical
pursuit.Hence,heintroducedakindofphilosophywhosepurposewastoserveasan
introductiontovalues,towarnagainstfallaciesofrelyingsolelyonthescientificmethod,
andtosetpeopleontherighttrack(Radhakrishnan,1980,p.196).Similarly,Schlick
around whom the Vienna Circle centered, embarked upon a vigorous scrutiny of
traditionalphilosophicalproblemsandpointedouttheanarchyofphilosophicalopinion.
His primary concern was to be very much critical. The important reason for this, he
claimed,wasthemisunderstandingandmisinterpretationofthenatureofphilosophyfiom
thatofscience;thephilosophicmethoddealswithdiscoveryofmeaningwhilethemethod
ofsciencedeals withbcoveryoftruth(Rorty,1967,p.53).Pointingoutthis definite
changeinphilosophicalperspective,hefurtherexhibitedthequestionofmeaningwhich
hepresumedtobetheturningpointinphilosophy.
 However,ifwebringoutthekeyconcept,alreadyintroduced,i.e.questionsof
valueandmeaning,fiomthecontextofbothRadhakrishnanandSchlickrespectively,we
findthatphilosophyisinsearchofamethod,whichisneitherempiricalorscientificnor
logical.ForRadhakrishnan,itisametaphysicalmethodandAnIdealisticViewofLifeis
thetreatiseregardingasearchofthesamemethod.Ontheotherhand,forSchlickand
subsequent members of the Vienna Circle the method of phlosophy is conceptual
clarification;itssoletaskistoclarifythemeaningsofourstatements(Fare,1998,p.178).
LikeRadhakrishnan,Schlickadmittedthatphilosophicalproblemsarequestionsnotof
fact,butofwhatmeansweattachtothatexperience,thatisourlanguage.Owingtoall
sortsofgrammaticalandpsychologicalcircumstances,itveryeasilyhappensthatonefalls
intoavarietyofconceptualconfusionsandtherebyintoparadoxesandcontradictions,
torturing ourselves with insoluble riddles. But the philosoplcal method of meaning
clarificationactsasasortoftherapysharingasimilaritytoRadhakrishnanforwhomthe
taskofphilosophywasalsotherapy.HisAnIdealisticViewofLifeanditssubjectmatter
was an inquiry concerned with resolving that disillusionment which arose out of
materialism.Therefore,hisinquirybecomesidealisticratherthanskeptical.Themethod
of that inquiry was transcendental, nothing empirical, but merely hypothetical, as its
subjectmatterwasamethodofargument.Hence,forRadhakrishnanthepropertaskof
philosophyconsistsinthesolutionofspeculativeproblemssuchasthepurposeoflife
becausesuchproblemstranscendrationallogic.Thus,philosophycanreasonablyattempt
toanalyzeanddefinethesituations.Theseresemblances,betweenRadhakrishnanand
Schlick,whenviewedinthiscontext,showthatatthelevelofmethodbothenvisageda
pointinphilosophywhereitdoesnotencompassfactualproblemsasitsubjectmatter,
ratheritconcernsitselfwithconceptualormetaquestions.Thisenablesustoconceive
ofanaltogethernewactivity -conceptionofphilosophyasameansofclarification.
Thisclarificationofpropositionscannotbesciencebecausetherecannotbeanysetof
trueprepositionsaboutmeaning.Thereasonforthisisthatinordertoarriveata
meaningofasentenceorofapropositionwemustgobeyondpropositions.

Therefore,thepursuitofmeaningconsequentlyisnothingbutasortofmental
activity.Bymeansofthismentalactivity,themeaningofpropositionsaretobesought
putting its constituent words in its linguistic structure and this sort of conceptual
analysis,inturn,wouldhelpintheclarificationofwordsusedinapropercontext
withouthavingaperfectlyclearmeaning.Therefore,forSchlick,philosophyistobe
definedastheactivityoffindingmeaning(Rorty,1967,p.50).Inasimilarfashion,
Radhakrishnanalsoadmittedinhistime,thatthepeculiarcharacterofphilosophyis
anactivityoffindingmeaning.Theideathatphilosophyisanactivityisanessential
point of similarity with the activity conception of philosophy (methodology) as
incidental.Hence,itexhibitsthesemblanceofthecontinuityandconstructofIndian
thought.TheessenceofthemethodologicalperspectiveofSchlick'sphilosophy,in
spiteofhisothertheoreticalimplications,issimilartoanddefinitelyintendsthesame
spiritofphilosophizing,whichwasstronglyfeltlaterbyWittgenstein.

InWittgenstein(1994),thisconceptionofphilosophygetsmoreemphasis,
whenhestates,

Philosophyisnotabodyofdoctrinebutanactivity. A philosophicworkconsists
essentiallyofelucidations.Philosophydoesnotresult in"philosophicalproposition",
butratherintheclarificationofproposition".(Tractatus4.III4,p.112).
 Wittgenstein'sbackgroundissometimeselucidatedwithtworemarksfiomthe
Tractatus"Allphilosophyisacritiqueoflanguage",and"Logicistranscendental"
(Ibid, p. 73, 4.0031,6,B). When developed, these two statements suggest that the
functions once performed by Radhakrishnan's transcendental logic and diction of
intuitionarenowsuppliedbyWittgenstein'slogicalanalysisoflanguageformsandby
acritiqueoflanguageortranscendentalphilosophyoflanguage.Thisinterpretationis
useful as a retrospective view of Wittgenstein, which relates his work to the
discussionofmethodology.

Wittgensteinsuggeststhatacritiqueoflanguageisthepositiveremedyforthe
conditionsinwhich"mostofthepropositionsandquestionsofphilosophersarisefiom
our failure to understand the logic of our language" (Ibid, T.4.003). With
Radhakrishnanthereisabroadlysimilarrecognitionthatphilosophicaldisagreements
followapatternandtheycanberesolvedneitherbydogmatismnorbyskepticism,but
onlybytranscendentallogic.

Similarly,Wittgensteinwrites"inphilosophythequestion,'whatdoweactually
use this word or this proposition for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights" (Ibid,
T.4.211).DialecticalreasondoessupplyananalogueforWittgenstein'sconceptionforthe
activedissolutionoflinguisticdeception,justasthere isahintofphilosophicalawareness
concernedwithasenseofreachinglimitsofhumantalkandjudgment.Especiallyinhis
laterdevelopments,Wittgensteinapproximatedtoawayofphilosophizing.Thereisa
broad analogy between his theme of the bewitching effects of language and
Radhakrishnan'sdescriptionofthehumanmind'snaturalinescapableattractiontoward
transcendentalmetaphysicsanditsdialecticalillusions(Anscombe,
1975,p.109).Particularity,ifthetranscendentalargument istobetakenintoaccount,
we find a definite resemblance between Radhakrishnan and Wittgenstein. What
Wittgensteinmeansby"grammatical"knowledge(Pitcher,1966,p.196),wouldbe
consideredasequivalenttoaparaknowledgebyRadhakrishnan.

Thus,linguisticphilosophycouldberegardedasanenquiryintothenecessary
conditionsforthepossibilityoflanguageitself,inasimilarfashionthatRadhakrishnan
triedtodiscovernecessaryconditions forthepossibilityofexperience. Henceforthe
Linguistic Movement, philosophical problems are problems which may be solved or
dissolvedeitherbyreferringtolanguageorbyunderstandingmoreaboutthelanguagewe
use.Ifwecarehllyexaminethelanguageusedbyphilosopherswewouldfindthatitis
largelytheambiguitiesoflanguageandthemisuseoflanguagethatarepossibleforsome

of the difficulties of philosophical questions. In fact a large number of phlosophical

statementsandpuzzles,whenanalyzedcanbefoundtobemeaningless.Itisthusclaimed
bytheAnalyticalschool,thatlanguagealoneformstheentiresubjectmatterofphilosophy
andanalysisoflanguagebecomesthekeytophilosophicalinvestigations(Tarnas,1991,
p.354).Asanexample,logic,mathematicsandtraditionalmetaphysicsaresaidtoconsist
entirelyoralmostentirelyof apriori propositions.Butthesesocalledpropositionsare
puzzlingbecausetruthofsuchpropositionscannotbeestablishedbyanappealtosense
experience,andthentheproblemarisesofhowsuchapositioncanhaveanonempirical
method of validation and what that method is. It can be argued that the method of
validation consists in simply understanding the proposition either by examining the
propositionalone,orbydeducingitfkomotherpropositionssounderstood,orbysome
kindorargumentthatmakesnoreferencetoempiricalmattersoffact.Ithas
beenheldthataprioripropositionsarenecessarilytrue.Howanypropositioncanbenot
simplytruebutnecessarilytrueseemstobedeeplypuzzling.Foralmguisticphilosopher,
anecessarypropositionwouldbeofsuchanaturethatitstruthcanbeascertainedsimply
byreferencetotheuseofthewordsorsymbolsthatoccurinitsexpression,withoutany
furtherappealtosenseexperience."ItisironicthatDescartes,inwonderingwhether

perhapshealoneexisted,usedlanguagetodothewondering ...Thefirstindubitable,
therefore,isnotthatIexist,butthatdialogexists.Mydoubtitselfisfiamedbydialog,for
it is fiamed by language which is a product of language" (Gallagher, 1982, p. 58).
Linguistictheoryassertsthatsentencesthatseemtoexpressa priori propositionsreally
expressonlylinguisticrulesorrulesofinference.Thatis,theirhnctionistoprescribehow
certainwordsorsymbolsaretobeused.Whilepreoccupiedwiththissortoflinguistic
analysis,itistobenotedthatphilosophicalproblemsarenotaboutlanguage,theyare
clearlyaboutphilosophicalconcepts.Whatisarguedhere,however,isthattheseproblems
springfiomlanguage,revealtheconfusionastotheusesoflanguageandaretobesolved
orremovedbyemployinglanguageproperly.Thlsdecisivepointwillbringanendtothe
hitlessconflictofsystemsinherentinsometraditionalphilosophicalproblems.Weareat
present in possession of methods which make every such conflict in principle
unnecessary. Now it is clear, how linguistic philosophers, in spite of their difference
viewsoninterpretation,trytoendeavortoformulateacommonprogram,thatisasearch
for a method, which would help in the establishment of genuine philosophical
propositions by means of conceptual analysis. If we recall the philosophical method
employedbyRadhakrishnanwefindaclosesimilarity.ForRadhakrishnan,themethodof
philosophicalinvestigationisdifferentfromalogical,formalorempiricalscience.
Radhakrishnan'sformistranscendentalwhichaimsatthemodeofknowingobjects
rather than objects, similar to what analytic philosophers call conceptual analysis
(Landesman,1997,p.176).

Supposeintuitiveelementsareconsideredtobethegroundofpossibleexperience,
forRadhakrishnanthesearecategoriesoffundamentalconcepts.Thenwhatwouldbethe
mediumofexpressionofthosefundamentalconcepts?Theseinnatepossibilitiescannot
simply be considered as introspective contents because it would lead to a form of
psychologismofthetypewhichLockeandDescartesaccepted.ForRadhakrishnan,the
psychologicalmethodsareconsideredtobeinadequate as asolutionforphilosophical
problemsashecompletelysynthesizedthequestionoforiginwiththosewhichrelateto
value.ThistrendofthoughtinRadhakrishnanisarejectionofthephysiologyofmindof
Locke.Thedistinctionbetweenquestionsoffactandquestionsofmeaningneedsto be
removedfiomphilosophicalinvestigationforabetterunderstandingofphilosophyitself.
If questions of fact are to be accepted as the only concern, then the idea of innate
possibilitiesasintrospectablestateswouldneverarisebecauseasaphilosophicalconcept
theirstatuswouldbenotbeempirical.

Ifthemediumofexpressionofthoseintuitiveelementsarenotmentalstatesand
dispositions,whichwouldbefactualquestions,thenwhatwouldbethemediumofthat
kind of clarification? The medium would therefore be one in which the fundamental
conditionsareexpressedbynecessarilyordinarylanguage(Gallagher,1982,pp.100101).
Broadlyspeaking,twogroupsoflinguisticphilosophers,IdealLinguistsandOrdinary
Linguists,talkabouttheworldbymeansofusingasuitablelanguage.Theirfundamental
concernrelatestothemethod,onwhichordinarylanguageandideal
languageagree.Equallyandfundamentallytheydisagreeonwhatisa"language"and
whatmakes it"suitable"(Ibid,p.102).However,theconcernisnottopointoutthe
distinctivefeaturesofthedebatebetweenordinaryandideallanguage,buttheoutcomeis
definitely a clear indication of the solution of philosophical problems by means of
languageanalysis.Ifthemethodadoptedbybothisthesame,thenthequestionarisesas
towhy"ordinarylanguage"shouldbepreferredasthemediumofexpressionofameta
theory,insteadofan"ideallanguage".Tothismysubmissionwouldbethatthestarting
pointinorharylanguage,whosedistinctivefeatureistobeginwithcommonandplain
language for communication is very close and similar to Radhakrishnan. For
Radhakrishnan, the language of the categories of an intuitive experience is ordinary;
therefore, the metatheory which is being considered must be a theory of everyday
experience.Thisexplanationofthepossibleconditionsofhumanexperienceisnotatall
an artificial conceptual system. The main purpose of this critique is to deduce these
principles which describe the general nature of the objects given in experience by
showingthattheydescribenecessaryconditionsofthepossibilityofexperience.Withthis
themeinmind,adiscussionofAustinisneeded,inordertoseewhyordinarylanguage
shouldbethemediumofexpressionofphilosophicalinvestigations.

The methodology of Analytic Philosophy gets somewhat more specific in the

writings of J.L. Austin (1979). For example, he is very critical of the conventional
handlingofepistemologicalthemesthroughanobsessiverepletionofjustafewwords,
factandexamplestreatedasstandardsin"SenseandSensibilia" (p.63).Hismainremedy
istoattendmorecarehllytothedistinctionoperativeinourordinaryformsofspeech.In
ordertocanyouthisintendedprogram,headoptsacloseinvestigationof
ordinarylanguageashismethod.Acloseexaminationoflanguagewouldbeatleasta
"beginall"ifnotan"endall",whichismostlyfoundinhspapers;"APleaforExcuses",
(pp.175204)and"ThreewaysofSpillingInk",(pp.272-287).
Austin'scentralconcerniswithordmarylanguage,thelanguagespokenpriorto
specialisttheorizing,andthelanguageofthe"plainman".Hearguedthatordinary
languagealreadycontainsfinerandsubtlerdistinctionsthatareoftenrealized,andif
thoseareexploredinpreferencetoartificiallanguagethenitmaybepossibletoreach
agreementandmakesomeprogressinphilosophicaldiscussion(Ibid,pp.175ff.).

Our common stock of words embodied all the distinctions men have found with
drawingtheconnectionstheyhavefoundworthmaking,inthelifetimesofmany
generations.Thesesurelyarelikelytobemorenumerous,moresound,sincethey
havestooduptothelongtestofthesurvivalofthefittest,andmoresubtle,atleastin
allordinaryandreasonablypracticalmatters,thatanythatyouorIareliketothinkup
inourarmchairsofanafternoonthemostfavored,alternativemethod.. .
(Ibid,p.182)

Hecontinuedfurthertoassertthat,

Inviewoftheprevalenceoftheslogan'orcharylanguage'andofsuchnames
as'linguistic'or'analytic'philosophyor'theanalysisoflanguage',onething
needsspeciallyemphasizingtocountermisunderstandings.Whenweexamine
whatweshouldsaywhen,whatwordsweshoulduseinwhatsituations,we
arelookingagainnotmerelyatwords(or'meanings',whatevertheymaybe)
but also at the reahties we use the words to talk about; we are using a
sharpenedawarenessofwordstosharpenourperceptionof,thoughnotasthe
finalarbiterof,thephenomena.(Ibid,p.182)

IntheabovepassageswhicharecentraltoanunderstandingofAustin'sapproach
tophilosophy,theargumentisnotmerelythatweneedtoexamineordinarylanguageso
thatweareclearonwhatwearerejectingifwerejectit,itisratherthatthereisreasonfor
notrejectingit.Toputitinotherwords,theIndianconceptofintuitiveknowledgethat
Radhakrishnanoperateswithhasaclaimtosuperiorityforotherwiseitwouldnothave
survived,butwouldhavebeenreplacedbyamoreadequateone.Afterconsiderationof
thedistinctiveguidelinesofordinarylanguages,itisnowclearwhyitshouldtobetaken
asthemediumofexpressionofthemetatheory.
Nowonemoreaspectofthemethodologyremainstobeseen,i.e.whatwouldbe
theresultsofsuchaninvestigation?P.F.Strawson'sIndividuals:AnEssayInDescriptive
MetaphysicsdefinesthemajorconditionsforanotherstageoftheAnalyticMovementin
thedevelopmentofmyinterpretationofintuitivethought.Theconceptionofmetaphysics
ofexperienceisconcernedwiththegeneralconditionsoftheemploymentofconcepts
andoftherecognitionoftheparticularcontentsofexperienceashavingsomegeneral
character.

Ournaturalbeliefsaretheproductsoftheconceptualframeworkoftheoriginal
understandingwhenappliedtooursenseexperiences.Withthatconceptualfi
ameworkofthoughtistheclaimthattherearematerialobjects,andthatthose
objectslargeenoughtobeseenhavecolors.Whatwealreadythinkasaresultof
ourconceptualschemeisthatherearecoloredobjects.Nowonderwecannothelp
thinkthatthetomatoisredwhenwelookatit.Thatitisredisaninstanceofan
ingrainedwayofthinking,awayofthinkingthat is likelytobetheresultof
humanevolutionandthatmayverywellbeeitherinnateorsodeeplyingrained as
tobeineliminable.EvenifIconvincemyselfthattherearenocoloredobjects,I
willbeunabletoceasebelievingthattomatoesarered,lemonsareyellow,and
snowwhite.(Landesman,1997,p.43)

Radhakrishnan's fundamental conditions of ordinary or empirical self

consciousnesshaveaclosesimilarlywiththeStrawsoniandistinctionbetweendescriptive
andreversionarymetaphysics.ItisthisdistinctionthatpermitsustoconsiderStrawsonin
lightofthekindsofcontextualandthematicmetaphysicalconditions,asdescribedby
Radhakrishnan.
 In defense of transcendental metaphysics, if the metatheory's execution may
appeartobedoubtful,butthesedoubtsareprovedtobeunjustifiedandagenuineinquiry
ofthiskindispossible,thenitfullydeservesthetitleofmetaphysics.Itsmethodwould
benonempirical,notbecause,liketranscendentmetaphysics,itclaimstobeconcerned
witharealmofobjectsinaccessibletoexperience,butbecauseitisconcernedwiththe
conceptualstructurewhichispresupposedinallempiricalinquiry.

Strawsonsuggeststhattherearedifferentprimarymeaningsofmetaphysics
(Strawson,1959,p.10).Outofthese,myconcerniswithdescriptivemetaphysics
because the results of the investigation undertakes in an attempt to establish the
supposed metatheory is the same. If the intuitive elements considered to be the
groundsofpossibleexperienceformaconceptualsystem,whichispresupposedinall
ourknowledge,thendescriptivemetaphysicswouldbetheonlylogicalresultbecause
itinspectstheconceptsandmethodsrequired inexaminingthepossibleconditionsof
humanexperience.

Hence,descriptivemetaphysicsbecomestheonlyfactortoexplainconceptual
systems,whichisinvolved in anyactualclaimforknowledge,whetherlogicalor
informal.Theclaimsofdescriptivemetaphysicswillhaveapeculiarnecessityabout
them.Theyarenotnecessaryinthesenseoflogic,buttheyarenecessarybecause
theyarepresupposedinallknowledge,whichisinourconceptualsystem.Thus,to
deny such propositions would be unintelligible. Even the idea of descriptive
metaphysicsisliabletobemetwithskepticism.Skeptics,howevercriticaltheymay
be,canmakedescriptivemetaphysicstheirtarget,becausetheycannotsimplytalk
aboutanythingwithouthavingaconceptualsystem.Therefore,Strawsonwrites,
 The point is not that we must accept this conclusion in order to avoid
skepticism,butthatwemustacceptinordertoexplaintheexistenceofa
conceptualschemeintermsofwhichtheskepticalproblemisstated.Butonce
theconclusionisacceptedtheskepticalproblemdoesnotarise.Sowithmany
skepticalproblems:theirstatementinvolvedthepretendedacceptanceofa
conceptualschemeandatthesametimethesilentrepudiationofoneofthe
conditionsofitsexistence.(Passmore,1975,p.186)

Hencethepeculiarnecessityofphilosophicalpropositionsisthattheirdenial
wouldbeunintelligiblebutnotcontradictory(inthatcasethiswouldbeanalyticalbutthis
isnotso).Soskepticismisnotfalsebutunintelligible.Therefore,descriptivemetaphysics
isanindefensiblepartofanexplanationofthenonempiricalconditionsofhuman
experience,whichwouldbeatranscendentalnecessity.
Nowtolookbackforabriefobservation,itisfoundthatthemetatheory,which
aimsattheexplanationofnonempiricalconditionsofhumanexperience,beginswitha
conceptualanalysisasitsmethodandeventuallyprogressedwithinordinarylanguageas
itsmediumofexpressionandfinallyresultedinaformofmetaphysics,whichevena
skepticcannotquestion.ThisbecomespossiblewhenSchlickbroughtaboutaturning
pointofphilosophyandopenedanerawherethephilosopherisfieefiomallsortsof
factualclaims,butisaccountabletometaquestions.Wittgensteinthenpreparedtheway
fortheenlargementofitsscopeandAustinstrengtheneditbyshowingthatthereisa
transcendentalwayofaskingaboutthebasisofpossibilityandrelationships,inour
sensingofthings.UltimatelyStrawsonenabledanalyticphilosophytotakeonthe
dimensionsoftherangeofproblemswhichdeterminethedirectionofphilosophy
towardsdescriptivemetaphysics.
3.6 Conclusion

The doctrine of intuition that has been developed from a consolidation of

Western philosophic perspectives is found to be clearer and have maintained its
similaritytoRadhakrishnaninspiteofculturaldifferences.WithRadhakrishnan,itis
obviousthattheproblemofthedoctrineofintuitionisnottoquestionthegenesisof
ideasbuttosearchafterthepossibleconditionsofhumanexperience.Perceivingthe
doctrinethiswaynaturallyremovesfromitallsortsoffactualclaimsandconcentrates
attentionuponthemodeoforganizingorsynthesizingexperienceitself.Hencethis
manner or mode of synthesis itself becomes the innateelement, which is not an
empiricalorpsychologicalsynthesis,ratheritisatranscendentalintegration.Asthis
cannotbestudiedbytraditionalmethodsavailable,amethoduniqueinitsstructure
hastobesoughtafterandthatisnootherthanthemetatheorysuggested.

This method of studying the structure of transcendental integration would

naturallydemandfromus,anaccountofthecognitivecapacityofthemind.Itwould
enableustoknowthedescriptionofthefimdamentalstructureofhumanexperienceand
thedistinctfeaturesofitsmethodologyinananalyticmanner.Asaresponsetothese
demands,Ihavesuggestedthreepossiblebranchesofphilosophy,mainlyPiaget'sgenetic
epistemology,Husserl'sphenomenology,andAnalyticalPhilosophy.Inordertoexhibitin
more detail the transcendental implications of Radhakrishnan regarding the mode of
human experience; geneticepistemology supplies the "synthesis" and exhibits the
contents of the cognitive capacity of the mind; Husserl defines the structure of
transcendentalisminaphenomenologicalmannerbyreducingtheexperiencetoits
essence;andfinallyAnalyticalPhilosophy,whereresultssimilartotheDescriptive
Metaphysics of Strawson describes the distinctive features of the methodology
concerned.

Thus,themetatheorysuggestedforthepossibleconditionofhumanexperience
seemstobewellclarifiedbythesephilosophies.But,ifwelookback,wewouldfindtwo
prominent questions might be raised here. One would be concerning the attack on
psychologismandtheotherregardingthepossibilityofthetranscendentalsubject. Iwould
try to answer both questions taking geneticepistemology into account and would
concludethediscussionwithahumblenoteregardingfhthertaskstobeundertaken.

Therejectionofpsychologismbecomesmoreprominentinthelaterpartof
Husserl'sphenomenologyandtheAnalyticalPhilosophers.Thisattack,particularlyin

itsempiricalaspect(psychologyandepistemology),isnotvalidsincepsychologyisan
empirical science dealing with the empirical self as a phenomenon among other
phenomena, while epistemology is the science of reason itself, dealing with a priori
principles on which the possibility of all phenomena depends. As a result, I do not
proposeaninvestigationofhowman'ssensoryorgansfunctionorhowsensationsarise.

Ifitwerethat,itwouldbepartofpsychology,namelythepsychologyofsensations.Ifit
werethat,itsresultscouldbeverifiedonlybyrecoursetoobservationandtheprinciples
whichitreachedwouldbeempirical.Thereforeinmetaphysicallogic,Idonotpropose an
investigationofhowallpeoplealwaysthink.Ifitwerethat,itwouldbeapartof

psychologyandcouldnotestablishanyresultsapriori.Hence,Iinvestigatedwhether
thereareconditionsbywhichthinkingisfounded,ifpeopleweretoattainbytheir

thoughtsknowledgeofthings. I contendedthatLockfailedtoascertainwhetherornot,
andifso,howmetaphysicalknowledgeispossible,becausehetriedtosettlethismatter
bypsychologyandhencebyanempiricalinvestigation.Similarly, Iproposednotan
investigationofhowsensationsarise,butofthenecessaryconditionstowhichour
sensationsaresubject.

AnalyticphilosopherslikeHusserlemphasizedthenecessityofacleardistinction
betweenempiricalpsychologicalproblemsandnonempiricallogicalproblems.Itholds

thatwefindthetracesofsubjectivisminthelogicalsystemitself, inthediscussionof
logicalproblems,mixedwithobjectivelogicalconcepts,hence,theresultisinevitably
confusion. Therefore to avoid confusion, Analytic philosophers categorically
emphasizedthatnopsychologicalexplanationcouldbethegroundofthenecessary
truthofjudgments:Sensationscannotbethegroundofnecessarytruths.

Regardingthesecondquestion,thepossibilityofatranscendentalsubjector
transcendentalego,wefindthatthoughithasbeenacceptedbybothRadhakrishnan
andHusserl,Strawsonwasdubiousaboutitsstatus(Strawson,1959,p.32). In the
handsofbothHusserlandRadhakrishnan,wehavethetranscendentalmethodwith
rejection of psychologism, which resulted in the postulation of a transcendental
subjectbecausebothruledoutempiricalscienceasthesubjectmatterofphilosophy.
Hence,itbecomesclearherethatonlytheantipsychologismofHusserlimpelledhim
to admit a transcendental subject. This does not seem to derive fiom merely the
metaphysicalmethod.Therefore,ifwecanovercomeantipsychologism,itwouldbe
possibletousethetranscendentalmethodwithoutatranscendentalsubject.Eventhe
statusofthesubjectseemstobepeculiartoStrawson, asheclaimedthesubjectofthe
transcendentalpsychologytobe"imaginary"(Ibidp.32).
 Piaget'sgeneticepistemologyseemstoanswertheabovetwoquestions.The
developmentalpsychologyofPiagetsuggeststhatpsychologyneednotbeunderstood
purelyasanempiricalscienceasithassooftenbeen;ithasalsoitscognitiveparts
whichcontributetowardsanewlookinperception.

The cognitive function can be divided into two broad categories according to
whether the "figurative" or "operative" aspects of knowledge predominate. The
"figurativeaspects"bearonitsobservableconfigurationswhile"operativeaspects"by
contrastbearonthetransformationofonestateintoanotherandthereforeincludeactions

andoperations,whichbothaimattheunobservable(Furth,1969,p.86).Ofthesetwo,in
therealmofperception,operativeaspectsplayamuchgreaterpart.Theimportanceof
operative factors lies in stressing the function of "perceptual categorizing". Piaget
emphasizedthiscognitiveaspectofpsychology.Thosewhohaveattackedpsychologism
alsofollowthesamecognitivestructure(Ibid,p.180).Hence,thequestionsofcognitive
structurecannotberuledoutfiomanytypeofepistemologywhatsoeveritmaybe.To
examine the possible epistemologies in this context, we find the empiricist tradition.
Thosewhohaverecoursetopsychologywerecontent withcommonsenseideaswith
speculative descriptions because of the influence of experimental psychology, which
preventedthemfiomseeingthatexperienceisalwaysaprocessofassimilationtoexisting
structures.Epistemologies,eventhosewhatareantiempiricist,raisequestionsoffacts
andthusimplicitlyadoptpsychologicalpositionswhichlackeffectiveverificationeven
thoughthisisindispensableasfarasasoundmethodisconcerned.Therefore,toconceive
ofasatisfactoryexplanationofhumanexperience,aconsideration
ofcognitivestructureisessentialbecause,relativetothecontentsofbehavior,the
schemataareapriorianditisthiswhichmakesexperiencepossible.

This acceptance of psychological elements in explaining the possibility of

humanexperiencerulesoutthepostulationofatranscendentalsubjectbecauseitwas
the antipsychologism, which was responsible for such acceptance. In terms of
Piaget'scognitivepsychology,itisthe"epistemicsubject',whichisrequiredtomake
humanexperiencepossiblebymeansofitsoperationsbehavior.ForPiaget,thevery
notion of a transcendental subject is nothing but that of an epistemic subject.
Therefore, Piaget rightly said in connection with Husserl, "Husserl's hndamental
mistakelayinthefactthathistranscendentalsubjectisstillasubjectandthat"pure
intuition' is still the activity of a subject (in which the "object" or "essence",
admittedlyenterin,butifthereis,intuitionthereis,nonetheless,asubject).Itfollows
that,"transcendentalorempirical,referencetosuchintuitionisstillpsychologism,
that is to say, a passage from fact to norm" (Piaget, 1972, p. 104). The very
assumption of the epistemic subject, therefore, eliminates the notion of a
transcendental subject, in order to account for transcendental cognition. Thus, we
wouldhaveatranscendentalmethodwithoutpresupposingatranscendentalsubject.

In the light of the above position, if we go back to the basic notion of

Radhakrishnan'sviewofintuition,thatisthesynthesizingororganizingactivityofthe
mindinmakinghumanexperiencepossible,wefindthatthisnotionhasbeenwell
clarifiedbythetriangularcontributionofgeneticepistemology,phenomenologyand
analyticphilosophy.Theschematicoperationwhichmakesassimilationpossibleby
meansoftheassimilationandaccommodationmechanismconstitutesthemost
fundamentalingredientofintellectualfunctioningandtheirsynthesisisconsideredtobe
the ground of possibility of experience. Those conditions which are involved in this
"integration"areconsideredasthenonempiricalconditionsofhumanexperienceinthe
Radhakrishnansense,andthoseconditionsareconsideredtobeessentialforwhatever
typeofexperienceitmaybe,becausetheorganizationoftheseconditionsarenecessarily
preliminarytoallexperience.Hence,itisinthissense,i.e.thedescriptionofthismode

orsynthesis,isconsideredthatwecanspeakof"intuition"andnotanyproduct.This
synthesis never needs transcendence for an explanation in spite of its being
transcendental, because this transcendental synthesis is within the reach of the
epistemic subject. Otherwise, this "integration" is natural but its function is
transcendental.Therefore,anewunderstandingoftheintuitionassynthesiscanbehad
inthepurifiedformofametatheorywithouttranscendence.

Thisiscertainlyabeginningventureinsearchingforanadequatesolutionof
someproblemsofatheoryofknowledge:thediscussionhasbeenmainlyconcerned
withhowoneshouldproperlyformulateandconstructtheseproblems.Ihavebeen
trying to concentrate upon certain essential conceptual, methodological and
epistemologicalpreliminarieswhichmustbeconsideredfirst,beforewecanstatethe
basicissuesinatheoryofknowledgeproperly.Consequently,mymainconcernisnot
somuchwithatheoryofintuitiveideas,aswithatheoryofintuition.

Itisevidentthatariskhasbeentakeninsuggestingatheory.Therisk,namely
thatepistemologicalconsequencemayfollowfrompsychology.Iftheanswerispositive,
thenthecontroversialproblemofpsychologismwouldbesolved.Butapartfiomthis
manymorequestionsmayarise,whichIwillnotpursuehere,butIcanatleastsubmit
thatinthisthesisanattemptisbeingmadetodiscoveranalternativemethod,forthis
reason, a risk is inevitable. And so, I conclude my reflections with a remark of
Wittgenstein,"Asregardshisownwork,hesaiditdidnotmatterwhetherhisresultswere
trueornot:whatmatterswasthat'amethodhasbeenfound"'(Moore,1959,p.322).

3.7 FurtherResearch

Icertainlydonotwishtoimplyorsuggestthattherearenomoreproblemsleftor
questionsyettoberaisedandanswered.Onthecontrary,Iamonlytoowellawareofthe
factthattherearesomanymoreclarificationsneeded.Forexample,inadditiontothe
problemofpyschologism,thereisthestatusofthetranscendentalsubjectwhichrequires

furtherstudy.AsItrytosketchapossiblewayofdealingwiththesequestions,Iam
quiteawarethattheydemandmoreextensiveandprolongedtreatment,whichIhope
toreturntoandcontinueinmyfutureresearch.

ThechangeofperspectivewhichthisnewinsightofUpanisadicwisdomislikely
toaffectmaybreathenewlifeintowhatotherwiselookslikeasterileepistemological
issueofnoconsequences.Thereadermayalso be convincedthatcontrarytowhatis
generally believed about Eastern philosophers they are not impractical dreamers who
spendmuchoftheirtimemeditatingonloftyabstractionsandwhodohavesomethingto
offerfortheillsofthemodernday.Itisofcoursetruephilosophicalspeculationhasbeen
carriedtoaveryhighpointinIndia,butthepracticalsidehasalsobeencultivatedanda
greatdealofsociallifehasbeenpermeatedbypragmatism.Inepistemology,thishasbeen
reflectedintheidealsbywhichaholisticviewisundertakenandunderlieslife,never
leavingitoutofsight.Thisviewofliferestsultimatelyonvalues.Henceitis
regardedasessentialthatapupil'slifeshouldbelivedinanenvironmentpermeatedby
idealisticvalues.

Theplacethatvaluesoccupyinlifeissoimportantthatnophilosophercanomitto
takeaccountofthem.Butthisdoesnotmeanthattheywillalwaysreceivetheamountof
attention,whichtheirimportancedemands.InWesternphilosophy,eversincethetimeof
DescartesandLocke,thescientificmethodhasusurpedtheplaceaffordedtoidealism.It
isonlyinrecenttimesthatduetosocialstrifearisingoutofaconsequenceofthedvorce
ofphilosophy&omlife,therehasbeenagradualshlftingofinteresttothisproblemofthe
lackofvalues.OneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofIndianphilosophyisthat,throughout
itslonghistory,ithasconsistentlygiventheforemostplacetovalues.Inancientliterature,
thisproblemreceivesalmostexclusiveattention.Forexample,theUpanisadsspeakmore
oftenofthefinalgoaloflife,themeanstoitsattainmentandtheinnerpeaceandjoy
which it signifies than of "being" or of "knowing" as much. The recognition of its
importancebyIndianthinkershasnotmeantthattheytreatvalueasthesubjectmatterof
onlyaparticularbranchofphilosophy.Ratheritinspiredtheirinvestigationasawhole,
anditsinfluencewasseenineverydepartmentofphilosophicthought.Indianphilosophy
may,onthisaccountbedescribedasessentiallyaphilosophyofvalues.Thepurposeof
thenextchapteristoprovidetherolethatvaluescanplayin
ourcontemporaryproblems.Asinthecaseofthedoctrineofintuitioninvestigatedin

Indianphilosophy,thereisherealsomuchdiversityofopinionbuttheunderlyingaim
remainsthroughout.
3.8 DiscussionoftheLocalProblem

ThemainpurposeofmydissertationhasbeentotracetheancientIndianviewof
knowledgeandemphasizesomeoftheidealswhchitrestsupon.Noattempthasbeen
madetobeexhaustive,ortoshowallthebearingswhichIndianidealshaveonpresent
conditions.Thiswouldneedanotherdissertationtoitself.Nevertheless,ineducationasin
otherphasesofsociallife,minglingofEastandWestisnotonlyinevitablebutdesirable.
Timealonewilldetermineifthiscanbedonewiththeleastpossiblefriction.

Itmaynot,however,beoutofplacetoindicatewhatseemstometheplane
upon which Western and Indian thought may best be brought together and be
pragmaticallyappliedtothescornpresentlyfacingtheIndoCanadiancommunity.If
themodestaimofsearchingforinnateknowledgesucceeds,thensomeprogressmay
hopefully be made in also finding solutions to the issue of IndoCanadian gang
violencewhichhasleftbehindsomanydevastatedfamiliesbyleadingtheiryoung
boys into blind allies. From an evaluation and systematic understanding of the
contemporaryissue,itisclearthatanelixirconsistingoftheprominentelementsof
Indianphilosophy is possible. Such a mixture will notbe the panacea forall the
community'sills,butmayprovidethesolutionforsome.Itisdifficulttodrawsucha
blueprintindetail,however,anattemptofanoutlinewillbeprovided.

IndoCanadian youth stand alienated fiom the mainstream community in the

aftermathoftheganglandmurdersandcriminalactivitythathasoccurredinthelast10
years.Therootcausesoftheprocessofthisalienation,acceleratedbytheonslaughtof
mediaattention,stretchbacktocertainsociologicalfactorsthatneedtobeanalyzedin

depth.Thepointisthattheideologicaldimensionofthesituationtodayneedstobewell
analyzedandprojectedforaproperunderstandingofthecontemporarysocialrealityin
15
9
theLowerMainland.Thekeytoanabidingsolutionliesinaperspectivethatwould
facilitate the positive integration of youth with the mainstream community. This
perspectiveisessentialforthepreservationoftheyouth'sownidentityontheone
hand,andtheunityandintegrityofthelargerIndiancommunityontheotherhand
Fromtheverybeginning,thedevelopmentofanIndianidentitycontainedaninherent
predicamentfortheyoungwhenchoosingbetweentwopaths -trahtionalorWestern.
This contrahction was sought to be synthetically resolved in the pattern of the
Canadianmosaic,whichcanbeconsideredasamiddlepath.Butthissynthesis,like
alldialecticalsynthesis,meantonlyatransmutationoftheoriginalcontradictionand
notitspermanentresolution.Indiansadoptandadapttosociologicalstructuresand
institutions, as these had emerged during an earlier phase of their migration into
BritishColumbiaintheearly1970s.Theirearlierassimilationwasstructuredona
homogenized socialbaseinwhichalldiversities - religious,linguistic, ethnic,etc,
weresublatedintoaunityeuphemisticallyknownasamosaic.Thetransplantationof
Western structures and institutionsinto the Indianpsyche brought with it its own
orientationofpluralism.Thebearingofthisreorienteddialecticsharpenedinthepast
fewyearswithPunjabisaccentuatingtheiridentitycrisisinmorethanoneway.
The superimposed structures and institution of the Western stereotype,

characteristicoftheclassicalphaseofcapitalism,inviewoftheimperativesofa
homogenized social base envisaged only corporate integration of the community,
ratherthantheindividualintegrationintothelargermainstreamcommunity.Hencea

paradoxical situation arose,particularly in thecase oftheyoung.These youths were

gettingprogressivelyintegratedintothenationalsystemofsocial,economicandcultural
levels,butascorporatebeings.Ontheindividuallevel,theyouthweregettingalienated.
Themakeupofcommunityeldersinthetemplesaswellassocialactivistsatthistime
hadfailedtodiscoverthisparadoxandidentifyitscauses.And20yearslater,thetragic

events become realized a la the Orwellian manner that what we believed to be

progresstowardsintegrationwasinfactregressintoalienation.

Theessenceoftheissueisthatofchangingformsofselfrealizationonindividual
and corporate levels with the correlated question of integration with the mainstream
community.Theabovementionedsimplisticdescriptionisatworstsuperficialandatbest
onlyahalftruthwhichdoesnotyieldacompleteperspectiveoftherealnatureofthe
problemasthisquestionofselfrealizationhascroppedupfromtimetotimeintheannals
ofPunjab'shistory.Inthemodernperiod,ithasarisenintheprocessofIndiansbecoming
selfconsciousforthefirsttimeinthisprocessofselfidentity.Thisselfawarenessis
partly a result of the Punjabi community's multidimensional encounter with other
religious,linguisticandethniccommunitiesnotonlyinCanadabutelsewhereaswell,
including India. The quest for selfrealization should be understood, pursued and
accommodatedinapositivemannerbyboththeIndiansandnonIndians.

But luckily we have not reached the point of no return. The mainstream
consciousnessamongtheyouthstillgenuinelyseekstobeinunisonwiththelargerbody,
whichconsidersitselftoalsobeanintegralpartofthemuchlargercommunity.Inthis

contextitisessentialtounderstandthatcontemporaryyouth,arebecomingselfconscious
intheprocessofselfrealization.Thisconsciousnessofindividualselfidentityshouldnot
beconfusedwiththesocalledgroupidentity,butshouldratherbedistinguishedfiomthe
latter,appreciatedandrespectedassuch.Thisselfawarenessisanaturalphenomenonin
thecourseofethnosocialdevelopmentofacommunity.Similarly,theproblemof
individualintegrationinparticularandtheIndiancommunityingeneralwasfacedby

GuruNanakhimselfwhenheembarkeduponthecourseofintroducinganewsocio
politicoreligiousentityintheformofSikhismintomainstreamIndia.Thesolution

providedbyGuruNanakisinasense,aforerunnertotheUpanishadicconditionof
unityindiversitywhichcharacterizestheIndianmodelofepistemologicalintegration,
a model in which identity and integration, unity and diversity are not mutually
exclusivebutcomplementarytoeachother.

Sofarwehavebeendealingwiththeanswertothequestionofthe"why"
regardingthispresentaffliction.Nowweshallconcentrateonthe"who"and"how",
andseehowIndianphilosophytacklesthesequestions.

Who is responsible for this state of affairs? Our community, religious and
political leaders have ignored the synthesis of the social, religious and political
institutionsinheritedfiomourhistoricaltraditionwiththesocialstructuresthathave

comefiomintegratingwithWesterncommunities.Theleastthatonecandoistofoster
dialogueorprovideaperspectiveontheprobleminparticularandsituationingeneral.
Thiswouldbeamuchneededsteptowardsbridgingthecommunicationgapbetween
Indiansandthelargercommunity.Adispassionate,ideologicalanalysisofthebasics
issueswould,itishopedchangetheheatofconfusedandconfusingcontroversyinto
thelightofenlighteneddialogue.Thelocalproblemwhichoncewasonlyaquestionof
economics,someofwhichconcernedPunjabisasawhole,hasreachedastage,whereit
hasturnedintoalmosttotalalienationofyoungIndianmenfromthemainstream.
 Thisisonlyoneinstanceofthecrisis,whichtheIndiancommunityfindsitself
in today. To overcome this and any future crisis, we can interpret the essential
metaphysical concepts of the Upanishads in the modern perspective and work to
understandtheirsociologicalsignificance inthecontextofcontemporarysocialreality
thatthrowsupcertaincomplexanddifficultsituations.

Wenowturntothe"how"whichwouldbeconcernedwiththesolution. A
solutionrequiresamethod,aplanwhichwouldbeconcernedwiththeconstructionof
a program which is necessary for the proper development of a young person's
identity,thewouldbecitizensofourcommunity.

3.9 ContemporaryApplicationofIndianPhilosophy

Indianphilosophyhasgivenanallroundandintegratedpictureofhumannature.
Every disenfranchised youth must be seen fiom every perspective and should be
remembered that each element in their nature has a right for full fieedom and
development. Not only the rational but also the infiarational and the suprarational
aspectsofhumannaturemustfindaplaceinahumanschemeofknowledge.Ancient
Indianphilosophers,followingtheUpanisadictradition,handeddownthebestthatcanbe
thought of in the form of epistemological values. Whde the body and intellect are
considered,somust be thesoul. Our methodologythereforemustprovideopportunities
andfacilitiesforthehllestdevelopmentofallthesedifferentaspects.Contemporary

educationcanbeintegrated(humanized)insofarasweprovideforawidebased
curriculum.Thereshouldbemandatoryteachingofscience,arts,literaturealongwith
moral,religious,spiritual,andethicscourses.Thus,nopartofhumandevelopment
shouldbeleftoutofthecurriculum.Indianphilosophynotonlyanecdotesthevalueof
sense training and physical education along with academic, moral, and religious
education, but emphasizes it as necessary for the all round development of the
waywardyouth.

HowshalltheIndianidealsbeappliedtomoderneducationandcultureinthe
West?ThefirstrequisiteforthisisthattheageoldrelationshipbetweentheSacred
andeducationwhichIndianslivebymustbebroughtbackinthecommunity. An
integratedphilosophyisidealiftheendsandthemeansprovidedaresynchronizedand
meantforall.Indianphilosophystandsthistestveryboldlysincetheultimateaimthat
is envisaged is selfrealization, is attainable by everyone, and is "a source of
illuminationgivingusacorrectlead inthevariousspheresoflive"(Altekar,1957,p.
4).Amethodofreachingthehighestgoalisthroughreflectionofone'svaluesandthe
innerselfofone'sbeing.Itcanbepracticedbyanyonebelongingtoanyrace,religion
orcreed.However,asitisnotsomuchspiritualasphilosophicalinorigin,itspractice
wouldnotbeaffectedbymostyoungpeople'sdisdainforreligionasperanarticlein
The VancouverSun byrespectedcolumnistDouglasToddthatread,"Religionjust
doesn'tseemhip"(Todd,1999).Therecanbenodoubt,however,thatthedevelopment
of Indian philosophical ideals should be wholeheartedly embraced by Western
educationalthoughtandpracticedimmediately.

Apersonnaturallyfeelsaneedtorealizetheirtruenature -theknowledgeofthe
self.Everyeffortbyapersoninthisworldisdirectedtofulfilltheneedsofthatnature.
Thisisthehighestvaluewhichonecanrealize.Thoughpeoplehavetorealizetheirinner
nature, they should not overlook their other human aspects; they cannot neglect the
requirementsoftheirphysicalbeing.Onehasabody,thereforeithastobekeptinperfect
forminorderthatitmayhelpandnotputahindranceinrealizingtheiressentialnature.
Sinceyoungpeoplehaveastrongsocialnature,theiractshavesignificancebothfor
themselvesandforsociety.Theneedtodevelopcharacterinvolvesthecodesofmorality.
Sincepeoplehaveanaestheticnature,theyneedtoenjoythingsofbeautyandifpossible

tocreateforthemselvesthingsofart;sincetheyhave anemotionalnature,theymust
beabletofindcompletioninthesenses;sincetheyhaveintelligence,theymustbe
directedintherightchannelssothatthemaycarryonandcultivateknowledge;since
theyhavethepowerofthinking,theymustusesuchthinking as toriseabovethe
petty interests of their deviant behavior and feel themselves a part of the larger
community.Theyneedsomekindofphilosophythatintegratesalloftheabove.Allof
theseareneededforthecompletedevelopmentofaperson'spersonalityandconstitute
theobjectivesoftheirlearningandliving.Apersoncannotdowithoutthem,and
therefore these can also be regarded as practical objectives. Since the dawn of
civilization,fiomtheancientIndianrishistoWesternultramodernphilosophers,all
haverecognizedtheseobjectivesinoneformoranother.

Inordertobeacompleteperson,apersonneedstheallrounddevelopmentof
theirinherentpowers,andsincetheprevailingsystemofeducationneglectsthis
importantfactor,thereneedstobeareturntotheseideals.Therefore,"manmaking7'

(used in the generic sense) should be the essential aim of education. As Swami
Vivekananadaboldlyasserted,"Educationisnottheamountofinformationthatisputinto
yourbrain,and runs riotthere,undgested all yourlife...Ifeducationwereidentical
withinformation,thenlibrarieswouldbegreatestsagesintheworldandencyclopaedias,
therishis"(Vivekananada,1997,Vol.I,p.306).Educationthatdoesnothelpthe
common mass of people to equip themselves for life, which does not bring out
strengthofcharacter,aspiritofphilanthropyandthecourageofalion -isitworththe
name(Ibid,Vol.11,p.145).Thus,inVivekananada'swords,"Wewantthateducation
bywhichcharacterisformed,strengthofmindisincreased,theintellect isexpanded
andbywhichonecanstandonone'sownfeet"(Ibid,Vol.V,p.257).

WithafirmgroundingintheVedanticphilosophy, allknowledgewhethersecular
orspiritualisinherentinanindividualandcanbeharvested.TheLawofGravitationdidnot
waitforNewtontocomeintoexistence;itwasalreadythereinhismindandNewtononly
discovereditwhenitstime came.Therefore,inpsychologicallanguage,"tolearn"is"to
discover".Allknowledgeandallpowerareinthehumansoul,butitremainscovered.When
thecoveringisbeingtakenoff,"Wearelearning,andtheadvanceofknowledgeismadeby
thisuncovering.Thepersonfromwhothisveilisbeingliftedisthemoreknowingperson.
Thepersonuponwhomitliesthickisignorant.Likingfiretoapieceofflint,knowledge
existsinthemind,suggestionisthefrictionwhichbringsitout"(Ibid,Vol.I,p.26). Inthe
caseofNewton,thefallingofanapplewasthesuggestion,whichrevivedinhismindall
previouslinksofthoughtallowing himtofinallydiscoveranewlinkthathetermedtheLaw
ofGravitation."Allknowledgecomesfromthesoul.

Man manifests knowledge, discovers it within himself which is preexisting, through

eternity"(Ibid,Vol.I.p.421).Theancientrishisbasedtheireducationaldisciplineonthe
fimdamentalconceptionofthehumansoulwhereallknowledgeisandhastobeevoked
frominsidebyacleargoalthroughselfrealizationratherthaninstilledfromoutside.

While talking of the infinite goal, Indian philosophy does not neglect the
immediateobjectivesoflife,thevalueswithoutwhichmancannotdointhetemporal
impasse.Valuesoflikearedeterminedbytherequirementsofhumannature.Whatare
they?Partofthelistofvaluesofhumanbeings:health,character,socialjustice,skill,
art,love,knowledge,philosophyandreligion,allformthecompletionoftheperson.
These immediate objectives, taking the broadest sense of the term are practical
objectives,whichdeterminetheobjectivesofaperson'slearningandliving.

Apertinentthoughpuzzlingproblemcropsuphereregardingtheessentialstatus
ofthesevaluesasassignedtothembydifferentphilosophies.Naturalisticphilosophies,
includingrealismandpragmatismdenythemanycosmicconstitutionandconsiderthem
onlyasnewcreationscontingentuponmainlytemporallydependence.However,Indian
philosophyelevatesthemtothecosmicstatuebelievingastheydoessentiallyinasupra
temporal, spiritual, eternal, independent, infinite and perfect order of existence, the
prototypeofwhichtheentireterrestrialtypesarebutwithsomanyimperfectreflections.
Itardentlyadherestotheideaofaperfectand apriorirealization,insomeeverlasting,
ceaseless, and unchanging divine experience. Of all such human values which but
temporallyexpressthatimmortalorderofpureideasandideals,thesevaluesdonotgo
beggingforitsbeingbuteternallyandessentiallyinherestheirownsupremesacredself.

Suchaviewissupportedbyreason,andcommonsense.Sincesomethingcannot
comeoutofnothing,aperson'sfinitevalues,whichareafact,mustcomeoutofan
infinite reservoir of ideal values says reason, and common sense corroborates the
conclusionthatlifeisbestlivedwhenbasedoninfluentialidealslikehonour,faith,truth,
patienceandhope.ThepurposeofallknowledgeitisadmittedbythinkersofEastand

Westistoprovideacoherentpictureoftheuniverseandanintegratedwayoflife.We
mustobtainthoroughasenseofintuitiveapprehension,asynopticvision,aSamanyaya
(reconciliation)ofanintegratedphilosophythatsynthesizesnotonlyanaimandviewof
knowledgebutoflife.Humankindcannotlivebyamassofdisconnectedinformation.

Wehaveapassionforanorderedvisionoftheconnectionsofthings.Lifeisonein
allofitsvariedmanifestations.Wemaystudythefactualrelationsofthedifferent
manifestationsbutwemusthaveknowledgeoflifeasawhole.
 EPILOGUE

Itismybeliefthatknowledgeistobeviewedandreflectedfiomthestandpointof
the present but also fiom that of the past in both Western and Eastern circles, with
suggestionsforitsfuture.Itwasadecisiveandintentionaldecisionnottoprovidein
depthorlongitudinalresearchonthedoctrineofintuitionineithertheWestorEast.AsI
haveonlybrieflytoucheduponafewofthegreatestphilosopher'sviewsonintuitive
knowledge,itisobviousthatmyresearchhasnotbeenexhaustive.Ihavedesignedthis
dissertation paper mainly as an outline to bridge a link between Western and Indian
thought,Ihopethatitwillinspirethoseinmostneedtoseektruesolaceandguidance
fiom the Upanisad writings. It is up to the reader to judge the extent to which have
succeedinmyprofessedobjective.However,Iwillfeelamplyrewardedifastudyofthis
workstimulatesone,evenone,torethinkthedirectionofhisorherlifeandmakea

concertedeffortofchange.ThiscrisisintheLowerMainlandisthusnotonly an issue
whichisperipherallyskindeepbutfundamentallysouldeep.Materialwealthiswelcome,

butwithouthinsa,socialjusticeandfeelingoffraternityisvoid.Selfrealizationwill
becomefallacious,ifnotimpossible,intheabsenceofseriousreflectionuponthe
nature,aimsandaspirationsoftheindividuals.Thus,mydissertationhasattemptedto
generatesuchareflectionbyrevisitingIndianphilosophyofknowledge.
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InternetwordsearchesdoneFebruary20,2005
1) Intuition-www.nd.edul-archives/latgramm.htm
2) Philosophy
http://wordinfo.info/words/index.php?v=info&a=view~results&s=philosophy
3) Sruti-www.geocities.com1profvWsruti.html
4) Epistemology
www.wordinfo.info/words/index.php?v=info&a=view-results&s=epistemology
5)Upanisadtexts-http://www.celextel.org/