FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179884. January 25, 2012.]

DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY, INC. ,

petitioner, vs. CANDICE S. BONA, respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94479 dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution 2 dated
September 18, 2007.

On June 3, 2004, petitioner Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc.

(Durawood) led an action for sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against LBB Construction and
Development Corporation (LBB Construction) and its president Leticia Barber
(Barber) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. In said suit, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-7240, Durawood prayed for the sum of P665,385.50
as payment for construction materials delivered to LBB Construction.

On June 14, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting Durawood's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of attachment. On June 16, 2004, the corresponding writ was
issued.

On June 17, 2004, Sheri Rolando C. Leyva (Sheri Leyva) levied on a 344-square
meter parcel of land in Richdale Subdivision, Antipolo City covered by Transfer
Certicate of Title (TCT) No. R-17571 in the name of LBB Construction. A Notice of
Levy on Attachment was annotated in TCT No. R-17571's Memorandum of
Encumbrances on the same day, June 17, 2004.

On July 13, 2004, respondent Candice S. Bona (Candice) led a Motion seeking
leave to intervene in Civil Case No. 04-7240. Attached to said Motion was Candice's
Answer in Intervention, her Third Party Claim addressed to Sheriff Leyva, and a copy
of TCT No. R-17571. Candice claimed therein that she is a co-owner of the property
covered by TCT No. R-17571. She alleged that LBB Construction had sold the
property to her and her siblings, Michael Angelo S. Bona, Diane Sheila S. Bona,
Glenda May S. Bona and Johann Louie Sebastian S. Bona, through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 2, 2004. Candice asserted that the sale is the subject of
Entry No. 30549 dated June 16, 2004 in the books of the Registry of Deeds of
Antipolo City, while the levy on attachment is only Entry No. 30590 dated June
17, 2004. What was attached to the Motion was a copy of TCT No. R-17571, and
not a title in Candice and her co-owners' names.
On August 11, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting Candice's Motion to
Intervene. cASIED

LBB Construction and Barber led their Answer in Civil Case No. 04-7240, but failed
to attend the scheduled hearings, including the pre-trial. Consequently, Durawood
was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.

On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision 3 in Civil Case No. 04-7240 in favor
of Durawood. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is rendered

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, viz.:

1. Ordering the defendants to pay plainti the sum of Six Hundred

Sixty[-]Five Thousand Three Hundred Eighty[-]Five Pesos and
Fifty Centavos (P665,385.50) plus two percent (2%) interest per
month from May 11, 2004 up to the present;

2. Ordering the defendants to pay plainti twenty-ve percent

(25%) of the amount due to the plainti by way of attorney's
fees; and

3. To pay the costs of suit. 4

The Decision became final and executory. On September 12, 2005, Durawood filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On November 15, 2005, the RTC
issued a Writ of Execution. It was when this Writ was about to be enforced that
Durawood discovered the cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT
No. R-22522 in the name of Candice and her siblings.

It would appear from the records that on June 16, 2004, the supposed Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio (Atty. Rutaquio), cancelled TCT No.
R-17571 and issued TCT No. R-22522 in the name of Candice and her co-owners.
The parties, however, do not dispute that said cancellation of the old TCT and
issuance of the new one was antedated, since Atty. Rutaquio was still the Register
of Deeds of Malabon on said date. 5 According to a certication of the Land
Registration Authority, 6 it was a certain Atty. Edgar D. Santos (Atty. Santos) who
was the Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City on June 16, 2004.

Durawood led a Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-

22522 and Cite Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio for Contempt 7 on the following grounds:

5. The cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT No. R-
22522 was made by Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio who, on June 2004, was not
the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. As evidence of such fact, plainti
corporation was issued a certication by LRA Human Resource Management
Ocer IV Loreto I. Orense that Atty. Edgar D. Santos was the Acting
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City from June 1-30, 2004.

6. While the Deed of Sale annotated in TCT No. R-17571 appears to have
 been made on June 16, 2004, the fact of its inscription was made after that
of the levy on attachment as it obviously appears below and next to it.

7. The records of this case reveal that in the Third Party Claim led by
Candice Bona sometime in July 2004, there was never any mention of any
recording about a Deed of Absolute Sale in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances in TCT No. R-17571. It is dicult to comprehend that Atty.
Hernando U. Salvador, Bona's lawyer, would miss mentioning that a Deed of
Absolute Sale was inscribed ahead of the notice of levy on attachment if ever
such sale was made on June 16, 2004.

8. Thus, under the circumstances, plainti corporation cannot help

speculate that [the] Deed of Sale between LBB Construction and the Bonas
was made to appear to have been recorded a day before the attachment.

9. While the Notice of Levy on Attachment was inscribed in TCT No. R-

17571 ahead and before of the Deed of Sale between LBB Construction Co.,
Inc. and the Bonas, the said notice was not carried over in TCT No. R-22522
despite the fact that there was no order coming from this Honorable Court
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated June 16, 2004.

10. Randy Rutaquio's unauthorized acts of cancelling TCT No. R-17571

and issuing TCT No. R-22522 without inscribing the Notice of Levy on
Attachment despite the absence of a court order dissolving the writ of
Preliminary Attachment constitute improper conduct tending to directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. 8
SACHcD

Atty. Rutaquio led a Manifestation alleging that the sale was entered in the
Primary Entry Book prior to the Levy on Attachment. The two transactions were
assigned to dierent examiners and it just so happened that the examiner to whom
the levy on attachment was assigned was able to inscribe the memorandum ahead
of the sale, although the inscription of the sale was entered ahead of the levy. The
levy on attachment was not inscribed on TCT No. R-22522 because allegedly the
sale should have priority and preference. The cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and
the issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was already completed when he took over the
position of Atty. Santos as Acting Register of Deeds and was therefore already
clothed with the authority to issue and sign TCT No. R-22522.

Atty. Rutaquio also submitted a letter dated June 25, 2004 from Atty. Santos to
Land Registration Authority (LRA) Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (Administrator
Ulep) consulting the latter as regards the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the Notice of Levy on Attachment. 9 In said letter received by the LRA on July 1,
2004, Atty. Santos stated that he had not acted on the Deed of Absolute Sale since
the required registration fees were not paid therefor. 10 Administrator Ulep was able
to reply to said letter on October 6, 2004, when Atty. Rutaquio was already the
Acting Register of Deeds. Administrator Ulep stated that since the Deed of Sale was
considered registered on June 16, 2004, the same shall take precedence over the
Notice of Levy on Attachment registered on June 17, 2004. 11

Acting on the Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522
and Cite Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio for Contempt, the RTC issued an Order 12 dated
March 2, 2006, ruling in favor of Durawood. The RTC gave great weight to the
certication by LRA Human Resource Management Ocer IV Loreto I. Orense that
Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds from June 1-30, 2004, and held that
this proves the fact that Atty. Santos was the only person authorized to sign and
approve all the transactions with the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City at the time.
Moreover, according to the RTC, the alienation of LBB Construction in favor of the
Bonas without leaving sucient property to pay its obligation is considered by law
in fraud of creditor under Articles 1381 13 and 1387 14 of the Civil Code.

The RTC did not rule on Durawood's prayer to cite Atty. Rutaquio for contempt. The
dispositive portion of the March 2, 2006 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion to reinstate notice of

levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522 now in the name of the intervenors
is hereby GRANTED its non-inscription therein having been made without
order of this Court.

The Register of Deeds of Antipolo City is directed to reinstate the notice of

levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522 in the names of intervenors
immediately upon receipt of this Order. 15

Candice led a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order. In the meantime, on
March 13, 2006, Sheriff Leyva issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale setting the sale of the
property covered by TCT No. R-22522 at public auction on April 11, 2006 at 10:00
a.m., pursuant to the November 15, 2005 Writ of Execution. Candice led an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Branch Sheri to Desist from the Sale of
Intervenor's Property for Being Premature, which was granted by the RTC in an
Order dated March 29, 2006.

On March 8, 2006, the new Acting Register of Deeds Jose S. Loriega, Jr. complied
with the March 6, 2006 Order of the RTC by reinstating in TCT No. R-22522 the
Notice of Levy on Attachment in favor of Durawood.

On April 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying Candice's Motion for
Reconsideration. In said Order, the RTC highlighted its observation that in TCT No.
R-17571, the inscription of the levy on attachment by Atty. Santos dated June 17,
2004 was in page A (the dorsal portion) of the title, while the supposedly earlier
inscription of the Deed of Sale by Atty. Rutaquio dated June 16, 2004 was found in
page B (a separate page) of the title. The RTC found this fact, as well as the above-
mentioned certication that Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds of
Antipolo City from June 1 to 30, 2004, sucient proof of the irregularity of the June
16, 2004 inscription of the Deed of Sale.

On April 11, 2006, Sheri Leyva sold the subject property at public auction for
P1,259,727.90 with Durawood being the lone bidder, and issued the corresponding
Certicate of Sale. The sale was inscribed in TCT No. R-22522 on the same date. 16
DEHaTC

Candice led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
assailing the March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006 Orders of the RTC.

On April 18, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in favor of
Candice. According to the Court of Appeals, the sequence of presentation of the
entries in the TCT cannot control the determination of the rights of the claimants
over a disputed property. It is the registration in the Primary Entry Book (also
referred to in other cases as the day book) that establishes the order of reception of
instruments aecting registered land. As explained by Atty. Rutaquio, the entry in
the day book is only the preliminary step in the registration. The inscription of the
levy on attachment on TCT No. R-17571 (which was made before the inscription of
the Deed of Sale on said title) retroacts to the date of entry in the Primary Entry
Book, which is June 17, 2004. However, the inscription of the Deed of Sale on TCT
No. R-17571, although made after the inscription of the levy on attachment,
retroacts to the earlier date of entry in the Primary Entry Book, which is June 16,
2004.

As regards the issuance by Atty. Rutaquio of TCT No. R-22522 on June 16, 2004
despite the fact that he was not yet the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City at that
time, the Court of Appeals held that there was substantial compliance with the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA; now the
Land Registration Authority [LRA]) Circular No. 94 on "Certicates of title and
documents left unsigned by former Register of Deeds," which provides:

It has been brought to the attention of this Registration that, in some

Registries, there are certicates of title with the full transcriptions and
inscriptions, including the volume and page numbers, the title number, the
date and the name of the former Register of Deeds, already typewritten
thereon but which, for some reasons, cannot anymore be signed by the
former ocial. In such cases and to resolve this problem, the present
Register of Deeds may, without changing or altering the transcriptions and
inscriptions, ax his signature below the name of the former Register of
Deeds but placing the actual date and time of signing enclosed in
parenthesis below his signature. 17

The Court of Appeals accepted Atty. Rutaquio's manifestation that he signed TCT
No. R-22522 subsequent to June 16, 2004, on a date when he was already the
Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City. Since the entry in the Primary Entry Book
was made at the time of the incumbency of Atty. Santos, the name of the latter still
appears on the document. According to the Court of Appeals, Candice cannot be
made to suer for the failure of Atty. Rutaquio to ax the date when he signed the
document. Furthermore, a certicate of title, once registered, cannot be impugned,
altered, changed, modied, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding
permitted by law. Finally, an action for rescission of contracts entered into in fraud
of creditors cannot be instituted except when the party suering damage has no
other legal means to obtain reparation for the same. 18

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Orders of public

 respondent judge ordering the reinstatement of the subject notice of levy on
attachment in TCT No. R-22522 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. As a
result thereof, the public auction sale carried out pursuant to said levy is
also declared null and void. 19

Durawood led a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution dated September 18, 2007.

Durawood led the instant Petition for Review, with the following Assignment of
Errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE FACT THAT NON-PAYMENT OF THE

REQUIRED REGISTRATION FEES BY CANDICE S. BONA AND HER SIBLINGS
DID NOT COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
ON JUNE 16, 2004.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE

FACT THAT NALTDRA CIRCULAR NO. 94 WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY
ATTY. RANDY RUTAQUIO.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER

THAT THE ENTRIES IN TCT NO. R-17571 (THE PREDECESSOR OF TCT NO. R-
22522) ARE EVIDENCES OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE REAL

PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. R-17571 AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY TCT NO.
R-22522 HAS ALREADY BEEN ATTACHED BUT WAS UNILATERALLY
RELEASED FROM THE COURT'S JURISDICTION BY A USURPER. 20

All these allegations are specic matters to be resolved by this Court in determining
the overriding issue of the case at bar: whether the Court of Appeals correctly
granted Candice's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on its nding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006
Orders. In other words, the main issue to be determined by this Court is whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's order to reinstate the notice of
levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522. "Grave abuse of discretion" signies "such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law."
21
The Court of Appeals, in considering the date of entry in the day book of the
Registry of Deeds as controlling over the presentation of the entries in TCT No. R-
17571, relied on Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 which provides that:

SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certied copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry
fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes led with him relating to registered land. He
shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date,
hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time
so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made
on the certicate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and
city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in
advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration. (Emphasis
supplied.)AIaDcH

The consequence of the highlighted portion of the above section is two-fold: (1) in
determining the date in which an instrument is considered registered, the reckoning
point is the time of the reception of such instrument as noted in the Primary Entry
Book; and (2) when the memorandum of the instrument is later made on the
certicate of title to which it refers, such memorandum shall bear the same date as
that of the reception of the instrument as noted in the Primary Entry Book.
Pursuant to the second consequence stated above, the Court of Appeals held that
Atty. Rutaquio correctly placed the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book as the
date of the memorandum of the registration of the deed of sale in TCT No. R-17571.

As regards the rst consequence, this Court has applied the same in several cases.
Thus, in the old cases of Levin v. Bass, 22 Potenciano v. Dineros, 23 and Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, 24 as well as in
the fairly recent cases of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, 25 Armed Forces and
Police Mutual Benet Association, Inc. v. Santiago, 26 and National Housing
Authority v. Basa, Jr. , 27 we upheld the entry of instruments in the Primary Entry
Book to be equivalent to registration despite even the failure to annotate said
instruments in the corresponding certificates of title.

Based on this alone, it appears that the RTC was in error when it considered the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale on June 16, 2004 inferior to the
registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004 on the ground
that the Attachment was annotated on TCT No. R-17571 earlier than the Deed of
Sale. As discussed in the above-mentioned cases, the annotation in the certicate of
title is not determinative of the eectivity of the registration of the subject
instrument.

However, a close reading of the above-mentioned cases reveals that for the entry of
instruments in the Primary Entry Book to be equivalent to registration, certain
requirements have to be met. Thus, we held in Levin that:
 Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was presented and led
together with the owner's duplicate certicate of title with the oce of the
Registrar of Deeds and full payment of registration fees constitute a
complete act of registration which operates to convey and aect the land?
In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certicate be not surrendered and presented or if no
payment of registration fees be made within 15 days, entry in the
day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and
affect the land sold. . . . . 28

Levin, which was decided in 1952, applied Section 56 of the Land Registration Act 29
which provides:

Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which, upon
payment of the ling fee, he shall enter in the order of their reception all
deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs or other
process led with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book
the year, month, day, hour, and minute of reception of all instruments in the
order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when
made on the certicate of title to which it refers shall bear the same date;
Provided, however, That no registration, annotation, or
memorandum on a certificate of title shall be made unless the fees
prescribed therefor by this Act are paid within fteen days' time
after the date of the registration of the deed, instrument, order
or document in the entry book or day book, and in case said fee is
not paid within the time above mentioned, such entry shall be null
and void: Provided further, That the Insular Government and the provincial
and municipal governments need not pay such fees in advance in order to
be entitled to entry or registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

This provision is the precursor of the aforequoted Section 56 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529, which seems to have dispensed with the provision nullifying the
registration if the required fees are not paid:

SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certied copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry
fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes led with him relating to registered land. He
shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date,
hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted,
and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certicate of
title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national
government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt
from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry
and registration.

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,

30 this Court applied the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and modied
the doctrine as follows:

Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the eect of
registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary
one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required
of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more
remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of
deeds. 31

This pronouncement, which was reiterated in National Housing Authority v. Basa,

Jr., 32 shows that for the entry to be considered to have the eect of registration,
there is still a need to comply with all that is required for entry and registration,
including the payment of the prescribed fees. Thus, in Autocorp Group v. Court of
Appeals, 33 this Court compared the date when the required fees were paid with the
therein assailed writ of preliminary injunction:

Petitioners contend that payment of the entry fee is a condition sine qua non
before any valid entry can be made in the primary entry book. Allegedly, the
Court of Appeals resorted to judicial legislation when it held that the
subsequent payment of the entry fee was curative and a substantial
compliance with the law. Petitioners claim that the ruling in DBP vs. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija does not apply to this case. As there was
no valid registration, petitioners conclude that the order of the trial court
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction was proper, considering the
irregularities present in the conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure . . . .

We find the petition bereft of merit.

First. The objection as to the payment of the requisite fees is unavailing.

There is no question that the fees were paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent
bank presented the certicate of sale to the Oce of the Register of Deeds
of Cebu City for registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the
cashier had already left, the Oce could not receive the payment for entry
and registration fees, but still, the certicate of sale was entered in the
primary entry book. The following day, respondent bank paid the requisite
entry and registration fees. Given the peculiar facts of the case, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the payment of respondent bank must be
deemed to be substantial compliance with the law; and, the entry of the
instrument the day before, should not be invalidated. In any case, even if we
consider the entry to have been made on January 22, the important fact is
that the entry in the primary entry book was done prior to the issuance of
the writ of injunction [on February 15, 1999; TRO issued on January 25,
1999] by the trial court. 34 (Emphases supplied.)

Records in the case at bar reveal that as of June 25, 2004, the date of the letter of
Atty. Santos seeking the opinion of the LRA as regards the registration of the Deed
of Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment, the required registration fees for the
Deed of Sale has not yet been paid: ECHSDc

25 June 2004
 [received by the LRA: July 01, 2004]

HON. BENEDICTO B. ULEP

Administrator
This Authority

Sir:

This has reference to the TCT No. R-17571/T-87 registered under the name
of LBB Construction and Development Corporation relative to the Deed of
Absolute Sale with Entry No. 30549, which was sought to be registered on
16 June 2004 at 11:20 a.m. (a photocopy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A").

However, on 17 June 2004 at 11:45 a.m. a Notice of Levy on Attachment (a

photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B") with Entry No. 30590
was filed and annotated against TCT No. R-17571/T-87.

In view of the foregoing, we are now in a quandary as to what proper steps

should be taken. It should be noted further that the required
registration fees of the abovementioned sale was not paid the
reason for which the same was not immediately acted upon by the
undersigned. 35

Since there was still no compliance of "all that is required . . . for purposes of entry
and annotation" 36 of the Deed of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to
rule that the registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004
should take precedence over the former. Considering that the Notice of Levy on
Attachment was deemed registered earlier than the Deed of Sale, the TCT issued
pursuant to the latter should contain the annotation of the Attachment.

In view of the foregoing, we nd that the RTC was, in fact, acting properly when it
ordered the reinstatement of the Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522.
Since the RTC cannot be considered as to have acted in grave abuse of its discretion
in issuing such Order, the Petition for Certiorari assailing the same should have
been dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94479
dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 18, 2007 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Bersamin, Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 17-27; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate
Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring.
2. Id. at 28-29.

3. CA rollo, pp. 75-78.

4. Id. at 78.

5. Rollo, p. 62.

6. Id. at 252.

7. CA rollo, pp. 82-85.

8. Id. at 83-84.

9. Id. at 101.

10. Id.

11. Id. at 102-103.

12. Rollo, pp. 62-65.

13. Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they
represent suer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which
are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suer the
lesion stated in the preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other
manner collect the claim due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by
the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.

14. Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by
gratuitous title are presumed to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when
the donor did not reserve sucient property to pay all debts contracted before
the donation.

15. CA rollo, p. 35.

16. Rollo, p. 247.

17. Id. at 26.

18. Id. at 25-26.

19. Id. at 27.

20. Id. at 8-9.

21. Global Business Holdings, Inc. v. Surecomp Software, B.V., G.R. No. 173463,
October 13, 2010, 630 SCRA 94, 102.

22. 91 Phil. 419 (1952).

23. 97 Phil. 196 (1955).

24. 245 Phil. 492 (1988).

25. G.R. No. 157553, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 678.

26. G.R. No. 147559, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 46.

27. G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010, 618 SCRA 461.

28. Levin v. Bass, supra note 22 at 436-437.

29. Act No. 496, as amended by Section 2, Act No. 3300.

30. Supra note 24.

31. Id. at 500.

32. Supra note 27 at 480.

33. Supra note 25.

34. Id. at 685-686.

35. CA rollo, p. 101.

36. See National Housing Authority v. Basa, Jr., supra note 27 at 480.