Firstsem LTD Edited

Deans
Circle 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta

Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LAND TITLES AND

DEEDS
First Sem Cases
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
TORRENS SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 2
REGALIAN DOCTRINE ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT ............................................................................................................................................................... 33
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION ............................................................................................................................................................. 53
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES ...................................................................................................................................................... 58
DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND ....................................................................................................................................... 63
CANCELLATION OF TITLE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 66
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE ............................................................................................................................................................. 67
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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
TORRENS SYSTEM
MANUELA GREY Y ALBA, et al. v. ANACLETO R. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 5246, September 16, 1910, TRENT, J.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto; It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern.
Facts:
Manuela Grey y Alba, et al. are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey who
are deceased. When the decedents were still living, they purchased three parcels of land. The petitioners then
sought to register the three parcels of land. Their petition was granted by the court and a decree was issued.
Anacleto dela Cruz filed a petition to reverse the grant of the court. According to him, the two lots were
owned by his father by virtue of a state grant and he inherited the same. He alleged that at the time of
registration, he was occupying the property. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these
parcels of land as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition. Anacleto
prayed that the decree be modified to exclude the two parcels of land purportedly owned by him. The court
re-opened the case and modified the decree excluding therefrom the two lots. According to the court, failure
on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two
parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, constituting fraud. Petitioners claimed honest
belief that the appellee was occupying the said parcels of land as their lessee at the time they applied for
registration.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in re-opening the case and modifying the decree
Ruling:
Yes. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year.
Although Anacleto was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the
entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons,
including Anacleto, whether his name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. That decree was not
obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was
occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to re-open a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to
deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved. There
must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud. The main principle of registration is
to make registered titles indefeasible.
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CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO v. N.M. SALEEBY

G.R. No. L-8936, October 2, 1915, JOHNSON, J.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and Mauro Prieto and N.M. Saleeby occupy adjoining lots. Between their lots exists a
stone wall. Plaintiffs filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The court decreed
that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and thus an original certificate of title is issued in their
favour. The certificate included the wall. Six years after their registration, defendant filed a petition for
registration in the same Court. The court granted the petition and decreed that the title of defendant be
registered; an original certificate of title was therefore issued in his favour, included in the certificate is also
the subject wall.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Land Registration erred in including the subject wall in the certificate of
defendant
Ruling:
Yes. In case of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate; where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ANTIPAS VASQUEZ AND BASILIO GAYARES v.
RUFINA ABURAL, et al.
G.R. No. 14167, August 14, 1919, MALCOLM, J.
Registration of title under Torrens system becomes final, indisputable, and conclusive upon finality of
the order of the court adjudicating the land in favour of the applicant.
Facts:
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental upon application of the
Director of Lands. Notice of the proceedings was published in the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial
judge also issued general notice to all interested parties. Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for
registration in his name of Lot 1608. By declaration of general default, Lot 1608 was adjudicated in favor of
Victoriano on September 21. On November of the same year, the court declared final the order in favor of
Victoriano. 8 months after finality of the order, Antipas Vasquez and Basilio Gayares asked the court to re-
open the case to receive evidence they will present. The petitioners claim that Lot 1608 is part of their
hacienda and thus they are the owners thereof. Victoriano contended that the case cannot be re-opened.
Issue:
Whether petitioners may reopen the case despite the fact that the order of the court attained finality
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Ruling:
No. Since the judgment of the court on September 21 became final, and no action was taken by the
petitioners within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal, the SC is without jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal. The prime purpose of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippines by the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable.
STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CITY OF PASIG

G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing
of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein.
Facts:
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. is the owner of a parcel of land with a TCT no. 39112, which
indicated that it was located in Pasig. Later on, the land covered by TCT no. 39112 was consolidated by
another located in Cainta, with a TCT no. 518403. The consolidated TCTs were then divided into three TCTs,
all bearing the Cainta address. The Municipality of Pasig filed a petition to correct the location stated in the
three TCTs from Cainta to Pasig, which was granted by the court. Pasig then filed a complaint against Sta.
Lucia for collection of real property taxes. Sta. Lucia claimed that it has been paying real property taxes to
Cainta ever since. The RTC ruled in favour of Pasig, saying that the TCTs are conclusive as to ownership and
location.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in ruling in favour of Pasig by just relying on the face of the TCTs
Ruling:
Yes. A certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence
of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, while certificates of title are indefeasible,
unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest
title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other. Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the
TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta can aver that the metes and bounds of the subject
properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas boundaries.
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REGALIAN DOCTRINE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS, all
represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-fact
G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012, PEREZ, J.
All claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant,
whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership
through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.
Facts:
Respondents purchased three parcels of unregistered land formerly owned by Generosa Asuncion,
Teresita Sernal, and spouses Antona. The three parcels of land were consolidated into a single lot (Lot 3).
Respondents filed with the RTC an application for original registration over Lot 3. The RTC directed the DENR
to report on the status of Lot 3. DENR submitted a report saying that Lot 3 is an alienable and disposable land
since March 15, 1982. Respondents submitted a Certification by the DENR-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that Lot 3 is classified as alienable and disposable since March 15, 1982.
During the trial, respondents presented the testimonies of Generosa, Teresita, and spouses Antona all saying
that they have been in possession of the lots for more than 30 years before the sale. The Government
maintains that the land in question still forms part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether the respondents application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Jura Regalia means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and the source of all private
titles. Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the state. Those who seek the entry of such
land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish valid title thereto as against the state.
Respondents failed to establish valid title in this case. They anchored their claim on prescription provided
under Section 14(2) of PD 1529; for prescription to run against the state, the land must be proven to be
patrimonial in character. To be patrimonial, there must be an express declaration by the state that the land is
no longer needed for public service or the development of national wealth, or that the property has been
converted to patrimonial. Until then, the period of prescription against the state will not commence to run.
The express declaration contemplated is separate and distinct from mere classification that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondents were not able to prove that prescription has begun to run against the
state.
VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171726, February 23, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land is located is being used for residential
and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land. There must
be a positive act from the government declassifying the land.
Facts:
L. Yu Chang entered into a barter with the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur whereby the former
exchanged his 400 square meter land located in the barrio of San Roque for another 400 square meter land
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owned by the latter located in the barrio of San Juan. When L. Yu Chang died, his wife and children inherited
the land. A Deed of Transfer and Renunciation of their rights over the land was executed by the heirs of L. Yu
Chang in favour of Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang. They filed a petition for registration for the land.
They declared that they are the co-owners of the subject land; that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described
parcels of land for more than 100 years; and that they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed
the property in the concept of owners. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition claiming that the
land forms part of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. The RTC granted the petition
but the CA reversed it, saying that there must be a positive act from the government declassifying the land as
forest land before it could be deemed alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Petitioners insist that the subject land could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there
are buildings, residential houses, and government structures existing in the land.
Issue:
Whether the application for land registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. A
person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012, REYES, J.
Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided by law do
not automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain.
Facts:
East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation (ESRDC) filed an application for registration covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot 1309. Portions of the property were purchased from Francisco Oco pursuant
to a Deed of Absolute Sale and Rosario Tan, Nemesia Tan, and Mariano Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial
Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale. ESRDC claims that lot 1309 had been classified by the DENR as alienable
and disposable, and that its predecessors have been in possession of the land for more than 30 years, thus the
land is considered private land and can be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
Whether ESRDC has acquired the land through prescription
Ruling:
No. Without an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
development of national wealth, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
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the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law. The DAR converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16,
1990; therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only
then that the prescriptive period began to run.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY v. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA YBANEZ

G.R. No. 161380, April 21, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
A free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effect.
Facts:
Casimiro Ybanez sold to Aznar Brothers Realty Company (Aznar brothers) a parcel of unregistered
agricultural land (Lot 18563) in which they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Casimiro died intestate leaving
as heirs his wife and his children. The heirs of Casimiro executed a document entitled Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs with an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and Deed of Absolute Sale,
whereby they divided and adjudicated among themselves Lot No. 18563. By the same document, they sold the
entire lot to their co-heir, Adriano D. Ybaez who then sold the lot to Jose R. Ybanez. After the sale, Jose filed a
Free Patent application for Lot 18563 and in due course an OCT was issued over the lot. Aznar brothers
contested the free patent issued in favor of Jose alleging that they are the owners of Lot 18563 and it was
already a private property at the time of application and therefore free patent cannot be issued.
Issue:
Whether a free patent may be issued over private land
Ruling:
No. Lot 18563 is the private land of Casimiro. In their Deed of Absolute Sale, Casimiro expressly
warranted that the land was his own exclusive property. With the ownership of Aznar Brothers being
established in this case, the free patent issued to Jose R. Ybaez by the Government was invalid because the
Government had no authority to dispose of land already in private ownership. Private ownership of land as
when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants is not
affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to
lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have
ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a certificate of title
issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding
only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
DOLORES CAMPOS v. DOMINADOR ORTEGA, SR., AND JAMES SILOS

G.R. No. 171286, June 2, 2014, PERALTA, J.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law
Facts:
Dolores Campos and her husband were occupying the entire second level of a residential structure
located in Mandaluyong (Hulo estate). The lot on which said structure is erected is owned by the government
while the structure itself is owned by Dominga Boloy. Dolores and her husband had been leasing the second
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level since 1966. In 1977, under the Zonal Improvement Program [ZIP] of the then Metro Manila
Commission, in coordination with the Local Government of Mandaluyong, a census of the Hulo estate was
conducted wherein Dolores qualified as a bona fide occupant. As a consequence, Dolores was assigned an
identifying house number. After receiving the status of a bona fide occupant, Dolores followed up with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) concerning the award of the property to them in line with the ZIP, more
particularly after learning that all bona fide occupants may be allowed to buy the property. Dolores however
learned that the property was awarded to Dominador Ortega, Sr. and James Silos by the NHA. Four days later,
a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the heirs of Dominga Boloy in favor of the respondents, followed by
the issuance of a TCT.
Dolores claimed that they have acquired vested right over the property and filed a case for specific
performance against respondents to surrender their title to the NHA and directing the NHA to recognize
plaintiffs right over the property. The respondents countered that the Torrens title cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except through a direct proceeding.
Issue:
Whether the TCT can be subject to collateral attack
Ruling:
No. The case for specific performance instituted by petitioner effectively attacks the validity of
respondents' Torrens title over the property. Ultimately, the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of
respondents to the property in question, which, in turn, challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. This is a collateral attack and not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens
title. Under Section 48 of PD 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
VERGEL PAULINO AND CIREMIA PAULINO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the ADMINISTRATOR of the LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 205065, June 4, 2014 MENDOZA, J.
Reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title which was lost or destroyed. If
there was no loss or destruction, there is nothing to reconstitute.
Facts:
Spouses Paulino filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 301617 with the
RTC, alleging that its original copy was among those titles that were razed during the fire. Without awaiting
the LRA Report, the RTC rendered the decision, granting the petition for reconstitution. However, RTC
received the LRA Report, stating that TCT No. 301617 was registered in the name of a certain Emma B.
Florendo and that it was previously the subject of an application for administrative reconstitution. It was also
discovered that the original copy of the title on file in the Registry of Deeds was among those saved titles from
the fire.
The Republic of the Philippines filed its Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing RTC decision
granting the petition for reconstitution. The CA granted the petition ruling that RTC lacked jurisdiction to
order the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 301617, there being no lost or destroyed title.
Issue:
Whether there should be reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 301617
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Ruling:
No. Before jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings may be validly acquired, it is a condition sine
qua non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another person. If a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering
the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new title. The RTC lacked
jurisdiction to order the reconstitution, there being no lost or destroyed title over the real property.
Respondent duly proved that TCT No. 301617 was in the name of a different owner, Florendo, and the
technical description appearing on TCT No. 301617 was similar to the technical description appearing in Lot
939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the name of Antonino.
The same rule applies if in fact there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the
possession of another person and said title is existing. Accordingly, the judgment rendered by the RTC is null
and void, which may be attacked anytime.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANKLIN M. MILLADO

G.R. NO. 194066, JUNE 4, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Actual notice to the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property under Sections 12 and 13 of
R.A. 26 is mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for reconstitution of title.
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2108. He
claimed that despite efforts he exerted to locate the owners duplicate of OCT No. 2108, he was unable to find
it. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, the original copy of OCT No. 2108 was likewise not found in
the files of said office. The trial court ordered respondent to submit the names and addresses of the occupants
or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may
have any interest in the property. Respondent submitted only the names and addresses of the owners/actual
occupants of the adjoining lots. The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution.
The Republic of the Philippines thru the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial
court gravely erred in granting the petition for reconstitution despite non-compliance with all the
jurisdictional requisites. It pointed out that respondent failed to notify all the interested parties, particularly
the heirs of the registered owners. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal and held that the respondent had
satisfactorily complied with the statutory notice requirements.
Issue:
Whether lack of actual notice rendered the reconstitution proceedings void
Ruling:
Yes. The registered owners appearing in the title sought to be reconstituted, their surviving heirs, are
interested parties who should be notified of reconstitution proceeding under Section 12 in relation to Section
13 of R.A. 26. For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and
3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement aside from publication and posting of notice of hearing: that the
notice be mailed to occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the
property. Notwithstanding the sale supposedly effected by vendors claiming to be heirs of the registered
owners, they remain as interested parties entitled to notice of judicial reconstitution proceedings.
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Where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be void. As such, the court upon
which the petition for reconstitution of title is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the petition for
reconstitution of title and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional
requirements. The non-observance of the requirement of actual notice invalidates the whole reconstitution
proceedings in the trial court. The proceedings were therefore a nullity and the Decision was void.
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG v. ROSARIO CALALANG- GARCIA ET AL.

G.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The phrase Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba Calalang merely describes the civil status and
identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro Calalang. This does not mean that the property is conjugal.
Facts:
Pedro married Encarnacion, with whom he had three children, namely Rosario, Leonora and Carlito.
Encarnacion died in 1942. In 1967, he married Elvira, with whom he had two children, namely Nora and
Rolando. While Encarnacion was still alive, Pedro acquired an unregistered parcel of land. After Pedro
married Elvira, he applied for a free patent over the land. In 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued an original
certificate of title, which indicated him as the sole owner in the following manner: Pedro Calalang, married to
Elvira Berba Calalang.
In 1984, after the five-year prohibitory period, Pedro sold the land to his daughter, Nora. Pedro died
in 1989. His children by his first marriage, Rosario, et al. then filed an action for the annulment of sale in the
RTC. They claimed that they were co-owners of the land by virtue of succession, and that Pedro should have
obtained their consent before he sold it to Nora. They also claimed that their father acquired the land during
the first marriage as conjugal property, from their maternal grandmother, Francisca.
Issue:
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his
daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
Ruling:
Yes. The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of title shall set
forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their
citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal
partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both spouses.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale. The records do not show that the subject property belonged
to respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial
evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far
as she can remember and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal
grandparents. She was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present
any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents.
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SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON/HEIRS OF

BERNARDINA ABALON v. MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL ANDAL, ARNEL ANDAL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR
PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children
ALEX, IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA
G.R. No. 183448/G.R. No. 183464, June 30, 2014, SERENO, J.
A forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not been
cancelled.
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Bernardina Abalon over the subject property in favor of
Restituto M. Rellama. Then was subdivided into three portions sold to Spouses Peralta, Lotivio and the
Andals. TCTs were issued in their names. Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case against Rellama,
Spouses Peralta and the Andals contending that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forged document averring
that the owners duplicate copy of Oct No. (O) 16 had always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it
was delivered to them. Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that
the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of
transfer. Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, mainly alleged
that they are buyers in good faith and for value.
Issue:
Whether the title issued in the names of the Andals is valid
Ruling:
Yes. A forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent
purchaser for value. The qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This
means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and
that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the
transferee.
There is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither
were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellamas
ownership over the subject parcel of land. The Andals were buyers in good faith. The validity of their title to
the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be upheld. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama
was the owner of the property being sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the
said property. Thus, they had every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
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HECTOR L. UY v. VIRGINIA G. FULE; HEIRS OF THE LATE AMADO A. GARCIA, HEIRS OF THE LATE
GLORIA GARCIA ENCARNACION; HEIRS OF THE LATE PABLO GARCIA; and HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISA G.
HEMEDES
G.R. No. 164961, June 30, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
A purchaser cannot ignore facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard, and then claim that
he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Facts:
The disputed land was included in the Operation Land Transfer (OLT). The DAR issued emancipation
patents and original certificates of title covering the disputed land to the farmers-beneficiaries, one of whom
sold his portion to Hector Uy who then registered his title thereto. Respondent heirs of Conrado, filed a
complaint that the certificates of title of the petitioner be cancelled.
The RTC ruled for respondent. In his appeal, petitioner insisted that the RTC erred in holding that he
had not been an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value; and in declaring void and ordering the
cancellation of TCTs. But the CA ruled that even assuming that they had no notice of any defect in their
transferors titles, and the lands sold to them should be included in the DARs OLT program, no valid title
could have passed to them because the transfers are void under PD 27. Thus, petitioner is clearly not a
qualified transferees of the lands sold to them.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was a purchaser in good faith
Ruling:
No. The standard is that for one to be a purchaser in good faith in the eyes of the law, he should buy
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property,
and should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person
from whom he receives the property was the owner and could convey title to the property.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of
the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore
beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the
following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in
possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some
other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property. Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on
notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and
examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any
interest in the property.
The absence of the third condition put the petitioner on notice and obliged him to exercise a higher
degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to
determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any interest in the lots. Consequently, it is not sufficient
for him to insist that he relied on the face of the certificates of title, for he must further show that he exercised
reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the certificates of title. Failure to exercise such degree of
precaution rendered him a buyer in bad faith.
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HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOAQUIN MANGUARDIA AND SUSANA MANALO, et al. v. HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO
VALLES AND MARTA VALLES, et al.
G.R. No. 177616, August 27, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts
that standing. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith that
everyone is presumed to act in good faith.
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 835 was executed by Simplicio and Marta in favor of their brothers,
Melquiades and Rustico; Simplicios daughter, Adelaida; and Martas daughter, Encarnacion. The Deed of
Absolute Sale ostensibly bore the signature of Marta and the thumb marks of Simplicio and his wife.
Respondents commenced an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Title and Deeds of
Sale, Cancellation of Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioners in the RTC,
averring that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery because Marta and Simplicio were long dead
when the said document was executed. In their Answer, the heirs of spouses Manguardia averred that their
predecessors-in-interest were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, having acquired the lots from
their registered owners and occupants, Pedro and Soledad. The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale void
ab initio because there was no proof that the vendors, Marta and Simplicio, were still alive in 1968.
Issue:
Whether petitioners predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith and for value
Ruling:
No. The transfers of the properties in question did not go far, but were limited to close family
relatives by affinity and consanguinity. Good faith among the parties to the series of conveyances is therefore
hard if not impossible to presume. Petitioners did not provide any sufficient evidence that would convince the
courts that the proximity of relationships between/among the vendors and vendees in the questioned sales
was not used to perpetrate fraud. There is nothing to dispel the notion that apparent anomalies attended the
transactions among close relations. The parties to the alleged original sale and the witnesses were close
relatives. Similarly, the vendors and vendees in subsequent sale transactions were either the co-vendees
themselves in the original sale, first cousins, and close relatives by consanguinity and affinity. These
transactions between close relatives happened at a time when everybody knew everyone, in a place where
vendees lived in close proximity to the vendors, and to the disputed properties.
This is not to say however, that a sale between close relatives is automatically anomalous. It is just
that in this particular case, the circumstances strongly show that fraud was committed by relatives against
relatives and the evidence adduced by petitioners was insufficient to remove the cloud of doubt pertaining to
the good faith of their predecessors-in-interest in acquiring the properties in question.
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ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN v. BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON, SPS. JOSE MANUEL & LOURDES GUEVARA
G.R. No. 204369, September 17, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
A purchaser of property under the Torrens system cannot simply invoke that he is an innocent
purchaser for value when there are attending circumstances that raise suspicions.
Facts:
Locsin filed an ejectment case against Aceron to recover possession over the land. Eventually, they
entered into a compromise agreement. Locsin later went to the United States without knowing whether
Aceron has complied with his part. In spite of her absence, she continued to pay the real property taxes on the
subject lot. Later on, she discovered that the property was sold by a one Marylou Bolos to Bernardo but it was
titled under his son, Carlos.
Locsin sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the property since her signature in the purported
deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery but Carlos denied Locsins request, claiming that he was unaware
of any defect or flaw in the title and he is, thus, an innocent purchaser for value and good faith. Locsin filed an
action for reconveyance. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Locsin cannot simply rely on the
apparent difference of the signatures in the deed and in the documents presented by her to prove her
allegation of forgery and that respondents are all buyers in good faith.
Issue:
Whether respondents are innocent purchasers for value
Ruling:
No. Bolos certificate of title was free from liens and encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of
Carlos and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in light of the factual milieu
surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine.
The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.
Bernardo and Carlos should have investigated the reason behind the arrangement. They should have
been pressed to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation in order to protect Carlos
interest. It should have struck them as odd that it was Locsin, not Bolos, who sought the recovery of
possession by commencing an ejectment case against Aceron, and even entered into a compromise agreement
with the latter years after the purported sale in Bolos favor. Instead, Bernardo and Carlos took inconsistent
positions when they argued for the validity of the transfer of the property in favor of Bolos, but in the same
breath prayed for the enforcement of the compromise agreement entered into by Locsin.
As regards the transfer of the property from Carlos to the spouses Guevara, the existence of the sale
is highly suspicious. No document, contract, or deed evidenced the sale in favor of the spouses Guevara. The
same goes for the purported payment of the purchase price of the property. Also, the fact that Lourdes
Guevara and Carlos are siblings, and that Carlos agent in his dealings concerning the property is his own
father, renders incredible the argument that Lourdes had no knowledge whatsoever of Locsins claim of
ownership at the time of the purported sale.
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AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO ROTAIRO, and his children
FELINA ROTAIRO ET AL.) v. ROVIRA ALCANTARA AND VICTOR ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 173632, September 29, 2014, REYES, J.
When the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation, he cannot find solace in the protection afforded by a prior registration. Neither can such
person be considered an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.
Facts:
Alcantara and Ignacio mortgaged the subject property to Pilipinas Bank. After two years, property
was parceled out by them and sold to different buyers, one being Rotairo. However, Alcantara and Ignacio
defaulted in their loan obligation, thus, Pilipinas bank, being the highest bidder, foreclosed the mortgage. and
sold it to Rovira, who happens to be Alcantara's daughter. Rovira filed a case for the recovery of possession of
the land. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was
covered by P.D. No. 957. Rovira, as successor-in-interest, was well aware of the condition of the property
which she bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because she lives near the land, and at the time she purchased it
she was aware of the existing houses or structures on the land. She was, therefore, not entitled to the relief
prayed for in her complaint. On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of
possession of the property to Rovira. According to the CA, Section 181 of P.D. No. 957 protects innocent lot
buyers, and where there is a prior registered mortgage, the buyer purchases it with knowledge of the
mortgage.
Issue:
Whether Rotairo is a buyer and builder in good faith
Ruling:
No. Rovira does not deny that she is the daughter and an heir of Alcantara, one of the parties to the
contract to sell (and the contract of sale) executed in favor of Rotairo. The vendors heirs are his privies.
Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with constructive knowledge of prior dispositions or encumbrances
affecting the subject property made by her father.
More than the charge of constructive knowledge, the surrounding circumstances of this case show
Roviras actual knowledge of the disposition of the subject property and Rotairos possession thereof. After
the contract to sell was executed, Rotairo immediately secured a mayors permit for the construction of his
residential house on the property. Rotairo, and subsequently, his heirs, had been residing on the property
since then. Rovira, who lives only 50 meters away from the subject property, knew that there were structures
built on the property. Rovira, however, claims that she did not bother to inquire as to the legitimacy of the
rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of its title to the property. But Rovira cannot
rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title
and make necessary inquiries because the bank was not in possession of the property. Where the vendor is
not in possession of the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession. A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard,
and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. Hence, Rovira cannot claim a right better than that of Rotairo's as she is not a buyer in good faith.
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SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO,

represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO
G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014, REYES, J.
Prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system because under
the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Facts:
In 1996, Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry against Mario and Felix because they built a
piggery in his property without his consent. He claims that he purchased it from Capistrano and was able to
obtain a free patent over it. Mario claims that the property is owned by his wife Carmelita who inherited it
from her father and that they have been in possession of the land since 1969. The MTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of the disputed parcel of land. But on
appeal, the RTC held that the respondents were able to establish that the subject property is indeed part of
the parcel of land covered by OCT No. M-4559 registered in the name of Dionisio. Considering that OCT No. M-
4559 is registered under the name of Dionisio, the RTC opined that the respondents, as successors-in-interest
of Dionisio, are entitled to the possession of the subject property as an attribute of their ownership over the
same. On the other hand, the RTC averred that the petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support
their claim that they indeed own the subject property.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA claiming that respondents cause of action in the
recovery of possession case is already barred by laches. However, the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether respondents cause of action is barred by laches
Ruling:
No. As owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the possession
thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Assuming that the
petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, the
respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as
the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS, represented by her Attorney-in Fact, NYMPHA Z. SALES v. MARIA DIVINA
GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the action
for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years, the reference point being the date of registration
of the deed or the issuance of the title.
Facts:
Eliza is the owner of 3 parcels of land. She had a second husband named Lamberto with whom she
did not have any children. She was forced to take care of Lamberto's daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate
was forged to make it appear that the she was Eliza's daughter. Pursuant to void and voidable documents,
Lamberto succeeded in transferring Elizas properties in favor of Gran.
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Eliza filed a complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against Gran. Gran filed Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time
the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents before
the Registry of Deeds.
Issue:
Whether the action for nullity of the void deed of conveyance has prescribed
Ruling:
No. To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, the
plaintiffs possession of the disputed property is material. If the real owner remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him and
in such case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible.
Eliza did not remain in possession of the properties. It was Gran who was in possession of the subject
properties, there being an admission by the petitioner that the property covered by TCT No. 224174 was
being used by Grans mother-in-law. Elizas relief in the Complaint for the surrender of three properties to
her bolsters such stance. And since the new titles to the subject properties in the name of Gran were issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Marikina on July 27, 1992, January 29, 1976, and November 26, 1975, the filing of the
petitioners complaint before the RTC on January 9, 2006 was beyond the ten-year prescriptive period,
warranting the Complaints dismissal all the same.
ONOFRE ANDRES, substituted by his heirs, namely: FERDINAND, ROSALINA, ERIBERTO, FROILAN, MA.
CLEOFE, NELSON, GERMAN, GLORIA, ALEXANDER, MAY, ABRAHAM, AND AFRICA, ALL SURNAMED
ANDRES v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 173548, October, 15, 2014, LEONEN, J.
A bank that accepts a mortgage based upon a title which appears valid on its face and after exercising
the requisite care, prudence, and diligence appropriate to the public interest character of its business can be
deemed a mortgagee in good faith. The subsequent consolidation of title in its name after a valid foreclosure
shall be respected notwithstanding later proof showing that the title was based upon a void transaction.
Facts:
Spouses Andres acquired during their marriage a parcel of land covered by TCT. No. NT-7267. When
they died, their children, among them was Onofre, agreed in an extrajudicial partition of the one-half while
the other half was sold to Roman, also one of the children. Roman was issued a new TCT. PNB alleged that the
Spouses Andres mortgaged the property to PNB and that RTC transferred ownership of the properties of the
deceased to their only living heir, Reynaldo Andres. Spouses Reynaldo Andres and Janette de Leon used this
title and mortgaged the property to PNB. This was without Onofres consent.
Onofre Andres, claiming ownership over the property, filed a complaint for cancellation of title,
reconveyance of property alleging that Onofre Andres nephew Reynaldo Andres was in collusion with his
mother, Lydia Echaus-Andres, in executing a falsified document denominated as Self-Adjudication of Sole
Heir.
PNB denied the material allegations in the complaint. It argued that it conducted an investigation on the
property and that the title presented to PNB by Reynaldo Andres and his wife was free from adverse claims.
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Issue:
Whether PNB is an innocent mortgagee for value and in good faith
Ruling:
Yes. PNB sent its appraiser and credit investigator Gerardo Pestao to conduct an ocular inspection
of the property. He also went to the relevant government offices to verify the ownership status of the
property. There was an on-going construction of a residential building during his inspection, so he appraised
this building as well, in case the land proved insufficient to cover the applied loan. These acts complied with
the standard operating practice expected of banks when dealing with real property. Also, the two-year period
under Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court had lapsed and petitioner heirs did not allege if any heir or
creditor of Roman Andres and his wife had invoked their right under this provision. The title resulting from
the foreclosure sale, therefore, is to be protected.
AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS v. SPOUSES ALFREDO REVILLA AND THE HEIRS OF PAZ REVILLA
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014, LEONEN, J.
Those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the Torrens system for registered lands must
be protected. On the other hand, those who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.
Facts:
Spouses Revilla are owners of land located in Cavite. They faced financial difficulties, so Paz Castillo-
Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias. By way of security, the parties verbally agreed that
Amada would take physical possession of the property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation
to pay the loan and realty taxes and that upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the property to
the Revilla spouses. Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled
Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite with the Revilla Spouses as sellers and
Amada as buyers. Consequently, Tax Declaration in the name of the Revilla spouses was cancelled, and a new
one was issued to Amada. Then Amada sold the property to the Casorla spouses who then sold it to the Sun
Spouses. When Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia, he discovered that the propertys tax declaration
was already in the name of the Sun spouses.
Spouses Revilla filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of sales and transfers of title and
reconveyance of the property with damages against Amada, who contends that the Sun spouses were buyers
in good faith for value.
Issue:
Whether the property should be reinstated in favor of Revilla spouses
Ruling:
No. Amada argues that the subsequent buyer of the disputed parcel of land is in good faith. The issue
of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is
registered land and the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. The
good faith argument cannot be considered as this case involves unregistered land. In any case, this is a
defense personal to the Sun spouses and cannot be borrowed by petitioner. The Sun spouses no longer raised
this argument on appeal, but only made a partial appeal regarding legal interest on the award
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HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, represented by ROGELIA LOPEZ, et al. v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES [now substituted by PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.]
G.R. NO. 193551, November, 19, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land
is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner. It does not apply
when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Facts:
Lopez owned a parcel of land. When she died, she was survived by her three sons. The sons died, only
one of them, Teodoro, was survived by children: Gregorio, Enrique, Simplicio and Severino. Petitioners are
Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza and heirs of Gregorio and Severino. Enrique is deceased.
Petitioners discovered that Enrique executed an affidavit of self-adjudication and sold the property to
Marietta. They demanded the nullification of the documents. Marietta, who was already in possession of the
property, refused. Consequently, Marietta obtained a loan from DBP and mortgaged the property as security.
The mortgage was annotated to the title. Then Marietta failed to pay her loan to DBP, which foreclosed the
land and was awarded as highest bidder.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of document, recovery of possession, and
reconveyance of the property. The RTC ruled in their favor ruling that Marietta was not an innocent
purchaser for value because when the deed of absolute sale was executed, the property was only covered by a
tax declaration in the name of the heirs of Gregoria Lopez.
Issue:
Whether the property was validly transferred to Marietta and, eventually, to DBP
Ruling:
No. Marietta cannot claim the protection to innocent purchasers for value. There was no certificate of
title to rely on when she purchased the property from Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still
unregistered. What was available was only a tax declaration issued under the name of Heirs of Lopez. At the
very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted Marietta to inquire further as to
Enriques right over the property. She did not. Hence, she was not an innocent purchaser for value.
Likewise, DBP is not a mortgagee in good faith. DBP failed to exercise the degree of diligence
required of banks when it accepted the unregistered property as security for Mariettas loan despite
circumstances that should have aroused its suspicion. The protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith
cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the
mortgagor's name.
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FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, et al. v. EDNA C. SEE

G.R. No. 194077, December 3, 2014, LEONEN, J.
An innocent purchaser for value is someone who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another persons claim.
Facts:
Spouses Florentino and Carmelita owned the subject property wherein Elena, Florentino's sister-in-
law, was allowed to stay. She had stayed with her in-laws on the property rental-free for over two decades
until the building they lived in was razed by fire. Upon the spouses divorce, the property went to the wife
Carmelita, who then sold it to See. In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale,
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a waiver of interest notarized in Illinois. In
this waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the land.
Edna was aware of the Leong's relatives staying in the house of the land. Carmelita assured her that
her nieces and nephews would move out, but demands to vacate were unheeded.
Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena and to the other relatives. She alleged
that after the fire razed the building, Elena erected houses without Carmelita's consent. In response, Elena
alleged the titles legal infirmity for lack of Florentino's conformity to its sale.
Issue:
Whether See is a buyer in good faith and for value
Ruling:
Yes. She conducted further inquiry by relying not only on the certificate of title, but also on
Florentinos waiver. She went to the Register of Deeds to verify the title and relied on the marriage settlement
agreement. She exerted due diligence. By her overt acts, Edna See verified the authenticity of Carmelitas land
title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There was no annotation on the same thus deemed a clean title. Also,
she relied on the duly executed and notarized Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and
Certificate of Authentication issued by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Illinois in support to
the Waiver of Interest incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her. The Certificate of Authority
shows that it is valid and regular on its face. The Certificate of Authority is a notarized document and
presumed valid and duly executed. Edna Sees reliance on the notarial acknowledgment is sufficient evidence
of good faith.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and JUANA MENESES
represented by RODOLFO S. AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 212388, December 10, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Before a certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved
by the claimants that said certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among others.
Facts:
Respondents filed a petition for reconstitution of OCT since when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, it could not be registered because the owners copy of OCT was missing. They alleged
that the OCT was issued in the name of the spouses Sanchez, pursuant to Decree No. 41812 issued in relation
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to a decision by CFI. The Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) requested the trial court to
require respondents to submit some documents but respondents did not comply. Nonetheless, the trial court
gave due course to their petition for reconstitution. The LRA then questioned the legality of the reconstitution
on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence is sufficient to merit reconstitution
Ruling:
No. The mere existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled by TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was
superseded by TCT No. 80792, clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek to be reconstituted is no
longer in force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a mere superfluity.
If indeed OCT was lost or destroyed, it is necessary that the RD issue a certification that such was in
force at the time of its alleged loss or destruction. Definitely, the RD cannot issue such certification because of
the dearth of records in support of the alleged OCT in its file. The presentation of alleged derivative titles
TCT No. 10202, TCT No. 44365 and TCT No. 80792will not suffice to replace this certification because the
titles do not authenticate the issuance of OCT having been issued by the RD without any basis from its official
records. It is a wonder how the derivative titles were issued when the existence of OCT could not be
established based on the RDs records. The RD failed to explain how it was able to make an annotation of the
original registration of the lot under OCT when respondents are now asking for its reconstitution. It is also
highly suspicious why respondents are asking the for reconstitution of OCT when, supposedly, it has already
been cancelled and new titles have already been issued based on transfers purportedly made by
respondents. The reconstituted OCT has no use when the lot has already been transferred to other persons.
It will practically be of no value or worth to respondents.
SPOUSES CARLOS J. SUNTAY AND ROSARIO R. SUNTAY v. KEYSER MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 208462, December 10, 2014, MENDOZA, J.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of
the property.
Facts:
Keyser entered into contract to sell with Bayfront Development Corporation to purchase a condo
unit, Unit G and two parking lots. However, the Contract to Sell was not registered with RD of Manila, thus the
unit name remained in the name of Bayfront with a clean title.
Spouses Suntay also purchased condominium units executing a Contract to Sell but Bayfront failed to
deliver said units and reimburse the full purchase price paid by the Suntays. Spouses Suntay filed an action
before HLURB which rescinded contract in favor of the them. In the writ of execution, the Sheriff levied the
properties including Unit G and the two parking lots. Considering that CCT was registered with the Bayfront
with a clean title, the sheriffs deemed it proper to be levied. An auction sale was held and spouses Suntay
were the highest bidders. The Certificate of Sale was issued in their favor and this was annotated at the back
of the CCT. Keyser discovered the levy and sale in favor of Suntays and filed a complaint for annulment of the
auction sale before RTC
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Issue:
Whether Spouses Suntay have better rights over the condominium property
Ruling:
Yes. Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any
suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the title of the seller appearing on the
face of the certificate. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
The subject property was registered land under the Torrens System covered by CCT with Bayfront as
the registered owner. At the time that the Notice of Levy was annotated, the title had no previous
encumbrances and liens. Evidently, it was a clean title. The Certificate of Sale, pursuant to an auction sale, was
also annotated, with Bayfront still as the registered owner. It was only almost a year later, that Keyser was
able to register its Deed of Absolute Sale with Bayfront. Prior to such date, Spouses Suntay appropriately
relied on the Torrens title of Bayfront to enforce the latters judgment debt.
IMELDA SYJUCO, et al. v. FELISA BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature
of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is
in possession.
Facts:
Imelda Syjuco, et al. own and have registered in their names under a TCT a part of the Maysilo estate.
They discovered that Felisa Bonifacio, a purported owner of another lot in the same estate, has sold Syjuco, et
al.s land in favor of VSD Realty & Development Corporation. In their action to quiet title against the
respondents before the RTC, they contended that although the TCTs of Syjuco, et al. and VSD Realty contain
different technical descriptions, said certificates actually pertain to one and the same property. Also, they
allege that the respondents title could only have been obtained through fraud.
Issue:
Whether the action to quiet title by Syjuco, et al. has prescribed
Ruling:
No. The filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the
possession of the plaintiff. The rule on the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of title has no application as
the contending parties claim ownership over the subject land based on their respective certificates of title
thereon which originated from different sources. Syjucos title shows that it originated from OCT No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917, while Bonifacios title shows that it likewise originated from the same OCT, but
registered on April 19, 1917. This case affirmed the earlier finding that there is only one OCT No. 994, the
registration date of which had already been decisively settled as of May 3, 1917 and not April 19, 1917. Thus,
the OCT dated April 19, 1917 is null and void.
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UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015, PERALTA, J.
The person who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the registered owner, his
assigns, or persons in interest in the property.
Facts:
In filing the petition for reconstitution of an OCT before the RTC, UMM alleged that it is the registered
owner of a mining patent issued by the then President Macapagal and that the OCT issued in its name could
not be located despite a diligent search. The RTC dismissed the petition as it found that the purported
owners duplicate of the OCT was not signed by the then register of deeds on its face and dorsal side. The CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether UMM may file a petition to reconstitute the OCT
Ruling:
Yes. UMM admitted that it was not the owner of the land on which the mining patent was issued as
the same was owned and registered in the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc. UMM has no legal capacity to
institute a petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate. UMMs admission established that the surface land
covered by its mining patent, which title is sought to be reconstituted, is not owned by the same. Thus, not
having an interest on the land amounting to a title to the same, UMM is not possessed of a legal personality to
institute a petition for judicial reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT.
MARIFLOR HORTIZUELA v. GREGORIA TAGUFA, et al.

G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.
Facts:
Before the disputed property was named in favor of Gregoria Tagufa, Mariflor Hortizuelas parents
owned the same. Although untitled, the property was mortgaged to DBP by Hortizuelas parents, who failed to
redeem the same upon their non-payment of a loan. In the foreclosure sale of the property, Tagufas husband
bought the same using Tagufas money. An agreement was concluded between Tagufas husband and
Hortizuela, her sister, that the property will be conveyed to her upon demand. After finding out that the
property was registered under Tagufas name, Hortizuela filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of
possession against Tagufa.
Issue:
Whether an action for recovery of possession constitutes a collateral attack
Ruling:
No. A certificate of title is merely evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield
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for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance
in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered
owner.
Hortizuelas complaint was not a collateral attack on the title which warrants a dismissal. An action
for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam available to a person whose property has
been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought
to be set aside but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to reconvey the land
from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
IMELDA SYJUCO, et al. v. FELISA BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been
registered and that an earlier certificate for the same land is in existence.
Facts:
Imelda Syjuco, et al. own and have registered in their names under a TCT a part of the Maysilo estate.
They discovered that Felisa Bonifacio, a purported owner of another lot in the same estate, has sold Syjuco, et
al.s land in favor of VSD Realty & Development Corporation. In their action to quiet title against the
respondents before the RTC, they contended that although the TCTs of Syjuco, et al. and VSD Realty contain
different technical descriptions, said certificates actually pertain to one and the same property. Also, they
allege that the respondents title could only have been obtained through fraud.
Issue:
Whether the title of the respondents is indefeasible
Ruling:
No. There cannot be two or even several certificates of title on the same parcel of real property
because a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land would be null and
void since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. The
indefeasibility of a title under the Torrens system could be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same
parcel of land does not exist. Where the issuance of the title was attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in
the titled owner any valid legal title to the land covered by it; and the person in whose name the title was
issued cannot transmit the same, for he has no true title thereto.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CORAZON SESE and FE SESE

G.R. No. 185092, June 4, 2014, MENDOZA, J.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Facts:
Corazon and Fe Sese filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel
of land in Bulacan. They alleged that they acquired the same through a donation inter vivos from their mother.
In support of their application, the Seses submitted various documents, among which is the disputed survey
plan stating that the survey is inside an alienable and disposable area. The MTC found the application
sufficient, hence, issuing its approval. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed; but the
lower court decided in the Seses favor.
Issue:
Whether the subject land is alienable
Ruling:
No. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration or claiming ownership who must prove that the land is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land is alienable or disposable. There must be an existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
The Seses cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land. A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying
solely on the said surveyors assertion, the Seses have not sufficiently proven the land in question has been
declared alienable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCA SANTOS, et al.

One who applies for registration of ownership over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Facts:
Francisca Santos, et al. filed an application for registration of four parcels of land in Taguig, as
accompanied by the required documents. The RTC approved the same despite the OSGs opposition.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands are alienable
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Ruling:
No. There is no proof that the subject lots had been classified as alienable and disposable, because a
mere notation in the Conversion Plan, even if it had been formally offered in evidence, is not the required
proof of a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. The evidence
required to establish that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable are:
(1) CENRO or PENRO certification; and (2) a true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The foregoing documents
had not been submitted in evidence. A mere certification issued by the Forest Utilization & Law Enforcement
Division of the DENR is not enough. Evidence on record is not sufficient to prove that the subject lots had
been declared alienable and disposable lands.
KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC. v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an application for subdivision through an
ordinance should be understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land covered by said
application from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use.
Facts:
Laguna Estate Development Corporation (LEDC) filed a request with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
for the conversion of 10 parcels of land in Laguna to be converted from agricultural to residential land,
pursuant to R.A. No. 3844. The then minister granted the request provided that certain conditions are
complied with. Kasamaka-Canlubang, Inc. (KCI) filed a petition with the DAR for the revocation of the
conversion order, alleging that LEDC failed to comply with the requisite of developing the subject lands. DAR
partially revoked eight of the said lands conversion. The Office of the President deemed seven of the lands
exempt from the coverage of the R.A. No. 6657. The CA dismissed KCIs petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands agricultural lands
Ruling:
Yes. When city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or
district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone, pursuant to the power
granted to them under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying
any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and
compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality behind such a presumption is more
evident when considering the approval by local legislative bodies of subdivision ordinances and regulations.
To hold otherwise would render the approval of the subdivision application with no practical effect; for as
long as the property covered by the application remains classified as agricultural, it could not be subdivided
and developed for non-agricultural use.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO RANESES

G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014, VILLARAMA, J.
The applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable.
Facts:
Crisanto Raneses filed an application for original registration of land title over two (2) parcels of land
located in Taguig. There being no opposition and upon Raneses compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements, the RTC issued an order of general default against all persons except the Republic of the
Philippines. The RTC granted the request but Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) opposed the same,
alleging that the subject properties are below the 12.50 elevation, hence, forming part of the bed of Laguna
Lake and are, therefore, indisposable and inalienable. The RTC still decided in Raneses favor and the CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the subject properties are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
Ruling:
No. The Regalian doctrine, as embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Raneses merely presented that Conversion Subdivision Plan with the annotation that the subject
properties were inside alienable and disposable land area Project No. 270B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified
by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968 and the Inter-Office Memorandum from the LLDA. Raneses
reliance on the said annotation and inter-Office Memorandum is insufficient. The pieces of evidence
submitted by Raneses hardly satisfy the documentary requirements.
CARMEN T. GAHOL v. ESPERANZA COBARRUBIAS

G.R. No. 187144, September 17, 2014, PERALTA, J.
One of the requirements for the issuance of a Townsite Sales Application form is a certificate of no home
lot.
Facts:
Gahol applied for Townsite Sales Application (TSA) with the DENR for the land adjacent to her
property. Cobarrubias filed a protest, stating that she and her family are occupying the same. The DENR
decided in Gahols favor and the Office of the President dismissed Cobarrubias appeal. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether Gahol is qualified to own the disputed property
Ruling:
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No. Carmen Gahol did not submit a certificate of no home lot and was still issued a TSA despite the
fact that she owns another lot in Baguio City. The untruthfulness of her statements in the TSA shall render her
disqualified. Gahols application must be rejected because one of the requirements was that the applicant
must not own any other property, but Gahol is a registered owner of a residential lot. She also stated that
there are no signs of improvement or occupation in the said lot, but it was in fact occupied by the
Cobarrubias. Gahol is therefore disqualified due to the untruthful statements in her application.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
Land that is not devoted to agricultural activity is outside the coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
Facts:
The Dakila property, which was registered in the name of Freddie Santiago, was freely relinquished
by tenants Susana Surio, et al. to various successors while Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corporation
purchased the remaining properties from Santiago and transferred the title to its name. It proceeded to
subdivide the Dakila property into six lots. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Malolos passed a resolution which
reclassified four of the lots belonging to Holy Trinity. Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of one of the
previous tenants, Felix Surio, wrote to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Bulacan, requesting an
investigation of the sale of the Dakila property.
The DAR Regional Office decided to redistribute the subject property to qualified farmer
beneficiaries as it opined that the sale was a prohibited transaction under P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No.
6657. The DAR Secretary affirmed but the Office of the President reversed the formers ruling. The CA
reversed.
Issue:
Whether Dakila Property is agricultural land within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657
Ruling:
No. An agricultural land, according to R.A. No. 6657, is one that is devoted to agricultural activity and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Consequently, before land may be
placed under the coverage of R.A. No. 6657, two (2) requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be
devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Agricultural activity includes the "cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products; and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by persons whether natural or juridical. For land to be covered under Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be
devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein.
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DANILO ALMERO, et al. v. HEIRS OF MIGUEL PACQUING

G.R. No. 199008, November 19, 2014, BRION, J.
It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
Facts:
Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands in Tagum city through a homestead patent. The
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent Miguels representative a notice of coverage placing his
estate under R.A. No. 6657s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Miguel failed to reply and instead,
filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell the property with the DAR. Because Miguel died during the pendency of the
proceedings, his sole heir, Linda Pacquing adjudicated to herself ownership over the property and filed an
application for retention with the DAR of the same lot. The DAR denied it and its decision became final and
executory.
Linda filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator a petition to cancel Danilo Almero, et al.s
Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), which were granted in the latters favor for being farmer-
beneficiaries of cultivated portions of the same property. The petition was dismissed for Lindas failure to file
her position paper. The TCTs covering the portions of the property cultivated by Napoleon Villa, Sr. and
transferred by Linda to the former were nullified by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Subsequently, they issued titles to Almero, et al. over the same property.
Issue:
Whether the lands under the homestead grant are exempt from agrarian reform coverage
Ruling:
No. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homestead
only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will
not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. In order for the homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs to retain their homestead, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) they
must still be the owners of the original homestead at the time of R.A. No. 6657s effectivity, and (b) they must
continue to cultivate the homestead land. Linda, as the direct compulsory heir of the original homestead
grantee, is no longer cultivating the homestead land. Though the parcels of land are covered by homestead
patents, it will not automatically exempt them from the operation of the land reform.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188494, November 26, 2014, REYES, J.
A Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails
to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed with the RTC an application for registration of the subject properties
in Taguig. The State, through the OSG, interposed its opposition. The RTC granted the application but the CA
reversed, explaining that the survey plans and technical descriptions submitted by Remman failed to
establish the true identity of the subject properties.
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Issue:
Whether Remmans application for registration of the subject property should be granted
Ruling:
No. It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for the land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Thus, the property registration of a corporation merely relying on the CENRO Certification must be dismissed
for failure to prove that the land had been declared alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE and PERLA CASTUERA

G.R. No. 203384, January 14, 2015, CARPIO, J.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the property.
Facts:
Andres Valiente sold his lot in Zambales to the spouses Castuera. The spouses, in turn, filed with the
RTC an application for original registration of title over the said property. The OSG filed its opposition. The
RTC granted the same, holding that the spouses have preponderantly shown that they are the lawful owners
and the actual possessors of the lot. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the advance plan and the CENRO certification are sufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property
Ruling:
No. Spouses Castuera, as applicants for the registration of title, must present a certified true copy of
the DENR Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR
Secretary's declaration or the President's proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL CORTEZ

G.R. No. 186639, January 5, 2014, REYES, J.
Lands of the public domain that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription
and, accordingly, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, but the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth.
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Facts:
Emmanuel Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of
land in Manila. As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an order of general default and it granted Cortezs
application. It ratiocinated that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief prayed for as there was competent
evidence established that the possession of the land applied for and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, actual, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the same, under claim of title and in the concept of
owners. In the appeal by the OSG, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision and ruled that Cortez was able to
prove that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the declaration or
notation from the Bureau of Forest Development.
Issue:
Whether Cortezs application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. The only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However,
this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
There is no official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial character of the subject
property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less
that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for 57 years at the time he applied
for the registration of title thereto. It is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land in Taguig, with Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) opposing the same. The RTC
granted the application, opining that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the
reglementary elevation of 12.5 m, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether Remmans application for registration should be granted
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Ruling:
No. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. That the subject
properties are not part of the bed of Laguna lake does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the Remman to prove, with
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.
The certifications presented by Remman are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable. In addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a
parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the records. Respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and
DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN,
namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL
L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA
G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
There must be a positive act by the government declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of Maxima Lachica who was the owner of a parcel of
land situated in Aklan. They filed a complaint against the ANCF Superintendent claiming that ANCF usurped
the land they inherited. They asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the
concept of an owner. ANCF countered that the land was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 which allocated
it as a civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF and that the land is timberland which is not
susceptible of private ownership. The MCTC, RTC, and CA unanimously held that respondents retain private
rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the said proclamation.
Issue:
Whether respondents retain private rights to the property
Ruling:
No. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
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government. The respondents have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is
inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the
subject property.
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-630, November 15, 1947, MORAN, C.J.
Aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands.
Facts:
Alexander A. Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
1941. The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to register it but was
denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction because he is an
alien. Krivenko went to the CFI of Manila which sustained the refusal of the RD.
Issue:
Whether an alien may acquire residential land
Ruling:
No. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its
purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all
natural resources of the Nation. The three branches of the government have always maintained that lands of
the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include
residential lots. Under Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII
which closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It
would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Section 5 is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in Section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together.
The persons against whom the prohibition is directed in Section 5 are the very same persons who
under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens.
Since "agricultural land" under Section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be
attached to "agricultural land under Section 5. The only difference between "agricultural land" under Section
5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the
class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony,
what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
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ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG v. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD
PARIAN
G.R. Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, QUIASON, J.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Facts:
Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to Soledad Parian, wife of Ong Yee. Ong Yee is the brother of Ong
Ching Po. Both of them died subsequently. The sale was evidenced in a notarized Deed of Sale which was
registered in the RD in the name of Parian, who said that she entrusted the administration of the lot and
building to Ong Ching Po. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was
going to sell it. Petitioners refused to vacate the said premises, claiming that their father, Ong Ching Po,
bought the said land from Ong Joi Jong and was conveyed to them. Petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance against respondent who, in turn, filed an action for quieting of title against them. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA. Ong Ching Po claims that they have
an agreement that the land be registered in the name of respondent in order to avoid legal complications and
to facilitate registration and transfer and that the said title would be transferred by the respondent to Ong
Ching Po or his successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for him.
Issue:
Whether an alien can acquire and own real property in the Philippines
Ruling:
No. Ong Ching Po cannot claim that he merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title
over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property
in the Philippines. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in
the "disposition, exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other
natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of
which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Ong Ching Po
was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI v. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY
GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG
G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional
grounds after the entire parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.
Facts:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen died in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His
forced heirs were his widow Helen Meyers Guzman and son David Guzman. Both of them are also American
citizens. Helen conveyed to David all her rights over the six parcels of land they inherited. David then sold the
land to Emilio Cataniag. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint questioning the
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constitutionality of the two conveyances between Helen and David, and between the latter and Cataniag.
They claimed ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed and further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have
been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing petitioners to recover
the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified citizen renders moot any
question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made
Ruling:
Yes. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain,
except only by way of legal succession. However, jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." If the ban on aliens from
acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. Since the disputed land is now owned by
Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &
VENEER CO. INC., ETC.
G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986, NARVASA, J.
The reckoning point in determining whether a person is qualified to acquire land is the time the
right to own it is obtained and not the time of registration of ownership.
Facts:
The land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co. Inc from Mariano and Ancer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities. The possession of the Infiels dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The
sale took place on October 29, 1962. The CFI ordered the registration in favor of Acme. However, the Director
of Lands appealed asserting that the registration proceedings were done only on July 17, 1981, long after the
1973 Constitution had gone into effect. He contends that since Section 11 of Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme.
Issue:
Whether the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed
Ruling:
Yes. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution
of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered
in the negative. If they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition
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by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. Alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
The land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. The Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to
their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against
said corporation's holding or owning private land.
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUCIA M. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012, SERENO, J.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
Facts:
Gabriel Gomez was alleged to have been originally in possession of Lot No. 2872 in Kalibo, Aklan. In
1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent, bought the lot in a public auction and
declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez. Emilio declared part of Lot No. 2872 under his
name. When he died in 1969, his surviving spouse and children allegedly took continuous possession and
occupancy of the lot, for which they paid real property tax. The lot was partitioned. Respondent filed an
Application for registration of title with regard to her part. Herein petitioner filed its Opposition. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot was alienable and disposable and that the
requirements of P.D. No. 1529 had not been complied with. The CA held that the Certification made by the
Geodetic Engineer that the land was alienable and disposable was sufficient.
Issue:
Whether respondent was able to sufficiently prove that the land was alienable and disposable
Ruling:
No. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR but they are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR and it includes the CENRO which issues certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. Respondent applied for registration of a lot with an area over 50 hectares. The
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which is beyond the
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
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must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R.
VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA.
WENDELYN V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.
G. R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011, SERENO, J.
The rule regarding substantial compliance with the requirement of a CENRO or PENRO certification and
certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary applies pro hac vice.
Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land located in Los
Baos, Laguna. They alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother. The Republic filed an
opposition on the ground that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and not
subject to private appropriation. During the hearing, respondents presented several exhibits in compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation
and possession of the land including the testimony of Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the CENRO
under DENR. His report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and
disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by
any other person. The corresponding decree of registration was issued.
Issue:
Whether respondents have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable
Ruling:
Yes. To comply with the Property Registration Decree, respondents should have submitted a CENRO
certification and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary. Respondents failed
to do so. However, despite such failure, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement. First,
respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO whose testimony and written report
under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject land.
Second, the Subdivision Plan formally offered as evidence expressly indicates that the land is alienable and
disposable. Finally, the LRA never raised the issue. The absence of any effective opposition from the
government, coupled with other pieces of evidence persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents. It
must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. To establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all
applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO
or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented
on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that
there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of
effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration
currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications.
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CHARLES L. ONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it and of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Facts:
Charles Ong, in behalf of his brothers, filed an Application for Registration of Title over a lot situated
in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. They alleged that they are the co-owners and that it is their exclusive property
having acquired it by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil. The Republic of the
Philippines opposed and asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
appropriation.
Issue:
Whether the application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. The subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. However,
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The tax declaration
presented, although not conclusive but it constitutes a good indicia of possession, was issued in 1971, and this
would still fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Further, possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and
occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation, which seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot, neither he nor his brothers
actually occupied it. Petitioners predecessor-in-interest testified that he and his wife never actually occupied
the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997.
Petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, REYES, J.
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial.
Facts:
Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land situated in
Consolacion, Cebu. He alleged that the property is alienable and disposable, that he purchased it from his
mother, and together with his predecessor-in-interest, they had been in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years. He submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-000893
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to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as
evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by the Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating
that it was verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area. He also presented two tax declarations.
Petitioner opposed. The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and that the grant thereof is warranted.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Espinosas claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, not Section 14(1) because he repeatedly alleged that he acquired title through his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest of the subject property for 30 years, or through prescription. Since
Section 14(2) applies, the subject property being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As
Section 14(2) provides, only private properties may be acquired through prescription and under Articles 420
and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for
the development of national wealth, are considered private. There must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. Thus, granting that Isabel and, later,
Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of 30 years, this does not operate to
divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial.
Applying Section 14(1), albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand,
Applying Section 14(2), Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. The application for
registration is denied.
JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS,
represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, MA. WILHELMINA E. TOBIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, REYES, J.
Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth.
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC an application for land registration covering a parcel of land situated in
Indang, Cavite, alleging that they acquired the property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 25, 1996, and that they have been in possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. The RTC granted the application, but the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30
years. Appellees possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date
when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable. From said date up to the
filing of the application for registration of title over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only 18 years had
lapsed.
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Issue:
Whether the petitioners acquired ownership over the property through prescription
Ruling:
No. The petitioners application is anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they do not claim to
have possessed, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Unfortunately, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they and their predecessors-in-interest
possessed the property in the requisite manner. While there was an attempt to supplement the tax
declaration by testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and
Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration and do not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the 11
tax declarations submitted by the petitioners. Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed after only
one year from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No.
040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the
counting of the 30-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under
Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such
conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012, REYES, J.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
Facts:
Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for confirmation
of title over three parcels of land located in Indang, Cavite. Respondent claimed that they bought the
properties and it had been declared for tax purposes in its name since 2006. According to Metro Index, the
properties were alienable and disposable as evidenced by a certification from DENR, and that respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject properties for more than 50 years. One of
the witnesses of Metro Index claims that her parents were in possession since 1956. Moreover, the properties
are planted with coconut, banana, santol, palay and corn.
Issue:
Whether the respondent is entitled to the benefits of P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect titles
Ruling:
No. Respondents evidence demonstrated that its predecessors-in-interest started to possess and
occupy the properties sometime in 1956 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier, and thus, its claim is premised
on Section 14(2) of P.D. No.1529. It is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial. The indispensability of an official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its
private capacity or placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the State
cannot be overemphasized. There is no official declaration and, the respondents application should have
been dismissed outright. Moreover, the possession and occupation of the respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest was not in the manner contemplated by law. Tax declarations are mere bases for inferring
possession. They must be coupled with proof of actual possession for them to constitute "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence of a claim of ownership. The number of coconut trees is unspecified while the
number of fruit-bearing trees is too few (three santol, one avocado and one star apple). The mere planting of
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a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of
territory.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC. v. THE LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY
G.R. No. L-8451, December 20, 1957, FELIX, J.
A corporation sole, which consists of one person only, is vested with the right to purchase and hold real
estate and to register the same in trust for the faithful or members of the religious society or church for which
the corporation was organized.
Facts:
Mateo Rodis, a Filipino citizen, executed a deed of sale in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc., a corporation sole with a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed
of sale was presented to the RD for registration, the latter required said corporation to submit an affidavit
declaring that 60% of the members thereof were Filipino citizens. As the RD had some doubts as to the
registrability of the document, the matter was referred to the LRC which rendered a resolution holding that
the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines. Petitioner consistently maintained
that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to
acquire and hold real properties. Respondents averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not the
owner of the land purchased, he has control over the same.
Issue:
Whether Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. may acquire private agricultural
lands
Ruling:
Yes. The bishops or archbishops as corporation sole are merely administrators of the church
properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for the church. Through this legal fiction,
however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon
his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in office. The power of a corporation sole to purchase real
property, like the power exercised in the case at bar, is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage
sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned represented by
said corporation sole. Lands held in trust for specific purposes may be subject of registration (Section 69, Act
496), and the capacity of a corporation sole to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto
may be issued in its name. It is absurd that while the corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring
lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are
expressly authorized by law to acquire in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not register said
properties in their name. The court might safely state that even before, every corporation sole then organized
and registered had by express provision of law the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name
private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was
created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent single member and head, the bishop of the dioceses.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG AMBROSE ROASA, as
herein represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, JR. and ALVIN B. ACAYEN
G.R. No. 176022, February 2, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, what is important in computing the period of
possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration.
Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title with the RTC on December 15, 2000,
claiming ownership over the lot by reason of purchase. According to her, the property is an agricultural land
planted with corn, palay and others, and that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of
ownership since the 1930's. Also, they have declared the land for taxation purposes. The Republic opposed
the application contending that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts, did not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence and that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain. However, the Republic did
not present any evidence to support its opposition.
Issue:
Whether the application for confirmation of imperfect title should be granted
Ruling:
Yes. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property. Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to include
possession before the declaration of the lands alienability as long as at the time of the application for
registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands.
The subject lot has been declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than 18
years before respondent's application for registration, which was filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the
unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-
in-interest had been in adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even
before June 12, 1945.
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THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. NEMESIO DUMAGPI,

represented by VICENTE DUMAGPI
Adverse possession can only ripen into ownership when the land adversely owned is classified as an
agricultural land. If the disputed land is non-agricultural, adverse possession cannot ripen into ownership.
Facts:
Nemesio Dumagpi filed a complaint for quieting of title against defendants wherein he alleged that
the lot situated in Siay, Zamboanga del Sur has long been converted into his private property by operation of
law because of his manner and period of possession and occupation of such. Then, defendants allegedly
dispossessed him of a portion of the lot by force. He later learned that titles had been issued by the DAR to the
defendants. DARs witness testified that the area is a resettlement site which used to be part of a coal mine
reservation and that it was reclassified and declared as a resettlement site under Proclamation No. 2342
dated March 14, 1984 and that following DAR guidelines, the verified a list of qualified beneficiaries included
the private defendants who had been personally cultivating portions which were eventually titled to them.
The private defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the controversy involved the
implementation of the agrarian reform law, which is outside the courts jurisdiction. The RTC held that the
entire 22-hectare lot claimed by Nemesio had ipso jure attained the character of private property on account
of his continuous, open, notorious and exclusive occupation and cultivation for 30 years prior to the issuance
of the CLOAs and OCTs to the private defendants, who were mere intruders.
Issue:
Whether the 22 hectares had ipso jure attained the character of private property
Ruling:
No. The land Nemesio is claiming was not alienable public agricultural land but in truth was as a coal
mine from 1938 to 1984, a period which overlapped with his claimed acquisitive possession. Clearly, he
cannot invoke Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and assert an acquisitive title thereto by reason of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for 30 years. The CLOAs and OCTs issued over the
subject lot were pursuant to the implementation of the agrarian law under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary. Nemesio has doubtful standing to petition for quieting of title, which is clearly a collateral
attack against the CLOAs and titles the DAR Secretary issued to the private defendants. He has no title,
records, or instruments to uphold, and moreover, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 6657 as agrarian reform
beneficiary he is allowed only three hectares, not 22. Even granting that his complaint may be treated as one
for reconveyance, there is no ownership or title to reconvey to him because he never had one, not even
through acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the DAR is the real party in interest, since at issue is the validity
of its actions comprising the determination of the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries and the issuance of
CLOAs and titles to them. Since the implementation of agrarian law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary, and issues concerning the issuance of the subject titles can only be raised to the DAR
Secretary, the RTC has no jurisdiction.
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RAFAEL VALES, CECILIA VALES-VASQUEZ, and YASMIN VALES-JACINTO v. MA. LUZ CHORESCA
GALINATO, ERNESTO CHORESCA, TEOFILO AMADO, LORNA PARIAN MEDIANERO, REBECCA PORCAL,
and VIVENCIO ORDOYO
G.R. No. 180134, March 5, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum provides that tenants should (a) have actual knowledge of
unregistered transfers of ownership of lands covered by Torrens Certificate of Titles prior to October 21, 1972,
(b) have recognized the persons of the new owners, and (c) have been paying rentals/amortization to such new
owners in order to validate the transfer and bind the tenants to the same.
Facts:
Spouses Vales executed a Deed of Sale conveying five parcels of registered agricultural land located
in Cabatuan, Iloilo to their three children, herein petitioners. However, the sale as not registered and at that
time, the lands were tenanted. Months later, PD 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants. One of
the children, Rafael, executed a sworn declaration that he and his sisters are co-owners of the lands but still
the subject lands were placed under the coverage of the governments Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program as properties belonging to Spouses Vales, not to petitioners. Petitioners filed a letter-request for the
retention of the lands and also a petition to be certified as owners, however, both were not acted upon.
Meanwhile, during the period July to August 1987, petitioners entered into several Agricultural Leasehold
Contracts with nine tenants and in 1988, Emancipation Patents were issued in favor of the latter but
petitioners claim that they have no knowledge of such. Petitioners claims exemption from the OLT Program.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands are exempted from the OLT Program by virtue of the sale
Ruling:
No. Petitioners sought exemption of the subject lands from the OLT Program of the government by
claiming ownership thereof on the basis of a sale thereof by the registered owners, i.e., Spouses Vales,
executed on March 3, 1972. However, said transaction, in order to be valid, should be examined in line with
the provisions of the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum. The subject sale was not registered or even annotated
on the certificates of title covering the subject lands. More importantly, the tenants categorically belied having
actual knowledge of the said sale and still recognized Spouses Vales as the landowners. Petitioners failed to
comply with the requirements stated under the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum. The subject lands were
correctly placed under the OLT Program of the government, which thereby warranted the denial of the
petition for exemption.
SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184371, March 5, 2014, BRION, J.
Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 must
prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
Petitioners applied for the registration of a parcel of land. In support of their application, petitioners
presented among others tax declarations for the years 1948 and 1954. The Republic filed a formal opposition
to the application, which the MTC dismissed for failure to substantiate grounds for objection. The MTC
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granted the application. The Republic appealed to the CA on the ground that the MTC erred in grating the
application. The CA reversed the MTC decision stating that petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have presented sufficient evidence to show possession and cultivation
Ruling:
No. Petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The oldest documentary evidence presented by petitioners was a
1948 tax declaration over the subject land in the name of Margarita Laigo. They failed to present evidence of
their possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their application for registration, base their
possession of the subject land only from 1948, and not since June 12, 1945, or earlier as required by law.
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND ERLINDA FORTUNA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014, BRION, J.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
Facts:
Spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration, claiming that they through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the lot for
more than 50 years. The Republic opposed but was declared in default for failure to present evidence in
support of its opposition. The RTC granted the application for registration. The Republic appealed the RTC
decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses did not present an official proclamation from the government
that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA reversed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether Spouses Fortuna were able to prove that the land was alienable and disposable public land
Ruling:
No. Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties
alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification
through survey by the proper government office.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR
Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared
these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the
DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
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SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO, et al.

G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate
contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties.
Facts:
Bautista inherited a free-patent land which he subdivided and sold to several vendees. Three years
after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents anchoring his cause of action on
the CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Whether Bautista may repurchase the property he previously sold
Ruling:
Yes. Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of
sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a
period of 5 years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is
deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed
written into every contract. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES DANTE AND LOLITA BENIGNO

G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Applicants for registration of title under PD1529 must prove among others that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. In order to prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable public land, the application must include both a CENRO or PENRO
certification and a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
Facts:
Spouses Benigno filed with the RTC an Application for Registration of title. After trial the RTC granted
the application for registration. The Republic filed its notice of appeal to the CA claiming that the decision of
the RTC should be rendered null and void for lack of the required certification from the Secretary of the
DENR.
Issue:
Whether the RTC decision granting the application for registration should be null and void
Ruling:
Yes. The State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just
because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Spouses Benigno did not present
any documentary evidence to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land.
Consequently, the decision of the RTC is rendered null and void since it had no basis in fact and law to grant
respondents application for registration as there was no proof of alienability adduced.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI

G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015, PERALTA, J.
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
Facts:
Lualhati filed an application for original registration of a parcel of land over which she and her family
had been in possession in the concept of an owner since 1944. In support for her application she submitted
among others, the survey plan, the technical descriptions, real property tax register and certifications from
the DENR that no public land application covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lands covered by any
administrative title.
Issue:
Whether Lualhati was able to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
Ruling:
No. To support her contention, Lualhati submitted certifications from the DENR-CENRO stating that
no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any
administrative title. The certifications are not sufficient. The applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. The certifications presented by respondent, do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO v. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, et al.

G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014, PERALTA, J.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree covering the same land is null
and void.
Facts:
The Franciscos are the applicants for registration in the land registration case from whence the
challenged decision sprung. Guido, alleging that the original of his title could not be located in the files of the
Registry of Deeds, sought for the reconstitution of the same. Subsequently, it appeared that the application for
registration of the parcel of land overlapped a portion of the area covered by the title of Guido. The RTC
granted the application of the Franciscos due to the absence of opposition. The Rojases, successors-in-interest
of Guido, filed a petition for certiorari claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court to rule
on the application of the Franciscos.
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Issue:
Whether the Land Registration Proceeding is the appropriate proceeding in this case
Ruling:
No. Petitioners have based their claim to ownership of the subject lots on the alleged fact of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. Their application represented to the land registration court that the parcels of land subjects of
the case were unregistered and not yet brought within the coverage of the Torrens system of registration. As
the very nature of the action limits the subject matter to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
an ordinary registration proceeding cannot be availed of by petitioner in order to establish claims over lands
which had already been brought within the coverage of the Torrens system.
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200894, November 10, 2014, LEONEN, J.
An applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section
14 (1) of PD 1529 must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain, and (2) that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
Canlas applied for original registration of title of a parcel of land. The RTC granted the application.
According to the RTC, Canlas complied with the procedural requirements and substantiated her application.
She sufficiently proved that, through her predecessors-in-interest, she has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership for more than 30 years.
Issue:
Whether Canlas has proven open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
Ruling:
Yes. In land registration cases, the applicants legal basis is important in determining the required
number of years or the reference point for possession or prescription. Documentary evidence to prove
possession was presented and substantiated by the witnesses testimonies. There were sufficient pieces of
evidence to show that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest exercised specific acts of ownership such
as: farming activities; allowing the excavation of land for pulang lupa to make clay pots; paying realty taxes;
declaring the property for tax purposes; employing a care taker; causing corrections in entries in public
documents with regard to the land; and demanding unlawful occupants to vacate the premises.
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SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. TEODORO
T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, BRANCH 85
G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
The provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstruction of an existing
Torrens title are Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26.
Facts:
Petitioner applied for the judicial reconstitution of OCT with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
claiming that the original had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds. UP
opposed the petition and the Land Registration Authority recommended that the petition be dismissed. The
RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner went straight to the SC on a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition for judicial
reconstitution
Ruling:
No. The petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of the Original Certificate of Title. It
disobeyed Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases
for judicial reconstruction of an existing Torrens title. The RTC did not lack or exceed its authority in acting
on and dismissing the petition considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already
registered in the name of UP, as confirmed by the LRA. It would have been contrary to law had respondent
dealt with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE AND PERLA CASTUERA

G.R. No. 203384, January 12 2015, CARPIO, J.
An applicant for registration of title must present a certified true copy of the DENR Secretarys
declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
Facts:
Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title over the property.
The spouses presented an advance plan and a CENRO certification to support their application. The RTC
granted the application. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether the advance plan and the CENRO certification are sufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property
Ruling:
No. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property. As applicants for registration of title, the spouses must present a
certified true copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and
disposable.
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UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the registered owner, his
assigns or persons in interest in the property.
Facts:
Ungay Malobago Mines is the registered owner of a mining patent covered by the OCT. Petitioner
found that the Register of Deeds could not locate the copy of the OCT so it filed with the RTC a petition
seeking the reconstitution of the OCT. The RTC dismissed the petition ruling that since the petitioner is not
the owner of the surface land which had already been titled to Rapu Rapu Minerals it is not entitled to the
certificate of title over its mining patent.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has personality to file the petition for the reconstitution of the OCT
Ruling:
No. Petitioner admitted that it was not the owner of the land on which the mining patent was issued
as the same was owned and registered in the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals. Thus, not having an interest on the
land amounting to a title to the same, petitioner is not possessed of a legal personality to institute a petition
for judicial reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT.
IMELDA LEONARDO, FIDELINO AZUCENA, JOSEFINA, ANITA AND SISA ALL SURNAMED SYJUCO,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELISAD BONIFACIO AND VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title is direct or indirect, the relevance of the object
of the action instituted and the relief sought therein must be examined.
Facts:
The Syjucos are the registered co-owners of the subject land under TCT No. T-108530. Subsequently,
petitioner learned that a broker offered for sale the same subject land to another person which was covered
by a different TCT under the name of Bonifacio. The Syjucos filed a petition before the RTC for quieting of
title. The RTC ruled in favor of Bonifacio stating that the technical description of the two TCTs are different.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and ruled that the case filed before the RTC is a collateral attack on the
validity of Bonifacios TCT, which is in violation of Section 48 of PD1529.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners action is a collateral attack on the certificate of title of respondents
Ruling:
No. The instituted action in this case is a direct attack on a certificate of title to real property. The
attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment or enjoin its
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enforcement. The attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless is made as an incident thereof.
In their complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of nullity
and/or cancellation of respondents titles over the subject land. The relief sought by petitioners is certainly
feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title is precisely to quiet, remove, invalidate, annul and/or
nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ

Under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land. Among
the evidence to support his claim was a survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is
classified as alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the application for registration. The Republic
appealed claiming that Cortez was unable to present a certification from the government that the subject
property was alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioner presented a survey plan. A survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the property remains part of the inalienable public domain. The law provides
that an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, a legislative act or statute.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC

For purposes of land registration, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application. Applicants for registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc., filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land. The Laguna Lake Development Authority opposed asserting that the lots sought to be
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registered does not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The Republic
likewise filed its Opposition alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June
12, 1945 or earlier. The RTC granted the application of Remman Enterprises. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
As to the first requisite, Respondent presented two certifications attesting that the lots form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. These certifications do not, by themselves, prove that
the land is alienable and disposable. It is not enough for the PENRO and CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. In addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a
parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable.
As to the second and third requisites, respondent presented the testimony of the caretaker of the
property that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed and cultivated the same since 1943. Other
than the testimony, the respondent failed to present other evidence to prove the character of the possession
and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZURBARAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP

G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish that: (a) the land
is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title,
or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or
declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of
possession.
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for original
registration covering a parcel of land. Respondent alleged that it bought the property, where the previous
owner had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an
owner. The Republic opposed the application alleging that the respondents had not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land and that the land was a portion of the public
domain. The RTC granted the application and the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the application for original registration should be granted
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Ruling:
No. There is no evidence that showing that the land in question was within an area expressly
declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable and disposable, remains property of the public dominion, and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
EDUARDO LUCENA AND NATIVIDAD PARALES v. COURT OF APPEALS AND RURAL BANK OF NAUJAN,
INC., ROGELIO PINEDA, MARIANITO BAJA, PATRICIA ARAJA, BRAULIO BAGUS, REYNALDO MAMBIL
AND RAMON GARCIA
G.R. No. L-77468, August 25, 1999, QUISUMBING, J.
Subsequent registration by a purchaser in bad faith does not bar an action for reconveyance. An action
for reconveyance is available so long as the land has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Facts:
On May 7, 1974, a land previously registered under the names of Eduardo Lucena and Natividad
Parales was foreclosed, and was awarded to the Rural Bank of Naujan. The Certificate of Sale thereof was
registered only on January 9, 1975. After consolidation of ownership, the Bank sold the land to spouses Baja
on July 14, 1975. Consequently, a certificate of title was issued in favour of the spouses. After two years,
Lucena and Parales filed a complaint for reconveyance. The lower court ruled that the foreclosure sale was
void and that the Bank did not acquire valid title to the property in question.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent registration by spouses Baja is valid
Ruling:
No. The spouses Baja were purchasers in bad faith. When they verified the title of the subject
property, they must have noticed that the certificate of sale was registered only on January 9, 1975, so that
they are presumed to know that the Lucena and Parales had at least one year from that date or up to January
8, 1976 to redeem the subject property. This fact would have put a reasonable man on his guard. The spouses
cannot claim that they acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the bank. Not
being innocent purchasers for value, the spouses Baja did not acquire a complete legal and valid right over
the subject property. The subsequent registration of the land in their favor can be disregarded. Corollarily
thereto, Lucena and Parales availed the proper remedy of action for reconveyance. An action for
reconveyance is still available if the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. It is a
condition sine qua non for an action for reconveyance to prosper that the property should not have passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
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HEIRS OF MARIANO, JUAN, TARCELA AND JOSEFA, ALL SURNAMED BRUSAS v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
HEIRS OF SPOUSES INES BRUSAS AND CLETO REBOSA
G.R. No. 126875, August 26, 1999, BELLOSILLO, J.
An action for reconveyance is available to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name.
Facts:
Ines Brusas was awarded a free patent and was given a certificate of title covering a parcel of land.
When her siblings supposedly discovered this, the controversy arose. They asserted that their father was the
owner of the subject land which was later on partitioned between them. On the other hand, Ines insisted that
she is the absolute owner. She then filed a complaint for recovery of six hectares of land alleging that her
brothers and sisters forcibly entered and deprived her of that portion of the property. The Brusas siblings
countered by instituting in the same court an action for reconveyance imputing fraud, misrepresentation and
bad faith to Ines Brusas in using a forged affidavit to obtain title.
Issue:
Whether an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy in case the land is fraudulently registered
in anothers name
Ruling:
Yes. When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of the true owner, he is considered guilty of fraud. The landowner then can avail of
the remedy of reconveyance. However, an action for reconveyance presupposes the existence of a defrauded
party who is the lawful owner of the disputed property. Petitioners must prove by clear and convincing
evidence their title to the property, and the fact of fraud committed by the registered owner in registering the
property in her name, but they failed to do so.
What militates heavily against petitioners is the Affidavit executed by them, whereby they
relinquished, ceded and transferred to Brusas their rights and interests over the controversial property, and
recognized her as the absolute owner thereof. It was on the basis of this affidavit of waiver that Brusas stated
in her application for free patent that she was the sole claimant of the subject property. Certainly this is not
fraud.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
BITANGA, FERNANDO BITANGA, GREGORIO BITANGA, GUILLERMO BITANGA, CLARITA BITANGA
together with her husband AGRIPINO L. RABAGO and MELITONA LAGPACAN, assisted by her husband
JORGE MALACAS
G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, GUERRERO, J.
A lien by reason or on account of the mortgage executed by the registered owner over the property,
which was not annotated on the original certificate of title, could not have attached to the land.
Facts:
The subject lot was registered under the name of Spouses Bitanga. When the husband died, the wife
mortgaged the entire property in favour of Philippine National Bank. The mortgage document was registered
in the Register of Deeds; however, this mortgage lien was not annotated on the original certificate of title.
Meanwhile, Manila Trading Company levied upon the wifes share on the property in the fulfillment of her
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obligation with MTC. The said share was sold to MTC; and the deed of sale was annotated on the title. The
MTC then sold the lot to Sambrano, who secured the annotation of the said sale on the title. When the wife
failed to settle her obligation with PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was awarded to it. After
the period of redemption had expired without the property having been redeemed, PNB consolidated its title
over it. The document of consolidation was, however, not annotated upon the owner's duplicate certificate of
title as the wife failed to surrender the same. Later, PNB was able to secure a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title in its name and to cancel the owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of the spouses.
Afterwards, it sold the lot to Reyes; as a result of which, a new owner's duplicate certificate of title was issued
in the latter's name.
Issue:
Whether the earlier mortgage not annotated on the title prevails over the annotated sale.
Ruling:
No. The failure of the interested party to appear during the registration proceeding and claim such
interest in the land barred him from having such interest annotated on the certificate of title. A bona fide
purchaser for value of a property at an auction sale acquires good title as against a prior transferee of the
same property if such transfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction sale. A person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title.
CONRADO POTENCIANO (DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY LUIS, MILAGROS, VICTOR, AND LOURDES, ALL
SURNAMED POTENCIANO v. NAPOLEON DINEROS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL
G.R. No. L-7614, May 31, 1955, REYES, J.
A judgment creditor may not, as purchaser at the auction sale, invoke the protection accorded by law to
purchasers in good faith, if at the time of the auction he already had notice, thru the third party claim filed by the
registered owner, that the property had already been acquired by the latter from the judgment debtor.
Facts:
Conrado Potenciano bought the subject property from one Gregorio Alcabao. When he registered the
sale, the clerk who made the entry committed an error in copying the number of the certificate of title. In the
entry, it is numbered at TCT No. 28438, while the true number of the title is 18438. Afterwards, Manila was
bombed, the papers presented by Potenciano were either lost or destroyed. Up to this time, no certificate of
title has been issued to him. Later, Napoleon Dineros sued Alcabao and judgment was rendered in his favour.
As a result, the property in question was attached, it appearing that the property was still in the name of
Alcabao. When the attachment was levied on the property, Potenciano filed his third party claim thereto. The
property was sold to Dineros at a public auction. The sale was annotated in the certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether Dineros is a purchaser in good faith
Ruling:
No. A purchaser of real property at an execution sale acquires only such right or interest as the
judgment debtor had on the property at the time of the sale. It follows that if at that time the judgment debtor
had no more right to or interest in the property because he had already sold it to another, then the purchaser
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acquires nothing. Such appears to be the case here, because years before the execution sale and even before
the attachment the judgment debtor had already deeded the property and delivered his certificate of title to
another, who on the following day presented the deed and certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. In other
words, it was registered. This act of registration operated to convey the property to the buyer.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. v. HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL AND VICTORIA V.
MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA AND LEONORA P. TUGADE, HEIRS OF ETANG P.
GATMIN (LUDIVINA G. DELA CRUZ (BY AND THROUGH ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ), HILARIA G. COBERO
AND ALFREDO G. COBERO) AND SIONY G. TEPOL (BY AND THROUGH ELENA T. RIVAS AND ELESIO
TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA
G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009, TINGA, J.
The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person
from whom he had purchased the property.
Facts:
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 was registered under the name of Pablo Pascua. When
Pascua died intestate, one of his four children, Cipriano executed a document denominated as "Extrajudicial
Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales," wherein he declared himself as the only heir of Pablo
and confirmed the sales made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed
property to spouses Rodolfo. As a result thereof, TCT No. T-8241 was issued in the name of Cipriano without
OCT No. 404 having been cancelled. On the same day, TCT No. T-8242 was issued in the name of the spouses
Rodolfo and TCT No. T-8241 was thereby cancelled. Subsequently, the spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed
property to Guaranteed Homes, Inc. Consequently TCT No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT No. T-10863 was
issued in the name of GHI.
Issue:
Whether the purchaser is bound by original certificate of title.
Ruling:
No. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto. It is enough that GHI had examined the latest certificate of title which in this case was
issued in the name of the immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. A person dealing with registered
property need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. The act of
registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned.
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a nullity, the Court still has to uphold
the title of petitioner. Where the certificate of title was already transferred to an innocent purchaser, such a
fraudulent document becomes the root of a valid title. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate.
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CARMELITA FUDOT v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC.

G.R. No. 171008, September 13, 2007, TINGA, J.
The act of registration does not validate an otherwise void contract.
Facts:
Cattleya Land, Inc. purchased the subject property from spouses Tecson in 1992, but the same was
not annotated on the certificate of title. In 1995, Carmelita Fudot presented for registration the owner's copy
of the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in
1986. Cattleya opposed Fudots application. Much to its surprise, Cattleya learned that the Register of Deeds
had already registered the deed of sale in favor of Fudot and issued a new title in her name. Consequently, it
filed a complaint for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery of Ownership, alleging therein that the signature of the
Tecsons on the deed of sale was forged.
Issue:
Whether an alleged buyer who is the holder of and the first one to present the owner's copy of the
title for the issuance of a new TCT has a better right over the property
Ruling:
No. The deed of sale having been forged, it is void. Fudots act of registration does not validate the
void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be
inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of
title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. While it operates as a notice of the deed,
contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor convert an invalid instrument into a valid
one as between the parties, nor amount to a declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and
subsisting interest in the land. The registration of Fudot's void deed is not an impediment to a declaration by
the courts of its invalidity.
SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI v. LILIA V. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.
A purchaser in good faith buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same.
Facts:
Lilia Domingo was the owner of the lot in dispute. However, one Radelia Sy, representing herself as
the owner of the property, filed a petition for reissuance of a new owners copy and, as proof, presented a
deed of sale purportedly executed by Domingo, and an affidavit of loss stating that her bag containing the
owners copy of certificate of title had been snatched from her. The RTC granted the petition. Subsequently, Sy
immediately subdivided the property and sold each half to Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi. Resultantly,
transfer certificates of title were issued to the buyer spouses, annotated thereon was the consideration of
only one million each but the entire lot had an actual value of not less than 14 million. Two years thereafter,
Domingo learned about the situation. Consequently, she filed a petition for annulment of titles of Sy, Spouses
De Vera and Spouses Cusi. The RTC granted the same, however, the title of Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi
remain valid as they were held purchasers in good faith.
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Issue:
Whether Spouses Cusi are purchasers in good faith
Ruling:
No. A purchaser who is aware of the material undervaluation of the purchase price of the subject
property may not be considered a purchaser in good faith as such fact would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make an inquiry in dealing with the property. As the purchasers of the property, they also came under the
clear obligation to purchase the property not only in good faith but also for value.
It was not enough for the spouses to show that the property was unfenced and vacant, nor was it safe
for them to rely on the face of Sys TCT because they were aware that it was derived only from a duplicate
owners copy reissued by virtue of the loss of the original duplicate owners copy. That circumstance should
have already alerted them to the need to inquire beyond the face of the Sys TCT. Other circumstances that the
spouses were also aware of that should further put them on guard were particularly the several nearly
simultaneous transactions respecting the property, and the undervaluation of the purchase price.
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, TINGA, J.
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public domain begin to run.
Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land, claiming he had
purchased it from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Among the evidence
presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by CENRO-DENR stating that the subject
property was an Alienable or Disposable land. Accordingly, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic appealed arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain that is subject to acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
Whether a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
Ruling:
No. The classification of a property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion. Public domain lands become patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, there must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth. Absent any classification and government manifestation, the property is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable, there is no
competent evidence that it is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
wealth. It is not susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
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HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243, December 03, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of private persons or entities.
Facts:
PICOP was granted a Timber License Agreement covering forest lands. The license was valid for 25
years and renewable for another 25 years. Upon request of PICOP, President Marcos signed a 1969 Document
purportedly a Presidential Warranty which PICOP claimed as a contract which guarantees perpetual renewal
of its license. Now, PICOP filed an application with the DENR to convert its Timber License Agreement to an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) which effectively extends PICOPs license beyond the 50-
year maximum term in violation Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether granting the IFMA is constitutional
Ruling:
No. Converting the TLA into IFMA would in effect grant PICOP perpetual license and continuous and
uninterrupted possession of its concession areas. Granting to private entities, via a contract, a permanent,
irrevocable, and exclusive possession of and right over forest lands is tantamount to granting ownership
thereof. As aptly provided by the Constitution, all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, NAMELY: DOMINGA C. FABIO, SOCORRO D.
FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO, ROLANDO D. FABIO, NORMA D. FABIO, NORMA L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO,
ROSALIE FABIO, DANILO FABIO, RENATO FABIO, LEVITA FABIO, IRENE FABIO, TERESITA MOLERA,
ROSEMARIE C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C. MASANGKAY, ALFREDO F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO,
MERCEDITA F. CASTILLO, ESTELA DE JESUS AQUINO, FELECITO FABIO, AND ALEXANDER FABIO,
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ANGELITA F. ESTEIBAR AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008, CARPIO, J.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Facts:
The heirs of Juan Fabio filed an application for registration of title to a Lot which they claim to have
been in the possession of their predecessors-in-interest for more than 100 years. One of the documents they
presented as evidence is an approved survey plan which contained a notation that reads "this survey falls
within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation xxx." Conversely, the Republic of the Philippines opposed the
application, claiming that the Lot sought to be registered falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
as placed under the exclusive use of the military through three presidential proclamations. The heirs, on the
other hand, maintain that they have acquired a vested right over the Lot by acquisitive prescription.
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Issue:
Whether a lot under military reservation may be acquired through acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
No. Being a military reservation, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of,
cannot be subject to occupation, entry or settlement. Public lands not shown to have been classified as
alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient
evidence showing that it was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by
respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration.
MANUEL ALMAGRO JOINED BY HIS SPOUSE, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO v. SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C.
KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JOSE A. ARBAS, AND CECILIA C. KWAN
G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810, October 20, 2010, CARPIO, J.
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks
and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
Facts:
The heirs of spouses Kwan filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and damages
against spouses Duran among others. However, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
remaining dry portion the subject lot has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public
domain. It explained that a big portion of the said lot is presently underwater or submerged under the sea.
When the sea moves towards the estate and the tide invades it, the invaded property becomes foreshore land
and passes to the realm of public domain. The subject land, being foreshore land, should therefore be
returned to the public domain. On appeal to the RTC, the court observed that the small portion of the subject
lot actually remained dry even during high tide. Thus, the small dry portion of the land is not within the scope
of the well-settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land as it is not adjacent to the sea and it is not
alternately wet and dry by the ordinary flow of the tides as it is dry land.
Issue:
Whether the disputed portion of the subject has become foreshore land
Ruling:
No. The small dry portion of the subject lot is not foreshore because "it is already dry land" and is
"away from the shoreline." The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a
foreshore land. The disputed land remained dry even during high tide. It is not foreshore land and remains
private land.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, REYES, J.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. This
presumption is not controverted by a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed
is alienable and disposable because a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
Facts:
Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration. In support of his application, Espinosa
submitted the blueprint of an Advanced Survey Plan to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the
property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made
by a geodetic engineer. The Republic of the Philippines opposed Espinosas application claiming that Espinosa
failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable.
Issue:
Whether the notation sufficed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable
Ruling:
No. A surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. The notation made by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the positive
government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither is it the evidence
accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that all lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250, July 09, 2002, CARPIO, J.
Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain and are inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service.
Facts:
PEA entered into a joint venture agreement with AMARI Corporation to develop the Freedom Islands.
Under the JVA, PEA would later transfer to AMARI the reclaimed lands and foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay. Now, Frank Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus assailing the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable
Ruling:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State.
As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless reclaimed. However, the mere
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reclamation of these areas does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public
or quasi-public use.
Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY

(PRA) v. CITY OF PARAAQUE
G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012, MENDOZA, J.
Reclaimed lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain, owned by the State and,
therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
Facts:
The Philippine Reclamation Authority reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay, including those located in Paraaque City. In 2003, Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato Carabeo
issued Warrants of Levy on PRAs reclaimed properties based on an assessment for delinquent real property
taxes. In turn, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with a request not to proceed with the public auction of the
subject reclaimed properties. However, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRAs petition and ruled
that PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, it being a GOCC.
Issue:
Whether reclaimed lands are part of the public domain and, hence, exempt from real property tax
Ruling:
Yes. The subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. Reclaimed lands are reserved lands for public use, and are properties of public dominion. The
ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential
proclamation from public use. Properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
The assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands are without basis.
Furthermore, foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further declared no longer
needed for public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the PRA and
issued land patents or certificates of title in PRAs name did not automatically make such lands private.
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DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, NAMELY: ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON
AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO v. SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO
MARRIED TO ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO MARRIED TO FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M.
MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD MARRIED TO EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, AND ERLINDA
VELASQUEZ MARRIED TO HERMINIO VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J
Possession remains continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood.
Facts:
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land. Lot 1 was originally declared in the name of
Jose Gabriel under a Tax Declaration, while Lot 2 was originally declared in the name of Agueda
Dinguinbayan. Now, the heirs of Tanyag claim that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel as declared by her in an
Affidavit of Sale whereby she sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit who in turn sold the same in
1964 to Bienvenido Tanyag, the father of petitioners. As to Lot 2, petitioners claim that it was sold to Araceli
Tanyag in 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of both properties. They claimed to have
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana
Quinones. Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured a Tax Declaration in his name over
Lot 1 and included a portion of Lot 2. Consequently, in 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that
respondents never occupied the whole area of the lot neither were they able to set foot on the property for
the reason that those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the
petitioners for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title. They further contended that the issuance of
OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was
null and void from the beginning. On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of
action against them for they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a
Torrens title in respondents name
Issue:
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
Ruling:
Yes. From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have
been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the
property for the period and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be
defeated by respondents acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a
Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998. The act of obtaining an original certificate of title does not
effectively interrupt possession for purposes of prescription.
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JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO ILOILO ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, REYES, J.
Tax declarations are not by themselves competent evidence of acquisitive prescription; they must be
supported by competent evidence of acts of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.
Facts:
Tan and Co. (hereafter registrants) filed an application for land registration over a parcel of land
allegedly purchased from Gatdula, alleging that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the property as owner for more than 30 years.
They rely on the following: (1) testimony of their attorney-in-fact on the length of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest, (2) testimony of a caretaker who witnessed the sale and attested to the length of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest, (3) testimony of a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land
Registration Authority finding no issue with the registration, (4) tax declarations dating from 1961 under the
names of their predecessors-in-interest, (5) a single tax declaration dated 2003 under the registrants, (6) a
Sangunniang Bayan resolution dated 1998 reclassifying several lots, including the property, from agricultural
to residential/commercial, (7) a DARCO Conversion order dated 2000 also converting the same to
residential/commercial, and (8) a certification by the DENR dated 2002 stating that the area falls within the
alienable and disposable land of the town.
Issue(s):
1. Whether there was an express declaration by the State on the character of the land
2. Whether the tax declarations and testimonies were competent evidence of acquisitive prescription
Ruling:
1. Yes. Of the evidence presented, this express declaration is the DARCO Conversion order dated
2000. However, this means that the period of acquisitive prescription tolls only from 2000.
2. No. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
elements of acquisitive possession using competent evidence. Tax declarations per se do not qualify as such
competent evidence, particularly if the payment of taxes is episodic, irregular and random.
The tax declarations presented in this case were precisely of the kind, with only 11 tax payments out
of the 40 years that the registrants rely upon for their period of possession. Furthermore, the testimonial
evidence presented only mentioned conclusions of law-- they merely said that there was possession for over
30 years, without stating any specific acts of ownership or dominion performed during that period.
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PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all
surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDREA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA
and MANUEL YUSAY
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, PERALTA, J.
Mere declarations are at best conclusions of law, and not facts that are required in order to prove
ownership.
Facts:
The Valiaoas and Grandea filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land in
Negros Occidental. Their claim to registration is rooted in their predecessor-in-interest, an uncle who
purchased the land in 1916, and later sold to them in 1947 upon the death of the said uncle. It was in 1966
when one of the oppositors, Zafra, dispossessed them of their property, even leading them to file complaints
of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft. In further support of their claim is a Tax Declaration dated 1976 under
their collective title as heirs of their uncle.
Multiple private parties, later joined by the Republic through the OSG, opposed the application,
arguing that the land is not alienable and disposable, that there was res judicata given a prior case (which
ruled that the lot is of the public domain), and that their application is unsupported by competent evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented is competent to support registration of property.
Ruling:
No. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of public
dominion is on the registrant or claimant, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. He must also prove that he performed specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.
There was no evidence to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Although an adverse prior judgment declared the land as part of a
communal forest, the land may subsequently be reclassified. No such evidence was presented.
Even if the registrants showed that the land was now alienable and disposable land, they also failed
to present specific proof of acts of ownership and dominion over the land. They presented testimonial
evidence as to prior ownership, but as these were not substantiated by any documents, they were mostly
conjectural and self-serving. The tax declaration was only a single one dated 1976-- it cannot prove
possession from before that year, and at any rate, they are mere indicia of a claim of ownership, and are not
necessarily proof of ownership.
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2016
CANCELLATION OF TITLE
ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT v. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT

G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Sec. 108 of PD 1529 is applicable if the correction in the certificate of title involves only clerical errors,
alterations or amendments. Registering for a certificate of title is distinct from having title to property.
Facts:
In 1965, Adriano Tambuyat married Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat. In 1991, Adriano acquired the
property. However, the TCT covering the property listed the name of the owner as "Adriano Tambuyat
married to Rosario Banguis." Rosario Banguis, however, was actually married to Eduardo Nolasco since 1975,
and their marriage was never annulled.
Adriano died in 1998. A year later, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the TCT with the
RTC. Her ground for cancellation was the erroneous registration of the property under the name of Adriano
married to Rosario, given that Wenifreda was the spouse.
Rosario claimed that the property was actually purchased with her personal funds, and that she was
married to Adriano in 1988, years before the land was purchased. She also argued that the case was
mischaracterized as a summary proceeding, as it was not a mere correction of entry-- there had to be a
determination of whether the property is exclusive or conjugal, and that she and Adriano had a child whose
rights will be adversely affected by the judgment.
Issue:
Whether the case is a summary proceeding under the Land Registration Act
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 108 of PD 1529 allows for a summary proceeding for clerical errors in a certificate of title
(erasures, alterations, or amendments) in seven instances, of which two are present in this case: (3) errors,
omissions or mistakes in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or a duplicate certificate, and (7)
reasonable grounds for amendment or alteration of title.
Rosario's opposition is grounded on her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of her and
Adriano's son (that is, a need for partition), which may have necessitated a full-blown trial, but such is
unnecessary as it is impossible for Rosario to have been the owner of the property, and that the hereditary
rights are irrelevant for Wenifreda's petition. However, there are no issues that would prevent an application
of Sec. 108 of PD 1529.
First, Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. The marriage with Wenifreda subsisted when
Adriano entered into a supposed relationship with Rosario. When the New Civil Code talks of spouses, it
refers to a lawfully wedded spouse-- here, the TCT should refer to Wenifreda.
Second, the deed of sale also shows that the purchaser was Adriano alone, or at the very least, the
property was not solely that of Rosario's. Rosario's statements defeat her claim: (1) she acknowledged that
Adriano is a co-owner, making it unlikely that the property was exclusive to her, (2) she did not sign as the
sole purchaser, just a witness, and (3) she never signed as a co-vendee-- the only real signature was
Adriano's.
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2016
Third, it is unnecessary to deal with partition since a certificate of title refers to registration, and is
considered evidence of ownership. Registration is not the equivalent of title.
Withal, the sole error is clerical, and can be resolved as a summary proceeding.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER,
represented by their ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO v. EMILIANA,
VICTORIANA, FELIPE, MATEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, AND EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL
G.R. No. 182908, August 6, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff does not have the
property in his possession; if he does, it is imprescriptible.
Facts:
Basilia Imbornal owned the Sabangan property which she conveyed to her three daughters Balbina,
Alejandra and Catalina sometime in 1920.
Ciriaco Abrio, Catalina's husband, applied for and was granted a homestead patent over the
Motherland property. He was eventually awarded a Homestead Patent and in 1933, an OCT. This was later
cancelled in 1973 in favor of his heirs. He and his heirs occupied the northern portion of this land, while the
southern was accompanied by Emiliana Imbornal and the other respondent parties.
An accretion took place in 1949, which adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. In 1952, an
OCT was issued in favor of a member of the respondent parties. Another accretion took place in 1971, which
abutted the southern portion of the 1949 accretion. In 1978, an OCT was issued in favor of the respondent
parties.
In 1984, Francisco, a child of Balbina, filed a complaint for reconveyance, partition and damages
against the respondent parties, claiming that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife, Catalina, urged the other
original Imbornal siblings to sell the Sabangan property and use the funds to fund the homestead patent
application over the Motherland. Due to this, he claims ownership of the Motherland and both accretions
(because the accretions could not possibly pertain to the respondents as they were not the riparian owners)
on the ground that Ciriaco and his heirs held the land in trust for the original Imbornal sisters. Among the
defenses of the respondent parties is prescription.
Issue:
Whether Francisco's claim is barred by prescription
Ruling:
Yes, as to the Motherland and first accretion. The claim here was that there was an implied trust due
to the use of the proceeds of the sale of the Sabangan property in order to fund Ciriaco's Motherland patent.
Francisco was never in possession of the properties, so the ten year period applies. With respect to the
Motherland, the OCT was issued in 1933; for the first accretion, in 1952, and for the second accretion, in
1978. The complaint was filed in 1984, more than 10 years after the reckoning point for the Motherland and
first accretion. Hence, as to the Motherland and first accretion, the action had already prescribed, but not as to
the second accretion (of 1978).
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2016
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO v. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS

G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.
In an action for reconveyance, the property must be identified by a description of its location, area and
boundaries, often through a survey plan. The lack of such a plan is fatal to the plaintiffs cause of action.
Facts:
Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR Baguio two Townsite Sales Applications, V-A and V-B. When he
died in 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs. In 1979, one of his heirs, Solito, executed a Deed
of Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by V-B to the spouses De
Jesus, who would later construct a house on the property. In 1986, Solito went missing.
In 1996, the DENR issued an order of rejection and transfer of sales rights, with V-B's application
ordered dropped from the records, while V-A may continue. An OCT was issued in favor of the heirs of
Telesforo as to the property in V-A.
In 1999, the petitioner heirs of Telesforo filed a complaint for recovery of posssession of real
property, claiming that the house of the De Jesus spouses (supposedly within V-B) encroached into their
property. Among the defenses of the spouses is that V-A and V-B pertain to the same property, of which they
are the true and lawful owners and possessors.
Issue:
Whether the subject property was properly identified, giving the heirs a cause of action
Ruling:
No. Art. 434 NCC states that in an action to recover, the property must be identified. By this, the
plaintiff must describe the location, area and boundaries of the property, normally in a survey plan. The
petitioner heirs, not having presented any evidence to describe their property, have no subject matter that
can be the basis of an action for reconveyance.
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LAND TITLES AND

TORRENS SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 2

REGALIAN DOCTRINE ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5

CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT ............................................................................................................................................................... 33

SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION ............................................................................................................................................................. 53

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES ...................................................................................................................................................... 58

DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND ....................................................................................................................................... 63

CANCELLATION OF TITLE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 66

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE ............................................................................................................................................................. 67

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

MANUELA GREY Y ALBA, et al. v. ANACLETO R. DELA CRUZ

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO v. N.M. SALEEBY

STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CITY OF PASIG

Whether the respondents application for registration should be granted

VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether the application for land registration should be granted

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Whether ESRDC has acquired the land through prescription

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY v. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA YBANEZ

Whether a free patent may be issued over private land

DOLORES CAMPOS v. DOMINADOR ORTEGA, SR., AND JAMES SILOS

Whether the TCT can be subject to collateral attack

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANKLIN M. MILLADO

Whether lack of actual notice rendered the reconstitution proceedings void

NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG v. ROSARIO CALALANG- GARCIA ET AL.

SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON/HEIRS OF

Whether the title issued in the names of the Andals is valid

Whether petitioner was a purchaser in good faith

Whether respondents are innocent purchasers for value

Whether Rotairo is a buyer and builder in good faith

SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO,

Whether respondents cause of action is barred by laches

Whether PNB is an innocent mortgagee for value and in good faith

Whether the property should be reinstated in favor of Revilla spouses

FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, et al. v. EDNA C. SEE

Whether See is a buyer in good faith and for value

Whether the evidence is sufficient to merit reconstitution

SPOUSES CARLOS J. SUNTAY AND ROSARIO R. SUNTAY v. KEYSER MERCANTILE, INC.

Whether the action to quiet title by Syjuco, et al. has prescribed

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether UMM may file a petition to reconstitute the OCT

MARIFLOR HORTIZUELA v. GREGORIA TAGUFA, et al.

Whether an action for recovery of possession constitutes a collateral attack

Whether the title of the respondents is indefeasible

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CORAZON SESE and FE SESE

Whether the subject land is alienable

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCA SANTOS, et al.

Whether the subject lands are alienable

KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC. v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Whether the subject lands agricultural lands

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO RANESES

CARMEN T. GAHOL v. ESPERANZA COBARRUBIAS

Whether Gahol is qualified to own the disputed property

DANILO ALMERO, et al. v. HEIRS OF MIGUEL PACQUING

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE and PERLA CASTUERA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL CORTEZ

Whether Cortezs application for registration should be granted

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

Whether Remmans application for registration should be granted